© 2010 Research In Motion Limited. All rights reserved. www.blackberry.com
Security Target
BlackBerry® Device Software 5.0.0
Document Version 5.0
BlackBerry Certifications
Research In Motion
Security Target
BlackBerry® Device Software
© 2010 Research In Motion Limited. All rights reserved. www.blackberry.com
Document and Contact Information
Version Date Description
5.0 March 4, 2010 Final Revision
Contact Corporate Office
BlackBerry Certifications
certifications@rim.com
(519) 888-7465 ext. 72921
Research In Motion
295 Phillip Street
Waterloo, Ontario
Canada N2L 3W8
www.rim.com www.blackberry.com
Security Target
BlackBerry® Device Software
© 2010 Research In Motion Limited. All rights reserved. www.blackberry.com
Contents
1 ST Introduction .........................................................................................................1
1.1 ST Reference...................................................................................................1
1.2 TOE Reference................................................................................................1
1.3 Evaluated Configuration...................................................................................1
1.4 TOE Overview .................................................................................................1
1.5 TOE Type ........................................................................................................2
1.6 TOE Description ..............................................................................................3
2 Conformance Claim ................................................................................................10
3 Security Problem Definition.....................................................................................11
3.1 Threats ..........................................................................................................11
3.2 Organisational Security Policies.....................................................................11
3.3 Assumptions ..................................................................................................11
4 Security Objectives .................................................................................................13
4.1 TOE Security Objectives................................................................................13
4.2 Environmental Security Objectives.................................................................13
4.3 Security Objectives Rationale ........................................................................14
5 Extended Components Definition............................................................................16
5.1 FCS_VAL_EXP.1 Cryptographic Module Validation.......................................16
5.2 FDP_SDP_EXP.1 Stored Data Non-Disclosure .............................................16
5.3 FDP_SDP_EXP.2 Stored Data Deletion ........................................................16
5.4 FTA_SSL_EXP.4 Event-Initiated Session Locking.........................................16
6 Security Requirements............................................................................................17
6.1 Conventions...................................................................................................17
6.2 Security Functional Requirements .................................................................17
6.3 Security Assurance Requirements.................................................................38
6.4 Security Requirements Rationale...................................................................39
7 TOE Summary Specification...................................................................................50
7.1 Security Functions .........................................................................................50
7.2 Assurance Measures .....................................................................................58
7.3 TOE Security Specification ............................................................................58
8 Baseline Configuration............................................................................................69
Security Target
BlackBerry® Device Software
© 2010 Research In Motion Limited. All rights reserved. www.blackberry.com
8.1 Baseline IT Policy Configuration ....................................................................69
8.2 Baseline Software Configuration....................................................................70
8.3 Baseline User Guidance ................................................................................71
9 Glossary .................................................................................................................72
Security Target
BlackBerry® Device Software
© 2010 Research In Motion Limited. All rights reserved. www.blackberry.com
List of Tables
Table 1. User Data Protected by Content Protection Feature........................................................ 5
Table 2. Mapping of Security Objectives...................................................................................... 14
Table 3. TOE Assurance Components......................................................................................... 39
Table 4. Mapping of SFRs to Security Objectives........................................................................ 40
Table 5. SFR Dependencies ........................................................................................................ 43
Table 6. SAR Dependencies ........................................................................................................ 48
Table 7. IT Commands ................................................................................................................. 52
Table 8. IT Policy Rules................................................................................................................ 52
Table 9. Software Configuration Rules......................................................................................... 56
Table 10. Mapping of TOE Security Functions to SFRs .............................................................. 59
Table 11. Mapping of TOE Assurance Measures to SARs .......................................................... 65
Table 12. Baseline IT Policy Configuration .................................................................................. 69
Table 13. Baseline Software Configuration .................................................................................. 70
Security Target
BlackBerry® Device Software
© 2010 Research In Motion Limited. All rights reserved. www.blackberry.com
List of Figures
Figure 1. BlackBerry Solution Architecture..................................................................................... 2
Figure 2. BlackBerry Device Hardware Block Diagram.................................................................. 8
Figure 3. TOE Physical Boundary .................................................................................................. 9
Security Target
BlackBerry® Device Software 1
1 ST Introduction
1.1 ST Reference
The following information identifies this document:
Title: Security Target: BlackBerry® Device Software 5.0.0
Version: 5.0
1.2 TOE Reference
The following information identifies the TOE:
Title: BlackBerry® Device Software 5.0.0
Version: 5.0
1.3 Evaluated Configuration
Evaluated Configuration consists of the following;
BlackBerry 9700 series
BlackBerry 9500 series
9700 Series BlackBerry® Device Software 5.0.0 (5.0.0.321 bundle 499, 5.0.0.344 bundle
541, 5.0.0.351 bundle 554 )
o Guidance documents for the BlackBerry 9700 series Handheld device can be found
on the BlackBerry.com website at;
http://docs.blackberry.com/en/smartphone_users/subcategories/?userType=1&categ
ory=BlackBerry+Smartphones&subCategory=BlackBerry+Bold+9700+Series
9500 Series BlackBerry® Device Software 5.0.0 (5.0.0.320 bundle 497)
o Guidance documents for the BlackBerry 9500 series Handheld device are available
on the BlackBerry.com website at;
http://docs.blackberry.com/en/smartphone_users/subcategories/?userType=1&categ
ory=BlackBerry+Smartphones&subCategory=BlackBerry+Storm2+9500+Series
Visit http://www.blackberry.com for up to date device availability information.
