BSI-DSZ-CC-1053-2018
for
Huawei NE40E Series Software Consisting of VRP
and the Underlying OS, V800R010C00SPC200,
V800R010SPH220T
from
Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 CC-Zert-327 V5.21
BSI-DSZ-CC-1053-2018 (*)
Network Device
Huawei NE40E Series Software Consisting of VRP and the Underlying
OS
V800R010C00SPC200, V800R010SPH220T
from Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.
PP Conformance: collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices,
Version 2.0 + Errata 20180314, 2018-03-14, NDFW-
iTC (Exact conformance)
Functionality: PP conformant
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
The IT Product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation
facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1
extended by Scheme Interpretations and by Common Criteria Supporting Document:
Evaluation Activities for Network Device cPP, version 2.0 + Errata 20180314 for
conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1. CC and
CEM are also published as ISO/IEC 15408 and ISO/IEC 18045.
(*) This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its
evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report and
Notification. For details on the validity see Certification Report part A chapter 4
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification
scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions
of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the
evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT Product by the Federal Office for
Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is
either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 26 October 2018
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Bernd Kowalski L.S.
Head of Division
SOGIS
Recognition Agreement
Common Criteria
Recognition Arrangement
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1053-2018
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1053-2018 Certification Report
Contents
Certification..........................................................................................................................6
1. Preliminary Remarks.....................................................................................................6
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure................................................................6
3. Recognition Agreements...............................................................................................7
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification.................................................................8
5. Validity of the Certification Result..................................................................................8
6. Publication.....................................................................................................................9
B. Certification Results........................................................................................................10
1. Executive Summary.....................................................................................................11
2. Identification of the TOE..............................................................................................12
3. Security Policy.............................................................................................................14
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope......................................................................14
5. Architectural Information..............................................................................................15
6. Documentation............................................................................................................16
7. IT Product Testing........................................................................................................16
8. Evaluated Configuration..............................................................................................18
9. Results of the Evaluation.............................................................................................19
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE......................................................20
11. Security Target...........................................................................................................20
12. Definitions..................................................................................................................20
13. Bibliography...............................................................................................................22
C. Excerpts from the Criteria...............................................................................................24
D. Annexes..........................................................................................................................25
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1053-2018
Certification
1. Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1 Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
• Act on the Federal Office for Information Security1
• BSI Certification and Approval Ordinance2
• BSI Schedule of Costs3
• Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
• DIN EN ISO/IEC 17065 standard
• BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) [3]
• BSI certification: Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility, its
approval and licencing process (CC-Stellen) [3]
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
2
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of Security Certificates and approval by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungs- und -Anerkennungsverordnung - BSIZertV) of 17 December
2014, Bundesgesetzblatt 2014, part I, no. 61, p. 2231
3
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
6 / 26
BSI-DSZ-CC-1053-2018 Certification Report
• Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.14
[1] also published as
ISO/IEC 15408.
• Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 [2] also published
as ISO/IEC 18045.
• BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
3. Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
3.1. European Recognition of CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and, in addition, at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS
Technical Domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL 1 to EAL 4. For "Smartcards and similar devices" a SOGIS Technical Domain is in
place. For "HW Devices with Security Boxes" a SOGIS Technical Domains is in place, too.
In addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of
the recognition agreement.
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, details on
recognition, and the history of the agreement can be seen on the website at
https://www.sogisportal.eu.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the related bodies of the signatory nations. A disclaimer
beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of recognition.
This certificate is recognized under SOGIS-MRA for all assurance components selected.
3.2. International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC
(Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08
September 2014. It covers CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP)
(exact use), CC certificates based on assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or
the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR) and CC certificates for Protection
Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on
the website: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the related bodies
of the signatory nations. A disclaimer beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of
recognition.
4
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated
23 February 2007, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1053-2018
This certificate is recognized under CCRA-2014 for all assurance components selected.
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product Huawei NE40E Series Software Consisting of VRP and the Underlying OS,
V800R010C00SPC200, V800R010SPH220T has undergone the certification procedure at
BSI.
