National Information Assurance Partnership
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
Validation Report
for
Seagate Secure®
TCG Opal and Enterprise SSC Self-Encrypting Drives
Report Number: CCEVS-VR-VID11248-2022
Dated: 07 April 2022
Version: 1.0
National Institute of Standards and Technology
Information Technology Laboratory
100 Bureau Drive
Gaithersburg, MD 20899
Department of Defense
ATTN: NIAP, SUITE: 6982
9800 Savage Road
Fort Meade, MD 20755-6982
®
TM
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Acknowledgements
Validation Team
Meredith Hennan
Alex Korobchuk
Seada Mohammed
Jerome Myers
The Aerospace Corporation
Farid Ahmed
Richard (Rip) Toren
Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
Leidos Inc.
Columbia, MD
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Contents
1 Executive Summary............................................................................................................................... 1
2 Identification......................................................................................................................................... 3
3 TOE Architecture................................................................................................................................... 5
4 Security Policy....................................................................................................................................... 6
4.1 Cryptographic Support..................................................................................................................6
4.2 User Data Protection.....................................................................................................................6
4.3 Security Management...................................................................................................................6
4.4 Protection of the TSF ....................................................................................................................6
5 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope................................................................................................ 7
5.1 Assumptions..................................................................................................................................7
5.2 Clarification of Scope ....................................................................................................................7
6 Documentation ..................................................................................................................................... 9
7 IT Product Testing ............................................................................................................................... 10
8 TOE Evaluated Configuration.............................................................................................................. 11
9 Results of the Evaluation .................................................................................................................... 12
9.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ST) (ASE)...............................................................................12
9.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV)........................................................................................12
9.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD)...........................................................................12
9.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC)..................................................................12
9.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE) ...........................................13
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (AVA).....................................................................................13
9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results ..................................................................................................14
10 Validator Comments/Recommendations ........................................................................................... 15
11 Security Target.................................................................................................................................... 16
12 Abbreviations and Acronyms.............................................................................................................. 17
13 Bibliography ........................................................................................................................................ 19
List of Tables
Table 1: Evaluation Identifiers 3
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1 Executive Summary
This Validation Report (VR) documents the National Information Assurance Partnership (NIAP) assessment
of the evaluation of Seagate Secure® TCG Opal and Enterprise SSC Self-Encrypting Drives (the Target of
Evaluation, or TOE). It presents the evaluation results, their justifications, and the conformance results.
This VR is not an endorsement of the TOE by any agency of the U.S. Government and no warranty of the
TOE is either expressed or implied.
This VR is intended to assist the end-user of this product and any security certification agent for that end-
user in determining the suitability of this Information Technology (IT) product in their environment. End-
users should review the Security Target (ST), which is where specific security claims are made, in
conjunction with this VR, which describes how those security claims were evaluated and tested and any
restrictions on the evaluated configuration. This VR applies only to the specific version and configuration
of the product as evaluated and as documented in the ST. Prospective users should carefully read the
Assumptions and Clarification of Scope in Section 5 and the Validator Comments in Section 10, where any
restrictions on the evaluated configuration are highlighted.
The evaluation was performed by Leidos Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL) in Columbia,
Maryland, USA, and was completed in April 2022. The information in this report is largely derived from
the Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) and associated test report written by Leidos. The evaluation
determined that the TOE is Common Criteria Part 2 Extended and Common Criteria Part 3 Extended and
meets the assurance requirements of the following documents:
• collaborative Protection Profile for Full Drive Encryption – Encryption Engine, Version 2.0 + Errata
20190201, February 1, 2019 ([5])
The TOE is Seagate Secure® TCG Opal and Enterprise SSC Self-Encrypting Drives consisting of Seagate
Secure®
TCG Opal SSC Self-Encrypting Drive Series and Seagate Secure®
TCG Enterprise SSC Self-Encrypting
Drive Series with the following specific product identifiers and models:
Product Name Model # Standard Firmware
Exos X18 3.5” SAS HDD ST18000NM007J
ST16000NM007J
ST14000NM007J
ST12000NM007J
ST10000NM016G
Enterprise SSC EF02
Exos X18 3.5” SATA HDD ST18000NM025J Opal SSC
ATA Security
MF01
Exos X18 3.5” SAS HDD ST18000NM026J Opal SSC KF01
Exos 7E10 3.5” SAS HDD ST10000NM022B
ST10000NM011B
ST8000NM022B
ST8000NM011B
ST6000NM024B
ST6000NM013B
ST4000NM013B
Enterprise SSC EF01
KF01
NF01
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Product Name Model # Standard Firmware
ST4000NM029B
ST4000NM017B
Exos 7E10 3.5” SATA HDD ST10000NM021B
ST8000NM021B
ST6000NM023B
ST4000NM012B
ST4000NM028B
Enterprise SSC
ATA Security
SF01
TF01
The TOE identified in this VR has been evaluated at a NIAP approved CCTL using the Common
Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev. 5) for conformance to the Common Criteria for
IT Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev. 5). The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the
provisions of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme (CCEVS) and the conclusions
of the testing laboratory in the ETR are consistent with the evidence provided.