The evaluated configurations consist of the following:
Software version numbers are displayed on a BlackBerry device by navigating to the Options list
and selecting the About item.
1.4 TOE Overview
BlackBerry® is the leading wireless solution that allows users to stay connected to a full suite of
applications, including email, phone, enterprise applications, Internet, Short Messaging Service
(SMS), and organiser information. BlackBerry is a totally integrated package that includes
innovative software, advanced BlackBerry devices and wireless network service, providing a
seamless solution. The BlackBerry architecture is shown in the following figure.
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BlackBerry® Device Software 2
Internet
Enterprise
Firewall
BlackBerry
Infrastructure
Firewall
BlackBerry
Infrastructure
DataTAC
Wireless
Networks
Mobitex
Wireless
Networks
iDEN®
Wireless
Networks
BlackBerry
Devices
Multiple
Devices
BlackBerry
Enterprise
Server
Enterprise
Mail Server
BlackBerry
Enabled Devices
GSM™ /
GPRS / EDGE
Wireless
Networks
CDMA / EVDO
Wireless
Networks
Figure 1. BlackBerry Solution Architecture
BlackBerry Enterprise Server software tightly integrates with Microsoft® Exchange, IBM® Lotus®
Domino®, and Novell® GroupWise® (with the exclusion of Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail
Extensions (S/MIME) for Groupwise) while working with other existing enterprise systems to
enable push-based access of wireless email and data. It allows users to securely send and
receive email and information from enterprise data stores and applications. BlackBerry
Enterprise Server provides simplified management and centralised control of the wireless
environment with industry-standard performance monitoring capabilities, administrative tools, and
wirelessly-enabled IT policies. BlackBerry Enterprise Server also enables several other
productivity enhancements, including attachment viewing for popular file formats, wireless
calendar synchronisation, and remote address lookup, and allows IT departments to benefit from
a scalable and flexible solution that meets their evolving wireless requirements.
BlackBerry devices are built on industry-leading wireless technology, allowing users to receive
email and information automatically with no need to request for delivery. Additionally, users are
notified when new information arrives, making it easier to stay informed.
BlackBerry devices also provide an intuitive user experience. Users simply click on an email
address, telephone number, or URL inside a message to automatically begin composing the new
email, make the call, or link to the web page. BlackBerry device users can also easily navigate
through icons, menus, and options with the roll-and-click trackwheel and quickly compose
messages or enter data using the device keyboard.
BlackBerry provides advanced security features to meet the strict confidentiality and security
requirements of the public sector. Data remains encrypted at all points between the device and
BlackBerry Enterprise Server using FIPS 140-2 validated cryptography, allowing users to feel
confident about wirelessly sending and receiving sensitive information.
BlackBerry operates on multiple high speed wireless networks. With wireless service available in
North America, South America, Europe, Asia, Australia, and Africa, the BlackBerry solution can
support enterprises around the world while providing options for wireless network and service
choice.
Visit http://www.blackberry.com for more information on the BlackBerry solution.
1.5 TOE Type
Mobile Productivity Devices and Systems
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1.6 TOE Description
1.6.1 TOE Features
1.6.1.1 Messaging
The BlackBerry solution provides a secure wireless extension of the enterprise messaging
environment.
1.6.1.1.1 Email
The TOE integrates seamlessly with an existing email account, allowing the user to wirelessly
send and receive email. Email is pushed to the TOE automatically, so the user can wirelessly
receive email with the same speed and at least as much reliability as that of their desktop email
program.
When the user moves or deletes email messages using the TOE, or marks messages read or
unread, the changes are reconciled wirelessly between the device and the enterprise email
account.
Wireless email messaging and reconciliation is mediated by the BlackBerry Enterprise Server.
1.6.1.1.2 PIM Data
The user can synchronise personal information management (PIM) items such as calendar
entries, tasks, memos, and contacts wirelessly so that the entries on the TOE and the enterprise
email account are consistent. If wireless PIM synchronisation is enabled, PIM items are
synchronised over the wireless network automatically. With wireless PIM synchronisation and
wireless email reconciliation, the user does not need to physically connect the TOE to their
desktop to synchronise and reconcile messaging and PIM data.
The user can create or edit meeting requests and accept or decline invitations using the TOE.
Any changes are synchronised wirelessly between the TOE and the enterprise email account.
