National Information Assurance Partnership
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
Validation Report
for the
Junos OS 18.1R2 for QFX10002, QFX10008 and QFX100016, Version 1.1
Report Number: CCEVS-VR-VID10930-2019
Dated: January 28, 2019
Version: 1.1
National Institute of Standards and Technology National Security Agency
Information Technology Laboratory Information Assurance Directorate
100 Bureau Drive 9800 Savage Road STE 6940
Gaithersburg, MD 20899 Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6940
®
TM
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Validation Team
Meredith Hennan
Kenneth Stutterheim
The Aerospace Corporation
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
Acumen Security, LLC
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Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary............................................................................................................... 4
2 Identification.......................................................................................................................... 5
3 Architectural Information .................................................................................................... 6
4 Security Policy........................................................................................................................ 7
5 Assumptions, Threats & Clarification of Scope ................................................................. 9
5.1 Assumptions....................................................................................................................................................9
5.2 Threats...........................................................................................................................................................10
5.3 Clarification of Scope...................................................................................................................................12
5.4 Excluded Functionality ................................................................................................................................12
6 Documentation..................................................................................................................... 13
7 TOE Evaluated Configuration ........................................................................................... 14
7.1 Evaluated Configuration..............................................................................................................................14
8 IT Product Testing............................................................................................................... 16
8.1 Developer Testing .........................................................................................................................................16
8.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing.......................................................................................................16
9 Results of the Evaluation .................................................................................................... 17
9.1 Evaluation of Security Target .....................................................................................................................17
9.2 Evaluation of Development Documentation...............................................................................................17
9.3 Evaluation of Guidance Documents............................................................................................................18
9.4 Evaluation of Life Cycle Support Activities...............................................................................................18
9.5 Evaluation of Test Documentation and the Test Activity .........................................................................18
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity ..............................................................................................................18
9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results..................................................................................................................19
10 Validator Comments & Recommendations ...................................................................... 20
11 Annexes................................................................................................................................. 21
12 Security Target .................................................................................................................... 22
13 Glossary ................................................................................................................................ 23
14 Bibliography......................................................................................................................... 24
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1 Executive Summary
This Validation Report (VR) is intended to assist the end user of this product and any security
certification Agent for that end user to determine the suitability of this Information Technology
(IT) product for their environment. End users should review the Security Target (ST), which is
where specific security claims are made, in conjunction with this VR, which describes how those
security claims were tested and evaluated and any restrictions on the evaluated configuration.
Prospective users should carefully read the Assumptions and Clarification of Scope in Section 5
and the Validator Comments in Section 10, where any restrictions on the evaluated
configuration are highlighted.
This report documents the National Information Assurance Partnership (NIAP) assessment of
the evaluation of the Junos OS 18.1R2 for QFX10002, QFX10008 and QFX100016 Target of
Evaluation (TOE). It presents the evaluation results, their justifications, and the conformance
results. This VR is not an endorsement of the TOE by any agency of the U.S. Government and no
warranty of the TOE is either expressed or implied. This VR applies only to the specific version
and configuration of the product as evaluated and documented in the ST.
The evaluation was completed by Acumen Security in January 2019. The information in this
report is largely derived from the Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) and associated test report,
all written by Acumen Security. The evaluation determined that the product is both Common
Criteria Part 2 Extended and Part 3 Conformant, and meets the assurance requirements defined
in the Collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 2.0 + Errata 20180314
(NDcPPv2.0e).
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) identified in this Validation Report has been evaluated at a NIAP
approved Common Criteria Testing Laboratory using the Common Methodology for IT Security
Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev. 4) for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security
Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev. 4), as interpreted by the Assurance Activities contained in the
NDcPP. This Validation Report applies only to the specific version of the TOE as evaluated. The
evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the NIAP Common Criteria
Evaluation and Validation Scheme and the conclusions of the testing laboratory in the
evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence provided.
