TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V.
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Version
2017-
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Certification Report
Crypto Library V1.0 on P60D024/016/012yVB(Y/Z/A)/yVF
Sponsor and developer: NXP Semiconductors GmbH
Business Unit Security and Connectivity
Stresemannallee 101
D-22529 Hamburg
Germany
Evaluation facility: Brightsight
Delftechpark 1
2628 XJ Delft
The Netherlands
Reportnumber: NSCIB-CC-37322-CR3
Report version: 3
Projectnumber: 37322
Authors(s): Wouter Slegers
Date: 8 June 2017
Number of pages: 15
Number of appendices: 0
Reproduction of this report is authorized provided the report is reproduced in its entirety.
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CONTENTS:
Foreword 4
Recognition of the certificate 5
International recognition 5
European recognition 5
1 Executive Summary 6
2 Certification Results 8
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation 8
2.2 Security Policy 9
2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 9
2.4 Architectural Information 9
2.5 Documentation 9
2.6 IT Product Testing 10
2.7 Evaluated Configuration 11
2.8 Results of the Evaluation 12
2.9 Comments/Recommendations 12
3 Security Target 14
4 Definitions 14
5 Bibliography 15
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Foreword
The Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security (NSCIB) provides a third-party
evaluation and certification service for determining the trustworthiness of Information Technology (IT)
security products. Under this NSCIB, TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. has the task of issuing
certificates for IT security products, as well as for protection profiles and sites.
Part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product, protection profile or site
according to the Common Criteria assessment guidelines published by the NSCIB. Evaluations are
performed by an IT Security Evaluation Facility (ITSEF) under the oversight of the NSCIB Certification
Body, which is operated by TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. in cooperation with the Ministry of the
Interior and Kingdom Relations.
An ITSEF in the Netherlands is a commercial facility that has been licensed by TÜV Rheinland
Nederland B.V. to perform Common Criteria evaluations; a significant requirement for such a license is
accreditation to the requirements of ISO Standard 17025 “General requirements for the accreditation
of calibration and testing laboratories”.
By awarding a Common Criteria certificate, TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. asserts that the product or
site complies with the security requirements specified in the associated (site) security target, or that
the protection profile (PP) complies with the requirements for PP evaluation specified in the Common
Criteria for Information Security Evaluation. A (site) security target is a requirements specification
document that defines the scope of the evaluation activities.
The consumer should review the security target or protection profile, in addition to this certification
report, in order to gain an understanding of any assumptions made during the evaluation, the IT
product's intended environment, its security requirements, and the level of confidence (i.e., the
evaluation assurance level) that the product satisfies the security requirements stated in the security
target.
Reproduction of this report is authorized provided the report is reproduced in its entirety.
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Recognition of the certificate
Presence of the Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement and SOG-IS logos on the certificate
would indicate that this certificate is issued in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA and the
SOG-IS agreement and will be recognised by the participating nations.
International recognition
The CCRA has been signed by the Netherlands in May 2000 and provides mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC. Starting September 2014 the CCRA has been updated to provide mutual
recognition of certificates based on cPPs (exact use) or STs with evaluation assurance levels up to
and including EAL2+ALC_FLR. The current list of signatory nations and approved certification
schemes can be found on: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
Certificates issued before 8 September 2014 are still under recognition according to the rules of the
previous CCRA (i.e. recognition based on assurance components up to and including
EAL4+ALC_FLR). Also certification procedures started before 8 September 2014 and Assurance
Continuity (maintenance and re-certification) of old certificates remain recognised according to the
rules of the previous CCRA.
This certificate is a re-certification of an old certificate prior to 8 September 2014 and thus the
recognition of this certificate falls under the recognition rules of the previous CCRA.