The evaluation of the product Huawei NE40E Series Software Consisting of VRP and the
Underlying OS, V800R010C00SPC200, V800R010SPH220T was conducted by TÜV
Informationstechnik GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 25 October 2018. TÜV
Informationstechnik GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)5
recognised by the certification
body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: Huawei Technologies Co.,
Ltd.
The product was developed by: Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
5. Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report applies only to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is valid on the condition that
• all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
• the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report
and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance components and assurance levels please refer to CC
itself. Detailed references are listed in part C of this report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-assessment or
re-certification). Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation
and certification procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk
management needs regularly updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-
assessment on a regular e.g. annual basis.
In order to avoid an indefinite usage of the certificate when evolved attack methods would
require a re-assessment of the products resistance to state of the art attack methods, the
maximum validity of the certificate has been limited. The certificate issued on 26 October
2018 is valid until 25 October 2023. Validity can be re-newed by re-certification.
The owner of the certificate is obliged:
5
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1053-2018 Certification Report
1. when advertising the certificate or the fact of the product's certification, to refer to
the Certification Report as well as to provide the Certification Report, the Security
Target and user guidance documentation mentioned herein to any customer of the
product for the application and usage of the certified product,
2. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately about vulnerabilities of the
product that have been identified by the developer or any third party after issuance
of the certificate,
3. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately in the case that security relevant
changes in the evaluated life cycle, e.g. related to development and production sites
or processes, occur, or the confidentiality of documentation and information related
to the Target of Evaluation (TOE) or resulting from the evaluation and certification
procedure where the certification of the product has assumed this confidentiality
being maintained, is not given any longer. In particular, prior to the dissemination of
confidential documentation and information related to the TOE or resulting from the
evaluation and certification procedure that do not belong to the deliverables
according to the Certification Report part B, or for those where no dissemination
rules have been agreed on, to third parties, the Certification Body at BSI has to be
informed.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
6. Publication
The product Huawei NE40E Series Software Consisting of VRP and the Underlying OS,
V800R010C00SPC200, V800R010SPH220T has been included in the BSI list of certified
products, which is published regularly (see also Internet: https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]).
Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer6
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
6
Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.
Bantian Longgang
Shenzhen 518129
P.R. China
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1053-2018
B. Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
• the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
• the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
• complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1053-2018 Certification Report
1. Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is defined as Huawei NE40E Series Software Consisting of
VRP and the Underlying OS, version “V800R010C00SPC200” and patch version
“V800R010SPH220T”, running on hardware models NE40E-X3A and NE40E-X16A. The
TOE is a network device that is connected to the network and has an infrastructure role
within the network.
The usage of the TOE is the following:
• The TOE supports username/password, or public-key authentication mode. Only users
that are authenticated can access the TOE and its command line interface.
• The TOE is accessed by CLI locally or by a Network Management Server (NMS)
remotely over SSH so that a secure channel is established to protect the data between
TOE and NMS.
• For secure transmission of audit information between the TOE and the Syslog server a
secure TLS channel is used.
• The TOE supports digital signature verification for software. Each of the software
package or patch package released by Huawei includes a unique digital signature.
When an NMS distributes the package to NE40E, the TOE will verify the online digital
signature before updating. The verification of the digital signature demonstrates the
integrity and authenticity of the package. The package is only processed further after
successful verification of the digital signature, otherwise the package will be discarded
without processing.
The TOE provides security services onto a single and secure device.
The TOE is part of the overall NE40E series routers product and is deployed at the edge of
IP backbone networks, IP metropolitan area networks (MANs), and other large-scale IP
networks. It consists of both hardware and software, providing network traffic processing
capacity. The TOE is software only and consists of the Versatile Routing Platform (VRP)
and the underlying Operating System (OS). Network traffic is processed and forwarded by
the underlying hardware according to routing decisions downloaded from VRP. The NE40E
runs with the VRP developed by Huawei. VRP provides extensive security features. These
features include different interfaces with according access levels for administrators,
enforcing authentications prior to establishment of administrative sessions, auditing of
security-relevant management activities.
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified
Protection Profile collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 2.0 + Errata
20180314, 2018-03-14, NDFW-iTC [8].
