BSI-DSZ-CC-0428-2008
for
IBM Tivoli Directory Server 6.1
from
IBM Corporation
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 ZS-01-01-F-326 V4.2
BSI-DSZ-CC-0428-2008
IBM Tivoli Directory Server 6.1
from IBM Corporation
Functionality: Common Criteria Part 2 conformant
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant EAL 4
augmented by ALC_FLR.1 - Basic flaw remediation
Common Criteria
Arrangement
The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an accredited and licensed / approved
evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.3 extended by CEM
supplementation “ALC_FLR – Flaw remediation”, Version 2.3, August 2005 for conformance to the Common
Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 2.3 (ISO/IEC 15408:2005).
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration
and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme of the
German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the
evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any
other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by the
Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 22. April 2008
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Irmela Ruhrmann L.S.
Head of division
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582 -0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0428-2008
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IV
BSI-DSZ-CC-0428-2008 Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
1
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of 17
December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
V
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0428-2008
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VI
Contents
A Certification 1
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure 1
2 Recognition Agreements 1
2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC - Certificates 1
2.2 International Recognition of CC - Certificates 2
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification 2
4 Validity of the certification result 2
5 Publication 3
B Certification Results 4
1 Executive Summary 5
2 Identification of the TOE 10
3 Security Policy 11
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 12
4.1 Usage Assumptions 12
4.2 Environmental assumptions 12
4.3 Clarification of Scope 12
5 Architectural Information 14
6 Documentation 15
7 IT Product Testing 16
7.1 Test Coverage/Test Depth 16
7.2 Summary of Evaluator Testing Effort 16
8 Evaluated Configuration 18
9 Results of the Evaluation 20
9.1 CC specific results 20
9.2 Results of cryptographic assessment 20
10 Obligations and notes for the usage of the TOE 21
11 Security Target 22
12 Definitions 23
12.1 Acronyms 23
12.2 Glossary 23
13 Bibliography 25
13.1 User Guidance Documents 25
C Excerpts from the Criteria 27
D Annexes 35
The parts A to D contain the pages 1 to 36.
BSI-DSZ-CC-0428-2008 Certification Report
A Certification
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
• BSIG2
• BSI Certification Ordinance3
• BSI Schedule of Costs4
• Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
• DIN EN 45011 standard
• BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
• Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 2.3 (ISO/IEC 15408:2005)5
• Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.3
• BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS)
• Advice from the Certification Body on methodology for assurance components above
EAL4 (AIS 34)
2 Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC - Certificates
The SOGIS-Agreement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on ITSEC became
effective on 3 March 1998.
This agreement was signed by the national bodies of Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United
Kingdom. This agreement on the mutual recognition of IT security certificates was
extended to include certificates based on the CC for all evaluation levels (EAL 1 – EAL 7).
The German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) recognises certificates issued by
the national certification bodies of France and the United Kingdom within the terms of this
Agreement.
2
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of 17
December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for Information Security
(BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 07 July 1992, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 10 May 2006 in the Bundesanzeiger dated 19
May 2006, p. 3730
1
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0428-2008
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement.
2.2 International Recognition of CC - Certificates
An arrangement (Common Criteria Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of certificates
based on the CC evaluation assurance levels up to and including EAL 4 has been signed
in May 2000 (CC-MRA). It includes also the recognition of Protection Profiles based on the
CC.
As of February 2007 the arrangement has been signed by the national bodies of: Australia,
Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary,
India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,
Republic of Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States of
America. The current list of signatory nations resp. approved certification schemes can be
seen on the web site: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
The Common Criteria Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates that this
certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement.
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product IBM Tivoli Directory Server 6.1 has undergone the certification procedure at
BSI. This is a re-certification based on BSI-DSZ-CC-0283-2006. Specific results from the
evaluation process BSI-DSZ-CC-0283-2006 were re-used.
The evaluation of the product IBM Tivoli Directory Server 6.1 was conducted by atsec
information security GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 22. April 2008. The atsec
information security GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)6
recognised by the certification
body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: IBM Corporation
The product was developed by: IBM Corporation
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
4 Validity of the certification result
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
• all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
• the product is operated in the environment described, where specified in the following
report and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance levels and the confirmed strength of functions, please
refer to the excerpts from the criteria at the end of the Certification Report.
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
2
BSI-DSZ-CC-0428-2008 Certification Report
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security
Target at the date of certification. As attack methods may evolve over time, the resistance
of the certified version of the product against new attack methods can be re-assessed if
required and the sponsor applies for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme. It is recommended to
perform a re-assessment on a regular basis.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
5 Publication
The productIBM Tivoli Directory Server 6.1 has been included in the BSI list of the certified
products, which is published regularly (see also Internet: http:// www.bsi.bund.de) and [5].
Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer7
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
7
IBM Corporation
11501 Burnet Road
Internal mail drop 9015F000
Austin TX 78758
USA
3
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0428-2008
B Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
• the security target of the sponsor for the target of evaluation,
• the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
• complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
4
BSI-DSZ-CC-0428-2008 Certification Report
1 Executive Summary
The target of evaluation is the Tivoli Directory Server Version 6.1.
Tivoli Directory Server version 6.1 (TDS) is an implementation of Lightweight Directory
Access Protocol (LDAP), which is compliant with the Internet Engineering Task Force
(IETF) LDAP Version 2 specifications, i. e. RFC 1777 and LDAP Version 3 specifications,
i.e. RFC 2251-2256. The server is a software only product and can be installed and
operated on a variety of hardware/software platforms.
LDAP is essentially a specialized database where the update operation is less frequent
and dedicated to the common goal within the enterprise on consolidating and unifying the
management of identity. TDS is built for identity management with role support,
finegrained access control and entry ownership. It provides the foundation for improved
security, rapid development and deployment of Web applications. Using the power of the
IBM DB2 Universal Database as back end data store, TDS provides high performance,
reliability and stability in an enterprise or e-business. As the central repository for data
within an enterprise, it is a powerful, secure and standards compliant enterprise directory
for corporate intranets and the Internet.
The Tivoli Directory Server (TDS) is a software product only, delivered over the Internet as
a package including
● the TOE (the LDAP server and the administration daemon executables),
● user and administrative tools,
● a WebSphere HTTP server and
● a DB2 database.
Note: Although delivered together with the TOE, the user and administrator tools, the
HTTP server and the DB2 database are all excluded from the TOE and are considered
part of the TOE environment.
The TOE environment must also include applications that are not delivered with the TDS
product, but are used as unprivileged tools, for example the Internet Explorer or Firefox
browser needed to administrate the TOE via the web GUI, or the Adobe Acrobat Reader to
access the supplied online documentation.
Directory clients and servers
Directories are usually accessed using the client-server model of communication. The
client and server processes might or might not be on the same machine. A server is
capable of serving many clients. An application that wants to read or write information in a
directory does not access the directory directly. Instead, it calls a function or application
programming interface (API) that causes a message to be sent to another process. This
second process accesses the information in the directory on behalf of the requesting
application. The results of the read or write are then returned to the requesting application.
An API defines the programming interface a particular programming language uses to
access a service. The format and contents of the messages exchanged between client
and server must adhere to an agreed upon protocol. LDAP defines a message protocol
used by directory clients and directory servers. There is also an associated LDAP API for
the C language and ways to access the directory from a Java application using the Java
Naming and Directory Interface (JNDI).
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0428-2008
In order to improve performance and availability, directories may be replicated. This
means that one master directory may be replicated to a number of copies allowing
improved availability to read accesses. Any changes made to the master affecting the
replicas, will be transmitted out to them. A user accessing a server may then either go to
the master or to any of the replicas.
Replication is enabled as replication agreements between a server and a client. A
replication agreement is part of the directory tree of the master. Access to the replication
agreements and associated replication configuration information in the directory is limited.
This has been restricted in the evaluated configuration to the security roles of Primary
Directory Administrator, Local Administrative Group Members (with an administrative role
of Directory Data Administrator or Replication Administrator or Server Configuration Group
Member), and Master Server DN. Only these security roles are able to set up and change
replication agreements.
In the evaluated configuration, there must not be more than one master for a given entry at
any particular point in time. Since gateway servers only serve a purpose in a configuration
including more than one concurrently updateable master server they are not meaningful in
an evaluated configuration. Conflict resolution is not included in the TOE. Since an entry
can only be updated on one server at any point in time, there should never be any
replication conflicts.
The TOE provides the following evaluated security functionality:
Identification and authentication
Identification and authentication are used to determine the identity of the LDAP clients;
that is, verifying that users are who they say they are. A user name and password is a
basic authentication scheme. This user identity is used for determining access rights and
for user accountability. The administrator can manage users, set passwords for users, and
place restrictions on user-selected passwords by specifying rules in the password policy
managed by the administrator. Both end users and administrators are subject to the
password policy.
Access control
After users are authenticated, it must be determined whether they have authorization or
permission to perform the requested operation on the specific object. Authorization is often
based on access control lists (ACLs). An ACL is a list of authorizations that can be
attached to objects and attributes in the directory. An ACL lists what type of access each
user or a group of users is allowed or denied. To make ACLs shorter and more
manageable, users with the same access rights are often put into groups. The directory
administrator can manage access control by specifying the access rights to objects for
individual users or groups.
Auditing
The Tivoli Directory Server can perform auditing of security-relevant events, such as user
authentication and modification to the directory tree. The audit function provides a means
for accountability by generating audit records containing the time, user identity, and
additional information about the operation. The behaviour of the audit function, such as
selection of auditable events, as well as audit review and clearing of audit files, is
managed by the directory administrator.
