KECS-CR-19-12
CubeOne V2.5
Certification Report
Certification No.: KECS-CISS-0919-2019
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History of Creation and Revision
No. Date
Revised
Pages
Description
00 2019.03.04. -
Certification report for CubeOne V2.5
- First documentation
Certification Report Page 3
This document is the certification report for CubeOne V2.5 of eGlobal
Systems Co., Ltd.
The Certification Body
IT Security Certification Center
The Evaluation Facility
Telecommunications Technology Association (TTA)
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Certification Report Page 4
Table of Contents

1. Executive Summary.............................................................................................5
2. Identification.........................................................................................................8
3. Security Policy .....................................................................................................9
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope..........................................................10
5. Architectural Information ..................................................................................10
6. Documentation................................................................................................... 11
7. TOE Testing........................................................................................................ 11
8. Evaluated Configuration....................................................................................12
9. Results of the Evaluation ..................................................................................12
9.1 Security Target Evaluation (ASE)............................................................13
9.2 Life Cycle Support Evaluation (ALC) ......................................................13
9.3 Guidance Documents Evaluation (AGD).................................................13
9.4 Development Evaluation (ADV)..............................................................14
9.5 Test Evaluation (ATE).............................................................................14
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment (AVA)..............................................................14
9.7 Evaluation Result Summary ...................................................................15
10. Recommendations.............................................................................................16
11. Security Target ...................................................................................................16
12. Acronyms and Glossary....................................................................................17
13. Bibliography.......................................................................................................17
Certification Report Page 5
1. Executive Summary
This report describes the certification result drawn by the certification body on the
results of the evaluation of CubeOne V2.5 of eGlobal Systems Co., Ltd with reference
to the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation (“CC”
hereinafter) [1]. It describes the evaluation result and its soundness and conformity.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is database encryption software that provides
encryption and decryption for the user data in a column of a database to be protected.
The TOE consists of five software components: CubeOne Manager, CubeOne Server
(Plug-In), CubeOne Server (API), CubeOne Security Server, and CubeOne Beacon.
CubeOne Manager allows an authorized administrator to access the management
interface, CubeOne Server encrypts and decrypts the user data based on the policy set
by the authorized administrator, CubeOne Security Server stores the policies
configured by the authorized administrator and audit records in the DBMS, and
CubeOne Beacon analyzes potential violations and provides the authorized
administrator to review all audit records. The TOE includes a cryptographic module
validated under the Korea Cryptographic Module Validation Program (KCMVP).
The operational environment of the TOE defined in the Security Target (ST) [6] is
classified into two types depending on the location where CubeOne Server installed:
plug-in and API types. CubeOne Server is installed in a database server and an
application server in the plug-in and API types, respectively. Regardless of the
operational environment, CubeOne Security Server and CubeOne Beacon are installed
in the same server.
The evaluation of the TOE has been carried out by Telecommunications Technology
Association (TTA) and completed on February 7, 2019. This report grounds on the
evaluation technical report (ETR) TTA had submitted [5] and the ST [6].
The ST claims strict conformance to the Korean National PP for Database Encryption
V1.0 [7]. All Security Assurance Requirements (SARs) in the ST are based only upon
assurance component in CC Part 3, and the TOE satisfies the SARs of the PP [7].
Therefore, the ST and the resulting TOE is CC Part 3 conformant. The Security
Functional Requirements (SFRs) are based upon both functional components in CC
Part 2 and newly defined components in the Extended Component Definition chapter of
the ST, and the TOE satisfies the SFRs in the ST. Therefore, the ST and the resulting
TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
[Figure 1] and [Figure 2] show the operational environment of the TOE.
Certification Report Page 6
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[Figure 2] Operational environment of the TOE (API type)
Certification Report Page 7
[Table 1] shows minimum hardware and software requirements necessary for
installation and operation of the TOE.