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements ADV_FSP.1, AGD_OPE.1, AGD_PRE.1,
ALC_CMC.1, ALC_CMS.1, ATE_IND.1, AVA_VAN.1, as well as ASE_CCL.1, ASE_ECD.1,
ASE_INT.1, ASE_SPD.1, ASE_TSS.1.
The assurance requirements ASE_OBJ.2 and ASE_REQ.2 are not part of the ST and of
this certificate, in order to claim exact conformance to the NDcPP [8]. However they were
considered during the evaluation by refering to an addendum to the ST "Huawei NE40E
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1053-2018
Series Software Consisting of VRP and the Underlying OS, Security Target - ASE_OBJ.2,
ASE_REQ.2 Addendum" [9].
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6], chapter 6. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and some of
them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functionality:
TOE Security Functionality / ST
chapter
Addressed issue
7.1 Security Audit (FAU)
7.2 Cryptographic Support (FCS)
7.3 Identification and Authentication (FIA)
7.4 Security management (FMT)
7.5 Protection of the TSF (FPT)
7.6 TOE Access (FTA)
7.7 Trusted path/channels (FTP)
Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 7.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6], chapter 3.1 .
Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of Assumptions,
Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security Target [6],
chapter 3 and 4.
This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8.
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2. Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
Huawei NE40E Series Software Consisting of VRP and the Underlying OS,
V800R010C00SPC200, V800R010SPH220T
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1053-2018 Certification Report
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
1 SW TOE / : Huawei NE40E
Series Software Consisting
of VRP and the Underlying
OS
SW:
V800R010C00SPC200
Filename:
V800R010C00SPC200
-OC-NE-X3A.cc
SHA256 value:
3f3f7cdf2fc34e9409833
fdba57644ced0185932
4ab3776a60f901ce7f5
bb73d
HPV:
V800R010SPH220T
Filename:
NE40EV800R010SPH
220T.PAT
SHA256 value:
9f52bc0e01c94cff5a32
2c013bcfe8ee1571a92f
cd4f9afbd3c4e490100f
2450
Download
2 DOC PD / NE40E Product
Documentation
Procduct Version:
V800R010C00SPC200
[10]
Version 0.2
Filename: NE40E
V800R010C00SPC200
Product Documentation
02.chm
SHA256 value:
48ad0c9693099ce4df2
430276e6247d3070d2
ca2784435ece0e0576a
d36ca1de
Download
3 DOC PRE / Huawei NE40E
Series Product
V800R010C00SPC200
Preparative Procedures
Product Version:
V800R010C00SPC200
[11]
Version 0.7 Secure Shipping
4 DOC OPE / Huawei NE40E
Series Product
V800R010C00SPC200
Operational user Guidance
Product Version:
V800R010C00SPC200
[12]
Version 0.6 Secure Shipping
5 DOC C&R / NDcPP Universal
Service Router NE40E
V800R010C00SPC200
Configuration and
Reference
[13]
Version 0.4 Secure Shipping
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1053-2018
Please note: The Preparative Procedures Guidance document [11] gives information on
the Delivery Interfaces and Acceptance Procedures at delivery but Assurance Family
Delivery was not within the scope of the evaluation.
For TOE identification, the TOE supports the command “Display version” on the command
prompt to show the TOE version and the patch version information. The command can be
entered in the status after the secure installation. The command is registered at command
level 1.
The response of the TOE to the command starts as follows:
Huawei Versatile Routing Platform Software
VRP (R) software, Version 8.160 (NE40E V800R010C00SPC200)
[…]
Patch Version: V800R010SPH220T
For identification of the TOE the user shall only consider the information that is highlighted
in bold in the above example printout. The version information given in bold is the detailed
version information that reflects the unique TOE reference.
The unique reference for the TOE is V800R010C00SPC200 with Patch Version
V800R010SPH220T.
3. Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE. It covers the issues as described in detail in the ST, chapter 7 as
functional security policies enforced by the TOE and can be summarized as
• Security Audit,
• Cryptographic Support,
• Identification and Authentication,
• Security Management,
• Protection of the TSF,
• TOE Access,
• Trusted Path/Channels.
