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Cisco Confidential Cisco Catalyst Industrial Ethernet 3100 (IE3100) Rugged Series Switches running IOS-XE 17.12 Common Criteria Security Target Version 0.5 03 September 2024 Cisco Catalyst Industrial Ethernet 3100 (IE3100) Rugged Series Switches running IOS-XE 17.12 Common Criteria Security Target Page 2 of 53 Cisco Confidential Table of Contents Table of Contents.......................................................................................................................................... 2 List of Tables ................................................................................................................................................. 4 List of Figures ................................................................................................................................................ 4 1 SECURITY TARGET INTRODUCTION...................................................................................................... 7 1.1 ST and TOE Reference .................................................................................................................7 1.2 TOE Overview ..............................................................................................................................7 1.2.1 TOE Product Type..................................................................................................................7 1.2.2 Supported non-TOE Hardware/ Software/ Firmware...........................................................8 1.3 TOE DESCRIPTION........................................................................................................................8 1.4 TOE Evaluated Configuration.....................................................................................................10 1.5 Physical Scope of the TOE..........................................................................................................10 1.6 Logical Scope of the TOE ...........................................................................................................12 1.6.1 Security Audit......................................................................................................................12 1.6.2 Cryptographic Support........................................................................................................13 1.6.3 Identification and Authentication.......................................................................................16 1.6.4 Security Management.........................................................................................................16 1.6.5 Protection of the TSF ..........................................................................................................17 1.6.6 TOE Access ..........................................................................................................................17 1.6.7 Trusted path/Channels .......................................................................................................17 1.7 Excluded Functionality...............................................................................................................17 2 Conformance Claims .......................................................................................................................... 19 2.1 Common Criteria Conformance Claim.......................................................................................19 2.2 Protection Profile Conformance................................................................................................19 2.3 NIAP Technical Decisions Conformance....................................................................................19 2.3.1 Statement of Security Requirements Consistency..............................................................22 2.4 Protection Profile Conformance Claim Rationale......................................................................22 2.4.1 TOE Appropriateness ..........................................................................................................22 2.4.2 TOE Security Problem Definition Consistency ....................................................................23 3 SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION ....................................................................................................... 24 3.1 Assumptions ..............................................................................................................................24 3.2 Threats.......................................................................................................................................25 3.3 Organizational Security Policies ................................................................................................26 4 SECURITY OBJECTIVES ........................................................................................................................ 27 4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE.................................................................................................27 4.2 Security Objectives for the Environment ..................................................................................27 5 SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS........................................................................................... 28 5.1 Conventions...............................................................................................................................28 5.2 TOE Security Functional Requirements.....................................................................................28 5.2.1 Security Audit (FAU)............................................................................................................29 5.2.2 Cryptographic Support (FCS)...............................................................................................31 5.2.3 Identification and authentication (FIA)...............................................................................34 5.2.4 Security management (FMT)...............................................................................................37 5.2.5 Protection of the TSF (FPT) .................................................................................................38 5.2.6 TOE Access (FTA).................................................................................................................39 Cisco Catalyst Industrial Ethernet 3100 (IE3100) Rugged Series Switches running IOS-XE 17.12 Common Criteria Security Target Page 3 of 53 Cisco Confidential 5.2.7 Trusted Path/Channels (FTP) ..............................................................................................40 5.3 TOE SFR Dependencies Rationale for SFRs Found in NDcPPv2.2e ............................................40 5.4 Security Assurance Requirements.............................................................................................41 5.4.1 SAR Requirements...............................................................................................................41 5.4.2 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale ......................................................................41 5.5 Assurance Measures..................................................................................................................41 6 TOE Summary Specification ............................................................................................................... 43 6.1 TOE Security Functional Requirement Measures......................................................................43 7 Annex A: Key Zeroization ................................................................................................................... 52 7.1 Key Zeroization ..........................................................................................................................52 8 Annex B: References .......................................................................................................................... 53 Cisco Catalyst Industrial Ethernet 3100 (IE3100) Rugged Series Switches running IOS-XE 17.12 Common Criteria Security Target Page 4 of 53 Cisco Confidential List of Tables TABLE 1: ACRONYMS .......................................................................................................................................................................................... 4 TABLE 2: TERMINOLOGY..................................................................................................................................................................................... 5 TABLE 3: ST AND TOE IDENTIFICATION ........................................................................................................................................................ 7 TABLE 4: IT ENVIRONMENT COMPONENTS..................................................................................................................................................... 8 TABLE 5: HARDWARE MODELS AND SPECIFICATIONS.................................................................................................................................10 TABLE 6: CAVP REFERENCES..........................................................................................................................................................................14 TABLE 7: TOE PROVIDED CRYPTOGRAPHY...................................................................................................................................................15 TABLE 8: EXCLUDED FUNCTIONALITY............................................................................................................................................................17 TABLE 9: PROTECTION PROFILES....................................................................................................................................................................19 TABLE 10: NIAP TECHNICAL DECISIONS (TD) ...........................................................................................................................................19 TABLE 11: TOE ASSUMPTIONS .......................................................................................................................................................................24 TABLE 12: THREATS..........................................................................................................................................................................................25 TABLE 13: ORGANIZATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES.......................................................................................................................................26 TABLE 14: SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE ENVIRONMENT ......................................................................................................................27 TABLE 15: SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS...................................................................................................................................29 TABLE 16: AUDITABLE EVENTS ......................................................................................................................................................................30 TABLE 17: ADDITIONAL PASSWORD SPECIAL CHARACTERS......................................................................................................................35 TABLE 18: ASSURANCE MEASURES ................................................................................................................................................................41 TABLE 19: ASSURANCE MEASURE COMPONENTS ........................................................................................................................................42 TABLE 20: HOW TOE SFRS MEASURES ARE MET ......................................................................................................................................43 TABLE 21: TOE KEY ZEROIZATION................................................................................................................................................................52 TABLE 22: REFERENCES ...................................................................................................................................................................................53 List of Figures Acronyms The following acronyms and abbreviations are common and may be used in this Security Target. Table 1: Acronyms Acronyms / Abbreviations Definition ACL Access Control Lists AES Advanced Encryption Standard CA Certificate Authority CC Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation CEM Common Evaluation Methodology for Information Technology Security CM Configuration Management DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generation EAL Evaluation Assurance Level ECC Elliptic-Curve Cryptography ECDSA Elliptic-Curve Digital Signature Algorithm EEPROM Electronically-Erasable Programmable Read-Only Memory GE Gigabit Ethernet port Cisco Catalyst Industrial Ethernet 3100 (IE3100) Rugged Series Switches running IOS-XE 17.12 Common Criteria Security Target Page 5 of 53 Cisco Confidential Acronyms / Abbreviations Definition HMAC Hash-based Message Authentication Code IOS-XE The proprietary operating system developed by Cisco Systems IT Information Technology KAS Key Agreement Scheme LAN Local Area Network MAC Message Authentication Code NDcPP collaborative Network Device Protection Profile NVRAM Non-volatile random-access memory, specifically the memory in the switch where the configuration parameters are stored OS Operating System PP Protection Profile PROM Programmable Read-Only Memory RNG Random Number Generator ROM Read-only memory (ROM) is a type of non-volatile memory used in computers and other electronic devices. RSA Rivest, Shamir and Adleman (algorithm for public-key cryptography) SA Security Association SFP Small–Form-factor pluggable Port SHA Secure Hash Algorithm SHS Secure Hash Standard SNMP Simple Network Management Protocol SSHv2 Secure Shell (version 2) ST Security Target TLS Transport Layer Security TOE Target of Evaluation TSF Target of Evaluation Security Function vND virtual Network Drive VPN Virtual Private Network Terminology The following terms are common and may be used in this Security Target. Table 2: Terminology Term Definition Authorized Administrator Any user that has been assigned to a privilege level that is permitted to perform all TOE Security Function-related functions. Firmware (per NIST for FIPS validated cryptographic modules) The programs and data components of a cryptographic module that are stored in hardware (e.g., ROM, PROM, EPROM, EEPROM or FLASH) within the cryptographic boundary and cannot be dynamically written or modified during execution. Security Administrator Synonymous with Authorized Administrator for the purposes of this evaluation. syslog System Logging Protocol is used to send system log or event messages to a specific server, called a syslog server. User Any entity (human user or external IT entity) outside the TOE that interacts with the TOE. vty vty is a term used by Cisco to describe a single terminal (whereas Terminal is more of a verb or general action term). Cisco Catalyst Industrial Ethernet 3100 (IE3100) Rugged Series Switches running IOS-XE 17.12 Common Criteria Security Target Page 6 of 53 Cisco Confidential DOCUMENT INTRODUCTION Prepared By: Cisco Systems, Inc. 170 West Tasman Dr. San Jose, CA 95134 This document provides the basis for an evaluation of a specific Target of Evaluation (TOE), Cisco Catalyst Industrial Ethernet 3100 (IE3100) Rugged Series Switches. This Security Target (ST) defines a set of assumptions about the aspects of the environment, a list of threats that the product intends to counter, a set of security objectives, a set of security requirements and the IT security functions provided by the TOE which meet the set of requirements. Revision History Version Date Change 0.1 28 March 2024 Initial Version 0.2 13 May 2024 Address lab comments 0.3 20 June 2024 Address lab comments 0.4 28 June 2024 Address lab comments 0.5 03 September 2024 Updates to address checkout comments Cisco Catalyst Industrial Ethernet 3100 (IE3100) Rugged Series Switches running IOS-XE 17.12 Common Criteria Security Target Page 7 of 53 Cisco Confidential 1 SECURITY TARGET INTRODUCTION The Security Target contains the following sections: • [Section 1] Security Target Introduction • [Section 2] Conformance Claims • [Section 3] Security Problem Definition • [Section 4] Security Objectives • [Section 5] IT Security Requirements • [Section 6] TOE Summary Specification • [Annex A] Key Zeroization • [Annex B] References The structure and content of this ST comply with the requirements specified in the Common Criteria (CC), Part 1, Annex A, and Part 2. 