BSI-DSZ-CC-1096-2021
for
Arbit Data Diode 10 GbE
from
Arbit Cyber Defence Systems ApS
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 CC-Zert-327 V5.41
BSI-DSZ-CC-1096-2021 (*)
Arbit Data Diode 10 GbE, v1.00
from Arbit Cyber Defence Systems ApS
Functionality: Product specific Security Target
Common Criteria Part 2 conformant
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 7 augmented by ALC_FLR.1
The IT Product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation
facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1
extended by Scheme Interpretations, by advice of the Certification Body for components
beyond EAL 5 and CC Supporting Documents as listed in the Certification Report for
conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1. CC and
CEM are also published as ISO/IEC 15408 and ISO/IEC 18045.
(*) This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its
evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report and
Notification. For details on the validity see Certification Report part A chapter 5.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification
scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions
of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the
evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT Product by the Federal Office for
Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is
either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 7 April 2021
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Sandro Amendola L.S.
Head of Division
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
SOGIS
Recognition Agreement
for components up to
EAL 4
Common Criteria
Recognition Arrangement
recognition for components
up to EAL 2 and ALC_FLR
only
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1096-2021
This page is intentionally left blank.
4 / 22
BSI-DSZ-CC-1096-2021 Certification Report
Contents
A. Certification......................................................................................................................6
1. Preliminary Remarks....................................................................................................6
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure...............................................................6
3. Recognition Agreements..............................................................................................7
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification................................................................8
5. Validity of the Certification Result.................................................................................8
6. Publication....................................................................................................................9
B. Certification Results.......................................................................................................10
1. Executive Summary....................................................................................................11
2. Identification of the TOE.............................................................................................12
3. Security Policy............................................................................................................13
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.....................................................................13
5. Architectural Information.............................................................................................13
6. Documentation...........................................................................................................14
7. IT Product Testing.......................................................................................................14
8. Evaluated Configuration.............................................................................................14
9. Results of the Evaluation............................................................................................15
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE.....................................................16
11. Security Target..........................................................................................................17
12. Regulation specific aspects (eIDAS, QES)..............................................................17
13. Definitions.................................................................................................................17
14. Bibliography..............................................................................................................18
C. Excerpts from the Criteria..............................................................................................20
D. Annexes.........................................................................................................................21
5 / 22
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1096-2021
A. Certification
1. Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● Act on the Federal Office for Information Security1
● BSI Certification and Approval Ordinance2
● BSI Schedule of Costs3
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
● DIN EN ISO/IEC 17065 standard
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) [3]
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility, its
approval and licencing process (CC-Stellen) [3]
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
2
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of Security Certificates and approval by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungs- und -Anerkennungsverordnung - BSIZertV) of 17 December
2014, Bundesgesetzblatt 2014, part I, no. 61, p. 2231
3
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 3 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I, p. 519
6 / 22
BSI-DSZ-CC-1096-2021 Certification Report
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.14
[1] also published as
ISO/IEC 15408.
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 [2] also published
as ISO/IEC 18045
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
3. Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
3.1. European Recognition of CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and, in addition, at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS
Technical Domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL 1 to EAL 4. For "Smartcards and similar devices" a SOGIS Technical Domain is in
place. For "HW Devices with Security Boxes" a SOGIS Technical Domains is in place, too.
In addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of
the recognition agreement.
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, details on
recognition, and the history of the agreement can be seen on the website at
https://www.sogis.eu.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the related bodies of the signatory nations. A disclaimer
beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of recognition.
This certificate is recognized according to the rules of SOGIS-MRA, i.e. up to and including
CC part 3 EAL 4 components. The evaluation contained components above EAL 4 that are
not mutually recognised in accordance with the provisions of the SOGIS MRA. For mutual
recognition the EAL 4 components of these assurance families are relevant.
3.2. International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC
(Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08
September 2014. It covers CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP)
(exact use), CC certificates based on assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or
the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR) and CC certificates for Protection
Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on
the website: https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the related bodies
4
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated
23 February 2007, p. 3730
7 / 22
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1096-2021
of the signatory nations. A disclaimer beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of
recognition.