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The list of objectives
which have to be met by the environment is to be found in the Security Target [6], chapter
4.1. For convenience, the list is reproduced here:
• OE.PHYSICAL: Physical security, commensurate with the value of the TOE and the data
it contains, is provided by the environment.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1053-2018 Certification Report
• OE.NO_GENERAL_PURPOSE: There are no general-purpose computing capabilities
(e.g., compilers or user applications) available on the TOE, other than those services
necessary for the operation, administration and support of the TOE.
• OE.NO_THRU_TRAFFIC_PROTECTION: The TOE does not provide any protection of
traffic that traverses it. It is assumed that protection of this traffic will be covered by other
security and assurance measures in the operational environment.
• OE.TRUSTED_ADMIN: Security Administrators are trusted to follow and apply all
guidance documentation in a trusted manner.
• OE.UPDATES: The TOE firmware and software is updated by an Administrator on a
regular basis in response to the release of product updates due to known vulnerabilities.
• OE.ADMIN_CREDENTIALS_SECURE: The Administrator’s credentials (private key)
used to access the TOE must be protected on any other platform on which they reside.
• OE.RESIDUAL_INFORMATION: The Security Administrator ensures that there is no
unauthorized access possible for sensitive residual information (e.g. cryptographic keys,
keying material, PINs, passwords etc.) on networking equipment when the equipment is
discarded or removed from its operational environment.
5. Architectural Information
The TOE is composed of two parts: VRP and the underlying OS.
The underlying OS is the Windriver Linux and the Real Time Operating System (RTOS).
The OS provides basic services including memory management, scheduling management,
file management, and device management.
The VRP is a new-generation network operating platform, which has a distributed,
multiprocess, and component-based architecture. It builds upon the hardware
development trend and will meet carriers' exploding service requirements for the next five
to ten years.
The VRP software is responsible for functional management, routing information
generation, receiving generated routing information and formatting them into
hardwarespecific data to direct traffic forwarding.
Figure 1-2 of the Security Target [6] depicts the detailed TOE Software Architecture.
In that figure one can see that six logical planes are defined for the Software Architecture.
They are:
• System Manage Plane (SMP), implements management for external access,
management for system configuration, information output on VRP.
• Service Control Plane (SCP), implements authentication, authorization, accounting and
other serviceable functionality on VRP.
• General Control Plane (GCP), implements routing information learning, ARP table entry
learning, STP (Spanning Tree Protocol) topology management, and functionalities
related to TCP/IP stack on VRP.
• System Service Plane (SSP), implements system internal scheduling, communication,
management of signals, events, timers, etc. Communication with Virtual Path is also
implemented at this plane.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1053-2018
• Data Plane (DP), implements traffic forwarding. Forwarding related information, e.g.
routing information, ARP table entry, static MAC table entry are generated in GCP and
downloaded via communication channel provided by SSP.
• Operating System (OS), provides hardware and software resource management. The
underlying OS is the Windriver Linux and the Real Time Operating System (RTOS ). The
Real Time Operating System (RTOS) manages underlying hardware resources, such as
the CPU, memory, storage devices, network devices, and other hardware. The RTOS is
developed by Huawei.
Please note that VRP consists of SMP, SCP, GCP, DP and SSP.
SMP, SCP, SSP and OS are in the scope of the TOE. GCP and DP are not in the scope of
the TOE. SMP, SCP, GCP are hosted in the MPU. DP is hosted in the LPU. SSP and OS
are hosted in the both MPU and LPUs. Please see also the Security Target [6], chapter
1.4.1.
6. Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7. IT Product Testing
Independent Evaluator Testing
The independent testing was partially performed using the developer’s testing
environment, partially using the test environment of the ITSEF. The overall test result is
that no deviations were found between the expected and the actual test results.
The evaluator examined the test coverage achieved by Network Device cPP Supporting
Document (NDcPP/SD) testing and focused on the functional areas that were not fully
covered by the NDcPP/SD testing efforts. Moreover, the evaluator devised and conducted
further functional tests on a pre-release version of the TOE running on the X16A platform
in the developer’s test environment.