1.1 ST and TOE Reference This section provides information needed to identify and control this ST and its TOE. Table 3: ST and TOE Identification Name Description ST Title Cisco Catalyst Industrial Ethernet 3100 (IE3100) Rugged Series Switches running IOS-XE 17.12 Common Criteria Security Target ST Version 0.5 Publication Date 03 September 2024 Vendor and ST Author Cisco Systems, Inc. TOE Reference Cisco Catalyst Industrial Ethernet 3100 (IE3100) Rugged Series Switches TOE Hardware Models IE3100 Rugged Series TOE Software Version IOS-XE 17.12 Keywords Audit, Authentication, Encryption, Network Device, Secure Administration 1.2 TOE Overview The Cisco Catalyst Industrial Ethernet 3100 (IE3100) Rugged Series Switches (hereafter referred to as Cisco Catalyst Industrial Ethernet IE3100 Rugged Series Switches), running IOS-XE 17.12, is a purpose- built switching and routing platform with OSI Layer2 and Layer3 traffic filtering capabilities. The TOE includes the hardware models as defined in Table 3 in Section 1.1. 1.2.1 TOE Product Type The Cisco Catalyst Industrial Ethernet IE3100 Rugged Series Switches are switching and routing platforms that provide connectivity and security services. These switches offer broadband speeds and simplified management to small businesses, and enterprise small branch and teleworkers. The Cisco Catalyst Industrial Ethernet IE3100 Rugged Series Switches is a single-device security and switching solutions for protecting the network. Cisco Catalyst Industrial Ethernet 3100 (IE3100) Rugged Series Switches running IOS-XE 17.12 Common Criteria Security Target Page 8 of 53 Cisco Confidential 1.2.2 Supported non-TOE Hardware/ Software/ Firmware The TOE supports the following hardware, software, and firmware components in its operational environment. Each component is identified as being required or not based on the claims made in this Security Target. All the following environment components are supported by all TOE evaluated configurations. Table 4: IT Environment Components Component Required Usage/Purpose Description for TOE performance Audit (syslog) Server Yes This includes any syslog server to which the TOE transmits syslog messages over a secure TLS trusted channel. Local Console Yes This includes any IT Environment Console that is directly connected to the TOE via the Serial Console Port and is used by the TOE administrator to support TOE administration. Management Workstation with SSHv2 client Yes This includes any IT Environment Management workstation that is used by the TOE administrator to support TOE administration using SSHv2 protected channels. Any SSH client that supports SSHv2 may be used. Certification Authority (CA) Yes This includes any IT Environment Certification Authority (CA) on the TOE network. The CA can be used to provide the TOE with a valid certificate during certificate enrolment as well as validating a certificate. 1.3 TOE DESCRIPTION This section provides an overview of the Cisco Catalyst Industrial Ethernet IE3100 Rugged Series Switches Target of Evaluation (TOE). The TOE is comprised of both software and hardware. The hardware is comprised of the following hardware models as described in 1.5 Physical Scope of the TOE. The software is comprised of the Universal Cisco Internet Operating System (IOS) XE software image Release IOS-XE 17.12. The Cisco Catalyst Industrial Ethernet IE3100 Rugged Series Switches that comprises the TOE has common hardware characteristics as described in Table 5. These characteristics affect only non-TSF relevant functions of the switches (such as throughput and amount of storage) and therefore support security equivalency of the switches in terms of hardware. The Cisco Catalyst Industrial Ethernet IE3100 Rugged Series Switches primary features include the following: • Central processor that supports all system operations; • Dynamic memory, used by the central processor for all system operation; • x86 CPU complex with minimum, based on model of 2 GB memory, 1.5 GB of flash; • Flash memory (EEPROM), used to store the Cisco IOS-XE image (binary program); • Non-volatile read-only memory (ROM) is used to store the bootstrap program and power-on diagnostic programs and • Non-volatile random-access memory (NVRAM) is used to store switch configuration parameters that are used to initialize the system at start-up. • Physical network interfaces (minimally two) (for example, RJ45 serial and standard 10/100/1000 Ethernet ports). Some models have a fixed number and/or type of interfaces; some models have slots that accept additional network interfaces; • Dedicated management port on the switch, RJ-45 console port and a USB mini-Type B console connection; • Built for harsh environments and temperature ranges, fanless, convection-cooled with no moving parts for extended durability and hardened for vibration, shock and surge, and electrical noise immunity. Cisco Catalyst Industrial Ethernet 3100 (IE3100) Rugged Series Switches running IOS-XE 17.12 Common Criteria Security Target Page 9 of 53 Cisco Confidential Cisco IOS-XE is a Cisco-developed highly configurable proprietary operating system that provides for efficient and effective routing and switching. Although IOS-XE performs many networking functions, this TOE only addresses the functions that provide for the security of the TOE itself as described in Section 1.6 Logical Scope of the TOE below.Figure 1: provides a visual depiction of an example TOE deployment. Figure 1 TOE Example Deployment Syslog Server (Mandatory) Management Workstation (Mandatory) TOE Boundary CA (Mandatory) Local Console (Mandatory) Cisco Catalyst Industrial Ethernet IE3100 Series Switches Cisco Catalyst Industrial Ethernet 3100 (IE3100) Rugged Series Switches running IOS-XE 17.12 Common Criteria Security Target Page 10 of 53 Cisco Confidential Figure 1 includes the TOE models and IT entities in the IT environment. The TOE is only the Cisco Catalyst Industrial Ethernet IE3100 Rugged Series Switches. Only one TOE device is required for the deployment of the TOE in the evaluated configuration. • Identifies the TOE Models o Cisco Catalyst Industrial Ethernet 3100 (IE3100) Rugged Series Switches running Cisco IOS-XE 17.12 • Identifies the following IT entities that are in the IT Environment: o Syslog (audit) Server with a secure connection using TLS o Local Console to support local Administration (direct connection) o Management Workstation to support remote Administration with a secure connection using SSHv2 Client o Certificate Authority (CA) for X509 certificate validation 1.4 TOE Evaluated Configuration The TOE consists of one or more physical devices as specified in section 1.5 below and includes the Cisco IOS-XE 17.12 software. The TOE has two or more network interfaces and is connected to at least one internal and one external network. The Cisco IOS-XE configuration determines how packets are handled to and from the TOE’s network interfaces. The switch configuration determines how traffic flows received on an interface are handled. Typically, packet flows are passed through the internet working device and forwarded to their configured destination. In addition, if the Cisco Catalyst Industrial Ethernet IE3100 Rugged Series Switches are to be remotely administered, then the management workstation must be connected to an internal network. SSHv2 is used to securely connect to the switch. An external syslog server is used to store audit records, where TLS is used to secure the transmission of the records. If these servers are used, they must be attached to the internal (trusted) network. The internal (trusted) network is meant to be separated effectively from unauthorized individuals and user traffic, one that is in a controlled environment where implementation of security policies can be enforced. 1.5 Physical Scope of the TOE The TOE is a hardware and software solution that makes up the Cisco Catalyst Industrial Ethernet IE3100 Rugged Series Switch models as follows: IE3100 running Cisco IOS-XE 17.12. The network, on which they reside is considered part of the operational environment. The TOE is comprised of the following physical specifications. Figure 2: IE3100 Series Hardware (Rugged Series switches models) Table 5: Hardware Models and Specifications Model IE-3100-4T2S IE-3100-8T2C IE-3100- 18T2C IE-3100- 8T4S IE-3105-8T2C IE-3105- 18T2C Cisco Catalyst Industrial Ethernet 3100 (IE3100) Rugged Series Switches running IOS-XE 17.12 Common Criteria Security Target Page 11 of 53 Cisco Confidential Total Ports 6 10 20 12 10 20 0/100/1000 Mbps RJ-45 ports (downlinks) 4 8 18 8 8 18 1G SFP fiber ports (uplinks) 2 0 0 4 0 0 1G combo ports (uplinks) 0 2 2 0 2 2 Processor(s) Marvell Prestera (ARMv8 Cortex-A55) Marvell Prestera (ARMv8 Cortex-A55) Marvell Prestera (ARMv8 Cortex-A55) Marvell Prestera (ARMv8 Cortex-A55) Marvell Prestera (ARMv8 Cortex-A55) Marvell Prestera (ARMv8 Cortex-A55) Console ports 1 RS-232 (via RJ-45), 1 Micro USB 1 RS-232 (via RJ-45), 1 Micro USB 1 RS-232 (via RJ-45), 1 Micro USB 1 RS-232 (via RJ-45), 1 Micro USB 1 RS-232 (via RJ-45), 1 Micro USB 1 RS-232 (via RJ-45), 1 Micro USB Cisco Catalyst Industrial Ethernet 3100 (IE3100) Rugged Series Switches running IOS-XE 17.12 Common Criteria Security Target Page 12 of 53 Cisco Confidential 1.6 Logical Scope of the TOE The TOE is comprised of several security features. Each of the security features identified above consists of several security functionalities, as identified below. • Security Audit • Cryptographic Support • Identification and Authentication • Security Management • Protection of the TSF • TOE Access • Trusted Path/Channels These features are described in more detail in the subsections below. In addition, the TOE implements all RFCs of the NDcPP v2.2e as necessary to satisfy testing/assurance measures prescribed therein. 1.6.1 Security Audit The Cisco Catalyst Industrial Ethernet IE3100 Rugged Series Switches provide extensive auditing capabilities. The TOE generates a comprehensive set of audit logs that identify specific TOE operations. For each event, the TOE records the date and time of each event, the type of event, the subject identity, and the outcome of the event. Auditable events include: • failure on invoking cryptographic functionality such as establishment, termination and failure of cryptographic session establishments and connections; • modifications to the group of users that are part of the Authorized Administrator roles; • all use of the user identification mechanism; • any use of the authentication mechanism; • unsuccessful login attempts limit is met or exceeded; • any change in the configuration of the TOE; • changes to time; • initiation of TOE update; • indication of completion of TSF self-test; • termination of a remote or local session; • and initiation and termination of a trusted channel The TOE is configured to transmit its audit messages to an external syslog server. Communication with the syslog server is protected using TLS and the TOE can determine when communication with the syslog server fails. If that should occur, the TOE will store all audit records locally and when the connection to the remote syslog server is restored, all stored audit records will be transmitted to the remote syslog server. The audit logs can be viewed on the TOE using the appropriate IOS-XE commands. The records include the date/time the event occurred, the event/type of event, the user associated with the event, and additional information of the event and its success and/or failure. The TOE does not have an interface to modify audit records, though there is an interface available for the Authorized Administrator to clear audit data stored locally on the TOE. Cisco Catalyst Industrial Ethernet 3100 (IE3100) Rugged Series Switches running IOS-XE 17.12 Common Criteria Security Target Page 13 of 53 Cisco Confidential 1.6.2 Cryptographic Support The TOE provides cryptography in support of other TOE security functionality. With the exception of RSA key establishment and FFC schemes using safe-prime groups, all the algorithms claimed have CAVP certificates (Operation Environment – Marvell Prestera (ARMv8 Cortex-A55) processor). RSA key establishment and FFC schemes using safe-prime groups are verified using a known good implementation. The TOE leverages the IOS Common Cryptographic Module (IC2M) Rel5a for SSH and CiscoSSL FIPS Object Module (FOM) Cryptographic Implementation 7.2a for TLS as identified in the table below. The IOS software calls the CiscoSSL FIPS Object Module (FOM) Cryptographic Implementation 7.2a (Firmware Version: 7.2a) and IOS Common Cryptographic Module (IC2M) Rel5a (Firmware Version: Rel 5a) that have been validated for conformance to the requirements of FIPS 140-2 Level 1. Cisco Catalyst Industrial Ethernet 3100 (IE3100) Rugged Series Switches running IOS-XE 17.12 Common Criteria Security Target Page 14 of 53 Cisco Confidential Refer to Table 6, NIST Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program (CAVP) algorithm certificate references. Table 6: CAVP References Algorithm Description Supported Mode CAVP Cert. # Module SFR IOS Common Cryptographic Module (IC2M) Rel5a (for SSH) AES Used for symmetric encryption/decryption CBC (128 and 256 bits) A1462 IC2M Rel5a FCS_COP.1/ DataEncryption SHS (SHA-1, SHA- 256, SHA-512) Cryptographic hashing services Byte Oriented A1462 IC2M Rel5a FCS_COP.1/Hash HMAC (HMAC- SHA-256, HMAC- SHA-512) Keyed hashing services and software integrity test Byte Oriented A1462 IC2M Rel5a FCS_COP.1/KeyedHas h DRBG Deterministic random bit generation services in accordance with ISO/IEC 18031:2011 CTR_DRBG (AES 256) A1462 IC2M Rel5a FCS_RBG_EXT.1 RSA RSA Key generation RSA Signature generation, RSA Signature verification. FIPS PUB 186-4, Digital Signature Standard (DSS), Appendix B.3. Key sizes: 2048 bit and 3072 bit. FIPS PUB 186-4, Digital Signature Standard (DSS), Section 5.5. Key sizes: 2048 bit and 3072 bit. A1462 IC2M Rel5a FCS_CKM.1 FCS_COP.1/SigGen CVL-KAS-ECC (P-256, P-384) Key Agreement NIST Special Publication 800- 56A A1462 IC2M Rel5a FCS_CKM.2 ECDSA (P-256, P-384) ECDSA Key generation, ECDSA Key verification FIPS 186-4, Digital Signature Standard (DSS) A1462 IC2M Rel5a FCS_CKM.1 RSA based key establishment schemes (2048, 3072 bits) RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 RFC 3447, Section 7.2 Verified by known good implementati on IC2M Rel5a FCS_CKM.2 FFC Schemes using ‘safe- Key Agreement NIST Special Publication 800- 56A, revision 3, Verified by known good IC2M Rel5a FCS_CKM.2 FCS_CKM.1 Cisco Catalyst Industrial Ethernet 3100 (IE3100) Rugged Series Switches running IOS-XE 17.12 Common Criteria Security Target Page 15 of 53 Cisco Confidential Algorithm Description Supported Mode CAVP Cert. # Module SFR prime’groups (DH group 14) groups listed in RFC 3526 implementati on CiscoSSL FIPS Object Module (FOM) Cryptographic Implementation 7.2a (for TLS) AES Used for symmetric encryption/decryption CBC and GCM (128 and 256 bits) A1420 CiscoSSL FOM 7.2a FCS_COP.1/ DataEncryption SHS (SHA-1, SHA- 256, SHA-384) Cryptographic hashing services Byte Oriented A1420 CiscoSSL FOM 7.2a FCS_COP.1/Hash HMAC (HMAC- SHA-1, HMAC- SHA-256, HMAC- SHA-384) Keyed hashing services and software integrity test Byte Oriented A1420 CiscoSSL FOM 7.2a FCS_COP.1/KeyedHas h DRBG Deterministic random bit generation services in accordance with ISO/IEC 18031:2011 CTR_DRBG (AES 256) A1420 CiscoSSL FOM 7.2a FCS_RBG_EXT.1 RSA RSA Key generation RSA Signature generation, RSA Signature verification. FIPS PUB 186-4, Digital Signature Standard (DSS), Appendix B.3. Key sizes: 2048 bit and 3072 bit. FIPS PUB 186-4, Digital Signature Standard (DSS), Section 5.5. Key sizes: 2048 bit and 3072 bit. A1420 CiscoSSL FOM 7.2a FCS_CKM.1 FCS_COP.1/SigGen CVL-KAS-ECC (P-256, P-384, and P-521) Key Agreement NIST Special Publication 800- 56A A1420 CiscoSSL FOM 7.2a FCS_CKM.2 ECDSA (P-256, P-384 and P-521) ECDSA Key generation, ECDSA Key verification FIPS 186-4, Digital Signature Standard (DSS) A1420 CiscoSSL FOM 7.2a FCS_CKM.1 The TOE provides cryptography in support of secure connections that includes remote administrative management