This certificate is recognized according to the rules of CCRA-2014, i. e. up to and including
CC part 3 EAL 2+ ALC_FLR components.
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product Arbit Data Diode 10 GbE, v1.00 has undergone the certification procedure at
BSI.
The evaluation of the product Arbit Data Diode 10 GbE was conducted by TÜV
Informationstechnik GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 17 March 2021. TÜV
Informationstechnik GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)5
recognised by the certification
body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: Arbit Cyber Defence Systems
ApS.
The product was developed by: Arbit Cyber Defence Systems ApS.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
5. Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report applies only to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report
and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance components and assurance levels please refer to CC
itself. Detailed references are listed in part C of this report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-assessment or
re-certification). Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation
and certification procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk
management needs regularly updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-
assessment on a regular e.g. annual basis.
In order to avoid an indefinite usage of the certificate when evolved attack methods would
require a re-assessment of the products resistance to state of the art attack methods, the
maximum validity of the certificate has been limited. The certificate issued on 7 April 2021
is valid until 6 Aprilg 2026. Validity can be re-newed by re-certification.
5
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
8 / 22
BSI-DSZ-CC-1096-2021 Certification Report
The owner of the certificate is obliged:
1. when advertising the certificate or the fact of the product's certification, to refer to
the Certification Report as well as to provide the Certification Report, the Security
Target and user guidance documentation mentioned herein to any customer of the
product for the application and usage of the certified product,
2. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately about vulnerabilities of the
product that have been identified by the developer or any third party after issuance
of the certificate,
3. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately in the case that security relevant
changes in the evaluated life cycle, e.g. related to development and production sites
or processes, occur, or the confidentiality of documentation and information related
to the Target of Evaluation (TOE) or resulting from the evaluation and certification
procedure where the certification of the product has assumed this confidentiality
being maintained, is not given any longer. In particular, prior to the dissemination of
confidential documentation and information related to the TOE or resulting from the
evaluation and certification procedure that do not belong to the deliverables
according to the Certification Report part B, or for those where no dissemination
rules have been agreed on, to third parties, the Certification Body at BSI has to be
informed.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
6. Publication
The product Arbit Data Diode 10 GbE has been included in the BSI list of certified
products, which is published regularly (see also Internet: https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]).
Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer6
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
6
Arbit Cyber Defence Systems ApS
Immerkær 54
DK-2650 Hvidovre
Denmark
9 / 22
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1096-2021
B. Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
10 / 22
BSI-DSZ-CC-1096-2021 Certification Report
1. Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the Arbit Data Diode 10GbE Version 1.00, developed by
Arbit Cyber Defence Systems ApS.
In its intended use case, the TOE contains a photodiode to convert an optical signal at its
input port to an electrical signal at the output port. Additionally, the TOE implements a one-
way data flow policy, i.e., information entering the TOE at its output port is not emitted at
the input port in case customers follow the security requirements provided in the
installation guidance document.
The TOE acts on the first level of the ISO/OSI reference model, i.e., no logical behaviour is
implemented. This results in the fact that the TOE does not provide a configuration
interface, return values or error messages.
The Security Target [6] and [9] is the basis for this certification. It is not based on a certified
Protection Profile.
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 7
augmented by ALC_FLR.1.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 7. They are all selected from Common Criteria Part 2.
Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 conformant.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functionality:
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
One-Way Information Flow The TOE implements the one-way data diode
through a repeater, where a fiber optic network
cable is connected to the INPUT port and a
Receiver connection on the OUTPUT port.
Information can only be received from the
Sending network connected on the INPUT port,
and no information can spill over to the INPUT
port from the OUTPUT port. Information received
on the INPUT port is allowed to exit through the
OUTPUT port, without further processing.
Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6] and [9], chapters 2.2 and 4.3.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6] and [9],
chapter 4.1 . Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of
Assumptions, Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security
Target [6] and [9], chapter 4.
This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8.
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
11 / 22
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1096-2021
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2. Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
Arbit Data Diode 10 GbE.
