Apple Inc.

Apple macOS 13 Ventura
Security Target
Version: 1.1
Status: Final
Last Update: 2024-01-12
Validation Body: NIAP
Validation ID: VID11347
Classification: Public
Apple macOS 13 Ventura Security Target
VID11347
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/trademark/appletmlist.html
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Revision History
Version Date Author(s) Changes to Previous Revision
1.0 2023-11-22 Alejandro Masino First published version.
1.1 2024-01-12 Alejandro Masino Address NIAP's ECR comments.
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Table of Contents
1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 8
1.1 Security Target Identification ............................................................................................................. 8
1.2 TOE Identification .............................................................................................................................. 8
1.3 TOE Type .......................................................................................................................................... 8
1.4 TOE Overview ................................................................................................................................... 8
1.5 TOE Description ................................................................................................................................ 8
1.5.1 Architecture .............................................................................................................................. 8
1.5.2 Physical boundary .................................................................................................................... 9
1.5.3 TOE security functionality ........................................................................................................ 9
1.5.3.1 Security audit .................................................................................................................. 9
1.5.3.2 Cryptographic support ................................................................................................... 9
1.5.3.3 User data protection ..................................................................................................... 10
1.5.3.4 Identification and authentication .................................................................................. 10
1.5.3.5 Security management ................................................................................................... 10
1.5.3.6 Protection of the TSF ................................................................................................... 10
1.5.3.7 TOE access ................................................................................................................... 10
1.5.3.8 Trusted path/channels .................................................................................................. 10
1.5.4 TOE operational environment ................................................................................................. 10
2 CC Conformance Claim ........................................................................................................ 12
2.1 Protection Profile Tailoring and Additions ........................................................................................ 12
2.1.1 Protection Profile for General Purpose Operating Systems ([OSPPv4.2.1]) ............................ 12
2.1.2 PP-Module for Bluetooth ([BT]) ............................................................................................. 13
3 Security Problem Definition .................................................................................................. 14
3.1 Threat Environment ......................................................................................................................... 14
3.1.1 Threats countered by the TOE ............................................................................................... 14
3.2 Assumptions .................................................................................................................................... 14
4 Security Objectives .............................................................................................................. 15
4.1 Objectives for the TOE .................................................................................................................... 15
4.2 Objectives for the Operational Environment ................................................................................... 15
4.3 Security Objectives Rationale ......................................................................................................... 16
4.3.1 Coverage ................................................................................................................................ 16
4.3.2 Sufficiency ............................................................................................................................. 16
5 Extended Components Definition .......................................................................................... 18
6 Security Requirements ......................................................................................................... 19
6.1 TOE Security Functional Requirements ........................................................................................... 19
6.1.1 Security audit (FAU) ............................................................................................................... 21
6.1.1.1 FAU_GEN.1 Audit Data Generation (Refined) ................................................................ 21
6.1.1.2 FAU_GEN.1/BT Audit Data Generation (Bluetooth) ...................................................... 21
6.1.2 Cryptographic support (FCS) ................................................................................................ 23
6.1.2.1 FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic Key Generation (Refined) ................................................. 23
6.1.2.2 FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic Key Establishment (Refined) ............................................ 23
6.1.2.3 FCS_CKM_EXT.4 Cryptographic Key Destruction ....................................................... 23
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6.1.2.4 FCS_CKM_EXT.8 Bluetooth Key Generation ............................................................... 24
6.1.2.5 FCS_COP.1(1) Cryptographic Operation - Encryption/Decryption (Refined) ............... 24
6.1.2.6 FCS_COP.1(2) Cryptographic Operation - Hashing (Refined) ..................................... 24
6.1.2.7 FCS_COP.1(3) Cryptographic Operation - Signing (Refined) ...................................... 25
6.1.2.8 FCS_COP.1(4) Cryptographic Operation - Keyed-Hash Message Authentication
(Refined) .................................................................................................................................... 25
6.1.2.9 FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Random Bit Generation .................................................................... 25
6.1.2.10 FCS_STO_EXT.1 Storage of Sensitive Data ............................................................... 26
6.1.2.11 FCS_TLSC_EXT.1 TLS Client Protocol ........................................................................ 26
6.1.2.12 FCS_TLSC_EXT.2 TLS Client Protocol ....................................................................... 26
6.1.2.13 FCS_TLSC_EXT.4 TLS Client Protocol ...................................................................... 26
6.1.3 User data protection (FDP) .................................................................................................... 27
6.1.3.1 FDP_ACF_EXT.1 Access Controls for Protecting User Data ......................................... 27
6.1.4 Identification and authentication (FIA) ................................................................................... 27
6.1.4.1 FIA_AFL.1 Authentication failure handling (Refined) .................................................... 27
6.1.4.2 FIA_BLT_EXT.1 Bluetooth User Authorization .............................................................. 27
6.1.4.3 FIA_BLT_EXT.2 Bluetooth Mutual Authentication ........................................................ 27
6.1.4.4 FIA_BLT_EXT.3 Rejection of Duplicate Bluetooth Connections ................................... 28
6.1.4.5 FIA_BLT_EXT.4 Secure Simple Pairing ........................................................................ 28
6.1.4.6 FIA_BLT_EXT.6 Trusted Bluetooth Device User Authorization .................................... 28
6.1.4.7 FIA_BLT_EXT.7 Untrusted Bluetooth Device User Authorization ................................. 28
6.1.4.8 FIA_UAU.5 Multiple Authentication Mechanisms (Refined) ......................................... 28
6.1.4.9 FIA_X509_EXT.1 X.509 Certificate Validation ............................................................. 29
6.1.4.10 FIA_X509_EXT.2 X.509 Certificate Authentication ................................................... 30
6.1.5 Security management (FMT) ................................................................................................. 30
6.1.5.1 FMT_MOF_EXT.1 Management of security functions behavior .................................... 30
6.1.5.2 FMT_MOF_EXT.1/BT Management of Security Functions Behavior ............................. 30
6.1.5.3 FMT_SMF_EXT.1 Specification of Management Functions .......................................... 30
6.1.5.4 FMT_SMF_EXT.1/BT Specification of Management Functions ..................................... 31
6.1.6 Protection of the TSF (FPT) .................................................................................................. 32
6.1.6.1 FPT_ACF_EXT.1 Access controls ................................................................................. 32
6.1.6.2 FPT_ASLR_EXT.1 Address Space Layout Randomization ............................................ 32
6.1.6.3 FPT_SBOP_EXT.1 Stack Buffer Overflow Protection ................................................... 32
6.1.6.4 FPT_TST_EXT.1 Boot Integrity .................................................................................... 33
6.1.6.5 FPT_TUD_EXT.1 Trusted Update ................................................................................ 33
6.1.6.6 FPT_TUD_EXT.2 Trusted Update for Application Software ......................................... 33
6.1.6.7 FPT_W^X_EXT.1 Write XOR Execute Memory Pages .................................................. 34
6.1.7 TOE access (FTA) ................................................................................................................. 34
6.1.7.1 FTA_TAB.1 Default TOE access banners ..................................................................... 34
6.1.8 Trusted path/channels (FTP) ................................................................................................. 34
6.1.8.1 FTP_BLT_EXT.1 Bluetooth Encryption ......................................................................... 34
6.1.8.2 FTP_BLT_EXT.2 Persistence of Bluetooth Encryption ................................................. 34
6.1.8.3 FTP_BLT_EXT.3/BR Bluetooth Encryption Parameters (BR/EDR) ................................ 34
6.1.8.4 FTP_BLT_EXT.3/LE Bluetooth Encryption Parameters (LE) ......................................... 35
6.1.8.5 FTP_ITC_EXT.1 Trusted channel communication ........................................................ 35
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6.1.8.6 FTP_TRP.1 Trusted Path ............................................................................................. 35
6.2 Security Functional Requirements Rationale .................................................................................. 36
6.2.1 Coverage ............................................................................................................................... 36
6.2.2 Sufficiency ............................................................................................................................. 37
6.3 Security Assurance Requirements .................................................................................................. 39
6.3.1 ALC Life-cycle support ......................................................................................................... 40
6.3.1.1 ALC_TSU_EXT.1 Timely Security Updates .................................................................... 40
6.4 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale .................................................................................. 40
7 TOE Summary Specification .................................................................................................. 41
7.1 TSS Security Assurance Evaluation Activity .................................................................................... 41
7.1.1 Timely security updates (ALC_TSU_EXT.1) ............................................................................ 41
7.2 TOE Security Functionality .............................................................................................................. 41
7.2.1 Audit ....................................................................................................................................... 41
7.2.1.1 FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation ................................................................................. 41
7.2.1.2 FAU_GEN.1/BT Audit data generation (Bluetooth) ........................................................ 42
7.2.2 Cryptography ......................................................................................................................... 42
7.2.2.1 FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation .................................................................. 43
7.2.2.2 FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key establishment ............................................................ 44
7.2.2.3 FCS_CKM_EXT.4 Cryptographic key destruction ........................................................ 44
7.2.2.4 FCS_CKM_EXT.8 Bluetooth key generation ................................................................. 45
7.2.2.5 FCS_COP.1(1) Cryptographic operation - encryption/decryption ................................. 45
7.2.2.6 FCS_COP.1(2) Cryptographic operation - hashing ...................................................... 45
7.2.2.7 FCS_COP.1(3) Cryptographic operation - signing ....................................................... 45
7.2.2.8 FCS_COP.1(4) Cryptographic operation - keyed-hash message authentication .......... 45
7.2.2.9 FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Random bit generation ...................................................................... 46
7.2.2.10 FCS_STO_EXT.1 Storage of sensitive data ................................................................. 46
7.2.2.11 FCS_TLSC_EXT.1 TLS client protocol ......................................................................... 46
7.2.2.12 FCS_TLSC_EXT.2 TLS client protocol ........................................................................ 47
7.2.2.13 FCS_TLSC_EXT.4 TLS client protocol ........................................................................ 47
7.2.3 User data protection ............................................................................................................. 47
7.2.3.1 FDP_ACF_EXT.1 Access controls for protecting user data ........................................... 47
7.2.4 Identification and authentication ........................................................................................... 49
7.2.4.1 FIA_AFL.1 Authentication failure handling .................................................................... 49
7.2.4.2 FIA_BLT_EXT.1 Bluetooth user authorization ............................................................... 49
7.2.4.3 FIA_BLT_EXT.2 Bluetooth mutual authentication ......................................................... 50
7.2.4.4 FIA_BLT_EXT.3 Rejection of duplicate Bluetooth connections .................................... 50
7.2.4.5 FIA_BLT_EXT.4 Secure Simple Pairing ........................................................................ 50
7.2.4.6 FIA_BLT_EXT.6 Trusted Bluetooth device user authorization ...................................... 50
7.2.4.7 FIA_BLT_EXT.7 Untrusted Bluetooth device user authorization ................................... 51
7.2.4.8 FIA_UAU.5 Multiple authentication mechanisms .......................................................... 51
7.2.4.9 FIA_X509_EXT.1 X.509 Certificate validation .............................................................. 51
7.2.4.10 FIA_X509_EXT.2 X.509 Certificate authentication ..................................................... 52
7.2.5 Security management ............................................................................................................ 52
7.2.5.1 FMT_MOF_EXT.1 Management of security functions behavior ..................................... 52
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7.2.5.2 FMT_MOF_EXT.1/BT Management of security functions behavior ............................... 52
7.2.5.3 FMT_SMF_EXT.1 Specification of management functions ........................................... 52
7.2.5.4 FMT_SMF_EXT.1/BT Specification of management functions ...................................... 53
7.2.6 Protection of the TSF ............................................................................................................ 54
7.2.6.1 FPT_ACF_EXT.1 Access controls ................................................................................. 54
7.2.6.2 FPT_ASLR_EXT.1 Address space layout randomization (ASLR) ................................... 55
7.2.6.3 FPT_SBOP_EXT.1 Stack buffer overflow protection ..................................................... 55
7.2.6.4 FPT_TST_EXT.1 Boot integrity ..................................................................................... 55
7.2.6.5 FPT_TUD_EXT.1 Trusted update .................................................................................. 56
7.2.6.6 FPT_TUD_EXT.2 Trusted update for application software ........................................... 57
7.2.6.7 FPT_W^X_EXT.1 Write XOR execute memory pages .................................................... 57
7.2.7 TOE access ............................................................................................................................ 57
7.2.7.1 FTA_TAB.1 Default TOE access banners ...................................................................... 57
7.2.8 Trusted path/channels ........................................................................................................... 57
7.2.8.1 FTP_BLT_EXT.1 Bluetooth encryption .......................................................................... 57
7.2.8.2 FTP_BLT_EXT.2 Persistence of Bluetooth encryption .................................................. 58
7.2.8.3 FTP_BLT_EXT.3/BR Bluetooth encryption parameters (BR/EDR) ................................. 58
7.2.8.4 FTP_BLT_EXT.3/LE Bluetooth encryption parameters (LE) .......................................... 58
7.2.8.5 FTP_ITC_EXT.1 Trusted channel communication ......................................................... 58
7.2.8.6 FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path .............................................................................................. 58
8 Abbreviations, Terminology, and References ........................................................................ 59
8.1 Abbreviations .................................................................................................................................. 59
8.2 Terminology .................................................................................................................................... 63
8.3 References ...................................................................................................................................... 65
A Appendixes ......................................................................................................................... 67
A.1 Hardware Platforms Covered by this Evaluation ................................................................. 67
A.2 SFR to CAVP Mapping Table ............................................................................................. 70
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List of Tables
Table 1: TOE operational environment ...................................................................................................... 11
Table 2: NIAP TDs for OSPP .................................................................................................................... 12
Table 3: NIAP TDs for BT ......................................................................................................................... 13
Table 4: Mapping of security objectives to threats and policies .............................................................. 16
Table 5: Mapping of security objectives for the Operational Environment to assumptions, threats and
policies ............................................................................................................................................... 16
Table 6: Sufficiency of objectives countering threats .............................................................................. 16
Table 7: Sufficiency of objectives holding assumptions ........................................................................... 17
Table 8: SFRs for the TOE ....................................................................................................................... 19
Table 9: Auditable events (Bluetooth) ..................................................................................................... 22
Table 10: Management functions (OSPP) ................................................................................................ 30
Table 11: Management functions (Bluetooth) ........................................................................................... 31
Table 12: Mapping of security functional requirements to security objectives ........................................ 36
Table 13: Security objectives for the TOE rationale ................................................................................. 37
Table 14: SARs ......................................................................................................................................... 39
Table 15: Cryptographic algorithm table ................................................................................................. 43
Table 16: Hardware platforms .................................................................................................................. 67
Table 17: Cryptographic algorithm table .................................................................................................. 70
Table 18: Coverage of CAVP certificates for Apple silicon ...................................................................... 73
Table 19: Coverage of CAVP certificates for Intel Processors ................................................................. 73
Table 20: Coverage of CAVP certificates for Apple T2 Security Chip ..................................................... 75
Table 21: Coverage of CAVP certificates for Broadcom Chip with Bluetooth .......................................... 75
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1 Introduction
1.1 Security Target Identification
Title: Apple macOS 13 Ventura Security Target
Version: 1.1
Status: Final
Date: 2024-01-12
Sponsor: Apple Inc.
Developer: Apple Inc.
Validation Body: NIAP
Validation ID: VID11347
Keywords: macOS, operating system
1.2 TOE Identification
The TOE is Apple macOS 13 Ventura.
1.3 TOE Type
The TOE type is general purpose operating system.
1.4 TOE Overview
The Security Target (ST) serves as the basis for the Common Criteria (CC) evaluation and identifies the Target
of Evaluation (TOE), the scope of the evaluation, and the assumptions made throughout. This document will
also describe the intended operational environment of the TOE and the functional and assurance requirements
that the TOE meets.
The TOE is the Apple macOS 13 Ventura general purpose operating system (GPOS). The TOE is tightly integrated
with hardware and runs on Apple iMac, MacBook Air, MacBook Pro, Mac mini, Mac Pro, and Mac Studio
computers. The macOS Ventura operating system is a Unix-based graphical operating system. The macOS core
is a POSIX compliant operating system built on top of the XNU kernel with standard Unix facilities available from
the command line interface. The TOE includes Bluetooth communication—both Bluetooth Basic Rate/Enhanced
Data Rate (BR/EDR) and Low Energy (LE). A portion of the TOE's Bluetooth functionality is implemented in
hardware (Broadcom BT chip).
The tested version of the TOE is:
● Apple macOS 13.2.1
1.5 TOE Description
This section provides a general description of the TOE, including physical boundaries, security functions, and
relevant TOE documentation and references.
1.5.1 Architecture
The TOE is the software running on the Macs listed in Appendix A.1 "Hardware Platforms Covered by this
Evaluation". These Macs are organized into the following two groups:
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● Apple silicon Macs
● "Intel with T2" Macs
The Apple silicon Macs group represents all systems listed in Appendix A.1 that use an Apple silicon System
on a Chip (SoC). The "Intel with T2" Macs group represents all systems listed in Appendix A.1 that use an Intel
processor with the Apple T2 Security Chip. These groups have implementation differences where indicated in
this document.
The Macs in this evaluation contain the Apple Secure Enclave. The Secure Enclave contains the Secure Enclave
Processor (SEP) and a true random number generator (TRNG). The SEP runs sepOS, which is included with
macOS and is within the TOE boundary. The TRNG is mentioned here as a tie-in with the Entropy Assessment
Report (EAR), which is a document required by the conformance claims defined in Section 2.