The validation team monitored the activities of the evaluation team, provided guidance on technical
issues and evaluation processes, and reviewed the individual work units documented in the ETR and the
Assurance Activities Report (AAR). The validation team found the evaluation demonstrated the product
satisfies all of the Security Functional Requirements (SFRs) and Security Assurance Requirements (SARs)
specified in the ST. The conclusions of the testing laboratory in the ETR are consistent with the evidence
produced. Therefore, the validation team concludes that the testing laboratory's findings are accurate,
the conclusions justified, and the conformance results are correct.
The Leidos evaluation team determined that the TOE is conformant to the claimed Protection Profile and
when installed, configured and operated as described in the evaluated guidance documentation, satisfies
all the SFRs specified in the ST ([6]).
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2 Identification
The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST) effort to establish commercial facilities to perform trusted product evaluations. Under this
program, commercial testing laboratories called Common Criteria Testing Laboratories (CCTLs) use the
Common Criteria (CC) and Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM) to conduct security
evaluations, in accordance with National Voluntary Laboratory Assessment Program (NVLAP)
accreditation.
The NIAP Validation Body assigns Validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality and consistency across
evaluations. Developers of IT products desiring a security evaluation contract with a CCTL and pay a fee
for their product’s evaluation. Upon successful completion of the evaluation, the product is added to
NIAP’s Product Compliant List (PCL).
Table 1 provides information needed to completely identify the product, including:
• The TOE—the fully qualified identifier of the product as evaluated
• The ST—the unique identification of the document describing the security features, claims, and
assurances of the product
• The conformance result of the evaluation
• The PP/PP-Modules to which the product is conformant
• The organizations and individuals participating in the evaluation.
Table 1: Evaluation Identifiers
Item Identifier
Evaluation
Scheme
United States NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
TOE Seagate Secure®
TCG Opal SSC Self-Encrypting Drive Series
Seagate Secure®
TCG Enterprise SSC Self-Encrypting Drive Series
The specific TOE products and models include:
Product Name Model # Standard Firmware
Exos X18 3.5” SAS HDD ST18000NM007J
ST16000NM007J
ST14000NM007J
ST12000NM007J
ST10000NM016G
Enterprise SSC EF02
Exos X18 3.5” SATA HDD ST18000NM025J Opal SSC
ATA Security
MF01
Exos X18 3.5” SAS HDD ST18000NM026J Opal SSC KF01
Exos 7E10 3.5” SAS HDD ST10000NM022B
ST10000NM011B
ST8000NM022B
Enterprise SSC EF01
KF01
NF01
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Item Identifier
ST8000NM011B
ST6000NM024B
ST6000NM013B
ST4000NM013B
ST4000NM029B
ST4000NM017B
Exos 7E10 3.5” SATA HDD ST10000NM021B
ST8000NM021B
ST6000NM023B
ST4000NM012B
ST4000NM028B
Enterprise SSC
ATA Security
SF01
TF01
Security
Target
Seagate Secure® TCG Opal and Enterprise SSC Self-Encrypting Drives Security Target, v1.0, 10 March
2022 ([6])
Sponsor &
Developer
Seagate Technology, LLC
389 Disc Drive
Longmont, Colorado 80503
Completion
Date
April 2022
CC Version Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1, Release 5, April 2017
CEM Version Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation: Version 3.1, Release 5, April
2017
PP collaborative Protection Profile for Full Drive Encryption – Encryption Engine, Version 2.0 + Errata
20190201, February 1, 2019 ([5])
Conformance
Result
PP Compliant, CC Part 2 extended, CC Part 3 conformant
CCTL Leidos
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
6841 Benjamin Franklin Drive
Columbia, MD 21046
Evaluation
Personnel
Dawn Campbell
Pascal Patin
Furukh Siddique
Validation
Personnel
Meredith Hennan
Farid Ahmed
Alex Korobchuk
Seada Mohammed
Jerome Myers
Richard (Rip) Toren
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3 TOE Architecture
Note: The following architectural description is based on the description presented in the ST.