Category Contents
CubeOne
Manager
CPU Intel Dual Core 2.26 GHz or higherG
RAM 4 GB or higher
HDD 200 MB or higher space for installation of CubeOne
Manager
NIC 10/100/1000 X 1Port or higher
OS Windows 7 Pro 32-bit
Required S/W Oracle Client 11g
MS Visual C++ 2010 Redistributable Package (x86)
CubeOne
Server
(Plug-In)
CPU POWER5 process 1.5 GHz or higher
RAM 4 GB or higher
HDD 200 MB or higher space for installation of CubeOne
Server (Plug-In)
NIC 10/100/1000 X 1Port or higher
OS AIX 6.1 64-bit
Required S/W Oracle Database 11g Release 2
* Software that manages the database to be protected
CubeOne
Server
(API)
CPU Intel Dual Core 1.8 GHz or higher
RAM 4GB or higher
HDD 200 MB or higher space for installation of CubeOne
Server (API)
NIC 10/100/1000 X 1Port or higher
OS CentOS 6.9 (Kernel 2.6.32-696) 64-bit
CubeOne
Security
Server,
CubeOne
Beacon
CPU Intel Dual Core 2.26 GHz or higherG
RAM 4 GB or higher
HDD 200 MB or higher space for installation of CubeOne
Security Server and CubeOne Beacon
NIC 10/100/1000 X 1Port or higher
OS CentOS 6.9 (Kernel 2.6.32-696) 64-bit
Required S/W MariaDB 10.0.33
Apache Tomcat 8.5.34
[Table 1] Hardware and software requirements for the TOE
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[Table 2] shows minimum requirements necessary for the administrator’s PC to access
CubeOne Beacon.
Category Contents
CPU Intel Dual Core 2.26 GHz or higherG
RAM 4 GB or higher
HDD 100 GB or higher
NIC 10/100/1000 X 1Port or higher
OS Windows 7 Pro 32/64-bit
Required S/W Chrome V 70
[Table 2] The minimum requirements for the administrator’s PC
Certification Validity: The certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the
government of Republic of Korea or by any other organization that recognizes or gives
effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by the government of
Republic of Korea or by any other organization recognizes or gives effect to the
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2. Identification
The TOE is software consists of the following software component and related
guidance documents.
TOE CubeOne V2.5G
Version rev.0002
TOE
Components
CubeOne
Manager
CubeOne_Manager_V2.5.00.01
(CubeOne_Manager_V2.5.00.01.exe)
CubeOne
Server (Plug-In)
CubeOne_Server_V2.5.00.01_A64_6.1_OR11
(CubeOne_Server_V2.5.00.01_A64_6.1_OR11.tar)
CubeOne
Server (API)
CubeOne_Server_V2.5.00.01_L64_2.6_API
(CubeOne_Server_V2.5.00.01_L64_2.6_API.tar)
CubeOne
Security Server
CubeOne_SServer_V2.5.00.01_L64_2.6_MA
(CubeOne_SServer_V2.5.00.01_L64_2.6_MA.tar)
CubeOne
Beacon
CubeOne_Beacon_V2.5.00.01
(CubeOne_Beacon_V2.5.00.01.tar.gz)
Certification Report Page 9
Guidance
Document
CubeOne_PRE_V2.5.1.1.pdf
CubeOne_OPE_V2.5.1.2.pdf
[Table 3] TOE identification
Note that the TOE is delivered contained in a CD-ROM.
[Table 4] summarizes additional information for scheme, developer, sponsor, evaluation
facility, certification body, etc..
Scheme Korea Evaluation and Certification Guidelines for IT Security
(August 24, 2017)
Korea Evaluation and Certification Scheme for IT Security
(September 12, 2017)
Common Criteria Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 3.1 Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-001 ~ CCMB-2017-04-
003, April 2017
Protection Profile Korean National PP for Database Encryption V1.0, KECS-PP-
0820-2017, August 18, 2017
Developer eGlobal Systems Co., Ltd
Sponsor eGlobal Systems Co., Ltd
Evaluation
Facility
Telecommunications Technology Association (TTA)
Completion Date
of Evaluation
February 7, 2019
Certification Body IT Security Certification Center
[Table 4] Additional identification information
3. Security Policy
The ST [6] for the TOE claims strict conformance to the Korean National PP for
Database Encryption V1.0 [7], and complies security policies defined in the PP [7] by
security requirements. Thus, the TOE provides security features defined in the PP [7]
as follows:
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z Security audit: The TOE generates audit records of security relevant events
such as the start-up/shutdown of the audit functions, integrity violation, and
self-test failures, then stores them in the DBMS.