On Apple silicon Macs, the Secure Enclave is located on the SoC along with the application processor. On "Intel
with T2" Macs, the Secure Enclave is located on the T2 chip.
The executing TOE is divided into user space and kernel space. User space contains processes that each execute
in their own protected memory space and access services provided by the kernel. Kernel space contains the
macOS kernel (including device drivers and kernel extensions) that executes in its own protected memory space.
The kernel enforces process separation, provides processes with controlled access to hardware devices, and
implements many other OS features. The SEP is only accessible by the macOS kernel.
Both the Apple silicon and "Intel with T2" Macs include a Broadcom chip that implements part of the bluetooth
functionality; the chip model depends on the hardware platform and are also listed in Appendix A.1.
1.5.2 Physical boundary
The physical boundary of the TOE is the installation image. The installation image includes both macOS and
sepOS. The hardware platforms covered by this evaluation are listed in Appendix A.1.
The TOE also includes the TOE documentation providing information for installing, configuring, and maintaining
the evaluated configuration.
● Apple macOS 13 Ventura Common Criteria Configuration Guide, Version 1.1 [CCGUIDE]☝
1.5.3 TOE security functionality
The TOE provides the security functions required by the conformance claims defined in Section 2.
1.5.3.1 Security audit
The TOE generates audit events for all start-up and shut-down functions and all auditable events as specified
by the conformance claims defined in Section 2. Audit events are generated for the following audit functions:
● Start-up and shut-down of the audit functions
● Authentication events (Success/Failure)
● Use of privileged/special rights events (Successful and unsuccessful security, audit, and
configuration changes)
● Privilege or role escalation events (Success/Failure)
Each audit record contains the date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity (if applicable), and
outcome (success or failure) of the event.
1.5.3.2 Cryptographic support
The TOE includes the corecrypto v13.0 cryptographic libraries for performing user space, kernel space, and
SEP cryptographic operations. In addition, it uses a software noise source for entropy generation. The TOE
implements TLS 1.2 for secure communications with remote servers.
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The Bluetooth hardware implements the bulk AES-CCM-128 cryptographic functionality used when connecting
to Bluetooth devices.
1.5.3.3 User data protection
The TOE implements access controls that prevent unprivileged users from accessing files and directories owned
by other users.
1.5.3.4 Identification and authentication
All users must be authenticated to the TOE prior to carrying out any management actions. The TOE supports:
● Password-based authentication
● Authentication based on username and a PIN that releases an asymmetric key stored in OE-
protected storage
The TOE will lock out user accounts after a defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been
met.
The TOE supports Bluetooth Secure Simple Pairing (SSP). It requires user authorization and mutual
authentication during pairing. It also discards pairing attempts and session initialization from Bluetooth devices
to which an active session preexists. The TOE requires explicit user authorization when pairing with an untrusted
device.
1.5.3.5 Security management
The TOE can perform management functions. The administrator has full access to carry out all management
functions; whereas the user will have limited privileges.
1.5.3.6 Protection of the TSF
The TOE implements the following protection of TSF data functions:
● Access controls
● Address space layout randomization (ASLR) with 16 bits of entropy
● Stack buffer overflow protection
● Verification of integrity of the bootchain and operating system executable code
● Trusted software updates using digital signatures
1.5.3.7 TOE access
The TOE displays an advisory warning message regarding unauthorized use of the OS prior to establishment
of a user session.
1.5.3.8 Trusted path/channels
The TOE supports TLS 1.2 for trusted channel communications. The TOE uses TLS to securely communicate
with the Apple Update Server. Applications may invoke the TOE-provided TLS to securely communicate with
remote servers.
The TOE enforces encryption when transmitting data over Bluetooth for both BR/EDR and LE and terminates the
connection if the connected device stops encrypting.
1.5.4 TOE operational environment
The following environmental components interoperate with the TOE in the evaluated configuration:
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Table 1: TOE operational environment
Component Description
Hardware platform See Appendix A.1
Apple Update Server Server that allows the TOE to download updates
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2 CC Conformance Claim
This Security Target is CC Part 2 extended and CC Part 3 extended.
This Security Target claims conformance to the following Protection Profiles and PP packages:
● [CFG_GPOS-BT_V1.0]☝: PP-Configuration for General Purpose Operating Systems and Bluetooth.
Version 1.0 as of 2021-04-15; exact conformance.
● [OSPPv4.2.1]☝: Protection Profile for General Purpose Operating Systems. Version 4.2.1 as of
2019-04-22; exact conformance.
● [BT]☝: PP-Module for Bluetooth. Version 1.0 as of 2021-04-15; exact conformance.
Common Criteria [CC] version 3.1 revision 5 is the basis for this conformance claim.
2.1 Protection Profile Tailoring and Additions
2.1.1 Protection Profile for General Purpose Operating Systems
([OSPPv4.2.1])
This document claims conformance to the following OSPP Use Case:
● [Use Case 1] End User Devices: The TOE provides a platform for end user device such as desktops,
laptops, convertibles, and tablets.
Table 2 contains the NIAP Technical Decisions (TDs) for this protection profile at the time of the evaluation and
a statement of applicability to the evaluation.
Table 2: NIAP TDs for OSPP
NIAP TD TD description Applicable? Non-applicability rationale
TD0715 Updates to FIA_X509_EXT.1 for Exception
Processing and Test Conditions
Yes
TD0680 OS 4.2.1 Conformance Claims section updated to
allow for MOD_WLAN_CLI_v1.0
No This evaluation does not include
MOD_WLAN_CLI_V1.0.
TD0649 Conformance claims for OS PP v4.2.1 Yes
TD0630 FCS_COP.1 requirements for Secure Shell No This evaluation does not include
Secure Shell.
TD0600 Conformance claim sections updated to allow for
MOD_VPNC_V2.3
No This evaluation does not include
MOD_VPNC_V2.3.
TD0578 SHA-1 is no longer mandatory Yes
TD0501 Cryptographic selections and updates for OS PP Yes
TD0493 X.509v3 certificates when using digital signatures
for Boot Integrity
Yes
TD0463 Clarification for FPT_TUD_EXT Yes
TD0441 Updated TLS Ciphersuites for OS PP Yes
TD0386 Platform-Provided Verification of Update Yes
TD0365 FCS_CKM_EXT.4 selections Yes
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2.1.2 PP-Module for Bluetooth ([BT])
This document claims conformance to the following Bluetooth Use Case:
● [Use Case 1] General-Purpose Operating System: The bluetooth functionality provided by the TOE
is part of the general-purpose operating system itself. No standalone third-party applications are
necessary to be installed.
Table 3 contains the NIAP Technical Decisions (TDs) for this PP-Module at the time of the evaluation and a
statement of applicability to the evaluation.
Table 3: NIAP TDs for BT
NIAP TD TD description Applicable? Non-applicability rationale
TD0707 Formatting corrections for MOD_BT_V1.0 Yes
TD0685 BT missing multiple SFR-to-Obj mappings Yes
TD0671 Bluetooth PP-Module updated to allow for new PP
and PP-Module Versions
Yes
TD0650 Conformance claim sections updated to allow for
MOD_VPNC_V2.3 and 2.4
No This evaluation does not include
MOD_VPNC_V2.3 or MOD_VPNC_V2.4.
TD0645 Bluetooth audit details Yes
TD0640 Handling BT devices that do not support
encryption
Yes
TD0600 Conformance claim sections updated to allow for
MOD_VPNC_V2.3
No This evaluation does not include
MOD_VPNC_V2.3.
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3 Security Problem Definition
3.1 Threat Environment
3.1.1 Threats countered by the TOE
T.NETWORK_ATTACK
PP Origin: OSPP, BT
An attacker is positioned on a communications channel or elsewhere on the network infrastructure.
Attackers may engage in communications with applications and services running on or part of
the OS with the intent of compromise. Engagement may consist of altering existing legitimate
communications.
T.NETWORK_EAVESDROP
PP Origin: OSPP, BT
An attacker is positioned on a communications channel or elsewhere on the network infrastructure.
Attackers may monitor and gain access to data exchanged between applications and services that are
running on or part of the OS.
T.LOCAL_ATTACK
PP Origin: OSPP
An attacker may compromise applications running on the OS. The compromised application may
provide maliciously formatted input to the OS through a variety of channels including unprivileged
system calls and messaging via the file system.
T.LIMITED_PHYSICAL_ACCESS
PP Origin: OSPP
An attacker may attempt to access data on the OS while having a limited amount of time with the
physical device.
3.2 Assumptions
A.PLATFORM
PP Origin: OSPP
The OS relies upon a trustworthy computing platform for its execution. This underlying platform is out
of scope of this PP.
A.PROPER_USER
PP Origin: OSPP
The user of the OS is not willfully negligent or hostile, and uses the software in compliance with the
applied enterprise security policy. At the same time, malicious software could act as the user, so
requirements which confine malicious subjects are still in scope.
A.PROPER_ADMIN
PP Origin: OSPP
The administrator of the OS is not careless, willfully negligent or hostile, and administers the OS within
compliance of the applied enterprise security policy.
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4 Security Objectives
4.1 Objectives for the TOE
O.ACCOUNTABILITY
PP Origin: OSPP
Conformant OSes ensure that information exists that allows administrators to discover unintentional
issues with the configuration and operation of the operating system and discover its cause. Gathering
event information and immediately transmitting it to another system can also enable incident response
in the event of system compromise.
O.INTEGRITY
PP Origin: OSPP
Conformant OSes ensure the integrity of their update packages. OSes are seldom if ever shipped
without errors, and the ability to deploy patches and updates with integrity is critical to enterprise
network security. Conformant OSes provide execution environment-based mitigations that increase
the cost to attackers by adding complexity to the task of compromising systems.
O.MANAGEMENT
PP Origin: OSPP
To facilitate management by users and the enterprise, conformant OSes provide consistent and
supported interfaces for their security-relevant configuration and maintenance. This includes
the deployment of applications and application updates through the use of platform-supported
deployment mechanisms and formats, as well as providing mechanisms for configuration and
application execution control.
O.PROTECTED_STORAGE
PP Origin: OSPP
To address the issue of loss of confidentiality of credentials in the event of loss of physical control of
the storage medium, conformant OSes provide data-at-rest protection for credentials. Conformant
OSes also provide access controls which allow users to keep their files private from other users of the
same system.
O.PROTECTED_COMMS
PP Origin: OSPP, BT
To address both passive (eavesdropping) and active (packet modification) network attack threats,
conformant OSes provide mechanisms to create trusted channels for CSP and sensitive data. Both
CSP and sensitive data should not be exposed outside of the platform.
4.2 Objectives for the Operational Environment
OE.PLATFORM
PP Origin: OSPP
The OS relies on being installed on trusted hardware.
OE.PROPER_USER
PP Origin: OSPP
The user of the OS is not willfully negligent or hostile, and uses the software within compliance of
the applied enterprise security policy. Standard user accounts are provisioned in accordance with
the least privilege model. Users requiring higher levels of access should have a separate account
dedicated for that use.
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OE.PROPER_ADMIN
PP Origin: OSPP
The administrator of the OS is not careless, willfully negligent or hostile, and administers the OS within
compliance of the applied enterprise security policy.
4.3 Security Objectives Rationale
4.3.1 Coverage
The following table provides a mapping of TOE objectives to threats and policies, showing that each objective
counters or enforces at least one threat or policy, respectively.
Table 4: Mapping of security objectives to threats and policies
Objective Threats / OSPs
O.ACCOUNTABILITY T.NETWORK_ATTACK
T.LOCAL_ATTACK
O.INTEGRITY T.NETWORK_ATTACK
T.LOCAL_ATTACK
O.MANAGEMENT T.NETWORK_ATTACK
T.NETWORK_EAVESDROP
O.PROTECTED_STORAGE T.LIMITED_PHYSICAL_ACCESS
O.PROTECTED_COMMS T.NETWORK_ATTACK
T.NETWORK_EAVESDROP
The following table provides a mapping of the objectives for the Operational Environment to assumptions, threats
and policies, showing that each objective holds, counters or enforces at least one assumption, threat or policy,
respectively.
Table 5: Mapping of security objectives for the Operational Environment to assumptions, threats and policies
Objective Assumptions / Threats / OSPs
OE.PLATFORM A.PLATFORM
OE.PROPER_USER A.PROPER_USER
OE.PROPER_ADMIN A.PROPER_ADMIN
4.3.2 Sufficiency
The following rationale provides justification that the security objectives are suitable to counter each individual
threat and that each security objective tracing back to a threat, when achieved, actually contributes to the
removal, diminishing or mitigation of that threat.
Table 6: Sufficiency of objectives countering threats
Threat Rationale for security objectives
T.NETWORK_ATTACK [OSPP] The threat T.NETWORK_ATTACK is countered by
O.PROTECTED_COMMS as this provides for integrity of transmitted data.
[OSPP] The threat T.NETWORK_ATTACK is countered by O.INTEGRITY as this
provides for integrity of software that is installed onto the system from the
network.
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Threat Rationale for security objectives
[OSPP] The threat T.NETWORK_ATTACK is countered by O.MANAGEMENT as
this provides for the ability to configure the OS to defend against network attack.
[OSPP] The threat T.NETWORK_ATTACK is countered by O.ACCOUNTABILITY
as this provides a mechanism for the OS to report behavior that may indicate a
network attack has occurred.
[BT] The threat T.NETWORK_ATTACK is countered by O.PROTECTED_COMMS
as this provides the capability to communicate using Bluetooth as a means to
maintain the confidentiality of data that are transmitted outside of the TOE.
T.NETWORK_EAVESDROP [OSPP] The threat T.NETWORK_EAVESDROP is countered by
O.PROTECTED_COMMS as this provides for confidentiality of transmitted data.
[OSPP] The threat T.NETWORK_EAVESDROP is countered by O.MANAGEMENT
as this provides for the ability to configure the OS to protect the confidentiality
of its transmitted data.
[BT] The threat T.NETWORK_EAVESDROP is countered by
O.PROTECTED_COMMS as this provides the capability to communicate using
Bluetooth as a means to maintain the confidentiality of data that are transmitted
outside of the TOE.
T.LOCAL_ATTACK [OSPP] The objective O.INTEGRITY protects against the use of mechanisms that
weaken the TOE with regard to attack by other software on the platform.
[OSPP] The objective O.ACCOUNTABILITY protects against local attacks by
providing a mechanism to report behavior that may indicate a local attack is
occurring or has occurred.
T.LIMITED_PHYSICAL_ACCESS [OSPP] The objective O.PROTECTED_STORAGE protects against unauthorized
attempts to access physical storage used by the TOE.
The following rationale provides justification that the security objectives for the environment are suitable to cover
each individual assumption, that each security objective for the environment that traces back to an assumption
about the environment of use of the TOE, when achieved, actually contributes to the environment achieving
consistency with the assumption, and that if all security objectives for the environment that trace back to an
assumption are achieved, the intended usage is supported.
Table 7: Sufficiency of objectives holding assumptions
Assumption Rationale for security objectives
A.PLATFORM [OSPP] The operational environment objective OE.PLATFORM is realized through
A.PLATFORM.
A.PROPER_USER [OSPP] The operational environment objective OE.PROPER_USER is realized
through A.PROPER_USER.
A.PROPER_ADMIN [OSPP] The operational environment objective OE.PROPER_ADMIN is realized
through A.PROPER_ADMIN.
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5 Extended Components Definition
The extended components definitions are defined in the documents specified in Section 2 "CC Conformance
Claim".
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6 Security Requirements
6.1 TOE Security Functional Requirements
The table below summarizes the SFRs for the TOE and the operations performed on the components according
to CC part 1. Operations in the SFRs use the following convention:
● Iterations (Iter.) are identified by appending a suffix to the original SFR.
● Refinements (Ref.) added to the text are shown in italic text, deletions are shown as strikethrough
text.
● Assignments (Ass.) are shown in bold text.
● Selections (Sel.) are shown in bold text.
Table 8: SFRs for the TOE
Operations
Security
functional class
Security functional requirement Base security
functional
component
Source
Iter. Ref. Ass. Sel.
FAU_GEN.1 Audit Data Generation
(Refined)
OSPPv4.2.1 Yes No Yes Yes
FAU - Security
audit
FAU_GEN.1/BT Audit Data Generation
(Bluetooth)
FAU_GEN.1 BT Yes Yes No Yes
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic Key
Generation (Refined)
OSPPv4.2.1 No No No Yes
FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic Key
Establishment (Refined)
OSPPv4.2.1 No No No Yes
FCS_CKM_EXT.4 Cryptographic Key
Destruction
OSPPv4.2.1 No No No Yes
FCS_CKM_EXT.8 Bluetooth Key
Generation
BT No No Yes No
FCS_COP.1(1) Cryptographic
Operation - Encryption/Decryption
(Refined)
FCS_COP.1 OSPPv4.2.1 Yes No No Yes
FCS_COP.1(2) Cryptographic
Operation - Hashing (Refined)
FCS_COP.1 OSPPv4.2.1 Yes No No Yes
FCS_COP.1(3) Cryptographic
Operation - Signing (Refined)
FCS_COP.1 OSPPv4.2.1 Yes No No Yes
FCS_COP.1(4) Cryptographic
Operation - Keyed-Hash Message
Authentication (Refined)
FCS_COP.1 OSPPv4.2.1 Yes No Yes Yes
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Random Bit
Generation
OSPPv4.2.1 No No No Yes
FCS_STO_EXT.1 Storage of Sensitive
Data
OSPPv4.2.1 No No No No
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1 TLS Client Protocol OSPPv4.2.1 No No No Yes
FCS_TLSC_EXT.2 TLS Client Protocol OSPPv4.2.1 No No No Yes
FCS -
Cryptographic
support
FCS_TLSC_EXT.4 TLS Client Protocol OSPPv4.2.1 No No No No
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Operations
Security
functional class
Security functional requirement Base security
functional
component
Source
Iter. Ref. Ass. Sel.