European recognition
The European SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) version 3 effective from April
2010 provides mutual recognition of Common Criteria and ITSEC certificates at a basic evaluation
level for all products. A higher recognition level for evaluation levels beyond EAL4 (resp. E3-basic) is
provided for products related to specific technical domains. This agreement was initially signed by
Finland, France, Germany, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Italy
joined the SOGIS-MRA in December 2010. The current list of signatory nations, approved certification
schemes and the list of technical domains for which the higher recognition applies can be found on:
http://www.sogisportal.eu.
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1 Executive Summary
This Certification Report states the outcome of the Common Criteria security evaluation of the Crypto
Library V1.0 on P60D024/016/012yVB(Y/Z/A)/yVF. The developer of the Crypto Library V1.0 on
P60D024/016/012yVB(Y/Z/A)/yVF is NXP Semiconductors GmbH located in Hamburg, Germany and
they also act as the sponsor of the evaluation and certification. A Certification Report is intended to
assist prospective consumers when judging the suitability of the IT security properties of the product
for their particular requirements.
This third issue of the Certification Report is a result of a “recertification with major changes” with
respect to the second recertification of the “Crypto Library V1.0 on
P60D024/016/012yVB(Y/Z/A)/yVF.)” (NSCIB-CC-13-37322-CR2). The major change is the inclusion of
another variant of the Secure Smart Card Controller (i.e. the underlying hardware), and the exclusion
of the MIFARE functionality in both the underlying and this certificate. Small changes to the Crypto
Library’s guidance are also included. No changes to the implementation details of the Crypto Library
itself have been made.
A full, up to date vulnerability analysis has been made, as well as renewed testing, renewing the
certificate’s reusability date to the date of the ETR.
The Target of Evaluation – TOE (i.e., the Crypto Library V1.0 on P60D024/016/012yVB(Y/Z/A)/yVF)
consists of the Crypto Library V1.0 and the NXP SmartMX2 P60D024/016/012yVB(Y/Z/A)/yVF Secure
Smart Card Controller. For ease of reading the TOE is often called “Crypto Library on SmartMX2”.
The evaluation of the TOE was conducted as a composite evaluation and uses the results of the CC
evaluation of the underlying NXP SmartMX2 P60D024/016/012yVB(Y/Z/A)/yVF Secure Smart Card
Controller (re)certified under the German CC Scheme on January 2017 ([HW CERT]).
The Crypto Library on SmartMX2 is a cryptographic library, which provides a set of cryptographic
functions that can be used by the Smartcard Embedded Software. The cryptographic library consists
of several binary packages that are intended to be linked to the Smartcard Embedded Software. The
Smartcard Embedded Software developer links the binary packages that he needs to his Smartcard
Embedded Software and the whole is subsequently implemented in arbitrary memory. The NXP
SmartMX2 smart card processor provides the computing platform and cryptographic support by means
of co-processors for the Crypto Library on SmartMX2.
The Crypto Library on SmartMX2 provides AES, DES, Triple-DES (3DES), RSA, RSA key generation,
RSA public key computation, ECDSA (ECC over GF(p)) signature generation and verification, ECDSA
(ECC over GF(p)) key generation, ECDH (ECC Diffie-Helmann) keyexchange, full point addition (ECC
over GF(p)), SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512 algorithms. In addition, the Crypto
Library implements a software (pseudo) random number generator, which is initialised (seeded) by the
hardware random number generator of the SmartMX2.
Finally, the TOE provides a secure copy routine and a secure compare routine and includes internal
security measures for residual information protection. For more details refer to the [ST], chapter 1.3.2.
The TOE has been originally evaluated by Brightsight B.V. located in Delft, The Netherlands. The re-
evaluation was completed on 11 April 2017 with the approval of the ETR. The certification procedure
has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Netherlands Scheme for Certification in
the Area of IT Security [NSCIB].
The scope of the evaluation is defined by the Security Target [ST], which identifies assumptions made
during the evaluation, the intended environment for the Crypto Library V1.0 on
P60D024/016/012yVB(Y/Z/A)/yVF, the security requirements, and the level of confidence (evaluation
assurance level) at which the product is intended to satisfy the security requirements. Consumers of
the Crypto Library V1.0 on P60D024/016/012yVB(Y/Z/A)/yVF are advised to verify that their own
environment is consistent with the security target, and to give due consideration to the comments,
observations and recommendations in this certification report.
