BSI-DSZ-CC-0821-2014
for
AKD eID Card 1.0
from
Agencija za komercijalnu djelatnost d.o.o.
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 CC-Zert-327 V4.76
BSI-DSZ-CC-0821-2014
Secure Signature Creation Device (SSCD)
AKD eID Card 1.0
from Agencija za komercijalnu djelatnost d.o.o.
PP Conformance: Protection Profile for Secure Signature Creation Device -
Part 2: Device with Key Generation Version 2.01, January
2012, BSI-CC-PP-0059-2009-MA-01,
Protection profiles for secure signature creation device - Part
4: Extension for device with key generation and trusted
communication with certificate generation application 1.0.1,
November 2012, BSI-CC-PP-0071-2012 ,
Protection profiles for secure signature creation device - Part
3: Device with key import Version 1.0.2, July 2012,
BSI-CC-PP-0075-2012
Functionality: PP conformant
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by AVA_VAN.5, ALC_DVS.2
SOGIS
Recognition Agreement
The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation
facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1
extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and
guidance specific for the technology of the product for conformance to the Common
Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1.
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its
evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification
scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions
of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the
evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is
either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 29 October 2014
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Bernd Kowalski L.S.
Head of Department
Common Criteria
Recognition Arrangement
for components up to
EAL 4
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0821-2014
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0821-2014 Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0821-2014
Contents
A Certification.........................................................................................................................7
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure..................................................................7
2 Recognition Agreements.................................................................................................7
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification...................................................................8
4 Validity of the Certification Result....................................................................................9
5 Publication.......................................................................................................................9
B Certification Results..........................................................................................................11
1 Executive Summary......................................................................................................12
2 Identification of the TOE................................................................................................13
3 Security Policy...............................................................................................................14
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope........................................................................14
5 Architectural Information................................................................................................15
6 Documentation..............................................................................................................15
7 IT Product Testing..........................................................................................................15
8 Evaluated Configuration................................................................................................17
9 Results of the Evaluation...............................................................................................17
10 Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE........................................................18
11 Security Target.............................................................................................................19
12 Definitions....................................................................................................................19
13 Bibliography.................................................................................................................21
C Excerpts from the Criteria.................................................................................................23
CC Part 1:........................................................................................................................23
CC Part 3:........................................................................................................................24
D Annexes............................................................................................................................33
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0821-2014 Certification Report
A Certification
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● Act on the Federal Office for Information Security2
● BSI Certification Ordinance3
● BSI Schedule of Costs4
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
● DIN EN ISO/IEC 17065 standard
● BSI certification: Technical information on the IT security certification, Procedural
Description (BSI 7138) [3]
● BSI certification: Requirements regarding the Evaluation Facility (BSI 7125) [3]
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.15
[1] also published as
ISO/IEC 15408.
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 [2] also published
as ISO/IEC 18045.
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
2 Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and in addition at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain technical
domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL1 to EAL4 and ITSEC Evaluation Assurance Levels E1 to E3 (basic). For higher
2
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for Information Security
(BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 07 July 1992, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated
23 February 2007, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0821-2014
recognition levels the technical domain Smart card and similar Devices has been defined.
It includes assurance levels beyond EAL4 resp. E3 (basic). In addition, certificates issued
for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of the recognition agreement.
As of September 2011 the new agreement has been signed by the national bodies of
Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and
the United Kingdom. Details on recognition and the history of the agreement can be found
at https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the nations listed above. This certificate is recognized under
SOGIS-MRA for all assurance components selected.
2.2 International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
An arrangement (Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC Evaluation Assurance Levels up to and including EAL 4 has
been signed in May 2000 (CCRA). It includes also the recognition of Protection Profiles
based on the CC.
As of September 2011 the arrangement has been signed by the national bodies of:
Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, The Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United
Kingdom, United States of America. The current list of signatory nations and approved
certification schemes can be seen on the website: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the nations listed
above.
As the product certified has been accepted into the certification process before 08
September 2014, this certificate is recognized according to the rules of CCRA-2000, i.e. up
to and including CC part 3 EAL 4 components. The evaluation contained the components
AVA_VAN.5 and ALC_DVS.2 that are not mutually recognised in accordance with the
provisions of the CCRA-2000, for mutual recognition the EAL 4 components of these
assurance families are relevant.