The TOE comprises Seagate Secure® TCG Opal and Enterprise SSC Self-Encrypting Drives (SEDs) provided
by Seagate Technology, LLC. The TOE model numbers and firmware versions are identified in Table 1.
The Seagate SEDs implement FIPS-approved and NIST-recommended cryptographic algorithms. All
algorithms implementing cryptographic security functional requirements have applicable NIST
Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program (CAVP) certificates. The SEDs provide an Instant Secure Erase
(ISE) function and full protection of customer data-at-rest with self-encrypting drive locking. The Seagate
Secure Drives are designed in accordance with Trusted Computing Group (TCG) specifications.
The TOE provides the Full Disk Encryption (FDE) Encryption Engine functionality as defined by
[CPPFDE_EE]. In particular, the TOE provides data encryption, policy enforcement, and key management
functions. The TOE provides for the generation, update, protection, and destruction of the data encryption
key (DEK) and other intermediate keys under its control. Seagate terminology refers to the DEK as the
Media Encryption Key (MEK).
The TOE model series includes SSC Opal and SSC Enterprise and support either SATA or SAS interfaces.
SEDs can be a hard-disk drive (HDD) or a solid-state drive (SSD). All models in the TOE are HDD. All SEDs
meet the requirements set forth in this document and behave the same except for handling failed
authentication attempts as part of the process of validating the BEV.
Table 1 identifies the products included in the TOE, along with their firmware releases and supported
standard, and specifies each TOE model, including its capacity. All TOE models incorporate an ARM Cortex-
M0 processor (ARMv6-M microarchitecture) and include the Janus Application-Specific Integrated Circuit
(ASIC). All SATA drives additionally support ATA Security mode.
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4 Security Policy
The TOE enforces the following security policies as described in the ST.
Note: Much of the description of the security policy has been derived from the ST and the Final ETR.
4.1 Cryptographic Support
The TOE includes CAVP-certified cryptographic algorithms supporting cryptographic functions. The TOE
provides Key Wrapping, Key Derivation, and BEV Validation.
4.2 User Data Protection
The TOE performs Full Drive Encryption such that the drive contains no plaintext user data. The TOE
performs user data encryption by default in the out-of-the-box configuration using XTS-AES-256 mode.
4.3 Security Management
The TOE supports management functions for changing and erasing the DEK, for initiating the TOE firmware
updates, and for configuring the number of failed validation attempts required to trigger corrective action.
4.4 Protection of the TSF
The TOE provides trusted firmware update and access control functions; protects Key and Key Material;
and supports a compliant power saving state. The TOE runs a suite of self-tests during initial start-up (on
power on), before the function is first invoked.
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5 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
5.1 Assumptions
The ST references the PP to which it claims conformance for assumptions about the use of the TOE. Those
assumptions, drawn from the claimed PP, are as follows:
• Communication among and between product components (e.g., Authorization Acquisition (AA)
and Encryption Engine (EE) components) is sufficiently protected to prevent information
disclosure. In cases in which a single product fulfils both cPPs, then the communication between
the components does not extend beyond the boundary of the TOE (e.g., communication path is
within the TOE boundary). In cases in which independent products satisfy the requirements of the
AA and EE, the physically close proximity of the two products during their operation means that
the threat agent has very little opportunity to interpose itself in the channel between the two
without the user noticing and taking appropriate actions.
• Users enable Full Drive Encryption on a newly provisioned storage device free of protected data
in areas not targeted for encryption. It is also assumed that data intended for protection should
not be on the targeted storage media until after provisioning. The cPP does not intend to include
requirements to find all the areas on storage devices that potentially contain protected data. In
some cases, it may not be possible - for example, data contained in “bad” sectors. While
inadvertent exposure to data contained in bad sectors or unpartitioned space is unlikely, one may
use forensics tools to recover data from such areas of the storage device. Consequently, the cPP
assumes bad sectors, un-partitioned space, and areas that must contain unencrypted code (e.g.,
MBR and AA/EE pre-authentication software) contain no protected data.
• Users follow the provided guidance for securing the TOE and authorization factors. This includes
conformance with authorization factor strength, using external token authentication factors for
no other purpose and ensuring external token authorization factors are securely stored separately
from the storage device and/or platform. The user should also be trained on how to power off
their system.
• The platform in which the storage device resides (or an external storage device is connected) is
free of malware that could interfere with the correct operation of the product.