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The results documented in the evaluation technical report [ETR]
1
for this product provide sufficient
evidence that it meets the EAL6 augmented (EAL6+) assurance requirements for the evaluated
security functionality. This assurance level is augmented with ALC_FLR.1 (Basic flaw remediation),
ASE_TSS.2 (TOE summary specification with architectural design summary.
The evaluation was conducted using the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 4 [CEM], for conformance to the Common Criteria for Information
Technology Security Evaluation, version 3.1 Revision 4 [CC].
TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V., as the NSCIB Certification Body, declares that the Crypto Library
V1.0 on P60D024/016/012yVB(Y/Z/A)/yVF evaluation meets all the conditions for international
recognition of Common Criteria Certificates and that the product will be listed on the NSCIB Certified
Products list. It should be noted that the certification results only apply to the specific version of the
product as evaluated.
1
The Evaluation Technical Report contains information proprietary to the developer and/or the
evaluator, and is not releasable for public review.
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2 Certification Results
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) for this evaluation is the Crypto Library V1.0 on
P60D024/016/012yVB(Y/Z/A)/yVF from NXP Semiconductors GmbH located in Hamburg, Germany.
The TOE is comprised of the hardware as defined in [ST-HW] and the following software components:
Type Name Release Date Form of delivery
Library file phSmx2ClAes.lib 1.0 2012-12-05 Electronic file
phSmx2ClDes.lib 1.0 2012-12-05 Electronic file
phSmx2ClRsa.lib 1.0 2012-12-05 Electronic file
phSmx2ClRsaKg.lib 1.0 2012-12-05 Electronic file
phSmx2ClEccGfp.lib 1.0 2012-12-05 Electronic file
phSmx2ClSha.lib 1.0 2012-12-05 Electronic file
phSmx2ClSha512.lib 1.0 2012-12-05 Electronic file
phSmx2ClRng.lib 1.0 2012-12-05 Electronic file
phSmx2ClUtils.lib 1.0 2012-12-05 Electronic file
Header file phSmx2ClAes.h 1.0 2012-12-05 Electronic file
phSmx2ClDes.h 1.0 2012-12-05 Electronic file
phSmx2ClRsa.h 1.0 2012-12-05 Electronic file
phSmx2ClRsaKg.h 1.0 2012-12-05 Electronic file
phSmx2ClEccGfp.h 1.0 2012-12-05 Electronic file
phSmx2ClSha.h 1.0 2012-12-05 Electronic file
phSmx2ClSha512.h 1.0 2012-12-05 Electronic file
phSmx2ClRng.h 1.0 2012-12-05 Electronic file
phSmx2ClUtils.h 1.0 2012-12-05 Electronic file
phSmx2ClUtils_ImportExportFcts.h 1.0 2012-12-05 Electronic file
phSmx2ClUtils_RngAccess.h 1.0 2012-12-05 Electronic file
phSmx2ClTypes.h 1.0 2012-12-05 Electronic file
Source code phSmx2ClUtils_ ImportExportFcts.a51 1.0 2012-12-05 Electronic file
phSmx2ClUtils_ RngAccess.a51 1.0 2012-12-05 Electronic file
To ensure secure usage a set of guidance documents is provided together with the Crypto Library
V1.0 on P60D024/016/012yVB(Y/Z/A)/yVF. Details can be found in section 2.5 of this report.
The hardware part of the TOE is delivered by NXP either as wafer, module, inlay, or packaged form
together with the IC Dedicated Support Software. The Crypto Library is delivered in Phase 1 of the
TOE lifecycle as a software package (a set of binary files) to the developers of the Smartcard
Embedded Software. The Smartcard Embedded Software may comprise in this case an operating
system and/or other smart card software (applications). The Software developers can incorporate the
Crypto Library into their product.