Management
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0428-2008 Certification Report
The Tivoli Directory Server supports the roles of Primary Directory Administrator, Local
Administrative Group Members, Global Administrative Group Members, Master DN and
LDAP User, allowing the Primary Directory Administrator to manage the functions for
identification and authentication, authorization and audit. The Local Administrative Group
Members and the Global Administrative Group Members have a well-defined sub-set of
the rights of the Primary Directory Administrator. Both the Primary Directory Administrator,
the Local Administrative Group Members, and the Global Administrative Group Members
can manage the users and user attributes. The master server DN is a role used for
replication between LDAP servers. Finally, LDAP Users do not have any administrative
rights.
Reference mediation
The Tivoli Directory Server is designed that all security policy enforcement functions are
invoked and must succeed before any function is allowed to proceed. This means that any
request for access to a directory entry is checked for access according to the rules defined
before access is granted.
To ensure a secure usage, a set of guidance documents is provided together with TDS.
Details can be found in chapter 6 of this report.
The TOE can use a variety of different hardware and operating system platforms to
operate on. For the operating systems used during the evaluation of the TOE please refer
to chapter 2 and 7. Please note that no hardware is provided with the TOE.
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is not based on a certified
Protection Profile.
The TOE security assurance requirements are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 4
augmented augmented by ALC_FLR.1.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6], chapter 5.1. They are all selected from Common Criteria Part 2. Thus
the TOE is CC part 2 conformant.
The Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the IT-Environment of the TOE
are outlined in the Security Target [6], chapter 5.2.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functions:
TOE Security Function Addressed issue
F.AUDIT Audit Generation
ACCESS_CONTROL Access control to particular LDAP operations
F.I&A Identification & authentication of TOE user
F.MANAGEMENT Management of the behaviour of Roles, authentication functionality,
authorisation on directory entries and audit functionality
F.REF_MEDIATION Non-bypassability of the TSF
Table 1: TOE Security Functions
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 6.1.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0428-2008
The claimed TOE’s strength of functions 'medium' (SOF-medium) for specific functions as
indicated in the Security Target [6], chapter 1.5 and 8.3.2 is confirmed.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6], chapter 3.2.
Based on these assets the security environment is defined in terms of assumptions,
threats and policies. This is outlined in the Security Target [6], chapter 3.
The Security Target defines six different platforms as configuration requirements for
running the TOE:
● Microsoft Windows Server 2003 R2 Enterprise Edition
● IBM AIX 5.3
● Sun Solaris 10
● HP-UX 11i v2
● Red Hat Advanced Server 5.0
● SuSE Linux Enterprise Server 10
No explicit restrictions on the usable hardware were made in the Security Target [6]. For
details refer to chapter 8.
The following constraints concerning the operating environment are made in the Security
Target. They are based on the assumptions defined in the ST [6], chapter 3.1 and are
summarised in the following table:
Assumption Name Summary
A.PHYSICAL The TOE is operated in a physically secure environment.
A.ADMIN The TOE Administrators (i.e. the Primary Directory Administrator, the Local
Administrative Group Members, and the Global Administrative Group Members) are
trustworthy to perform discretionary actions in accordance with security policies and
not to interfere with the abstract machine, making sure that the TOE is competently
administered.
A.TOEENV The TOE Environment Administrators are trustworthy to perform discretionary
actions in accordance with security policies, assuring that the TOE environment is
competently installed and administered.
A.COMM It is assumed that any communication links between the TOE and external systems
are protected against unauthorized modification and disclosure of communication
data.
A.COOP Authorized LDAP Users possess the necessary authorization to access at least
some of the information managed by the TOE and are expected to act in a
cooperating manner in a benign environment.
A.ROUTE It is assumed that in a replicated environment, all the update requests are made to
the master server only. It is also assumed that all replicas are under the same
administration and the protection in the TOE environment is as for the TOE (master
server).
A.TIME It is assumed that a reliable time function is provided by the TOE environment to
support the generation of audit records.
A.ENCRYPT It is assumed that the TOE environment provides one-way encryption and random
8
BSI-DSZ-CC-0428-2008 Certification Report
Assumption Name Summary
number generation functions for the TOE.
Table 2: Assumptions on the TOE environment
The Certification Results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the Certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
9
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0428-2008
2 Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
IBM Tivoli Directory Server 6.1
The Tivoli Directory Server is a software product only, delivered over the Internet (secure
download procedure offered by IBM has to be used) as a package including:
No Type Identifier Release Form of
Delivery
TOE/
Not TOE
1 SW - LDAP Base Server and LDAP Server Administration
Daemon Package
6.1 Download TOE
2 SW – LDAP Client Packages
– Web Administration Package
– LDAP Proxy Server Package
– LDAP RDBM Server Package
6.1 Download Not TOE
Table 3: Deliverables of the TOE
10
BSI-DSZ-CC-0428-2008 Certification Report
3 Security Policy
The security policy is expressed by the set of security functional requirements and
implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues:
The TOE is an implementation of the Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP). The
main purpose of the TOE is to provide identification and authentication, access control and
audit functionality. This is supplemented by management and non-bypassability.
