TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V.
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info@nl.tuv.com
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Version
2021-1
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Certification Report
ZTE 5G-RAN Solution V3.00.30.20P10
Sponsor and developer: ZTE Corporation
R&D Building 1
ZTE Industrial Plaza
LiuXian Avenue, Xili
Nanshan District, Shenzhen
P.R. China
Evaluation facility: Brightsight B.V
Brassersplein 2
2612 CT Delft
The Netherlands
Report number: NSCIB-CC-0132539-CR
Report version: 1
Project number: 0132539
Author(s): Brian Smithson
Date: 07 April 2021
Number of pages: 13
Number of appendices: 0
Reproduction of this report is authorized provided the report is reproduced in its entirety.
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CONTENTS:
Foreword 3
Recognition of the certificate 4
International recognition 4
European recognition 4
1 Executive Summary 5
2 Certification Results 6
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation 6
2.2 Security Policy 7
2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 7
2.4 Architectural Information 7
2.5 Documentation 8
2.6 IT Product Testing 9
2.7 Re-used evaluation results 10
2.8 Evaluated Configuration 10
2.9 Results of the Evaluation 10
2.10 Comments/Recommendations 11
3 Security Target 12
4 Definitions 12
5 Bibliography 13
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Foreword
The Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security (NSCIB) provides a third-party
evaluation and certification service for determining the trustworthiness of Information Technology (IT)
security products. Under this NSCIB, TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. has the task of issuing
certificates for IT security products, as well as for protection profiles and sites.
Part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product, protection profile or site
according to the Common Criteria assessment guidelines published by the NSCIB. Evaluations are
performed by an IT Security Evaluation Facility (ITSEF) under the oversight of the NSCIB Certification
Body, which is operated by TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. in cooperation with the Ministry of the
Interior and Kingdom Relations.
An ITSEF in the Netherlands is a commercial facility that has been licensed by TÜV Rheinland
Nederland B.V. to perform Common Criteria evaluations; a significant requirement for such a license is
accreditation to the requirements of ISO Standard 17025 “General requirements for the accreditation
of calibration and testing laboratories”.
By awarding a Common Criteria certificate, TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. asserts that the product or
site complies with the security requirements specified in the associated (site) security target, or that
the protection profile (PP) complies with the requirements for PP evaluation specified in the Common
Criteria for Information Security Evaluation. A (site) security target is a requirements specification
document that defines the scope of the evaluation activities.
The consumer should review the (site) security target or protection profile, in addition to this
certification report, in order to gain an understanding of any assumptions made during the evaluation,
the IT product's intended environment, its security requirements, and the level of confidence (i.e., the
evaluation assurance level) that the product or site satisfies the security requirements stated in the
(site) security target.
Reproduction of this report is authorized provided the report is reproduced in its entirety.
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Recognition of the certificate
Presence of the Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement and SOG-IS logos on the certificate
indicates that this certificate is issued in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA and the SOG-IS
agreement and will be recognised by the participating nations.
International recognition
The CCRA has been signed by the Netherlands in May 2000 and provides mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC. Starting September 2014 the CCRA has been updated to provide mutual
recognition of certificates based on cPPs (exact use) or STs with evaluation assurance components
up to and including EAL2+ALC_FLR. The current list of signatory nations and approved certification
schemes can be found on: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
European recognition
The European SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) version 3 effective from April
2010 provides mutual recognition of Common Criteria and ITSEC certificates at a basic evaluation
level for all products. A higher recognition level for evaluation levels beyond EAL4 (resp. E3-basic) is
provided for products related to specific technical domains. This agreement was initially signed by
Finland, France, Germany, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Italy
joined the SOGIS-MRA in December 2010. The current list of signatory nations, approved certification
schemes and the list of technical domains for which the higher recognition applies can be found on:
http://www.sogisportal.eu.
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1 Executive Summary
This Certification Report states the outcome of the Common Criteria security evaluation of the ZTE
5G-RAN Solution V3.00.30.20P10. The developer of the ZTE 5G-RAN Solution V3.00.30.20P10 is
ZTE Corporation located in Shenzhen, P.R. China and they also act as the sponsor of the evaluation
and certification. A Certification Report is intended to assist prospective consumers when judging the
suitability of the IT security properties of the product for their particular requirements.
The TOE is a New Generation Radio Access Network (NG-RAN) system solution for NR (new radio)
network plus an UME. The solution interfaces with User Equipment (UE) and implements such
functions as radio resource management, data stream IP header compression and encryption, attach
progress selection, user plane data routing, data scheduling and transmission, and mobility
management. The UME is used to manage the system via web interface.
The TOE has been evaluated by Brightsight B.V. located in Delft, The Netherlands. The evaluation
was completed on 30 March 2021 with the approval of the ETR. The certification procedure has been
conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of
IT Security [NSCIB].
