Xerox WorkCentre™ 7755/7765/7775 Validation Report, Version 1.1
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National Information Assurance Partnership
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
Validation Report
Xerox WorkCentre™ 7755/7765/7775
Report Number: CCEVS-VR-VID-10422-2012
Dated: January 30, 2013
Version: 1.1
National Institute of Standards and Technology Department of Defense
Information Technology Laboratory National Security Agency
100 Bureau Drive 9800 Savage Road
Gaithersburg, MD 20899 Fort Meade, MD 20755-6940
®
TM
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Validation Team
Mario Tinto
Franklin Haskell
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
Computer Sciences Corporation
7231 Parkway Drive
Hanover, Maryland 21076
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1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This report is intended to assist the end-user of this product and any security certification
Agent for the end-user with determining the suitability of this Information Technology
(IT) product in their environment. End-users should review both the Security Target
(ST), which is where specific security claims are made, in conjunction with this
Validation Report (VR), which describes how those security claims were evaluated.
This report documents the assessment by the National Information Assurance Partnership
(NIAP) validation team of the evaluation of the Xerox WorkCentre™ 7755/7765/7775,
the target of evaluation (TOE), performed by Computer Sciences Corporation. It presents
the evaluation results, their justifications, and the conformance results. This report is not
an endorsement of the TOE by any agency of the U.S. government, and no warranty is
either expressed or implied.
The evaluation was performed by Computer Sciences Corporation (CSC) of Hanover,
MD in accordance with the United States evaluation scheme and completed on the 19th
of
December 2012. The information in this report is largely derived from the ST, the
Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) and the functional testing report. The ST was written
by Computer Sciences Corporation on behalf of Xerox. The evaluation was performed to
conform to the requirements of the Common Criteria for Information Technology
Security Evaluation, Version 3.1, Revision 2, dated September 2007 at Evaluation
Assurance Level 2 (EAL 2) augmented with ALC_FLR.3, and the Common Evaluation
Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1, Revision 2, dated
September 2007.
The Xerox WorkCentre™ 7755/7765/7775 is a multi-function device (MFD) that copies,
prints, scans and faxes. The MFD contains an internal hard disk drive. Standard security
functions include SSL, IPSec, SNMPv3, a host-based firewall, and an internal audit log.
Users may be authenticated to the network or locally at the device. The evaluated
configuration includes the Image Overwrite Security package. The Image Overwrite
Security package causes any temporary image files to be erased from the internal hard
disk drive when those files are no longer needed or on demand at the discretion of the
system administrator.
1.1.Interpretations
There are no applicable Common Criteria interpretations.
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2. IDENTIFICATION
The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST) effort to establish commercial facilities to perform
trusted product evaluations. Under this program, commercial testing laboratories called
Common Criteria Testing Laboratories (CCTLs) using the Common Evaluation
Methodology (CEM) for Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL) 1 through EAL 4 in
accordance with National Voluntary Laboratory Assessment Program (NVLAP)
accreditation conduct security evaluations.
The NIAP Validation Body assigns Validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality
and consistency across evaluations. Developers of IT products desiring a security
evaluation contract with a CCTL and pay a fee for their product’s evaluation. Upon
successful completion of the evaluation, the product is added to NIAP’s Validated
Products List.
Table 1 provides information needed to completely identify the product, including:
 The Target of Evaluation (TOE): the fully qualified identifier of the product as
evaluated;
 The Security Target (ST), describing the security features, claims, and assurances
of the product;
 The conformance result of the evaluation;
 Any Protection Profile to which the product is conformant;
 The organizations participating in the evaluation.
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Table 1: Evaluation Identifiers
Item Identifier
Evaluation Scheme United States NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
Target of Evaluation Xerox WorkCentre™ 7755/7765/7775
Protection Profile
U.S. Government Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices Version (IEEE
Std. 2600.2-2009 Protection Profile, v1.0, 26 February 2010
Security Target
Xerox WorkCentre™ 7755/7765/7775 Security Target, Version 1.0, Revision
1.6, 19th
December 2012
Dates of evaluation August 2009 to December 2012
Evaluation Technical Report
Xerox WorkCentre™ 7755/7765/7775 Evaluation Technical Report,
Computer Sciences Corporation, v1.1, 19 December 2012
Conformance Result EAL 2 augmented with ALC_FLR.3
Common Criteria version Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Version
3.1, Revision 2, September 2007
Common Evaluation
Methodology (CEM) version
CEM version 3.1R2, September 2007
Sponsor Xerox Corporation
Developer Xerox Corporation
Evaluators John Daniels, Cheryl Dugan, Annette Nadeau
Validation Team Mario Tinto, Franklin Haskell
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3. SECURITY POLICY
The TOE enforces the following security policies:
 Information Flow Security. The TOE prevents unauthorized data flow between
the fax line interface and the network interface.
