



# Certification Report

**BSI-DSZ-CC-0391-2009**

for

**MICARDO V3.4 R1.0 eHC V1.0**

from

**Sagem Orga GmbH**

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# Deutsches IT-Sicherheitszertifikat

erteilt vom



Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik

## BSI-DSZ-CC-0391-2009

Smartcard with eHC application based on MICARDO V3.4 R1.0  
Operation System Platform:

### MICARDO V3.4 R1.0 eHC V1.0

from Sagem Orga GmbH

PP Conformance: Common Criteria Protection Profile electronic Health  
Card (eHC) – elektronische Gesundheitskarte (eGK),  
Version 2.60, 29 July 2008, BSI-PP-0020-V2-2007-  
MA-02

Functionality: PP conformant  
Common Criteria Part 2 extended

Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant  
EAL 4 augmented by  
ADV\_IMP.2, ATE\_DPT.2, AVA\_MSU.3 and  
AVA\_VLA.4



Common Criteria  
Recognition  
Arrangement  
for components up to  
EAL 4



The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an accredited and licensed / approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.3 extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 4 and guidance specific for the technology of the product for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 2.3 (ISO/IEC 15408:2005).

This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.

The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.

This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.

Bonn, 11 May 2009

For the Federal Office for Information Security



SOGIS - MRA

Bernd Kowalski L.S.  
Head of Department

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## Preliminary Remarks

Under the BSIG<sup>1</sup> Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of issuing certificates for information technology products.

Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor, hereinafter called the sponsor.

A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.

The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by BSI itself.

The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed Certification Results.

The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and instructions for the user.

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<sup>1</sup> Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of 17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834

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## A Certification

### 1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure

The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the following:

- BSIG<sup>2</sup>
- BSI Certification Ordinance<sup>3</sup>
- BSI Schedule of Costs<sup>4</sup>
- Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the Interior)
- DIN EN 45011 standard
- BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125) [3]
- Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 2.3 (ISO/IEC 15408:2005)<sup>5</sup> [1]
- Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.3 [2]
- BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
- Advice from the Certification Body on methodology for assurance components above EAL4 (AIS 34)

### 2 Recognition Agreements

In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or CC - under certain conditions was agreed.

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<sup>2</sup> Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of 17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834

<sup>3</sup> Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 07 July 1992, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230

<sup>4</sup> Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519

<sup>5</sup> Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 10 May 2006 in the Bundesanzeiger dated 19 May 2006, p. 3730

## 2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC - Certificates

The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (MRA) for certificates based on ITSEC became initially effective in March 1998.

This agreement on the mutual recognition of IT security certificates was extended in April 1999 to include certificates based on the Common Criteria for the Evaluation Assurance Levels (EAL 1 – EAL 7). This agreement was signed by the national bodies of Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. The German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) recognises certificates issued by the national certification bodies of France and United Kingdom, and from The Netherlands since January 2009 within the terms of this agreement.

The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the terms of this agreement.

## 2.2 International Recognition of CC - Certificates

An arrangement (Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC Evaluation Assurance Levels up to and including EAL 4 has been signed in May 2000 (CCRA). It includes also the recognition of Protection Profiles based on the CC.

As of January 2009 the arrangement has been signed by the national bodies of: Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States of America. The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on the web site: <http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org>

The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement.

This evaluation contains the components ADV\_IMP.2, ATE\_DPT.2, AVA\_MSU.3 and AVA\_VLA.4 that are not mutually recognised in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA. For mutual recognition the EAL4 components of these assurance families are relevant.

## 3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification

The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.

The product MICARDO V3.4 R1.0 eHC V1.0 has undergone the certification procedure at BSI.

The evaluation of the product MICARDO V3.4 R1.0 eHC V1.0 was conducted by SRC Security Research & consulting GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 16 April 2009. The SRC Security Research & Consulting GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)<sup>6</sup> recognised by the certification body of BSI.

For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: Sagem Orga GmbH

The product was developed by: Sagem Orga GmbH

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<sup>6</sup> Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility



The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.

## 4 Validity of the certification result

This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product as indicated. The confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that

- all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the following report, are observed,
- the product is operated in the environment described, where specified in the following report and in the Security Target.

For the meaning of the assurance levels and the confirmed strength of functions, please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at the end of the Certification Report.

The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target at the date of certification. As attack methods may evolve over time, the resistance of the certified version of the product against new attack methods can be re-assessed if required and the sponsor applies for the certified product being monitored within the assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme. It is recommended to perform a re-assessment on a regular basis.

In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e. re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.

## 5 Publication

The product MICARDO V3.4 R1.0 eHC V1.0 has been included in the BSI list of the certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet: <http://www.bsi.bund.de>) and [5]. Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.

Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer<sup>7</sup> of the product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet address stated above.

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## **B Certification Results**

The following results represent a summary of

- the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
- the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
- complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.