The scope of the evaluation is defined by the security target [ST], which identifies assumptions made
during the evaluation, the intended environment for the ZTE 5G-RAN Solution V3.00.30.20P10, the
security requirements, and the level of confidence (evaluation assurance level) at which the product is
intended to satisfy the security requirements. Consumers of the ZTE 5G-RAN Solution
V3.00.30.20P10 are advised to verify that their own environment is consistent with the security target,
and to give due consideration to the comments, observations and recommendations in this
certification report.
The results documented in the evaluation technical report [ETR]
1
for this product provides sufficient
evidence that the TOE meets the EAL3 augmented (EAL3+) assurance requirements for the evaluated
security functionality. This assurance level is augmented with ALC_FLR.2 (Flaw reporting procedures).
The evaluation was conducted using the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5 and [CEM] for conformance to the Common Criteria for Information
Technology Security Evaluation, version 3.1 Revision 5 [CC] (Parts I, II and III).
TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V., as the NSCIB Certification Body, declares that the evaluation meets
all the conditions for international recognition of Common Criteria Certificates and that the product will
be listed on the NSCIB Certified Products list. It should be noted that the certification results only apply
to the specific version of the product as evaluated.
1
The Evaluation Technical Report contains information proprietary to the developer and/or the
evaluator, and is not releasable for public review.
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2 Certification Results
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) for this evaluation is the ZTE 5G-RAN Solution V3.00.30.20P10 from
ZTE Corporation located in Shenzhen, P.R. China.
The TOE is comprised of the following main components:
BBU Hardware and Software Components
Delivery item type Identifier Version
Hardware BBU V9200
Software BBU NR: V3.00.30.20P10
RRU Hardware and Software Components
Delivery item type Identifier Version
Hardware RRU R9105
R9212
R8998
R8894
R8854
R9222
R9214
R8862
R8852
Software RRU V3.00.30.20P10
AAU Hardware and Software Components
Delivery item type Identifier Version
Hardware AAU A9611
A9815
A9631
A9622
Software AAU V3.00.30.20P10
UME Software Components
Delivery item type Identifier Version
Software UME Server version ElasticNet UME V16.20.30
SSH Server (Apache SSHD) V2.1.0
SFTP Server (Apache-sshd-core) V2.2.0
LDAP server (ApacheDS) V2.0.0-M24
To ensure secure usage a set of guidance documents is provided together with the ZTE 5G-RAN
Solution V3.00.30.20P10. Details can be found in section 2.5 of this report.
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2.2 Security Policy
The major security features of the ZTE 5G-RAN Solution V3.00.30.20P10 are:
 Secure management and usage of the TOE, to ensure that only properly authorized staff can
manage and/or use the TOE;
 Secure interaction between various parts of the TOE and between the TOE and various
machines in the environment, so that user data and/or management commands cannot be
read or modified in between; and,
 Logging and auditing of user actions.
2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
2.3.1 Assumptions
The assumptions defined in the Security Target are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead
to specific Security Objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. Detailed information on these
security objectives that must be fulfilled by the TOE environment can be found in section 3.4 of the
[ST].
2.3.2 Clarification of scope
The evaluation did not reveal any threats to the TOE that are not countered by the evaluated security
functions of the product.
2.4 Architectural Information
The TOE consists of three parts: a Baseband Unit (BBU), a Remote RF unit (RRU) or Active Antenna
Unit (AAU), and a Unified Management Expert (UME).
 BBU is the device processing the analogue to digital conversion of the signal.
 RRU is the remote radio unit transceiver.
 AAU is a radio frequency processing module and antenna.
 UME is a unified intelligent operation and maintenance system for RAN. UME provides the
intelligent operation and maintenance management of network and the on-demand deployment
and the gray-scale based upgrade of system.
The logical architecture, originating from the Security Target [ST], can be depicted as follows:
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The TOE has the following features:
 Secure management and usage of the TOE, to ensure that only properly authorized staff can
manage and/or use the TOE;
 Secure interaction between various parts of the TOE and between the TOE and various
machines in the environment, so that user data and/or management commands cannot be read
or modified in between; and,
 Logging and auditing of user actions.