 User Data Protection – SSL. The TOE implements the Secure Sockets Layer
(SSL) protocol to protect communication via the Web Graphical User Interface
(GUI) and to protect workflow scanning communications to an SSL enabled
repository.
 User Data Protection – IPSec. The TOE implements Internet Protocol Security
(IPSec) to protect print client communications.
 IP Filtering. The TOE provides the ability for the system administrator to
configure IPv4 filtering rules.
 Network Management Security. The TOE implements Simple Network
Management Protocol v3 (SNMP) for management communications via the
SNMP interface.
 Privileged User Access Control. The TOE restricts management of security
functions to the authorized system administrator.
 User Access Control. The TOE enables system administrators to restrict access
to the print, copy, scan and fax functions to authorized users.
A complete list of the security functions of the TOE is provided at section 5.1.
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4. SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION
4.1.Assumptions
The ST identified the following security assumptions:
 The TOE is located in a restricted or monitored environment that provides
protection from unmanaged access to the physical components and data interfaces
of the TOE.
 TOE Users are aware of the security policies and procedures of their organization,
and are trained and competent to follow those policies and procedures.
 Administrators are aware of the security policies and procedures of their
organization, are trained and competent to follow the manufacturer’s guidance
and documentation, and correctly configure and operate the TOE in accordance
with those policies and procedures.
 Administrators do not use their privileged access rights for malicious purposes.
4.2.Threats
The ST identified the following threats addressed by the TOE:
 User Document Data may be disclosed to unauthorized persons
 User Document Data may be altered by unauthorized persons
 User Function Data may be altered by unauthorized persons
4.3.Organizational Security Policies
The ST identified the following OSPs addressed by the TOE:
 To preserve operational accountability and security, Users will be authorized to
use the TOE only as permitted by the TOE Owner
 To detect corruption of the executable code in the TSF, procedures will exist to
self-verify executable code in the TSF
 To preserve operational accountability and security, records that provide an audit
trail of TOE use and security-relevant events will be created, maintained, and
protected from unauthorized disclosure or alteration, and will be reviewed by
authorized personnel
 To prevent unauthorized use of the external interfaces of the TOE, operation of
those interfaces will be controlled by the TOE and its IT environment
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5. ARCHITECTURAL INFORMATION
5.1.Logical Scope and Boundary
The TOE logical scope and boundary consists of the security functions provided/controlled by the
TOE as follows:
 Image Overwrite. The TOE implements an image overwrite security function to
overwrite all temporary files created during processing of jobs.
 Information Flow Security. The TOE prevents unauthorized data flow between
the fax line interface and the network interface.
 Authentication. The TOE can be configured to authenticate users against an
internal database via username and password.
 Network Identification. The TOE can be configured to authenticate users against
an external database via username and password or smartcard and Personal
Identification Number (PIN).
 Security Audit. The TOE generates audit logs that track events/actions (e.g.,
copy/print/scan/fax job completion) to identified users.
 User Data Protection – SSL. The TOE implements the Secure Sockets Layer
(SSL) protocol to protect communication via the Web Graphical User Interface
(GUI) and to protect workflow scanning communications to an SSL enabled
repository.
 User Data Protection – IPSec. The TOE implements Internet Protocol Security
(IPSec) to protect print client communications.
 User Data Protection – Disk Encryption. The TOE implements AES data
encryption to protect all areas of the hard drive where user jobs are temporarily
stored for processing.
 User Data Protection – IP Filtering. The TOE provides the ability for the
system administrator to configure IPv4 filtering rules.
 Network Management Security. The TOE implements Simple Network
Management Protocol v3 (SNMP) for management communications via the
SNMP interface.
 Security Management. The security functions of the TOE are managed by the
system administrator from both the LUI and WebUI. User’s access to the TOE
functions, Job or Image Data stored inside the TOE is restricted, in accordance
with the applicable TOE Security Policies. The TOE is capable of verifying the
integrity of the TSF at the request of the administrator.
 Cryptographic Operations. The TOE utilizes data encryption (AES, RSA, RC4,
DES, TDES) and cryptographic checksum generation and secure hash
computation (MD5 and SHA-1), as provided by the OpenSSL cryptographic
libraries, to support secure communication between the TOE and remote trusted
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products. The algorithms deployed have the associated Cryptographic Algorithm
Validation Program (CAVP) certificates: TDES – FIPS 46-3 (CAVP Certificate
No. 826 and CAVP Certificate No. 1174); AES - FIPS 197 (CAVP Certificate
No. 1131 and CAVP Certificate No. 1821); SHA-1 - FIPS 180-3 (CAVP
Certificate No. 1599), HMAC - FIPS 198 (CAVP Certificate No. 644 and CAVP
Certificate No. 1076); RSA - FIPS186-3 (CAVP Certificate No. 914).