As explained in the user guidance, as part of the delivery procedure, the customer shall verify the
correctness of the delivered files by calculating the SHA-256 hash value of the delivered files and
comparing them to reference values provided in the user guidance.
For a detailed and precise description of the TOE lifecycle refer to the [ST], chapter 1.2.2.
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2.2 Security Policy
The TOE provides the cryptographic algorithms AES, DES, Triple-DES (3DES), RSA, RSA key
generation, RSA public key computation, ECDSA (ECC over GF(p)) signature generation and
verification, ECDSA (ECC over GF(p)) key generation, ECDH (ECC Diffie-Helmann) keyexchange, full
point addition (ECC over GF(p)), SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512 algorithms in
addition to the functionality described in the Hardware Security Target [ST-HW] for the hardware
platform. The cryptographic algorithms (except SHA) are resistant against Side Channel Attacks,
including Simple Power Analysis (SPA), Differential Power Analysis (DPA), Differential Fault Analysis
(DFA) and timing attacks. SHA is only resistant against Side Channel Attacks and timing attacks.
Details on the resistance claims are provided in the Security Target [ST], relevant details are provided
in the user guidance documents.
The TOE implements a software (pseudo) random number generator, which is initialised (seeded) by
the hardware random number generator of the SmartMX2.
The TOE also a secure copy routine and a secure compare routine and includes internal security
measures for residual information protection.
Note that the TOE does not restrict access to the functions provided by the hardware: these functions
are still directly accessible to the Smartcard embedded Software.
2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
2.3.1 Assumptions
Detailed information on the assumption and threats can be found in the [ST] sections 3.4 and 3.2
respectively. Detailed information on the security objectives that must be fulfilled by the TOE
environment can be found in sections 4.2 and 4.3 of the [ST].
2.3.2 Clarification of scope
The evaluation did not reveal any threats to the TOE that are not countered by the evaluated security
functions of the product.
2.4 Architectural Information
The TOE contains a Crypto Library, which provides a set of cryptographic functionalities that can be
used by the Smartcard Embedded Software. The Crypto Library consists of several binary packages
that are intended to be linked to the Smartcard Embedded Software. The Smartcard Embedded
Software developer links the binary packages that he needs to his Smartcard Embedded Software and
the whole is subsequently implemented in arbitrary memory. Please note that the crypto functions are
supplied as a library rather than as a monolithic program, and hence a user of the library may include
only those functions that are actually required. However, some dependencies exist; details are
described in the User Guidance.
The TOE is implemented as a set of subsystems. The division into subsystems is chosen according to
the cryptographic algorithms provided. The whole TOE provides AES, DES, Triple-DES (3DES), RSA,
RSA key generation, RSA public key computation, ECDSA (ECC over GF(p)) signature generation
and verification, ECDSA (ECC over GF(p)) key generation, ECDH (ECC Diffie-Helmann)
keyexchange, full point addition (ECC over GF(p)), SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512
algorithms in addition to the functionality described in the Hardware Security Target [ST-HW] for the
hardware platform. In addition, the TOE implements a software (pseudo) random number generator,
which is initialised (seeded) by the hardware random number generator of the SmartMX2.
The TOE also contains a secure copy routine and a secure compare routine and includes internal
security measures for residual information protection.
