BSI-DSZ-CC-1172-2022
for
CardOS V6.0 ID R1.0 (BAC)
from
Atos Information Technology GmbH
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 CC-Zert-327 V5.41
BSI-DSZ-CC-1172-2022 (*)
CardOS V6.0 ID R1.0 (BAC)
from Atos Information Technology GmbH
PP Conformance: Machine Readable Travel Document with "ICAO
Application" Basic Access Control, Version 1.10, 25
March 2009, BSI-CC-PP-0055-2009
Functionality: PP conformant
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by ALC_DVS.2
The IT Product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation
facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1
extended by Scheme Interpretations by advice of the Certification Body for components
beyond EAL 5 for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC),
Version 3.1. CC and CEM are also published as ISO/IEC 15408 and ISO/IEC 18045.
(*) This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its
evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report and
Notification. For details on the validity see Certification Report part A chapter 5.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification
scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions
of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the
evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT Product by the Federal Office for
Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is
either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 11 March 2022
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Sandro Amendola L.S.
Head of Division
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
SOGIS
Recognition Agreement
Common Criteria
Recognition Arrangement
recognition for components
up to EAL 2 and ALC_FLR
only
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1172-2022
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1172-2022 Certification Report
Contents
A. Certification......................................................................................................................6
1. Preliminary Remarks....................................................................................................6
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure...............................................................6
3. Recognition Agreements..............................................................................................7
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification................................................................8
5. Validity of the Certification Result.................................................................................8
6. Publication....................................................................................................................9
B. Certification Results.......................................................................................................10
1. Executive Summary....................................................................................................11
2. Identification of the TOE.............................................................................................12
3. Security Policy............................................................................................................13
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.....................................................................13
5. Architectural Information.............................................................................................14
6. Documentation...........................................................................................................14
7. IT Product Testing.......................................................................................................15
8. Evaluated Configuration.............................................................................................17
9. Results of the Evaluation............................................................................................17
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE.....................................................19
11. Security Target..........................................................................................................19
12. Regulation specific aspects (eIDAS, QES)..............................................................19
13. Definitions.................................................................................................................19
14. Bibliography..............................................................................................................21
C. Excerpts from the Criteria..............................................................................................23
D. Annexes.........................................................................................................................24
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1172-2022
A. Certification
1. Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● Act on the Federal Office for Information Security1
● BSI Certification and Approval Ordinance2
● BMI Regulations on Ex-parte Costs 3
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
● DIN EN ISO/IEC 17065 standard
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) [3]
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility, its
approval and licencing process (CC-Stellen) [3]
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.14
[1] also published as
ISO/IEC 15408.
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
2
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of Security Certificates and approval by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungs- und -Anerkennungsverordnung - BSIZertV) of 17 December
2014, Bundesgesetzblatt 2014, part I, no. 61, p. 2231
3
BMI Regulations on Ex-parte Costs - Besondere Gebührenverordnung des BMI für individuell
zurechenbare öffentliche Leistungen in dessen Zuständigkeitsbereich (BMIBGebV), Abschnitt 7 (BSI-
Gesetz) - dated 2 September 2019, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1365
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1172-2022 Certification Report
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 [2] also published
as ISO/IEC 18045
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
3. Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
3.1. European Recognition of CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and, in addition, at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS
Technical Domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL 1 to EAL 4. For "Smartcards and similar devices" a SOGIS Technical Domain is in
place. For "HW Devices with Security Boxes" a SOGIS Technical Domains is in place, too.
In addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of
the recognition agreement.
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, details on
recognition, and the history of the agreement can be seen on the website at
https://www.sogis.eu.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the related bodies of the signatory nations. A disclaimer
beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of recognition.
This certificate is recognized under SOGIS-MRA for all assurance components selected.
3.2. International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC
(Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08
September 2014. It covers CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP)
(exact use), CC certificates based on assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or
the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR) and CC certificates for Protection
Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on
the website: https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the related bodies
of the signatory nations. A disclaimer beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of
recognition.
This certificate is recognized according to the rules of CCRA-2014, i. e. up to and including
CC part 3 EAL 2+ ALC_FLR components.