FDP - User data
protection
FDP_ACF_EXT.1 Access Controls for
Protecting User Data
OSPPv4.2.1 No No No No
FIA_AFL.1 Authentication failure
handling (Refined)
OSPPv4.2.1 No No Yes Yes
FIA_BLT_EXT.1 Bluetooth User
Authorization
BT No No No No
FIA_BLT_EXT.2 Bluetooth Mutual
Authentication
BT No No No No
FIA_BLT_EXT.3 Rejection of Duplicate
Bluetooth Connections
BT No No No No
FIA_BLT_EXT.4 Secure Simple Pairing BT No No No No
FIA_BLT_EXT.6 Trusted Bluetooth
Device User Authorization
BT No No Yes No
FIA_BLT_EXT.7 Untrusted Bluetooth
Device User Authorization
BT No No Yes No
FIA_UAU.5 Multiple Authentication
Mechanisms (Refined)
OSPPv4.2.1 No No Yes Yes
FIA_X509_EXT.1 X.509 Certificate
Validation
OSPPv4.2.1 No No No Yes
FIA - Identification
and authentication
FIA_X509_EXT.2 X.509 Certificate
Authentication
OSPPv4.2.1 No No No Yes
FMT_MOF_EXT.1 Management of
security functions behavior
OSPPv4.2.1 Yes No No No
FMT_MOF_EXT.1/BT Management of
Security Functions Behavior
FMT_MOF_EXT
.1
BT Yes No No No
FMT_SMF_EXT.1 Specification of
Management Functions
OSPPv4.2.1 Yes No Yes Yes
FMT - Security
management
FMT_SMF_EXT.1/BT Specification of
Management Functions
FMT_SMF_EXT
.1
BT Yes No No No
FPT_ACF_EXT.1 Access controls OSPPv4.2.1 No No Yes No
FPT_ASLR_EXT.1 Address Space
Layout Randomization
OSPPv4.2.1 No No Yes Yes
FPT_SBOP_EXT.1 Stack Buffer
Overflow Protection
OSPPv4.2.1 No No No Yes
FPT_TST_EXT.1 Boot Integrity OSPPv4.2.1 No No No Yes
FPT_TUD_EXT.1 Trusted Update OSPPv4.2.1 No No No Yes
FPT - Protection of
the TSF
FPT_TUD_EXT.2 Trusted Update for
Application Software
OSPPv4.2.1 No No No No
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Operations
Security
functional class
Security functional requirement Base security
functional
component
Source
Iter. Ref. Ass. Sel.
FPT_W^X_EXT.1 Write XOR Execute
Memory Pages
OSPPv4.2.1 No No Yes No
FTA - TOE access FTA_TAB.1 Default TOE access
banners
OSPPv4.2.1 No No No No
FTP_BLT_EXT.1 Bluetooth Encryption BT No No No Yes
FTP_BLT_EXT.2 Persistence of
Bluetooth Encryption
BT No No No Yes
FTP_BLT_EXT.3/BR Bluetooth
Encryption Parameters (BR/EDR)
FTP_BLT_EXT.
3
BT Yes No Yes No
FTP_BLT_EXT.3/LE Bluetooth
Encryption Parameters (LE)
FTP_BLT_EXT.
3
BT Yes No Yes No
FTP_ITC_EXT.1 Trusted channel
communication
OSPPv4.2.1 No No Yes Yes
FTP - Trusted
path/channels
FTP_TRP.1 Trusted Path OSPPv4.2.1 No No No Yes
6.1.1 Security audit (FAU)
6.1.1.1 FAU_GEN.1 Audit Data Generation (Refined)
PP Origin: OSPP
FAU_GEN.1.1
The OS shall be able to generate an audit record of the following auditable events:
a. Start-up and shut-down of the audit functions;
b. All auditable events for the not specified level of audit; and
c. ● Authentication events (Success/Failure);
● Use of privileged/special rights events (Successful and unsuccessful security, audit, and
configuration changes);
● Privilege or role escalation events (Success/Failure);
● Administrator or root-level access events (Success/Failure)
FAU_GEN.1.2
The OS shall record within each audit record at least the following information:
a) Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity (if applicable), and outcome (success or
failure) of the event; and
b) For each audit event type, based on the auditable event definitions of the functional components
included in the PP/ST, none.
TSS Link: TSS for FAU_GEN.1
6.1.1.2 FAU_GEN.1/BT Audit Data Generation (Bluetooth)
PP Origin: BT
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Applied TDs: TD0645 TD0707
FAU_GEN.1.1/BT
The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the following auditable events:
a. Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions
b. All auditable events for the not specified level of audit
c. Specifically defined auditable events in the Auditable Events table ( Table 9 ).
Table 9: Auditable events (Bluetooth)
Requirement Auditable Events Additional Audit Record Contents
FCS_CKM_EXT.8 None.
Failed user authorization of
Bluetooth device.
User authorization decision (e.g., user rejected
connection, incorrect pin entry).
FIA_BLT_EXT.1
Failed user authorization for
local Bluetooth Service.
Complete BD_ADDR and no other
information. Bluetooth profile. Identity of local
service with service ID.
Initiation of Bluetooth
connection.
Complete BD_ADDR and no other
information.
FIA_BLT_EXT.2
Failure of Bluetooth
connection.
Reason for failure.
FIA_BLT_EXT.3
(optional)
Duplicate connection attempt. BD_ADDR of connection attempt.
FIA_BLT_EXT.4 None.
FIA_BLT_EXT.5 (if
claimed)
None.
FIA_BLT_EXT.6 None.
FIA_BLT_EXT.7 None.
FTP_BLT_EXT.1 None.
FTP_BLT_EXT.2 None.
FTP_BLT_EXT.3/BR None.
FTP_BLT_EXT.3/LE (if
claimed)
None.
Application Note: FIA_BLT_EXT.3 is crossed out in Table 9 because the rejection is performed at the HCI layer. FIA_BLT_EXT.5 is
crossed out in Table 9 because it is not claimed by this ST.
FAU_GEN.1.2/BT
The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the following information:
a. Date and time of the event
b. Type of event
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c. Subject identity
d. The outcome (success or failure) of the event
e. For each audit event type, based on the auditable event definitions of the functional components
included in the PP/ST, Additional information in the Auditable Events table (Table 9).
TSS Link: TSS for FAU_GEN.1/BT
6.1.2 Cryptographic support (FCS)
6.1.2.1 FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic Key Generation (Refined)
PP Origin: OSPP
Applied TDs: TD0501
FCS_CKM.1.1
The OS shall generate asymmetric cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key
generation algorithm
● RSA schemes using cryptographic key sizes of 2048-bit or greater that meet the following:
FIPS PUB 186-4, "Digital Signature Standard (DSS)", Appendix B.3
● ECC schemes using "NIST curves" P-256, P-384 and P-521 that meet the following: FIPS
PUB 186-4, "Digital Signature Standard (DSS)", Appendix B.4
TSS Link: TSS for FCS_CKM.1
6.1.2.2 FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic Key Establishment (Refined)
PP Origin: OSPP
Applied TDs: TD0501
FCS_CKM.2.1
The OS shall implement functionality to perform cryptographic key establishment in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key establishment method:
● RSA-based key establishment schemes that meets the following: RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 as
specified in Section 7.2 of RFC 8017, "Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA
Cryptography Specifications Version 2.2"
● Elliptic curve-based key establishment schemes that meets the following: NIST Special
Publication 800-56A Revision 3, "Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment
Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography"
TSS Link: TSS for FCS_CKM.2
6.1.2.3 FCS_CKM_EXT.4 Cryptographic Key Destruction
PP Origin: OSPP
Applied TDs: TD0365
FCS_CKM_EXT.4.1
The OS shall destroy cryptographic keys and key material in accordance with a specified cryptographic
key destruction method
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● For volatile memory, the destruction shall be executed by a
❍ single overwrite consisting of zeroes
● For non-volatile memory that consists of
❍ destruction of all key encrypting keys protecting the target key according to
FCS_CKM_EXT.4.1, where none of the KEKs protecting the target key are derived
FCS_CKM_EXT.4.2
The OS shall destroy all keys and key material when no longer needed.
TSS Link: TSS for FCS_CKM_EXT.4
6.1.2.4 FCS_CKM_EXT.8 Bluetooth Key Generation
PP Origin: BT
FCS_CKM_EXT.8.1
The TSF shall generate public/private ECDH key pairs every new connection attempt.
TSS Link: TSS for FCS_CKM_EXT.8
6.1.2.5 FCS_COP.1(1) Cryptographic Operation - Encryption/Decryption
(Refined)
PP Origin: OSPP
FCS_COP.1.1(1)
The OS shall perform encryption/decryption services for data in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm
● AES-CBC (as defined in NIST SP 800-38A)
and
● AES-GCM (as defined in NIST SP 800-38D)
● AES-CCM (as defined in NIST SP 800-38C)
and cryptographic key sizes 128-bit, 256-bit.
TSS Link: TSS for FCS_COP.1(1)
6.1.2.6 FCS_COP.1(2) Cryptographic Operation - Hashing (Refined)
PP Origin: OSPP
Applied TDs: TD0578
FCS_COP.1.1(2)
The OS shall perform cryptographic hashing services in accordance with a specified cryptographic
algorithm
● SHA-1
● SHA-256
● SHA-384
● SHA-512
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and message digest sizes
● 160 bits
● 256 bits
● 384 bits
● 512 bits
that meet the following: FIPS Pub 180-4.
TSS Link: TSS for FCS_COP.1(2)
6.1.2.7 FCS_COP.1(3) Cryptographic Operation - Signing (Refined)
PP Origin: OSPP
FCS_COP.1.1(3)
The OS shall perform cryptographic signature services (generation and verification) in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm
● RSA schemes using cryptographic key sizes of 2048-bit or greater that meet the following:
FIPS PUB 186-4, "Digital Signature Standard (DSS)", Section 4
● ECDSA schemes using "NIST curves" P-256, P-384 and P-521 that meet the following:
FIPS PUB 186-4, "Digital Signature Standard (DSS)", Section 5
TSS Link: TSS for FCS_COP.1(3)
6.1.2.8 FCS_COP.1(4) Cryptographic Operation - Keyed-Hash Message
Authentication (Refined)
PP Origin: OSPP
FCS_COP.1.1(4)
The OS shall perform keyed-hash message authentication services in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512 with key sizes 160 bits, 256 bits,
384 bits, 512 bits and message digest sizes 160 bits, 256 bits, 384 bits, 512 bits that meet the
following: FIPS Pub 198-1 The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code and FIPS Pub 180-4 Secure
Hash Standard.
TSS Link: TSS for FCS_COP.1(4)
6.1.2.9 FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Random Bit Generation
PP Origin: OSPP
FCS_RBG_EXT.1.1
The OS shall perform all deterministic random bit generation (DRBG) services in accordance with NIST
Special Publication 800-90A using CTR_DRBG (AES).
FCS_RBG_EXT.1.2
The deterministic RBG used by the OS shall be seeded by an entropy source that accumulates entropy
from a software-based noise source with a minimum of 256 bits of entropy at least equal to the
greatest security strength (according to NIST SP 800-57) of the keys and hashes that it will generate.
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TSS Link: TSS for FCS_RBG_EXT.1
6.1.2.10 FCS_STO_EXT.1 Storage of Sensitive Data
PP Origin: OSPP
FCS_STO_EXT.1.1
The OS shall implement functionality to encrypt sensitive data stored in non-volatile storage and provide
interfaces to applications to invoke this functionality.
TSS Link: TSS for FCS_STO_EXT.1
6.1.2.11 FCS_TLSC_EXT.1 TLS Client Protocol
PP Origin: OSPP
Applied TDs: TD0441
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.1
The OS shall implement TLS 1.2 (RFC 5246) supporting the following cipher suites:
● TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC 5246
● TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC 5246
● TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5288
● TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5288
● TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5289
● TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289
● TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5289
● TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.2
The OS shall verify that the presented identifier matches the reference identifier according to RFC 6125.
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.3
The OS shall only establish a trusted channel if the peer certificate is valid.
TSS Link: TSS for FCS_TLSC_EXT.1
6.1.2.12 FCS_TLSC_EXT.2 TLS Client Protocol
PP Origin: OSPP
FCS_TLSC_EXT.2.1
The OS shall present the Supported Groups Extension in the Client Hello with the following supported
groups: secp256r1, secp384r1, secp521r1.
TSS Link: TSS for FCS_TLSC_EXT.2
6.1.2.13 FCS_TLSC_EXT.4 TLS Client Protocol
PP Origin: OSPP
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FCS_TLSC_EXT.4.1
The OS shall support mutual authentication using X.509v3 certificates.
TSS Link: TSS for FCS_TLSC_EXT.4
6.1.3 User data protection (FDP)
6.1.3.1 FDP_ACF_EXT.1 Access Controls for Protecting User Data
PP Origin: OSPP
FDP_ACF_EXT.1.1
The OS shall implement access controls which can prohibit unprivileged users from accessing files and
directories owned by other users.
TSS Link: TSS for FDP_ACF_EXT.1
6.1.4 Identification and authentication (FIA)
6.1.4.1 FIA_AFL.1 Authentication failure handling (Refined)
PP Origin: OSPP
FIA_AFL.1.1
The OS shall detect when an administrator configurable positive integer within 1-50 unsuccessful
authentication attempts occur related to events with authentication based on user name and
password.
FIA_AFL.1.2
When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts for an account has been met, the OS
shall: Account Lockout.
TSS Link: TSS for FIA_AFL.1
6.1.4.2 FIA_BLT_EXT.1 Bluetooth User Authorization
PP Origin: BT
FIA_BLT_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall require explicit user authorization before pairing with a remote Bluetooth device.
TSS Link: TSS for FIA_BLT_EXT.1
6.1.4.3 FIA_BLT_EXT.2 Bluetooth Mutual Authentication
PP Origin: BT
FIA_BLT_EXT.2.1
The TSF shall require Bluetooth mutual authentication between devices prior to any data transfer over the
Bluetooth link.
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TSS Link: TSS for FIA_BLT_EXT.2
6.1.4.4 FIA_BLT_EXT.3 Rejection of Duplicate Bluetooth Connections
PP Origin: BT
FIA_BLT_EXT.3.1
The TSF shall discard pairing and session initialization attempts from a Bluetooth device address
(BD_ADDR) to which an active session already exists.
TSS Link: TSS for FIA_BLT_EXT.3
6.1.4.5 FIA_BLT_EXT.4 Secure Simple Pairing
PP Origin: BT
FIA_BLT_EXT.4.1
The TOE shall support Bluetooth Secure Simple Pairing, both in the host and the controller.
FIA_BLT_EXT.4.2
The TOE shall support Secure Simple Pairing during the pairing process.
TSS Link: TSS for FIA_BLT_EXT.4
6.1.4.6 FIA_BLT_EXT.6 Trusted Bluetooth Device User Authorization
PP Origin: BT
FIA_BLT_EXT.6.1
The TSF shall require explicit user authorization before granting trusted remote devices access to
services associated with the following Bluetooth profiles: none.
TSS Link: TSS for FIA_BLT_EXT.6
6.1.4.7 FIA_BLT_EXT.7 Untrusted Bluetooth Device User Authorization
PP Origin: BT
FIA_BLT_EXT.7.1
The TSF shall require explicit user authorization before granting untrusted remote devices access to
services associated with the following Bluetooth profiles: none.
TSS Link: TSS for FIA_BLT_EXT.7
6.1.4.8 FIA_UAU.5 Multiple Authentication Mechanisms (Refined)
PP Origin: OSPP
Applied TDs: TD0649
FIA_UAU.5.1
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The OS shall provide the following authentication mechanisms:
● authentication based on user name and password
● authentication based on user name and a PIN that releases an asymmetric key stored in OE-
protected storage
to support user authentication.
FIA_UAU.5.2
The OS shall authenticate any user's claimed identity according to the
● Authentication based on username and a password/PIN that release a set of keys stored in
the TOE to unwrap locally stored files
TSS Link: TSS for FIA_UAU.5
6.1.4.9 FIA_X509_EXT.1 X.509 Certificate Validation
PP Origin: OSPP
Applied TDs: TD0715
FIA_X509_EXT.1.1
The OS shall implement functionality to validate certificates in accordance with the following rules:
● RFC 5280 certificate validation and certificate path validation
● The certificate path must terminate with a trusted CA certificate
● The OS shall validate a certificate path by ensuring the presence of the basicConstraints extension,
that the CA flag is set to TRUE for all CA certificates, and that any path constraints are met.
● The TSF shall validate that any CA certificate includes caSigning purpose in the key usage field
● The OS shall validate the revocation status of the certificate using OCSP as specified in RFC 6960
with no exceptions
● The OS shall validate the extendedKeyUsage field according to the following rules:
❍ Certificates used for trusted updates and executable code integrity verification shall have the
Code Signing Purpose (id-kp 3 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.3) in the extendedKeyUsage field.
❍ Server certificates presented for TLS shall have the Server Authentication purpose (id-kp 1
with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1) in the extendedKeyUsage field.
❍ Client certificates presented for TLS shall have the Client Authentication purpose (id-kp 2 with
OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2) in the EKU field.