2.5 Documentation
The following documentation is provided with the product by the developer to the customer in addition
to the documentation of the hardware as defined in [ST-HW]:
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Type Name Release Date Form of delivery
Software Crypto Library on SmartMX2 Preparative
procedures and operational user guidance
1.5 2016-01-14 Electronic document
SmartMX2 Crypto Library: User Manual –
Random Number Generator
1.0 2012-12-05 Electronic document
SmartMX2 Crypto Library: User Manual –
AES
1.0 2012-12-05 Electronic document
SmartMX2 Crypto Library: User Manual –
DES
1.0 2012-12-05 Electronic document
SmartMX2 Crypto Library: User Manual –
SHA
1.0 2012-12-05 Electronic document
SmartMX2 Crypto Library: User Manual –
SHA-512
1.0 2012-12-05 Electronic document
SmartMX2 Crypto Library: User Manual –
RSA
1.0 2012-12-05 Electronic document
SmartMX2 Crypto Library: User Manual –
RSA Key Generation
1.0 2012-12-05 Electronic document
SmartMX2 Crypto Library: User Manual –
ECC over GF(p)
1.0 2012-12-05 Electronic document
SmartMX2 Crypto Library: User Manual –
Utils
1.0 2012-12-05 Electronic document
2.6 IT Product Testing
Testing (depth, coverage, functional tests, independent testing): The evaluators examined the
developer’s testing activities documentation and verified that the developer has met their testing
responsibilities.
2.6.1 Testing approach and depth
For the Crypto Library, the developer has performed extensive testing on FSP, subsystem and module
level. All parameter choices have been addressed at least once. All boundary cases identified have
been tested explicitly, and additionally the near-boundary conditions have been covered
probabilistically. The testing was largely automated using a test-OS that allows access to the
functionalities. Test scripts were extensively used to verify that the functions return the expected
values.
The hardware test results are extendable to composite evaluations on this hardware TOE, as the
hardware is operated according to its guidance and the composite evaluation requirements are met.
For the testing performed by the evaluators, the developer has provided samples and a testing
environment. The evaluators have reproduced a selection of the developer tests, as well as a small
number of test cases designed by the evaluator.
2.6.2 Independent Penetration Testing
The evaluator independent penetration tests were conducted according to the following testing
approach:
1. During evaluation of the ADV, ATE and ALC classes the evaluators hypothesized possible
vulnerabilities. This resulted in a shortlist of possible vulnerabilities to be further analysed in
AVA using the design knowledge gained in particular from the source code analysis in IMP
and from the hardware ‘ETR for composition’. This resulted in a shortlist of potential
vulnerabilities to be tested.
2. Next the evaluators analysed the TOE design and implementation for resistance against the
[JIL] attacks. This resulted in further potential vulnerabilities to be tested.
3. The evaluators made an analysis of the TOE in its intended environment to check whether the
developer vulnerability analysis in ARC has assessed all information.
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4. The evaluators concluded that a number of areas could be potentially vulnerable for attackers
possessing a high attack potential. Consequently practical penetration testing was performed
for absolute assurance.
Two side channel analysis attacks were performed. For detailed information, see [ETR].
2.6.3 Test Configuration
Since the TOE is not an end-user product it is not possible to perform testing without first embedding it
in a testable configuration. To this end, the developer has created a proprietary test operating system.
The main purpose of the test OS is to provide access to the crypto library’s functionality. The test OS,
and its documentation, was provided to the evaluators, and was used in all the testing. See the [ETR]
for details.
The TOE was tested on P60D024PVB and P60D024PVF, in contact and contactless modes. The
results of the tests are deemed applicable to all variants of the Crypto Library V1.0 on
P60D024/016/012yVB(Y/Z/A)/yVF, based on the similarity of results obtained in the base evaluations
of the TOE on the respective platforms, and the fact that the hardware architecture of the platforms
only differ in the memory size.
The following items were used to provide support during the tests:
• A set of card samples (the TOE) containing the following:
o Hardware sample: P60D024PVB and P60D024PVF
o Crypto library loaded into the hardware sample.
o CryptOS loaded into the hardware sample.
• A toolset provided by the developer in order to facilitate recreation of the Cryptographic library,
and loading the library and the CryptOS into samples.
• CryptOS documentation
2.6.4 Testing Results
The testing activities, including configurations, procedures, test cases, expected results and observed
results are summarised in the [ETR], with references to the documents containing the full details.