# 1 Executive Summary

The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is a Smartcard Integrated Circuit (IC with contacts) with Smartcard Embedded Software, consisting of the MICARDO V3.4 Operating System platform and the dedicated electronic Health Card Application (eHC Application) as intended to be used for the German Health Care System.

The TOEs eHC Application is based on the MICARDO V3.4 Operating System platform.

In particular, the TOE's platform and its technical functionality and inherently integrated security features are designed and developed under consideration of the specifications, standards and requirements as stated in the Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 1.2.

The TOE is intended to be used as electronic Health Card (eHC) within the German Health Care System.

The TOE comprises the following components:

- Integrated Circuit (IC) with Crypto Library "NXP SmartMX P5CC144V0B Secure Smartcard Controller with Cryptographic Library as IC Dedicated Support Software" provided by NXP Semiconductors GmbH.
- Smartcard Embedded Software comprising the MICARDO V3.4 Operating System platform (designed as native implementation) and the dedicated eHC Application for the German Health Care System provided by Sagem Orga GmbH.

The configuration of the TOE as eHC will be done by Sagem Orga GmbH prior to the delivery of the product. In any case, the TOE contains the dedicated eHC Application.

The TOE contains at its delivery unalterable identification information on the delivered configuration. Furthermore, the TOE provides authenticity information which allows for an authenticity proof of the product.

For the delivery of the TOE two different ways are established:

- The TOE is delivered to the customer in form of a complete initialised smartcard. In this case, the initialisation of the modules resp. smartcards will be performed by Sagem Orga GmbH prior to the delivery of the TOE to the customer. In the case of the delivery of modules, the last part of the smartcard finishing process, i.e. the embedding of the delivered modules and final (card) tests, is the task of the customer.
- Alternatively, the TOE is delivered to the customer in the form of an not-initialised module or smartcard. In this case, the delivery of the modules resp. smartcards will be combined with the delivery of the customer specific initialisation file (in particular containing the evaluated eHC Application) developed by Sagem Orga GmbH. The initialisation file is sent to the Initialiser by a secured transfer way for loading the EEPROM initialisation data into the TOE during its initialisation phase whereat the production requirements defined in the Guidance for the Initialiser (as well delivered by Sagem Orga GmbH) have to be considered. In the case of the delivery of modules, the last part of the smartcard finishing process, i.e. the embedding of the delivered modules and final (card) tests, is the task of the customer.

The Security Target [6] and [9] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified Protection Profile Common Criteria Protection Profile electronic Health Card (eHC) – elektronische Gesundheitskarte (eGK), Version 2.60, 29 July 2008, BSI-PP-0020-V2-2007-MA-02 [10].

The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details). The TOE meets the Assurance Requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 4 augmented by ADV\_IMP.2, ATE\_DPT.2, AVA\_MSU.3 und AVA\_VLA.4.

The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 5.1. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and some of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.]

The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE Security Functions:

TOE Security Function	Addressed issue
F.ACS_SFP	Security Attribute Based Access Control
F.IA_AKEY	Key Based User / TOE Authentication Based on Asymmetric Cryptography
F.IA_SKEY	Key Based User / TOE Authentication Based on Symmetric Cryptography
F.IA_PWD	Password Based User Authentication
F.DATA_INT	Stored Data Integrity Monitoring and Action
F.EX_CONF	Confidentiality of Data Exchange
F.EX_INT	Integrity and Authenticity of Data Exchange
F.RIP	Residual Information Protection
F.FAIL_PROT	Hardware and Software Failure Protection
F.SELFTEST	Self Test
F.SIDE_CHAN	Side Channel Analysis Control
F.CRYPTO	Cryptographic Support
F.RSA_KEYGEN	RSA Key Pair Generation
F.GEN_DIGSIG	RSA Generation of Digital Signatures
F.VER_DIGSIG	RSA Verification of Digital Signatures
F.RSA_ENC	RSA Encryption
F.RSA_DEC	RSA Decryption

Table 1: TOE Security Functions

For more details please refer to the Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 6.

The claimed TOE's Strength of Functions 'high' (SOF-high) for specific functions as indicated in the Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 6.2 is confirmed. The rating of the Strength of Functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms suitable for encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2). For details see chapter 9 of this report.

The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 3.1 . Based on these assets the TOE Security Environment is defined in terms of Assumptions, Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 3.2 to 3.4.

This certification covers the following configurations and delivery forms of the TOE:

- completely initialised smartcard
- completely initialised module
- non-initialised smartcard
- non-initialised module

The TOE contains at its delivery unalterable identification information on the delivered configuration.

The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.

