Certification Report
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
BSI-DSZ-CC-0218-2003
for
Internet Security and Acceleration
Server 2000 - Standard Edition - SP1
with FP1
from
Microsoft Corporation
- Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Telefon +49 228 9582-0, Infoline +49 228 9582-111, Telefax +49 228 9582-455
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Telefon (0228) 9582-0 - Telefax (0228) 9582-455 - Infoline (0228) 9582-111
SOGIS-MRA
BSI-DSZ-CC-0218-2003
Internet Security and Acceleration
Server 2000 - Standard Edition - SP1
with FP1
from
Microsoft Corporation
Common Criteria Arrangement
The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an accredited and licensed/
approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Part 1
Version 0.6, Part 2 Version 1.0 for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation,
Version 2.1 (ISO/IEC 15408:1999).
Evaluation Results:
Functionality: Product specific Security Target
Common Criteria Part 2 conformant
Assurance Package: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL2
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated
configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme
of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation
facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
The notes mentioned on the reverse side are part of this certificate.
Bonn, 8. September 2003
The President of the Federal Office
for Information Security
Dr. Helmbrecht L.S.
The rating of the strength of functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms suitable for encryption
and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2)
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty
of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
BSI-DSZ-CC-0218-2003 Certification Report
V
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the
task of issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a
distributor, hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product
according to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised
security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the
BSI or by BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This
report contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the
detailed Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security
functionality of the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and
weaknesses) and instructions for the user.
1
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of
17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0218-2003
VI
Contents
Part A: Certification
Part B: Certification Results
Part C: Excerpts from the Criteria
BSI-DSZ-CC-0218-2003 Certification Report
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A Certification
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down
in the following:
· BSIG2
· BSI Certification Ordinance3
· BSI Schedule of Costs4
· Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal
Ministry of the Interior)
· DIN EN 45011 standard
· BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
· Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 2.15
· Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM)
- Part 1, Version 0.6
- Part 2, Version 1.0
· BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme
(AIS)
2
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of
17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 7 July 1992,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-
Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 29th October 1992, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1838
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 22nd September 2000 in the
Bundesanzeiger p. 19445
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0218-2003
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2 Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries
a mutual recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are
based on ITSEC or CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1 ITSEC/CC - Certificates
The SOGIS-Agreement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on
ITSEC became effective on 3 March 1998. This agreement was signed by the
national bodies of Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands,
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. This
agreement on the mutual recognition of IT security certificates based on the
ITSEC was extended to include certificates based on the CC for all evaluation
levels (EAL 1 – EAL 7).
2.2 CC - Certificates
An arrangement (Common Criteria Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC evaluation assurance levels up to and including
EAL 4 was signed in May 2000. It includes also the recognition of Protection
Profiles based on the CC. The arrangement was signed by the national bodies
of Australia, Canada, Finland France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands,
New Zealand, Norway, Spain, United Kingdom and the United States. Israel
joined the arrangement in November 2000, Sweden in February 2002, Austria
in November 2002.
BSI-DSZ-CC-0218-2003 Certification Report
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3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform
procedure, a uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product Internet Security and Acceleration Server 2000 - Standard Edition -
Service Pack 1 with Feature Pack 1 has undergone the certification procedure
at BSI.
The evaluation of the product Internet Security and Acceleration Server 2000 -
Standard Edition - SP1 with FP1 was conducted by TÜV Informationstechnik
GmbH, Prüfstelle für IT-Sicherheit (ITSEF)6
. The TÜV Informationstechnik
GmbH, Prüfstelle für IT-Sicherheit is an evaluation facility recognised by BSI.
The sponsor and vendor and distributor is Microsoft Corporation.
The certification is concluded with
· the comparability check and
· the production of this Certification Report.
This work was completed by the BSI on 8. September 2003.
The confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
· all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as
given in the following report, are observed,
· the product is operated in the environment described, where specified in
the following report.
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product indicated
here. The validity can be extended to new versions and releases of the product,
provided the sponsor applies for re-certification of the modified product, in
accordance with the procedural requirements, and the evaluation does not
reveal any security deficiencies.
For the meaning of the assurance levels and the confirmed strength of
functions, please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at the end of the
Certification Report.
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0218-2003
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4 Publication
The following Certification Results contain pages B-1 to B-20.
The product Internet Security and Acceleration Server 2000 - Standard Edition -
SP1 with FP1 has been included in the BSI list of the certified products, which is
published regularly (see also Internet: http://www.bsi.bund.de). Further
information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline 0228/9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the vendor7
of
the product. The Certification Report can also be downloaded from the above-
mentioned website.