via SSHv2, and TLS to secure the transmission of audit records to the remote syslog server. The cryptographic services provided by the TOE are described in Table 7: TOE Provided Cryptography. Table 7: TOE Provided Cryptography Cisco Catalyst Industrial Ethernet 3100 (IE3100) Rugged Series Switches running IOS-XE 17.12 Common Criteria Security Target Page 16 of 53 Cisco Confidential Cryptographic Method Use within the TOE AES Used to encrypt TLS session traffic Used to encrypt SSH session traffic HMAC Used for keyed hash, integrity services in TLS and SSH session establishment FFC DH Used as the Key exchange method for SSH RSA Signature Services Used in TLS session establishment Used in SSH session establishment X.509 certificate signing. RSA Used in TLS server authentication Used to provide cryptographic signature services Used in Cryptographic Key Generation and Key Establishment Secure Shell Establishment Used to establish initial SSH session. SHS Used to provide SSH traffic integrity verification Used for keyed-hash message authentication CTR_DRBG (AES) Used for random number generation, key generation and seeds to asymmetric key generation Used in TLS session establishment Used in SSH session establishment ECDSA Used in cryptographic key generation and key establishment ECC DH Used as the Key exchange method for TLS and SSH 1.6.3 Identification and Authentication The TOE performs two types of authentication: device-level authentication of the remote device (TOE peers) and user authentication for the Authorized Administrator of the TOE. Device-level authentication allows the TOE to establish a secure channel with a trusted peer. The secure channel is established only after each device authenticates the other. Device-level authentication is performed via TLS authentication. The TOE provides authentication services for administrative users to connect to the TOE’s secure CLI administrator interface. The TOE requires Authorized Administrators to authenticate prior to being granted access to any of the management functionality. The TOE can be configured to require a minimum password length of between 1-127 characters. The TOE provides administrator authentication against a local user database. Password-based authentication can be performed on the local serial console or SSHv2 interfaces. The SSHv2 interface also supports authentication using SSH keys. The TOE also provides an automatic lockout when a user attempts to authenticate and enters invalid information. When the threshold for a defined number of failed authentication attempts has exceeded the configured allowable attempts, the user is locked out for an administrator specified time period. The TOE uses X.509v3 certificates as defined by RFC 5280 to support authentication for TLS connections. 1.6.4 Security Management The TOE provides secure remote administrative interface and local interface to perform security management functions. This includes ability to configure cryptographic functionality; an access banner Cisco Catalyst Industrial Ethernet 3100 (IE3100) Rugged Series Switches running IOS-XE 17.12 Common Criteria Security Target Page 17 of 53 Cisco Confidential containing an advisory notice and consent warning message; a session inactivity timer before session termination as well as an ability to update TOE software. The TOE provides a Security Administrator role and only the Security Administrator can perform the above security management functions. 1.6.5 Protection of the TSF The TOE protects against interference and tampering by untrusted subjects by implementing identification, authentication, and access controls to limit configuration to Authorized Administrators. The TOE prevents the reading of cryptographic keys and passwords. Additionally, Cisco IOS-XE is not a general-purpose operating system, access to Cisco IOS-XE memory space is restricted to Cisco IOS-XE functions. The TOE can verify software updates prior to the software updates being installed on the TOE. This verification avoids the installation of unauthorized software. The TOE internally maintains the date and time. This date and time are used as the timestamp that is applied to audit records generated by the TOE. The TOE provides the Authorized Administrators the capability to update the TOE’s clock manually to maintain a reliable timestamp. Finally, the TOE performs self-testing to verify correct operation of the TOE itself and that of the cryptographic module. 1.6.6 TOE Access The TOE can terminate inactive local and remote sessions after an Authorized Administrator configurable time period. Once a session has been terminated, the TOE requires the Authorized Administrator to re-authenticate to establish a new session. Sessions can also be terminated if an Authorized Administrator enters “exit” or the “logout” command. The TOE can also display an Authorized Administrator specified banner on the CLI management interface prior to allowing any administrative access to the TOE. 1.6.7 Trusted path/Channels The TOE allows a trusted path to be established to itself from remote administrators over SSHv2 and initiates outbound TLS trusted channels to transmit audit messages to remote syslog servers. 1.7 Excluded Functionality The functionality excluded from the evaluation is described in the table below: Table 8: Excluded Functionality Excluded Functionality Exclusion Rationale HTTP/HTTPS Remote Management is performed using SSH SNMP Remote Management is performed using SSH Other cryptographic engines The TOE leverages the IOS Common Cryptographic Module (IC2M) Rel5a and CiscoSSL FIPS Object Module (FOM) Cryptographic Implementation 7.2a to provide cryptography in support of other TOE security functionality. No other cryptographic engine or module has been evaluated or tested in the CC evaluation. Cisco Catalyst Industrial Ethernet 3100 (IE3100) Rugged Series Switches running IOS-XE 17.12 Common Criteria Security Target Page 18 of 53 Cisco Confidential These services can be disabled by using the configuration settings as described in the Administrative Guidance Documents (AGD). The exclusion of this functionality does not affect the compliance to the collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices Version 2.2e. Cisco Catalyst Industrial Ethernet 3100 (IE3100) Rugged Series Switches running IOS-XE 17.12 Common Criteria Security Target Page 19 of 53 Cisco Confidential 2 CONFORMANCE CLAIMS 2.1 Common Criteria Conformance Claim The TOE and ST are compliant with the Common Criteria (CC) Version 3.1, Revision 5, dated: April 2017. For a listing of Security Assurance Requirements (SARs) claimed, see section 5.4. The TOE and ST are CC Part 2 extended and CC Part 3 conformant. 2.2 Protection Profile Conformance The TOE and ST are conformant with the Protection Profiles as listed in Table 9: Protection Profiles. This Security Target (ST) applies the NIAP Technical Decisions (TDs) as described in Table 9: Protection Profiles. Each posted TD was reviewed and considered based on the TOE product type, the PP claims, and the Security Functional Requirements claimed in this document. Table 9: Protection Profiles Protection Profile Version Date collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices (NDcPP) 2.2e 23 March 2020 2.3 NIAP Technical Decisions Conformance This ST applies the following NIAP Technical Decisions: Table 10: NIAP Technical Decisions (TD) TD Identifier TD Name Protection Profiles References Publication Date Applicable? TD0800 Updated NIT Technical Decision for IPsec IKE/SA Lifetimes Tolerance CPP_ND_V2.2E FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.7, FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.8, CPP_ND_V2.2-SD 2023.11.13 No. SFR not claimed TD0792 NIT Technical Decision: FIA_PMG_EXT.1 - TSS EA not in line with SFR CPP_ND_V2.2E FIA_PMG_EXT.1, CPP_ND_V2.2-SD 2023.09.27 Yes TD0790 NIT Technical Decision: Clarification Required for testing IPv6 CPP_ND_V2.2E FCS_DTLSC_EXT.1.2, FCS_TLSC_EXT1.2, CPP_ND_V2.2-SD 2023.09.27 Yes TD0738 NIT Technical Decision for Link to Allowed-With List CPP_ND_V2.2E Chapter 2 2023.05.19 Yes TD0670 NIT Technical Decision for Mutual and Non-Mutual CPP_ND_V2.2E ND SD2.2, FCS_TLSC_EXT.2.1 2022.09.16 No. SFR not claimed Cisco Catalyst Industrial Ethernet 3100 (IE3100) Rugged Series Switches running IOS-XE 17.12 Common Criteria Security Target Page 20 of 53 Cisco Confidential TD Identifier TD Name Protection Profiles References Publication Date Applicable? Auth TLSC Testing TD0639 NIT Technical Decision for Clarification for NTP MAC Keys CPP_ND_V2.2E FCS_NTP_EXT.1.2, FAU_GEN.1, FCS_CKM.4, FPT_SKP_EXT.1 2022.08.26 Yes TD0638 NIT Technical Decision for Key Pair Generation for Authentication CPP_ND_V2.2E NDSDv2.2, FCS_CKM.1 2022.08.05 Yes TD0636 NIT Technical Decision for Clarification of Public Key User Authentication for SSH CPP_ND_V2.2E ND SD2.2, FCS_SSHC_EXT.1 2022.03.21 No, SFR not claimed TD0635 NIT Technical Decision for TLS Server and Key Agreement Parameters CPP_ND_V2.2E FCS_TLSS_EXT.1.3, NDSD v2.2 2022.03.21 No, SFR not claimed TD0632 NIT Technical Decision for Consistency with Time Data for vNDs CPP_ND_V2.2E ND SD2.2, FPT_STM_EXT.1.2 2022.03.21 No, vND is not claimed TD0631 NIT Technical Decision for Clarification of public key authentication for SSH Server CPP_ND_V2.2E ND SDv2.2, FCS_SSHS_EXT.1, FMT_SMF.1 2022.03.21 Yes TD0592 NIT Technical Decision for Local Storage of Audit Records CPP_ND_V2.2E FAU_STG 2021.05.21 Yes TD0591 NIT Technical Decision for Virtual TOEs and hypervisors CPP_ND_V2.2E A.LIMITED_FUNCTIONALITY , ACRONYMS 2021.05.21 Yes TD0581 The NIT has issued a technical decision for Elliptic curve- based key establishment and NIST SP 800- 56Arev3. CPP_ND_V2.2E FCS_CKM.2 2021.04.09 Yes Cisco Catalyst Industrial Ethernet 3100 (IE3100) Rugged Series Switches running IOS-XE 17.12 Common Criteria Security Target Page 21 of 53 Cisco Confidential TD Identifier TD Name Protection Profiles References Publication Date Applicable? TD0580 The NIT has issued a technical decision for clarification about use of DH14 in NDcPPv2.2e. CPP_ND_V2.2E FCS_CKM.1.1, FCS_CKM.2.1 2021.04.09 Yes TD0572 NiT Technical Decision for Restricting FTP_ITC.1 to only IP address identifiers CPP_ND_V2.1, CPP_ND_V2.2E FTP_ITC.1 2021.01.29 Yes TD0571 NiT Technical Decision for Guidance on how to handle FIA_AFL.1 CPP_ND_V2.1, CPP_ND_V2.2E FIA_UAU.1, FIA_PMG_EXT.1 2021.01.29 Yes TD0570 NiT Technical Decision for Clarification about FIA_AFL.1 CPP_ND_V2.1, CPP_ND_V2.2E FIA_AFL.1 2021.01.29 Yes TD0569 NIT Technical Decision for Session ID Usage Conflict in FCS_DTLSS_EXT. 1.7 CPP_ND_V2.2E ND SD v2.2, FCS_DTLSS_EXT.1.7, FCS_TLSS_EXT.1.4 2021.01.28 No, SFR not claimed TD0564 NiT Technical Decision for Vulnerability Analysis Search Criteria CPP_ND_V2.2E NDSDv2.2, AVA_VAN.1 2021.01.28 Yes TD0563 NiT Technical Decision for Clarification of audit date information CPP_ND_V2.2E NDcPPv2.2e, FAU_GEN.1.2 2021.01.28 Yes TD0556 NIT Technical Decision for RFC 5077 question CPP_ND_V2.2E NDSDv2.2, FCS_TLSS_EXT.1.4, Test 3 2020.11.06 No, SFR not claimed TD0555 NIT Technical Decision for RFC Reference incorrect in TLSS Test CPP_ND_V2.2E NDSDv2.2, FCS_TLSS_EXT.1.4, Test 3 2020.11.06 No, SFR not claimed TD0547 NIT Technical Decision for Clarification on developer disclosure of AVA_VAN CPP_ND_V2.1, CPP_ND_V2.2E ND SDv2.1, ND SDv2.2, AVA_VAN.1 2020.10.15 Yes Cisco Catalyst Industrial Ethernet 3100 (IE3100) Rugged Series Switches running IOS-XE 17.12 Common Criteria Security Target Page 22 of 53 Cisco Confidential TD Identifier TD Name Protection Profiles References Publication Date Applicable? TD0546 NIT Technical Decision for DTLS - clarification of Application Note 63 CPP_ND_V2.2E FCS_DTLSC_EXT.1.1 2020.10.15 No, SFR not claimed TD0537 The NIT has issued a technical decision for Incorrect reference to FCS_TLSC_EXT.2. 3 CPP_ND_V2.2E FIA_X509_EXT.2.2 2020.07.13 Yes TD0536 The NIT has issued a technical decision for Update Verification Inconsistency CPP_ND_V2.1, CPP_ND_V2.2E AGD_OPE.1, ND SDv2.1, ND SDv2.2 2020.07.13 Yes TD0528 The NIT has issued a technical decision for Missing EAs for FCS_NTP_EXT.1. 4 CPP_ND_V2.1, CPP_ND_V2.2E FCS_NTP_EXT.1.4, ND SD v2.1, ND SD v2.2 2020.07.13 No, SFR not claimed TD0527 Updates to Certificate Revocation Testing (FIA_X509_EXT.1 ) CPP_ND_V2.2E FIA_X509_EXT.1/REV, FIA_X509_EXT.1/ITT 2020.07.01 Yes 2.3.1 Statement of Security Requirements Consistency The Security Functional Requirements included in the Security Target represent the Security Functional Requirements specified in the collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 2.2e for which conformance is claimed verbatim. All concepts covered in the Protection Profile and Extended Package Statement of Security Requirements is included in this Security Target. Additionally, the Security Assurance Requirements included in this Security Target are identical to the Security Assurance Requirements included in the collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 2.2e. 2.4 Protection Profile Conformance Claim Rationale 2.4.1 TOE Appropriateness The TOE provides all the functionality at a level of security commensurate with that identified in the: • collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 2.2e Cisco Catalyst Industrial Ethernet 3100 (IE3100) Rugged Series Switches running IOS-XE 17.12 Common Criteria Security Target Page 23 of 53 Cisco Confidential 2.4.2 TOE Security Problem Definition Consistency The Assumptions, Threats, and Organization Security Policies included in the Security Target (ST) represent the Assumptions, Threats, and Organization Security Policies specified in the collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 2.2e for which conformance is claimed verbatim. All concepts covered in the Protection Profile and Extended Package Security Problem Definition is included in the Security Target Statement of Security Objectives Consistency. The Security Objectives included in the Security Target represent the Security Objectives specified in the collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 2.2e for which conformance is claimed verbatim. All concepts covered in the Protection Profile and Extended Package Statement of Security Objectives is included in the Security Target. Cisco Catalyst Industrial Ethernet 3100 (IE3100) Rugged Series Switches running IOS-XE 17.12 Common Criteria Security Target Page 24 of 53 Cisco Confidential 3 SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION This section identifies the following: • Significant assumptions about the TOE’s operational environment. • IT related threats to the organization countered by the TOE. • Environmental threats requiring controls to provide sufficient protection. • Organizational Security Policies for the TOE as appropriate. This document identifies assumptions as A.assumption with “assumption” specifying a unique name. Threats are identified as T.threat with “threat” specifying a unique name. Organizational Security Policies (OSPs) are identified as P.osp with “osp” specifying a unique name. 3.1 Assumptions The specific conditions listed in the following subsections are assumed to exist in the TOE’s environment. These assumptions include both practical realities in the development of the TOE security requirements and the essential environmental conditions on the use of the TOE. Table 11: TOE Assumptions Assumption Assumption Definition A.PHYSICAL_PROTECTION The Network Device is assumed to be physically protected in its operational environment and not subject to physical attacks that compromise the security and/or interfere with the device’s physical interconnections and correct operation. This protection is assumed to be sufficient to protect the device and the data it contains. As a result, the cPP will not include any requirements on physical tamper protection or other physical attack mitigations. The cPP will not expect the product to defend against physical access to the device that allows unauthorized entities to extract data, b- ypass other controls, or otherwise manipulate the device. For vNDs, this assumption applies to the physical platform on which the VM runs. A.LIMITED_FUNCTIONALITY The device is assumed to provide networking functionality as its core function and not provide functionality/ services that could be deemed as general-purpose computing. For example, the device should not provide a computing platform for general purpose applications (unrelated to networking functionality). If a virtual TOE evaluated as a pND, following Case 2 vNDs as specified