The validation team provided guidance on technical issues and evaluation processes and
reviewed the individual work units documented in the ETR and the Assurance Activities Report
(AAR). The validation team found that the evaluation showed that the product satisfies all the
functional requirements and assurance requirements stated in the Security Target (ST). Based
on these findings, the validation team concludes that the testing laboratory's findings are
accurate, the conclusions justified, and the conformance results are correct. The conclusions of
the testing laboratory in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence
produced.
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2 Identification
The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of
Standards effort to establish commercial facilities to perform trusted product evaluations.
Under this program, security evaluations are conducted by commercial testing
laboratories called Common Criteria Testing Laboratories (CCTLs). CCTLs evaluate
products against Protection Profile containing Assurance Activities, which are
interpretation of CEM work units specific to the technology described by the PP.
The NIAP Validation Body assigns validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality
and consistency across evaluations. Developers of information technology products
desiring a security evaluation contract with a CCTL and pay a fee for their product's
evaluation. Upon successful completion of the evaluation, the product is added to NIAP's
Product Compliance List.
Table 1 provides information needed to completely identify the product, including:
 The Target of Evaluation (TOE): the fully qualified identifier of the product as
evaluated.
 The Security Target (ST), describing the security features, claims, and assurances
of the product.
 The conformance result of the evaluation.
 The Protection Profile(s) to which the product is conformant.
 The organizations and individuals participating in the evaluation.
Table 1: Evaluation Identifiers
Item Identifier
Evaluation
Scheme
United States NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
TOE Junos OS 18.1R2 for QFX10002, QFX10008 and QFX100016
Protection Profile Collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 2.0 +
Errata 20180314, 14 March 2018 (NDcPPv2.0e)
Security Target Junos OS 18.1R2 for QFX10002, QFX10008 and QFX100016 Security
Target, Version 1.5, January 2019
Evaluation
Technical Report
Junos OS 18.1R2 for QFX10002, QFX10008 and QFX100016 ETR, Version
1.2 January 2019
CC Version Version 3.1 Revision 4
Conformance
Result
CC Part 2 Extended and CC Part 3 Conformant
Sponsor Juniper Networks, Inc.
Developer Juniper Networks, Inc.
Common Criteria
Testing Lab (CCTL)
Acumen Security
2400 Research Blvd
Rockville, MD 20850
CCEVS Validators Meredith Hennan, Kenneth Stutterheim
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3 Architectural Information
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is Juniper Networks, Inc. Junos OS 18.1R2 executing on
QFX10K-Series Ethernet Switches. The supported QFX10K-Series chassis are:
 QFX10002
 QFX10008
 QFX10016
Each of the Ethernet Switches is a secure network device that protects itself largely by
offering only a minimal logical interface to the network and attached nodes. All switching
platforms are powered by the Junos OS firmware, Junos OS 18.1R2 for QFX10K Series, which
is a special purpose OS that provides no general-purpose computing capability. Junos OS
provides both management and control functions as well as all IP switching.
The Ethernet Switches primarily support the definition and enforcement of information flow
policies among network nodes. All information flow from one network node to another
passes through an instance of the TOE. Information flow is controlled based on network
node addresses and protocol. In support of the information flow security functions, the TOE
ensures that security-relevant activity is audited and provides the security tools to manage
the security functions.
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4 Security Policy
The logical boundary of the TOE includes those security functions implemented exclusively by
the TOE.
Protected Communications
The TOE provides an SSH server to support protected communications for administrators to
establish secure sessions and to support connections from external syslog servers. The TOE
requires that applications exchanging information with it are successfully authenticated prior to
any exchange (i.e. applications connecting over SSH). The TOE includes cryptographic modules
that provide the underlying cryptographic services, including key management and protection
of stored keys, algorithms, random bit generation and crypto-administration. The
cryptographic modules provide confidentiality and integrity services for authentication and
protecting communications with connecting applications.
Administrator Authentication
Administrative users must provide unique identification and authentication data before any
administrative access to the system is granted. Authentication data entered and stored on the
TOE is protected. The TOE can be configured to terminate interactive user sessions and to
present an access banner with warning messages prior to authentication.
Correct Operation
The TOE provides for both cryptographic and non-cryptographic self-tests, and is capable of
automated recovery from failure states.