4
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated
23 February 2007, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1172-2022
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product CardOS V6.0 ID R1.0 (BAC) has undergone the certification procedure at
BSI. This is a re-certification based on BSI-DSZ-CC-1162-2021. Specific results from the
evaluation process BSI-DSZ-CC-1162-2021 were re-used.
The evaluation of the product CardOS V6.0 ID R1.0 (BAC) was conducted by TÜV
Informationstechnik GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 3 February 2022. TÜV
Informationstechnik GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)5
recognised by the certification
body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: Atos Information Technology
GmbH.
The product was developed by: Atos Information Technology GmbH.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
5. Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report applies only to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report
and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance components and assurance levels please refer to CC
itself. Detailed references are listed in part C of this report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-assessment or
re-certification). Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation
and certification procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk
management needs regularly updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-
assessment on a regular e.g. annual basis.
In order to avoid an indefinite usage of the certificate when evolved attack methods would
require a re-assessment of the products resistance to state of the art attack methods, the
maximum validity of the certificate has been limited. The certificate issued on 11 March
2022 is valid until 10 March 2027. Validity can be re-newed by re-certification.
The owner of the certificate is obliged:
1. when advertising the certificate or the fact of the product's certification, to refer to
the Certification Report as well as to provide the Certification Report, the Security
5
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1172-2022 Certification Report
Target and user guidance documentation mentioned herein to any customer of the
product for the application and usage of the certified product,
2. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately about vulnerabilities of the
product that have been identified by the developer or any third party after issuance
of the certificate,
3. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately in the case that security relevant
changes in the evaluated life cycle, e.g. related to development and production sites
or processes, occur, or the confidentiality of documentation and information related
to the Target of Evaluation (TOE) or resulting from the evaluation and certification
procedure where the certification of the product has assumed this confidentiality
being maintained, is not given any longer. In particular, prior to the dissemination of
confidential documentation and information related to the TOE or resulting from the
evaluation and certification procedure that do not belong to the deliverables
according to the Certification Report part B, or for those where no dissemination
rules have been agreed on, to third parties, the Certification Body at BSI has to be
informed.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
6. Publication
The product CardOS V6.0 ID R1.0 (BAC) has been included in the BSI list of certified
products, which is published regularly (see also Internet: https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]).
Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer6
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
6
Atos Information Technology GmbH
Otto-Hahn-Ring 6
81739 München
Deutschland
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1172-2022
B. Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1172-2022 Certification Report
1. Executive Summary
The composite TOE is named CardOS V6.0 ID (BAC) R1.0 and was developed by Atos
Information Technology GmbH. The TOE is a smart card operating system on an IC with
one application. Applications covered by this TOE comprise the electronic passport
(ePass) application. The TOE is a machine readable travel document based on the
requirements of ICAO which can be accessed through the contact-based and contactless
interface of the TOE. It supports Basic Access Control (BAC) only and is a re-evaluation of
CardOS V6.0 ID R1.0, certified as BSI-DSZ-CC-1162-2021.
The IC platform comprises the integrated circuit SLC52GDA448* (IFX_CCI_000005
Design Step H13) and the cryptographic libraries RSA v2.08.007, EC v2.08.007, Toolbox
v2.08.007, Base v2.08.007, HCL2 v1.12.001 (hash library) and Symmetric Crypto Library
(SCL) v2.04.002 certified according CC v3.1 with ID BSI-DSZ-CC-1110-V4-2021.
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified
Protection Profile [8].
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 4
augmented by ALC_DVS.2.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6], chapter 7.1. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and some
of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functionality:
TOE Security Functionality
User Identification and Authentication (BAC)
BAC protocol
Read access to the LTD and SO.D at phase Operational Use
Secure messaging
Test features
Protection
Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 8.1.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6], chapter 4.1.
Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of Assumptions,
Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security Target [6],
chapter 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4.
This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8.
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1172-2022
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2. Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
CardOS V6.0 ID R1.0 (BAC)
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
1 HW Infineon SLC52GDA448* IFX_CCI_000005
Design Step H13
Wafer, module or a
packaged component.
2 SW CardOS V6.0 ID R1.0 V.60 / R1.0
3 SW
(Infineon)
RSA Library v2.08.007
4 EC Library v2.08.007
5 Toolbox Library v2.08.007
6 Base Library v2.08.007
7 Hash Library v1.12.001
8 Symmetric Crypto Library v2.04.002
9 DOC CardOS V6.0 User’s Manual 08/2021 As PDF via signed and
encrypted mail.