The TOE has also been tested on the X3A platform. A selection of standard test tools has
been used, including:
• SSH clients,
• Packet capture tool,
• Cryptographic key generator,
• C Compiler and Linker.
The functional tests on the X3A platform have been mainly focused on the following TOE
functionalities:
• SSH server behavior when processing large packets,
• SSH configuration,
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1053-2018 Certification Report
• SSH rekeying,
• User identification & authentication,
• User authorization,
• Audit.
The overall test result is that no deviations were found between the expected and the
actual test results.
Penetration Testing
The penetration testing was partially performed on the X16A platform in the developer’s
test environment, and partially on the X3A platform in the test environment of the ITSEF.
The overall test result is that no deviations were found between the expected and the
actual test results; moreover, no attack scenario with the attack potential Basic was
actually successful.
The evaluator examined public information to identify potential vulnerabilities in the TOE.
As a result from this analysis, the evaluator devised penetration tests and performed these
tests on the TOE running on the X3A platform using the test environment of the ITSEF.
Further penetration tests were performed on a pre-release version of the TOE running on
the X16A platform.
The TOE has been tested on the X3A platform, and supplemental tests have been
performed on a pre-release version of the TOE on the X16A platform. A selection of
standard test tools has been used, including:
• SSH clients,
• Port scanner,
• Packet capture tool,
• Packet generation tool, and
• Exploit framework.
The attack scenarios that have been tested target the following TOE properties:
• Available network services and protocols provided by the TOE in its certified
configuration,
• Configuration and robustness of the SSH server, and
• Configuration of user accounts and privileges.
The penetration tests focus on the X3A platform was on the following Security Functional
Requirements:
• FCS_SSHS_EXT.1 (SSH Server Protocol),
• FMT_MTD.1/CoreData (Management of TSF Data),
• FTP_TRP.1/Admin Trusted Path (Refinement).
The overall test result is that no deviations were found between the expected and the
actual test results. No attack scenario with the attack potential Basic was actually
successful in the TOE’s operational environment as defined in the Security Target [6]
provided that all measures required by the developer are applied.
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The TOE has passed the evaluation tests. Overall, the tests confirm the TOE functions as
described in the developer´s documents. With the result of the vulnerability analysis the
evaluator has determined that the TOE is free of vulnerabilities, which can be exploited by
an attacker with Basic attack potential.
8. Evaluated Configuration
This certification covers the TOE Huawei NE40E Series Software Consisting of VRP and
the Underlying OS, V800R010C00SPC200, V800R010SPH220T of which
“V800R010C00SPC200” is the TOE version and “V800R010SPH220T” is the patch
version. The Preparative Procedures document [11] has identified only one possible
configuration of the TOE under evaluation, which is the TOE being only one instance. The
configuration as multiple instances was not included in the evaluation.
The operational environment of the TOE in its evaluated configuration can be summarized
by the following hardware, software, and firmware components which are required in the
operational environment of the TOE:
• NE40E-X3A, NE40E-X16A: The TOE runs on these hardware platforms.
• Network Management Server: This includes any Management workstation with a SSH
client installed that is used to establish a protected channel with the TOE.
• Local Console: This includes any Console that is directly connected to the TOE via the
Serial Console Port and is used by the TOE administrator to support TOE administration.
The following hardware, software, and firmware components are optional based on the
claims made in the Security Target:
• RADIUS AAA Server: This RADIUS AAA server provides user authentication. The TOE
correctly leverages the services provided by this RADIUS AAA server to provide
authentication to administrators.
• CRL Distribution Point: CRL should be downloaded from CRL Distribution Point. Then
this downloaded CRL should be uploaded into the TOE.
• NTP: The TOE supports secure communications with an NTP server in order to
synchronize the date and time on the TOE with the NTP server’s date and time. When
the TOE acts as NTP server, it receives NTP request from client and send timestamp to
the client.
• Syslog Server: This includes any syslog server to which the TOE would transmit syslog
messages.