7
Microsoft Corporation, 1 Microsoft Way, Redmond WA 98052, USA
BSI-DSZ-CC-0218-2003 Certification Report
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B Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
· the security target of the sponsor for the target of evaluation,
· the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
· complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0218-2003
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Contents of the certification results
1 Executive Summary 3
2 Identification of the TOE 8
3 Security Policy 9
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 9
5 Architectural Information 10
6 Documentation 12
7 IT Product Testing 12
8 Evaluated Configuration 14
9 Results of the Evaluation 15
10 Comments/Recommendations 16
11 Annexes 16
12 Security Target 16
13 Definitions 16
14 Bibliography 18
BSI-DSZ-CC-0218-2003 Certification Report
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1 Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) and subject of the Security Target (ST) [5] is
the Firewall product Internet Security and Acceleration Server 2000 - Standard
Edition - Service Pack 1 with Feature Pack 1 (also named ISA Server in short).
ISA Server is a dedicated firewall that acts as the secure gateway to the
Internet for internal computers. ISA Server protects all communication between
internal computers and the Internet and runs on a Windows 2000 Server
operating system.
The basic functions of the ISA Server are:
· Identification and Authentication: ISA Server 2000 supports a range of
authentication methods, whereof basic authentication as the standard
method of authentication for Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP)
transmissions comprises the scope of the evaluated configuration.
· Filtering (Packet and Application level filtering): Packet filters, Server
publishing, Web publishing and Application filters
· Generation of audit records
The ISA Server is intended to be used as a multi-layered firewall. IP packet
filtering provides security by inspecting individual packets passing through the
firewall. Application level filtering allows ISA Server to inspect and secure
popular protocols.
Graphical taskpads and wizards do not belong to the TOE but are implemented
in the environment , they shall simplify navigation and configuration for common
tasks.
The operating system Windows 2000 maintains security attributes for all
administrators. The operating system Windows 2000 stores the identification
and authentication data for all known administrators and maintains a method of
associating human users with the authorized administrator role.
The TOE itself offers no additional identification and authentication methods for
firewall administrators.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) used in the Security Target
are Common Criteria Part 2 conformant. The ISA Server was evaluated by TÜV
Informationstechnik GmbH, Prüfstelle für IT-Sicherheit. The evaluation was
completed on 3. September 2003. The TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH,
Prüfstelle für IT-Sicherheit (ITSEF)8
is an evaluation facility recognised by BSI.
The sponsor and vendor and distributor is Microsoft Corporation.
8
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0218-2003
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1.1 Assurance package
The TOE security assurance requirements are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C of this report,
or [1], part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of assurance level EAL2
(Evaluation Assurance Level 2).
1.2 Functionality
The TOE provides following functionality:
SFR Name
Audit Generation
FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
FAU_SAR.1 Audit review
FAU_STG.3 Action in case of possible audit data loss
Identification and Authentication
FIA_AFL.1 Authentication failure handling
FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition
FIA_UID.2 User identification before any action
FIA_UAU.2 User authentication before any action
Information Flow Control
FDP_IFC.1 (1) Subset information flow control (1) - UNAUTHENTICATED SFP
FDP_IFC.1 (2) Subset information flow control (2) - UNAUTHENTICATED_APPL
SFP
FDP_IFC.1 (3) Subset information flow control (3) - AUTHENTICATED SFP
FDP_IFF.1 (1) Simple security attributes (1) - UNAUTHENTICATED SFP
FDP_IFF.1 (2) Simple security attributes (2) - UNAUTHENTICATED_APPL SFP
FDP_IFF.1 (3) Simple security attributes (3) - AUTHENTICATED SFP
FDP_RIP.1 Subset residual information protection
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization
FPT_RVM.1 Non-bypassability of the TSP
Table 1: TOE security functional requirements
BSI-DSZ-CC-0218-2003 Certification Report
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These Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functions:
Security function
SF1: Identification and Authentication
SF2: Information Flow Control
SF3: Audit Generation
Table 2: TOE security functions
Note: Only the titles of the Security Functional Requirements and of the TOE
Security Functions are provided. For more details please refer to the Security
Target [5], chapter 5 and 6.
1.3 Strength of Function
The TOE’s strength of function is claimed SOF-basic for the chosen basic
authentication method within the security function “Identification and
Authentication”.
1.4 Summary of threats and Organisational Security Policies (OSPs)
addressed by the evaluated IT product
The following list of threats is defined in the Security Target [5], chapter 3.3:
T.NOAUTH
An attacker may attempt to bypass the security of the TOE so as to
access and use security functions and/or non-security functions provided
by the TOE.
T.ASPOOF
An attacker may carry out spoofing in information flows mediated by the
TOE between clients and servers located on internal and external
networks governed by the TOE, by using a spoofed source address to
hide his identity.
T.MEDIAT
An attacker may send impermissible information through the TOE, which
results in the exploitation of resources on the internal network and
gathering of information he is not authorized for.