Trusted Update
The administrator can initiate update of the TOE firmware. The integrity of any firmware
updates is verified prior to installation of the updated firmware.
Audit
Junos auditable events are stored in the syslog files on the appliance, and can be sent to an
external log server (via Netconf over SSH). Auditable events include start-up and shutdown of
the audit functions, authentication events, as well as the events listed in Table 4. Audit records
include the date and time, event category, event type, username, and the outcome of the event
(success or failure). Local syslog storage limits are configurable and are monitored. In the event
of storage limits being reached the oldest logs will be overwritten.
Management
The TOE provides a Security Administrator role that is responsible for:
• the configuration and maintenance of cryptographic elements related to the
establishment of secure connections to and from the evaluated product
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• the regular review of all audit data;
• initiation of trusted update function;
• all administrative tasks (e.g., creating the security policy).
The devices are managed through a Command Line Interface (CLI). The CLI is accessible through
local (serial) console connection or remote administrative (SSHv2) session.
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5 Assumptions, Threats & Clarification of Scope
5.1 Assumptions
The specific conditions listed in the following subsections are assumed to exist in the TOE’s
environment. These assumptions include both practical realities in the development of the TOE
security requirements and the essential environmental conditions on the use of the TOE.
Assumption Description
A.PHYSICAL_PROTECTION The network device is assumed to be physically
protected in its operational environment and not
subject to physical attacks that compromise the security
and/or interfere with the device’s physical
interconnections and correct operation. This protection
is assumed to be sufficient to protect the device and the
data it contains. As a result, the [NDcPP] will not include
any requirements on physical tamper protection or
other physical attack mitigations. The [NDcPP] will not
expect the product to defend against physical access to
the device that allows unauthorized entities to extract
data, bypass other controls, or otherwise manipulate
the device.
A.LIMITED_FUNCTIONALITY The device is assumed to provide networking
functionality as its core function and not provide
functionality/services that could be deemed as general
purpose computing. For example, the device should not
provide a computing platform for general purpose
applications (unrelated to networking functionality).
A.NO_THRU_TRAFFIC_PROTECTION A standard/generic network device does not provide any
assurance regarding the protection of traffic that
traverses it. The intent is for the network device to
protect data that originates on or is destined to the
device itself, to include administrative data and audit
data. Traffic that is traversing the network device,
destined for another network entity, is not covered by
the NDcPP. It is assumed that this protection will be
covered by cPPs for particular types of network devices
(e.g., firewall).
A.TRUSTED_ADMINISTRATOR The Security Administrator(s) for the network device are
assumed to be trusted and to act in the best interest of
security for the organization. This includes being
appropriately trained, following policy, and adhering to
guidance documentation. Administrators are trusted to
ensure passwords/credentials have sufficient strength
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and entropy and to lack malicious intent when
administering the device. The network device is not
expected to be capable of defending against a malicious
Administrator that actively works to bypass or
compromise the security of the device.
A.REGULAR_UPDATES The network device firmware and software is assumed
to be updated by an Administrator on a regular basis in
response to the release of product updates due to
known vulnerabilities.
A.ADMIN_CREDENTIALS_SECURE The Administrator’s credentials (private key) used to
access the network device are protected by the platform
on which they reside.
A.RESIDUAL_INFORMATION The Administrator must ensure that there is no
unauthorized access possible for sensitive residual
information (e.g. cryptographic keys, keying material,
PINs, passwords etc.) on networking equipment when
the equipment is discarded or removed from its
operational environment.
5.2 Threats
The following table lists the threats addressed by the TOE and the IT Environment. The
assumed level of expertise of the attacker for all the threats identified below is Enhanced-Basic.
Threat Description
T.UNAUTHORIZED_ADMINI
STRATOR_ACCESS
Threat agents may attempt to gain Administrator access to the
network device by nefarious means such as masquerading as an
Administrator to the device, masquerading as the device to an
Administrator, replaying an administrative session (in its
entirety, or selected portions), or performing man-in-the-
middle attacks, which would provide access to the
administrative session, or sessions between network devices.