10 User Guidance ’CardOS V6.0 ID
R1.0’ and ’CardOS V6.0 ID R1.0
(BAC)’
1.20R
11 Administrator Guidance ’CardOS
V6.0 ID R1.0’ and ’CardOS V6.0
ID R1.0 (BAC)’
1.31R
12 Application Base Guidance
’CardOS V6.0 ID R1.0’ and
’CardOS V6.0 ID R1.0 (BAC)’
1.33R
13 Application ePassport Guidance
’CardOS V6.0 ID R1.0’ and
’CardOS V6.0 ID R1.0
(BAC)’ePassport Guidance
’CardOS V6.0 ID’
1.32R
14 Application eSign Guidance
’CardOS V6.0 ID R1.0’ and
’CardOS V6.0 ID R1.0 (BAC)’
1.22R
15 DATA Configuration Scripts for
initialization and personalization
R1.03 As PDF via signed and
encrypted mail.
16 StartKey for initialization -
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
Components No. 1 to No. 8 are actually delivered as one item, namely the IC platform
containing the software mask.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1172-2022 Certification Report
Item No. 15 represents the configuration files for initialization and personalization. These
represent possible configurations and changes on values and parameters can be applied
as outlined in the scripts itself and according to the guidance documents.
The OS software pre-loaded on the IC hardware is sent directly from the chip
manufacturer to the Trust Center or via logistic centers or distributors. This is possible
since the TOE protects itself during delivery and standard procedures for packing, storage
and distribution can be applied. Only with knowledge of the StartKey it is possible to
continue the process of setting up the TOE. The Trust Center is also provided with the
guidance and initialization / personalization scripts from the developer Atos Information
Technology GmbH. All data and documents are sent signed and encrypted by mail.
The TOE can be identified in accordance with the described processes in Administrator
Guidance chap. 5.1, User Guidance chap. 4.2 and Application Base Guidance chap. 4.1
[12]. After the delivery the TOE can be identified by the command response sequence as
outlined in Application Base Guidance chap. 4.1 and Administrator Guidance chap. 5.1
[12], verifying the OS version, product name, version and year, chip identification and
loaded packages (i.e. none in this case).
3. Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues:
● Security Audit
● Cryptographic Support
● User Data Protection
● Identification and Authentication
● Security Management
● Protection of the TSF
Specific details concerning the above mentioned security policies can be found in Chapter
7 of the Security Target [6].
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are
of relevance:
● OE.MRTD_Manufact (Protection of the MRTD Manufacturing)
● OE.MRTD_Delivery (Protection of the MRTD delivery)
● OE.Personalization (Personalization of logical MRTD)
● OE.Pass_Auth_Sign (Authentication of logical MRTD by Signature)
● OE.BAC-Keys (Cryptographic quality of Basic Access Control Keys)
● OE.Exam_MRTD (Examination of the MRTD passport book)
● OE.Passive_Auth_Verif (Verification by Passive Authentication)
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1172-2022
● OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD (Protection of data from the logical MRTD)
Details can be found in the Security Target [6], chapter 5.2.
5. Architectural Information
The composite TOE CardOS V6.0 ID (BAC) R1.0 is a smart card operating system based
on a certified hardware platform together with the cryptographic libraries and object system
that defines its applications. The TOE comprises ten subsystem, listed with a short
description in the following itemization:
● Startup: Performs actions needed at startup only and not further used after entry into
user commands processing loop.
● Command Manager: The main loop within the Command Manager is the most central
part of CardOS.
● Protocol Manager: The Protocol Manager takes care of command reception and
transmission of response data.
● Command Layer: Implements the APDU command set, enables secure access to data
and allows for package download.
● Security: Selects appropriate rules and the corresponding evaluation, manages the
administration of access rights, provides secure messaging processing, evaluates an
entities life cycle when influencing access rules, protects the TOE against attacks using
the underlying hardware security features.
● Entities: Provides the mediation of access to the application and its objects, provides file
system administration, setting of authorization flags, provides PIN/PUK blocking
functionality, handles private keys for signature generation with appropriate parameters,
handles SCP functionality, provides integrity mechanisms (CRC), checks file status and
provides countermeasures against fault induction attacks.