• The user does not leave the platform and/or storage device unattended until the device is in a
compliant power saving state or has fully powered off. This properly clears memories and locks
down the device. Authorized users do not leave the platform and/or storage device in a mode
where sensitive information persists in non-volatile storage (e.g., lock screen or sleep state). Users
power the platform and/or storage device down or place it into a power managed state, such as
a “hibernation mode”.
• The platform is assumed to be physically protected in its Operational Environment and not subject
to physical attacks that compromise the security and/or interfere with the platform’s correct
operation.
5.2 Clarification of Scope
All evaluations (and all products) have limitations, as well as potential misconceptions that need clarifying.
This text covers some of the more important limitations and clarifications of this evaluation. Note that:
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• As with any evaluation, this evaluation shows only that the evaluated configuration meets the
security claims made, with a certain level of assurance, achieved through performance by the
evaluation team of the evaluation activities specified in the following document:
o collaborative Protection Profile for Full Drive Encryption – Encryption Engine Version 2.0 +
Errata 20190201, February 1, 2019 ([5])
• This evaluation covers only the specific hardware and firmware identified in this document, and
not any earlier or later versions released or in process.
• The TOE use case explicitly excludes the case when TOE is in powered state.
• The evaluation of security functionality of the product was limited to the functionality specified
in Seagate Secure® TCG Opal and Enterprise SSC Self-Encrypting Drives Security Target, Version
1.0, 10 March 2022 ([6]). Any additional security related functional capabilities included in the
product were not covered by this evaluation.
• This evaluation did not specifically search for, nor attempt to exploit, vulnerabilities that were not
“obvious” or vulnerabilities to objectives not claimed in the ST. The CEM defines an “obvious”
vulnerability as one that is easily exploited with a minimum of understanding of the TOE, technical
sophistication and resources.
• The TOE must be installed, configured and managed as described in the documentation
referenced in Section 6 of this VR.
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6 Documentation
The vendor offers guidance documents describing the installation process for the TOE as well as guidance
for subsequent administration and use of the applicable security features. The guidance documentation
examined during the evaluation and delivered with the TOE is as follows:
• Seagate Secure® TCG Enterprise and TCG Opal SSC Self-Encrypting Drive Common Criteria
Evaluated Configuration Guide (CCECG), Version 1.0, 9 March 2022 ([7])
To use the product in the evaluated configuration, the product must be configured as specified in this
documentation.
Any additional customer documentation provided with the product, or that which may be available online,
was not included in the scope of the evaluation and therefore should not be relied upon to configure or
operate the TOE as evaluated. Consumers are encouraged to download the evaluated administrative
guidance documentation from the NIAP website.
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7 IT Product Testing
This section describes the testing efforts of the evaluation team. It is derived from information contained
in the following proprietary document:
• Seagate Secure® TCG SSC Self-Encrypting Drives Common Criteria Test Report and Procedures,
Version 1.1, 04 April 2022 ([8])
A non-proprietary description of the tests performed and their results is provided in the following
document:
• Seagate Secure® TCG Opal and Enterprise SSC Self-Encrypting Drives Assurance Activity Report,
Version 1.0, 10 March 2022 ([9])
The purpose of the testing activity was to confirm the TOE behaves in accordance with the TOE security
functional requirements as specified in the ST for a product that claims conformance to the following
specifications:
• collaborative Protection Profile for Full Drive Encryption – Encryption Engine Version 2.0 + Errata
20190201, February 1, 2019 ([5])
The evaluation team devised a test plan based on the test activities specified in these documents. The test
plan described how each test activity was to be instantiated within the TOE test environment. The
evaluation team executed the tests specified in the test plan and documented the results in the team test
report listed above.
Independent testing took place at Leidos CCTL facilities in Columbia, Maryland, from July 1, 2021 to
January 30, 2022. The tested platforms covered instances of the TOE to cover a variety of firmware,
native interfaces, standards and media types. Evaluators configured default environment configurations
for the products as described in the guidance. In addition to using vendor proprietary tools, they used
Python interpreter, 010 Hex editor, and Dell Optiplex 790 for the test.
The evaluators received the TOE in the form that customers would receive it, installed and configured the
TOE in accordance with the provided guidance, and exercised the team test plan on equipment configured
in the testing laboratory.
Given the complete set of test results from the test procedures exercised by the evaluators, the testing
requirements for collaborative Protection Profile for Full Drive Encryption – Encryption Engine were
fulfilled.