## 2 Identification of the TOE

The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:

### MICARDO V3.4 R1.0 eHC V1.0

The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:

Item	Description / Additional Information	Type	Transfer Form
1	NXP SmartMX P5CC144V0B Secure smartcard Controller (incl. its IC Dedicated Software, covering in particular the Crypto Library)	HW / SW	Delivery of not-initialised / initialised modules or smartcards  Delivery of initialisation files in electronic form (if applicable)
2	Smartcard Embedded Software / Part Basic Software (implemented in ROM/EEPROM of the microcontroller) Rom-Mask: MICARDO_EHC_R7.0_CORE_090_ORGA_0102	SW	
3	Smartcard Embedded Software / Part Application Software (containing the eHC Application implemented in the EEPROM of the microcontroller) Initialisation file with the eHC Application: MICARDO_EHC_R7.0_EHC_090_ORGA_5045	SW	
4	User Guidance, MICARDO V3.4 R1.0 eHC V1.0, Version V1.00, 16.04.2009, Sagem ORGA GmbH [12]	DOC	Document in paper / electronic form
5	User Guidance for the Initialiser, MICARDO V3.4 R1.0 eHC V1.0, Version V1.00, 16.04.2009, Sagem ORGA GmbH [13]	DOC	Document in paper / electronic form
6	User Guidance for the Personaliser, MICARDO V3.4 R1.0 eHC V1.0, Version V1.00, 16.04.2009, Sagem ORGA GmbH [14]	DOC	Document in paper / electronic form
7	Data Sheet with information on the actual identification data and configuration of the eHC Card delivered to the customer: Data Sheet MICARDO V3.4 R1.0 eHC V1.0 Version V1.02, 09.03.2009 [15]	DOC	Document in paper / electronic form
8	Aut-Key of the eHC Card:  Public part of the authentication key pair relevant for the authenticity of the eHC Card  Note: The card's authentication key pair is generated by Sagem Orga GmbH and depends on the TOE's configuration delivered to the customer. Furthermore, the key pair may be chosen customer specific.	KEY	Document in paper form / electronic file

Item	Description / Additional Information	Type	Transfer Form
9	<p>Pers-Key of the eHC Card:</p> <p>Personalisation key relevant for the personalisation of the eHC Card</p> <p>Note: The card's personalisation key pair is generated by Sagem Orga GmbH and depends on the TOE's configuration delivered to the customer. Furthermore, the key may be chosen customer specific.</p>	KEY	Document in paper form / electronic file

Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE

## Note 1:

The TOE will be delivered from Sagem Orga GmbH as not-initialised or initialised product (module / smartcard). To finalise the TOE as not-initialised product, the initialisation file developed by Sagem Orga GmbH must be loaded during the initialisation phase by the Initialiser (Sagem Orga GmbH or other initialisation facility) following the production requirements defined in the Guidance for the Initialiser [13].

## Note 2:

Deliverables in paper form require a personal passing on or a procedure of at least the same security. For deliverables in electronic form an integrity and authenticity attribute will be attached.

The customer **verifies the authenticity and integrity** of the cards/modules as follows:

**Non-initialised** cards/modules can be authenticated with the command VERIFY ROM (the data necessary for the verification – the 64 byte freely selected data and the hash value – are included in ch. 6 of the Identification Data Sheet of the eHC Card [15]). See also User Guidance for the Initialiser [13], chapter 4.

**Initialised cards/modules** can be authenticated with the command INTERNAL AUTHENTICATE (see also user guidance [12] ch. 8.2.)

The customer **identifies the TOE** as the certified product as follows:

**Non-initialised cards/modules** can be identified with the historical bytes of the cold and warm ROM ATR. The TOE before initialisation is provided with the following identifiers:

The historical bytes of the Cold and Warm ROM ATR contain

- identifier of the ROM mask,
- identifier of the producer of the semiconductor,
- identifier of the semiconductor.

The identifiers are not alterable. In detail the following identifiers are applied :

Cold ROM ATR: '3B 91 95 01 02 07'

Warm ROM ATR: '3B 93 95 00 02 04 07'

**Initialised cards/modules** can be identified with the historical bytes of the Cold and Warm EEPROM ATR as well as with the data record EF\_TIN, which can be read with the command READ RECORD.:

The historical bytes of the Cold and Warm EEPROM ATR contain

- identifier of the ROM mask,
- identifier of the producer of the semiconductor,
- identifier of the semiconductor,
- identifier of the TOE configuration.

All the identifiers and information are not alterable. In detail the following identifiers are applied:

Cold EEPROM ATR: '3b dd 96ff81 b1 fe451f 03 006404050702739e2150009000 4f'

Warm EEPROM ATR: '3b dd 96ff81 b1 fe451f 03 006404050702739e2150009000 4f'

The EF\_TIN of the eHC file system contains

- immutable information about the eHC initialisation file,
- unique identification of the image,
- unique identification of the core image.

In detail the following identifiers are applied:

Record 1: Identification of Image 'c0-14-6dde9ef1ad9ff516f3e098e2c3364b6d94b46afc8e-08-F8288CD1AB8FDB6B'

Record 2: '00' (Note: '00' means eHC)

Record 3: Version and ID of image specification '82 0D 3031 303930 4353 3530 2E56 3435' ("01090CS50.V45")

The initialised TOE is uniquely identified by the designation MICARDO V3.4 R1.0 eHC V1.0.