● Cryptography: Provides wrapper modules for IFX platform libraries, padding routines
and generic management of cryptography.
● CBIOS: Provides interface functionality to the hardware peripherals (UART, CRC
generator) and provides utility functions (memory management, transaction
management, interrupt service routines).
● IC: Represents the parts of the underlying hardware platform of the composite TOE,
which interacts with the operating system.
● Retrieval functions: This subsystem retrieves the results of performed routines.
6. Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1172-2022 Certification Report
7. IT Product Testing
Developer's Test according to ATE_FUN
Testing Approach:
Originating from the behaviour defined in the SFRs of the ST, the developer specified test
cases for all SFRs in order to cover the TSF. ATE_COV and ATE_DPT were taken into
account and mapped to these test cases. The main test focus was laid upon the access
right management and commands and that are used in the operational usage phase to
allow signature creation. Tests using multiple application DFs to verify their separation
were performed.
Additional test cases that could not be performed on a real smartcard (e.g. memory faults
and manipulation) were performed on an emulator.
Verdict for the activity:
The testing approach covers all TSFI as described in the functional specification and all
subsystems of the TOE design adequately. All configuration options as described in the ST
are covered and a well-defined approach of possible combinations of options was applied.
All test results collected in the test reports are as expected and in accordance with the
TOE design and the desired TOE functionality.
Independent Testing according to ATE_IND
Approach for independent testing:
● Examination of developer’s testing amount, depth and coverage analysis and of the
developer’s test goals and plan for identification of gaps.
● Examination whether the TOE in its intended environment, is operating as specified
using iterations of developer’s tests.
● Independent testing was performed by the evaluator in Essen using developer’s and
evaluator’s test equipment.
TOE test configurations:
● Tests were done in different life-cycle phases (personalisation / operational),
● eSign and ePassport application, combinations of both applications and multiple
instances were considered in the product test configurations,
● Different options on application parameters were tested, for example RSA or EC-based
cryptography (Brainpool and NIST curves), different key lengths or PIN/PUK options (not
BAC-related however).
Subset size chosen:
● During sample testing the evaluator chose to sample the developer functional tests at
the Evaluation Body for IT Security in Essen. Emulator tests with similar test focus were
omitted.
● During independent testing the evaluator focussed on the main security functionality as
described in the ST. Access control and user authentication was mainly in focus.
● Penetration tests as outcome of the vulnerability analysis were performed to cover
potential vulnerabilities. Fuzzy tests, laser fault injections and side-channel analysis
were conducted during testing.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1172-2022
Developer tests performed:
● The developer performed tests of all TSF and interfaces with script based tests and
emulator test cases.
● The evaluator selected a set of functional tests of the developer’s testing documentation
for sampling. Test cases with similar test focus were omitted.
Verdict for the activity:
● During the evaluator’s TSF subset testing the TOE operated as specified.
The evaluator verified the developer’s test results by executing a sample of the
developer’s tests and verifying the test results for successful execution.
Penetration Testing according to AVA_VAN
Overview:
The penetration testing was performed at the site of the evaluation body TÜViT in the
evaluator’s test environment with the evaluator’s test equipment. The samples were
provided by the sponsor and developer. The test samples were configured and
parameterized by the evaluator according to the guidance documentation. The single
configuration of the TOE intended to be covered by the current evaluation was tested. The
overall result is that no deviations were found between the expected result and the actual
result of the tests. Moreover, no attack scenario with an attack potential of Enhanced-Basic
was actually successful.
Penetration testing approach:
Based on the list of potential vulnerabilities applicable to the TOE in its operational
environment created within the vulnerability analysis evaluation report, the evaluator
created attack scenarios for the penetration tests, where the evaluator is of the opinion
that the vulnerabilities could be exploitable. While doing so, the evaluator also considered
all aspects of the security architecture of the TOE being not covered by the functional
developer tests.
The source code reviews of the provided implementation representation accompanied the
development of test cases and were used to find test input. The code inspection supported
testing activity by enabling the evaluator to verify implementation aspects that could hardly
be covered by test cases.