The developer’s tests and the independent functional tests produced the expected results, giving
assurance that the TOE behaves as specified in its ST and functional specification.
No exploitable vulnerabilities were found with the independent penetration tests.
The algorithmic security level of cryptographic functionality has not been rated in this certification
process, but the current consensus on the algorithmic security level in the open domain, i.e. from the
current best cryptanalytic attacks published, has been taken into account.
The strength of the implementation of the cryptographic functionality has been assessed in the
evaluation, as part of the AVA_VAN activities. These activities revealed that for some cryptographic
functionality the security level could be reduced. As the remaining security level still exceeds 80 bits,
this is considered sufficient. So no exploitable vulnerabilities were found with the independent
penetration tests.
For composite evaluations, please consult the [ETRfC] for details
2.7 Re-used evaluation results
This is a re-certification: direct re-use has been made of previous evaluation results from the original
certifications NSCIB-CC-13-37322-CR and NSCIB-CC-13-37322-CR2. It was noted that some
updates to the hardware guidance were made as a result of the re-assessment of the underlying
hardware. These were addressed in this re-certification of the composite. This re-certification also
included a reassessment of the original vulnerability analysis. No changes to the software part of the
TOE (i.e. the Crypto Library) were made.
There has been extensive re-use of the ALC aspects for the sites involved in the software component
of the TOE (NXP Semiconductors Hamburg, NXP Semiconductors Austria GmbH Styria, NXP
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Semiconductors Leuven). Sites involved in the development and production of the hardware platform
were re-used by composition.
No sites have been visited as part of this evaluation.
2.8 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is defined uniquely by its name and version number Crypto Library V1.0 on
P60D024/016/012yVB(Y/Z/A)/yVF.
The TOE consists of a hardware part and a software part. This certification covers the configurations
of the TOE identified as follows:
• The reference of the hardware part of the TOE is defined in the [HW CERT] section “Evaluated
Configuration” and checked by visual inspection of the die inscription on the surface of the
TOE and by reading out the data stored in the memory, as documented in [HW-UG-Wafer]
and [HW-P60-DATASHEET].
• The reference of the software part of the TOE is checked by calculating the SHA-256 hash
value of the delivered files and comparing them to reference values provided in the user
guidance.
2.9 Results of the Evaluation
The evaluation lab documented their evaluation results in the [ETR]
2
which references the ASE
Intermediate Report and other evaluator documents. To support composite evaluations according to
[CCDB-2007-09-01] a derived document [ETRfC] was provided and approved. This document
provides details of the TOE evaluation that have to be considered when this TOE is used as platform
in a composite evaluation.
The verdict of each claimed assurance requirement is “Pass”.
Based on the above evaluation results the evaluation lab concluded the Crypto Library V1.0 on
P60D024/016/012yVB(Y/Z/A)/yVF, to be CC Part 2 extended
3
, CC Part 3 conformant and to meet
the requirements of EAL 6 augmented with ALC_FLR.1 and ASE_TSS.2. This implies that the
product satisfies the security technical requirements specified in Security Target [ST].
The Security Target claims ’strict’ conformance to the Protection Profile Security IC Platform
Protection Profile, Version 1.0, 15.06.2007; Registered and Certified by Bundesamt für Sicherheit in
der Informationstechnik (BSI) under the reference BSI-PP-0035.
2.10 Comments/Recommendations
The user guidance as outlined in section 2.5 contains necessary information about the usage of the
TOE. Certain aspects of the TOE’s security functionality, in particular the countermeasures against
attacks, depend on accurate conformance to the user guidance of both the software and the hardware
part of the TOE.There are no particular obligations or recommendations for the user apart from
following the user guidance. Please note that the documents contain relevant details with respect to
the resistance against certain attacks.
In addition all aspects of assumptions, threats and policies as outlined in the Security Target not
covered by the TOE itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his system risk
management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and techniques to be covered, he
should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the TOE is required and thus requested from
the sponsor of the certificate.