in Section 1.2, the VS is considered part of the TOE with only one vND instance for each physical hardware platform. The exception being where components of a distributed TOE run inside more than one virtual machine (VM) on a single VS. In Case 2 vND, no non-TOE guest VMs are allowed on the platform. A.NO_THRU_TRAFFIC_PROTECTION A standard/generic network device does not provide any assurance regarding the protection of traffic that traverses it. The intent is for the network device to protect data that originates on or is destined to the device itself, to include administrative data and audit data. Traffic that is traversing the network device, destined for another network entity, is not covered by the ND cPP. It is assumed that this protection will be covered by cPPs and PP Modules for particular types of Network Devices (e.g, firewall). A.TRUSTED_ADMINISTRATOR The Security Administrator(s) for the Network Device are assumed to be trusted and to act in the best interest of security for the organization. This includes being appropriately trained, following policy, and adhering to guidance documentation. Administrators are trusted to ensure passwords/credentials have sufficient strength and entropy and to lack malicious intent when administering the device. The Network Device is not Cisco Catalyst Industrial Ethernet 3100 (IE3100) Rugged Series Switches running IOS-XE 17.12 Common Criteria Security Target Page 25 of 53 Cisco Confidential Assumption Assumption Definition expected to be capable of defending against a malicious administrator that actively works to bypass or compromise the security of the device. For TOEs supporting X.509v3 certificate-based authentication, the Security Administrator(s) are expected to fully validate (e.g. offline verification) any Certificate Authority certificate (root CA certificate or intermediate CA certificate) loaded into the TOE’s trust store (aka 'root store', 'trusted CA Key Store', or similar) as a trust anchor prior to use (e.g. offline verification). A.REGULAR_UPDATES The Network Device firmware and software is assumed to be updated by an administrator on a regular basis in response to the release of product updates due to known vulnerabilities. A.ADMIN_CREDENTIALS_SECURE The administrator’s credentials (private key) used to access the Network Device are protected by the platform on which they reside. A.RESIDUAL_INFORMATION The Administrator must ensure that there is no unauthorized access possible for sensitive residual information (e.g. cryptographic keys, keying material, PINs, passwords etc.) on networking equipment when the equipment is discarded or removed from its operational environment. 3.2 Threats This table lists the threats addressed by the TOE and the IT Environment. The assumed level of expertise of the attacker for all the threats identified below is Enhanced-Basic. Table 12: Threats Threat Threat Definition T.UNAUTHORIZED_ADMINISTRATOR_ACCESS Threat agents may attempt to gain administrator access to the Network Device by nefarious means such as masquerading as an administrator to the device, masquerading as the device to an administrator, replaying an administrative session (in its entirety, or selected portions), or performing man-in-the-middle attacks, which would provide access to the administrative session, or sessions between Network Devices. Successfully gaining administrator access allows malicious actions that compromise the security functionality of the device and the network on which it resides. T.WEAK_CRYPTOGRAPHY Threat agents may exploit weak cryptographic algorithms or perform a cryptographic exhaust against the key space. Poorly chosen encryption algorithms, modes, and key sizes will allow attackers to compromise the algorithms, or brute force exhaust the key space and give them unauthorized access allowing them to read, manipulate and/or control the traffic with minimal effort. T.UNTRUSTED_COMMUNICATION_CHANNELS Threat agents may attempt to target Network Devices that do not use standardized secure tunneling protocols to protect the critical network traffic. Attackers may take advantage of poorly designed protocols or poor key management to successfully perform man-in-the-middle attacks, replay attacks, etc. Successful attacks will result in loss of confidentiality and integrity of the critical network traffic, and potentially could lead to a compromise of the Network Device itself. Cisco Catalyst Industrial Ethernet 3100 (IE3100) Rugged Series Switches running IOS-XE 17.12 Common Criteria Security Target Page 26 of 53 Cisco Confidential Threat Threat Definition T.WEAK_AUTHENTICATION_ENDPOINTS Threat agents may take advantage of secure protocols that use weak methods to authenticate the endpoints – e.g., shared password that is guessable or transported as plaintext. The consequences are the same as a poorly designed protocol, the attacker could masquerade as the administrator or another device, and the attacker could insert themselves into the network stream and perform a man-in-the-middle attack. The result is the critical network traffic is exposed and there could be a loss of confidentiality and integrity, and potentially the network device itself could be compromised. T.UPDATE_COMPROMISE Threat agents may attempt to provide a compromised update of the software or firmware which undermines the security functionality of the device. Non-validated updates or updates validated using non-secure or weak cryptography leave the update firmware vulnerable to surreptitious alteration. T.UNDETECTED_ACTIVITY Threat agents may attempt to access, change, and/or modify the security functionality of the network device without administrator awareness. This could result in the attacker finding an avenue (e.g., misconfiguration, flaw in the product) to compromise the device and the administrator would have no knowledge that the device has been compromised. T.SECURITY_FUNCTIONALITY_COMPROMISE Threat agents may compromise credentials and device data enabling continued access to the Network Device and its critical data. The compromise of credentials includes replacing existing credentials with an attacker’s credentials, modifying existing credentials, or obtaining the administrator or device credentials for use by the attacker. T.PASSWORD_CRACKING Threat agents may be able to take advantage of weak administrative passwords to gain privileged access to the device. Having privileged access to the device provides the attacker unfettered access to the network traffic and may allow them to take advantage of any trust relationships with other Network Devices. T.SECURITY_FUNCTIONALITY_FAILURE An external, unauthorized entity could make use of failed or compromised security functionality and might therefore subsequently use or abuse security functions without prior authentication to access, change or modify device data, critical network traffic or security functionality of the device. 3.3 Organizational Security Policies The following table lists the Organizational Security Policies imposed by an organization to address its security needs. Table 13: Organizational Security Policies Policy Name Policy Definition P.ACCESS_BANNER The TOE shall display an initial banner describing restrictions of use, legal agreements, or any other appropriate information to which users consent by accessing the TOE. Cisco Catalyst Industrial Ethernet 3100 (IE3100) Rugged Series Switches running IOS-XE 17.12 Common Criteria Security Target Page 27 of 53 Cisco Confidential 4 SECURITY OBJECTIVES This section identifies the security objectives of the TOE and the IT Environment. The security objectives identify the responsibilities of the TOE and the TOE’s IT environment in meeting the security needs. 4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE The collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices v2.2e does not define any security objectives for the TOE. 4.2 Security Objectives for the Environment All the assumptions stated in section 3.1 are security objectives for the environment. The table lists the Protection Profile non-IT security objectives, which, in addition to those assumptions, are to be satisfied without imposing technical requirements on the TOE. That is, they will not require the implementation of functions in the TOE hardware and/or software. Thus, they will be satisfied largely through application of procedural or administrative measures. Table 14: Security Objectives for the Environment Environment Security Objective IT Environment Security Objective Definition OE.PHYSICAL Physical security, commensurate with the value of the TOE and the data it contains, is provided by the environment. OE.NO_GENERAL_PURPOSE There are no general-purpose computing capabilities (e.g., compilers or user applications) available on the TOE, other than those services necessary for the operation, administration, and support of the TOE. Note: For vNDs the TOE includes only the contents of its own VM, and does not include other VMs or the VS OE.NO_THRU_TRAFFIC_PROTECTION The TOE does not provide any protection of traffic that traverses it. It is assumed that protection of this traffic will be covered by other security and assurance measures in the operational environment. OE.TRUSTED_ADMIN Security Administrators are trusted to follow and apply all guidance documentation in a trusted manner. For vNDs, this includes the VS Administrator responsible for configuring the VMs that implement ND functionality. For TOEs supporting X.509v3 certificate-based authentication, the Security Administrator(s) are assumed to monitor the revocation status of all certificates in the TOE's trust store and to remove any certificate from the TOE’s trust store in case such certificate can no longer be trusted. OE.UPDATES The TOE firmware and software is updated by an administrator on a regular basis in response to the release of product updates due to known vulnerabilities. OE.ADMIN_CREDENTIALS_SECURE The administrator’s credentials (private key) used to access the TOE must be protected on any other platform on which they reside. OE.RESIDUAL_INFORMATION The Security Administrator ensures that there is no unauthorized access possible for sensitive residual information (e.g. cryptographic keys, keying material, PINs, passwords etc.) on networking equipment when the equipment is discarded or removed from its operational environment. For vNDs, this applies when the physical platform on which the VM runs is removed from its operational environment. Cisco Catalyst Industrial Ethernet 3100 (IE3100) Rugged Series Switches running IOS-XE 17.12 Common Criteria Security Target Page 28 of 53 Cisco Confidential 5 SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS This section identifies the Security Functional Requirements for the TOE. The Security Functional Requirements included in this section are derived from Part 2 of the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1, Revision 5, dated: April 2017 and all international interpretations. 5.1 Conventions The CC defines operations on Security Functional Requirements: assignments, selections, assignments within selections and refinements. This document uses the following font conventions to identify the operations defined by the CC and claimed PP/EP: • Unaltered SFRs are stated in the form used in [CC2] or their extended component definition (ECD); • Refinement made by PP author: Indicated with bold text and strikethroughs; • Selection wholly or partially completed in the PP: the selection values (i.e. the selection values adopted in the PP or the remaining selection values available for the ST) are indicated with underlined text o e.g. “[selection: disclosure, modification, loss of use]” in [CC2] or an ECD might become “disclosure” (completion) or “[selection: disclosure, modification]” (partial completion) in the PP; • Assignment wholly or partially completed in the PP: indicated with italicized text • Assignment completed within a selection in the PP: the completed assignment text is indicated with italicized and underlined text o e.g. “[selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, [assignment: other operations]]” in [CC2] or an ECD might become “change_default, select_tag” (completion of both selection and assignment) or “[selection: change_default, select_tag, select_value]” (partial completion of selection, and completion of assignment) in the PP; • Iteration: indicated by adding a string starting with “/” (e.g. “FCS_COP.1/Hash”). • Extended SFRs are identified by having a label “EXT” at the end of the SFR name. Formatting conventions outside of operations and iterations matches the formatting specified within the NDcPPv2.2e. 5.2 TOE Security Functional Requirements This section identifies the Security Functional Requirements for the TOE. The TOE Security Functional Requirements that appear in the following table are described in more detail in the following subsections. Cisco Catalyst Industrial Ethernet 3100 (IE3100) Rugged Series Switches running IOS-XE 17.12 Common Criteria Security Target Page 29 of 53 Cisco Confidential Table 15: Security Functional Requirements Class Name Component Identification Component Name FAU: Security Audit FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation FAU_GEN.2 User Identity Association FAU_STG_EXT.1 Protected Audit Event Storage FCS: Cryptographic Support FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic Key Generation (for asymmetric keys) FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic Key Establishment FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic Key Destruction FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption Cryptographic Operation (AES Data Encryption/ Decryption) FCS_COP.1/SigGen Cryptographic Operation (Signature Generation and Verification) FCS_COP.1/Hash Cryptographic Operation (Hash Algorithm) FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash Cryptographic Operation (Keyed Hash Algorithm) FCS_TLSC_EXT.1 TLS Client Protocol Without Mutual Authentication FCS_SSHS_EXT.1 SSH Server Protocol FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Random Bit Generation FIA: Identification and Authentication FIA_AFL.1 Authentication Failure Handling FIA_PMG_EXT.1 Password Management FIA_UIA_EXT.1 User Identification and Authentication FIA_UAU_EXT.2 Password-based Authentication Mechanism FIA_UAU.7 Protected Authentication Feedback FIA_X509_EXT.1/Rev X.509 Certificate Validation FIA_X509_EXT.2 X.509 Certificate Authentication FMT: Security Management FMT_MOF.1/ManualUpdate Management of security functions behaviour FMT_MTD.1/CoreData Management of TSF Data FMT_MTD.1/CryptoKeys Management of TSF Data FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions FMT_SMR.2 Restrictions on Security Roles FPT: Protection of the TSF FPT_APW_EXT.1 Protection of Administrator Passwords FPT_SKP_EXT.1 Protection of TSF Data (for reading of all pre-shared, symmetric and private keys) FPT_STM.1 Reliable Time Stamps FPT_TST_EXT.1 TSF Testing FPT_TUD_EXT.1 Trusted Update FTA: TOE Access FTA_SSL_EXT.1 TSF-initiated Session Locking FTA_SSL.3 TSF-initiated Termination FTA_SSL.4 User-initiated Termination FTA_TAB.1 Default TOE Access Banners FTP: Trusted Path/Channels FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel FTP_TRP.1/Admin Trusted Path 5.2.1 Security Audit (FAU) 5.2.1.1 FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation FAU_GEN.1.1 The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the following auditable events: a) Start-up and shut-down of the audit functions; b) All auditable events for the not specified level of audit; and c) All administrative actions comprising: • Administrative login and logout (name of user account shall be logged if individual user accounts are required for administrators). • Changes to TSF data related to configuration changes (in addition to the information that a change occurred it shall be logged what has been changed). Cisco Catalyst Industrial Ethernet 3100 (IE3100) Rugged Series Switches running IOS-XE 17.12 Common Criteria Security Target Page 30 of 53 Cisco Confidential • Generating/import of, changing, or deleting of cryptographic keys (in addition to the action itself a unique key name or key reference shall be logged). • Resetting passwords (name of related user account shall be logged). • [no other actions]; d) Specifically defined auditable events listed in Table 16: Auditable Events. FAU_GEN.1.2 The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the following information: a) Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity, and the outcome (success or failure) of the event; and b) For each audit event type, based on the auditable event definitions of the functional components included in the PP/ST, information specified in column three of Table 16: Auditable Events. Table 16: Auditable Events SFR Auditable Event Additional Audit Record Contents FAU_GEN.1 None. None. FAU_GEN.2 None. None. FAU_STG_EXT.1 None. None. FCS_CKM.1 None. None. FCS_CKM.2 None. None. FCS_CKM.4 None. None. FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption None. None. FCS_COP.1/SigGen None. None. FCS_COP.1/Hash None. None. FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash None. None. FCS_TLSC_EXT.1 Failure to establish a TLS session. Reason for failure. FCS_SSHS_EXT.1 Failure to establish an SSH session. Reason for failure. FCS_RBG_EXT.1 None. None. FIA_AFL.1 Unsuccessful login attempts limit is met or exceeded. Origin of the attempt (e.g., IP address). FIA_PMG_EXT.1 None. None. FIA_UIA_EXT.1 All use of the identification and authentication mechanism. Origin of the attempt (e.g., IP address). FIA_UAU_EXT.2 All use of the identification and authentication mechanism. Origin of the attempt (e.g., IP address). FIA_UAU.7 None. None. FIA_X509_EXT.1/Rev Unsuccessful attempt to validate a certificate Any addition, replacement or removal of trust anchors in the TOE's trust store. Reason for failure of certificate validation Identification of certificates added, replaced or removed as trust anchor in the TOE's trust store. FIA_X509_EXT.2 None. None. FMT_MOF.1/ ManualUpdate Any attempt to initiate a manual update None. FMT_MTD.1/CoreData None. None. FMT_MTD.1/CryptoKeys None. None FMT_SMF.1 All management activities of TSF data. None. FMT_SMR.2 None. None. FPT_SKP_EXT.1 None. None. FPT_APW_EXT.1 None. None. FPT_STM_EXT.1 Discontinuous changes to time – either Administrator actuated or For discontinuous changes to time: The old and new values for the Cisco Catalyst Industrial Ethernet 3100 (IE3100) Rugged Series Switches running IOS-XE 17.12 Common Criteria Security Target Page 31 of 53 Cisco Confidential SFR Auditable Event Additional Audit Record Contents changed via an automated process. (Note that no continuous changes to time need to be logged. See also application note on FPT_STM_EXT.1) time. Origin of the attempt to change time for success and failure (e.g., IP address). FPT_TST_EXT.1 None. None. FPT_TUD_EXT.1 Initiation of update; result of the update attempt (success and failure) None. FTA_SSL_EXT.1 The termination of a local session by the session locking mechanism. None. FTA_SSL.3 The termination of a remote session by the session locking mechanism. None. FTA_SSL.4 The termination of an interactive session. None. FTA_TAB.1 None. None. FTP_ITC.1 Initiation of the trusted channel. Termination of the trusted channel. Failure of the trusted channel functions. Identification of the initiator and target of failed trusted channels establishment attempt FTP_TRP.1/Admin Initiation of the trusted path. Termination of the trusted path. Failures of the trusted path functions. None. 5.2.1.2 FAU_GEN.2 User Identity Association FAU_GEN.2.1 For audit events resulting from actions of identified users, the TSF shall be able to associate each auditable event with the identity of the user that caused the event. 5.2.1.3 FAU_STG_EXT.1 Protected Audit Event Storage FAU_STG_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall be able to transmit the generated audit data to an external IT entity using a trusted channel according to FTP_ITC.1. FAU_STG_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall be able to store generated audit data on the TOE itself [TOE shall consist of a single standalone component that stores audit data locally]. FAU_STG_EXT.1.3 The TSF shall [overwrite previous audit records according to the following rule: [the oldest audit records will be overwritten first]] when the local storage space for audit data is full. 5.2.2 Cryptographic Support (FCS) 5.2.2.1 FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic Key Generation FCS_CKM.1.1: The TSF shall generate asymmetric cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm: [ • RSA schemes using cryptographic key sizes of 2048-bit or greater that meet the following: FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”, Appendix B.3; • ECC schemes using “NIST curves” [P-256, P-384, P-521] that meet the following: FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”, Appendix B.4; Cisco Catalyst Industrial Ethernet 3100 (IE3100) Rugged Series Switches running IOS-XE 17.12 Common Criteria Security Target Page 32 of 53 Cisco Confidential • FFC Schemes using ’safe-prime’ groups that meet the following: “NIST Special Publication 800-56A Revision 3, Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography” and [RFC 3526] ] and specified cryptographic key sizes [assignment: cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following: [assignment: list of standards]. 5.2.2.2 FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic Key Establishment FCS_CKM.2.1 The TSF shall perform cryptographic key establishment in accordance with a specified cryptographic key establishment method: [ • RSA-based key establishment schemes that meet the following: RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 as specified in Section 7.2 of RFC 3447, “Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1; • Elliptic curve-based key establishment schemes that meets the following: NIST Special Publication 800-56A Revision 3, “Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography”; • FFC Schemes using ‘safe-prime’ groups that meet the following: NIST Special Publication 800-56A Revision 3, “Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography” and [groups listed in RFC 3526]; ] that meets the following: [assignment: list of standards]. 5.2.2.3 FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic Key Destruction FCS_CKM.4.1 The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key destruction method [ • For plaintext keys in volatile storage, the destruction shall be executed by a [single overwrite consisting of [zeroes]]; • For plaintext keys in non-volatile storage, the destruction shall be executed by the invocation of an interface provided by a part of the TSF that [ o logically addresses the storage location of the key and performs a [single] overwrite consisting of [zeroes]]; that meets the following: No Standard. 5.2.2.4 FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption Cryptographic Operation (AES Data Encryption/Decryption) FCS_COP.1.1/DataEncryption The TSF shall perform encryption/decryption in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm AES used in [CBC, GCM] mode and cryptographic key sizes [128 bits, 256 bits] that meet the following: AES as specified in ISO 18033-3, [CBC as specified in ISO 10116, GCM as specified in ISO 19772]. 5.2.2.5 FCS_COP.1/SigGen Cryptographic Operation (Signature Generation and Verification) FCS_COP.1.1/SigGen The TSF shall perform cryptographic signature services (generation and verification) in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm Cisco Catalyst Industrial Ethernet 3100 (IE3100) Rugged Series Switches running IOS-XE 17.12 Common Criteria Security Target Page 33 of 53 Cisco Confidential [ • RSA Digital Signature Algorithm and cryptographic key sizes (modulus) [2048 bits, 3072 bits], ] that meet the following: [ • For RSA schemes: FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”, Section 5.5, using PKCS #1 v2.1 Signature Schemes RSASSA-PSS and/or RSASSA-PKCS1v1_5; ISO/IEC 9796-2, Digital signature scheme 2 or Digital Signature scheme 3, ]. 5.2.2.6 FCS_COP.1/Hash Cryptographic Operation (Hash Algorithm) FCS_COP.1.1/Hash The TSF shall perform cryptographic hashing services in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512] and cryptographic key sizes [assignment: cryptographic key sizes] and message digest sizes [160, 256, 384, 512] bits that meet the following: ISO/IEC 10118-3:2004. 5.2.2.7 FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash Cryptographic Operation (Keyed Hash Algorithm) FCS_COP.1.1/KeyedHash The TSF shall perform keyed-hash message authentication in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384, HMAC-SHA-512] and cryptographic key sizes [160-bit, 256-bit, 384, 512-bit] and message digest sizes [160, 256, 384, 512] bits that meet the following: ISO/IEC 9797-2:2011, Section 7 “MAC Algorithm 2”. 5.2.2.8 FCS_TLSC_EXT.1 TLS Client Protocol without Mutual Authentication FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall implement [TLS 1.2 (RFC 5246)] and reject all other TLS and SSL versions. The TLS implementation will support the following ciphersuites [ • TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5289 • TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289 • TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5289 • TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289 ] and no other ciphersuites. FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall verify that the presented identifier matches [the reference identifier per RFC 6125 section 6, IPv4 address in SAN] and no other attribute types]. FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.3 When establishing a trusted channel, by default the TSF shall not establish a trusted channel if the server certificate is invalid. The TSF shall also [ • Not implement any administrator override mechanism ]. FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.4 The TSF shall [present the Supported Elliptic Curves/Supported Groups Extension with the following curves/groups: [secp256r1, secp384r1, secp521r1] and no other curves/groups] in the Client Hello. Cisco Catalyst Industrial Ethernet 3100 (IE3100) Rugged Series Switches running IOS-XE 17.12 Common Criteria Security Target Page 34 of 53 Cisco Confidential 5.2.2.9 FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Random Bit Generation FCS_RBG_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall perform all deterministic random bit generation services in accordance with ISO/IEC 18031:2011 using [CTR_DRBG (AES)]. FCS_RBG_EXT.1.2 The deterministic RBG shall be seeded by at least one entropy source that accumulates entropy from [[1] platform-based noise source] with a minimum of [256 bits] of entropy at least equal to the greatest security strength, according to ISO/IEC 18031:2011 Table C.1 “Security Strength Table for Hash Functions”, of the keys and hashes that it will generate. 5.2.2.10 FCS_SSHS_EXT.1 SSH Server Protocol FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall implement the SSH protocol in accordance with: RFCs 4251, 4252, 4253, 4254, [6668, 8308 section 3.1, 8332] FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall ensure that the SSH protocol implementation supports the following user authentication methods as described in RFC 4252: public key-based, [password based]. Application Note NIAP TD0631 has been applied to FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.2. FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.3 The TSF shall ensure that, as described in RFC 4253, packets greater than [65,806] bytes in an SSH transport connection are dropped. FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.4 The TSF shall ensure that the SSH transport implementation uses the following encryption algorithms and rejects all other encryption algorithms: [aes128-cbc, aes256-cbc]. FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.5 The TSF shall ensure that the SSH public-key based authentication implementation uses [rsa-sha2-256, rsa-sha2-512] as its public key algorithm(s) and rejects all other public key algorithms. FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.6 The TSF shall ensure that the SSH transport implementation uses [hmac-sha2-256, hmac-sha2-512] as its MAC algorithm(s) and rejects all other MAC algorithm(s). FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.7 The TSF shall ensure that [diffie-hellman-group14-sha1, ecdh-sha2-nistp256] and [ecdh-sha2-nistp384] are the only allowed key exchange methods used for the SSH protocol. FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.8 The TSF shall ensure that within SSH connections, the same session keys are used for a threshold of no longer than one hour, and each encryption key is used to protect no more than one gigabyte of data. After any of the thresholds are reached, a rekey needs to be performed. 5.2.3 Identification and authentication (FIA) 5.2.3.1 FIA_AFL.1 Authentication Failure Handling FIA_AFL.1.1 The TSF shall detect when an Administrator configurable positive integer within [1-3] unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related to Administrators attempting to authenticate remotely using a password. Cisco Catalyst Industrial Ethernet 3100 (IE3100) Rugged Series Switches running IOS-XE 17.12 Common Criteria Security Target Page 35 of 53 Cisco Confidential FIA_AFL.1.2 When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been met, the TSF shall [prevent the offending Administrator from successfully establishing a remote session using any authentication method that involves a password until an Administrator defined time period has elapsed]. 5.2.3.2 FIA_PMG_EXT.1 Password Management FIA_PMG_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall provide the following password management capabilities for administrative passwords: a) Passwords shall be able to be composed of any combination of upper and lower case letters, numbers, and the following special characters: [“!”, “@”, “#”, “$”, “%”, “^”, “&”, “*”, “(“, “)”[Additional Special Characters listed in Table 17: Additional Password Special Characters]]; b) Minimum password length shall be configurable to between [minimum 1] and [maximum 127] characters. Table 17: Additional Password Special Characters Special Character Name ! Exclamation @ At sign # Number sign (hash) $ Dollar sign % Percent ^ Caret & Ampersand * Asterisk ( Left parenthesis ) Right parenthesis Space ; Semicolon : Colon “ Double Quote ‘ Single Quote | Vertical Bar + Plus - Minus = Equal Sign Cisco Catalyst Industrial Ethernet 3100 (IE3100) Rugged Series Switches running IOS-XE 17.12 Common Criteria Security Target Page 36 of 53 Cisco Confidential . Period , Comma / Slash \ Backslash < Less Than > Greater Than _ Underscore ` Grave accent (backtick) ~ Tilde { Left Brace } Right Brace 5.2.3.3 FIA_UIA_EXT.1 User Identification and Authentication FIA_UIA_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall allow the following actions prior to requiring the non-TOE entity to initiate the identification and authentication process: • Display the warning banner in accordance with FTA_TAB.1; • [no other actions]. FIA_UIA_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall require each administrative user to be successfully identified and authenticated before allowing any other TSF-mediated action on behalf of that administrative user. 5.2.3.4 FIA_UAU_EXT.2 Password-based Authentication Mechanism FIA_UAU_EXT.2.1 The TSF shall provide a local [password-based, SSH public key-based] authentication mechanism to perform local administrative user authentication. 5.2.3.5 FIA_UAU.7 Protected Authentication Feedback FIA_UAU.7.1 The TSF shall provide only obscured feedback to the administrative user while the authentication is in progress at the local console. 