The difference between the TOE models is their printing speed. The following figure depicts the
TOE’s architectural subsystems and its environment.
Figure 1: Depiction of TOE and Subsystems
5.2.Physical Scope and Boundary
The Xerox WorkCentre™ 7755/7765/7775 is a multi-function device (MFD). The
physical boundary of the TOE consists of the MFD and optional fax accessory, and
accompanying user and administrator guidance listed in section 6.
In the evaluated configuration, the TOE is connected to the Public Switched Telephone
Network (PSTN) and the Local Area Network (LAN) as described in the user guidance
delivered with the TOE.
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The following figure depicts the TOE.
Figure 2: Xerox WorkCentre™ 7755/7765/7775
The various software and firmware that comprise the TOE are listed in Table 2. A
system administrator can ensure that they have a TOE by printing a configuration sheet
and comparing the version numbers reported on the sheet to the table below.
Table 2: Evaluated version
Software/Firmware
Item
WorkCentre™ 7755/7765/7775
System Software 061.090.221.36202
Network Controller Software 061.091.36121
UI Software 061.091.34920
Marking Engine Software 008.035.000
Copy Controller Software 061.091.35740
DADH Software 012.003.003
Finisher Software (Options)
• C-Finisher 017.019.000
• D-Finisher 013.013.000
FAX Software 003.010.004
Scanner Software 011.050.008
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6. DOCUMENTATION
This section details the documentation that is (a) delivered to the customer, and (b) was
used as evidence for the evaluation of the Xerox WorkCentre™ 7755/7765/7775. Note
that not all evidence is available to customers. The following documentation is available
to the customer:
 Xerox
WorkCentre
7755/7765/7775 System Administrator Guide v1.0
 Xerox
WorkCentre
7755/7765/7775 User Guide v1.0
 Secure Installation and Operation of Your WorkCentre™ 7755/7765/7775 v1.3
The remaining evaluation evidence is described in the Evaluation Technical Report
developed by Computer Sciences Corporation.
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7. IT PRODUCT TESTING
This section describes the testing efforts of the developer and the evaluation team.
7.1.Developer testing
Test procedures were written by the developer and designed to be conducted using
manual interaction with the TOE interfaces. The developer tested all of the interfaces to
the TOE and in doing so tested all TSFs.
The developer tested the TOE consistent with the Common Criteria evaluated
configuration identified in the ST. The developer’s approach to testing is defined in the
TOE Test Plan. The expected and actual test results (ATRs) are also included with each
of the tests in the TOE Test Procedures. Each test case was assigned an identifier that
was used to reference it throughout the testing evidence.
The evaluation team analyzed the developer’s testing to ensure adequate coverage for
EAL 2. The evaluation team determined that the developer’s actual test results matched
the developer’s expected test results.
The evaluators assessed that the test environment used by the developers was appropriate
and mirrored the test configuration during independent testing.
7.2.Evaluation team independent testing
The evaluation team conducted independent testing at the CCTL facility. The TOE was
delivered in accordance with the documented delivery procedures. The evaluation team
installed and configured the TOE according to vendor installation instructions and the
evaluated configuration as identified in the Security Target.
The evaluation team confirmed the technical accuracy of the setup and installation guide
during installation of the TOE while the associated ATE_IND work units. The
evaluation team confirmed that the TOE version delivered for testing was identical to the
version identified in the ST.
The evaluation team used the developer’s test plan as a basis for creating the Independent
Test Plan. The evaluation team analyzed the developer’s test procedures to determine
their relevance and adequacy to test the security function under test. The following items
represent a subset of the factors considered in selecting the functional tests to be
conducted:
 Security functions that implement critical security features
 Security functions critical to the TOE’s security objectives
 Security functions that gave rise to suspicion regarding the behavior of the
security features during the documentation evidence evaluation
 Security functions not tested adequately in the vendor’s test plan and procedures
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The evaluation team repeated a sample of the developer’s test cases and designed
additional independent tests. The additional test coverage was determined based on the
analysis of the developer test coverage and the ST.
The evaluators examined the design evidence and selected an appropriate test platform.
Each TOE Security Function was exercised and the evaluation team verified that each
test passed.
7.3.Vulnerability analysis
The evaluation team performed a vulnerability analysis of the TOE evidence and a search
of publicly available information to identify potential vulnerabilities in the TOE. Based
on the results of this effort, the evaluation team conducted penetration testing to
determine if any of the identified potential vulnerabilities was indeed exploitable.
The evaluation team concluded that the TOE does not contain exploitable vulnerabilities
in the intended environment and for the postulated attackers.