The primary focus for devising penetration tests was to cover all potential vulnerabilities
identified as applicable in the TOE’s operational environment for which an appropriate test
set was devised.
TOE test configurations:
The evaluators used TOE samples for testing that were configured according to the ST
and guidance documentation. The samples were identified using the method as described
by the developer in its guidance documentation. Both, contactless and contact based
interface were covered during testing.
Verdict for the sub-activity:
The overall test result is that no deviations were found between the expected and the
actual test results. No attack scenario with the attack potential Enhanced-Basic was
actually successful in the TOE’s operational environment as defined in [ST] provided that
all measures required by the developer are applied.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1172-2022 Certification Report
Summary of Test Results and Effectiveness Analysis
The test results yielded that no deviations were found between the expected and the
actual test results. No attack scenario with the attack potential high was actually
successful in the TOE’s operational environment as defined in [6] provided that all
measures required by the developer are applied.
8. Evaluated Configuration
This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE:
The tests were performed with the composite smartcard product CardOS V6.0 ID R1.0
(BAC) on the IC SLC52GDA448* (IFX_CCI_000005 Design Step H13). The developer
tested the TOE on a product with additional eID functionality, which is outside of the TOE
scope, using a wide spectrum of configurations, and configuration parameters basically
categorized as follows:
● Configuration variants with ECC ePassport application,
● Configuration variants with RSA ePassport application,
● Configuration variants with eSign and ePassport applications:
• Both ECC-based,
• Both RSA-based,
• One ECC-based and one RSA-based, and
• A 4th configuration with ECC and RSA vice versa.
A special test configuration was used for test cases where the TOE shall be in the
MANUFACTURING card life cycle before delivery. The tested configurations take into
account the configurable options of the eID product (CardOS V6.0 ID / BSI-DSZ-CC-1162)
as e.g. the use of elliptic curves or RSA, different key lengths, use of Brainpool or NIST
elliptic curves, contact and contactless interface, and other options related to PIN secrets
or Active Authentication.
All configurations were tested appropriately with a similar amount of tests. The tests were
performed in all life-cycle phases that are in scope after TOE delivery within the according
operation environment.
9. Results of the Evaluation
9.1. CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used for those components up to EAL 5
extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and guidance
specific for the technology of the product [4] (AIS 34).
The following guidance specific for the technology was used:
(i) AIS 1, Version 14, Durchführung der Ortsbesichtigung in der
Entwicklungsumgebung des Herstellers
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(ii) AIS 14, Version 7, Anforderungen an Aufbau und Inhalt der ETR-Teile (Evaluation
Technical Report) für Evaluationen nach CC (Common Criteria)
(iii) AIS 19, Version 9, Anforderungen an Aufbau und Inhalt der Zusammenfassung des
ETR (Evaluation Technical Report) für Evaluationen nach CC (Common Criteria)
(iv) AIS 20, Version 3, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für
deterministische Zufallszahlengeneratoren
(v) AIS 26, Version 10, Evaluationsmethodologie für in Hardware integrierte
Schaltungen including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document
(vi) AIS 32, Version 7, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
(vii) AIS 34, Version 3, Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL 5+
(CCv2.3 & CCv3.1) and EAL 6 (CCv3.1)
(viii) AIS 35, Version 2, Öffentliche Fassung des Security Targets (ST-Lite) including JIL
Document and CC Supporting Document and CCRA policies
(ix) AIS 36, Version 5, Kompositionsevaluierung including JIL Document and CC
Supporting Document
(x) AIS 37, Version 3, Terminologie und Vorbereitung von Smartcard-Evaluierungen
(xi) AIS 45, Version 2, Erstellung und Pflege von Meilensteinplänen
(xii) AIS 46, Version 3, Informationen zur Evaluierung von kryptographischen
Algorithmen und ergänzende Hinweise für die Evaluierung von
Zufallszahlengeneratoren
For smart card specific methodology the scheme interpretations AIS 26 and AIS 36 were
used (see [4]).
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the EAL 4 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report)
● The components ALC_DVS.2 augmented for this TOE evaluation.
As the evaluation work performed for this certification procedure was carried out as a re-
evaluation based on the certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-1162-2021, re-use of specific evaluation
tasks was possible. The focus of this re-evaluation was on BAC specific TOE parts.