T.OLDINF
Because of a flaw in the TOE functioning, an attacker may gather
residual information from a previous information flow or internal TOE data
by monitoring the padding of the information flows from the TOE.
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0218-2003
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T.AUDFUL
An attacker may cause audit records to be lost or prevent future records
from being recorded by taking actions to exhaust audit storage capacity,
thus masking an attackers actions.
There is one Security policy to be fulfilled by the TOE, please refer to the
Security Target [5], chapter 3.2:
P.AUDACC
Persons must be accountable for the actions that they conduct.
Therefore audit records must contain sufficient information to prevent an
attacker to escape detection.
1.5 Special configuration requirements
There are two versions of ISA Server available: Standard Edition (single
machine support only) and Enterprise Edition (can be member of a firewall
cluster). The Standard Edition with local administration and without Active
Directory integration comprises the TOE.
ISA Server Standard Edition is intended for small businesses, workgroups, and
departmental environments. Standard Edition provides local policy only, and
supports up to four processors. Scalability is not part of the evaluation. For the
Standard Edition security policy configuration data is stored in the local
Windows registry, however, the storage of policy configuration data is not part
of the evaluation as Windows Registry and Active Directory are outside the
scope of the TOE.
ISA Server can be installed in one out of three modes: firewall, cache, or
integrated. For evaluation the firewall mode without cache is chosen. The
caching functionality does not include any security related features.
The evaluated TOE is uniquely named as "Microsoft Internet Security and
Acceleration Server 2000 - Standard Edition" and its software version is
Microsoft ISA 2000 Service Pack 1 with Feature Pack 1.
The ISA Server software and the Administrator and User Guidance as parts of
the evaluated version for the TOE are provided as a boxed product that is
delivered to the sales channels. The required Service Pack 1 and Feature Pack
1 are distributed to users using both physical distribution and electronic
distribution via the web in a secure way. Subject of evaluation was the secure
distribution via the web. The AGD Addendum of the guidance documentation is
delivered via the web only.
The Administrator and User Guidance is also available on the internet, however,
relevant for the evaluated version of the TOE is the Administrator and User
Guidance that is delivered together with the software on CD-ROM [7]. The AGD
Addendum [8] is also part of the evaluated version of the TOE. It is only
available as a pdf document via a secure channel on the vendors TOE-internet-
homepage.
BSI-DSZ-CC-0218-2003 Certification Report
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The TOE is running on a Windows 2000 operating system with service pack 3,
installed on an HP/Compaq ProLiant ML330 G2 as the server hardware.
1.6 Assumptions about the operating environment
The following constraints concerning the operating environment are made in the
Security Target, please refer to the Security Target [5], chapter 3.1:
A.PHYSEC
The TOE is physically secure. Only authorized personal has physical
access to the TOE.
A.GENPUR
The TOE stores and executes security-relevant applications only. It
stores only data required for its secure operation.
A.NOEVIL
Authorized administrators are non-hostile and follow all administrator
guidance.
A.SINGEN
Information can not flow among the internal and external networks unless
it passes through the TOE.
A.DIRECT
The TOE is available to authorized administrators only. Personal who
has physical access to the TOE and can log in the operating system is
assumed to act as an authorized TOE administrator.
A.SECINST
Required certificates and user identities are installed using a confidential
path.
A.OS
The operating system implements following functions which are used by
the TOE security functions: reliable time stamp (log file audit), file
protection (for log file access protection), tools for audit review, and
administration access control.
The ISA Server is running on a Windows 2000 operating system with service
pack 3 and is installed on an HP/Compaq ProLiant ML330 G2 hardware.
1.7 Disclaimers
The Certification Results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the
Certificate and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in
this Certification Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0218-2003
B-8
by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation
that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT
product by BSI or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2 Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation is called:
Microsoft Internet Security and Acceleration Server 2000 - Standard Edition with
Service Pack 1 and Feature Pack 1
The following table summarises the TOE components and defines the
evaluated configuration of the TOE:
Deliverables Version Comment
Box 3.0.1200.50 CD-ROM ISA Server 2000 Standard Edition
without SP1 and FP1 including the
Administrator and User Guidance on CD-
ROM [7]
Service Pack 1 3.0.1200.166 Direct download page for English language
version:
http://www.microsoft.com/isaserver/download
s/ENGsp1.asp
File to download: isasp1.exe
Feature Pack 1 3.0.1200.235 Direct download page for English language
version:
http://www.microsoft.com/downloads/details.a
spx?FamilyID=2f92b02c-ac49-44df-af6c-
5be084b345f9&DisplayLang=en
File to download: isafp1.exe
AGD Addendum
(of the Adminis-
trator and User
Guidance)
1.0 Guidance evaluation addendum [8],
downloaded from:
https://s.microsoft.com/isaserver/code/commo
ncriteria/msisa_agd_usr.pdf
The end-user gets the location of the
Common Criteria documentation from the ISA
Server homepage
http://www.microsoft.com/isaserver/
via "Technical Resources" to "Deployment".