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product AKD eID Card 1.0 has undergone the certification procedure at BSI.
The evaluation of the product AKD eID Card 1.0 was conducted by TÜV
Informationstechnik GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 1 October 2014. TÜV
Informationstechnik GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)6
recognised by the certification
body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: Agencija za komercijalnu
djelatnost d.o.o..
The product was developed by: Agencija za komercijalnu djelatnost d.o.o..
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0821-2014 Certification Report
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
4 Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report
and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance levels please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at
the end of the Certification Report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-certification).
Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation and certification
procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk management needs regularly
updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-assessment on a regular e.g. annual
basis.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
5 Publication
The product AKD eID Card 1.0 has been included in the BSI list of certified products,
which is published regularly (see also Internet: https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]). Further
information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer7
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
7
Agencija za komercijalnu djelatnost d.o.o.
Savska cesta 31
10000 Zagreb
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0821-2014 Certification Report
B Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0821-2014
1 Executive Summary
The AKD Electronic Identity Card 1.0 is a SSCD (Secure Signature Creation Device) in the
appearance of a contact smart card. The TOE consists of the Java Card applet AKD eID
Card 1.0, executed on the underlying JCOP platform NXP J2E081_M64 Secure Smart
Card Controller Revision 3 (certification ID NSCIB-CC-13-37761-CR2 [15]), and the
hardware platform. The hardware platform comprises the Crypto Library V2.7/V2.9
(certification ID BSI-DSZ-CC-0633-V2-2014 [16]) and the NXP Secure Smart Card
Controller P5CC081V1A (certification ID BSI-DSZ-CC-0857-2013 [17]). The TOE may
generate internally or externally signing key and communicates with the signature creation
application in a protected manner. In secure environment the TOE may also be used to
create advanced electronic signatures or qualified electronic signatures. The TOE
implements the following functionalities, according to the strictly claimed protection profiles
for secure signature creation devices, certificated by the BSI
(BSI-CC-PP-0059-2009-MA-01 [7], BSI-CC-PP-0071-2012 [8] and BSI-CC-PP-0075-2012
[9]):
● On chip and external key generation
● Advanced or qualified digital signature
● Certificate information application
● Knowledge based user authentication with two PINs and one PUK
● Secure Messaging
● Symmetric or asymmetric device authentication
● Administrator role authentication and post issuance management of the card
● Signature generation for Client/Server authentication
● Encryption key decipherment
● Certificate verification
● Self protection
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified
● Protection Profile for Secure Signature Creation Device - Part 2: Device with Key
Generation Version 2.01, January 2012, BSI-CC-PP-0059-2009-MA-01 [7];
● Protection profiles for secure signature creation device - Part 4: Extension for device
with key generation and trusted communication with certificate generation application
1.0.1, November 2012, BSI-CC-PP-0071-2012 [8];
● Protection profiles for secure signature creation device - Part 3: Device with key import
Version 1.0.2, July 2012, BSI-CC-PP-0075-2012 [9].
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 4
augmented by AVA_VAN.5, ALC_DVS.2.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6], chapter 9. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and some of
them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0821-2014 Certification Report
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functionality:
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
SF.USER User authentication
SF.DEV Device authentication
SF.SM Trusted channel
SF.ACCESS Role authentication
SF.CRYPTO Cryptographic functions - provided by the certified
platform
SF.PROTECT Self protection
Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 10.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6], chapter 6.1.
Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of Assumptions,
Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security Target [6],
chapter 6 and 7.
This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8 of this
report.
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2 Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
AKD eID Card 1.0
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
1 HW/
SW
Finalized composite
TOE
Java Card applet AKD
eID Card 1.0, executed
on the underlying JCOP
platform NXP
J2E081_M64 Secure
Smart Card Controller
Revision 3, comprising of
Crypto Library V2.7/V2.9
and the NXP Secure
Smart Card Controller
P5CC081V1A
Delivery in sealed boxes / crates
by shipping company or courier
under dual control
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0821-2014
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
2 KEYS Personalization-key
-set
n/a Delivery in three separated
components either in three
separate PGP encrypted mails
or the three Key Custodians
enter the components directly to
the personalization centre HSM.