2
The Evaluation Technical Report contains information proprietary to the developer and/or the
evaluator, and is not releasable for public review.
3
The TOE is a composite TOE with a certified hardware platform. Claiming CC Part 2 extended is
because the underlying platform claims CC Part 2 extended
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prior
approval.
The strength of the implemented cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this
evaluation. To fend off attackers with high attack potential appropriate cryptographic algorithms with
adequate key lengths must be used (references can be found in national and international documents
and standards).
The user of the Crypto Library must implement the advices of the hardware user guidance.
Page: 14/15 of report number: NSCIB-CC-37322-CR3, dated 2017-06-08
®
TÜV,
TUEV
and
TUV
are
registered
trademarks.
Any
use
or
application
requires
prior
approval.
3 Security Target
The Security Target Crypto Library V1.0 on P60D024/016/012yVB(Y/Z/A)/yVF, Revision 2.1, 03 April
2017 [ST] is included here by reference.
4 Definitions
This list of Acronyms and the glossary of terms contains elements that are not already defined by the
CC or CEM:
CBC Cipher Block Chaining (a block cipher mode of operation)
CBC-MAC Cipher Block Chaining Message Authentication Code
DES Data Encryption Standard
DFA Differential Fault Analysis
ECB Electronic Code Book (a block cipher mode of operation)
IC Integrated Circuit
IT Information Technology
ITSEF IT Security Evaluation Facility
JIL Joint Interpretation Library
NSCIB Netherlands scheme for certification in the area of IT security
PP Protection Profile
PRNG Pseudo Random Number Generator
RSA Rivest-Shamir-Adleman Algorithm
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SPA/DPA Simple/Differential Power Analysis
TOE Target of Evaluation
Page: 15/15 of report number: NSCIB-CC-37322-CR3, dated 2017-06-08
®
TÜV,
TUEV
and
TUV
are
registered
trademarks.
Any
use
or
application
requires
prior
approval.
5 Bibliography
This section lists all referenced documentation used as source material in the compilation of this
report:
[BSI-PP-0035] "Security IC Platform Protection Profile", Version 1.0, June 2007.
[CC] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Parts I version
3.1 revision 1, and Part II and III, version 3.1,revision 4, September 2012.
[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, version 3.1,
Revision 4, September 2012.
[ETR] Brightsight, ETR Crypto Library V1.0 on P60D024/016/012yVB(Y/Z/A)/yVF EAL6+,
document identifier 17-RPT-152, version 2.0, dated 07 April 2017.
[ETRfC] Brightsight, ETR for Composite Evaluation Crypto Library V1.0 on
P60D024/016/012yVB(Y/Z/A)/yVF EAL6+, document identifier 17-RPT-153,
version 2.0, dated 07 April 2017.
[HW-CERT] Certification Report for NXP Secure Smart Card Controller
P60D024/016/012yVB(Y/Z/A)/yVF with IC Dedicated Software, BSI-DSZ-CC-0939-
V2-2016, 18 February 2016, and
Assurance Continuity Reassessment Report. NXP Secure Smart Card Controller
P60D024/016/012yVB(Y/Z/A)/yVF with IC Dedicated Software, BSI-DSZ-CC-0939-
V2-2016-RA-01, version 1.0, 4 January 2017
[HW-ETRfC] TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH - Evaluation Technical Report for Composite
Evaluation P60D024/016/012yVB(Y/Z/A)/yVF, Version 4, 23 November 2016.
[HW-ST] NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P60D024/016/012yVB(Y/Z/A)/yVF Security
Target Rev. 4.1 — 23 November 2015.
[JIL] Attack methods for Smart cards and similar devices, JIL, version 2.2, January
2013.
[NSCIB] Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security, Version 2.2,
August 10
th
, 2015.
[ST] Security Target Crypto Library V1.0 on P60D024/016/012yVB(Y/Z/A)/yVF,
Revision 2.1, 03 April 2017.
(This is the end of this report).