Table 3: Identification of the TOE
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Note: Although administration and management tools (e. g. for reporting and
alerting, cache, monitoring, logging, remote management) are delivered
together with the TOE, they are all excluded from the TOE and are considered
part of the environment. Graphical taskpads and wizards that simplify navigation
and configuration for common tasks do not belong to the TOE because they are
embedded in the Microsoft Management Console (MMC - a configuration
management tool that is supplied with the operating system Windows 2000).
The TOE is the ISA Server running in firewall mode and with basic
authentication only.
The TOE environment also includes applications that are not delivered with the
ISA Server, but are used functionality of the underlying operating system
Windows 2000 (e. g. File System, Event Log File, Registry, Network Interface,
Cryptographic Support Interface, User Account Database).
3 Security Policy
The security policy of the TOE is to provide controlled and audited access to
services, both from inside and outside an organisation's network, by allowing,
denying, and/or redirecting the flow of data through the firewall.
The TOE allows or denies a set of computers or a group of users to access
specific servers. If a rule is defined specifically to users, the TOE checks how
the user should be authenticated. The evaluated TOE supports basic
authentication as the standard method of authentication for Hypertext Transfer
Protocol (HTTP) transmissions.
The TOE controls the flow of incoming and outgoing IP packets and controls
information flow on protocol level. Information flow control is subdivided into IP
packet filters, Protocol rules, Site and content rules, Server- and Web
publishing, and Application filters.
The TOE also features the generation of security and access logs.
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
4.1 Usage assumptions
Based on the personnel assumptions, the following usage conditions exist.
Please refer to the Security Target [5], chapter 3.1 for more detail:
· Authorized administrators are non-hostile and follow all administrator
guidance (A.NOEVIL).
· Personal who has physical access to the TOE and can log in the operating
system is assumed to act as an authorized TOE administrator. That means
that the TOE is available to authorized administrators only (A.DIRECT).
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0218-2003
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4.2 Environmental assumptions
The following assumptions about physical and connectivity aspects defined by
the Security Target have to be met (refer to Security Target [5], chapter 3.1):
· Only authorized personal has physical access to the TOE because the TOE
is physically secured (A.PHYSEC).
· The TOE stores and executes security-relevant applications only. It stores
only data required for its secure operation (A.GENPUR).
· Information can not flow among the internal and external networks unless it
passes through the TOE (A.SINGEN).
· Required certificates and user identities are installed using a confidential
path (A.SECINST).
· The operating system implements the functions which are used by the TOE
security functions. These functions are: reliable time stamp for log file audit,
file protection for log file access protection, tools for audit review, and
administration access control (A.OS).
Furthermore, the Security Target [5], chapter 3.2 defines an Organisational
Security Policy (P.AUDACC) that states that audit records must contain
sufficient information to prevent an attacker to escape detection in order to
make persons accountable for the actions they conduct.
4.3 Clarification of scope
Additional threats that are not countered by the TOE and its evaluated security
functions were not addressed by this product evaluation.
5 Architectural Information
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) and subject of the Security Target (ST) [5] is
the Firewall product Internet Security and Acceleration Server 2000 - Standard
Edition - SP1 with FP1.
ISA Server is a dedicated firewall that acts as the secure gateway to the
Internet for internal computers. ISA Server protects all communication between
internal computers and the Internet and runs on a Windows 2000 Server
operating system. As a multi-layered firewall, the TOE provides security at
different levels. IP packet filtering provides security by inspecting individual
packets passing through the firewall. Application-level filtering allows ISA Server
to inspect and secure popular protocols. The TOE has the possibility to create
filters that allow or deny traffic on the packet layer and with data-aware filters to
determine if packets should be accepted, rejected, redirected, or modified. The
identification and authentication capabilities can be configured separately for
incoming and outgoing requests. The TOE also includes the generation of
security and access logs. The log files can be configured and enabled for
BSI-DSZ-CC-0218-2003 Certification Report
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packet and application filters. They are human readable and can be reviewed
with additional tools that belong to the TOE environment.
The operating system Windows 2000 maintains security attributes for all
administrators. Windows 2000 stores the identification and authentication data
for all known administrators and maintains a method of associating human
users with the authorized administrator role. The TOE itself offers no additional
identification and authentication methods for firewall administrators.
Figure 1 shows the TOE boundaries of the TOE, whereas the arrows indicate
the interfaces between the TOE and the operating system Windows 2000.