3 DOC User guidance [12] Version 1.2
Date 2014-08-14
Delivery by PGP encrypted
e-mail with previous verification
of the client recipient
authenticity.
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
The IC is delivered from the IC production site of NXP to AKD. This delivery is covered by
the certified JCOP platform (NSCIB-CC-13-37761-CR2). At the AKD production and
development site, the composite TOE is manufactured including the chip integration and
the applet installation. According to the Security Target, the composite TOE is finalized
after initialization / pre-personalization at AKD and then delivered to the personalization
site. Therefore the personalization agent is the client and the receiver of the finalized TOE.
See also figure 3, TOE life cycle, in the Security Target [6].
The verification of the delivered composite TOEs unique identity is gained by the
identification mechanisms according to the user guidance [12]. The finalized composite
TOE is delivered from AKD to the personalization agent who verifies the identity by the
ATR (Answer To Reset) check which should return the expected value: ‘3B FF 13 00 00 81
31 FE 45 00 31 B9 64 04 44 EC C1 73 94 01 80 82 90 00 12’ [12], chapter 5.1. Additional
the INS_GET_VERSION command is used to verify the correct version of the applet by
sending ’80 26 00 00 00’ or ‘8C 26 00 00 00’ and checking that the returned version
matches the expected value for the applet version 1.0: ’02 00 01 00 00’ [12], chapters
5.1.2 and 6.8.2.
3 Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE. It is defined according to the certified Protection Profiles for
Secure Signature Creation Device - Part 2: Device with Key Generation Version 2.01,
January 2012, BSI-CC-PP-0059-2009-MA-01[7], for secure signature creation device -
Part 4: Extension for device with key generation and trusted communication with certificate
generation application 1.0.1, November 2012, BSI-CC-PP-0071-2012 [8], and for secure
signature creation device - Part 3: Device with key import Version 1.0.2, July 2012,
BSI-CC-PP-0075-2012 [9] by the Security Objectives and Requirements given in these
Protection Profiles and according the the Security Target [6].
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The List of objectives
which have to be met by the the environment can be found in the Security Target [6],
chapter 7.2.
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5 Architectural Information
The AKD Electronic Identity Card 1.0 is a composite TOE which consists of the Java Card
applet AKD eID Card 1.0, executed on the underlying JCOP platform NXP J2E081_M64
Secure Smart Card Controller Revision 3 (certification ID NSCIB-CC-13-37761-CR2 [15]),
and the hardware platform. The hardware platform comprises the Crypto Library V2.7/V2.9
(certification ID BSI-DSZ-CC-0633-V2-2014 [16]) and the NXP Secure Smart Card
Controller P5CC081V1A (certification ID BSI-DSZ-CC-0857-2013 [17]).
The AKD Electronic Identity Card 1.0 applet consists of four subsystems. Each subsystem
package implements functionalities in modules.
● The applet subsystem contains two modules regarding secure messaging and the applet
itself.
● The file system subsystem contains the modules for the usage of dedicated, elementary
and normal files.
● The Security Data Object subsystem implements the management of the security
functionality and summarizes modules for the security context and environment, the
different key-sets, and the PIN.
● The Utility subsystem includes, besides other functions, also a common module
providing utilities used by most of all other modules.
6 Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7 IT Product Testing
Developer Tests
The TOE consists of the AKD eID Card which is a Java Card applet developed by AKD,
built on secure platform NXP J2E081 Secure Smart Card Controller Rev 3 (JCOP 2.4.2
R3).
All functional tests are done on a test platform including a set of libraries that are used for
tests and test scripts development. The test scripts are further organized in test campaigns
and executed either as all tests of a campaign or as single tests, with an automatic
creation of tests reports. The test reports are generated in HTML format and provide all
information about the test execution event: general information, summary results and
execution result for each test.
To run a test campaign the TOE on the smartcard shall undergo well-defined preparative
procedures. The card preparation is implemented as a script by the developer.
The test reports include details and comments of the used command structure and the
expected results. The evaluator determined that the test prerequisites, test steps, and
expected results adequately test each TSFI, and they are consistent with the descriptions
of the TSFI in the functional specification.
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The test documentation includes all details about the set-up procedures, the test
procedure and information about the execution of the tests. They are suitable to test the
TSF portion mediated by the related interface adequately.