11
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0428-2008
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of threats and
organisational security policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE environment. The following topics are
of relevance.
4.1 Usage Assumptions
Based on personnel assumptions defined in the ST [6] the following usage conditions
exist:
● The Administrators of the TOE are trustworthy to perform discretionary actions in
accordance with security policies and not to interfere with the abstract machine
(A.ADMIN). Whereas abstract machine means the hardware and operating system
software the TOE runs on.
● The TOE Environment Administrators are trustworthy to perform discretionary
actions in accordance with security policies, assuring that the TOE environment is
competently installed and administered (A.TOEENV).
● Authorised users are expected to act in a co-operating manner in a benign
environment (A.COOP).
For a detailed description of the usage assumptions refer to the Security Target [6],
especially chapter 3.1.
4.2 Environmental assumptions
The following assumptions about physical and connectivity aspects defined by the Security
Target have to be met (refer to Security Target [6], chapter 3.1):
● The TOE is operated in a physically secure environment (A.PHYSICAL).
● Communication links between TOE and external systems are protected against
modification and disclosure of transmitted data (A.COMM).
● In a replicated environment all the update requests are made to the master server
only. Furthermore it is assumed that all replicas are under the same administration
and the protection in the TOE environment as for the master server (A.ROUTE).
● A reliable time function is provided by the environment (A.TIME).
Please consider also the requirements for the evaluated configuration specified in chapter
8 of this report.
4.3 Clarification of Scope
The threats listed below must be countered in order to support the TOE security
capabilities but are either (i) not addressed by, or (ii) only partly addressed by the TOE.
These threats must therefore be addressed in conjunction with the operating environment.
Please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 3.2.2 and chapter 8.1 for more details.
12
BSI-DSZ-CC-0428-2008 Certification Report
Threat name Summary
TE.CRASH Human error or a failure of software, hardware, power supply, or an accidental
event may cause an abrupt interruption to the TOE operation, resulting in loss or
corruption of data.
TE.SOPHISTICATED An unauthorised individual may gain access to TOE resources or information by
using sophisticated technical attack, using IT security-defeating tools applied to
the TOE or the underlying system components.
TE.PASS An attacker may bypass the TOE to access resources or resources protected by
the TOE by attacking the underlying operating system or database, in order to
gain access to TOE resources and information.
Table 4: Threats addressed by the operating environment
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0428-2008
5 Architectural Information
Major structural units of the TOE
The TOE consists of two components: the directory server component and the
administration daemon. User clients are connecting both to the LDAP server and to the
administration daemon, using the LDAP protocol, but using different port numbers. The
directory server is providing the LDAP functionality to users and administrators, while the
administration daemon is only used by the administrator for starting, stopping and querying
the status of the Tivoli Directory Server. Figure 1 below provides a more detailed overview
of the TOE:
Figure 1: Tivoli Directory Architecture and TOE Boundary
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0428-2008 Certification Report
6 Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 3 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed. The following documentation is provided with the product
by the developer to the customer:
[AdminGuide] IBM Tivoli Directory Server Version 6.1, Administration Guide,
GC32-1564-00, 02.04.2008
[C4Guide] IBM Tivoli Directory Server Version 6.1, Common Criteria Guide,
GC32-1570-00, 02.04.2008
[CommandRef] IBM Tivoli Directory Server Version 6.1, Command Reference,
SC23-7834-00, 02.04.2008
[InstGuide] IBM Tivoli Directory Server Version 6.1, Installation and
Configuration Guide, GC32-1560-00, 02.04.2008
[MsgsGuide] IBM Tivoli Directory Server Version 6.1, Messages Guide
GC32-1567-00, 24.08.2007
[New] IBM Tivoli Directory Server Version 6.1, What's New for This
Release, SC23-6539-00, 24.08.2007
[PDGuide] IBM Tivoli Directory Server Version 6.1, Problem Determination
Guide, GC32-1568-00, 02.04.2008
[PlugIn] IBM Tivoli Directory Server Version 6.1, Server Plug-ins Reference,
GC32-1565-00, 24.08.2007
[ProgRef] IBM Tivoli Directory Server Version 6.1, Programming Reference,
SC23-7836-00, 02.04.2008
[QuickStart] IBM Tivoli Directory Server Version 6.1, Quick Start Guide,
GI11-8172-00, 24.08.2007
[SysReq] IBM Tivoli Directory Server Version 6.1, System Requirements,
SC23-7835-00, 24.08.2007
[TuningGuide] IBM Tivoli Directory Server Version 6.1, Performance Tuning and
Capacity Planning Guide , SC23-6540-00, 24.08.2007
Table 5: Supporting documents
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0428-2008
7 IT Product Testing
The Security Target defines six different platforms for running the TOE:
● Microsoft Windows Server 2003 R2 Enterprise Edition
● IBM AIX 5.3
● Sun Solaris 10
● HP-UX 11i v2
● Red Hat Advanced Server 5.0
● SuSE Linux Enterprise Server 10
Developer tests have been performed on all platforms, whereas evaluator tests were
executed on a sampled subset of those platforms.