Successfully gaining Administrator access allows malicious
actions that compromise the security functionality of the device
and the network on which it resides.
T.WEAK_CRYPTOGRAPHY Threat agents may exploit weak cryptographic algorithms or
perform a cryptographic exhaust against the key space. Poorly
chosen encryption algorithms, modes, and key sizes will allow
attackers to compromise the algorithms, or brute force exhaust
the key space and give them unauthorized access allowing them
to read, manipulate and/or control the traffic with minimal
effort.
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T.UNTRUSTED_COMMUNIC
ATION_CHANNELS
Threat agents may attempt to target network devices that do
not use standardized secure tunneling protocols to protect the
critical network traffic. Attackers may take advantage of poorly
designed protocols or poor key management to successfully
perform man-in-the-middle attacks, replay attacks, etc.
Successful attacks will result in loss of confidentiality and
integrity of the critical network traffic, and potentially could
lead to a compromise of the network device itself.
T.WEAK_AUTHENTICATION
_ENDPOINTS
Threat agents may take advantage of secure protocols that use
weak methods to authenticate the endpoints – e.g. a shared
password that is guessable or transported as plaintext. The
consequences are the same as a poorly designed protocol, the
attacker could masquerade as the Administrator or another
device, and the attacker could insert themselves into the
network stream and perform a man-in-the-middle attack. The
result is the critical network traffic is exposed and there could
be a loss of confidentiality and integrity, and potentially the
network device itself could be compromised.
T.UPDATE_COMPROMISE Threat agents may attempt to provide a compromised update
of the software or firmware which undermines the security
functionality of the device. Non-validated updates or updates
validated using non-secure or weak cryptography leave the
update firmware vulnerable to surreptitious alteration.
T.UNDETECTED_ACTIVITY Threat agents may attempt to access, change, and/or modify
the security functionality of the network device without
Administrator awareness. This could result in the attacker
finding an avenue (e.g., misconfiguration, flaw in the product)
to compromise the device and the Administrator would have no
knowledge that the device has been compromised.
T.SECURITY_FUNCTIONALIT
Y_COMPROMISE
Threat agents may compromise credentials and device data
enabling continued access to the network device and its critical
data. The compromise of credentials includes replacing existing
credentials with an attacker’s credentials, modifying existing
credentials, or obtaining the Administrator or device credentials
for use by the attacker.
T.PASSWORD_CRACKING Threat agents may be able to take advantage of weak
administrative passwords to gain privileged access to the
device. Having privileged access to the device provides the
attacker unfettered access to the network traffic, and may allow
them to take advantage of any trust relationships with other
network devices.
T.SECURITY_FUNCTIONALIT
Y_FAILURE
An external, unauthorized entity could make use of failed or
compromised security functionality and might therefore
12
subsequently use or abuse security functions without prior
authentication to access, change or modify device data, critical
network traffic or security functionality of the device.
5.3 Clarification of Scope
All evaluations (and all products) have limitations, as well as potential misconceptions that need
clarifying. This text covers some of the more important limitations and clarifications of this
evaluation. Note that:
 As with any evaluation, this evaluation only shows that the evaluated configuration
meets the security claims made, with a certain level of assurance. The level of assurance
for this evaluation is defined within the NDcPPv2.0e.
 Consistent with the expectations of the Protection Profile, this evaluation did not
specifically search for, nor seriously attempt to counter, vulnerabilities that were not
“obvious” or vulnerabilities to objectives not claimed in the ST. The CEM defines an
“obvious” vulnerability as one that is easily exploited with a minimum of understanding
of the TOE, technical sophistication and resources.
 The evaluation of security functionality of the product was limited to the functionality
specified in the claimed PPs. Any additional security related functional capabilities
included in the product were not covered by this evaluation.
5.4 Excluded Functionality
The following security capabilities of the device were not tested as part of the evaluation
although they are represented in the administrative guide; therefore, no claims can be made
regarding their proper operation or effectiveness:
 Access Control Lists as part of stateless firewall filtering capability
 Reverse Path Forwarding
 Routing Engine IPSec
The following capabilities are Out-of-Scope for this evaluation:
 Use of telnet, since it violates the Trusted Path requirement
 Use of FTP, since it violates the Trusted Path requirement
 Use of SNMP, since it violates the Trusted Path requirement
 Use of SSL, including management via J-Web, JUNOScript and JUNOScope, since it
violates the Trusted Path requirement
 Use of CLI account super-user and Linux root account.