The analysis of the test procedures show that all interfaces of SFR-enforcing modules are
tested. All TSFI are present and covered by tests.
The actual test results correspond to the expected test results. The TOE has passed all
tests so that all TSF have been successfully tested against the functional specification and
the design of the TOE. The developer test results demonstrate that the TSF perform as
specified.
Evaluator Tests
The TOE consists of the Java Card applet AKD eID Card which is developed by AKD and
built on secure platform NXP J2E081 Secure Smart Card Controller Rev 3 (JCOP 2.4.2
R3).
The evaluator repeated all developer tests independently and additionally performed tests
regarding the TSF and the preparative procedures on his own, for which he used the
scripts provided by the developer.
The evaluator used test samples provided by the developer. Additionally the evaluator
created, installed and configured test samples of the TOE on his own according to the user
guidance documentation. There is only one configuration of the TOE that is delivered in to
personalization agent. For the tests this configuration was used.
The test logs and the test documentation include details and comments on the test
configuration, on the test equipment used, on the used command structure and the
expected results. The test prerequisites, test steps, and expected results adequately test
the related TSFI, and they are consistent with the descriptions of the TSFI in the functional
specification.
The test results have not shown any deviations between the expected test results and the
actual test results.
Penetration Testing
Based on the list of potential vulnerabilities applicable to the TOE in its operational
environment the evaluator devised the attack scenarios for penetration tests to verify if
they could be exploited in the TOE’s operational environment.
The evaluator performed applet code review during his evaluation, to verify the
implementation of the requirements recommended in the platform's ETR for composition
and guidance, as well as of the security mechanisms of the applet in general. Further
aspects were covered by additional independent tests.
There is only one allowed configuration of the TOE which will be delivered to
personalization agent. The evaluator performed penetration testing on this configuration
and additional tests on other test configurations.
Attack scenarios that have been tested are Perturbation attacks: Program flow disturbance
with LFI. The SFRs that were penetration tested belong to the security funtion
SF.PROTECT and are FDP_RIP.1, FDP_SDI.2/Persistent, FDP_SDI.2/DTBS,
FPT_EMS.1, FPT_FLS.1, FPT_PHP.1, FPT_PHP.3, FPT_TST.1. The remaining SFRs
were analysed, but not penetration tested due to non-exploitability of the related attack
scenarios in the TOE’s operational environment, assuming an attacker with a High attack
potential.
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The overall test result is that no deviations were found between the expected and the
actual test results. No attack scenario with the attack potential High was actually
successful in the TOE’s operational environment as defined in the ST [6] provided that all
measures required by the developer are applied.
8 Evaluated Configuration
The AKD Electronic Identity Card 1.0 is a composite TOE which consists of the Java Card
applet AKD eID Card 1.0, executed on the underlying JCOP platform NXP J2E081_M64
Secure Smart Card Controller Revision 3 (certification ID NSCIB-CC-13-37761-CR2 [15]),
and the hardware platform. The hardware platform comprises the Crypto Library V2.7/V2.9
(certification ID BSI-DSZ-CC-0633-V2-2014 [16]) and the NXP Secure Smart Card
Controller P5CC081V1A (certification ID BSI-DSZ-CC-0857-2013 [17]). The evaluated
TOE is delivered in one configuration, parameterized for symmetric and asymmetric
authentication. According to the Security Target, the TOE is finalized after initialization /
pre-personalization and then delivered to the personalization site. Therefore the
personalization agent is the client and the receiver of the finalized TOE.
9 Results of the Evaluation
9.1 CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [11] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used for those components up to EAL5
extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and guidance
specific for the technology of the product [4] (AIS 34).
The following guidance specific for the technology was used:
(i) The Application of CC to Integrated Circuits
(ii) Application of Attack Potential to Smart Cards
(iii) Composite product evaluation for Smart Cards and similar devices (see AIS 36).
According to this concept the relevant guidance documents of the underlying
platform and the documents ETR for Composition from the platform evaluations
(i.e. on the underlying JCOP platform NXP J2E081_M64 Secure Smart Card
Controller Revision 3 (certification ID NSCIB-CC-13-37761-CR2) [18], on the
Crypto Library V2.7/V2.9 (certification ID BSI-DSZ-CC-0633-V2-2014) [19] and on
the NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P5CC081V1A (certification ID
BSI-DSZ-CC-0857-2013) [20]) have been applied in the TOE evaluation.