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
1 HW Arbit Data Diode 10GbE v1.00 Personal hand-over of sealed
SFP+ module (see below).
2 DOC Arbit Data Diode 10GbE –
Integration Guide
V1.08, 2020-10-
21
Personal hand-over in paper
format (see below).
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
Regarding delivery:
As it is stated in the Security targets [6] and [9] section 2.1.1, the “delivery of TOE and its
Integration Guide shall be performed as trusted personal handover in accordance with the
delivery procedure”.
Thus, delivery is conducted by the following ways:
• Announced delivery:
The recipient knows the expected time of delivery window and forwarder company.
The recipient shall accept deliveries as announced, otherwise shall contact the
sender.
• Personal handover:
The delivered items are personally handed over to the forwarder and the forwarder
personally handover the delivery to the consumer. The developer shall be informed
of the successful handover.
• Known forwarder:
The respective parties know the forwarder. The identity of the forwarder shall be
verified before handing over items.
• Independent delivery of TOE parts:
TOE parts shall be delivered independently. The TOE parts may be sent by different
forwarders or on different days. One forwarder shall never have the TOE and its
guidance at the same time The consumer shall verify Independence of delivery
before accepting the complete delivery.
Regarding identification:
The TOE and its reference are part of the Integration Guidance [11] (section 2), and the
TOE itself is labelled accordingly (part of considerations of assurance family ALC_CMS).
12 / 22
BSI-DSZ-CC-1096-2021 Certification Report
The independent delivery of TOE parts and the correct labelling of the TOE enable
consumer of secure reception of the TOE and its guidance, maintaining authenticity and
integrity during delivery.
3. Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues:
The security functionality of the TOE is to implement the one-was data flow policy. While in
its intended use case, the TOE converts an optical signal at its input port to an electrical
signal at its output port, the TOE makes sure that no data or information is transmitted
from its output port to the input port. In fact, when operated as described in the user
guidance [11], the TOE is not able to emit light that contains information about any signal
applied to the electrical output.
Specific details concerning the above mentioned security policy can be found in [6] and [9],
chapters 2.1.2, 7.1, and 7.6.
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are
of relevance:
The Security Objective for the Operational Environment OE.INTEGRATOR requires
integrators performing the installation of the TOE to be well-trained and competent in the
prevention of signal leakage. Furthermore, integrators shall adhere to the guidance. In [11]
section 2.2, the developer states that the integrator who is performing the installation has
to apply procedures applicable to the respective operational environment such that proper
protection of the TOE is maintained at all times.
The Security Objective for the Operational Environment OE.PHYSICAL requires that the
TOE and its interfaces shall be physically protected from unauthorized access. In [11]
section 2.2 and 2.4, the developer clearly states that no user may have physical access to
the TOE. If an integrity breach is possible (identified by the means implemented by the
integrator), the TOE shall not be used.
The Security Objective for the Operational Environment OE.POWER requires that the
power supply of the TOE shall be 3.3V +/- 5% and that the minimum current capacity
(continuous and peak-to-peak) shall be 500 mA. Guidance document [11] section 2.3.3
addresses this OE accordingly.
5. Architectural Information
Details on architectural information can be found in the Security Target [6] and [9], section
2.
13 / 22
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1096-2021
6. Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7. IT Product Testing
Both the developer as well as ITSEF conducted product testing.
Regarding the developer testing:
The developer conducted tests during development of the TOE and conducted tests for
each produced device:
• The development tests are suitable verify that the TSF behaves as specified in
ADV_FSP, ADV_TDS, and ADV_IMP.
• The production tests are used to check that a produced product matches the
expected behavior derived from the development tests.
The following TOE security functionalities were tested by the developer:
• FDP_IFC.2 Complete information flow control, and
• FDP_IFF.1 Simple security attributes.
Regarding ITSEF testing:
• Functional verification of the TOE interfaces (TSFI),
• Functional verification of the TOE design providing assurance that the product
matches the implementation representation,
• Functional production tests as a sanity check of the core features of the
manufactured device,
• Penetration testing.