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8. EVALUATED CONFIGURATION
In its evaluated configuration, IIO and ODIO (the Image Overwrite Security Package) are
installed and enabled on the TOE; SSL is enabled on the TOE; and User Authorization is
enabled on the TOE. The FAX (Xerox Embedded Fax accessory) option, if purchased by
the consumer, is installed and enabled on the TOE. The LanFax option is included in the
evaluated configuration of the TOE. USB Direct Printing is not included in the evaluated
configuration of the TOE.
In its evaluated configuration, the following options should be disabled:
 Network Accounting
 Copy/Print, Store and Reprint
 SMart eSolutions
 Xerox Extensible Interface Platform (EIP)
 USB direct printing
Please see http://www.xerox.com/information-security/product/enus.html for more
specific information about maintaining the security of this TOE.
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9. RESULTS OF THE EVALUATION
The evaluation was carried out in accordance with the Common Criteria Evaluation and
Validation Scheme (CCEVS) processes and procedures. The TOE was evaluated against
the criteria contained in the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Version 3.1R2. The evaluation methodology used by the evaluation team to
conduct the evaluation is the Common Methodology for Information Technology
Security Evaluation, Version 3.1R2.
Computer Sciences Corporation (CSC) has determined that the product meets the security
criteria in the Security Target, which specifies an assurance level of EAL 2 augmented
with ALC_FLR.3. A team of Validators, on behalf of the CCEVS Validation Body,
monitored the evaluation. The evaluation effort was finished on December 19, 2012. A
final Validation Oversight Review (VOR) was held on January 24, 2013 and final
changes to the VR were completed on January 29, 2013.
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10. VALIDATOR COMMENTS
Testing indicated that this platform and other similar machines, when subjected to a
severe test scenario, exhausted their audit storage in a matter of hours – which is not
really an adequate timeframe for an administrator to respond. This resulted in two ORs
numbered 0313 and 0314. The scheme created resolutions for these and published them
as ODs 0313 and 0314. Xerox implemented the resolution for this platform: an
automatically generated email message sent to the administrator. However, Xerox also
implemented a password lockout mechanism that reduces the audit trail exhaustion
vulnerability to a near impossibility. Xerox is to be commended for taking such a
proactive measure.
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11. ANNEXES
None
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12. SECURITY TARGET
Xerox WorkCentre™ 7755/7765/7775 Security Target, Version 1.0, Revision 1.6, 19th
December 2012.
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13. GLOSSARY
 Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL): An IT security evaluation facility
accredited by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP)
and approved by the CCEVS Validation Body to conduct Common Criteria-based
evaluations.
 Evaluation: The assessment of an IT product against the Common Criteria using the
Common Criteria Evaluation Methodology to determine whether or not the claims
made are justified; or the assessment of a protection profile against the Common
Criteria using the Common Evaluation Methodology to determine if the Profile is
complete, consistent, technically sound and hence suitable for use as a statement of
requirements for one or more TOEs that may be evaluated.
 Evaluation Evidence: Any tangible resource (information) required from the
sponsor or developer by the evaluator to perform one or more evaluation activities.
 Target of Evaluation (TOE): A group of IT products configured as an IT system, or
an IT product, and associated documentation that is the subject of a security
evaluation under the CC.
 Threat: Means through which the ability or intent of a threat agent to adversely
affect the primary functionality of the TOE, facility that contains the TOE, or
malicious operation directed towards the TOE. A potential violation of security.
 Validation: The process carried out by the CCEVS Validation Body leading to the
issue of a Common Criteria certificate.
 Validation Body: A governmental organization responsible for carrying out
validation and for overseeing the day-to-day operation of the NIAP Common Criteria
Evaluation and Validation Scheme.
 Vulnerabilities: A vulnerability is a hardware, firmware, or software flaw that
leaves an Automated Information System (AIS) open for potential exploitation. A
weakness in automated system security procedures, administrative controls, physical
layout, internal controls, and so forth, which could be exploited by a threat to gain
unauthorized access to information or disrupt critical processing.
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14. BIBLIOGRAPHY
1.) Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation – Part 1:
Introduction and general model, dated September 2006, Version 3.1, Revision 1,
CCMB-2006-09-001.
2.) Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation – Part 2: Security
functional requirements, dated September 2007, Version 3.1, Revision 2, CCMB-
2007-09-002.
3.) Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation – Part 3: Security
assurance requirements, dated September 2007, Version 3.1, Revision 2, CCMB-
2007-09-003.
4.) Common Evaluation Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
dated September 2007, Version 3.1, Revision 2, CCMB-2007-09-004.
5.) Xerox WorkCentre™ 7755/7765/7775 Security Target, Version 1.0, Revision 1.6,
19th
December 2012
6.) Computer Sciences Corporation (CSC) Evaluation Technical Report for Xerox
WorkCentre™ 7755/7765/7775, Version 1.1, 19 December 2012.