(see [4], AIS 25, AIS 26, AIS 34, AIS 36).
Random number generation according to class DRG.3 and DRG.2 of AIS 20 is
JCOP-functionality and has been covered by the platform certificate.
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the EAL 4 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report)
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● The components AVA_VAN.5, ALC_DVS.2 augmented for this TOE evaluation.
The evaluation has confirmed:
● PP Conformance:
• Protection Profile for Secure Signature Creation Device - Part 2: Device with Key
Generation Version 2.01, January 2012, BSI-CC-PP-0059-2009-MA-01 [7]
• Protection Profile for secure signature creation device - Part 4: Extension for device
with key generation and trusted communication with certificate generation
application 1.0.1, November 2012, BSI-CC-PP-0071-2012 [8]
• Protection Profile for secure signature creation device - Part 3: Device with key
import Version 1.0.2, July 2012, BSI-CC-PP-0075-2012 [9]
● for the Functionality: PP conformant
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant / extended
EAL 4 augmented by AVA_VAN.5, ALC_DVS.2
For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production environment see
annex B in part D of this report.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2 Results of cryptographic assessment
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this certification
procedure (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). But Cryptographic Functionalities with
a security level of lower than 100 bits can no longer be regarded as secure without
considering the application context. Therefore, for these functionalities it shall be checked
whether the related crypto operations are appropriate for the intended system. Some
further hints and guidelines can be derived from the 'Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-02102'
(https://www.bsi.bund.de).
The cryptographic algorithms that are used by the TOE to enforce its security policy are
detailed with all necessary information in the ST [6] chapter 12, Crypto-Disclaimer.
Any Cryptographic Functionality that is marked in column 'Security Level above 100 Bits' in
the referenced table with 'no' achieves a security level of lower than 100 Bits (in general
context).
According to [13] and [14] the algorithms are suitable for create advanced electronic
signatures or qualified electronic signatures The validity period of each algorithm is
mentioned in [13] and [14].
10 Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE
itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
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The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
The limited validity for the usage of cryptographic algorithms as outlined in chapter 9 has
to be considered by the user and his system risk management process.
11 Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [6] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report. It is a sanitised version of
the complete Security Target [10] used for the evaluation performed. Sanitisation was
performed according to the rules as outlined in the relevant CCRA policy (see AIS 35 [4]).
12 Definitions
12.1 Acronyms
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
IT Information Technology
ITSEC Information Technology Security Evaluation Criteria
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
PP Protection Profile
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
12.2 Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in part 2
and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the CC.
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Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on
well-established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Protection Profile - An implementation-independent statement of security needs for a
TOE type.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - A set of software, firmware and/or hardware possibly accompanied
by guidance.
TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
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13 Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 4, September 2012
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 4, September 2012
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 4, September 2012
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 4, September 2012
[3] BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE8
.
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
in the BSI Website
[6] Security Target Lite BSI-DSZ-CC-0821-2014, AKD Electronic Identity Card, Version
1.3, Date 2014-09-26, AKD (sanitised public document)
[7] Protection Profile for Secure Signature Creation Device - Part 2: Device with Key
Generation Version 2.01, January 2012, BSI-CC-PP-0059-2009-MA-01,
[8] Protection Profile for secure signature creation device - Part 4: Extension for device
with key generation and trusted communication with certificate generation
application 1.0.1, November 2012, BSI-CC-PP-0071-2012
[9] Protection Profile for secure signature creation device - Part 3: Device with key
import Version 1.0.2, July 2012, BSI-CC-PP-0075-2012
[10] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0821-2014, AKD Electronic Identity Card, Version 1.3,
Date 2014-09-26, AKD ( confidential document)
[11] Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) for AKD Electronic Identity Card 1.0, Version 2,
Date 2014-09-26, TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH, (confidential document)
[12] AKD Electronic Identity Card, User Guidance, Version 1.2, Date 2014-08-14, AKD
[13] Bekanntmachung zur elektronischen Signatur nach dem Signaturgesetz und der
Signaturveraordnung (Übersicht über geeignete Algorithmen), BNetzA Banz AT
20.02.2014
8
specifically
• AIS 25, Version 8, Anwendung der CC auf Integrierte Schaltungen including JIL Document and CC
Supporting Document
• AIS 26, Version 9, Evaluationsmethodologie für in Hardware integrierte Schaltungen including JIL
Document and CC Supporting Document
• AIS 32, Version 7, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
• AIS 34, Version 3, Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL5+ (CCv2.3 & CCv3.1)
and EAL6 (CCv3.1)
• AIS 35, Version 1, Öffentliche Fassung des Security Targets (ST-Lite) including JIL Document and
CC Supporting Document and CCRA policies
• AIS 36, Version 4, Kompositionsevaluierung including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document
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[14] BSI – Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-02102-1, Kryptographische Verfahren:
Empfehlungen und Schlüssellängen, Version 1.0, Stand 2014, 10.02.2014,
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
[15] Certification Report NXP J3E081_M64, J3E081_M66, J2E081_M64, J3E041_M66,
J3E016_M66, J3E016_M64, J3E041_M64 Secure Smart Card Controller Revision
3, Version 1, 05.08.2013, NSCIB-CC-13-37761-CR, TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V.