Report on the Developer Testing Effort
For details on the developer tests that go beyond the summary presented here, please
refer to the Single Evaluation Report on Testing [ETE]. All developer tests were performed
on all the platforms listed above. Due to the identical code base for the two Linux versions
only one Linux platform was tested. Each platform was set up in accordance with the
Security Target [6] and all the relevant guidance.
Testing Results
The developer testing was performed successfully by the developer on all platforms
comprising the evaluated configuration of the TOE as listed above. All actual test results
did match the expected results for the respective test case as documented in the
developer test documentation.
7.1 Test Coverage/Test Depth
A complete coverage was achieved for all the TOE security functions as provided by the
developer. The security functionality of the TOE as well as all TSFIs as detailed in the
Functional Specification were completely covered by those tests.
The developer tests provide for a sufficient depth as required by EAL4. The test areas
provided by the developer cover the subsystems as defined in the high-level design
documentation of the TOE as well as their internal interfaces, whereas the single test
cases be applicable for the lowlevel design as well, thus exceeding the scope of this
evaluation.
7.2 Summary of Evaluator Testing Effort
The evaluation lab decided to devise independent evaluator tests in order to gain
confidence on the behaviour of security functionality of the TOE and to check for
exploitability of identified potential vulnerabilities.
Based upon the test cases provided by the developer and on the observation from the
vulnerability analysis, the evaluation lab designed test cases, each either probing for
potential vulnerabilities or extending the scope of an available developer test case to an
aspect of the tested security function that the evaluator considered had not been covered
appropriately by developer tests.
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The tests of the evaluation lab were performed as planned using the selected platforms
listed above. All actual test results obtained matched the expected results as documented
in the evaluator test descriptions.
Report on the Evaluator Penetration Testing
Within the vulnerability analysis, the evaluator identified potential vulnerabilities and
decided to determine their potential of being exploited by devising additional penetration
tests probing for ways a potential attacker might circumvent security functions. Those
penetration tests were performed as part of the evaluator independent testing. These tests
did not reveal any exploitable vulnerability.
Evaluator Penetration Testing
By performing the penetration tests as part of the independent evaluator testing, the
evaluator was able to clarify open issues with respect to his analysis of potential
vulnerabilities. All penetration tests passed, i.e. it could be positively verified by the
evaluator that the TOE behaved as expected not providing for potential ways to breach its
security functionality. The actual test results obtained by the evaluator matched the
expected test results as documented in the evaluator test descriptions.
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8 Evaluated Configuration
This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE:
IBM Tivoli Directory Server 6.1
The IBM Tivoli Directory Server is a software product only, delivered over the Internet
(secure download procedure offered by IBM has to be used) as a package including:
Component TOE / Not TOE
IBM Tivoli Directory Server 6.1 package
The LDAP daemon executable and Administration daemon executable.
TOE
Installation and Configuration Tools and GSKit, Version 7.0.3.30 (SSL package
only)
Not TOE
User and administrative tools (like the IBM Directory Server Client SDK 6.1 or the
Web Administration Tool).
Not TOE
Java Client (Java runtime version 1.5 and Java utilities) Not TOE
A WebSphere Application server (IBM WebSphere Application Server Express,
Version 6.1.0.7).
Not TOE
An IBM DB2 database. Not TOE
Table 6: Product/ TOE components
Note: Although delivered together with the TOE, the user and administrator tools, the
WebSphere Application server and the DB2 database as well as GSKit, Installation and
Configuration Tools are all excluded from the TOE. They are considered to be part of the
environment. The TOE is the LDAP server and the administration daemon
executables only.
The TOE environment can also include applications that are not delivered with the IBM
Tivoli Directory Server, but are used as unprivileged tools, for example the web browser
that may be used to administrate the TOE or the Adobe Acrobat Reader to access the
supplied online documentation.
To install and configure the TOE in a certification conformant configuration the user has to
follow the guidance documentation as listed in chapter 6. The Security Guide [9] provides
guidance on how to configure the TOE in accordance with the Security Target [6]. For the
secure operation of the TOE document [9] has to be followed.
According to the Security Target, the TOE can be run on
● Microsoft Windows Server 2003 R2 Enterprise Edition
● IBM AIX 5.3
● Sun Solaris 10
● HP-UX 11i v2
● Red Hat Advanced Server 5.0
● SuSE Linux Enterprise Server 10
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No explicit restrictions on the usable hardware were made in the Security Target [6]. The
Administrators of the TOE and its environment are seen as trustworthy to perform
discretionary actions in accordance with security policies. The TOE and its environment is
competently installed and administered. Authorised users are expected to act in a co-
operating manner in a benign environment.