❍ S/MIME certificates presented for email encryption and signature shall have the Email
Protection purpose (id-kp 4 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.4) in the EKU field.
❍ OCSP certificates presented for OCSP responses shall have the OCSP Signing Purpose (id-kp
9 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.9) in the EKU field.
❍ Server certificates presented for EST shall have the CMC Registration Authority (RA)
purpose (id-kp-cmcRA with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.28) in the EKU field.
FIA_X509_EXT.1.2
The OS shall only treat a certificate as a CA certificate if the basicConstraints extension is present and the
CA flag is set to TRUE.
TSS Link: TSS for FIA_X509_EXT.1
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6.1.4.10 FIA_X509_EXT.2 X.509 Certificate Authentication
PP Origin: OSPP
FIA_X509_EXT.2.1
The OS shall use X.509v3 certificates as defined by RFC 5280 to support authentication for TLS and
HTTPS connections.
TSS Link: TSS for FIA_X509_EXT.2
6.1.5 Security management (FMT)
6.1.5.1 FMT_MOF_EXT.1 Management of security functions behavior
PP Origin: OSPP
FMT_MOF_EXT.1.1
The OS shall restrict the ability to perform the function indicated in the "Administrator" column in
FMT_SMF_EXT.1.1 to the administrator.
TSS Link: TSS for FMT_MOF_EXT.1
6.1.5.2 FMT_MOF_EXT.1/BT Management of Security Functions Behavior
PP Origin: BT
FMT_MOF_EXT.1.1/BT
The OS shall restrict the ability to perform the function indicated in the "Administrator" column in
FMT_SMF_EXT.1.1/BT to the administrator.
TSS Link: TSS for FMT_MOF_EXT.1/BT
6.1.5.3 FMT_SMF_EXT.1 Specification of Management Functions
PP Origin: OSPP, BT
FMT_SMF_EXT.1.1
The OS shall be capable of performing the following management functions:
Table 10: Management functions (OSPP)
# Management Function Administrator User
1 Enable/disable screen lock M X
2 Configure screen lock inactivity timeout M X
3 Configure local audit storage capacity X -
4 Configure minimum password length X -
5 Configure minimum number of special characters in password X -
6 Configure minimum number of numeric characters in password - -
7 Configure minimum number of uppercase characters in password - -
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# Management Function Administrator User
8 Configure minimum number of lowercase characters in password - -
9 Configure lockout policy for unsuccessful authentication attempts through
timeouts between attempts, limiting number of attempts during a time
period
- -
10 Configure host-based firewall X -
11 Configure name/address of directory server with which to bind - -
12 Configure name/address of remote management server from which to receive
management settings
X -
13 Configure name/address of audit/logging server to which to send audit/logging
records
X -
14 Configure audit rules X -
15 Configure name/address of network time server X -
16 Enable/disable automatic software update X -
17 Configure Wi-Fi interface X X
18 Enable/disable Bluetooth interface - X
19 Enable/disable no other external interfaces - -
20 No other management functions to be provided by the TSF - -
Application Note: M—Mandatory support by the specified role. X—Supported by the specified role. Grey/Hyphen—Not supported by
the specified role.
TSS Link: TSS for FMT_SMF_EXT.1
6.1.5.4 FMT_SMF_EXT.1/BT Specification of Management Functions
PP Origin: BT
FMT_SMF_EXT.1.1/BT
The OS shall be capable of performing the following Bluetooth management functions:
Table 11: Management functions (Bluetooth)
# Management Function Administrator User
BT-1 Configure the Bluetooth trusted channel.
● Disable/enable the Discoverable (for BR/EDR) and Advertising (for LE)
modes;
M X
BT-2 Change the Bluetooth device name (separately for BR/EDR and LE); - -
BT-3 Provide separate controls for turning the BR/EDR and LE radios on and off; - -
BT-4 Allow/disallow the following additional wireless technologies to be used with
Bluetooth: [selection: Wi-Fi, NFC, [assignment: other wireless technologies]];
- -
BT-5 Configure allowable methods of Out of Band pairing (for BR/EDR and LE); - -
BT-6 Disable/enable the Discoverable (for BR/EDR) and Advertising (for LE) modes
separately;
- -
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# Management Function Administrator User
BT-7 Disable/enable the Connectable mode (for BR/EDR and LE); - -
BT-8 Disable/enable the Bluetooth [assignment: list of Bluetooth service and/or
profiles available on the OS (for BR/EDR and LE)];
- -
BT-9 Specify minimum level of security for each pairing (for BR/EDR and LE); - -
Application Note: M—Mandatory support by the specified role. X—Supported by the specified role. Grey/Hyphen—Not supported by
the specified role.
TSS Link: TSS for FMT_SMF_EXT.1/BT
6.1.6 Protection of the TSF (FPT)
6.1.6.1 FPT_ACF_EXT.1 Access controls
PP Origin: OSPP
FPT_ACF_EXT.1.1
The OS shall implement access controls which prohibit unprivileged users from modifying:
a) Kernel and its drivers/modules
b) Security audit logs
c) Shared libraries
d) System executables
e) System configuration files
f) TSF-data
g) Applications
FPT_ACF_EXT.1.2
The OS shall implement access controls which prohibit unprivileged users from reading:
a) Security audit logs
b) System-wide credential repositories
c) no other objects
TSS Link: TSS for FPT_ACF_EXT.1
6.1.6.2 FPT_ASLR_EXT.1 Address Space Layout Randomization
PP Origin: OSPP
FPT_ASLR_EXT.1.1
The OS shall always randomize process address space memory locations with 16 bits of entropy except
for no exceptions.
TSS Link: TSS for FPT_ASLR_EXT.1
6.1.6.3 FPT_SBOP_EXT.1 Stack Buffer Overflow Protection
PP Origin: OSPP
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FPT_SBOP_EXT.1.1
The OS shall employ stack-based buffer overflow protections.
TSS Link: TSS for FPT_SBOP_EXT.1
6.1.6.4 FPT_TST_EXT.1 Boot Integrity
PP Origin: OSPP
Applied TDs: TD0493
FPT_TST_EXT.1.1
The OS shall verify the integrity of the bootchain up through the OS kernel and
● no other executable code
prior to its execution through the use of
● a digital signature using a hardware-protected asymmetric key
TSS Link: TSS for FPT_TST_EXT.1
6.1.6.5 FPT_TUD_EXT.1 Trusted Update
PP Origin: OSPP
Applied TDs: TD0386, TD0463
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.1
The OS shall provide the ability to check for updates to the OS software itself and shall use a digital
signature scheme specified in FCS_COP.1(3) to validate the authenticity of the response.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.2
The OS shall cryptographically verify updates to itself using a digital signature prior to installation using
schemes specified in FCS_COP.1(3).
TSS Link: TSS for FPT_TUD_EXT.1
6.1.6.6 FPT_TUD_EXT.2 Trusted Update for Application Software
PP Origin: OSPP
Applied TDs: TD0463
FPT_TUD_EXT.2.1
The OS shall provide the ability to check for updates to application software and shall use a digital
signature scheme specified in FCS_COP.1(3) to validate the authenticity of the response.
FPT_TUD_EXT.2.2
The OS shall cryptographically verify the integrity of updates to applications using a digital signature
specified by FCS_COP.1(3) prior to installation.
TSS Link: TSS for FPT_TUD_EXT.2
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6.1.6.7 FPT_W^X_EXT.1 Write XOR Execute Memory Pages
PP Origin: OSPP
FPT_W^X_EXT.1.1
The OS shall prevent allocation of any memory region with both write and execute permissions except for
● On Apple silicon Macs: Safari, Perl, Python, JavaScript
● On "Intel with T2" Macs: Applications not marked with hardened execution in their binary
image
TSS Link: TSS for FPT_W^X_EXT.1
6.1.7 TOE access (FTA)
6.1.7.1 FTA_TAB.1 Default TOE access banners
PP Origin: OSPP
FTA_TAB.1.1
Before establishing a user session, the OS shall display an advisory warning message regarding
unauthorized use of the OS.
TSS Link: TSS for FTA_TAB.1
6.1.8 Trusted path/channels (FTP)
6.1.8.1 FTP_BLT_EXT.1 Bluetooth Encryption
PP Origin: BT
FTP_BLT_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall enforce the use of encryption when transmitting data over the Bluetooth trusted channel for
BR/EDR and LE.
FTP_BLT_EXT.1.2
The TSF shall use key pairs per FCS_CKM_EXT.8 for Bluetooth encryption.
TSS Link: TSS for FTP_BLT_EXT.1
6.1.8.2 FTP_BLT_EXT.2 Persistence of Bluetooth Encryption
PP Origin: BT
FTP_BLT_EXT.2.1
The TSF shall terminate the connection if the remote device stops encryption while connected to the
TOE.
TSS Link: TSS for FTP_BLT_EXT.2
6.1.8.3 FTP_BLT_EXT.3/BR Bluetooth Encryption Parameters (BR/EDR)
PP Origin: BT
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Applied TDs: TD0640
FTP_BLT_EXT.3.1/BR
The TSF shall set the minimum encryption key size to 128 bits for BR/EDR and not negotiate encryption
key sizes smaller than the minimum size.
TSS Link: TSS for FTP_BLT_EXT.3/BR
6.1.8.4 FTP_BLT_EXT.3/LE Bluetooth Encryption Parameters (LE)
PP Origin: BT
FTP_BLT_EXT.3.1/LE
The TSF shall set the minimum encryption key size to 128 bits for LE and not negotiate encryption key
sizes smaller than the minimum size.
TSS Link: TSS for FTP_BLT_EXT.3/LE
6.1.8.5 FTP_ITC_EXT.1 Trusted channel communication
PP Origin: OSPP
Applied TDs: TD0649
FTP_ITC_EXT.1.1
The OS shall use
● TLS as conforming to FCS_TLSC_EXT.1
to provide a trusted communication channel between itself and authorized IT entities supporting the
following capabilities: update server, application initiated TLS that is logically distinct from other
communication channels and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the
channel data from disclosure and detection of modification of the channel data.
TSS Link: TSS for FTP_ITC_EXT.1
6.1.8.6 FTP_TRP.1 Trusted Path
PP Origin: OSPP
FTP_TRP.1.1
The OS shall provide a communication path between itself and local users that is logically distinct from
other communication paths and provides assured identification of its endpoints and protection of the
communicated data from modification, disclosure.
FTP_TRP.1.2
The OS shall permit local users to initiate communication via the trusted path.
FTP_TRP.1.3
The OS shall require use of the trusted path for all remote administrative actions.
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TSS Link: TSS for FTP_TRP.1
6.2 Security Functional Requirements Rationale
6.2.1 Coverage
The following table provides a mapping of SFR to the security objectives, showing that each security functional
requirement addresses at least one security objective.
Table 12: Mapping of security functional requirements to security objectives
Security functional requirements Objectives
FAU_GEN.1 O.ACCOUNTABILITY
FAU_GEN.1/BT O.ACCOUNTABILITY,
O.INTEGRITY
FCS_CKM.1 O.PROTECTED_COMMS
FCS_CKM.2 O.PROTECTED_COMMS
FCS_CKM_EXT.4 O.PROTECTED_COMMS
FCS_CKM_EXT.8 O.PROTECTED_COMMS
FCS_COP.1(1) O.PROTECTED_COMMS,
O.PROTECTED_STORAGE
FCS_COP.1(2) O.INTEGRITY,
O.PROTECTED_COMMS
FCS_COP.1(3) O.INTEGRITY,
O.PROTECTED_COMMS
FCS_COP.1(4) O.INTEGRITY,
O.PROTECTED_COMMS
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 O.PROTECTED_COMMS,
O.PROTECTED_STORAGE
FCS_STO_EXT.1 O.PROTECTED_STORAGE
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1 O.PROTECTED_COMMS
FCS_TLSC_EXT.2 O.PROTECTED_COMMS
FCS_TLSC_EXT.4 O.PROTECTED_COMMS
FDP_ACF_EXT.1 O.PROTECTED_STORAGE
FIA_AFL.1 O.INTEGRITY
FIA_BLT_EXT.1 O.PROTECTED_COMMS
FIA_BLT_EXT.2 O.PROTECTED_COMMS
FIA_BLT_EXT.3 O.PROTECTED_COMMS
FIA_BLT_EXT.4 O.PROTECTED_COMMS
FIA_BLT_EXT.6 O.PROTECTED_COMMS
FIA_BLT_EXT.7 O.PROTECTED_COMMS
FIA_UAU.5 O.INTEGRITY
FIA_X509_EXT.1 O.INTEGRITY,
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Security functional requirements Objectives
O.PROTECTED_COMMS
FIA_X509_EXT.2 O.PROTECTED_COMMS
FMT_MOF_EXT.1 O.MANAGEMENT
FMT_MOF_EXT.1/BT O.MANAGEMENT
FMT_SMF_EXT.1 O.MANAGEMENT
FMT_SMF_EXT.1/BT O.MANAGEMENT
FPT_ACF_EXT.1 O.INTEGRITY
FPT_ASLR_EXT.1 O.INTEGRITY
FPT_SBOP_EXT.1 O.INTEGRITY
FPT_TST_EXT.1 O.INTEGRITY
FPT_TUD_EXT.1 O.INTEGRITY
FPT_TUD_EXT.2 O.INTEGRITY
FPT_W^X_EXT.1 O.INTEGRITY
FTA_TAB.1 O.MANAGEMENT
FTP_BLT_EXT.1 O.PROTECTED_COMMS
FTP_BLT_EXT.2 O.PROTECTED_COMMS
FTP_BLT_EXT.3/BR O.PROTECTED_COMMS
FTP_BLT_EXT.3/LE O.PROTECTED_COMMS
FTP_ITC_EXT.1 O.ACCOUNTABILITY,
O.INTEGRITY,
O.PROTECTED_COMMS
FTP_TRP.1 O.MANAGEMENT
6.2.2 Sufficiency
The following rationale provides justification for each security objective for the TOE, showing that the security
functional requirements are suitable to meet and achieve the security objectives.
Table 13: Security objectives for the TOE rationale
Security objectives Rationale
O.ACCOUNTABILITY [OSPP] FAU_GEN.1 defines the auditable events that must be generated to
diagnose the cause of unexpected system behavior.
[OSPP] FTP_ITC_EXT.1 provides a mechanism for the TSF to transmit the audit
data to a remote system.
[BT] FAU_GEN.1/BT supports the objective by requiring the TSF to specify the
Bluetooth-related auditable events for which it will generate audit records.
O.INTEGRITY [OSPP] FPT_SBOP_EXT.1 enforces stack buffer overflow protection that makes
it more difficult to exploit running code.
[OSPP] FPT_ASLR_EXT.1 prevents attackers from exploiting code that executes
in static known memory locations.
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Security objectives Rationale
[OSPP] FPT_TUD_EXT.1 and FPT_TUD_EXT.2 enforce integrity of software
updates.
[OSPP] FCS_COP.1(2), FCS_COP.1(3), and FCS_COP.1(4) provide the
cryptographic mechanisms that are used to verify integrity values.
[OSPP] FPT_ACF_EXT.1 guarantees the integrity of critical components by
preventing unauthorized modifications of them.
[OSPP] FIA_X509_EXT.1 provides X.509 certificates as a way of validating
software integrity.
[OSPP] FPT_TST_EXT.1 verifies the integrity of stored code.
[OSPP] FPT_W^X_EXT.1 prevents execution of data in writable memory.
[OSPP] FIA_UAU.5 provides mechanisms that prevent untrusted users from
accessing the TSF and FIA_AFL.1 prevents brute-force authentication attempts.
[OSPP] FTP_ITC_EXT.1 provides trusted remote communications which makes a
remote authenticated session less susceptible to compromise.
[BT] FAU_GEN.1/BT supports the objective by requiring the TSF to specify the
Bluetooth-related auditable events for which it will generate audit records.
O.MANAGEMENT [OSPP] FMT_SMF_EXT.1 defines the TOE's management functions and
FMT_MOF_EXT.1 defines the privileges required to invoke them.
[OSPP] FTP_TRP.1 provides one or more secure remote interfaces for
management of the TSF and FTA_TAB.1 provides actionable warnings against
misuse of these interfaces.
[BT] FMT_MOF_EXT.1/BT supports the objective by restricting the ability to
perform Bluetooth-related management functions to the Administrator.
[BT] FMT_SMF_EXT.1/BT supports the objective by specifying the Bluetooth-
related management functions that the TSF must perform.
O.PROTECTED_STORAGE [OSPP] FCS_STO_EXT.1 provides a mechanism by which the TOE can designate
data as 'sensitive' and subsequently require it to be encrypted.
[OSPP] FCS_COP.1(1) defines the symmetric algorithm used to encrypt and
decrypt sensitive data.
[OSPP] FCS_RBG_EXT.1 defines the random bit generator used to create the
symmetric keys used to perform this encryption and decryption.
[OSPP] FDP_ACF_EXT.1 enforces logical access control on stored data.
O.PROTECTED_COMMS [OSPP] FCS_TLSC_EXT.1, FCS_TLSC_EXT.2, and FCS_TLSC_EXT.4 define the
ability of the TOE to act as a TLS client as a method of enforcing protected
communications.
[OSPP] FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.2, FCS_CKM_EXT.4, FCS_COP.1(1),
FCS_COP.1(2), FCS_COP.1(3), FCS_COP.1(4), and FCS_RBG_EXT.1 define the
cryptographic operations and key lifecycle activity used to support the
establishment of protected communications.
[OSPP] FIA_X509_EXT.1 defines how the TSF validates x.509 certificates as part
of establishing protected communications.