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6 Documentation
The following documents were provided by the vendor with the TOE for evaluation:
 Junos OS 18.1R2 for QFX10002, QFX10008 and QFX100016 Security Target
 Junos OS Common Criteria and FIPS Evaluated Configuration Guide for QFX10K Ethernet
Switches Release 18.1R2
Any additional customer documentation provided with the product, or that is available online
was not included in the scope of the evaluation and therefore should not to be relied upon
when configuring or operating the device as evaluated.
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7 TOE Evaluated Configuration
7.1 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is the Junos OS 18.1R2-S3 firmware running on the appliance chassis listed in table 2 of
ST. Hence the TOE is contained within the physical boundary of the specified appliance
chassis as shown in figure 1 below.
The physical boundary of the TOE is:
 QFX10002 Ethernet Switches – the entirety of the Fixed Ethernet Switch
appliance (either QFX10002-72Q or QFX10002-36Q switch)
 QFX10008 and QFX10016 Modular Ethernet Switches – the chassis populated
with at least one instance of the QFX10000 Control Board and one or more or
the line cards listed in Table .
Figure 1 TOE Boundary
Separate install images are provided for QFX10002 and QFX10008/QFX10016, namely:
 QFX10002: jinstall-host-qfx-10-f-x86-64-18.1R2-S3.3-secure-signed.tgz
 QFX10008/QFX10016: jinstall-host-qfx-10-m-x86-64-18.1R2-S3.3-secure-signed.tgz
The TOE interfaces comprise the following:
i. Network interfaces which pass traffic
ii. Local and Remote Management interfaces used for administrative
actions.
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Ethernet
Switch
Model
Network Ports Routing Engine Firmware
QFX10002 QSFP+ for 40GbE speeds
QSFP28 ports for 100GbE speeds
Fixed in
QFX10002
chassis
Junos OS
18.1R2
QFX10008  QFX10000-36Q, a 36-port 40GbE quad
small form-factor pluggable plus
transceiver (QSFP+) or 12-port
100GbE QSFP28 line card
 QFX10000-30C, a 30-port 100GbE
QSFP28/40GbE QSFP+ line card
 QFX10000-60S-6Q, a 60-port
1GbE/10GbE SFP/SFP+ line card with
six-port 40GbE QSFP+ / two-port
100GbE QSFP28
 QFX10008 Switch Fabric
QFX10000
Control Board
QFX10016  QFX10000-36Q, a 36-port 40GbE quad
small form-factor pluggable plus
transceiver (QSFP+) or 12-port
100GbE QSFP28 line card
 QFX10000-30C, a 30-port 100GbE
QSFP28/40GbE QSFP+ line card
 QFX10000-60S-6Q, a 60-port
1GbE/10GbE SFP/SFP+ line card with
six-port 40GbE QSFP+ / two-port
100GbE QSFP28
 QFX10016 Switch Fabric
QFX10000
Control Board
Table 2 TOE Chassis Details
The firmware version reflects the detail reported for the components of the Junos OS when the
“show version” command is executed on the appliance.
The guidance documents included as part of the TOE are:
[ECG] Junos OS Common Criteria and FIPS Evaluated Configuration Guide for QFX10K
Ethernet Switches Release 18.1R2
To use the product in the evaluated configuration, the product must be configured as specified
in the Junos OS Common Criteria and FIPS Evaluated Configuration Guide for QFX10K Ethernet
Switches Release 18.1R2. Consumers are encouraged to download the configuration guide from
the NIAP website to ensure the device is configured as evaluated.
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8 IT Product Testing
This section describes the testing efforts of the developer and the evaluation team. It is derived
from information contained in Evaluation Test Report for Junos OS 18.1R2 for QFX10002,
QFX10008 and QFX100016, which is not publicly available. The publicly available Assurance
Activities Report provides an overview of testing and the prescribed assurance activities.