including maintenance certification report NSCIB-CC-13-37761-CR2, 25.08.2014
[16] Certification Report, BSI-DSZ-CC-0633-V2-2014 for Crypto Library V2.7/V2.9 on
SmartMX P5CD016/021/041/051 and P5Cx081 V1A/V1A(s) from NXP
Semiconductors Germany GmbH, 16 July 2014 BSI
[17] Certification Report, BSI-DSZ-CC-0857-2013 for NXP Secure Smart Card
ControllersP5CD016/021/041/051 and P5Cx081 V1A/ V1A(s) from NXP
Semiconductors Germany GmbH, 12.06.2013, BSI
[18] ETR for Composite Evaluation NXP J3E081_M64, J3E081_M66, J2E081_M64,
J3E041_M66, J3E016_M66, J3E016_M64, J3E041_M64 Secure Smart Card
Controller Revision 3 EAL5+, Version 3.0, 13.08.2014, NSCIB-13-37761-CR2,
Brightsight, (confidential document)
[19] ETR for Composition, Crypto Library V2.7/2.9 on SmartMX P5CD016/021/041/051
and P5Cx081 V1A/V1A(s) according to AIS36, version 6, certification ID
BSI-DSZ-CC-0633-V2-2014, 26.06.2014, (confidential document)
[20] ETR for Composition according to AIS 36, NXP Secure Smart Card Controllers
P5CD016/021/041/051 and P5Cx081V1A/ V1A(s), Version 1.5, 04.06.2013,
BSI-DSZ-CC-0857-2013, (confidential document)
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C Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part 1:
Conformance Claim
“The conformance claim indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is met
by a PP or ST that passes its evaluation. This conformance claim contains a CC
conformance claim that:
● describes the version of the CC to which the PP or ST claims conformance.
● describes the conformance to CC Part 2 (security functional requirements) as either:
– CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 conformant if all SFRs in that
PP or ST are based only upon functional components in CC Part 2, or
– CC Part 2 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 extended if at least one SFR in
that PP or ST is not based upon functional components in CC Part 2.
● describes the conformance to CC Part 3 (security assurance requirements) as either:
– CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 conformant if all SARs in that
PP or ST are based only upon assurance components in CC Part 3, or
– CC Part 3 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 extended if at least one SAR in
that PP or ST is not based upon assurance components in CC Part 3.
Additionally, the conformance claim may include a statement made with respect to
packages, in which case it consists of one of the following:
● Package name Conformant - A PP or ST is conformant to a pre-defined package
(e.g. EAL) if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST are identical to the SFRs in the package, or
– the SARs of that PP or ST are identical to the SARs in the package.
● Package name Augmented - A PP or ST is an augmentation of a predefined package
if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST contain all SFRs in the package, but have at least
one additional SFR or one SFR that is hierarchically higher than an SFR in the
package.
– the SARs of that PP or ST contain all SARs in the package, but have at least
one additional SAR or one SAR that is hierarchically higher than an SAR in the
package.
Note that when a TOE is successfully evaluated to a given ST, any conformance claims of
the ST also hold for the TOE. A TOE can therefore also be e.g. CC Part 2 conformant.