[OSPP] FIA_X509_EXT.2 defines the trusted communication protocols for which
the TOE must perform certificate validation operations.
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Security objectives Rationale
[OSPP] FTP_ITC_EXT.1 defines the trusted communications channels supported
by the TOE.
[BT] FCS_CKM_EXT.8 supports the objective by requiring the TSF to specify how
ECDH key pairs will be refreshed.
[BT] FIA_BLT_EXT.1 supports the objective by ensuring that Bluetooth
communications are not initiated without user approval.
[BT] FIA_BLT_EXT.2 supports the objective by requiring the TSF to implement
Bluetooth mutual authentication.
[BT] FIA_BLT_EXT.3 supports the objective by preventing Bluetooth spoofing by
rejecting connections with duplicate device addresses.
[BT] FIA_BLT_EXT.4 supports the objective by defining the TSF's implementation
of Bluetooth Secure Simple Pairing.
[BT] FIA_BLT_EXT.6 supports the objective by requiring the TSF to specify the
Bluetooth profiles that it requires explicit user authorization to grant access to for
trusted devices.
[BT] FIA_BLT_EXT.7 supports the objective by requiring the TSF to specify the
Bluetooth profiles that it requires explicit user authorization to grant access to for
untrusted devices.
[BT] FTP_BLT_EXT.1 supports the objective by requiring the TSF to implement
encryption to protect Bluetooth communications.
[BT] FTP_BLT_EXT.2 supports the objective by requiring the TSF to prevent data
transmission over Bluetooth if the paired device is not using encryption.
[BT] FTP_BLT_EXT.3/BR support the objective by requiring the TSF to implement
a minimum encryption key size for Bluetooth BR/EDR.
[BT] FTP_BLT_EXT.3/LE support the objective by requiring the TSF to implement
a minimum encryption key size for Bluetooth LE.
6.3 Security Assurance Requirements
The security assurance requirements (SARs) for the TOE are defined in the OSPPV4.2.1 protection profile; and
defined in CC assurance package.
The following table shows the SARs, and the operations performed on the components according to CC part 3:
iteration (Iter.), refinement (Ref.), assignment (Ass.) and selection (Sel.).
Table 14: SARs
Operations
Security
assurance class
Security assurance requirement Source
Iter. Ref. Ass. Sel.
ALC_TSU_EXT.1 Timely Security Updates OSPPV4.2.1 No No No No
ALC_CMC.1 Labelling of the TOE CC No No No No
ALC Life-cycle
support
ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage CC No No No No
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims CC No No No No
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition CC No No No No
ASE Security
Target evaluation
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction CC No No No No
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Operations
Security
assurance class
Security assurance requirement Source
Iter. Ref. Ass. Sel.
ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives CC No No No No
ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements CC No No No No
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition CC No No No No
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification CC No No No No
ADV Development ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification CC No No No No
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance CC No No No No
AGD Guidance
documents
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures CC No No No No
ATE Tests ATE_IND.1 Independent testing - conformance CC No No No No
AVA Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability survey CC No No No No
6.3.1 ALC Life-cycle support
6.3.1.1 ALC_TSU_EXT.1 Timely Security Updates
Developer action elements:
ALC_TSU_EXT.1.1D
The developer shall provide a description in the TSS of how timely security updates are made to the OS.
ALC_TSU_EXT.1.2D
The developer shall provide a description in the TSS of how users are notified when updates change
security properties or the configuration of the product.
Content and presentation elements:
ALC_TSU_EXT.1.1C
The description shall include the process for creating and deploying security updates for the OS software.
ALC_TSU_EXT.1.2C
The description shall include the mechanisms publicly available for reporting security issues pertaining to
the OS.
Evaluator action elements:
ALC_TSU_EXT.1.1E
The evaluator will confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and
presentation of evidence.
6.4 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale
SAR rationales are provided by the PPs to which this ST conforms. Section 2 contains the list of PPs.
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7 TOE Summary Specification
7.1 TSS Security Assurance Evaluation Activity
7.1.1 Timely security updates (ALC_TSU_EXT.1)
Apple generally does not disclose, discuss, or confirm security issues until a full investigation is complete and
any necessary patches or releases are available. Once an issue has been confirmed and a patch has been made
available, references containing technical details on the patches are made available and Common Vulnerabilities
and Exposures (CVEs), etc. are released.
Apple distributes information about security issues in its products through its "Apple security updates" page (h
ttps://support.apple.com/HT201222).
Security advisories are also provided through the security-announce mailing list (https://lists.apple.com/mailm
an/listinfo/security-announce/).
Potential security vulnerabilities can be reported by following the procedures on the "Report a security or
privacy vulnerability" page (https://support.apple.com/HT201220). This includes sending an email to "product-
security@apple.com" and includes the ability to encrypt information using the Apple Product Security PGP key
(https://support.apple.com/kb/HT201214).
The TOE supports Apple's Rapid Security Responses feature. This feature allows security updates to the TOE
to be applied when available without waiting for the next cumulative macOS update.
7.2 TOE Security Functionality
7.2.1 Audit
7.2.1.1 FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
PP Origin: OSPP
SFR Link: FAU_GEN.1
Audit events are generated for the following audit functions:
● Start-up and shut-down of the audit functions
● Authentication events (Success/Failure)
● Use of privileged/special rights events (Successful and unsuccessful security, audit, and
configuration changes)
● Privilege or role escalation events (Success/Failure)
● Administrator or root-level access events (Success/Failure)
Each audit record contains the following information:
● Date and time
● Type of event
● Subject identity (if applicable)
● Outcome (success or failure)
The logging system captures messages across all levels of the system, and it stores the log data in memory
and data store on disk. Audit events are only accessible by administrators. Audit events can be viewed via the
command line. If the username is longer than 8 characters, the system uses the user ID to display. To access
the audit logs, the TOE provides built-in utilities "audit", "praudit", and "auditreduce". All audit records are Basic
Security Module (BSM) compliant, and any BSM Audit Tool could be used for viewing audit logs.
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7.2.1.2 FAU_GEN.1/BT Audit data generation (Bluetooth)
PP Origin: BT
SFR Link: FAU_GEN.1/BT
The TOE generates Bluetooth audit records after the "Bluetooth for macOS" configuration profile is installed on
the TOE. This profile is obtainable from the Apple Developer website under "Profiles and Logs » macOS" along
with instructions. The administrator can use the macOS sysdiagnose feature to obtain these records in the form
of log files. The /private/var/tmp folder will contain the log files.
The TOE audits the following events:
● Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions
● Specifically defined auditable events listed in Table 9
Each audit record contains the following information:
● Date and time
● Type of event
● Subject identity
● Outcome (success or failure)
● Additional information as specified in Table 9
The TOE does not generate audit records for Bluetooth duplicate connection attempts (FIA_BLT_EXT.3) because
rejections happen at the Host Controller Interface (HCI) layer.
7.2.2 Cryptography
The security features that use cryptography in this ST are the following:
● Bluetooth
● Keychains
● Secure boot
● TLS client
● Trusted update
The cryptographic modules used to implement the above security features are the following:
● Apple corecrypto Module v13.0 [Apple ARM, User, Software, SL1] (user space)
● Apple corecrypto Module v13.0 [Apple ARM, Kernel, Software, SL1] (kernel space)
● Apple corecrypto Module v13.0 [Apple silicon, Secure Key Store, Hardware, SL2] (SKS)
● Apple corecrypto Module v13.0 [Intel, User, Software, SL1] (user space)
● Apple corecrypto Module v13.0 [Intel, Kernel, Software, SL1] (kernel space)
● Apple corecrypto Module v13.0 [Apple ARM, Secure Key Store, Hardware, SL2] (SKS)
● Bluetooth hardware
Bluetooth uses the user space module for all cryptographic operations except for the Bluetooth AES-CCM-128
bulk encryption which is implemented by the Bluetooth hardware.
Keychains use the user space module with the root key anchored by the SKS module.
Secure boot uses the kernel space module and SKS module.
TLS and trusted update use the user space module for all cryptographic operations.
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Table 15 lists the algorithms discussed in the following subsections.
Table 15: Cryptographic algorithm table
SFR Algorithm Capabilities Usage
RSA KeyGen 2048, 3072, 4096 Client authentication in TLS client with
mutual authentication
FCS_CKM.1
ECDSA KeyGen P-256, P-384, P-521 Bluetooth SSP (P-256)
Client authentication in TLS client
with mutual authentication and key
establishment using ephemeral keys in
TLS client (ECDHE)
RSA RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5
Key Establishment
2048, 3072, 4096 Key establishment in TLS client
FCS_CKM.2
ECC Key Establishment
(KAS-ECC)
P-256, P-384, P-521 Bluetooth SSP (P-256)
Key establishment in TLS client
AES-CBC, AES-GCM 128-bit, 256-bit Keychains (AES-GCM-256)
TLS client (AES-CBC, AES-GCM)
FCS_COP.1(1)
AES-CCM 128-bit Bluetooth SSP (AES-CCM-128)
FCS_COP.1(2) SHA-1, SHA-256,
SHA-384, SHA-512
Secure boot (SHA-256 in Apple silicon
and SHA-512 in "Intel with T2")
TLS client
Trusted update (SHA-256 in Apple
silicon and SHA-512 in "Intel with T2")
RSA SigVer 2048, 3072, 4096
with:
SHA-1, SHA-256,
SHA-384, SHA-512
Secure boot (4096 bits with SHA-256 in
"Intel with T2")
TLS client
Trusted update (4096 bits with SHA-256
in "Intel with T2")
FCS_COP.1(3)
ECDSA SigVer P-256, P-384, P-521
with:
SHA-1, SHA-256,
SHA-384, SHA-512
Secure boot (P-512 with SHA-512 in
Apple silicon)
TLS client
Trusted update (P-512 with SHA-512 in
Apple silicon)
FCS_COP.1(4) HMAC-SHA-1,
HMAC-SHA-256,
HMAC-SHA-384,
HMAC-SHA-512
Bluetooth BR/EDR (HMAC-SHA-256)
TLS client
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 CTR_DRBG AES Bluetooth
TLS client
7.2.2.1 FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation
PP Origin: OSPP
SFR Link: FCS_CKM.1
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The TOE supports generation of 2048-bit, 3072-bit, and 4096-bit RSA keys conforming to FIPS PUB 186-4
"Digital Signature Standard (DSS)", Appendix B.3. The TOE provides RSA key generation for being used in TLS
sessions with client authentication.
The TOE supports NIST curves P-256, P-384, and P-521 for key generation conforming to FIPS PUB 186-4
"Digital Signature Standard (DSS)", Appendix B.4. The TOE provides ECDSA key generation for being used in
TLS sessions with client authentication. Also, the TOE generates ephemeral keys using these curves for ECDH
key establishment. Bluetooth SSP uses ephemeral ECDH curve P-256 for key establishment.
Please refer to Table 15 for details.
7.2.2.2 FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key establishment
PP Origin: OSPP
SFR Link: FCS_CKM.2
The TOE supports cryptographic key establishment using the following schemes:
● RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 RSA-based key establishment with 2048-bit, 3072-bit, and 4096-bit keys as
specified in Section 7.2 of RFC 8017.
● Elliptic curve-based key establishment with NIST curves P-256, P-384, and P-521 as specified
in NIST SP 800-56A rev 3, "Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using
Discrete Logarithm Cryptography".
RSA-based key establishment is used in TLS sessions when ciphersuites with RSA key exchange are negotiated.
The TOE acts as the sender for RSA-based key establishment schemes. When the TOE detects a decryption
error, it warns the invoker that an error occurred, but it doesn't provide any cryptographically-sensitive data to
the invoker or in log files to unauthorized users.
Elliptic curve-based key establishment is used in TLS sessions when ciphersuites with ECDHE key exchange
are negotiated. Bluetooth SSP initialization also uses elliptic curve-based key establishment.
Please refer to Table 15 for details.
7.2.2.3 FCS_CKM_EXT.4 Cryptographic key destruction
PP Origin: OSPP
SFR Link: FCS_CKM_EXT.4
The TOE includes a Keychain Access program that allows users the ability to add, remove, and manage
certificates and private keys. Please see Section 7.2.2.10 below for Keychain details. The metadata key is a Data
Encryption Key (DEK) stored in non-volatile memory. Each Keychain item is protected with an individual DEK.
The metadata of all Keychain items is collectively encrypted with another DEK.
Each DEK is wrapped by the Secure Enclave with one class key acting as the key encryption key (KEK) as
requested by the creator of the Keychain item. The KEK remains inside the Secure Enclave. The KEKs are
wrapped by a key derived from the user's passcode.
All DEKs and KEKs are always stored in wrapped form in non-volatile store. The unwrapped copy of the key is
solely held in volatile memory for the duration that key is required to unwrap the DEK (for KEKs) or to decrypt
the data (for DEKs).
The wrapped keys held in non-volatile store are cryptographically destroyed by destroying the KEK wrapping
key.
The plaintext keys held in volatile store are overwritten with zeros.
The TOE also provides an interface to add, remove and manage certificates and private keys through the
Keychain Services API, which is described in [CCGUIDE]☝.
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7.2.2.4 FCS_CKM_EXT.8 Bluetooth key generation
PP Origin: BT
SFR Link: FCS_CKM_EXT.8
The TOE generates a new ECDH key pair for every new Bluetooth connection attempt. Static ECDH key pairs
are not permitted.
7.2.2.5 FCS_COP.1(1) Cryptographic operation - encryption/decryption
PP Origin: OSPP
SFR Link: FCS_COP.1(1)
The TOE supports AES encryption using 128-bit and 256-bit keys in the following modes:
● CBC as specified in NIST SP 800-38A (for TLS)
● GCM as specified in NIST SP 800-38D (for TLS, Keychain)
● CCM (128-bit) as specified in NIST SP 800-38C (for Bluetooth)
Please refer to Table 15 for details.
7.2.2.6 FCS_COP.1(2) Cryptographic operation - hashing
PP Origin: OSPP
SFR Link: FCS_COP.1(2)
The TOE supports cryptographic hashing services conforming to FIPS Pub 180-4. The hashing algorithms are
used for signature services and HMAC services.
The TOE supports the following hash algorithms: SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512. The message
digest sizes supported are: 160 bits, 256 bits, 384 bits, and 512 bits.
Please refer to Table 15 for details.
7.2.2.7 FCS_COP.1(3) Cryptographic operation - signing
PP Origin: OSPP
SFR Link: FCS_COP.1(3)
The TOE provides cryptographic signature generation and verification in accordance with the following
cryptographic algorithms:
● RSA digital signature algorithm conforming to FIPS Pub 186-4, "Digital Signature Standard (DSS)",
Section 4. The RSA key sizes supported are: 2048 bits, 3072 bits, and 4096-bit.
● Elliptical curve digital signature algorithm conforming to FIPS Pub 186-4, "Digital Signature Standard
(DSS)", Section 5. The TOE supports curves P-256, P-384, and P-521.
Please refer to Table 15 for details.
7.2.2.8 FCS_COP.1(4) Cryptographic operation - keyed-hash message
authentication
PP Origin: OSPP
SFR Link: FCS_COP.1(4)
The TOE supports keyed-hash message authentication conforming to FIPS Pub 198-1 "The Keyed-Hash
Message Authentication Code" and FIPS Pub 180-4 "Secure Hash Standard" with the following algorithms:
● HMAC-SHA-1
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● HMAC-SHA-256
● HMAC-SHA-384
● HMAC-SHA-512
The TOE supports key sizes 8 through 262144 bits for all HMAC algorithms.
Please refer to Table 15 for details.
7.2.2.9 FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Random bit generation
PP Origin: OSPP
SFR Link: FCS_RBG_EXT.1
The TOE uses a CTR_DRBG(AES) to generate random bits. The DRBG is seeded by an entropy source that
accumulates entropy from a software-based noise (interrupts) source with a minimum of 256 bits of entropy.
Please refer to Table 15 for details.
7.2.2.10 FCS_STO_EXT.1 Storage of sensitive data
PP Origin: OSPP
SFR Link: FCS_STO_EXT.1
The TOE stores the following sensitive data:
● TOE usernames used for authentication are maintained by the local directory services.
● Trusted Certificates are used for establishing TLS sessions and are stored in the macOS Keychain.
● Private Keys are used for establishing TLS session and are stored in the macOS Keychain.
The TOE does not store login passwords. Instead, the TOE converts the user's typed password into a key used
to unwrap the user's class keys. If the typed password is correct (i.e., it successfully unwraps the user's class
keys), the user is considered authenticated; otherwise, authentication fails.
TOE usernames are handled via the "Users & Group" GUI described in section 3.2 of the [CCGUIDE]☝.
The TOE offers a repository, called Keychain, that provides apps a convenient and secure location to store
trusted certificates and private keys. It can be accessed by opening the Keychain Access app in the /System/
Applications/Utilities/ folder. An initial default keychain is created for each user, though users can create other
keychains for specific purposes.
In addition to user keychains, the TOE relies on a number of system-level keychains that maintain authentication
assets that are not user-specific, such as network credentials and public key infrastructure (PKI) identities.
Keychain items are encrypted using two different AES-GCM-256 keys:
● Table key (metadata key)
● Per-row key (secret key)
Keychain metadata (all attributes other than kSecValue) is encrypted with the metadata key to speed searches
while the secret value (kSecValueData) is encrypted with the secret key. The metadata key is protected by the
Secure Enclave (platform-provided HW storage) but is cached in the application processor to allow fast queries
of the keychain.
Applications can use the Keychain Services API described in [CCGUIDE]☝ to manage trusted certificates and
private keys.