The evaluation has confirmed:
● PP Conformance: Machine Readable Travel Document with "ICAO Application"
Basic Access Control, Version 1.10, 25 March 2009, BSI-CC-PP-
0055-2009 [8]
● for the Functionality: PP conformant
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by ALC_DVS.2
For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production environment see
annex B in part D of this report.
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The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2. Results of cryptographic assessment
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this certification
procedure (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). But cryptographic functionalities with a
security level of lower than 100 bits can no longer be regarded as secure without
considering the application context. Therefore, for these functionalities it shall be checked
whether the related crypto operations are appropriate for the intended system. Some
further hints and guidelines can be derived from the 'Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-02102'
(https://www.bsi.bund.de).
The table A.1 presented in the Security Target gives an overview of the cryptographic
functionalities inside the TOE to enforce the security policy and outlines its rating from
cryptographic point of view.
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE
itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
The limited validity for the usage of cryptographic algorithms as outlined in chapter 9 has
to be considered by the user and his system risk management process, too.
11. Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [6] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report.
12. Regulation specific aspects (eIDAS, QES)
None.
13. Definitions
13.1. Acronyms
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
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CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
cPP Collaborative Protection Profile
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
PP Protection Profile
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
13.2. Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Collaborative Protection Profile - A Protection Profile collaboratively developed by an
International Technical Community endorsed by the Management Committee.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in CC
part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in CC part 3.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Package - named set of either security functional or security assurance requirements
Protection Profile - A formal document defined in CC, expressing an implementation
independent set of security requirements for a category of IT Products that meet specific
consumer needs.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - An IT Product and its associated administrator and user guidance
documentation that is the subject of an Evaluation.
TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
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14. Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 5, April 2017
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 5, April 2017,
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[3] BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) and Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility,
approval and licencing (CC-Stellen), https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE7
https://www.bsi.bund.de/AIS
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
on the BSI Website, https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierungsreporte
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-1172-2022, Version 1.35R, 2021-11-19, Security
Target ’CardOS V6.0 ID R1.0 (BAC)’, Atos Information Technology GmbH
[7] Evaluation Technical Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1172, Version 2, 2022-02-03,
EVALUATION TECHNICAL REPORT SUMMARY (ETR SUMMARY), TÜV
Informationstechnik GmbH, (confidential document)
[8] Machine Readable Travel Document with "ICAO Application" Basic Access Control,
Version 1.10, 25 March 2009, BSI-CC-PP-0055-2009
7
specifically
• AIS 1, Version 14, Durchführung der Ortsbesichtigung in der Entwicklungsumgebung des Herstellers
• AIS 14, Version 7, Anforderungen an Aufbau und Inhalt der ETR-Teile (Evaluation Technical Report)
für Evaluationen nach CC (Common Criteria)
• AIS 19, Version 9, Anforderungen an Aufbau und Inhalt der Zusammenfassung des ETR (Evaluation
Technical Report) für Evaluationen nach CC (Common Criteria)
• AIS 20, Version 3, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für deterministische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 26, Version 10, Evaluationsmethodologie für in Hardware integrierte Schaltungen including JIL
Document and CC Supporting Document
• AIS 32, Version 7, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
• AIS 34, Version 3, Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL 5+ (CCv2.3 &
CCv3.1) and EAL 6 (CCv3.1)