Please read the Security Target [6] chapter 1.3.3 for the description of Non TOE Hardware
and Software, the Security Target [6] table 1-2 for the description of evaluated and not
evaluated modules, Security Target [6] chapter 1.4.2 and 1.4.3 for the physical and logical
scope of the TOE. The Security Target [6] chapter 1.4.4 defines the TOE as a standalone
TOE, i.e. it is not a distributed TOE in the sense of the collaborative Protection Profile [8],
chapter 3.
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9. Results of the Evaluation
9.1. CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used, extended by Scheme Interpretations and
by the assurance activities specified in Common Criteria Supporting Document: Evaluation
Activities for Network Device cPP, version 2.0 + Errata 20180314 [8] and showed that the
TOE is conformant to the collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 2.0
+ Errata 20180314, 14 March 2018 [8], and that the assurance activities specified in the
Supporting Document [8] had been performed appropriately.
For RNG assessment the scheme interpretations AIS 20 (see [4]) and [8] (for the entropy
assessment) were used.
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
• All components claimed in the Security Target [6], chapter 2.2 and 6.2 and defined in the
CC (see also part C of this report)
Please note that the ST [6] lists threats but the cPP [8] excludes an analysis if those
threats have actually been countered by the TOE. Please also note that there have no
objectives for the TOE been claimed. The cPP author chose an evaluation scope that
excludes the analysis if and how SFRs are traced back to security objectives for the TOE
and if they counter all threats, and if and how security objectives for the TOE are traced
back to the threats and OSPs, and if security objectives for the TOE are defined. To
include these aspects into this evaluation, the developer provided an addendum to the ST
(in order to not interfere with the exact conformance of the ST to the NDcPP): "Huawei
NE40E Series Software Consisting of VRP and the Underlying OS, Security Target -
ASE_OBJ.2, ASE_REQ.2 Addendum" [9] with the required information that allow the
evaluation of the aforementioned aspects, i.e. to consider the assurance families
ASE_REQ.2 and ASE_OBJ.2 in the evaluation.
The evaluation has confirmed:
• PP Conformance: collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 2.0 +
Errata 20180314, 2018-03-14, NDFW-iTC [8]
• for the Functionality: Exact PP conformant
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
• for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
Please note that Exact Conformance, as a subset of Strict Conformance as defined by the
CC, is defined as the ST containing all of the SFRs in section 6 of the NDcPP [8] (these
are the mandatory SFRs), and potentially additional SFRs from Appendix A of the NDcPP
[8] (these are optional SFRs) or Appendix B of the NDcPP [8] (these are selection-based
SFRs, some of which will be mandatory according to the selections made in other SFRs).
While iteration is allowed, no additional requirements (from the CC parts 2 or 3, or
definitions of extended components not already included in the cPP) are allowed.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
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9.2. Results of cryptographic assessment
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this certification
procedure (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). But cryptographic functionalities with a
security level of lower than 100 bits can no longer be regarded as secure without
considering the application context. Therefore, for these functionalities it shall be checked
whether the related crypto operations are appropriate for the intended system. Some
further hints and guidelines can be derived from the 'Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-02102'
(https://www.bsi.bund.de).
The table presented in chapter 8 of the Security Target [6] gives an overview of the
cryptographic functionalities inside the TOE to enforce the security policy and outlines its
rating from cryptographic point of view. All Cryptographic Functionality reach a Security
Level above 100 Bits.
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE
itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
The limited validity for the usage of cryptographic algorithms as outlined in chapter 9 has
to be considered by the user and his system risk management process, too.
If available, certified updates of the TOE should be used. If non-certified updates or
patches are available the user of the TOE should request the sponsor to provide a re-
certification. In the meantime a risk management process of the system using the TOE
should investigate and decide on the usage of not yet certified updates and patches or
take additional measures in order to maintain system security.
11. Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [6] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report. It is a finalized version of
the working version of the Security Target [6] that was used for the performed evaluation.
Their contents are identical, only some formattings, version histories, and document
classifications differ.