7.2.2.11 FCS_TLSC_EXT.1 TLS client protocol
PP Origin: OSPP
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SFR Link: FCS_TLSC_EXT.1
The TOE implements TLS 1.2 (RFC 5246) client functionality supporting the following cipher suites:
● TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC 5246
● TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC 5246
● TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5288
● TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5288
● TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5289
● TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289
● TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5289
● TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289
The TOE also supports the following TLS 1.2 cipher suites not specified in [OSPPv4.2.1]☝:
● TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
● TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
● TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
● TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
The TOE verifies that server certificate is valid according to FIA_X509_EXT.1 and that the presented identifier
matches the reference identifier according to RFC 6125. The reference identifiers supported are DNS and IP
addresses in the SAN. Wildcards are supported. The TOE does not support certificate pinning. The TOE does
not establish a trusted channel if the server certificate is invalid.
7.2.2.12 FCS_TLSC_EXT.2 TLS client protocol
PP Origin: OSPP
SFR Link: FCS_TLSC_EXT.2
The TOE, by default, presents the Supported Elliptic Curves Extension in the Client Hello with the following NIST
curves: secp256r1, secp384r1, and secp521r1.
7.2.2.13 FCS_TLSC_EXT.4 TLS client protocol
PP Origin: OSPP
SFR Link: FCS_TLSC_EXT.4
The TOE supports mutual authentication using X.509v3 certificates. When configured, the TOE will send a
Certificate and Certificate Verify message in response to a Certificate Request message from a TLS server.
7.2.3 User data protection
7.2.3.1 FDP_ACF_EXT.1 Access controls for protecting user data
PP Origin: OSPP
SFR Link: FDP_ACF_EXT.1
The TOE uses the Apple File System (APFS), which provides access control to data. File system object attributes
includes manipulation of metadata (e.g., change, access, modify time) as well as owner and permission data
(e.g., group IDs for allowing multiple users to have the same access privileges, user IDs for individual access
privileges, and permissions that can be assigned per user or group). The TOE provides the following file system
security schemes: sandbox entitlements, POSIX access control lists (ACLs), Unix (BSD) permissions, and per-
file BSD flags that override Unix permissions.
These security schemes fit together as follows (rules are processed in the following order):
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1. If the app's sandbox forbids the requested access, the request is denied.
2. If ownership checking has been disabled for the volume in question by the system administrator
(with a checkbox in its Finder Get Info window), the request is granted.
3. If an access control entry exists on the file, it is evaluated and used to determine access rights.
4. If a file flag prohibits the operation, the operation is denied.
5. Otherwise, if the user ID matches the owner of the file, the "user" permissions (also called "owner"
permissions) are used.
6. Otherwise, if the group ID matches the group for the file, the "group" permissions are used.
7. Otherwise, the "other" permissions are used.
Sandbox Entitlements
The TOE supports the use of a sandbox to limit an app's ability to access files. These limits override any
permissions the app might otherwise have. Sandbox limits are subtractive, not additive. Therefore, the file
system permissions represent the maximum access an app might be allowed if its sandbox also permits that
access.
POSIX ACLs
The TOE supports ACLs, which are data structures that provide much more detailed control over permissions
than Unix permissions. For example, ACLs allow the system administrator to specify that a specific user can
delete a file but cannot write to it. ACLs also provide compatibility with Active Directory and with the SMB/
CIFS networks used by the Windows operating system. An ACL consists of an ordered list of ACEs (access
control entries), each of which associates a user or group with a set of permissions and specifies whether each
permission is allowed or denied. ACEs also include attributes related to inheritance.
Each ACE in a directory's ACL can contain any combination of the following inheritance flags:
● Inherited (this ACE was inherited)
● File Inherit (this ACE should be inherited by files created within this directory)
● Directory Inherit (this ACE should be inherited by directories created within this directory)
● Inherit Only (this ACE should not be checked during authorization)
● No Propagate Inherit (this ACE should be inherited only by direct children; that is, the ACE should
lose any Directory Inherit or File Inherit bit when inherited)
When it creates a new file, the kernel goes through the entire access control list of the parent directory and copies
to the file's ACL any ACEs that are marked for file inheritance. Similarly, when it creates a new subdirectory, the
kernel copies to the subdirectory's ACL any ACEs that are marked for directory inheritance.
If a file is copied and pasted into a directory, the kernel replicates the contents of the source file into a new file at
the destination. Because it is creating a new file, the system checks the ACL of the parent directory and adds any
inherited ACEs to whatever ACEs were in the original file. If a file is moved into a directory, on the other hand, the
original file is not replicated and no ACEs are inherited. In this case, the parent directory's ACEs are added to the
moved file only if the administrator specifically propagates ACEs from the parent directory through contained
files and subdirectories. Similarly, once a file has been created, changing the ACL of the parent directory does not
affect the ACL of contained files and subdirectories unless the administrator specifically propagates the change.
In BSD, applying a directory's permissions to enclosed files and subdirectories completely replaces the
permissions of the enclosed objects. With ACLs, in contrast, inherited ACEs are added to other ACEs already
on the file or directory.
The order in which ACEs are placed in an ACL—and therefore the order in which they are evaluated to determine
permissions—is as follows:
1. Explicitly specified deny associations
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2. Explicitly specified allow associations
Inherited associations appear in the same order in which they appeared in the parent. Since ACEs can be
inherited, administrators can control the fine-grained permissions of files created in a directory by assigning
inheritable ACEs to the directory. Doing so saves the work of assigning ACEs to each file individually. In addition,
because ACEs can apply to groups of users, administrators can assign permissions to groups rather than having
to specify permissions for each individual. Applying access security to directories and groups rather than to files
and individuals saves administrator time and gives better file system performance in many circumstances.
Unix Permissions
Each file system object has a set of UNIX permissions defined by three attributes
● UID, short for User ID. Commonly referred to as the File's Owner.
● GID, short for Group ID.
● Flags that include permission bits and other related attributes.
The flags for a file or directory are a 16-bit value that is often represented as a three-digit or four-digit octal
value (with the top four or seven bits dropped). The Owner, Group, and Other bit sets contain three bits: read,
write, execute (rwx for short).
BSD File Flags
In addition to the standard Unix file permissions, the TOE supports several BSD file flags provided by the chflags
API and the related chflags command. These flags override the Unix permissions.
The TOE also allows admin users to disable ownership and permissions checking for removable volumes on a
per-volume basis by choosing Get Info on the volume in Finder then checking the "Ignore ownership on this
volume" checkbox.
7.2.4 Identification and authentication
7.2.4.1 FIA_AFL.1 Authentication failure handling
PP Origin: OSPP
SFR Link: FIA_AFL.1
The TOE will detect when an administrator-configurable integer within 1-50 unsuccessful authentication
attempts for authentication based on username and password attempts have been met. Once the specified
number of unsuccessful authentication attempts for an account has been met, the TOE will lock out the account.
7.2.4.2 FIA_BLT_EXT.1 Bluetooth user authorization
PP Origin: BT
SFR Link: FIA_BLT_EXT.1
The TOE supports SSP and the following Bluetooth association models:
● Numeric comparison
● Passkey entry
Users can pair their TOE device with a remote Bluetooth device using the 'Set up Bluetooth Device' option from
the Bluetooth status menu. Users can also remove a device from the TOE's device list. Explicit user authorization
is required for both pairing and removing a Bluetooth device from the TOE's device list.
Manual authorization is implicitly configured since pairing can only occur when explicitly authorized through the
System Settings » Bluetooth interface of the TOE device. During the pairing time, another device (or the TOE)
can send a pairing request. Commonly, a six-digit number is displayed on both sides, which must be manually
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matched by a user (i.e., the PIN is shown and the user must accept it before the pairing completes). If one device
does not support this automatic exchange of a PIN, a window for entering a manual PIN is shown. That PIN must
match on both sides.
This applies to applications that use Bluetooth also.
Bluetooth devices such as Keyboards, mice, trackpads, etc. can also be paired with the TOE simply by
connecting the device with a USB cable while the user is successfully logged in.
7.2.4.3 FIA_BLT_EXT.2 Bluetooth mutual authentication
PP Origin: BT
SFR Link: FIA_BLT_EXT.2
The TOE's Bluetooth device driver prevents data transfer via Bluetooth until pairing has fully completed and the
devices have mutually authenticated.
The TOE supports the Logical Link Control and Adaptation Layer Protocol (L2CAP) through an API in the
IOBluetoothDevice class.
An RFCOMM channel object can be obtained by opening an RFCOMM channel in a device or by requesting
a notification when a channel is created (this is commonly used to provide services). See the IOBluetooth
RFCOMMChannel class.
7.2.4.4 FIA_BLT_EXT.3 Rejection of duplicate Bluetooth connections
PP Origin: BT
SFR Link: FIA_BLT_EXT.3
Bluetooth devices may not establish more than one connection. Multiple connection attempts (i.e., pairing and
session initialization attempts) from the same BD_ADDR for an established connection will be discarded. For
details of the security of Bluetooth/LE see the Bluetooth Specifications [BT_SPEC]☝.
Rejection is performed at the Host Controller Interface (HCI) layer.
7.2.4.5 FIA_BLT_EXT.4 Secure Simple Pairing
PP Origin: BT
SFR Link: FIA_BLT_EXT.4
Devices that want to pair with the TOE via Bluetooth are required by the TOE to use Secure Simple Pairing,
which uses ECDH-based authentication and key exchange and AES for data encryption. See the Bluetooth
Specifications [BT_SPEC]☝ for details.
7.2.4.6 FIA_BLT_EXT.6 Trusted Bluetooth device user authorization
PP Origin: BT
SFR Link: FIA_BLT_EXT.6
The TOE supports Bluetooth including Basic Rate/Enhanced Data Rate (BR/EDR) and Low Energy (LE) with the
following Bluetooth profiles:
● Hands-Free Profile (HFP 1.6)
● Phone Book Access Profile (PBAP)
● Advanced Audio Distribution Profile (A2DP)
● Audio/Video Remote Control Profile (AVRCP 1.4)
● Personal Area Network Profile (PAN)
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● Human Interface Device Profile (HID)
● Message Access Profile (MAP)
Users can pair their TOE device with a remote Bluetooth device using the 'Set up Bluetooth Device' option from
the Bluetooth status menu. They can also remove a device from the TOE's device list. Explicit user authorization
is required for both pairing and removing a Bluetooth device from the TOE's device list.
Manual authorization is implicitly configured since pairing can only occur when explicitly authorized through the
System Settings » Bluetooth interface. During the pairing time, another device (or the TOE) can send a pairing
request. Commonly, a six-digit number is displayed on both sides, which must be manually matched by a user
(i.e., the PIN is shown and the user must accept it before the pairing completes). If one device does not support
this automatic exchange of a PIN, a window for entering a manual PIN is shown. That PIN must match on both
sides.
The TOE automatically authorizes the remote Bluetooth device during pairing for all Bluetooth profiles the remote
device announces to support during the pairing operation. This approach avoids user confusion between a paired
device to which the TOE is connected and authorized and thus can communicate with and a device to which
the TOE is connected but not yet authorized with which the TOE cannot yet communicate. To de-authorize a
device, the user would unpair the device. The TOE establishes a "trusted relationship" with an authorized device
at the time of pairing. The only difference in behavior between a trusted device and an untrusted device is that
the untrusted device must first be manually authorized as described in the previous paragraph.
7.2.4.7 FIA_BLT_EXT.7 Untrusted Bluetooth device user authorization
PP Origin: BT
SFR Link: FIA_BLT_EXT.7
See the TSS for FIA_BLT_EXT.6.
7.2.4.8 FIA_UAU.5 Multiple authentication mechanisms
PP Origin: OSPP
SFR Link: FIA_UAU.5
The TOE supports authentication based on username/password and username/smart card.
For password-based authentication, the user account supports a username and a password. To authenticate, a
Password-Based Derivation Key Function 2 (PBKDF2) with SHA-256 is used to generate the user's keybag key
from the user's password. If the output key from the PBKDF2 function can unwrap the user's keybag, then the
user is granted access; otherwise, the user is denied access.
For smart card authentication, the user initially logins in providing a valid username and password. Once
successfully authenticated, a smart card is paired to the user account by connecting the smart card and entering
the smart card's PIN to unlock the card. Entering the PIN releases the smart card's certificate (which contains
its public key), so it can be stored by the TOE. The certificate is associated with the user's account and the
card is considered to be paired with the user. When a user inserts a smart card to authenticate, the user enters
the associated PIN to unlock the card. Once unlocked, a signing operation is performed by the card. The TOE
verifies the signature using the paired certificate for authentication.
7.2.4.9 FIA_X509_EXT.1 X.509 Certificate validation
PP Origin: OSPP
SFR Link: FIA_X509_EXT.1
When an X.509 certificate is presented, the TOE verifies the certificate path and certification validation process
by verifying the following rules:
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● RFC 5280 certificate validation and certificate path validation.
● The certificate path must terminate with a trusted CA certificate.
● The OS shall validate a certificate path by ensuring the presence of the basicConstraints extension,
that the CA flag is set to TRUE for all CA certificates, and that any path constraints are met.
● The TSF shall validate that any CA certificate includes caSigning purpose in the key usage field
● The OS shall validate the revocation status of the certificate using OCSP. The certificate is accepted
if its revocation status cannot be determined.
The TOE validates the extendedKeyUsage field depending on the specific usage of the certificate as follows:
● Certificates used for trusted updates and executable code integrity verification shall have the Code
Signing Purpose (id-kp 3 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.3) in the extendedKeyUsage field.
● Server certificates presented for TLS shall have the Server Authentication purpose (id-kp 1 with OID
1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1) in the extendedKeyUsage field.
● Client certificates presented for TLS shall have the Client Authentication purpose (id-kp 2 with OID
1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2) in the EKU field.
● S/MIME certificates presented for email encryption and signature shall have the Email Protection
purpose (id-kp 4 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.4) in the EKU field.
● OCSP certificates presented for OCSP responses shall have the OCSP Signing Purpose (id-kp 9 with
OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.9) in the EKU field.
● Server certificates presented for EST shall have the CMC Registration Authority (RA) purpose (id-kp-
cmcRA with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.28) in the EKU field.
X.509 certificates are validated when imported into the TOE's trusted certificate store, during session
establishment with a peer, and prior to presenting a certificate to the peer during trusted channel implementation
using TLS for mutual authentications.
7.2.4.10 FIA_X509_EXT.2 X.509 Certificate authentication
PP Origin: OSPP
SFR Link: FIA_X509_EXT.2
The TOE uses X.509v3 certificates for performing mutual authentication for TLS and HTTPS connections.
7.2.5 Security management
7.2.5.1 FMT_MOF_EXT.1 Management of security functions behavior
PP Origin: OSPP
SFR Link: FMT_MOF_EXT.1
See the TSS for FMT_SMF_EXT.1.
7.2.5.2 FMT_MOF_EXT.1/BT Management of security functions behavior
PP Origin: BT
SFR Link: FMT_MOF_EXT.1/BT
See the TSS for FMT_SMF_EXT.1/BT.
7.2.5.3 FMT_SMF_EXT.1 Specification of management functions
PP Origin: OSPP
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SFR Link: FMT_SMF_EXT.1
The TOE supports the following roles: Administrator and User. The Administrator is a member of the local
admin group or an applied configuration profile, and the User is an unprivileged account. Functions requiring
Administrator access require the user to enter the correct Administrator password before allowing the user to
modify the function.
The Administrator has access to the following management functions:
● Enable/disable screen lock ("Require password after screen saver begins or display is turned off")
● Configure screen lock inactivity timeout ("Start Screen Saver when inactive")
● Configure local audit storage capacity
● Configure minimum password Length
● Configure minimum number of special characters in password
● Configure host-based firewall
● Configure name/address of remote management server from which to receive management settings
● Configure name/address of the logging server (syslog) to which to send logging records
● Configure audit rules
● Configure name/address of network time server
● Enable/disable automatic software update
● Configure Wi-Fi interface
The User has access to the following management functions:
● Enable/disable screen lock ("Require password after screen saver begins or display is turned off")
● Configure Wi-Fi interface (if not restricted by an Administrator)
● Enable/disable Bluetooth interface
7.2.5.4 FMT_SMF_EXT.1/BT Specification of management functions
PP Origin: BT
SFR Link: FMT_SMF_EXT.1/BT
The TOE supports both Bluetooth BR/EDR and LE, uses Secure Simple Pairing (SSP) for security, and supports
the following Bluetooth profiles:
● Hands-Free Profile (HFP 1.6)
● Phone Book Access Profile (PBAP)
● Advanced Audio Distribution Profile (A2DP)
● Audio/Video Remote Control Profile (AVRCP 1.4)
● Personal Area Network Profile (PAN)
● Human Interface Device Profile (HID)
● Message Access Profile (MAP)
Different TOE devices support different versions of Bluetooth. See Table 16 for the mapping of TOE devices to
Bluetooth versions.
BT-1
The TOE allows an administrator and user to enable and disable the Bluetooth Discoverable (for BR/EDR) and
Advertising (for LE) modes.
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7.2.6 Protection of the TSF
7.2.6.1 FPT_ACF_EXT.1 Access controls
PP Origin: OSPP
SFR Link: FPT_ACF_EXT.1
The TOE provides access control policy through System Integrity Protection. This technology prevents users,
including malicious software and the root user account (an administrator superuser account), from modifying
protected files and folders. System Integrity Protection is designed to allow modification of these protected parts
only by processes that are signed by Apple and have special entitlements to write to system files, such as Apple
software updates and Apple installers.