Figure 1: Identification of the TOE
The three main security functionality of the TOE are:
· Identification and Authentication:
The scope of the evaluation is basic authentication. Basic authentication is
the standard method of authentication for Hypertext Transfer Protocol
(HTTP) transmissions for incoming and outgoing requests. Basic
authentication sends and receives user information as text characters. No
encryption is used with basic authentication, however, an optional SSL
channel can be used but is not part of the evaluation.
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0218-2003
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· Filtering (Packet and Application level filtering):
The TOE controls the flow of incoming and outgoing IP packets and controls
information flow on protocol level. This control has to be active before any
information can be transmitted through the TOE. Information flow control is
subdivided into IP packet filters, Protocol rules, Site and content rules,
Server- and Web publishing, and Application filters.
· Audit Generation:
The TOE allows the generation of security and access logs. Logging
information can be stored in Packet filter log files, Firewall service log file,
Web proxy service log files, and Windows application event log files, outside
the TOE.
6 Documentation
The following documentation is provided with the product by the developer to
the customer:
[7] Microsoft Internet Security & Acceleration Server 2000 - Standard Edition
manual, CD-ROM file: isa\chmbook\isa.chm; Date: 2000-12-15; size:
716.128 Bytes
[8] Microsoft Internet Security & Acceleration Server 2000 - Standard Edition
- Evaluation addendum manual; Version 1.0; Date: 2003-08-22
7 IT Product Testing
Developer Tests
Test Configuration
The TOE has been tested within a configuration that consists of three networks.
The TOE as the centre of the configuration has been connected to the three
networks which are:
· a local network,
· the internet,
· and the DMZ.
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Test Approach
The developer's tests were conducted to confirm that the TOE meets the
security functions. The developer's strategy was to test the TOE against the
specification of all security functions detailed in the developer’s functional
specification.
The tests cover all security functions defined in the Security Target [5]. The
amount of developer tests ensures that the TSF behave as specified in the
Security Target [5] and as detailed in the developer’s functional specification.
The majority of tests were performed as automated testing using a proprietary
automated test tool named Xcite.
Test Results
The developer specified, conducted and documented suitable functional tests
for each security function. The test results obtained for all of the performed tests
turned out to be as expected. In a few cases retraceable aberrance to the
expected results could be described entirely due to configuration problems and
could be resolved in a second test run.
No errors or other flaws occurred with regard to the security functionality
defined in the Security Target [5]. Consequently, the test results demonstrate
that the behaviour of the security functions are as specified.
All security functions could be tested successfully. The manufacturer was able
to demonstrate that all security functions behave as specified in the Security
Target [5] and as detailed in the developer’s functional specification.
Independent Evaluator Tests
Test Configuration
Basis of all test configurations is an installed TOE as identified in the Security
Target [5]. For the testing, ISA Server has been installed on HP/Compaq
ProLiant ML330 hardware.
For ITSEF’s independent testing as well as for the penetration testing, four
different test configurations have been used including the same configuration as
for the developer tests.
The evaluator tests have been performed both at the ITSEF facility in Essen,
Germany and at Microsoft in Munich/München, Germany.
Test Approach:
The evaluation facility included all security functions in its test activities.
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0218-2003
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When choosing a sample of tests, the ITSEF accompanied all developer tests.
All test cases and tests that were already conducted by the developer were
taken into consideration, automated tests as well as manual tests. All TSFIs
were tested.
Additionally, independent tests according to each TOE security function and
other miscellaneous tests were conducted by the ITSEF. The objective was to
test the functionality of the TOE and to verify the developer’s test results.
To verify and reject possible vulnerabilities, the ITSEF performed penetration
tests. Additionally, the TOE has been scanned with the Internet Security
Scanner (ISS), a tool that can identify about 1200 possible vulnerabilities,
including possible vulnerabiolities for the TOE and for the operating system.
Because of the very different kind of created packets and scans this is also a
stress test for the TOE.
Test Results
The independent tests as well as the repeated manufacturer tests confirmed
that the TOE’s security functions behave as specified in the Security Target [5]
and as detailed in the developer’s functional specification.
The penetration tests showed that the TOE does not feature obvious security
vulnerabilities that can be exploited in its intended environment.
8 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE configuration consists of the software package "Microsoft Internet
Security and Acceleration Server 2000 - Standard Edition" with Service Pack 1
and Feature Pack 1 installed, running on a single machine in firewall mode
without cache and with basic authentication.
The ISA Server software and the Administrator and User Guidance as parts of
the evaluated version for the TOE are delivered on CD-ROM through the sales
channels. The required Service Pack 1 and Feature Pack 1 are distributed to
users using both physical distribution and electronic distribution via the web.