8.1 Developer Testing
No evidence of developer testing is required in the Assurance Activities for this product.
8.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing
The evaluation team verified the product according the vendor-provided guidance
documentation and ran the tests specified in the NDcPP. The Independent Testing activity is
documented in the Assurance Activities Report, which is publicly available, and is not duplicated
here.
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9 Results of the Evaluation
The results of the assurance requirements are generally described in this section and are
presented in detail in the proprietary documents: the Detailed Test Report (DTR) and the
Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) and summarized in the publicly available Assurance Activity
Report (AAR) for this evaluation. The reader of this document can assume that activities and
work units received a passing verdict.
A verdict for an assurance component is determined by the resulting verdicts assigned to the
corresponding evaluator action elements. The evaluation was conducted based upon CC
version 3.1 rev 4 and CEM version 3.1 rev 4. The evaluation determined the Junos OS 18.1R2 for
QFX10002, QFX10008 and QFX100016 to be Part 2 extended, and meets the SARs contained in
the PP. Additionally, the evaluator performed the Assurance Activities specified in the NDPP
and Supporting Document (SD).
9.1 Evaluation of Security Target
The evaluation team applied each ASE CEM work unit. The ST evaluation ensured the ST
contains a description of the environment in terms of policies and assumptions, a statement of
security requirements claimed to be met by the Junos OS 18.1R2 for QFX10002, QFX10008 and
QFX100016 that are consistent with the Common Criteria, and product security function
descriptions that support the requirements. Additionally, the evaluator performed an
assessment of the Assurance Activities specified in the NDcPP.
The validators reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted
in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the
evaluation team was justified.
9.2 Evaluation of Development Documentation
The evaluation team applied each ADV CEM work unit. The evaluation team assessed the
design documentation and found it adequate to aid in understanding how the TSF provides the
security functions. The design documentation consists of a functional specification contained in
the Security Target's TOE Summary Specification. Additionally, the evaluator performed the
Assurance Activities specified in the NDcPP related to the examination of the information
contained in the TOE Summary Specification.
The validators reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the Assurance Activities, and that the conclusion reached by the
evaluation team was justified.
18
9.3 Evaluation of Guidance Documents
The evaluation team applied each AGD CEM work unit. The evaluation team ensured the
adequacy of the user guidance in describing how to use the operational TOE. Additionally, the
evaluation team ensured the adequacy of the administrator guidance in describing how to
securely administer the TOE. The guides were assessed during the design and testing phases of
the evaluation to ensure they were complete. Additionally, the evaluator performed the
Assurance Activities specified in the NDcPP related to the examination of the information
contained in the operational guidance documents.
The validators reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the Assurance Activities, and that the conclusion reached by
the evaluation team was justified.
9.4 Evaluation of Life Cycle Support Activities
The evaluation team applied each ALC CEM work unit. The evaluation team found
that the TOE was identified.
The validators reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted
in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the
evaluation team was justified.
9.5 Evaluation of Test Documentation and the Test Activity
The evaluation team applied each ATE CEM work unit. The evaluation team ran the set of tests
specified by the Assurance Activities in the NDcPP and recorded the results in a Test Report,
summarized in the Evaluation Technical Report and Assurance Activities Report.
The validators reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence
was provided by the evaluation team to show that the evaluation activities addressed the test
activities in the NDcPP and the Supporting Document Evaluation Activities for Network Device
cPP, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation team was justified.
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity
The evaluation team applied each AVA CEM work unit. The evaluation team performed a public
search for vulnerabilities performed vulnerability testing and did not discover any issues with
the TOE. A search of publicly available sources was performed on November 19, 2018. A follow
up search was performed on January 2, 2019 using the following search terms:
 JunOS 18.1R2
 QFX10K
 QFX10000
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 QFX10002
 QFX10008
 QFX10016
 WindRiver
 WindRiver 7
 QFX10K-Kernel
 WRL7
 SSH
 QFX10K-OpenSSL
The sources of the publicly available information search are provided below.
 http://nvd.nist.gov/
 http://www.us-cert.gov
 http://www.securityfocus.com/
The validators reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation addressed the
vulnerability analysis Assurance Activities in the NDcPPv2.0e, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results
The evaluation team's assessment of the evaluation evidence demonstrates that the claims in
the ST are met. Additionally, the evaluation team's test activities also demonstrated the
accuracy of the claims in the ST.