z Cryptographic support: The TOE performs cryptographic key management
such as key generation, distribution, and destruction, and cryptographic
operations such as encryption and decryption using the cryptographic module
(KLIB V2.2) validated under the KCMVP.
z User data protection: The TOE provides encryption and decryption for the user
data in a column of a database
z Identification and authentication: The TOE identifies and authenticates the
administrators using their ID/password and mutually authenticates TOE
components.
z Security management: The TOE allows only an authorized administrator to
access the management interface provided by the TOE.
z Protection of the TSF: The TOE implements secure communications between
the TOE components to protect the transmitted data. The TOE encrypts the
stored TSF data to protect them from unauthorized exposure and modification.
The TOE performs self-tests on the TOE components, which includes the self-
test on the validated cryptographic module.
z TOE access: The TOE manages authorized administrators’ sessions based on
attributes such as connection IP address, and terminates the sessions after
predefined time interval of inactivity.
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
There is no explicit Security Problem Definition chapter, therefore no Assumptions
section, in the low assurance ST. Some security aspects of the operational
environment are added to those of the PP [7] in which the TOE will be used or is
intended to be used (For the detailed and precise definition of the security objectives of
the operational environment, refer to the ST [6], chapter 3.).
5. Architectural Information
The TOE is software consisting of the following components:
Certification Report Page 11
z CubeOne Manager provides security features of identification and
authentication of administrators, security management to the TOE and TSF
data, access control to CubeOne Manager
z CubeOne Server (Plug-In) and CubeOne Server (API) encrypt and decrypt the
user data in a column of a database.
z CubeOne Security Server manages authorized administrators’ sessions.
z CubeOne Beacon provides functionality of security management to the TOE
and access control to CubeOne Beacon.
Note that all the five components perform the same functionalities of audit data
generation, cryptographic key management, cryptographic operations, protection of
TSF data, and mutual authentication between the components. For the detailed
description on the architectural information, refer to the ST [6], chapter 1.4.2.
6. Documentation
The following documentations are evaluated and provided with the TOE by the
developer to the customer.
Identifier Release Date
CubeOne_PRE_V2.5.1.1.pdf V1.1 Oct. 26, 2018
CubeOne_OPE_V2.5.1.2.pdf V1.2 Jan. 28, 2019
[Table 5] Documentation
7. TOE Testing
The developer took a testing approach based on the security services provided by
each TOE components based on the operational environment of the TOE. Each test
case includes the following information:
z Test no.: Identifier of each test case
z Test Purpose: Includes the security functions and modules to be tested
z Test Configuration: Details about the test configuration
z Test Procedure detail: Detailed procedures for testing each security function
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z Expected result: Result expected from testing
z Actual result: Result obtained by performing testing
z Test result compared to the expected result: Comparison between the
expected and actual result
The developer correctly performed and documented the tests according to the
assurance component ATE_FUN.1.
The evaluator installed and prepared the TOE in accordance to the preparative
procedures, and conducted independent testing based upon test cases devised by the
evaluator. The TOE and test configuration are identical to the developer’s tests.
Also, the evaluator conducted vulnerability analysis and penetration testing based upon
test cases devised by the evaluator resulting from the independent search for potential
vulnerabilities.
The evaluator’s testing effort, the testing approach, configuration, depth, and results
are summarized in the ETR [5].
8. Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is CubeOne V2.5 (version number rev.0002). See table 3 for detailed
information on the TOE components.