Part of the evaluation was the web distribution of Service Pack 1 and Feature
Pack 1. The Guidance documentation [7] that is used for the evaluation is
present on the distributed CD-ROM. The AGD Addendum [8] of the guidance
documentation is delivered via the web only.
The TOE is running on a Windows 2000 operating system with service pack 3
installed and on a HP/Compaq ProLiant ML330 G2 hardware as the server
hardware. The Standard Edition of the ISA Server with local administration and
without Active Directory integration comprises the TOE.
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9 Results of the Evaluation
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [6] was provided by the ITSEF
according to the Common Criteria [1], the Common Evaluation Methodology [2],
the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all interpretations and guidelines of the
Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The verdicts for the CC, Part 3 assurance components (according to EAL2 and
the Security Target evaluation) are summarised in the following table:
Assurance Classes and Components Verdict
Security Target CC Class ASE PASS
TOE description ASE_DES.1 PASS
Security environment ASE_ENV.1 PASS
ST introduction ASE_INT.1 PASS
Security objectives ASE_OBJ.1 PASS
PP claims ASE_PPC.1 PASS
IT security requirements ASE_REQ.1 PASS
Explicitly stated IT security requirements ASE_SRE.1 PASS
TOE summary specification ASE_TSS.1 PASS
Configuration management CC Class ACM PASS
Configuration items ACM_CAP.2 PASS
Delivery and Operation CC Class ADO PASS
Delivery Procedures ADO_DEL.1 PASS
Installation, generation, and start-up procedures ADO_IGS.1 PASS
Development CC class ADV PASS
Informal functional specification ADV_FSP.1 PASS
Descriptive high-level design ADV_HLD.1 PASS
Informal correspondence demonstration ADV_RCR.1 PASS
Guidance documents CC Class AGD PASS
Administrator guidance AGD_ADM.1 PASS
User guidance AGD_USR.1 PASS
Tests CC Class ATE PASS
Evidence of coverage ATE_COV.1 PASS
Functional testing ATE_FUN.1 PASS
Independent testing - sample ATE_IND.2 PASS
Vulnerability assessment CC Class AVA PASS
Strength of TOE security function evaluation AVA_SOF.1 PASS
Developer vulnerability analysis AVA_VLA.1 PASS
Table 4: Verdicts for the assurance components
The evaluation has shown that the TOE fulfils the claimed strength of function
(SOF-basic) for the authentication function using passwords.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the product ISA Server in the
configuration as defined in the Security Target and summarised in this report
(refer to the Security Target [5] and the chapters 2, 4 and 8 of this report). The
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validity can be extended to new versions and releases of the product, provided
the sponsor applies for re-certification of the modified product, and if the
evaluation of the modified product does not reveal any security deficiencies.
10 Comments/Recommendations
The User Guidance documentation (refer to chapter 6 of this report) contains
necessary information about the secure usage of the TOE. Additionally, for
secure usage of the TOE the fulfilment of the assumptions about the
environment in the Security Target [5] and the Security Target as a whole has to
be taken into account. Therefore a user/administrator has to follow the guidance
in these documents.
The user of the TOE has to be aware of the existence and purpose of the AGD
Addendum [8]. Therefore, the TOE’s Internet product homepage has to provide
information about the existence of the document and describe how to access
the document. The reference has to be unambiguous and permanent.
11 Annexes
none
12 Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the security target [5] of the target of evaluation
(TOE) is provided within a separate document.
13 Definitions
13.1 Acronyms
AGD Guidance Documentation (according to the CC assurance class “
Guidance Documentation”)
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal
Office for Information Security
DMZ Originally an abbreviation for demilitarised zone. In firewall terms a
DMZ separates the internal network from the hostile forces of the
Internet.
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
FP Feature Pack
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http Hypertext Transfer Protocol
ISA-Server Internet Security and Acceleration Server
IT Information Technology
MMC Microsoft Management Console, a configuration management tool
supplied with Windows 2000 that can be extended with plugins
PP Protection Profile
SF Security Function
SFP Security Function Policy
SOF Strength of Function
SP Service Pack
SSL Secure Sockets Layer, a protocol that supplies secure data
communication.
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSC TSF Scope of Control
TSF TOE Security Functions
TSFI TSF Interface
TSP TOE Security Policy
13.2 Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more assurance component(s) from CC
Part 3 to an EAL or assurance package.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not
contained in part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the
CC.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics
based on well-established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - An entity within the TSC that contains or receives information and
upon which subjects perform operations.
Protection Profile - An implementation-independent set of security require-
ments for a category of TOEs that meet specific consumer needs.
Security Function - A part or parts of the TOE that have to be relied upon for
enforcing a closely related subset of the rules from the TSP.
Security Target - A set of security requirements and specifications to be used
as the basis for evaluation of an identified TOE.
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Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined
semantics.