12. Definitions
12.1. Acronyms
AAA Authentication Authorization Accounting
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
ARP Address Resolution Protocol
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BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CA Certificate Authority
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
CLI Command Line Interface
cPP Collaborative Protection Profile
CRL Certificate Revocation List
DP Data Plane
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
GCP General Control Plane
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
LPU Line Process Unit
MAC Media Access Control
MAN Metropolitan Area Network
MPU Main Processing Unit
ND Network Device
NMS Network Management Server
NTP Network Time Protocal
OS Operating System
PP Protection Profile
RTOS Real Time Operating System
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SCP Service Control Plane
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SMP System Manage Plane
SSH Secure Shell
SSP System Service Plane
ST Security Target
TLS Transport Layer Security
TOE Target of Evaluation
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TSF TOE Security Functionality
VRP Versatile Routing Platform
12.2. Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Collaborative Protection Profile - A Protection Profile collaboratively developed by an
International Technical Community endorsed by the Management Committee.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in CC
part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in CC part 3.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Package - named set of either security functional or security assurance requirements
Protection Profile - A formal document defined in CC, expressing an implementation
independent set of security requirements for a category of IT Products that meet specific
consumer needs.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - An IT Product and its associated administrator and user guidance
documentation that is the subject of an Evaluation.
TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
13. Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 5, April 2017
http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 5, April 2017,
http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[3] BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) and Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility,
approval and licencing (CC-Stellen), https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung
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[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE7
https://www.bsi.bund.de/AIS
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
on the BSI Website, https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierungsreporte
[6] Security Target of Huawei NE40E Series Software Consisting of VRP and the
Underlying OS BSI-DSZ-CC-1053-2018, Version 2.5, Date 2018-10-23, Huawei
Technologies Co., Ltd. (confidential working document) and Security Target Lite of
Huawei NE40E Series Software Consisting of VRP and the Underlying OS BSI-
DSZ-CC-1053-2018, Version 2.5, Date 2018-10-23, Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.
(public finalized document)
[7] Evaluation Technical Report for Huawei NE40E Series Software Consisting of VRP
and the Underlying OS V800R010C00SPC200, V800R010SPH220T, BSI-DSZ-CC-
1053-2018, Version 2.0, Date 2018-10-24, TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH,
(confidential document)
[8] collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 2.0 + Errata 20180314,
2018-03-14, NDFW-iTC + Common Criteria Supporting Document: Evaluation
Activities for Network Device cPP, version 2.0 + Errata 20180314
[9] Huawei NE40E Series Software Consisting of VRP and the Underlying OS, Security
Target - ASE_OBJ.2, ASE_REQ.2 Addendum, Version 0.4, Date 2018-10-02,
Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.
[10] NE40E Product Documentation Procduct Version: V800R010C00SPC200, Version
0.2, Date 2018-04-10, Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.
[11] Huawei NE40E Series Product V800R010C00SPC200 Preparative Procedures
Product Version: V800R010C00SPC200, Version 0.7, Date 2018-10-02, Huawei
Technologies Co., Ltd.
[12] Huawei NE40E Series Product V800R010C00SPC200 Operational user Guidance
Product Version: V800R010C00SPC200, Version 0.6, Date 2018-10-02, Huawei
Technologies Co., Ltd.
[13] NDcPP Universal Service Router NE40E V800R010C00SPC200 Configuration and
Reference, Version 0.4, Date 2018-09-29, Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.
7
specifically
• AIS 20, Version 3, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für deterministische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 32, Version 7, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
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C. Excerpts from the Criteria
For the meaning of the assurance components and levels the following references to the
Common Criteria can be followed:
• On conformance claim definitions and descriptions refer to CC part 1 chapter 10.5
• On the concept of assurance classes, families and components refer to CC Part 3
chapter 7.1
• On the concept and definition of pre-defined assurance packages (EAL) refer to CC
Part 3 chapters 7.2 and 8
• On the assurance class ASE for Security Target evaluation refer to CC Part 3
chapter 12
• On the detailed definitions of the assurance components for the TOE evaluation
refer to CC Part 3 chapters 13 to 17
• The table in CC part 3 , Annex E summarizes the relationship between the
evaluation assurance levels (EAL) and the assurance classes, families and
components.
The CC are published at http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/cc/
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D. Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
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Note: End of report
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