The TOE is installed from the CD-ROM distributed by eGlobal Systems Co., Ltd. After
installing the TOE, an administrator can identify the TOE version through the product’s
Info check menu. The guidance documents listed in this report chapter 6, [Table 5]
were evaluated with the TOE.
9. Results of the Evaluation
The evaluation facility provided the evaluation result in the ETR [5] which references
Single Evaluation Reports for each assurance requirement and Observation Reports.
The evaluation result was based on the CC [1] and CEM [2].
As a result of the evaluation, the verdict PASS is assigned to all assurance
components.
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9.1 Security Target Evaluation (ASE)
The ST Introduction correctly identifies the ST and the TOE, and describes the TOE in
a narrative way at three levels of abstraction (TOE reference, TOE overview and TOE
description), and these three descriptions are consistent with each other. Therefore, the
verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_INT.1.
The Conformance Claim properly describes how the ST and the TOE conform to the
CC and how the ST conforms to packages. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to
ASE_CCL.1.
The Security Objectives for the operational environment are clearly defined. Therefore,
the verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_OBJ.1.
The Extended Components Definition has been clearly and unambiguously defined,
and it is necessary. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_ECD.1.
The Security Requirements is defined clearly and unambiguously, and it is internally
consistent. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_REQ.1.
The TOE Summary Specification addresses all SFRs, and it is consistent with other
narrative descriptions of the TOE. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to
ASE_TSS.1.
Thus, the ST is sound and internally consistent, and suitable to be used as the basis
for the TOE evaluation.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ASE.
9.2 Life Cycle Support Evaluation (ALC)
The developer has uniquely identified the TOE. Therefore, the verdict PASS is
assigned to ALC_CMC.1.
The configuration list includes the TOE and the evaluation evidence required by the
SARs in the ST. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to ALC_CMS.1.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ALC.
9.3 Guidance Documents Evaluation (AGD)
The procedures and steps for the secure preparation of the TOE have been
documented and result in a secure configuration. Therefore, the verdict PASS is
assigned to AGD_PRE.1.
The operational user guidance describes for each user role the security functionality
Certification Report Page 14
and interfaces provided by the TSF, provides instructions and guidelines for the secure
use of the TOE, addresses secure procedures for all modes of operation, facilitates
prevention and detection of insecure TOE states, or it is misleading or unreasonable.
Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to AGD_OPE.1.
Thus, the guidance documents are adequately describing the user can handle the TOE
in a secure manner. The guidance documents take into account the various types of
users (e.g. those who accept, install, administrate or operate the TOE) whose incorrect
actions could adversely affect the security of the TOE or of their own data.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class AGD.
9.4 Development Evaluation (ADV)
The developer has provided a high-level description of at least the SFR-enforcing and
SFR-supporting TSFIs, in terms of descriptions of their parameters. Therefore, the
verdict PASS is assigned to ADV_FSP.1.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ADV.
9.5 Test Evaluation (ATE)
The developer correctly performed and documented the tests in the test documentation.
Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to ATE_FUN.1.
By independently testing a subset of the TSFI, the evaluator confirmed that the TOE
behaves as specified in the functional specification and guidance documentation.
Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to ATE_IND.1.
Thus, the TOE behaves as described in the ST and as specified in the evaluation
evidence (described in the ADV class).
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ATE.
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment (AVA)
By penetration testing, the evaluator confirmed that there are no exploitable
vulnerabilities by attackers possessing basic attack potential in the operational
environment of the TOE. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to AVA_VAN.1.
Thus, potential vulnerabilities identified, during the evaluation of the development and
anticipated operation of the TOE, don’t allow attackers possessing basic attack
Certification Report Page 15
potential to violate the SFRs.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class AVA.