5.2.3.6 FIA_X509_EXT.1/Rev X.509 Certificate Validation FIA_X509_EXT.1.1/Rev The TSF shall validate certificates in accordance with the following rules: • RFC 5280 certificate validation and certification path validation supporting a minimum path length of three certificates. • The certificate path must terminate with a trusted CA certificate designated as a trust anchor. • The TSF shall validate a certification path by ensuring that all CA certificates in the certification Cisco Catalyst Industrial Ethernet 3100 (IE3100) Rugged Series Switches running IOS-XE 17.12 Common Criteria Security Target Page 37 of 53 Cisco Confidential path contain the basicConstraints extension with the CA flag set to TRUE. • The TSF shall validate the revocation status of the certificate using [Certificate Revocation List (CRL) as specified in RFC 5759 Section 5]. • The TSF shall validate the extendedKeyUsage field according to the following rules: o Certificates used for trusted updates and executable code integrity verification shall have the Code Signing purpose (id-kp 3 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.3) in the extendedKeyUsage field. o Server certificates presented for TLS shall have the Server Authentication purpose (id-kp 1 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1) in the extendedKeyUsage field. o Client certificates presented for TLS shall have the Client Authentication purpose (id-kp 2 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2) in the extendedKeyUsage field. o OCSP certificates presented for OCSP responses shall have the OCSP Signing purpose (id-kp 9 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.9) in the extendedKeyUsage field. FIA_X509_EXT.1.2/Rev The TSF shall only treat a certificate as a CA certificate if the basicConstraints extension is present and the CA flag is set to TRUE. Application Note NIAP TD0527 has been applied to FIA_X509_EXT.1/Rev, though it impacts only the tests, not the text of the SFR. 5.2.3.7 FIA_X509_EXT.2 X.509 Certificate Authentication FIA_X509_EXT.2.1 The TSF shall use X.509v3 certificates as defined by RFC 5280 to support authentication for [TLS], and [no additional uses]. FIA_X509_EXT.2.2 When the TSF cannot establish a connection to determine the validity of a certificate, the TSF shall [not accept the certificate]. Application Note NIAP TD0537 has been applied to FIA_X509_EXT.2. 5.2.4 Security management (FMT) 5.2.4.1 FMT_MOF.1/ManualUpdate Management of security functions behaviour FMT_MOF.1.1/ManualUpdate The TSF shall restrict the ability to enable the functions to perform manual updates to Security Administrators. 5.2.4.2 FMT_MTD.1/CoreData Management of TSF Data FMT_MTD.1.1/CoreData The TSF shall restrict the ability to manage the TSF data to Security Administrators. 5.2.4.3 FMT_MTD.1/CryptoKeys Management of TSF data FMT_MTD.1.1/CryptoKeys The TSF shall restrict the ability to manage the cryptographic keys to Security Administrators. Cisco Catalyst Industrial Ethernet 3100 (IE3100) Rugged Series Switches running IOS-XE 17.12 Common Criteria Security Target Page 38 of 53 Cisco Confidential 5.2.4.4 FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions: • Ability to administer the TOE locally and remotely; • Ability to configure the access banner; • Ability to configure the session inactivity time before session termination or locking; • Ability to update the TOE, and to verify the updates using [hash comparison] capability prior to installing those updates; • Ability to configure the authentication failure parameters for FIA_AFL.1; • [ o Ability to modify the behavior of the transmission of audit data to an external IT entity; o Ability to configure the cryptographic functionality; o Ability to configure thresholds for SSH rekeying; o Ability to set the time which is used for time-stamps; o Ability to configure the reference identifier for the peer; o Ability to manage the trusted public keys database; o Ability to import X.509v3 certificates to the TOE's trust store; o Ability to manage the TOE’s trust store and designate X509.v2 certificates as trust anchors o Ability to manage the cryptographic keys]]. Application Note NIAP TD0631 has been applied to FMT_SMF.1.1. 5.2.4.5 FMT_SMR.2 Restrictions on Security Roles FMT_SMR.2.1 The TSF shall maintain the roles: • Security Administrator. FMT_SMR.2.2 The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles. FMT_SMR.2.3 The TSF shall ensure that the conditions • The Security Administrator role shall be able to administer the TOE locally; • The Security Administrator role shall be able to administer the TOE remotely are satisfied. 5.2.5 Protection of the TSF (FPT) 5.2.5.1 FPT_APW_EXT.1: Protection of Administrator Passwords FPT_APW_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall store administrative passwords in non-plaintext form. FPT_APW_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall prevent the reading of plaintext administrative passwords. 5.2.5.2 FPT_SKP_EXT.1 Protection of TSF Data (for reading of all pre-shared, symmetric and private keys) FPT_SKP_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall prevent reading of all pre-shared keys, symmetric keys, and private keys. Cisco Catalyst Industrial Ethernet 3100 (IE3100) Rugged Series Switches running IOS-XE 17.12 Common Criteria Security Target Page 39 of 53 Cisco Confidential 5.2.5.3 FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps FPT_STM_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall be able to provide reliable time stamps for its own use. FPT_STM_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall [allow the Security Administrator to set the time]. 5.2.5.4 FPT_TST_EXT.1: TSF Testing FPT_TST_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall run a suite of the following self-tests [during initial start-up (on power on), periodically during normal operation] to demonstrate the correct operation of the TSF: [ • AES Known Answer Test • HMAC Known Answer Test • RNG/DRBG Known Answer Test • SHA-1/256/384/512 Known Answer Test • RSA Signature Known Answer Test (both signature/verification) • Software Integrity Test ]. 5.2.5.5 FPT_TUD_EXT.1 Trusted Update FPT_TUD_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall provide Security Administrators the ability to query the currently executing version of the TOE firmware/software and [no other TOE firmware/software version]. FPT_TUD_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall provide Security Administrators the ability to manually initiate updates to TOE firmware/software and [no other update mechanism]. FPT_TUD_EXT.1.3 The TSF shall provide means to authenticate firmware/software updates to the TOE using a [published hash] prior to installing those updates. 5.2.6 TOE Access (FTA) 5.2.6.1 FTA_SSL_EXT.1 TSF-initiated Session Locking FTA_SSL_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall, for local interactive sessions, [ • terminate the session] after a Security Administrator-specified time period of inactivity. 5.2.6.2 FTA_SSL.3 TSF-initiated Termination FTA_SSL.3.1: The TSF shall terminate a remote interactive session after a Security Administrator- configurable time interval of session inactivity. Cisco Catalyst Industrial Ethernet 3100 (IE3100) Rugged Series Switches running IOS-XE 17.12 Common Criteria Security Target Page 40 of 53 Cisco Confidential 5.2.6.3 FTA_SSL.4 User-initiated Termination FTA_SSL.4.1 The TSF shall allow Administrator-initiated termination of the Administrator’s own interactive session. 5.2.6.4 FTA_TAB.1 Default TOE Access Banners FTA_TAB.1.1 Before establishing an administrative user session the TSF shall display a Security Administrator-specified advisory notice and consent warning message regarding use of the TOE. 5.2.7 Trusted Path/Channels (FTP) 5.2.7.1 FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel FTP_ITC.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of using [TLS] to provide a trusted communication channel between itself and authorized IT entities supporting the following capabilities: audit server, [no other capabilities] that is logically distinct from other communication channels and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel data from disclosure and detection of modification of the channel data. FTP_ITC.1.2 The TSF shall permit the TSF or the authorized IT entities to initiate communication via the trusted channel. FTP_ ITC.1.3 The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for [ • external audit server using TLS ]. 5.2.7.2 FTP_TRP.1 Trusted Path/Admin Trusted Path (Refinement) FTP_TRP.1.1/Admin: The TSF shall be capable of using [SSH] to provide a communication path between itself and authorized remote Administrators that is logically distinct from other communication paths and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the communicated data from disclosure and provides detection of modification of the channel data. FTP_TRP.1.2/Admin The TSF shall permit remote Administrators to initiate communication via the trusted path. FTP_TRP.1.3/Admin The TSF shall require the use of the trusted path for initial Administrator authentication and all remote administration actions. 5.3 TOE SFR Dependencies Rationale for SFRs Found in NDcPPv2.2e The Security Functional Requirements (SFRs) in this Security Target represent the SFRs identified in the NDcPPv2.2e. As such, the NDcPPv2.2e SFR dependency rationale is deemed acceptable since the PP itself has been validated. Cisco Catalyst Industrial Ethernet 3100 (IE3100) Rugged Series Switches running IOS-XE 17.12 Common Criteria Security Target Page 41 of 53 Cisco Confidential 5.4 Security Assurance Requirements 5.4.1 SAR Requirements The TOE assurance requirements for this ST are taken directly from the NDcPPv2.2e which are derived from Common Criteria Version 3.1, Revision 5, dated April 2017. The assurance requirements are summarized in the table below. Table 18: Assurance Measures Assurance Class Components Components Description Security Target (ASE) ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition ASE_INT.1 ST introduction ASE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment ASE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements ASE_SPD.1 Security Problem Definition ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification Development (ADV) ADV_FSP.1 Basic Functional Specification Guidance Documents (AGD) AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance AGD_PRE.1 Preparative User guidance Life Cycle Support (ALC) ALC_CMC.1 Labeling of the TOE ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage Tests (ATE) ATE_IND.1 Independent testing - conformance Vulnerability Assessment (AVA) AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability analysis 5.4.2 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale The Security Assurance Requirements (SARs) in this Security Target represent the SARs identified in the NDcPPv2.2e. As such, the NDcPPv2.2e SAR rationale is deemed acceptable since the PP itself has been validated. 5.5 Assurance Measures The TOE satisfies the identified assurance requirements. This section identifies the Assurance Measures applied by Cisco to satisfy the assurance requirements. The table below lists the details. Cisco Catalyst Industrial Ethernet 3100 (IE3100) Rugged Series Switches running IOS-XE 17.12 Common Criteria Security Target Page 42 of 53 Cisco Confidential Table 19: Assurance Measure Components Component How requirement will be met Security Target (ASE) / ASE_CCL.1 / ASE_ECD.1 / ASE_INT.1 / ASE_OBJ.1 / ASE_REQ.1 / ASE_SPD.1 / ASE_TSS.1 Section 2 of this ST includes the TOE and ST conformance claim to CC Version 3.1, Revision 5, dated: April 2017, CC Part 2 extended and CC Part 3 conformant, NDcPPv2.2e and the rationale of how TOE provides all of the functionality at a level of security commensurate with that identified in NDcPPv2.2e. Section 2 also includes the consistency rationale for the TOE Security Problem Definition and the Security Requirements to include the extended components definition. ADV_FSP.1 The functional specification describes the external interfaces of the TOE; such as the means for a user to invoke a service and the corresponding response of those services. The description includes the interface(s) that enforces a security functional requirement, the interface(s) that supports the enforcement of a security functional requirement, and the interface(s) that does not enforce any security functional requirements. The interfaces are described in terms of their: • purpose (general goal of the interface); • method of use (how the interface is to be used); • parameters (explicit inputs to and outputs from an interface that control the behaviour of that interface); • parameter descriptions (tells what the parameter is in some meaningful way); and • error messages (identifies the condition that generated it, what the message is, and the meaning of any error codes). The development evidence also contains a tracing of the interfaces to the SFRs described in this ST. AGD_OPE.1 The Administrative Guide provides the descriptions of the processes and procedures of how the administrative users of the TOE can securely administer the TOE using the interfaces that provide the features and functions detailed in the ST. AGD_PRE.1 The Installation Guide describes the installation, generation and startup procedures so that the users of the TOE can setup the components of the TOE in the evaluated configuration. ALC_CMC.1 The Configuration Management (CM) document(s) describes how the consumer (end-user) of the TOE can identify the evaluated TOE (Target of Evaluation). The CM document(s) identifies the configuration items, how those configuration items are uniquely identified, and the adequacy of the procedures that are used to control and track changes that are made to the TOE. This includes details on what changes are tracked, how potential changes are incorporated, and the degree to which automation is used to reduce the scope for error. ALC_CMS.1 ATE_IND.1 Cisco will provide the TOE for testing. AVA_VAN.1 Cisco will provide the TOE for testing. Cisco Catalyst Industrial Ethernet 3100 (IE3100) Rugged Series Switches running IOS-XE 17.12 Common Criteria Security Target Page 43 of 53 Cisco Confidential 6 TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION 6.1 TOE Security Functional Requirement Measures This section identifies and describes how the Security Functional Requirements identified above are met by the TOE. Table 20: How TOE SFRs Measures are Met TOE SFRs How the SFR is Met FAU_GEN.1 The TOE generates an audit record whenever an audited event occurs. The types of events that cause audit records to be generated include cryptography related events such as, generating keys (e.g. RSA), and deletion of cryptographic keys, importing of X509 certificates, and management of the cryptographic algorithms is provided through the CLI with auditing of those commands. Audit records are also generated for identification and authentication related events and administrative events (the specific events and the contents of each audit record are listed in the table within the FAU_GEN.1 SFR, “Auditable Events Table”). Each of the events specified in the audit record is in enough detail to identify the user for which the event is associated (e.g. user identity, MAC address, IP address), when the event occurred, where the event occurred, the outcome of the event, and the type of event that occurred such as generating keys, including the type of key and “key name” which is assigned to the “label” of the crypto command per instructions in the CC Configuration Guide and is included in the audit records when a key is generated. Additionally, the startup and shutdown of the audit functionality is audited. The audit trail consists of the individual audit records; one audit record for each event that occurred. The audit record can contain up to 80 characters and a percent sign (%), which follows the time-stamp information. As noted above, the information includes [at least] all of the required information. Additional information can be configured and included if desired. Following is the audit record format: seq no:timestamp: %facility-severity-MNEMONIC:description (hostname-n) Following is an example of an audit record: <45>503026: IE3100: May 9 2024 21:19:07: %SYS-5-LOGGING_START: Logging enabled - CLI initiated <46>356: IE3100: Apr 18 2024 22:53:27: %SYS-6-LOGGINGHOST_STARTSTOP: Logging to host 192.168.144.46 port 6514 started - reconnection FAU_GEN.2 The TOE ensures that each auditable event is associated with the user that triggered the event and as a result, they are traceable to a specific user. For example, a human user, user identity or related session ID would be included in the audit record. For an IT entity or device, the IP address, MAC address, host name, or other configured identification is presented. FAU_STG_EXT.1 The TOE is a standalone TOE that internally stores audit records in a circular log file where the oldest audit records are overwritten when the audit trail becomes full. The size of the logging files on the TOE is configurable by the administrator with the minimum value being <4096-67108864> logging buffer size of available disk space. Refer to the CC Configuration Guide for command description and usage information. Only Authorized Administrators are able to clear the local logs, and local audit records are stored in a directory that does not allow administrators to modify the contents. The TOE can optionally be configured to export syslog