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8 TOE Evaluated Configuration
The evaluated version of the TOE consists of the Seagate Secure® TCG Opal and Enterprise SSC Self-
Encrypting Drives identified in Table 1.
The TOE must be deployed as described in Section 5 Assumptions of this document and be configured in
accordance with the documentation identified in Section 6.
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9 Results of the Evaluation
The results of the evaluation of the TOE against its target assurance requirements are generally described
in this section and are presented in detail in the proprietary Evaluation Technical Report For Seagate
Secure® TCG SSC Self-Encrypting Drives ([10]). The reader of this VR can assume that all assurance
activities and work units received passing verdicts.
A verdict for an assurance component is determined by the resulting verdicts assigned to the
corresponding evaluator action elements. The evaluation was conducted based upon CC version 3.1,
revision 5 ([1], [2], [3]) and CEM version 3.1, revision 5 ([4]), and the specific evaluation activities specified
in:
• collaborative Protection Profile for Full Drive Encryption – Encryption Engine Version 2.0 + Errata
20190201, February 1, 2019 ([5])
The evaluation determined the TOE satisfies the conformance claims made in the Seagate Secure® TCG
Opal and Enterprise SSC Self-Encrypting Drives Security Target, of Part 2 extended and Part 3 conformant.
The TOE satisfies the requirements specified in the PP.
The Validators reviewed all the work of the evaluation team and agreed with their practices and findings.
9.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ST) (ASE)
The evaluation team performed each TSS evaluation activity and ASE CEM work unit. The ST evaluation
ensured the ST contains an ST introduction, TOE overview, TOE description, security problem definition in
terms of threats, policies and assumptions, description of security objectives for the operational
environment, a statement of security requirements claimed to be met by the product that are consistent
with the claimed PP, and security function descriptions that satisfy the requirements.
9.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV)
The evaluation team performed each ADV evaluation activity and applied each ADV_FSP.1 CEM work unit.
The evaluation team assessed the evaluation evidence and found it adequate to meet the requirements
specified in the claimed PP for design evidence. The ADV evidence consists of the TSS descriptions
provided in the ST and product guidance documentation providing descriptions of the TOE external
interfaces.
9.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD)
The evaluation team performed each guidance evaluation activity and applied each AGD work unit. The
evaluation team determined the adequacy of the operational user guidance in describing how to operate
the TOE in accordance with the descriptions in the ST. The evaluation team followed the guidance in the
TOE preparative procedures to test the installation and configuration procedures to ensure the
procedures result in the evaluated configuration. The guidance documentation was assessed during the
design and testing phases of the evaluation to ensure it was complete.
9.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC)
The evaluation team performed each ALC evaluation activity and applied each ALC_CMC.1 and ALC_CMS.1
CEM work unit, to the extent possible given the evaluation evidence required by the claimed PP. The
evaluation team ensured the TOE is labeled with a unique identifier consistent with the TOE identification
in the evaluation evidence, and that the ST describes how timely security updates are made to the TOE.
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9.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE)
The evaluation team performed each test activity and applied each ATE_FUN.1 CEM work unit. The
evaluation team ran the set of tests specified by the claimed PP and recorded the results in the Test
Report, summarized in the AAR.
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (AVA)
The evaluation team performed each AVA evaluation activity and applied each AVA_VAN.1 CEM work
unit. The evaluation team performed a vulnerability analysis following the processes described in the
claimed PP. This comprised a search of public vulnerability databases.
The evaluation team performed a search of the National Vulnerability Database (https://nvd.nist.gov/),
MITRE CVE, US-CERT, and Seagate Security Advisory website.
The evaluation team performed searches on 7 April 2022, using the following search terms:
• Seagate
• Seagate Secure TCG Opal SSC
• Seagate Secure TCG Enterprise SSC
• ARMv6-M
• Cortex-M0
• ARM Processor
• 800-90A DRBG in Hardware
• ARMv6 AES in Firmware
• ARMv6 AES Key Wrap in Firmware
• ARMv6 GCM in Firmware
• ARMv6 HMAC in Firmware
• ARMv6 RSA in Firmware
• ARMv6 SHS in Firmware
• Janus
• drive encryption
• disk encryption
• key destruction
• key sanitization
• self encrypting drive (sed)
• opal
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• opal ssc ata security
• enterprise ssc
• Enterprise SSC ATA Security
• tcg ssc
• Exos X18
• Exos 7E10
The results of these searches did not identify any vulnerabilities that are applicable to the TOE. The
conclusion drawn from the vulnerability analysis is that no residual vulnerabilities exist that are
exploitable by attackers with Basic Attack Potential as defined by the Certification Body in accordance
with the guidance in the CEM.