The TOE is operated in a physically secure environment. Communication links (between
the TOE and external systems) are protected against modification and disclosure of
transmitted data. A reliable time is provided by the TOE environment.
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9 Results of the Evaluation
9.1 CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR), [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The evaluation methodology CEM [2] was used. It was supplemented by the methodology
for “ALC_FLR – Flaw remediation”, Version 2.3, August 2005.
The verdicts for the CC, Part 3 assurance components (according to EAL4 augmented by
ALC_FLR.1 – Basic flaw remediation and the class ASE for the Security Target evaluation)
are summarised in the following table.
• All components of the EAL 4 augmented package as defined in the CC (see also part C
of this report)
• The components ALC_FLR.1 augmented for this TOE evaluation.
This is a re-certification based on BSI-DSZ-CC-0283-2006. For this evaluation specific
results from the evaluation process based on BSI-DSZ-CC-0283-2006 were re-used. In
comparance to the former certificate the Level of Assurance has been increased and new
functionality was subject to analysis (refer to the ST [6] for details). The focus of this re-
evaluation was on the introduction of administrative roles, to allow for more specific
administrative roles. Additionally features introduced are new interfaces to the server
through extended operations, controls and environment variables. The encrypted attributes
feature allows administrators the ability to add an additional layer of security to the data.
The evaluation has confirmed:
• for the functionality: Common Criteria Part 2 conformant
• for the assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant EAL 4 augmented by
ALC_FLR.1 - Basic flaw remediation
• The following TOE Security Functions fulfil the claimed Strength of Function : medium
FIA_SOS.1 Verification of secrets
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the IBM Tivoli Directory Server 6.1 IBM
Tivoli Directory Server 6.1 as outlined in chapter 2 and 8 of this report.
For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production environment see
annex B in part D of this report.
The validity can be extended to new versions and releases of the product, provided the
sponsor applies for re-certification or assurance continuity of the modified product, in
accordance with the procedural requirements and the evaluation of the modified product
does not reveal any security deficiencies.
9.2 Results of cryptographic assessment
The TOE does not include cryptoalgorithms. Thus, no such mechanisms were part of the
assessment.
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10 Obligations and notes for the usage of the TOE
The operational documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the
usage of the TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered.
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11 Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the security target [6] of the target of evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report.
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12 Definitions
12.1 Acronyms
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
PP Protection Profile
SF Security Function
SFP Security Function Policy
SOF Strength of Function
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSC TSF Scope of Control
TSF TOE Security Functions
TSP TOE Security Policy
12.2 Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more assurance component(s) from CC Part 3 to
an EAL or assurance package.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in part 2
and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the CC.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - An entity within the TSC that contains or receives information and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Protection Profile - An implementation-independent set of security requirements for a
category of TOEs that meet specific consumer needs.
Security Function - A part or parts of the TOE that have to be relied upon for enforcing a
closely related subset of the rules from the TSP.
Security Target - A set of security requirements and specifications to be used as the
basis for evaluation of an identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
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Strength of Function - A qualification of a TOE security function expressing the minimum
efforts assumed necessary to defeat its expected security behaviour by directly attacking
its underlying security mechanisms.
SOF-basic - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that the function
provides adequate protection against casual breach of TOE security by attackers
possessing a low attack potential.
SOF-medium - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that the
function provides adequate protection against straightforward or intentional breach of TOE
security by attackers possessing a moderate attack potential.
SOF-high - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that the function
provides adequate protection against deliberately planned or organised breach of TOE
security by attackers possessing a high attack potential.
Subject - An entity within the TSC that causes operations to be performed.
Target of Evaluation - An IT product or system and its associated administrator and user
guidance documentation that is the subject of an evaluation.
TOE Security Functions - A set consisting of all hardware, software, and firmware of the
TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the TSP.
TOE Security Policy - A set of rules that regulate how assets are managed, protected
and distributed within a TOE.
TSF Scope of Control - The set of interactions that can occur with or within a TOE and
are subject to the rules of the TSP.
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13 Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 2.3, August 2005
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
(CEM), Evaluation Methodology, Version 2.3, August 2005
[3] BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE.