2.5 Documentation
The following documentation is provided with the product by the developer to the customer:
Reference Name Version Date
[UG-BBU-ACP] UG-BBU-ACP Acceptance procedure 0.4 2021/02/03
[UG-BBU-CONF] RAN Configuration Management 1.3 2020/09/23
[UG-BBU-HW-DES] ZXRAN V9200 Radio Access Network
Product Description
2.0 2019/10/08
[UG-BBU-HW-INS] ZXRAN V9200 Radio Access Network
Hardware Installation
2.0 2019/10/08
[UG-BBU-OPE] RAN Element Management 1.0 2020/07/26
[UG-BBU-SW-INS] ZXRAN Base Station Commissioning
Guide (Image Burning)
1.2 2020/04/28
[UG-UME-ACP] UG-UME-ACP Acceptance procedure 0.3 2021/02/03
[UG-UME-INS] UME Installation and Deployment
Guide
1.3 2020/09/11
[UG-UME-LE] Security Log Events 1.0 NA
[UG-UME-MML] UME Command List 1.0 NA
[UG-UME-OPE-LOG] ElasticNet UME Log Management
Operation Guide
R1.0 2020/07/22
[UG-UME-OPE-OAOG] ElasticNet UME Open API Service
Operation Guide
R1.0 2020/07/30
[UG-UME-OPE-SMOG] ElasticNet UME Security Management
Operation Guide
R1.0 2020/07/22
[UG-UME-PRE] UME Software Integrity Protection
Evidence description
1.0 NA
[UG-UME-SPM] Security Parameter Manual 1.0 NA
[UG-UME-UPG] UME Upgrade Guide 1.12 2020/08/11
[UG-A9622E-INST] ZXRAN A9622E S35 5G Hardware
Installation
1.0 2019/12/24
[UG-A9631-AAU-INST] ZXRAN A9631 S26 5G Active Antenna
Unit Hardware Installation Guide
1.0 2019/12/25
[UG-A9815-AAU-INST] ZXRAN A9815 5G Active Antenna Unit
Hardware Installation
1.0 2018/03/30
[UG-A9611-AAU-INST] ZXRAN A9611 S35 5G Active Antenna
Unit Hardware Installation
1.0 2018/01/25
[UG-R9105-S26-RRU-INST] ZXRAN R9105 S26 5G Remote Radio
Unit Hardware Installation
1.0 2019/06/20
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Reference Name Version Date
[UG-R9105-S35-RRU-INST] ZXRAN R9105 S35 5G Remote Radio
Unit Hardware Installation
1.0 2019/08/20
[UG-R9212E-RRU-INST] ZXRAN R9212E Macro Radio Remote
Unit Hardware Installation Guide
1.0 2019/07/30
[UG-R9214E-RRU-INST] ZXRAN R9214E Macro Radio Remote
Unit Hardware Installation
1.0 2019/10/22
[UG-R9222-RRU-INST] ZXRAN R9222 Macro Radio Remote
Unit Hardware Installation Guide
1.0 2019/10/24
[UG-R8862A-RRU-INST] ZXSDR R8862A Macro Remote Radio
Unit Hardware Installation
1.0 2018/06/20
[UG-R8998E-S2600-RRU-INST] ZXSDR R8998E S2600 TDD Multi-
Path Remote Radio Unit Hardware
Installation
1.0
2018/12/10
[UG-R8998E-S3700-RRU-INST] ZXSDR R8998E S3700 TDD Multi-
Path Remote Radio Unit Hardware
Installation
1.0
2018/12/18
[UG-R8852E-RRU-INST] ZXSDR R8852E Macro Remote Radio
Unit Hardware Installation
1.0 2018/09/30
[UG-R8854E-RRU-INST] ZXSDR R8854E Macro Radio Remote
Unit Hardware Installation
1.0 2018/09/30
[UG-R8894-RRU-INST] ZXSDR R8894E Macro Radio Remote
Unit Hardware Installation
1.0 2019/11/30
2.6 IT Product Testing
Testing (depth, coverage, functional tests, independent testing): The evaluators examined the
developer’s testing activities documentation and verified that the developer has met their testing
responsibilities.
2.6.1 Testing approach and depth
The developer provided evidence, that is mapped to the TOE TSFIs, which represents a subset of the
entire developer functional testing. Evaluators validated the correctness of the mapping and the
correspondence of the testing to the TSFIs expected behavior. Evaluators validated the
appropriateness of the test cases definition (prerequisites, test procedure, expected results) for testing
the expected TSFIs behavior.
The developer created its functional test plan directly from the test cases described in the 3gpp
standards [TS.33.511] for BBU, and [TS.33.117] for BBU and UME, as required by NESAS for 5G
products.
The developer provided the evaluator with access to TOE samples.
For the BBU the evaluators performed 100% sampling of the delevoper testing.
For the UME, evaluators repeated all developer tests on an earlier version of the UME software. The
evaluators then repeated a sample of developer tests that covered all UME subsystems and relevant
TSFIs on the version of UME software included in the TOE.
2.6.2 Independent Penetration Testing
To identify potential vulnerabilities the evaluator performed the following activities:
 Analyzed public vulnerabilities sources and internal vulnerability sources and assess the
applicability and execute or define a new penetration test if required.
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 Performed network and web scanning tools on the UME and BBU interfaces so identify
vulnerabilities, discover unexpected ports, and check cipher suites.