9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results
The evaluation team’s assessment of the evaluation evidence demonstrates that the claims in the ST are
met, sufficient to satisfy the assurance activities specified in the claimed PP. Additionally, the evaluation
team’s testing also demonstrated the accuracy of the claims in the ST.
The validation team’s assessment of the evidence provided by the evaluation team is that it demonstrates
that the evaluation team followed the procedures defined in the CEM, and correctly verified that the
product meets the claims in the ST.
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10 Validator Comments/Recommendations
All of the validators concerns are adequately captured in Section 5, Assumptions and Clarification of
Scope.
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11 Security Target
The ST for this product’s evaluation is Seagate Secure® TCG Opal and Enterprise SSC Self-Encrypting Drives
Security Target, Version 1.0, 10 March 2022 ([6]).
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12 Abbreviations and Acronyms
This section identifies abbreviations and acronyms used in this document.
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
ASIC Application-Specific Integrated Circuit
ATA Advanced Technology Attachment
BEV Border Encryption Value
CBC Cipher-Block Chaining
CC Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation
CLI Command Line Interface
CPP Collaborative Protection Profile
CPPFDE_EE
CPPFDE_AA
Collaborative Protection Profile for Full Drive Encryption – Encryption Engine
Collaborative Protection Profile for Full Drive Encryption – Authorization Acquisition
CSPSK Critical Security Parameter Sanitization Key
DEK Data Encryption Key
DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator
DSS Digital Signature Standard
EE Encryption Engine
FDE Full Drive Encryption
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard
FW Firmware
GCM Galois Counter Mode
HDD Hard Disk Drive
HMAC Hashed Message Authentication Code
ISE Instant Secure Erase
IT Information Technology
IV Initialization Vector
KEK Key Encryption Key
KMD Key Management Description
LBA Logical Block Addressing
MEK Media Encryption Key
MEKEK Media Encryption Key Encryption Key
MK Master Key
PP Protection Profile
PSID Physical SID (public drive-unique value)
RBG Random Bit Generator
RNG Random Number Generator
ROM
RSA
Read Only Memory
Rivest, Shamir and Adleman (algorithm for public-key cryptography)
RTU
SAR
Root of Trust for Update
Security Assurance Requirement
SAS Serial Attached SCSI
SATA Serial ATA (Serial AT Attachment)
SCSI Small Computer Systems Interface
SED Self-Encrypting Drive
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SID Security Identifier, (aka Drive Owner PIN)
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SPD Security Problem Definition
SPI Serial Peripheral Interface
SSC Security Subsystem Class
SSD Solid State Drive
ST Security Target
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TCG Trusted Computer Group
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functions
XOR Exclusive or
XTS XEX (XOR Encrypt XOR) Tweakable Block Cipher with Ciphertext Stealing
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13 Bibliography
The validation team used the following documents to produce this VR:
[1] Common Criteria Project Sponsoring Organisations. Common Criteria for Information Technology
Security Evaluation: Part 1: Introduction and general model, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.
[2] Common Criteria Project Sponsoring Organisations. Common Criteria for Information Technology
Security Evaluation: Part 2: Security functional components, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.
[3] Common Criteria Project Sponsoring Organisations. Common Criteria for Information Technology
Security Evaluation: Part 3: Security assurance requirements, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.
[4] Common Criteria Project Sponsoring Organisations. Common Evaluation Methodology for
Information Technology Security, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.
[5] collaborative Protection Profile for Full Drive Encryption – Encryption Engine Version 2.0 + Errata
20190201, February 1, 2019.
[6] Seagate Secure® TCG Opal and Enterprise SSC Self-Encrypting Drives Security Target, v1.0, 10
March 2022
[7] Seagate Secure® TCG Enterprise and TCG Opal SSC Self-Encrypting Drive Common Criteria
Evaluated Configuration Guide (CCECG), Version 1.0, 9 March 2022
[8] Seagate Secure® TCG SSC Self-Encrypting Drives Common Criteria Test Report and Procedures,
Version 1.0, 10 March 2022
[9] Seagate Secure® TCG Opal and Enterprise SSC Self-Encrypting Drives Assurance Activity Report,
Version 1.0, 9 March 2022
[10] Evaluation Technical Report For Seagate Secure® TCG SSC Self-Encrypting Drives, Version 1.0, 25
February 2022.