The validation team's assessment of the evidence provided by the evaluation team is that it
demonstrates that the evaluation team performed the Assurance Activities in the NDcPPv2.0e,
and correctly verified that the product meets the claims in the ST.
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10 Validator Comments & Recommendations
Administrators of the devices should note that if the audit storage space on the TOE is
exhausted, the TOE continues to operate.
The AGD points out that the devices must be configured into FIPS mode to meet the
requirements of the Common Criteria evaluated mode. Note that FIPS mode sets AES192-CBC
and AES192-CTR which are not allowed in the Common Criteria evaluated configuration.
Therefore, administrators should follow the configuration as set forth in the section titled
“Configuring SSH on the Evaluated Configuration for NDcPP”
NIST CAVP algorithms were tested on JunOS 18.1r1. The vendor asserts this version of the
JunOS is identical to the tested version with the exception of bug fixes, and that there were no
changes to the implementation of the cryptographic functionality.
21
11 Annexes
Not applicable.
22
12 Security Target
Junos OS 18.1R2 for QFX10002, QFX10008 and QFX100016 Security Target
23
13 Glossary
The following definitions are used throughout this document:
 Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL). An IT security evaluation facility accredited
by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) and approved by
the CCEVS Validation Body to conduct Common Criteria-based evaluations.
 Conformance. The ability to demonstrate in an unambiguous way that a given
implementation is correct with respect to the formal model.
 Evaluation. The assessment of an IT product against the Common Criteria using the
Common Criteria Evaluation Methodology to determine whether or not the claims made
are justified; or the assessment of a protection profile against the Common Criteria
using the Common Evaluation Methodology to determine if the Profile is complete,
consistent, technically sound and hence suitable for use as a statement of requirements
for one or more TOEs that may be evaluated.
 Evaluation Evidence. Any tangible resource (information) required from the sponsor or
developer by the evaluator to perform one or more evaluation activities.
 Feature. Part of a product that is either included with the product or can be ordered
separately.
 Target of Evaluation (TOE). A group of IT products configured as an IT system, or an IT
product, and associated documentation that is the subject of a security evaluation
under the CC.
 Validation. The process carried out by the CCEVS Validation Body leading to the issue of
a Common Criteria certificate.
 Validation Body. A governmental organization responsible for carrying out validation
and for overseeing the day-to-day operation of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation
and Validation Scheme.
24
14 Bibliography
The Validation Team used the following documents to produce this Validation Report:
1. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Part 1: Introduction
and general model, Version 3.1 Revision 4.
2. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Part 2: Security
functional requirements, Version 3.1 Revision 4.
3. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Part 3: Security
assurance requirements, Version 3.1 Revision 4.
4. Common Evaluation Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 3.1 Revision 4.
5. Security Target Junos OS 18.1R2 for QFX10002, QFX 10008, and QFX10016 Series
Devices, Version 1.5, January 2019.
6. Common Criteria and FIPS Evaluated Configuration Guide for QFX10002, QFX 10008, and
QFX10016 Series Devices Release 18.1R2, 2018-12-31.
7. Junos OS 18.1R2 for QFX10002, QFX 10008, and QFX10016 Common Criteria NDcPP
Assurance Activity Report, Version 1.4, January 2019.
8. Vulnerability Assessment for Junos OS 18.1R2 for QFX10002, QFX 10008, and QFX10016,
Version 1.1, January 2019. (evaluation sensitive)
9. Junos OS 18.1R2 for QFX10002, QFX 10008, and QFX10016 Evaluation Technical Report,
Version 1.2, January 2019. (evaluation sensitive)
10. Test Plan for a Target of Evaluation, Version 1.2, January 22, 2019. (evaluation sensitive)