The identification of the TOE is also done using the READ RECORD command for EF.TIN. This allows identifying the initialisation file, the image and the core image exactly.

### 3 Security Policy

The TOE is the composition of an IC with Smartcard Embedded Software, including the eHC Application and will be used as electronic Health Card (eHC) within the German Health Care System. The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and implemented by the TOE.

The security policy of the TOE is to provide basic Security Functions to be used to ensure an overall smartcard system security. Therefore, the TOE will implement an algorithm to ensure the confidentiality of plain text data by encryption and to support secure authentication protocols.

The security policy of the TOE is also to provide protection against leakage of information (e.g. to ensure the confidentiality of cryptographic keys during cryptographic functions performed by the TOE), against physical probing, against malfunctions, against physical manipulations and against abuse of functionality. Hence the TOE shall

- maintain the integrity and the confidentiality of data stored in the memory of the TOE and
- maintain the integrity, the correct operation and the confidentiality of Security Functions (security mechanisms and associated functions) provided by the TOE.



## 4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope

The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to specific Security Objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The security objectives related to the environment of the TOE's dedicated eHC Application can be found in the protection profile [10] in chapter 4.2 and 4.3. See also the Security Target [6] and [9] chapter 4.2.

## 5 Architectural Information

The TOE is composed from an Circuit (IC) with its proprietary IC Dedicated Software (TOE-IC) and a Smartcard Embedded Software (TOE-ES), consisting of Basic Software (TOE-ES/BS) and Application Software (TOE-ES/AS). While the Basic Software consists of the MICARDO V3.4 Operating System platform of the TOE (realised as native implementation), the Application Software covers the Application Layer which is directly set-up on the MICARDO V3.4 Operating System platform and implements the specific eHC Application. As all these parts of software are running inside the IC, the external interface of the TOE to its environment can be defined as the external interface of this IC, the NXP SmartMX P5CC080V0B Secure smartcard Controller. The IC and its Dedicated Software is evaluated according to Common Criteria EAL 5 augmented with a minimum strength level for its security functions of SOF-high.

## 6 Documentation

The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.

Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of this report have to be followed.

## 7 IT Product Testing

The developer tested all TOE Security Functions either on real cards or with emulator tests. For all commands and functionality test, test cases are specified in order to demonstrate its expected behaviour including error cases. Hereby a representative sample including all limit values of the parameter set, e.g. all command APDUs with valid and invalid inputs were tested and all functions were tested with valid and invalid inputs. Repetition of developer tests were performed during the independent evaluator tests.

Since many Security Functions can be tested by ISO-7816 APDU command sequences, the evaluators performed these tests with real cards. This is considered to be a reasonable approach because the developers tests include a full coverage of all security functionality with emulator tests. Tests with emulators were chosen by the evaluators for those Security Functions where internal resources of the card needed to be modified or observed during the test. During their independent testing, the evaluators covered

- testing APDU commands related to Access Control,
- testing APDU commands related to External Authenticate and Internal Authenticate based on asymmetric cryptography,

- testing APDU commands related to External Authenticate and Internal Authenticate based on symmetric cryptography,
- testing the "Verify" command,
- Source code analysis, emulator tests performed by the evaluators,
- Testing commands which (may) use Secure Messaging,
- Source code analysis, emulator tests performed by the evaluators,
- SPA/DPA Analysis for Triple-DES and RSA (including RSA key generation),
- Fault Injection Attacks (Laser attacks),
- testing APDU commands for the commands using cryptographic mechanisms,
- testing APDU commands for the commands generating RSA key pairs,
- testing APDU commands for the commands using digital signatures,
- testing APDU commands for the commands used for RSA encryption and decryption.

The evaluators have tested the TOE systematically against high attack potential during their penetration testing.

The achieved test results correspond to the expected test results.

## 8 Evaluated Configuration

The TOE is defined uniquely by the name and version number .

With regard to the smartcard product life cycle of the TOE (for more details about the TOE life cycle phases please read the Overview of the TOE Life Cycle explained in the ST [6] and [9], chapter 2.2), the different development and production phases of the TOE with its IC including its IC Dedicated Software, covering in particular the Crypto Library and with its Embedded Software / Part Basic Software (implemented in ROM/EEPROM of the microcontroller) as well as its Embedded Software / Part Application Software (containing the eHC Application implemented in the EEPROM of the microcontroller) are all part of the evaluation of the TOE. For the delivery of the TOE different ways are established:

The TOE is delivered at the end of phase 5 in form of complete cards or modules, i.e. after the initialisation process of the TOE has been successfully finished, final tests have been successfully conducted and the card production has been fulfilled.