During the evaluation of all performed assurance classes the evaluator labeled the identified potential
vulnerabilities, if any. No potential vulnerabilities were identified during the evaluation activities for
ASE, AGD, or ALC. Potential vulnerabilities were identified during the evaluation activities for ADV and
ATE. Only software attacks category is taken into account since it is assumed that the TOE physical
access is protected. The penetration tests that were devised and executed were:
 Communication channel attack
 Web attack
 OS attack
 Data protection of logs and other information
2.6.3 Test Configuration
The configuration of the sample was the same as described in the ZTE RAN Solution Security Target,
v0.22, 4 February 2021:The sampled BBU and UME are listed, below (RRU/AAU units are essentially
passive radio transceivers in these tests). The Developer and Independent tests were performed on
the same TOE model and version.
TOE component Version number
BBU ZXRAN V9200
UME V16.20.30
Tests were conducted with test clients/tools communicating with the BBU and UME through a router
and, when required, also directly to the BBU through its debug port.
2.6.4 Testing Results
The testing activities, including configurations, procedures, test cases, expected results and observed
results are summarised in the [ETR], with references to the documents containing the full details.
The developer’s tests and the independent functional tests produced the expected results, giving
assurance that the TOE behaves as specified in its [ST] and functional specification.
No exploitable vulnerabilities were found with the independent penetration tests.
2.7 Re-used evaluation results
There is no re-use of evaluation results in this certification.
2.8 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is defined uniquely by its name and version number ZTE 5G-RAN Solution V3.00.30.20P10.
Details of the verification process for both hardware and software components is provided in
acceptance procedures [UG-BBU-ACP] for BBU and [UG-UME-ACP] for UME.
2.9 Results of the Evaluation
The evaluation lab documented their evaluation results in the [ETR], which references an ASE
Intermediate Report and other evaluator documents.
The verdict of each claimed assurance requirement is “Pass”.
Based on the above evaluation results the evaluation lab concluded the ZTE 5G-RAN Solution
V3.00.30.20P10, to be CC Part 2 extended, CC Part 3 conformant, and to meet the requirements of
EAL 3 augmented with ALC_FLR.2. This implies that the product satisfies the security requirements
specified in Security Target [ST].
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2.10 Comments/Recommendations
The user guidance as outlined in section 2.5 contains necessary information about the usage of the
TOE. Certain aspects of the TOE’s security functionality, in particular the countermeasures against
attacks, depend on accurate conformance to the user guidance of both the software and the hardware
part of the TOE. There are no particular obligations or recommendations for the user apart from
following the user guidance. Please note that the documents contain relevant details with respect to
the resistance against certain attacks.
In addition, all aspects of assumptions, threats and policies as outlined in the Security Target not
covered by the TOE itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his system risk
management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and techniques to be covered, he
should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the TOE is required and thus requested from
the sponsor of the certificate.
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms and protocols was not rated in the course of this
evaluation. This specifically applies to the following proprietary or non-standard algorithms, protocols
and implementations: <none>.
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3 Security Target
The ZTE RAN Solution Security Target, v0.22, 4 February 2021[ST] is included here by reference.
4 Definitions
This list of Acronyms and the glossary of terms contains elements that are not already defined by the
CC or CEM:
3GPP 3
rd
Generation Partnership Project
5G Fifth generation technology standard for broadband cellular networks
AAU Active Antenna Unit
BBU Baseband Unit
gNodeB 5G base station employing New Radio technology
GSMA GSM Association
IT Information Technology
ITSEF IT Security Evaluation Facility
NESAS Network Equipment Security Assurance Scheme (GSMA/3GPP)
NSCIB Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the area of IT security
PP Protection Profile
RAN Radio Access Network
RRU remote RF unit
TOE Target of Evaluation
UME Unified Management Expert
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5 Bibliography
This section lists all referenced documentation used as source material in the compilation of this
report:
[CC] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Parts I, II and III,
Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.
[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1
Revision 5, April 2017.
[ETR] Evaluation Technical Report ZTE RAN V3.00.30.20P10 – EAL3+, 20-RPT-1144,
v4.0, 26 March 2021.
[NSCIB] Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security, Version 2.5, 28
March 2019.
[ST] ZTE RAN Solution Security Target, v0.22, 4 February 2021.
[TS.33.117] TS.33.117: Catalogue of general security assurance requirements, Release 16.6.0,
16 December 2020.
[TS.33.511] TS.33.511: Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) for the next generation Node
B (gNodeB) network product class, Release 16.5.0, 25 September 2020.
[UG-BBU-ACP] UG-BBU-ACP Acceptance procedure, v0.4, 3 February 2021.
[UG-UME-ACP] UG-UME-ACP Acceptance procedure, v0.3, 3 February 2021.
(This is the end of this report).