• AIS 35, Version 2, Öffentliche Fassung des Security Targets (ST-Lite) including JIL Document and
CC Supporting Document and CCRA policies
• AIS 36, Version 5, Kompositionsevaluierung including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document
• AIS 37, Version 3, Terminologie und Vorbereitung von Smartcard-Evaluierungen
• AIS 45, Version 2, Erstellung und Pflege von Meilensteinplänen
• AIS 46, Version 3, Informationen zur Evaluierung von kryptographischen Algorithmen und
ergänzende Hinweise für die Evaluierung von Zufallszahlengeneratoren
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[9] Certification Report – BSI-DSZ-CC-1110-V4-2021 for Infineon Security Controller
IFX_CCI_000003h, 000005h, 000008h, 00000Ch, 000013h, 000014h, 000015h,
00001Ch, 00001Dh, 000021h, 000022h in the design step H13 and including
optional software libraries and dedicated firmware in several versions from Infineon
Technologies AG, BSI
[10] ETR FOR COMPOSITE EVALUATION (ETR-COMP), IFX_CCI_000003h,
IFX_CCI_000005h, IFX_CCI_000008h, IFX_CCI_00000Ch, IFX_CCI_000013h,
IFX_CCI_000014h, IFX_CCI_000015h, IFX_CCI_00001Ch, IFX_CCI_00001Dh,
IFX_CCI_000021h, IFX_CCI_000022h H13, BSI-DSZ-CC-1110-V4, Version 1, 2021-
07-01, TÜViT (confidential document)
[11] Configuration list for the TOE, Version 1.33, 2022-02-03, Configuration List ’CardOS
V6.0 ID R1.0’ and ’CardOS V6.0 ID R1.0 (BAC)’, Atos Information Technology
GmbH (confidential document)
[12] Guidance documentation for the TOE (confidential documents)
CardOS V6.0 User’s Manual, 08/2021, Atos Information Technology GmbH
User Guidance ’CardOS V6.0 ID R1.0’ and ’CardOS V6.0 ID R1.0 (BAC)’, Revision
1.20R, 2021-10-21, Atos Information Technology GmbH
Administrator Guidance ’CardOS V6.0 ID R1.0’ and ’CardOS V6.0 ID R1.0 (BAC)’,
Revision 1.31R, 2021-10-25, Atos Information Technology GmbH
Application Base Guidance ’CardOS V6.0 ID R1.0’ and ’CardOS V6.0 ID R1.0
(BAC)’, Revision 1.33R, 2021-10-21, Atos Information Technology GmbH
Application ePassport Guidance ’CardOS V6.0 ID R1.0’ and ’CardOS V6.0 ID R1.0
(BAC)’ePassport Guidance ’CardOS V6.0 ID’, Revision 1.32R, 2021-10-21, Atos
Information Technology GmbH
Application eSign Guidance ’CardOS V6.0 ID R1.0’ and ’CardOS V6.0 ID R1.0
(BAC)’, Revision 1.22R, 2021-10-21, Atos Information Technology GmbH
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C. Excerpts from the Criteria
For the meaning of the assurance components and levels the following references to the
Common Criteria can be followed:
• On conformance claim definitions and descriptions refer to CC part 1 chapter 10.5
• On the concept of assurance classes, families and components refer to CC Part 3
chapter 7.1
• On the concept and definition of pre-defined assurance packages (EAL) refer to CC
Part 3 chapters 7.2 and 8
• On the assurance class ASE for Security Target evaluation refer to CC Part 3
chapter 12
• On the detailed definitions of the assurance components for the TOE evaluation
refer to CC Part 3 chapters 13 to 17
• The table in CC part 3 , Annex E summarizes the relationship between the
evaluation assurance levels (EAL) and the assurance classes, families and
components.
The CC are published at https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/cc/
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D. Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
Annex B: Evaluation results regarding development
and production environment
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Annex B of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1172-2022
Evaluation results regarding
development and production
environment
The IT product CardOS V6.0 ID R1.0 (BAC) (Target of Evaluation, TOE) has been
evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT
Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 extended by Scheme Interpretations by advice of
the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 for conformance to the Common
Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1.
As a result of the TOE certification, dated 11 March 2022, the following results regarding
the development and production environment apply. The Common Criteria assurance
requirements ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC_CMC.4, ALC_CMS.4, ALC_DEL.1,
ALC_DVS.2, ALC_LCD.1, ALC_TAT.1)
are fulfilled for the development and production sites of the TOE listed below:
a) Atos Information Technology GmbH, Otto-Hahn-Ring 6, 81739 Munich,
Germany (SW Development)
b) Atos Information Technology GmbH, Wuerzburger Str. 121, 90766 Fuerth,
Germany (SW Development)
c) Atos IT Solutions and Services d.o.o, Matice Hrvatske 15, 21000 Split, Croatia
(SW Development)
d) See [9] for the development and production sites of the hardware platform.
For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in accordance
with the Security Target [6]. The evaluators verified, that the threats, security objectives
and requirements for the TOE life cycle phases up to delivery (as stated in the Security
Target [6]) are fulfilled by the procedures of these sites.
Note: End of report
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