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148, BSI 7149), periodically updated list
published also on the BSI Web-site
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0428, Version 1.9.9, 2008-04-02, IBM Tivoli Directory
Server Version 6.1, IBM Corporation
[7] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 3, 2008-04-15, atsec information security
GmbH (confidential document)
13.1 User Guidance Documents
[8] IBM Tivoli Directory Server Version 6.1, Administration Guide, GC32-1564-00,
02.04.2008
[9] IBM Tivoli Directory Server Version 6.1, Common Criteria Guide, GC32-1570-00,
02.04.2008
[10] IBM Tivoli Directory Server Version 6.1, Command Reference, SC23-7834-000,
2.04.2008
[11] IBM Tivoli Directory Server Version 6.1, Installation and Configuration Guide,
GC32-1560-00, 02.04.2008
[12] IBM Tivoli Directory Server Version 6.1, Messages Guide GC32-1567-00,
24.08.2007
[13] IBM Tivoli Directory Server Version 6.1, What's New for This Release,
SC23-6539-00, 24.08.2007
[14] IBM Tivoli Directory Server Version 6.1, Problem Determination Guide,
GC32-1568-00, 02.04.2008
[15] IBM Tivoli Directory Server Version 6.1, Server Plug-ins Reference, GC32-1565-00
[16] IBM Tivoli Directory Server Version 6.1, Programming Reference, SC23-7836-00,
02.04.2008
[17] IBM Tivoli Directory Server Version 6.1, Quick Start Guide, GI11-8172-00,
24.08.2007
[18] IBM Tivoli Directory Server Version 6.1, System Requirements, SC23-7835-00,
24.08.2007
[19] IBM Tivoli Directory Server Version 6.1, Performance Tuning and Capacity Planning
Guide , SC23-6540-00, 24.08.2007
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0428-2008 Certification Report
C Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part1:
Conformance results (chapter 7.4)
„The conformance result indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is met
by a TOE or PP that passes its evaluation. This conformance result is presented with
respect to CC Part 2 (functional requirements), CC Part 3 (assurance requirements) and, if
applicable, to a pre-defined set of requirements (e.g., EAL, Protection Profile).
The conformance result consists of one of the following:
– CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or TOE is CC Part 2 conformant if the functional
requirements are based only upon functional components in CC Part 2.
– CC Part 2 extended - A PP or TOE is CC Part 2 extended if the functional
requirements include functional components not in CC Part 2.
plus one of the following:
– CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or TOE is CC Part 3 conformant if the assurance
requirements are based only upon assurance components in CC Part 3.
– CC Part 3 extended - A PP or TOE is CC Part 3 extended if the assurance
requirements include assurance requirements not in CC Part 3.
Additionally, the conformance result may include a statement made with respect to sets of
defined requirements, in which case it consists of one of the following:
– Package name Conformant - A PP or TOE is conformant to a pre-defined named
functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the requirements (functions or
assurance) include all components in the packages listed as part of the conformance
result.
– Package name Augmented - A PP or TOE is an augmentation of a pre-defined
named functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the requirements (functions
or assurance) are a proper superset of all components in the packages listed as part of
the conformance result.
Finally, the conformance result may also include a statement made with respect to
Protection Profiles, in which case it includes the following:
– PP Conformant - A TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the
conformance result.“
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CC Part 3:
Protection Profile criteria overview (chapter 8.2)
“The goal of a PP evaluation is to demonstrate that the PP is complete, consistent,
technically sound, and hence suitable for use as a statement of requirements for one or
more evaluable TOEs. Such a PP may be eligible for inclusion within a PP registry.”
“Assurance Class Assurance Family
TOE description (APE_DES)
Security environment (APE_ENV)
Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation PP introduction (APE_INT)
Security objectives (APE_OBJ)
IT security requirements (APE_REQ)
Explicitly stated IT security requirements
(APE_SRE)
Table 3 - Protection Profile families - CC extended requirements ”
Security Target criteria overview (Chapter 8.3)
“The goal of an ST evaluation is to demonstrate that the ST is complete, consistent,
technically sound, and hence suitable for use as the basis for the corresponding TOE
evaluation.”
“Assurance Class Assurance Family
TOE description (ASE_DES)
Security environment (ASE_ENV)
ST introduction (ASE_INT)
Class ASE: Security Target evaluation Security objectives (ASE_OBJ)
PP claims (ASE_PPC)
IT security requirements (ASE_REQ)
Explicitly stated IT security requirements (ASE_SRE)
TOE summary specification (ASE_TSS)
Table 5 - Security Target families - CC extended requirements ”
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Assurance categorisation (chapter 7.5)
“The assurance classes, families, and the abbreviation for each family are shown in Table
1.
Assurance Class Assurance Family
CM automation (ACM_AUT)
ACM: Configuration management CM capabilities (ACM_CAP)
CM scope (ACM_SCP)
ADO: Delivery and operation Delivery (ADO_DEL)
Installation, generation and start-up (ADO_IGS)
Functional specification (ADV_FSP)
High-level design (ADV_HLD)
Implementation representation (ADV_IMP)
ADV: Development TSF internals (ADV_INT)
Low-level design (ADV_LLD)
Representation correspondence (ADV_RCR)
Security policy modeling (ADV_SPM)
AGD: Guidance documents Administrator guidance (AGD_ADM)
User guidance (AGD_USR)
Development security (ALC_DVS)
ALC: Life cycle support Flaw remediation (ALC_FLR)
Life cycle definition (ALC_LCD)
Tools and techniques (ALC_TAT)
Coverage (ATE_COV)
ATE: Tests Depth (ATE_DPT)
Functional tests (ATE_FUN)
Independent testing (ATE_IND)
Covert channel analysis (AVA_CCA)
AVA: Vulnerability assessment Misuse (AVA_MSU)
Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF)
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA)
Table 1: Assurance family breakdown and mapping”
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Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 11)
“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances the
level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of
assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE at
the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the operational use
of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are included in
the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable
assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be considered
for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide utility.”