Alternatively, the TOE is delivered in form of a not-initialised module or smartcard. In this case, the delivery of the modules or smartcards will be combined with the delivery of the customer specific initialisation file and the last part of the smartcard finishing process, i.e. the embedding of the delivered modules and final (card) tests, is the task of the customer.

The form of the delivery of the TOE does not concern the security features of the TOE. However, the initialisation process in Flintbek, Germany is considered within the framework of the CC evaluation of the product.

The development of the TOE is done in Paderborn; production and if necessary initialisation of the TOE takes place in Flintbek. Regarding the development and production environment of the underlying IC please refer to Annex A of the certification report of the chip [17].

The evaluation results are restricted to chip cards containing the TOE with eHC application that has been inspected during the evaluation process.

## 9 Results of the Evaluation

### 9.1 CC specific results

The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.

The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used for those components up to EAL4 extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 4 and guidance specific for the technology of the product [4] (AIS 34).

The following guidance specific for the technology was used:

- The Application of CC to Integrated Circuits
- Application of Attack Potential to Smart Cards
- Functionality classes and evaluation methodology of physical random number generators

(see [4], AIS 1, AIS 14, AIS 19, AIS 25, AIS 26, AIS 34, AIS 36, AIS 37.)

The assurance refinements outlined in the Security Target were followed in the course of the evaluation of the TOE.

As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance components:

- All components of the class ASE
- All components of the EAL 4 package as defined in the CC (see also part C of this report)
- The components ADV\_IMP.2, ATE\_DPT.2, AVA\_MSU.3 und AVA\_VLA.4 augmented for this TOE evaluation.

The evaluation has confirmed:

- PP Conformance: Common Criteria Protection Profile electronic Health Card (eHC) – elektronische Gesundheitskarte (eGK), Version 2.60, 29 July 2008, BSI-PP-0020-V2-2007-MA-02 [10]
- for the Functionality: PP conformant  
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
- for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant  
EAL 4 augmented by  
ADV\_IMP.2, ATE\_DPT.2, AVA\_MSU.3 and AVA\_VLA.4
- The following TOE Security Functions fulfil the claimed Strength of Function : high
  - F.IA\_AKEY (The TSF includes a probabilistic password mechanism.)
  - F.IA\_SKEY (The TSF includes a probabilistic password mechanism.)
  - F.IA\_PWD (The TSF includes a probabilistic password mechanism for the authentication of the user.)

- F.CRYPTO (The TSF part concerning DES functionality used for encryption, decryption, MAC generation and MAC verification are as well assigned to the SOF claim as permutational and probabilistic mechanisms are involved.)
- F.RSA\_KEYGEN (The TSF includes permutational and probabilistic mechanisms for the key generation process itself as well as for the integrated random number generation and key check.)
- F.GEN\_DIGSIG (The quality of the implemented security mechanisms against leakage can be analysed using permutational or probabilistic methods.)
- F.RSA\_DEC (The quality of the implemented security mechanisms against leakage can be analysed using permutational or probabilistic methods.)

In order to assess the Strength of Function the scheme interpretations AIS 25 and AIS 26 (see [4]) were used.

For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production environment see annex B in part D of this report.

The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.

## 9.2 Results of cryptographic assessment

The following cryptographic algorithms are used by the TOE to enforce its security policy:  
hash functions:

- SHA-256 according to FIPS 180-2

algorithms for the encryption and decryption:

- 3-key Triple-DES, 168 bit, according to FIPS PUB 46-3
- RSA 2048 according to the standard PKCS1

This holds for the following security functions:

- F.CRYPTO: providing cryptographic support for the other TSFs using cryptographic mechanisms (SHA-256, DES, RSA, RNG)
- F.IA\_AKEY: Key Based User / TOE Authentication Based on Asymmetric Cryptography (SHA-256, RSA)
- F.IA\_SKEY: Key Based User / TOE Authentication Based on Symmetric Cryptography (SHA-256, DES)
- F.EX\_CONF: Confidentiality of Data Exchange (DES)
- F.EX\_INT: Integrity and Authenticity of Data Exchange (DES)
- F.RSA\_KEYGEN: RSA Key Pair Generation (RSA, RNG)
- F.GEN\_DIGSIG: RSA Generation of Digital Signatures (SHA-256, RSA, RNG)
- F.VER\_DIGSIG: RSA Verification of Digital Signatures (SHA-256, RSA)
- F.RSA\_ENC: RSA Encryption (RSA)
- F.RSA\_DEC: RSA Decryption (RSA)

The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this evaluation (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2). According to "Technische Richtlinie für die eCard-

Projekte der Bundesregierung” BSI TR-03116 [16] the algorithms are suitable for encryption and decryption. The validity period of each algorithm is mentioned in the official catalogue [16].

## 10 Obligations and notes for the usage of the TOE

The operational documents as outlined in table 2 and the Security Target [6] and [9] contain necessary information about the usage of the TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered.