SFRs penetration tested by the ITSEF:
• FDP_IFC.2 Complete information flow control, and
• FDP_IFF.1 Simple security attributes.
The overall ITSEF verdict is:
The penetration tests results confirm that the TOE is resistant to attackers with high attack
potential in the intended operational environment.
8. Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is available in a single variant and cannot be further configured.
14 / 22
BSI-DSZ-CC-1096-2021 Certification Report
9. Results of the Evaluation
9.1. CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used for those components up to EAL 5
extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5.
The following guidance specific for the certification procedure was used:
• AIS1: Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 1,
Durchführung der Ortsbesichtigung in der Entwicklungsumgebung des Herstellers,
Version 14, 2017-10-11, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik,
• AIS14: Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 14,
Anforderungen an Aufbau und Inhalt der ETR-Teile (Evaluation Technical Report)
für Evaluationen nach CC (Common Criteria), Version 7, 2010-08-03, Bundesamt
für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik,
• AIS19: Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 14,
Anforderungen an Aufbau und Inhalt der ETR-Teile (Evaluation Technical Report)
für Evaluationen nach CC (Common Criteria), Version 7, 2010-08-03, Bundesamt
für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik,
• AIS32: Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 14,
Anforderungen an Aufbau und Inhalt der ETR-Teile (Evaluation Technical Report)
für Evaluationen nach CC (Common Criteria), Version 7, 2010-08-03, Bundesamt
für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik,
• AIS34: Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 14,
Anforderungen an Aufbau und Inhalt der ETR-Teile (Evaluation Technical Report)
für Evaluationen nach CC (Common Criteria), Version 7, 2010-08-03, Bundesamt
für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik,
• AIS39: Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 14,
Anforderungen an Aufbau und Inhalt der ETR-Teile (Evaluation Technical Report)
für Evaluationen nach CC (Common Criteria), Version 7, 2010-08-03, Bundesamt
für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik,
• AIS45: Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 45,
Erstellung und Pflege von Meilensteinplänen, Version 2, 2010-08-03, Bundesamt
für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik.
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the EAL 7 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report)
● The components ALC_FLR.1 augmented for this TOE evaluation.
The evaluation thus has confirmed:
● for the Functionality: Product specific Security Target
Common Criteria Part 2 conformant
15 / 22
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1096-2021
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 7 augmented by ALC_FLR.1
For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production environment see
annex B in part D of this report.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2. Results of cryptographic assessment
The TOE does not include cryptographic mechanisms. Thus, no such mechanisms were
part of the assessment.
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered, especially the implementation
guidance [11]. In addition all aspects of Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the
Security Target not covered by the TOE itself need to be fulfilled by the operational
environment of the TOE. In detail, the assumptions on the operational environment need
to be taken into account by customers:
Assumption Definition
A.INTEGRATOR The integrator who is performing the installation
of the TOE is well-trained and competent in the
prevention of signal leakage, and will properly
adhere to the TOE guidance.
A.PHYSICAL The TOE and its interfaces will be physically
protected from unauthorized access and
mechanical, electrical, optical, radiation or any
other form of physical influence.
A.POWER Power supply to TOE shall be 3.3 V +/-5%. The
minimum current capacity, both continuous and
peak, shall be 500 mA.
Table 3: Assumptions on the operational environment
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
The limited validity for the usage of cryptographic algorithms (if any) as outlined in chapter
9 has to be considered by the user and his system risk management process, too.
For this reason the TOE includes guidance documentation (see table 2) which contains
obligations and guidelines for users of the product layer on top on how to securely use this
certified TOE and which (e.g. organisational measures of delivery) measures have to be
implemented in order to fulfil the security requirements of the Security Target of the TOE.
In the course of the evaluation of the composite product or system it must be examined if
the required measures have been correctly and effectively implemented by the product
layer on top.
16 / 22
BSI-DSZ-CC-1096-2021 Certification Report
11. Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [9] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report. It is a sanitised version of
the complete Security Target [6] used for the evaluation performed. Sanitisation was
performed according to the rules as outlined in the relevant CCRA policy (see AIS 35 [4]).