Finally, the conformance claim may also include two statements with respect to Protection
Profiles:
● PP Conformant - A PP or TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the
conformance result.
● Conformance Statement (Only for PPs) - This statement describes the manner in
which PPs or STs must conform to this PP: strict or demonstrable. For more
information on this Conformance Statement, see Annex D.”
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CC Part 3:
Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation (chapter 10)
“Evaluating a PP is required to demonstrate that the PP is sound and internally consistent,
and, if the PP is based on one or more other PPs or on packages, that the PP is a correct
instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the PP to be
suitable for use as the basis for writing an ST or another PP.
Assurance Class Assurance Components
Class APE: Protection
Profile evaluation
APE_INT.1 PP introduction
APE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
APE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
APE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
APE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
APE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
APE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
APE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
APE: Protection Profile evaluation class decomposition”
Class ASE: Security Target evaluation (chapter 11)
“Evaluating an ST is required to demonstrate that the ST is sound and internally
consistent, and, if the ST is based on one or more PPs or packages, that the ST is a
correct instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the
ST to be suitable for use as the basis for a TOE evaluation.”
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Assurance Class Assurance Components
Class ASE: Security
Target evaluation
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
ASE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
ASE_TSS.2 TOE summary specification with architectural design
summary
ASE: Security Target evaluation class decomposition
Security assurance components (chapter 7)
“The following Sections describe the constructs used in representing the assurance
classes, families, and components.“
“Each assurance class contains at least one assurance family.”
“Each assurance family contains one or more assurance components.”
The following table shows the assurance class decomposition.
Assurance Class Assurance Components
ADV: Development ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification
ADV_FSP.2 Security-enforcing functional specification
ADV_FSP.3 Functional specification with complete summary
ADV_FSP.4 Complete functional specification
ADV_FSP.5 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional error information
ADV_FSP.6 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional formal specification
ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF
ADV_IMP.2 Implementation of the TSF
ADV_INT.1 Well-structured subset of TSF internals
ADV_INT.2 Well-structured internals
ADV_INT.3 Minimally complex internals
ADV_SPM.1 Formal TOE security policy model
ADV_TDS.1 Basic design
ADV_TDS.2 Architectural design
ADV_TDS.3 Basic modular design
ADV_TDS.4 Semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.5 Complete semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.6 Complete semiformal modular design with formal
high-level design presentation
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Assurance Class Assurance Components
AGD:
Guidance documents
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ALC: Life cycle support
ALC_CMC.1 Labelling of the TOE
ALC_CMC.2 Use of a CM system
ALC_CMC.3 Authorisation controls
ALC_CMC.4 Production support, acceptance procedures and
automation
ALC_CMC.5 Advanced support
ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.2 Parts of the TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.3 Implementation representation CM coverage
ALC_CMS.4 Problem tracking CM coverage
ALC_CMS.5 Development tools CM coverage
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
ALC_DVS.1 Identification of security measures
ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures
ALC_FLR.1 Basic flaw remediation
ALC_FLR.2 Flaw reporting procedures
ALC_FLR.3 Systematic flaw remediation
ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model
ALC_LCD.2 Measurable life-cycle model
ALC_TAT.1 Well-defined development tools
ALC_TAT.2 Compliance with implementation standards
ALC_TAT.3 Compliance with implementation standards - all parts
ATE: Tests
ATE_COV.1 Evidence of coverage
ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage
ATE_COV.3 Rigorous analysis of coverage
ATE_DPT.1 Testing: basic design
ATE_DPT.2 Testing: security enforcing modules
ATE_DPT.3 Testing: modular design
ATE_DPT.4 Testing: implementation representation
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE_FUN.2 Ordered functional testing
ATE_IND.1 Independent testing – conformance
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing – sample
ATE_IND.3 Independent testing – complete
AVA: Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability survey
AVA_VAN.2 Vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.3 Focused vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.4 Methodical vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis
Assurance class decomposition
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Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 8)
“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances the
level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of
assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE at
the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the operational use
of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are included in
the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable
assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be considered
for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide utility.”
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 8.1)
“Table 1 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically
ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the
resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.