Principally, the user has to follow the instructions in the user guidance documents and has to ensure the fulfilment of the assumptions about the environment in the Security Target [6] and [9].

## 11 Security Target

For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [9] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report. It is a sanitised version of the complete Security Target [6] used for the evaluation performed. Sanitisation was performed according to the rules as outlined in the relevant CCRA policy (see AIS 35 [4])

## 12 Definitions

### 12.1 Acronyms

<b>APDU</b>	Application Protocol Data Unit
<b>AS</b>	Application Software
<b>ATR</b>	Answer to Reset
<b>BSI</b>	Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for Information Security, Bonn, Germany
<b>BSIG</b>	BSI-Errichtungsgesetz
<b>CCRA</b>	Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
<b>CC</b>	Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
<b>CEM</b>	Evaluation Methodology
<b>DES</b>	Data Encryption Standard
<b>DFA</b>	Differential Fault Analysis
<b>DOC</b>	Document
<b>DPA</b>	Differential Power Analysis
<b>EAL</b>	Evaluation Assurance Level
<b>EEPROM</b>	Electrically Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory
<b>EHC</b>	Electronic Health Card
<b>ES</b>	Embedded Software
<b>ETR</b>	Evaluation Technical Report
<b>IC</b>	Integrated Circuit

<b>IT</b>	Information Technology
<b>ITSEF</b>	Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
<b>JIL</b>	Joint Interpretation Library
<b>OS</b>	Operating System
<b>PP</b>	Protection Profile
<b>ROM</b>	Read Only Memory
<b>RSA</b>	Rivest Shamir Adleman Algorithmus
<b>SF</b>	Security Function
<b>SFP</b>	Security Function Policy
<b>SHA</b>	Secure Hash Algorithm
<b>SOF</b>	Strength of Function
<b>SPA</b>	Simple Power Analysis
<b>ST</b>	Security Target
<b>TOE</b>	Target of Evaluation
<b>TSC</b>	TSF Scope of Control
<b>TSF</b>	TOE Security Functions
<b>TSP</b>	TOE Security Policy

## 12.2 Glossary

**Augmentation** - The addition of one or more assurance component(s) from CC Part 3 to an EAL or assurance package.

**Extension** - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the CC.

**Formal** - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-established mathematical concepts.

**Informal** - Expressed in natural language.

**Object** - An entity within the TSC that contains or receives information and upon which subjects perform operations.

**Protection Profile** - An implementation-independent set of security requirements for a category of TOEs that meet specific consumer needs.

**Security Function** - A part or parts of the TOE that have to be relied upon for enforcing a closely related subset of the rules from the TSP.

**Security Target** - A set of security requirements and specifications to be used as the basis for evaluation of an identified TOE.

**Semiformal** - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.

**Strength of Function** - A qualification of a TOE security function expressing the minimum efforts assumed necessary to defeat its expected security behaviour by directly attacking its underlying security mechanisms.

**SOF-basic** - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that the function provides adequate protection against casual breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a low attack potential.

**SOF-medium** - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that the function provides adequate protection against straightforward or intentional breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a moderate attack potential.

**SOF-high** - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that the function provides adequate protection against deliberately planned or organised breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a high attack potential.

**Subject** - An entity within the TSC that causes operations to be performed.

**Target of Evaluation** - An IT product or system and its associated administrator and user guidance documentation that is the subject of an evaluation.

**TOE Security Functions** - A set consisting of all hardware, software, and firmware of the TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the TSP.

**TOE Security Policy** - A set of rules that regulate how assets are managed, protected and distributed within a TOE.

**TSF Scope of Control** - The set of interactions that can occur with or within a TOE and are subject to the rules of the TSP.

## 13 Bibliography

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<sup>8</sup> specifically

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## C Excerpts from the Criteria

CC Part1:

### Conformance results (chapter 7.4)

„The conformance result indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is met by a TOE or PP that passes its evaluation. This conformance result is presented with respect to CC Part 2 (functional requirements), CC Part 3 (assurance requirements) and, if applicable, to a pre-defined set of requirements (e.g., EAL, Protection Profile).

The conformance result consists of one of the following:

- **CC Part 2 conformant** - A PP or TOE is CC Part 2 conformant if the functional requirements are based only upon functional components in CC Part 2.
- **CC Part 2 extended** - A PP or TOE is CC Part 2 extended if the functional requirements include functional components not in CC Part 2.

plus one of the following:

- **CC Part 3 conformant** - A PP or TOE is CC Part 3 conformant if the assurance requirements are based only upon assurance components in CC Part 3.
- **CC Part 3 extended** - A PP or TOE is CC Part 3 extended if the assurance requirements include assurance requirements not in CC Part 3.

Additionally, the conformance result may include a statement made with respect to sets of defined requirements, in which case it consists of one of the following:

- **Package name Conformant** - A PP or TOE is conformant to a pre-defined named functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the requirements (functions or assurance) include all components in the packages listed as part of the conformance result.
- **Package name Augmented** - A PP or TOE is an augmentation of a pre-defined named functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the requirements (functions or assurance) are a proper superset of all components in the packages listed as part of the conformance result.