12. Regulation specific aspects (eIDAS, QES)
None.
13. Definitions
13.1. Acronyms
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
cPP Collaborative Protection Profile
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
PP Protection Profile
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
13.2. Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Collaborative Protection Profile - A Protection Profile collaboratively developed by an
International Technical Community endorsed by the Management Committee.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in CC
part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in CC part 3.
17 / 22
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1096-2021
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Package - named set of either security functional or security assurance requirements
Protection Profile - A formal document defined in CC, expressing an implementation
independent set of security requirements for a category of IT Products that meet specific
consumer needs.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - An IT Product and its associated administrator and user guidance
documentation that is the subject of an Evaluation.
TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
14. Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 5, April 2017
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 5, April 2017,
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[3] BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) and Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility,
approval and licencing (CC-Stellen), https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE7
https://www.bsi.bund.de/AIS
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
on the BSI Website, https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierungsreporte
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-1096-2021, Version 0.75, 21.10.2020, “Arbit Data
Diode 10GbE - Security Target”, Confiware ApS and Arbit Cyber Defence Systems
ApS (confidential document)
[7] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 2, 2021-01-20, “ETR Summary V2 – Arbit Data
Diode 1.00”, TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH, (confidential document)
[8] (reference not used)
7
See section 9.1 for details on used AIS.
18 / 22
BSI-DSZ-CC-1096-2021 Certification Report
[9] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-1096-2021, Version 1.01, 10.12.2020, “Arbit Data
Diode 10GbE - Security Target Lite”, Confiware ApS and Arbit Cyber Defence
Systems ApS (sanitised public document)
[10] Configuration list for the TOE, Version 0.42, 2020-12-10, “Arbit Data Diode 10GbE -
Configuration List” (confidential document)
[11] “Arbit Data Diode 10GbE – Integration Guide”, Version 1.08, 2021-10-21, Confiware
ApS and Arbit Cyber Defence Systems ApS
19 / 22
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1096-2021
C. Excerpts from the Criteria
For the meaning of the assurance components and levels the following references to the
Common Criteria can be followed:
• On conformance claim definitions and descriptions refer to CC part 1 chapter 10.5
• On the concept of assurance classes, families and components refer to CC Part 3
chapter 7.1
• On the concept and definition of pre-defined assurance packages (EAL) refer to CC
Part 3 chapters 7.2 and 8
• On the assurance class ASE for Security Target evaluation refer to CC Part 3
chapter 12
• On the detailed definitions of the assurance components for the TOE evaluation
refer to CC Part 3 chapters 13 to 17
• The table in CC part 3 , Annex E summarizes the relationship between the
evaluation assurance levels (EAL) and the assurance classes, families and
components.
The CC are published at https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/cc/.
20 / 22
BSI-DSZ-CC-1096-2021 Certification Report
D. Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
Annex B: Evaluation results regarding development
and production environment
21 / 22
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1096-2021
Annex B of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1096-2021
Evaluation results regarding
development and production
environment
The IT product Arbit Data Diode 10 GbE (Target of Evaluation, TOE) has been evaluated
at an approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security
Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 extended by Scheme Interpretations, by advice of the
Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and CC Supporting Documents for
conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1.
As a result of the TOE certification, dated 7 April 2021, the following results regarding the
development and production environment apply. The Common Criteria assurance
requirements ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC_CMC.5, ALC_CMS.5, ALC_DEL.1,
ALC_DVS.2, ALC_LCD.2, ALC_TAT.3)
are fulfilled for the development and production sites of the TOE. The relevant delivery
related site is:
• “Arbit Hvidovre”,
Arbit Cyber Defence Systems ApS,
Immerkær 54,
2650 Hvidovre – Denmark.
For all of the sites, the requirements have been specifically applied in accordance with the
Security Target [6]. The evaluators verified, that the threats, security objectives and
requirements for the TOE life cycle phases up to delivery (as stated in the Security Target
[6] and [9]) are fulfilled by the procedures of these sites.
Note: End of report
22 / 22