System Integrity Protection protects the following parts of the system from unauthorized modification.
● Kernel drivers and modules
❍ /System/Library/Extensions/
● Shared libraries
❍ Library/Frameworks
❍ /System/Library/Frameworks
❍ /System/Library/PrivateFrameworks
● Applications
❍ /System/Applications
➤ Apps that are installed with the TOE and updated as part of TOE updates
❍ /Applications
➤ Apps that are installed with the TOE but updated independently
Standard file permissions (FDP_ACF_EXT.1) are used to protect the following from unauthorized modification:
● Security audit logs
❍ /var/audit
● System configuration files
❍ /Library/Preferences - system-wide "preferences"
❍ ~/Library/Preferences - User-specific "preferences." A user has permission to modify their
own configuration files.
❍ /etc/security/audit-control
● TSF-data
❍ /var
❍ /var/db/mds/messages/<PID>/se_SecurityMessages – each se_SecurityMessages file
contains messages for the user represented by <PID>. A user has permission to modify
their own data.
❍ /var/folders/zz
❍ /var/folders/<non-zz directories> - user-specific TSF data. A user has permission to modify
their own data.
● System-wide credentials repositories (accessed through local directory services)
❍ /private/var/db/dslocal/nodes/Default/
● Applications
❍ /Applications
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➤ Apps installed by a traditional installer
➤ Apps copied into /Applications
The TOE prevents unprivileged users from reading Security audit logs and System-wide credential repositories.
7.2.6.2 FPT_ASLR_EXT.1 Address space layout randomization (ASLR)
PP Origin: OSPP
SFR Link: FPT_ASLR_EXT.1
The TOE always randomizes process address memory locations with 16 bits of entropy.
7.2.6.3 FPT_SBOP_EXT.1 Stack buffer overflow protection
PP Origin: OSPP
SFR Link: FPT_SBOP_EXT.1
The TOE protects all TOE binaries from stack-based buffer overflow attacks using:
● ASLR to randomize executable locations on the stack, preventing attackers from jumping to specific
data that has been written to the stack
● Stack canaries to detect if the stack has been overwritten when returning from a function
All TOE binaries are compiled with stack-based overflow protections enabled; however, not all compiled binaries
contain stack canaries for one or more of the following reasons:
● Type 1: The compiler can optimize away stack usage (which macOS heavily relies on for
performance reasons).
● Type 2: Some binaries are just small entry points that rely on system frameworks for all of their
functionality. There, the binary itself is going to be really small (less than ~1000 instructions,
sometimes as small as 10 instructions), so is much less likely to need stack protection.
● Type 3: There are very short program/functions that do not access the stack (and just forward to
system frameworks to perform the real work)
● Type 4: There are tiny binaries (very few instructions) with a single trivial function that do not need
stack protections or tiny wrappers that do not make use of the stack.
● Type 5: Some binaries do not access the stack in any kind of vulnerable way.
7.2.6.4 FPT_TST_EXT.1 Boot integrity
PP Origin: OSPP
SFR Link: FPT_TST_EXT.1
The boot process for an Apple silicon Mac is as follows:
1. The application processor loads the Boot ROM.
2. The Boot ROM validates the Low-Level Bootloader (LLB) signature using the Apple Root CA public
key.
3. LLB validates system-paired firmware signatures.
4. LLB validates iBoot stage 2 signature.
5. iBoot stage 2 validates the macOS-paired firmware, Boot Kernel Collection, Auxiliary Kernel
Collection (if applicable), system trust cache, and signed system volume signatures.
6. The TOE (macOS) begins execution.
The boot process for an Intel-based Mac with an Apple T2 security chip is as follows:
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● T2
1. The T2 loads the Boot ROM.
2. The Boot ROM validates the iBoot signature using the Apple Root CA public key.
3. iBoot validates the T2 kernel cache signature.
4. The T2 kernel cache evaluates the UEFI firmware signature.
5. The UEFI firmware begins the boot process on the Intel CPU.
● Intel CPU
1. The UEFI firmware validates the boot.efi signature.
2. boot.efi validates the macOS immutable kernel signature.
3. The TOE (macOS) begins execution.
For both hardware platforms, the Boot ROM is immutable code, referred to as the hardware root of trust. It is
laid down during chip fabrication and is audited for vulnerabilities and implicitly trusted. The Boot ROM code
contains the Apple Root CA public key, which is used to verify the digital signatures of the bootchain.
7.2.6.5 FPT_TUD_EXT.1 Trusted update
PP Origin: OSPP
SFR Link: FPT_TUD_EXT.1
The TOE allows the user to check for and install OS updates using the Software Update preference pane. This
pane also supports Apple's Rapid Security Responses feature. This feature allows security updates to the TOE
to be applied when available without waiting for the next cumulative macOS software update.
Signature verification of the TOE image is performed by the SEP. As the kernel boots, each stage of the boot
process validates the signatures of the next stage.
The TOE includes the Mac App Store app, which allows users to check for and install updates to apps. The TOE
validates the digital signature of the apps.
Apple silicon
Algorithm: ECDSA P-521 sigver
Standard: FIPS PUB 186-4
Modules:
● Apple corecrypto Module v13.0 [Apple ARM, User, Software, SL1]
● Apple corecrypto Module v13.0 [Apple ARM, Kernel, Software, SL1]
● Apple corecrypto Module v13.0 [Apple silicon, Secure Key Store, Hardware, SL2]
On Apple silicon Macs, signatures are verified using ECDSA P-521 and SHA-512. The CA public key is
embedded in the Mac's Boot ROM code during manufacturing. The TOE image is signed using this public key's
corresponding private key.
Intel with T2
Algorithm: RSA 4096 sigver
Standard: IEEE 1619
Modules:
● Apple corecrypto Module v13.0 [Intel, User, Software, SL1]
● Apple corecrypto Module v13.0 [Intel, Kernel, Software, SL1]
● Apple corecrypto Module v13.0 [Apple ARM, Secure Key Store, Hardware, SL2]
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On "Intel with T2" Macs, signatures are verified using RSA 4096-bit and SHA-256. The CA public key is
embedded in the SEP's Boot ROM code during manufacturing. The TOE image is signed using this public key's
corresponding private key.
7.2.6.6 FPT_TUD_EXT.2 Trusted update for application software
PP Origin: OSPP
SFR Link: FPT_TUD_EXT.2
See the TSS for FPT_TUD_EXT.1.
7.2.6.7 FPT_W^X_EXT.1 Write XOR execute memory pages
PP Origin: OSPP
SFR Link: FPT_W^X_EXT.1
Apple silicon
As a general rule, application memory has either write or execute permission but not both simultaneously. There
exists a special condition where memory pages marked as both writable and executable can be used only by
apps under tightly controlled conditions: the kernel checks for the presence of the Apple-only dynamic code-
signing entitlement. Even then, only a single mmap call can be made to request a writable and executable page,
which is given a randomized address.
The Safari web browser, Perl language, Python language, and JavaScript language contain components that use
Just-In-Time (JIT) code compilation technology and require both write and execute permission to memory.
Intel with T2
As a general rule, application memory has either write or execute permission but not both simultaneously
when the corresponding binary executable contains the hardened execution flag. This flag is consulted by the
application loading mechanism of the operating system which prevents the concurrent permissions of write and
execute on current and newly allocated memory.
7.2.7 TOE access
7.2.7.1 FTA_TAB.1 Default TOE access banners
PP Origin: OSPP
SFR Link: FTA_TAB.1
The TOE will display an advisory warning message regarding unauthorized use of the OS prior to establishing
a user session.
7.2.8 Trusted path/channels
7.2.8.1 FTP_BLT_EXT.1 Bluetooth encryption
PP Origin: BT
SFR Link: FTP_BLT_EXT.1
The TOE supports Bluetooth Basic Rate/Enhanced Data Rate (BR/EDR) and Low Energy (LE). Bluetooth is
enabled by default.
Devices that want to pair with the TOE via Bluetooth are required by the TOE to use Secure Simple Pairing, which
uses ECDH-based authentication and key exchange and AES for data encryption. This applies to both BR/EDR
and LE. Bluetooth encryption is always enabled.
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7.2.8.2 FTP_BLT_EXT.2 Persistence of Bluetooth encryption
PP Origin: BT
SFR Link: FTP_BLT_EXT.2
If the remote Bluetooth device stops encrypting while connected to the TOE, the TOE terminates the connection.
7.2.8.3 FTP_BLT_EXT.3/BR Bluetooth encryption parameters (BR/EDR)
PP Origin: BT
SFR Link: FTP_BLT_EXT.3/BR
Connections via BR/EDR and LE are secured using 128-bit AES Counter with CBC-MAC (AES-CCM-128) mode.
No other key sizes are supported; thus, smaller key sizes cannot be negotiated.
7.2.8.4 FTP_BLT_EXT.3/LE Bluetooth encryption parameters (LE)
PP Origin: BT
SFR Link: FTP_BLT_EXT.3/LE
See the TSS for FTP_BLT_EXT.3/BR for LE connections.
7.2.8.5 FTP_ITC_EXT.1 Trusted channel communication
PP Origin: OSPP
SFR Link: FTP_ITC_EXT.1
The TOE uses TLS as conforming to FCS_TLSC_EXT.1 to provide a trusted channel between itself and authorized
IT entities. The update server and other authenticated TLS servers are authorized IT entities.
7.2.8.6 FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path
PP Origin: OSPP
SFR Link: FTP_TRP.1
The TOE provides a trusted path between itself and local users that provides assured identification of its
endpoints. The trusted path is initiated by the local user. The TOE does not support a remote administrative
communication path in the evaluated configuration.
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8 Abbreviations, Terminology, and References
8.1 Abbreviations
ABM
Apple Business Manager
ACE
Access Control Entry
AES
Advanced Encryption Standard
app
Application
APFS
Apple File System
API
Application Programming Interface
ASLR
Address Space Layout Randomization
BD_ADDR
Bluetooth Device Address
BR/EDR
Basic Rate/Enhanced Data Rate
BSD
Berkeley Software Distribution
BSM
Basic Security Module
CA
Certificate Authority
CBC
Cypher Block Chaining
CC
Common Criteria
CCM
Counter with CBC-MAC
CEM
Common Evaluation Methodology
CIFS
Common Internet File System
CMC
Certificate Management over CMS
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CMS
Cryptographic Message Syntax
CSP
Critical Security Parameters
CVE
Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures
DAR
Data At Rest
DEK
Data Encryption Key
DEP
Data Execution Prevention
DNS
Domain Name System
DRBG
Deterministic Random Bit Generator
DSS
Digital Signature Standard
ECC
Elliptic Curve Cryptography
ECDH
Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman
ECDHE
ECDH Ephemeral
EKU
extendedKeyUsage
EST
Enrollment over Secure Transport
GCM
Galois/Counter Mode
GID
Group Identifier
GPOS
General Purpose Operating System
HCI
Host Controller Interface
HMAC
Keyed-hash Message Authentication Code
HTTPS
Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure
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ID
Identifier or Identity
IP
Internet Protocol
KAS
Key Agreement Scheme
KEK
Key Encryption Key
L2CAP
Logical Link Control and Adaptation Protocol
LE
Low Energy
LLB
Low-Level Bootloader
MAC
Message Authentication Code
OCSP
Online Certificate Status Protocol
OID
Object Identifier
OS
Operating System
PBKDF
Password-Based Key Derivation Function
PGP
Pretty Good Privacy
PII
Personally Identifiable Information
PIN
Personal Identification Number
PKI
Public Key Infrastructure
POSIX
Portable Operating System Interface
PP
Protection Profile
RA
Registration Authority
RBG
Random Bit Generator
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RFCOMM
Radio Frequency Communication
ROM
Read Only Memory
RSA
Rivest-Shamir-Adleman
SAN
Subject Alternative Name
SAR
Security Assurance Requirement
SCEP
Simple Certificate Enrollment Protocol
SEP
Secure Enclave Processor
SFR
Security Functional Requirement
SHA
Secure Hash Algorithm
SL1
Security Level 1 (FIPS 140-3)
SMB
Server Message Block
SoC
System on a Chip
SSP
Secure Simple Pairing
ST
Security Target
TLS
Transport Layer Security
TOE
Target of Evaluation
TRNG
True Random Number Generator
TSF
TOE Security Functionality
TSFI
TSF Interface
TSS
TOE Summary Specification
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UDID
Unique Device Identifier
UID
User Identifier
UUID
Universally Unique Identifier
XNU
X is Not Unix
8.2 Terminology
This section contains definitions of technical terms that are used with a meaning specific to this document.
Terms defined in the [CC] are not reiterated here, unless stated otherwise.
Administrator
An administrator is responsible for management activities, including setting policies that are applied
by the enterprise on the operating system. This administrator could be acting remotely through a
management server, from which the system receives configuration policies. An administrator can
enforce settings on the system which cannot be overridden by non-administrator users.
API
A specification of routines, data structures, object classes, and variables that allows an application
to make use of services provided by another software component, such as a library. APIs are often
provided for a set of libraries included with the platform.
app
Software that runs on a platform and performs tasks on behalf of the user or owner of the platform, as
well as its supporting documentation.
ASLR
An anti-exploitation feature which loads memory mappings into unpredictable locations. ASLR makes
it more difficult for an attacker to redirect control to code that they have introduced into the address
space of a process.
CC
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation.
CEM
Common Evaluation Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation.
Credential
Data that establishes the identity of a user, e.g. a cryptographic key or password.
CSP
Information that is either user or system defined and is used to operate a cryptographic module
in processing encryption functions including cryptographic keys and authentication data, such as
passwords, the disclosure or modification of which can compromise the security of a cryptographic
module or the security of the information protected by the module.
DAR Protection
Countermeasures that prevent attackers, even those with physical access, from extracting data from
non-volatile storage. Common techniques include data encryption and wiping.
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DEP
An anti-exploitation feature of modern operating systems executing on modern computer hardware,
which enforces a non-execute permission on pages of memory. DEP prevents pages of memory from
containing both data and instructions, which makes it more difficult for an attacker to introduce and
execute code.
Developer
An entity that writes OS software. For the purposes of this document, vendors and developers are the
same.
General Purpose Operating System
A class of OSes designed to support a wide-variety of workloads consisting of many concurrent
applications or services. Typical characteristics for OSes in this class include support for third-party
applications, support for multiple users, and security separation between users and their respective
resources. General Purpose Operating Systems also lack the real-time constraint that defines Real
Time Operating Systems (RTOS). RTOSes typically power routers, switches, and embedded devices.
Host-based Firewall
A software-based firewall implementation running on the OS for filtering inbound and outbound
network traffic to and from processes running on the OS.
OS
Software that manages physical and logical resources and provides services for applications. The
terms TOE and OS are interchangeable in this document.
PII
Any information about an individual maintained by an agency, including, but not limited to, education,
financial transactions, medical history, and criminal or employment history and information which can
be used to distinguish or trace an individual's identity, such as their name, social security number,
date and place of birth, mother's maiden name, biometric records, etc., including any other personal
information which is linked or linkable to an individual.
PP
An implementation-independent set of security requirements for a category of products.
SAR
A requirement to assure the security of the TOE.
Sensitive Data
Sensitive data may include all user or enterprise data or may be specific application data such as PII,
emails, messaging, documents, calendar items, and contacts. Sensitive data must minimally include
credentials and keys. Sensitive data shall be identified in the OS's TSS by the ST author.
SFR
A requirement for security enforcement by the TOE.
ST
A set of implementation-dependent security requirements for a specific product.
TOE
The product under evaluation. In this case, the Operating System and its supporting documentation.
TSF
The security functionality of the product under evaluation.
TSS
A description of how a TOE satisfies the SFRs in a ST.
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User
A user is subject to configuration policies applied to the operating system by administrators. On some
systems under certain configurations, a normal user can temporarily elevate privileges to that of an
administrator. At that time, such a user should be considered an administrator.
8.3 References
PP-Module for Bluetooth
Version 1.0
Date 2021-04-15
BT
Location https://www.niap-ccevs.org/Profile/Info.cfm?PPID=425&id=425
Bluetooth Specifications
Author(s) Bluetooth SIG, Inc.
Date 2021-07-13
BT_SPEC
Location https://www.bluetooth.com/specifications/
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation
Version 3.1R5
Date April 2017
Location http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/files/ccfiles/CCPART1V3.1R5.pdf
Location http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/files/ccfiles/CCPART2V3.1R5.pdf
CC
Location http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/files/ccfiles/CCPART3V3.1R5.pdf
Apple macOS 13 Ventura Common Criteria Configuration Guide
Version 1.1
Date 2024-01-12
CCGUIDE
Location https://www.niap-ccevs.org/MMO/Product/st_vid11347-agd.pdf
PP-Configuration for General Purpose Operating Systems and Bluetooth
Version 1.0
Date 2021-04-15
CFG_GPOS-BT_V1.0
Location https://www.niap-ccevs.org/MMO/PP/CFG_GPOS-BT_V1.0.pdf
Digital Signature Standard (DSS)
Date 2013-07-19
FIPS186-4
Location https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/fips/186-4/final
The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC)
Date 2008-07-16
FIPS198-1
Location https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/fips/198-1/final
Protection Profile for General Purpose Operating Systems Version 4.2.1
Version 4.2.1
Date 2019-04-22
OSPPv4.2.1
Location https://www.niap-ccevs.org/MMO/PP/PP_OS_V4.2.1.pdf
PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.2
Author(s) K. Moriarty, B. Kaliski, J. Jonsson, A. Rusch
Date 2016-11-01
RFC8017
Location http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc8017.txt
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Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Methods and
Techniques
Date 2001-12-01
SP800-38A
Location https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/38/a/final
Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: the CCM Mode for
Authentication and Confidentiality
Date 2007-07-20
SP800-38C
Location https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/38/c/upd1/final
Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Galois/Counter Mode
(GCM) and GMAC
Date 2007-11-28
SP800-38D
Location https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/38/d/final
Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key-Establishment Schemes Using Discrete
Logarithm Cryptography
Date 2018-04-16
SP800-56A-Rev3
Location https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/56/a/r3/final
Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic
Random Bit Generators
Date 2015-06-24
SP800-90A-Rev1
Location https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/90/a/r1/final
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A Appendixes
A.1 Hardware Platforms Covered by this Evaluation
This evaluation covers the following hardware platforms.