records to a specified, external syslog server. Once the configuration is complete, the audit records are automatically sent to the external syslog server at the same time as they are written to the logging buffer. The TOE protects communications with an external syslog server via TLS. If the TLS connection fails, the TOE will store audit records on the TOE when it discovers it can no longer communicate with its configured syslog server. When the connection is restored, the TOE will transmit the buffer contents to the syslog server. FCS_CKM.1 The TOE uses RSA keys of size 2048 and 3072 bits in support of device authentication for SSH Remote administration and for TLS sessions according to FIPS PUB 186-4, Appendix B.3. The TOE employs RSA-based key establishment, RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 used in cryptographic operations as specified in Section 7.2 of RFC 3447 for SSH. FCS_CKM.2 Cisco Catalyst Industrial Ethernet 3100 (IE3100) Rugged Series Switches running IOS-XE 17.12 Common Criteria Security Target Page 44 of 53 Cisco Confidential TOE SFRs How the SFR is Met The TOE implements ECC key generation and establishment for TLS key exchanges according to FIPS PUB 186-4, Appendix B.4 using NIST curves P-256, P-384, and P-521. The TOE implements ECC key generation and establishment for SSH key exchanges according to FIPS PUB 186-4, Appendix B.4 using NIST curves P-256, and P-384. The TOE generates asymmetric keys and performs key establishment in accordance with FFC Schemes using ‘safe prime’ groups that meet NIST SP800-56A Revision 3 and RFC 3526. The TOE implements Diffie-Hellman (DH) group 14 (2048) bit key establishment schemes in SSH. The DH key generation meets RFC3526, Section 3. The TOE acts as a receiver for SSH communications (remote administration) and as both a sender and receiver for TLS communications (transmit generated audit records to an external IT entity (syslog server). Scheme SFR Service RSA Key generation FCS_SSHS_EXT.1 SSH Remote Administration FCS_TLSC_EXT.1 Transmit generated audit data to an external IT entity RSA Key establishment FCS_SSHS_EXT.1 SSH Remote Administration ECC Key generation Key establishment FCS_SSHS_EXT.1 SSH Remote Administration FCS_TLSC_EXT.1 Transmit generated audit data to an external IT entity FFC Key generation Key establishment FCS_SSHS_EXT.1 SSH Remote Administration For details on each protocol, see the related SFR. FCS_CKM.4 The TOE meets all requirements as specified by the cryptographic key destruction method of the keys and the Critical Security Parameters (CSPs) when no longer required for use. See Table 21: TOE Key Zeroization in Section 7.1 Key Zeroization. The information provided in the table includes all of the secrets, keys and associated values, the description, and the method used to zeroize when no longer required for use. In the event of an unexpected shutdown (e.g. crash or power loss), keys stored in volatile storage would be cleared from memory as a result of the loss of power/shutdown. For private keys in NVRAM (non-volatile storage), if an unexpected shutdown occurs during administrator-initiated zeroization of a private key, the administrator should run the command again when the the TOE is back in its operational state to ensure no residual portions of the private keys remain. FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption The TOE provides symmetric encryption and decryption capabilities using AES in CBC mode and GCM mode (128, 256 bits) as described in ISO 18033-3, ISO 10116, and ISO 19772. AES is implemented in the following protocols: TLS and SSH. Through the implementation of the cryptographic module, the TOE provides AES encryption and decryption in support of SSH and TLS for secure communications. The configuration and management of the cryptographic algorithms is provided through the CLI, to include the auditing of configuring the options by the Authorized Administrator. The relevant CAVP certificate numbers are listed in Table 6. Cisco Catalyst Industrial Ethernet 3100 (IE3100) Rugged Series Switches running IOS-XE 17.12 Common Criteria Security Target Page 45 of 53 Cisco Confidential TOE SFRs How the SFR is Met FCS_COP.1/SigGen The TOE provides cryptographic signature services using RSA Digital Signature Algorithm with key size of 2048 and greater as specified in ISO/IEC 9796-2, Digital signature scheme 2 or Digital Signature scheme 3. The TOE also supports RSA key size of 3072-bit, and it is recommended to use the stronger key size. Through the implementation of the cryptographic module, the TOE provides cryptographic signatures in support of TLS and SSH for secure communications. The configuration and management of the cryptographic algorithms is provided through the CLI, to include the auditing of configuring the options by the Authorized Administrator. The relevant CAVP certificate numbers are listed in Table 6. FCS_COP.1/Hash FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash The TOE provides cryptographic hashing services using SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512 as specified in ISO/IEC 10118-3:2004 (with key sizes and message digest sizes of 160, 256, 384, and 512 respectively). The TOE provides keyed-hashing message authentication services using HMAC-SHA-1 that operates on 512- bit blocks of data with key sizes and message digest sizes of 160 bits; HMAC-SHA-256 operating on 512-bit blocks of data with key sizes and message digest sizes of 256 bits; HMAC-SHA-384 and HMAC-SHA-512 operating on 1024-bit blocks of data, with key sizes and message digest sizes of 384 bits and 512 bits respectively as specified in ISO/IEC 9797-2:2011, Section 7 “MAC Algorithm 2”. For TLS hashing, administrators can select any SHA-256, and/or SHA-384 (with message digest sizes of 256, and 384 respectively) to be used with remote TLS endpoints. SHA-512 hashing is used for verification of software image integrity. SHA-256 hashing is used by the IOS Common Cryptographic Module (IC2M) for a software integrity self test. SHA-1 hashing is used by the CiscoSSL FIPS Object Module (FOM) for a software integrity self test. For SSH remote administration, Administrators configure hmac-sha2-256 and hmac-sha2-512 for MAC integrity. Through the implementation of the cryptographic module, the TOE provides SHS hashing and HMAC message authentication in support of SSH and TLS for secure communications. The configuration steps, commands and algorithms for the supported keys, key sizes and hashing are provided in the CC Configuration Guide. The relevant CAVP certificate numbers are listed in Table 6. FCS_TLSC_EXT.1 The TSF implements TLS 1.2 conformant to RFC 5246 to provide secure TLS communication between itself and a syslog server supporting the following ciphersuites: • TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5289 • TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289 • TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5289 • TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289 When establishing a TLS connection, the TOE supports reference identifiers of type IPv4 address and of type FQDN, and will seek a match to the DNS domain name or IP address respectively in the subjectAltName extension. If the TOE determines there is a mismatch in the presented identifier, it will not establish the TLS trusted channel connection. The TOE does not support the use of wildcards within certificates and does not support certificate pinning. For TLS 1.2 connections to the Syslog server, the TSF presents secp256r1, secp384r1, and secp521r1 and no other curves in the Supported Group extension of the Client Hello. This behavior is implemented by default and is not configurable. Cisco Catalyst Industrial Ethernet 3100 (IE3100) Rugged Series Switches running IOS-XE 17.12 Common Criteria Security Target Page 46 of 53 Cisco Confidential TOE SFRs How the SFR is Met FCS_RBG_EXT.1 The TOE implements a NIST-approved AES-CTR Deterministic Random Bit Generator (DRBG), as specified in ISO/IEC 18031:2011 seeded by an entropy source that accumulates entropy from a TSF-platform-based noise source. The deterministic RBG is seeded with a minimum of 256 bits of entropy, which is at least equal to the greatest security strength of the keys and hashes that it will generate. FCS_SSHS_EXT.1 When the SSH client presents a public key, the TSF verifies it matches the one configured for the Administrator account. If the presented public key does not match the one configured for the Administrator account, access is denied. The TOE implementation of SSHv2 supports the following: • Compliance with RFCs 4251, 4252, 4253, 4254, 6668, 8308 section 3.1 and 8332. • Dropping packets greater than 65,806 bytes, as such packets would violate the IP packet size limitations. Large packets are detected by the SSHv2 implementation and dropped internal to the SSH process. • Enforcement to only allow the encryption algorithms AES-CBC-128, and AES-CBC-256 to ensure confidentiality of the session; • The TOE uses RSA-SHA2-256 and RSA-SHA2-512 for host key authentication and uses SSH-RSA for client. • Local password-based and public key authentication for administrative users accessing the TOE through SSHv2; The TOE provides a command that allows a user to upload a public key for SSHv2 public key authentication and to specify the user identity associated that key. • Enforcement to only allow the hashing algorithms hmac-sha2-256 and hmac-sha2-512 to ensure the integrity of the session and • The TOE's implementation of SSHv2 can be configured to only allow Diffie-Hellman Group 14 (2048-bit keys), ECDH-SHA2-NISTP256, and ECDH-SHA2-NISTP384.Key Establishment, as required by the cPP to which conformance is claimed. The TSF's SSH implementation will perform a rekey after no longer than one hour or more than one gigabyte of data has been transmitted with the same session key. Both thresholds are checked. Rekeying is performed upon reaching whichever threshold is met first. The Administrator can configure lower rekey values if desired. The minimum time value is 10 minutes. The minimum volume value is 100 kilobytes. FIA_AFL.1 To block password-based brute force attacks, the TOE uses an internal AAA function to detect and track failed login attempts. When an account attempting to log into an administrative interface reaches the set maximum number of failed authentication attempts, the account will not be granted access until the time period has elapsed. The TOE provides the Administrator the ability to specify the maximum number of unsuccessful authentication attempts before an offending account will be blocked. The supported range is <1-65535>. The TOE also provides the ability to specify the time period to block offending accounts. To avoid a potential situation where password failures made by Administrators leads to no Administrator access until the defined blocking time period has elapsed, the CC Configuration Guide instructs the Administrator to configure the TOE for SSH public key authentication which is not subjected to password- based brute force attacks. During the block out period, the TOE provides the ability for the Administrator account to login remotely using SSH public key au-thentication. FIA_PMG_EXT.1 The TOE supports the local definition of users with corresponding passwords. The passwords can be composed of any combination of upper and lower case letters, numbers, and special characters that include: “!”, “@”, “#”, “$”, “%”, “^”, “&”, “*”, “(“, “)” and other special char-acters listed in Table 17: Additional Password Special Characters. Minimum password length is settable by the Authorized Administrator, and can be configured for minimum password lengths of 1 and maximum of 127 characters. A minimum password length of 8 is recommended. Cisco Catalyst Industrial Ethernet 3100 (IE3100) Rugged Series Switches running IOS-XE 17.12 Common Criteria Security Target Page 47 of 53 Cisco Confidential TOE SFRs How the SFR is Met FIA_UIA_EXT.1 FIA_UAU_EXT.2 The TOE requires all users to be successfully identified and authenticated before allowing any TSF mediated actions to be performed except for the login warning banner that is displayed prior to user authentication. Administrative access to the TOE is facilitated through the TOE’s CLI. The TOE mediates all administrative actions through the CLI. Once a potential administrative user attempts to access the CLI of the TOE through either a directly connected console or remotely through an SSHv2 secured connection, the TOE prompts the user for a user name and password or SSH public key authentication. Only after the administrative user presents the correct authentication credentials will access to the TOE administrative functionality be granted. No access is allowed to the administrative functionality of the TOE until an administrator is successfully identified and authenticated. The TOE provides a local password based authentication mechanism. The TOE also performs remote authentication using SSH public key to login authorized administrative users. The process for authentication is the same for administrative access whether administration is occurring via a directly connected console or remotely via SSHv2 secured connection. At initial login, the administrative user is prompted to provide a username. After the user provides the username, the user is prompted to provide the administrative password associated with the user account. The TOE then either grant administrative access (if the combination of username and password is correct) or indicate that the login was unsuccessful. The TOE does not provide a reason for failure in the cases of a login failure. FIA_UAU.7 When a user enters their password at the local console, the TOE does not echo any characters as they are entered. For remote session authentication, the TOE does not echo any characters as they are entered. FIA_X509_EXT.1/Rev The TOE uses X.509v3 certificates to support authentication for TLS connections. Certificate validity is performed when the remote TLS peer presents a certificate chain to the TOE and when certificates are imported into the TOE's trust store. The TSF determines the validity of certificates by ensuring that the certificate and the certificate path are valid in accordance with RFC 5280. The certificate path is validated by ensuring that all the CA certificates have the basicConstraints extension and the CA flag is set to TRUE and the certificate path must terminate with a trusted CA certificate. The TOE will also verify the extendedKeyUsage field of the TLS peer certificate contains the Server Authentication purpose. OCSP is not supported; therefore, the OCSP Signing purpose (id-kp 9 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.9) is trivially satisfied by the TOE CRL revocation checking is supported by the TOE. Revocation checking is performed on the leaf and intermediate certificate(s) when authenticating a certificate chain provided by the remote peer. There are no functional differences if a full certificate chain or only a leaf certificate is presented. FIA_X509_EXT.2 The TOE determines which certificate to use based upon the trustpoint configured. The instructions for configuring trustpoints is provided in CC Configuration Guide. In the event that a network connection cannot be established to verify the revocation status of certificate for an external peer the connection will be rejected. FMT_MOF./ManualUpdate FMT_MTD.1/CoreData FMT_MTD.1/CryptoKeys The TOE performs role-based authorization, using TOE platform authorization mechanisms, to grant access to the privileged and semi-privileged levels. For the purposes of this evaluation, the privileged level is equivalent to full administrative access to the CLI, which is the default access for IOS-XE privilege level 15; and the semi-privileged level equates to any privilege level that has a subset of the privileges assigned to level 15. Privilege levels 0 and 1 are defined by default and are customizable, while levels 2-14 are undefined by default and are also customizable. The term “Authorized Administrator” is used in this ST to refer to any user which has been assigned to a privilege level that is permitted to perform the relevant action; therefore, has the appropriate privileges to perform the requested functions. Therefore, semi-privileged administrators with only a subset of privileges may also manage and modify TOE data based on the privileges assigned. The TOE provides the ability for Security Administrators (a.k.a Authorized Administrators) to