Strength of Function - A qualification of a TOE security function expressing
the minimum efforts assumed necessary to defeat its expected security
behaviour by directly attacking its underlying security mechanisms.
SOF-basic - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that
the function provides adequate protection against casual breach of TOE
security by attackers possessing a low attack potential.
SOF-medium - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows
that the function provides adequate protection against straightforward or
intentional breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a moderate attack
potential.
SOF-high - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that
the function provides adequate protection against deliberately planned or
organised breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a high attack
potential.
Subject - An entity within the TSC that causes operations to be performed.
Target of Evaluation - An IT product or system and its associated
administrator and user guidance documentation that is the subject of an
evaluation.
TOE Security Functions - A set consisting of all hardware, software, and
firmware of the TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the
TSP.
TOE Security Policy - A set of rules that regulate how assets are managed,
protected and distributed within a TOE.
TSF Scope of Control - The set of interactions that can occur with or within a
TOE and are subject to the rules of the TSP.
14 Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 2.1, August 1999
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
(CEM), Part 1, Version 0.6; Part 2: Evaluation Methodology, Version 1.0,
August 1999
[3] BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for
the TOE.
[5] ISA Common Criteria Evaluation - Security Target, BSI-DSZ-CC-0218-
2003, Version 1.2, Date 2003-08-12, Microsoft Corporation
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[6] Evaluation Technical Report, BSI-DSZ-CC-0218-2003, Version 2, Datum
2003-09-02, TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH (confidential document)
[7] Microsoft Internet Security & Acceleration Server 2000 - Standard Edition
manual, CD-ROM file: isa\chmbook\i sa.chm; Date: 2000-12-15; size:
716.128 Bytes
[8] Microsoft Internet Security & Acceleration Server 2000 - Standard Edition
- Evaluation addendum manual; Version 1.0; Date: 2003-08-22
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C Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part 1:
Caveats on evaluation results (chapter 5.4) / Final Interpretation 008
The conformance result indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is
met by a TOE or PP that passes its evaluation. This conformance result is presented
with respect to Part 2 (functional requirements), Part 3 (assurance requirements) and, if
applicable, to a pre-defined set of requirements (e.g., EAL, Protection Profile).
The conformance result consists of one of the following:
Part 2 conformant - A PP or TOE is Part 2 conformant if the functional requirements
are based only upon functional components in Part 2
Part 2 extended - A PP or TOE is Part 2 extended if the functional requirements
include functional components not in Part 2
plus one of the following:
Part 3 conformant - A PP or TOE is Part 3 conformant if the assurance requirements
are based only upon assurance components in Part 3
Part 3 extended - A PP or TOE is Part 3 extended if the assurance requirements
include assurance requirements not in Part 3.
Additionally, the conformance result may include a statement made with respect to sets
of defined requirements, in which case it consists of one of the following:
Package name Conformant - A PP or TOE is conformant to a pre-defined named
functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the requirements (functions or
assurance) include all components in the packages listed as part of the conformance
result.
Package name Augmented - A PP or TOE is an augmentation of a pre-defined
named functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the requirements (functions
or assurance) are a proper superset of all components in the packages listed as part of
the conformance result.
Finally, the conformance result may also include a statement made with respect to
Protection Profiles, in which case it includes the following:
PP Conformant - A TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the
conformance result.
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CC Part 3:
Assurance categorisation (chapter 2.5)
„The assurance classes, families, and the abbreviation for each family are shown in
Table 2.1.
Assurance Class Assurance Family Abbreviated Name
Class ACM:
Configuration
management
CM automation ACM_AUT
CM capabilities ACM_CAP
CM scope ACM_SCP
Class ADO: Delivery
and operation
Delivery ADO_DEL
Installation, generation and start-up ADO_IGS
Class ADV:
Development
Functional specification ADV_FSP
High-level design ADV_HLD
Implementation representation ADV_IMP
TSF internals ADV_INT
Low-level design ADV_LLD
Representation correspondence ADV_RCR
Security policy modeling ADV_SPM
Class AGD: Guidance
documents
Administrator guidance AGD_ADM
User guidance AGD_USR
Class ALC: Life cycle
support
Development security ALC_DVS
Flaw remediation ALC_FLR
Life cycle definition ALC_LCD
Tools and techniques ALC_TAT
Class ATE: Tests Coverage ATE_COV
Depth ATE_DPT
Functional tests ATE_FUN
Independent testing ATE_IND
Class AVA:
Vulnerability
assessment
Covert channel analysis AVA_CCA
Misuse AVA_MSU
Strength of TOE security functions AVA_SOF
Vulnerability analysis AVA_VLA
Table 2.1 -Assurance family breakdown and mapping“
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Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 6)
„The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances
the level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of
assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE
at the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the
operational use of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from Part 3 are included in
the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable
assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be
considered for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide
utility.