9.7 Evaluation Result Summary
Assurance
Class
Assurance
Component
Evaluator
Action
Elements
Verdict
Evaluator Action
Elements
Assurance
Component
Assurance
Class
ASE ASE_INT.1 ASE_INT.1.1E PASS PASS PASS
ASE_INT.1.2E PASS
ASE_CCL.1 ASE_CCL.1.1E PASS PASS
ASE_OBJ.1 ASE_OBJ.1.1E PASS PASS
ASE_ECD.1 ASE_ECD.1.1E PASS PASS
ASE_ECD.1.2E PASS
ASE_REQ.1 ASE_REQ.1.1E PASS PASS
ASE_TSS.1 ASE_TSS.1.1E PASS PASS
ASE_TSS.1.2E PASS
ALC ALC_CMC.1 ALC_CMC.1.1E PASS PASS PASS
ALC_CMS.1 ALC_CMS.1.1E PASS PASS
AGD AGD_PRE.1 AGD_PRE.1.1E PASS PASS PASS
AGD_PRE.1.2E PASS PASS
AGD_OPE.1 AGD_OPE.1.1E PASS PASS
ADV ADV_FSP.2 ADV_FSP.1.1E PASS PASS PASS
ADV_FSP.1.2E PASS
ATE ATE_FUN.1 ATE_FUN.1.1E PASS PASS PASS
ATE_IND.1 ATE_IND.1.1E PASS PASS
ATE_IND.1.2E PASS
AVA AVA_VAN.1 AVA_VAN.1.1E PASS PASS PASS
AVA_VAN.1.2E PASS
AVA_VAN.1.3E PASS
[Table 6] Evaluation Result Summary
Certification Report Page 16
10. Recommendations
The TOE security functionality can be ensured only in the evaluated TOE operational
environment with the evaluated TOE configuration, thus the TOE shall be operated by
complying with the followings:
z The administrator should install and operate the TOE and DBMS in a
physically secure environment that is accessible only by the authorized
administrator, and should not allow remote management from the outside.
z Developers who link the encryption function to the application or DBMS should
ensure that the security functions of the TOE are applied safely in accordance
with the requirements of the manual.
z When operating the product, the administrator's password should be changed
periodically.
z It is necessary to maintain the reliability and safety of the operating system by
performing reinforcement work on the latest vulnerabilities of the operating
system installed and operated by the TOE.
z The authorized administrator should maintain the secure state, such as
applying the latest security patches to the operating system and DBMS, and
removing unnecessary services, when operating the product.
z The authorized administrator shall periodically check the free space of the
audit data storage in preparation for the loss of the audit records and perform
the backup of the audit records so that the audit records are not deleted.
z The administrator should perform periodic monitoring through CubeOne
Beacon when a potential security violation event occurs after installing the
product.
z In order to prevent modification and deletion of the audit log from unauthorized
users, the policy manager should manage the PC so that only the authorized
policy manager can access the system (PC).
11. Security Target
CubeOne V2.5 Security Target V1.2 [6] is included in this report for reference.
Certification Report Page 17
12. Acronyms and Glossary
CC Common Criteria
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology
Security Evaluation
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
KCMVP the Korea Cryptographic Module Validation Program
PP Protection Profile
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFR Security Functional Requirement
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
TSFI TSF Interface
Decryption The act that restoring the ciphertext into the plaintext
using the decryption key
Encryption The act that converting the plaintext into the ciphertext
using the cryptographic key
Self-test Pre-operational or conditional test executed by the
cryptographic module
Validated Cryptographic
Module
A cryptographic module that is validated and given a
validation number by validation authority
13. Bibliography
The certification body has used following documents to produce this report.
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1
Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-001 ~ CCMB-2017-04-003, April 2017
Part 1: Introduction and general model
Part 2: Security functional components
Part 3: Security assurance components
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version
Certification Report Page 18
3.1 Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-004, April 2017
[3] Korea Evaluation and Certification Guidelines for IT Security (August 24, 2017)
[4] Korea Evaluation and Certification Scheme for IT Security (September 12,
2017)
[5] TTA-CCE-17-015-ETR-05 CubeOne V2.5 Evaluation Technical Report V1.5,
February 26, 2019
[6] CubeOne V2.5 Security Target V1.2, January 31, 2019
[7] Korean National PP for Database Encryption V1.0 (KECS-PP-0820-2017,
August 18, 2017)