Finally, the conformance result may also include a statement made with respect to Protection Profiles, in which case it includes the following:

- **PP Conformant** - A TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the conformance result.“

CC Part 3:

**Protection Profile criteria overview** (chapter 8.2)

“The goal of a PP evaluation is to demonstrate that the PP is complete, consistent, technically sound, and hence suitable for use as a statement of requirements for one or more evaluable TOEs. Such a PP may be eligible for inclusion within a PP registry.

Assurance Class	Assurance Family
Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation	TOE description (APE_DES)
	Security environment (APE_ENV)
	PP introduction (APE_INT)
	Security objectives (APE_OBJ)
	IT security requirements (APE_REQ)
	Explicitly stated IT security requirements (APE_SRE)

Table 3 - Protection Profile families - CC extended requirements”

**Security Target criteria overview** (Chapter 8.3)

“The goal of an ST evaluation is to demonstrate that the ST is complete, consistent, technically sound, and hence suitable for use as the basis for the corresponding TOE evaluation.

Assurance Class	Assurance Family
Class ASE: Security Target evaluation	TOE description (ASE_DES)
	Security environment (ASE_ENV)
	ST introduction (ASE_INT)
	Security objectives (ASE_OBJ)
	PP claims (ASE_PPC)
	IT security requirements (ASE_REQ)
	Explicitly stated IT security requirements (ASE_SRE)
	TOE summary specification (ASE_TSS)

Table 5 - Security Target families - CC extended requirements ”

**Assurance categorisation** (chapter 7.5)

“The assurance classes, families, and the abbreviation for each family are shown in Table 1.

<b>Assurance Class</b>	<b>Assurance Family</b>
ACM: Configuration management	CM automation (ACM_AUT)
	CM capabilities (ACM_CAP)
	CM scope (ACM_SCP)
ADO: Delivery and operation	Delivery (ADO_DEL)
	Installation, generation and start-up (ADO_IGS)
ADV: Development	Functional specification (ADV_FSP)
	High-level design (ADV_HLD)
	Implementation representation (ADV_IMP)
	TSF internals (ADV_INT)
	Low-level design (ADV_LLD)
	Representation correspondence (ADV_RCR)
	Security policy modeling (ADV_SPM)
AGD: Guidance documents	Administrator guidance (AGD_ADM)
	User guidance (AGD_USR)
ALC: Life cycle support	Development security (ALC_DVS)
	Flaw remediation (ALC_FLR)
	Life cycle definition (ALC_LCD)
	Tools and techniques (ALC_TAT)
ATE: Tests	Coverage (ATE_COV)
	Depth (ATE_DPT)
	Functional tests (ATE_FUN)
	Independent testing (ATE_IND)
AVA: Vulnerability assessment	Covert channel analysis (AVA_CCA)
	Misuse (AVA_MSU)
	Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF)
	Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA)

Table 1: Assurance family breakdown and mapping”

## Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 11)

“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances the level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE at the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the operational use of the TOE.

It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are included in the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be considered for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide utility.”

### Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 11.1)

“Table 6 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.

As outlined in the next section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance levels are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance. They are hierarchically ordered inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope, and/or depth) and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance families (i.e. adding new requirements).

These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as described in chapter 7 of this Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than one component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every component are addressed.

While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the addition of assurance components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the substitution of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance component in the same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance component” is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be extended with explicitly stated assurance requirements.

Assurance Class	Assurance Family	Assurance Evaluation Assurance Level Components							by
		EAL1	EAL2	EAL3	EAL4	EAL5	EAL6	EAL7	
Configuration management	ACM_AUT				1	1	2	2	
	ACM_CAP	1	2	3	4	4	5	5	
	ACM_SCP			1	2	3	3	3	
Delivery and operation	ADO_DEL		1	1	2	2	2	3	
	ADO_IGS	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	
Development	ADV_FSP	1	1	1	2	3	3	4	
	ADV_HLD		1	2	2	3	4	5	
	ADV_IMP				1	2	3	3	
	ADV_INT					1	2	3	
	ADV_LLD				1	1	2	2	
	ADV_RCR	1	1	1	1	2	2	3	
	ADV_SPM				1	3	3	3	
Guidance documents	AGD_ADM	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	
	AGD_USR	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	
Life cycle support	ALC_DVS			1	1	1	2	2	
	ALC_FLR								
	ALC_LCD				1	2	2	3	
	ALC_TAT				1	2	3	3	
Tests	ATE_COV		1	2	2	2	3	3	
	ATE_DPT			1	1	2	2	3	
	ATE_FUN		1	1	1	1	2	2	
	ATE_IND	1	2	2	2	2	2	3	
Vulnerability assessment	AVA_CCA					1	2	2	
	AVA_MSU			1	2	2	3	3	
	AVA_SOF		1	1	1	1	1	1	
	AVA_VLA		1	1	2	3	4	4	

Table 6: Evaluation assurance level summary”

**Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested** (chapter 11.3)

## “Objectives

EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the threats to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent assurance is required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with respect to the protection of personal or similar information.

EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could be successfully conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.

An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner consistent with its documentation, and that it provides useful protection against identified threats.”

**Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested** (chapter 11.4)

## “Objectives

EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the developer than is consistent with good commercial practice. As such it should not require a substantially increased investment of cost or time.

EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when securing legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.”

**Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked** (chapter 11.5)

## “Objectives

EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound development practices.

EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation of the TOE and its development without substantial re-engineering.”



**Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and reviewed**  
(chapter 11.6)

## “Objectives

EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering based on good commercial development practices which, though rigorous, do not require substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL4 is the highest level at which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.

EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.”

**Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested**  
(chapter 11.7)

## “Objectives

EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering based upon rigorous commercial development practices supported by moderate application of specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be designed and developed with the intent of achieving EAL5 assurance. It is likely that the additional costs attributable to the EAL5 requirements, relative to rigorous development without the application of specialised techniques, will not be large.

EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to specialist security engineering techniques.”

**Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and tested**  
(chapter 11.8)

## “Objectives

EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security engineering techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a premium TOE for protecting high value assets against significant risks.

EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in high risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional costs.”

**Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested**  
(chapter 11.9)

## "Objectives

EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely high risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs. Practical application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security functionality that is amenable to extensive formal analysis."

**Strength of TOE security functions (AVA\_SOF)** (chapter 19.3)

## "Objectives

Even if a TOE security function cannot be bypassed, deactivated, or corrupted, it may still be possible to defeat it because there is a vulnerability in the concept of its underlying security mechanisms. For those functions a qualification of their security behaviour can be made using the results of a quantitative or statistical analysis of the security behaviour of these mechanisms and the effort required to overcome them. The qualification is made in the form of a strength of TOE security function claim."

**Vulnerability analysis (AVA\_VLA)** (chapter 19.4)

## "Objectives

Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether vulnerabilities identified, during the evaluation of the construction and anticipated operation of the TOE or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses), could allow users to violate the TSP.

Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that a user will be able to discover flaws that will allow unauthorised access to resources (e.g. data), allow the ability to interfere with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users."

## "Application notes

A vulnerability analysis is performed by the developer in order to ascertain the presence of security vulnerabilities, and should consider at least the contents of all the TOE deliverables including the ST for the targeted evaluation assurance level. The developer is required to document the disposition of identified vulnerabilities to allow the evaluator to make use of that information if it is found useful as a support for the evaluator's independent vulnerability analysis."

"Independent vulnerability analysis goes beyond the vulnerabilities identified by the developer. The main intent of the evaluator analysis is to determine that the TOE is resistant to penetration attacks performed by an attacker possessing a low (for AVA\_VLA.2 Independent vulnerability analysis), moderate (for AVA\_VLA.3 Moderately resistant) or high (for AVA\_VLA.4 Highly resistant) attack potential."

## **D Annexes**

### **List of annexes of this certification report**

- Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
- Annex B: Evaluation results regarding development and production environment

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## Annex B of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0391-2009

### Evaluation results regarding development and production environment



The IT product MICARDO V3.4 R1.0 eHC V1.0 (Target of Evaluation, TOE) has been evaluated at an accredited and licensed / approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.3 extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 4 and guidance specific for the technology of the product for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 2.3 (ISO/IEC 15408:2005).

As a result of the TOE certification, dated 11 May 2009, the following results regarding the development and production environment apply. The Common Criteria Security Assurance Requirements

- ACM – Configuration management (i.e. ACM\_AUT.1, ACM\_CAP.4, ACM\_SCP.2),
- ADO – Delivery and operation (i.e. ADO\_DEL.2, ADO\_IGS.1) and
- ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC\_DVS.1, ALC\_LCD.1, ALC\_TAT.1),

are fulfilled for the development and production sites of the TOE listed below:

- (a) Sagem Orga GmbH, Riemekestraße 160, Office Center Almpark, Building G, level 04 and 05, 33106 Paderborn (Development)
- (b) Sagem Orga GmbH, Konrad-Zuse-Ring 1, 24220 Flintbek (card production and initialisation site)
- (c) For development and productions sites regarding the "NXP SmartMX P5CC144V0B Secure Smartcard Controller with Cryptographic Library as IC Dedicated Support Software" refer to the certification report BSI-DSZ-CC-0440.

For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in accordance with the Security Target [6]). The evaluators verified, that the Threats, Security Objectives and Requirements for the TOE life cycle phases up to delivery (as stated in the Security Target [6] and [9]) are fulfilled by the procedures of these sites.

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