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 6.1)
Table 6.1 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically
ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the
resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.
As outlined in the next section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance
levels are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance. They are hierarchically
ordered inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The
increase in assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a
hierarchically higher assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e.
increasing rigour, scope, and/or depth) and from the addition of assurance components
from other assurance families (i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as
described in chapter 2 of this Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than
one component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every
component are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of
assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation“ allows the addition of assurance
components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the
substitution of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance
component in the same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs
defined in the CC, only EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a
constituent assurance component“ is not recognised by the CC as a valid claim.
Augmentation carries with it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility
and added value of the added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be
extended with explicitly stated assurance requirements.
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Assurance
Class
Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL1 EAL2 EAL3 EAL4 EAL5 EAL6 EAL7
Configuration
management
ACM_AUT 1 1 2 2
ACM_CAP 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
ACM_SCP 1 2 3 3 3
Delivery and
operation
ADO_DEL 1 1 2 2 2 3
ADO_IGS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Development ADV_FSP 1 1 1 2 3 3 4
ADV_HLD 1 2 2 3 4 5
ADV_IMP 1 2 3 3
ADV_INT 1 2 3
ADV_LLD 1 1 2 2
ADV_RCR 1 1 1 1 2 2 3
ADV_SPM 1 3 3 3
Guidance
documents
AGD_ADM 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AGD_USR 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life cycle
support
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 2 2 3
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3
Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3
ATE_DPT 1 1 2 2 3
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_CCA 1 2 2
AVA_MSU 1 2 2 3 3
AVA_SOF 1 1 1 1 1 1
AVA_VLA 1 1 2 3 4 4
Table 6.1 - Evaluation assurance level summary“
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Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 6.2.1)
„Objectives
EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the
threats to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent
assurance is required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with
respect to the protection of personal or similar information.
EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including
independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance
documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could be successfully
conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner
consistent with its documentation, and that it provides useful protection against
identified threats.“
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 6.2.2)
„Objectives
EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design
information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the
developer than is consistent with good commercial practice. As such it should not
require a substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require
a low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready
availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when
securing legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.“
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked
(chapter 6.2.3)
„Objectives
EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive
security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound
development practices.
EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation
of the TOE and its development without substantial re-engineering.“
Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and
reviewed (chapter 6.2.4)
„Objectives
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security
engineering based on good commercial development practices which, though rigorous,
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do not require substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL4 is the
highest level at which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing
product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require
a moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity
TOEs and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.“
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested
(chapter 6.2.5)
„Objectives
EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering
based upon rigorous commercial development practices supported by moderate
application of specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be
designed and developed with the intent of achieving EAL5 assurance. It is likely that
the additional costs attributable to the EAL5 requirements, relative to rigorous
development without the application of specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require
a high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a
rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to
specialist security engineering techniques.“
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and
tested (chapter 6.2.6)
„Objectives
EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security
engineering techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a
premium TOE for protecting high value assets against significant risks.
EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in
high risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional
costs.“
Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 6.2.7)
„Objectives
EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely
high risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs.
Practical application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security
functionality that is amenable to extensive formal analysis.“
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Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF) (chapter 14.3)
AVA_SOF Strength of TOE security functions
„Objectives
Even if a TOE security function cannot be bypassed, deactivated, or corrupted, it may
still be possible to defeat it because there is a vulnerability in the concept of its
underlying security mechanisms. For those functions a qualification of their security
behaviour can be made using the results of a quantitative or statistical analysis of the
security behaviour of these mechanisms and the effort required to overcome them. The
qualification is made in the form of a strength of TOE security function claim.“
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA) (chapter 14.4)
AVA_VLA Vulnerability analysis
„Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether vulnerabilities identified,
during the evaluation of the construction and anticipated operation of the TOE or by
other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses), could allow users to violate the TSP.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that a user will be able to discover flaws
that will allow unauthorised access to resources (e.g. data), allow the ability to interfere
with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users.“
„Application notes
A vulnerability analysis is performed by the developer in order to ascertain the
presence of security vulnerabilities, and should consider at least the contents of all the
TOE deliverables including the ST for the targeted evaluation assurance level. The
developer is required to document the disposition of identified vulnerabilities to allow
the evaluator to make use of that information if it is found useful as a support for the
evaluator's independent vulnerability analysis.“
„Independent vulnerability analysis goes beyond the vulnerabilities identified by the
developer. The main intent of the evaluator analysis is to determine that the TOE is
resistant to penetration attacks performed by an attacker possessing a low (for
AVA_VLA.2), moderate (for AVA_VLA.3) or high (for AVA_VLA.4) attack potential.“