For brevity, the processor manufacturer names were left out of the table leaving only the processor names.
The Apple silicon processors start with the letter M. The Intel® processors start with either Core™ or Xeon®.
Bluetooth is abbreviated as BT.
Table 16: Hardware platforms
Marketing Name Model Model Identifier Processor Micro
Architecture
Security
Chip
BT
version
BT
Chip
2023
Mac14,6 M2 Max ARMv8.6-A SEP v2.0 5.3 4388
MacBook Pro (16-inch,
2023)
A2780
Mac14,10 M2 Pro ARMv8.6-A SEP v2.0 5.3 4388
Mac14,5 M2 Max ARMv8.6-A SEP v2.0 5.3 4388
MacBook Pro (14-inch,
2023)
A2779
Mac14,9 M2 Pro ARMv8.6-A SEP v2.0 5.3 4388
Mac mini (M2 Pro, 2023) A2816 Mac14,12 M2 Pro ARMv8.6-A SEP v2.0 5.3 4388
Mac mini (M2, 2023) A2686 Mac14,3 M2 ARMv8.6-A SEP v2.0 5.3 4388
2022
MacBook Pro (13-inch,
M2, 2022)
A2338 Mac14,7 M2 ARMv8.6-A SEP v2.0 5.0 4378
MacBook Air (M2, 2022) A2861 Mac14,2 M2 ARMv8.6-A SEP v2.0 5.0 4387
A2615 Mac13,2 M1 Ultra ARMv8.5-A SEP v2.0 5.0 4387
Mac Studio
A2615 Mac13,1 M1 Max ARMv8.5-A SEP v2.0 5.0 4387
2021
MacBookPro18,2 M1 Max ARMv8.5-A SEP v2.0 5.0 4387
MacBook Pro (16-inch,
2021)
A2485
MacBookPro18,1 M1 Pro ARMv8.5-A SEP v2.0 5.0 4387
MacBookPro18,4 M1 Max ARMv8.5-A SEP v2.0 5.0 4387
MacBook Pro (14-inch,
2021)
A2442
MacBookPro18,3 M1 Pro ARMv8.5-A SEP v2.0 5.0 4387
A2438 iMac21,1 M1 ARMv8.5-A SEP v2.0 5.0 4378
iMac (24-inch, M1, 2021)
A2439 iMac21,2 M1 ARMv8.5-A SEP v2.0 5.0 4378
2020
Mac mini (M1, 2020) A2348 Macmini9,1 M1 ARMv8.5-A SEP v2.0 5.0 4378
MacBook Air (M1, 2020) A2337 MacBookAir10,1 M1 ARMv8.5-A SEP v2.0 5.0 4378
MacBook Pro (13-inch,
M1, 2020)
A2338 MacBookPro17,1 M1 ARMv8.5-A SEP v2.0 5.0 4364
MacBook Air (Retina, 13-
inch, 2020)
A2179 MacBookAir9,1 Core i5-1030NG7
Core i7-1060NG7
Ice Lake T2 5.0 4377
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Marketing Name Model Model Identifier Processor Micro
Architecture
Security
Chip
BT
version
BT
Chip
MacBook Pro (13-inch,
2020, Four Thunderbolt
3 ports)
A2251 MacBookPro16,2 Core i5-1038NG7
Core i7-1068NG7
Ice Lake T2 5.0 4377
MacBook Pro (13-inch,
2020, Two Thunderbolt
3 ports)
A2289 MacBookPro16,3 Core i5-8257U
Core i7-8557U
Coffee Lake T2 5.0 4377
iMac (Retina 5K, 27-inch,
2020)
A2115 iMac20,1
iMac20,2
Core i5-10500
Core i5-10600
Core i7-10700K
Core i9-10910
Comet Lake T2 5.0 4364
2019
MacBook Air (Retina, 13-
inch, 2019)
A1932 MacBookAir8,2 Core i5-8210Y Amber Lake T2 4.2 4355
MacBook Pro (13-inch,
2019, Four Thunderbolt
3 ports)
A1989 MacBookPro15,2 Core i5-8279U
Core i7-8569U
Coffee Lake T2 5.0 4364
MacBook Pro (13-inch,
2019, Two Thunderbolt 3
ports)
A2159 MacBookPro15,4 Core i5-8257U
Core i7-8557U
Coffee Lake T2 5.0 4377
MacBook Pro (15-inch,
2019)
A1990 MacBookPro15,1
MacBookPro15,3
Core i7-9750H
Core i9-9880H
Coffee Lake T2 5.0 4364
MacBook Pro (16-inch,
2019)
A2141 MacBookPro16,1
MacBookPro16,4
Core i7-9750H
Core i9-9880H
Coffee Lake T2 5.0 4377
Mac Pro (2019) A1991 MacPro7,1 Xeon W-3223
Xeon W-3235
Xeon W-3245
Xeon W-3265M
Xeon W-3275M
Cascade Lake T2 5.0 4364
Mac Pro (2019 Rack) A2304 MacPro7,1 Xeon W-3223
Xeon W-3235
Xeon W-3245
Xeon W-3265M
Xeon W-3275M
Cascade Lake T2 5.0 4364
2018
MacBook Air (Retina, 13-
inch, 2018)
A1932 MacBookAir8,1 Core i5-8210Y Amber Lake T2 4.2 4355
Mac mini (2018) A1993 Macmini8,1 Core i5-8500B
Core i7-8700B
Coffee Lake T2 5.0 4364
MacBook Pro (15-inch,
2018)
A1990 MacBookPro15,1
MacBookPro15,3
Core i7-8750H
Core i7-8850H
Core i9-8950HK
Coffee Lake T2 5.0 4364
MacBook Pro (13-inch,
2018, Four Thunderbolt
3 ports)
A1989 MacBookPro15,2 Core i5-8259U
Core i7-8559U
Coffee Lake T2 5.0 4364
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Marketing Name Model Model Identifier Processor Micro
Architecture
Security
Chip
BT
version
BT
Chip
2017
iMac Pro (2017) A1862 iMacPro1,1 Xeon W-2140B
Xeon W-2150B
Xeon W-2170B
Xeon W-2190B
Skylake T2 5.0 4364
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A.2 SFR to CAVP Mapping Table
The CAVP certificates contain several different SoCs and micro-architectures in the operational environment
(OE). The relationship between the SoCs and micro-architectures used by the devices claimed in this
evaluation are specified in Appendix A.1.
The following convention is used in the tables of this appendix to identify the cryptographic modules.
KRN
● Apple corecrypto Module v13.0 [Apple ARM, Kernel, Software, SL1], or
● Apple corecrypto Module v13.0 [Intel, Kernel, Software, SL1]
SEP
● SEP Hardware v2.0 in Apple silicon, or
● SEP Hardware v2.0 in Apple T2
SKS
● Apple corecrypto Module v13.0 [Apple silicon, Secure Key Store, Hardware, SL2], or
● Apple corecrypto Module v13.0 [Apple ARM, Secure Key Store, Hardware, SL2]
USR
● Apple corecrypto Module v13.0 [Apple ARM, User, Software, SL1], or
● Apple corecrypto Module v13.0 [Intel, User, Software, SL1]
BC
The Broadcom core hardware module implementation names are:
● Crypto Hardware Module aes_core_gcm.vhd for Broadcom chip models 4378, 4387 and
4388.
● Cryptographic Hardware Module for Broadcom chip models 4355, 4364 and 4377.
The T2 is marketed as Apple ARM technology and runs T2OS 13.
Table 17: Cryptographic algorithm table
SFR Algorithm Capabilities Mod Implementation CAVP
2048, 3072, 4096
(Apple silicon)
USR vng_ltc A3488
RSA KeyGen
[FIPS186-4]☝
2048, 3072, 4096
(Intel)
USR c_avx2 A3506
P-256, P-384, P-521
(Apple silicon)
USR vng_ltc A3488
FCS_CKM.1
ECDSA KeyGen
[FIPS186-4]☝
P-256, P-384, P-521
(Intel)
USR c_avx2 A3506
2048, 3072, 4096
(Apple silicon)
USR c_ltc
FCS_CKM.2 RSA Key Establishment
[RFC8017]☝
2048, 3072, 4096
(Intel)
USR c_ltc
Tested by
the CCTL
following
the testing
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SFR Algorithm Capabilities Mod Implementation CAVP
Assurance
Activity for
FCS_CKM.2
P-256, P-384, P-521
(Apple silicon)
USR c_ltc A3486
ECC Key Establishment
(KAS-ECC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3)
[SP800-56A-Rev3]☝ P-256, P-384, P-521
(Intel)
USR c_ltc A3509
128-bit, 256-bit
(Apple silicon)
USR asm_arm A3483
AES-CBC
[SP800-38A]☝
128-bit, 256-bit
(Intel)
USR asm_aesni A3501
128-bit, 256-bit
(Apple silicon)
USR vng_asm A3487
AES-GCM
[SP800-38D]☝
128-bit, 256-bit
(Intel)
USR vng_asm A3510
4388 AES 5926
4387 AES 5926
4378 AES 5926
4377 AES 4791
4364 AES 3678
FCS_COP.1(1)
AES-CCM
[SP800-38C]☝
128-bit BC
4355 AES 3678
SHA-1, SHA-256,
SHA-384, SHA-512
(Apple silicon)
USR vng_ltc A3488
KRN vng_ltc A3521
SHA-256
(Apple silicon)
SKS vng_ltc A4259
SHA-1, SHA-256,
SHA-384, SHA-512
(Intel)
USR c_avx2 A3506
SHA-256
(Intel)
KRN c_avx2 A3623
FCS_COP.1(2) SHS
Byte-oriented mode
[FIPS186-4]☝
SHA-256 SKS vng_neon A4110
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SFR Algorithm Capabilities Mod Implementation CAVP
(T2)
Modulo: 2048, 3072, 4096
with: SHA-1, SHA-256,
SHA-384, SHA-512
(Apple silicon)
USR vng_ltc A3488
Modulo: 2048, 3072, 4096
with: SHA-1, SHA-256,
SHA-384, SHA-512
(Intel)
USR c_avx2 A3506
Modulo: 4096
with: SHA-256
(Intel)
KRN c_avx2 A3623
RSA SigVer
[FIPS186-4]☝
Modulo: 4096
with: SHA-256
(T2)
SKS vng_ltc A4109
P-256, P-384, P-521
with: SHA-1, SHA-256,
SHA-384, SHA-512
(Apple silicon)
USR vng_ltc A3488
KRN vng_ltc A3521
P-521
with: SHA-512
(Apple silicon)
SKS vng_ltc A4259
FCS_COP.1(3)
ECDSA SigVer
[FIPS186-4]☝
P-256, P-384, P-521
with: SHA-1, SHA-256,
SHA-384, SHA-512
(Intel)
USR vng_ltc A3506
HMAC-SHA-1,
HMAC-SHA-256,
HMAC-SHA-384,
HMAC-SHA-512
(Apple silicon)
USR vng_ltc A3488
FCS_COP.1(4) HMAC
Byte-oriented mode
[FIPS198-1]☝
HMAC-SHA-1,
HMAC-SHA-256,
HMAC-SHA-384,
HMAC-SHA-512
(Intel)
USR c_avx2 A3506
USR vng_asm A3487
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 CTR_DRBG AES-256
SEP M2 Max (skg) A3490
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SFR Algorithm Capabilities Mod Implementation CAVP
M2 Pro (skg)
M2 (skg)
M1 Ultra (skg)
M1 Max (skg)
M1 Pro (skg)
(Apple silicon)
M1 (skg) A1362
AES-256
(Intel)
USR vng_asm A3510
[SP800-90A-Rev1]☝
AES-256
(T2)
SEP T2 (skg) DRBG 2029
The following table shows the full coverage of CAVP tests for the Apple silicon models used in the devices
covered by this evaluation and specified in Appendix A.1 .
Table 18: Coverage of CAVP certificates for Apple silicon
Cryptographic Modules
SoC Micro
Architecture
USR KRN SKS SEP
M1 ARMv8.5-A A3483, A3486,
A3487, A3488
A3521 A4259 A1362
M1 Max ARMv8.5-A A3483, A3486,
A3487, A3488
A3521 A4259 A3490
M1 Pro ARMv8.5-A A3483, A3486,
A3487, A3488
A3521 A4259 A3490
M1 Ultra ARMv8.5-A A3483, A3486,
A3487, A3488
A3521 A4259 A3490
M2 ARMv8.6-A A3483, A3486,
A3487, A3488
A3521 A4259 A3490
M2 Max ARMv8.6-A A3483, A3486,
A3487, A3488
A3521 A4259 A3490
M2 Pro ARMv8.6-A A3483, A3486,
A3487, A3488
A3521 A4259 A3490
The following table shows the coverage of CAVP tests for the Intel processors used in the devices covered
by this evaluation and specified in Appendix A.1. For those processor models not tested, the last column
indicates the equivalent processor on which the CAVP tests were performed. The equivalence argument for
these processors is that the reference testing is performed on a processor of the same Intel Micro Architecture
and Intel processor Generation.
Table 19: Coverage of CAVP certificates for Intel Processors
Cryptographic Modules
Intel Processor Gen Micro
Architecture
USR KRN
Equivalent processor
Xeon W-2140B W Skylake A3501, A3506, A3623 Tested
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Cryptographic Modules
Intel Processor Gen Micro
Architecture
USR KRN
Equivalent processor
A3509, A3510
Xeon W-2150B W Skylake Xeon W-2140B
Xeon W-2170B W Skylake Xeon W-2140B
Xeon W-2190B W Skylake Xeon W-2140B
Xeon W-3223 W Cascade Lake A3501, A3506,
A3509, A3510
A3623 Tested
Xeon W-3235 W Cascade Lake Xeon W-3223
Xeon W-3245 W Cascade Lake Xeon W-3223
Xeon W-3265 W Cascade Lake Xeon W-3223
Xeon W-3265M W Cascade Lake Xeon W-3223
Xeon W-3275M W Cascade Lake Xeon W-3223
Core i5-8210Y 8th
Amber Lake A3501, A3506,
A3509, A3510
A3623 Tested
Core i5-8257U 8th
Coffee Lake A3501, A3506,
A3509, A3510
A3623 Tested
Core i5-8259U 8th
Coffee Lake Core i5-8257U
Core i5-8279U 8th
Coffee Lake Core i5-8257U
Core i7-8557U 8th
Coffee Lake Core i5-8257U
Core i7-8559U 8th
Coffee Lake Core i5-8257U
Core i7-8569U 8th
Coffee Lake Core i5-8257U
Core i5-8500B 8th
Coffee Lake Core i7-8700B
Core i7-8700B 8th
Coffee Lake A3501, A3506,
A3509, A3510
A3623 Tested
Core i7-8750H 8th
Coffee Lake Core i7-8700B
Core i7-8850H 8th
Coffee Lake Core i7-8700B
Core i9-8950HK 8th
Coffee Lake Core i7-8700B
Core i7-9750H 9th
Coffee Lake Core i9-9880H
Core i9-9880H 9th
Coffee Lake A3501, A3506,
A3509, A3510
A3623 Tested
Core i9-9880HK 9th
Coffee Lake Core i9-9880H
Core i5-10500 10th
Comet Lake Core i7-10700K
Core i5-10600 10th
Comet Lake Core i7-10700K
Core i7-10700K 10th
Comet Lake A3501, A3506,
A3509, A3510
A3623 Tested
Core i9-10910 10th
Comet Lake A3501, A3506,
A3509, A3510
A3623 Tested
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Cryptographic Modules
Intel Processor Gen Micro
Architecture
USR KRN
Equivalent processor
Core i5-1030NG7 10th
Ice Lake Core i7-1060NG7
Core i5-1038NG7 10th
Ice Lake Core i7-1060NG7
Core i7-1060NG7 10th
Ice Lake A3501, A3506,
A3509, A3510
A3623 Tested
Core i7-1068NG7 10th
Ice Lake Core i7-1060NG7
The following table shows the full coverage of CAVP tests for the Apple T2 Security Chip, used as the security
chip in devices using Intel processors, as specified in Appendix A.1.
Table 20: Coverage of CAVP certificates for Apple T2 Security Chip
Cryptographic Modules
SoC Micro
Architecture
SKS SEP
T2 ARMv8.1-A A4109, A4110 DRBG 2029
The following table shows the full coverage of CAVP tests for the different models of the Broadcom Chip with
Bluetooth, used for bluetooth functionality, as specified in Appendix A.1.
Table 21: Coverage of CAVP certificates
for Broadcom Chip with Bluetooth
Cryptographic
Modules
Broadcom
Chip Model
Bluetooth
version
BC
4355 4.2 AES 3678
4364 5.0 AES 3678
4377 5.0 AES 4791
4378 5.0 AES 5926
4387 5.0 AES 5926
4388 5.3 AES 5926
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