access TOE data, such as audit data, configuration data, security attributes, session thresholds, cryptographic keys, trust store, and updates. Each of the predefined and administratively configured privilege level has a set of permissions that will grant them access to the TOE data, though with some privilege levels, the access is Cisco Catalyst Industrial Ethernet 3100 (IE3100) Rugged Series Switches running IOS-XE 17.12 Common Criteria Security Target Page 48 of 53 Cisco Confidential TOE SFRs How the SFR is Met limited. TOE Administrators can control (generate/delete) SSH RSA Key Pairs by following the instructions in the CC Configuration Guide. The TOE does not provide automatic updates to the software version running on the TOE. The Security Administrators (a.k.a Authorized Administrators) can query the software version running on the TOE, and can initiate updates to (replacements of) software images. When software updates are made available by Cisco, the Authorized Administrators can obtain, verify the integrity of, and install those updates. Only the Security Administrators (a.k.a Authorized Administrators) can manage the TOE’s trust store and import or remove X509.v3 certificates. The warning and access banner may also be displayed prior to the identification and authentication of an Authorized Administrator. No administrative functionality is available prior to administrative login. Management functionality of the TOE is provided through the TOE CLI. FMT_SMF.1 The TOE provides all the capabilities necessary to securely manage the TOE. The Security Administrators (a.k.a Authorized Administrators) user can connect to the TOE using the CLI to perform these functions via SSHv2 secured connection, or at the local console. The specific management capabilities available from the TOE include; • Local and remote administration of the TOE and the services provided by the TOE via the TOE CLI, as described above; • The ability to manage the warning banner message and content which allows the Authorized Administrator the ability to define warning banner that is displayed prior to establishing a session (note this applies to the interactive (human) users; e.g. administrative users; • The ability to manage the time limits of session inactivity which allows the Authorized Administrator the ability to set and modify the inactivity time threshold; • The ability to configure the number of failed administrator logon attempts that will cause the account to be locked for an administrator specified time period; • The ability to update the IOS-XE software. The validity of the image is provided using SHA-512 published hash to verify the update prior to installing the update; • The ability to modify the behavior of the transmission of audit data to an external IT entity; • The ability to manage the cryptographic keys; • The ability to manage the cryptographic functionality which allows the Authorized Administrator the ability to identify and configure the algorithms used to provide protection of the data; • The ability to configure thresholds for SSH rekeying; • The ability to manage the trusted public key database”; • The ability to manage the TOE's trust store and designate X509.v3 certificates as trust anchors; • The ability to import the X.509v3 certificates and validate for use in authentication and secure connections; • The ability to configure and set the time clock. • The ability to configure the reference identifiers for peers, which is SAN: IPv4 address and SAN:FQDN identifier. FMT_SMR.2 The TOE maintains Authorizer Administrators that include privileged and semi-privileged administrator roles to administer the TOE locally and remotely. The TOE performs role-based authorization, using TOE platform authorization mechanisms, to grant access to the privileged and semi-privileged roles. For the purposes of this evaluation, the privileged role is equivalent to full administrative access to the CLI, which is the default access for IOS privilege level 15; and the semi-privileged role equates to any privilege level that has a subset of the privileges assigned to level 15. Privilege levels 0 and 1 are defined by default and are customizable, while levels 2-14 are undefined by default and are also customizable. Note: the levels are not theoretically hierarchical. The term “Authorized Administrator” is used in this ST to refer to any user which has been assigned to a privilege level that is permitted to perform the relevant action; therefore, has the appropriate privileges to perform the requested functions. Cisco Catalyst Industrial Ethernet 3100 (IE3100) Rugged Series Switches running IOS-XE 17.12 Common Criteria Security Target Page 49 of 53 Cisco Confidential TOE SFRs How the SFR is Met The privilege level determines the functions the user can perform; hence the Authorized Administrator with the appropriate privileges. The TOE can and shall be configured to authenticate all access to the command line interface using a username and password. The TOE supports both local administration via a directly connected console cable and remote administration via SSHv2 secure connection. FPT_SKP_EXT.1 and FPT_APW_EXT.1 The TOE is designed specifically to not disclose any keys stored in the TOE. The TOE stores all private keys in a secure directory that cannot be viewed or accessed, even by the Administrator. The TOE stores symmetric keys only in volatile memory. Only the Administrator may view the configuration file. The TOE is designed specifically to not disclose any passwords stored in the TOE. All passwords are stored using a SHA-2 hash. ‘Show’ commands display only the hashed password. The CC Configuration Guide instructs the Administrator to use the algorithm-type scrypt sub-command when passwords are created or updated. The scrypt is password type 9 and uses a SHA-2 hash. Refer to the CC Configuration Guide for command description and usage information. FPT_STM.1 The TOE provides a source of date and time information used in audit event timestamps. The clock function is reliant on the system clock provided by the underlying hardware. This date and time are used as the time stamp that is applied to TOE generated audit records and used to track inactivity of administrative sessions. The TOE relies upon date and time information for the following security functions: • To monitor local and remote interactive administrative sessions for inactivity (FTA_SSL_EXT.1, FTA_SSL.3); • Validating X.509 certificates to determine if a certificate has expired (FIA_X509_EXT.1/Rev); • To determine when SSH session keys have expired and to initiate a rekey (FCS_SSHS_EXT.1); • To provide accurate timestamps in audit records (FAU_GEN.1.2). FPT_TUD_EXT.1 Authorized Administrator can query the software version running on the TOE and can initiate updates to (replacements of) software images. The software version information for the TOE specific image can be displayed using the following commands. The administrator in privileged EXEC mode enters: Switch# show version (this displays information about the Cisco IOS software version running on the TOE the ROM Monitor and Bootflash software versions, and the hardware configuration, including the amount of system memory When updates are made available by Cisco, an Authorized Administrator can obtain and install those updates. The Authorized Administrator can download the approved image file from Cisco.com onto a trusted computer system for usage in the trusted update functionality. Software images are available from Cisco.com at the following: https://software.cisco.com/download/home. Published hash mechanisms are used to verify software/firmware update files (to ensure they have not been modified from the originals distributed by Cisco) before they are used to update the TOE. The process associated with verifying the published hash requires: 1) Use a hash generation utility to compute a SHA-512 hash; 2) Compare the result with the SHA-512 hash associated with the image at Cisco Software Central; and 3) If the hash values match, the administrator may proceed with installing the image. If the hash values do not match the administrator must not install the image and should contact Cisco Technical Support. Once the image is loaded into bootflash, the Authorized Administrator can display information related to software authenticity for a specific image file, using the verify command. The image name and hash can be verified on the [TOE] download page on Cisco.com (https://software.cisco.com/download/home/286320755/type/282046477/release/Dublin-17.12.2). If the there is an issue with the verification of the SHA512 checksum, the software should not be installed and contact Cisco for assistance. Cisco Catalyst Industrial Ethernet 3100 (IE3100) Rugged Series Switches running IOS-XE 17.12 Common Criteria Security Target Page 50 of 53 Cisco Confidential TOE SFRs How the SFR is Met Once the Authorized Administrator has verified the TOE image, the file can be installed. For full details, refer to the (CC Configuration Guide for assistance. FPT_TST_EXT.1 The TOE runs a suite of self-tests during initial start-up to verify correct operation of the IOS Common Cryptographic Module, Rel5a.and the CiscoSSL FOM 7.2a Cryptographic Module. All ports are blocked from moving to forwarding state during the POST. If all components of all modules pass the POST, the system is placed in FIPS PASS state and ports are allowed to forward data traffic. If any of the tests fail, a message is displayed to the local console and the TOE component will automatically reboot. These tests include: AES Known Answer Test: For the encrypt test, a known key is used to encrypt a known plain text value resulting in an encrypted value. This encrypted value is compared to a known encrypted value. If the encrypted texts match, the test passes; otherwise, the test fails. The decrypt test is just the opposite. In this test a known key is used to decrypt a known encrypted value. The resulting plaintext value is compared to a known plaintext value. If the decrypted texts match, the test passes; otherwise, the test fails. RSA Signature Known Answer Test (both signature/verification): This test takes a known plaintext value and Private/Public key pair and used the public key to encrypt the data. This value is compared to a known encrypted value. If the encrypted values, the test passes; otherwise, the test fails. The encrypted data is then decrypted using the private key. This value is compared to the original plaintext value. If the decrypted values match, the test passes; otherwise, the test fails. RNG/DRBG Known Answer Test: For this test, known seed values are provided to the DRBG implementation. The DRBG uses these values to generate random bits. These random bits are compared to known random bits. If the random bits match, the test passes; otherwise, the test fails. HMAC Known Answer Test: For each of the hash values listed, the HMAC implementation is fed known plaintext data and a known key. These values are used to generate a MAC. This MAC is compared to a known MAC. If the MAC values match, the test passes; otherwise, the test fails. Software Integrity Test: The Software Integrity Test uses HMAC-SHA256 (IC2M) and HMAC-SHA-1 (CiscoSSL FOM) verification to confirm the cryptographic module has maintained its integrity. The Software Integrity Test is run automatically when the module is loaded. SHA-1/256/384/512 Known Answer Test: For each of the values listed, the SHA implementation is fed known data and a key. These values are used to generate a hash. This hash is compared to a known value. If the hash values match, the test passes; otherwise, the test fails. If any component reports failure for the POST, the system crashes. Appropriate information is displayed to the local console. All ports are blocked during the POST. If all components pass the POST, the system is placed in FIPS PASS state and ports can forward data traffic. If any of the tests fail, a message is displayed to the local console and the TOE component will automatically reboot. If an error occurs during the self-test, a SELF_TEST_FAILURE system log is generated. Example Error Message: %CRYPTO-0-SELF_TEST_FAILURE: Crypto algorithms self-test failed (SHA hashing) These tests are sufficient to verify that the correct version of the TOE software is running as well as that the cryptographic operations are all performing as expected because any deviation in the TSF behaviour will be identified by the failure of a self-test. Cisco Catalyst Industrial Ethernet 3100 (IE3100) Rugged Series Switches running IOS-XE 17.12 Common Criteria Security Target Page 51 of 53 Cisco Confidential TOE SFRs How the SFR is Met FTA_SSL_EXT.1 and FTA_SSL.3 An Authorized Administrator can configure maximum inactivity times individually for both local and remote administrative sessions through the use of the “exec-timeout” setting applied to the console and virtual terminal (vty) lines. The configuration of the vty lines sets the configuration for the remote console access. The line console settings are not immediately activated for the current session. The current line console session must be exited. When the user logs back in, the inactivity timer will be activated for the new session. If a local user session is inactive for a configured period of time, the session will be terminated and will require re-identification and authentication to login. If a remote user session is inactive for a configured period of time, the session will be terminated and will require re- identification and authentication to establish a new session. The allowable inactivity timeout range is from <0-35791> minutes. A session (local or remote) that is inactive (i.e., no commands issuing from the local or remote client) for the defined timeout value will be terminated. FTA_SSL.4 An Authorized Administrator is able to exit out of both local and remote administrative sessions by issuing either the ‘exit’ or `logout` command. FTA_TAB.1 Authorized administrators define a custom login banner that will be displayed at the CLI for both local and remote access configurations prior to allowing Authorized Administrator access through those interfaces. A local console includes any IT Environment Console that is directly connected to the TOE via the Serial Console Port and is used by the TOE administrator to support TOE administration. Whereas a remote console is one that includes any IT Environment Management workstation with a SSH client installed that is used by the TOE administrator to support TOE administration through SSH protected channels. Any SSH client that supports SSHv2 may be used. FTP_ITC.1 The TOE protects communication with a remote audit server using TLS. The TOE protects communications with the syslog server using keyed hash as defined in FCS_COP.1.1/keyedhash and cryptographic hashing functions FCS_COP.1.1/hash. This protects the data from modification of data by hashing that verify that data has not been modified in transit. In addition, encryption of the data as defined in FCS_COP.1.1/DataEncryption is provided to ensure the data is not disclosed in transit. The TSF allows the TOE, or the syslog server to initiate communication via the trusted channel. FTP_TRP.1/Admin All remote administrative communications take place over a secure encrypted SSHv2 session. The SSHv2 session is encrypted using AES encryption. The remote users (Authorized Administrators) are able to initiate SSHv2 communications with the TOE. Cisco Catalyst Industrial Ethernet 3100 (IE3100) Rugged Series Switches running IOS-XE 17.12 Common Criteria Security Target Page 52 of 53 Cisco Confidential 7 ANNEX A: KEY ZEROIZATION 7.1 Key Zeroization The following table describes the key zeroization referenced by FCS_CKM.4 provided by the TOE. As described in the table below, the TOE zeroizes all secrets, keys, and associated values when they are no longer required. The process in which the TOE zeroizes, meets FIPS 140 validation. Table 21: TOE Key Zeroization Key Description Storage Location Zeroization Method SSH Session Key Used to encrypt SSH traffic SDRAM in plaintext Overwritten automatically with 0x00 when the SSH trusted channel is no longer in use. SSH Session keyed hash Used for SSH traffic integrity verification SDRAM in plaintext Overwritten automatically with 0x00 when the SSH trusted channel is no longer in use. SSH Private Key Used in establishing a secure SSH session NVRAM in plaintext Overwritten with 0x00 by using the following command: #crypto key zeroize