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 11.1)
“Table 6 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically
ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the
resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.
As outlined in the next section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance levels
are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance. They are hierarchically ordered
inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in
assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher
assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope,
and/or depth) and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance
families (i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as described
in chapter 7 of this Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than one
component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every component
are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of
assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the addition of assurance
components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the substitution
of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance component in the
same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only
EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance
component” is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with
it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the
added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be extended with explicitly
stated assurance requirements.
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Assurance Class Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL1 EAL2 EAL3 EAL4 EAL5 EAL6 EAL7
Configuration
management
ACM_AUT 1 1 2 2
ACM_CAP 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
ACM_SCP 1 2 3 3 3
Delivery and
operation
ADO_DEL 1 1 2 2 2 3
ADO_IGS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Development ADV_FSP 1 1 1 2 3 3 4
ADV_HLD 1 2 2 3 4 5
ADV_IMP 1 2 3 3
ADV_INT 1 2 3
ADV_LLD 1 1 2 2
ADV_RCR 1 1 1 1 2 2 3
ADV_SPM 1 3 3 3
Guidance
documents
AGD_ADM 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AGD_USR 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life cycle
support
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 2 2 3
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3
Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3
ATE_DPT 1 1 2 2 3
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_CCA 1 2 2
AVA_MSU 1 2 2 3 3
AVA_SOF 1 1 1 1 1 1
AVA_VLA 1 1 2 3 4 4
Table 6: Evaluation assurance level summary”
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Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 11.3)
“Objectives
EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the threats
to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent assurance is
required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with respect to the
protection of personal or similar information.
EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including
independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance
documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could be successfully
conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner
consistent with its documentation, and that it provides useful protection against identified
threats.”
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 11.4)
“Objectives
EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design
information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the
developer than is consistent with good commercial practice. As such it should not require a
substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready
availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when securing
legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.”
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked (chapter
11.5)
“Objectives
EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive
security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound
development practices.
EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate
level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation of the TOE
and its development without substantial re-engineering.”
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Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and reviewed
(chapter 11.6)
“Objectives
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering
based on good commercial development practices which, though rigorous, do not require
substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL4 is the highest level at
which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs
and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested (chapter
11.7)
“Objectives
EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering based
upon rigorous commercial development practices supported by moderate application of
specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be designed and
developed with the intent of achieving EAL5 assurance. It is likely that the additional costs
attributable to the EAL5 requirements, relative to rigorous development without the
application of specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a
rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to
specialist security engineering techniques.”
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and tested
(chapter 11.8)
“Objectives
EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security engineering
techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a premium TOE for
protecting high value assets against significant risks.
EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in high
risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested (chapter
11.9)
“Objectives
EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely high
risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs. Practical
application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security functionality
that is amenable to extensive formal analysis.“
Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF) (chapter 19.3)
“Objectives
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Even if a TOE security function cannot be bypassed, deactivated, or corrupted, it may still
be possible to defeat it because there is a vulnerability in the concept of its underlying
security mechanisms. For those functions a qualification of their security behaviour can be
made using the results of a quantitative or statistical analysis of the security behaviour of
these mechanisms and the effort required to overcome them. The qualification is made in
the form of a strength of TOE security function claim.”
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA) (chapter 19.4)
"Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether vulnerabilities identified,
during the evaluation of the construction and anticipated operation of the TOE or by other
methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses), could allow users to violate the TSP.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that a user will be able to discover flaws that
will allow unauthorised access to resources (e.g. data), allow the ability to interfere with or
alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users.”
"Application notes
A vulnerability analysis is performed by the developer in order to ascertain the presence of
security vulnerabilities, and should consider at least the contents of all the TOE
deliverables including the ST for the targeted evaluation assurance level. The developer is
required to document the disposition of identified vulnerabilities to allow the evaluator to
make use of that information if it is found useful as a support for the evaluator's
independent vulnerability analysis.”
“Independent vulnerability analysis goes beyond the vulnerabilities identified by the
developer. The main intent of the evaluator analysis is to determine that the TOE is
resistant to penetration attacks performed by an attacker possessing a low (for AVA_VLA.
2 Independent vulnerability analysis), moderate (for AVA_VLA.3 Moderately resistant) or
high (for AVA_VLA.4 Highly resistant) attack potential.”
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D Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
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