As outlined in the next Section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance levels
are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance. They are hierarchically ordered
inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in
assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher
assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope,
and/or depth) and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance
families (i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as described
in Chapter 7 of this CC Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than one
component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every component
are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of
assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the addition of assurance
components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the substitution
of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance component in the
same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only
EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance
component” is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with
it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the
added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be augmented with extended
assurance requirements.
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Assurance
Class
Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL1 EAL2 EAL3 EAL4 EAL5 EAL6 EAL7
Development ADV_ARC 1 1 1 1 1 1
ADV_FSP 1 2 3 4 5 5 6
ADV_IMP 1 1 2 2
ADV_INT 2 3 3
ADV_SPM 1 1
ADV_TDS 1 2 3 4 5 6
Guidance
Documents
AGD_OPE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AGD_PRE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life cycle
Support
ALC_CMC 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
ALC_CMS 1 2 3 4 5 5 5
ALC_DEL 1 1 1 1 1 1
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 1 1 1 2
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3
Security Target
Evaluation
ASE_CCL 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_ECD 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_INT 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_OBJ 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
ASR_REQ 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
ASE_SPD 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_TSS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3
ATE_DPT 1 1 3 3 4
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN 1 2 2 3 4 5 5
Table 1: Evaluation assurance level summary”
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Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 8.3)
“Objectives
EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the threats
to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent assurance is
required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with respect to the
protection of personal or similar information.
EAL1 requires only a limited security target. It is sufficient to simply state the SFRs that the
TOE must meet, rather than deriving them from threats, OSPs and assumptions through
security objectives.
EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including
independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance
documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could be successfully
conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner
consistent with its documentation.”
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 8.4)
“Objectives
EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design
information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the
developer than is consistent with good commercial practise. As such it should not require a
substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready
availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when securing
legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.”
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked (chapter 8.5)
“Objectives
EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive
security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound
development practises.
EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate
level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation of the TOE
and its development without substantial re-engineering.”
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Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and reviewed
(chapter 8.6)
“Objectives
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering
based on good commercial development practises which, though rigorous, do not require
substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL4 is the highest level at
which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs
and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested (chapter 8.7)
“Objectives
EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering based
upon rigorous commercial development practises supported by moderate application of
specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be designed and
developed with the intent of achieving EAL5 assurance. It is likely that the additional costs
attributable to the EAL5 requirements, relative to rigorous development without the
application of specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a
rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to
specialist security engineering techniques.”
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.8)
“Objectives
EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security engineering
techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a premium TOE for
protecting high value assets against significant risks.
EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in high
risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional costs.”
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Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.9)
“Objectives
EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely high
risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs. Practical
application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security functionality
that is amenable to extensive formal analysis.”
Class AVA: Vulnerability assessment (chapter 16)
“The AVA: Vulnerability assessment class addresses the possibility of exploitable
vulnerabilities introduced in the development or the operation of the TOE.”
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VAN) (chapter 16.1)
“Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether potential vulnerabilities
identified, during the evaluation of the development and anticipated operation of the TOE
or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses or quantitative or statistical analysis of the
security behaviour of the underlying security mechanisms), could allow attackers to violate
the SFRs.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that an attacker will be able to discover flaws
that will allow unauthorised access to data and functionality, allow the ability to interfere
with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users.”
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D Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
Annex B: Evaluation results regarding development
and production environment
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Annex B of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0821-2014
Evaluation results regarding
development and production
environment
The IT product AKD eID Card 1.0 (Target of Evaluation, TOE) has been evaluated at an
approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation
(CEM), Version 3.1 extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond
EAL 5 and guidance specific for the technology of the product for conformance to the
Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1.
As a result of the TOE certification, dated 29 October 2014, the following results regarding
the development and production environment apply. The Common Criteria assurance
requirements ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC_CMC.4, ALC_CMS.4, ALC_DEL.1,
ALC_DVS.2, ALC_LCD.1, ALC_TAT.1)
are fulfilled for the development and production sites of the TOE listed below:
a) Agencija za komercijalnu djelatnost d.o.o., Savska cesta 31, HR - 10000
Zagreb (Development and Production - card body manufacturing)
For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in accordance
with the Security Target [6]. The evaluators verified, that the threats, security objectives
and requirements for the TOE life cycle phases up to delivery (as stated in the Security
Target [6]) are fulfilled by the procedures of these sites.
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