When wireless PIM synchronisation is enabled, an initial data synchronisation between the TOE
and the enterprise mail server to fully synchronise both sides is performed in a way that avoids
data loss on either side and is optimised for wireless transmission. After the initial
synchronisation is complete, incremental changes are synchronised bi-directionally between the
TOE and the enterprise mail server.
PIM data synchronisation is mediated by the BlackBerry Enterprise Server.
1.6.1.1.3 Attachments
The BlackBerry Enterprise Server enables the user to use the TOE to view supported email
attachments in a format that retains the original layout, appearance, and navigation of the
attachment. The device attachment viewer is fully integrated with the device mail application and
the BlackBerry Enterprise Server.
Because the BlackBerry Enterprise Server interprets and converts email attachments in binary
format, the applications that are associated with the attachment format are not required to be
installed on the BlackBerry Enterprise Server, and there is no risk of infection on the device by
macro viruses that operate within those applications.
The attachment viewer is installed automatically with the BlackBerry Enterprise Server software
and supports many formats, such as .doc, .dot, .xls, .ppt, .pdf, .txt, .html, .htm, .wpd, and .zip
document formats and .jpg, .bmp, .gif, .png, and .tif graphic formats.
1.6.1.1.4 Remote Address Lookup
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Remote address lookup enables the user to search for a recipient in their enterprise directory
when they compose an email message using the TOE.
The user can search using letters from the entry’s first name, last name, or both. The BlackBerry
Enterprise Server searches the enterprise directory and returns (up to) the 20 closest matches. If
the desired name does not appear in the list, the user can request the next 20 search results.
When the user selects a match, the entry can be added to the personal address book.
1.6.1.2 S/MIME Support Package
The S/MIME Support Package for BlackBerry devices is designed to enable BlackBerry device
users who are already sending and receiving S/MIME messages using their computer email
application to send and receive S/MIME-protected messages using their BlackBerry devices. The
S/MIME Support Package for BlackBerry devices is designed to work with S/MIME email clients
including Microsoft Outlook® and Microsoft Outlook Express, and with popular PKI components,
including Netscape®, Entrust® Authority™ Security Manager version 5 and later, and Microsoft
certificate authorities.
The S/MIME Support Package for BlackBerry devices includes tools for obtaining certificates and
transferring them to the BlackBerry device. This means that BlackBerry devices with the S/MIME
Support Package for BlackBerry devices installed can decrypt messages that are encrypted using
S/MIME encryption and BlackBerry device users can read the decrypted messages on their
BlackBerry devices, and that BlackBerry device users can sign, encrypt, and send S/MIME
messages from their BlackBerry devices. Without the S/MIME Support Package for BlackBerry
devices the BlackBerry Enterprise Server sends a message to the BlackBerry device in which the
message body includes a statement that the S/MIME message cannot be decrypted.
In order to use the S/MIME functionality the BES must be configured to allow S/MIME and an
activation cod from http://www.blackberry.com/updates must be installed.
The S/MIME Support Package for BlackBerry devices includes support for the following features:
 Certificate and private key synchronization and management using the Certificate
Synchronization Manager included in the BlackBerry Desktop Software
 Encrypting and decrypting messages, including PIN messages, verifying digital
signatures, and digitally signing outgoing messages
 Searching for and retrieving certificates and certificate status over the wireless network
using PKI protocols
 Smart cards on BlackBerry devices
1.6.1.3 BlackBerry Mobile Data Service
The BlackBerry Enterprise Server provides the BlackBerry Browser and third-party Java™
applications with secure access to the Internet and online enterprise data and applications. The
BlackBerry Enterprise Server can provide a link to standard servers on the enterprise intranet or
Internet using standard Internet protocol, such as HTTP, and encrypts content in transit using the
same encryption standard used to encrypt email and other BlackBerry data.
1.6.1.4 IT Policy
1.6.1.4.5 Wireless IT Policy
Wireless IT policy enables the BlackBerry Enterprise Server administrator to define settings and
push them wirelessly to the TOE for enforcement. A policy consists of rules that define the
security, PIM synchronisation settings, and other behaviours of the TOE. Because the policy is
pushed wirelessly, it is effective immediately.
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BlackBerry® Device Software 5
1.6.1.4.6 Wireless IT Commands
The BlackBerry Enterprise Server administrator can wirelessly and securely send commands to
the TOE for execution. Wireless IT commands include Erase Data and Disable Handheld and
Set Password and Lock Handheld.
1.6.1.5 Security
1.6.1.5.7 BlackBerry Infrastructure
Communication between the TOE and a BlackBerry Enterprise Server or another BlackBerry
device is routed by the BlackBerry Infrastructure, the link between the wired and wireless
networks in the BlackBerry solution. The communication between the TOE and the BlackBerry
Infrastructure utilises the RIM-proprietary Gateway Message Envelope (GME) protocol.
1.6.1.5.8 Secure Communication
The BlackBerry solution enables users to send and receive email and access enterprise data
wirelessly, while seamlessly protecting data against attack. Data is encrypted while in transit
between the TOE and a BlackBerry Enterprise Server or another BlackBerry device and is never
decrypted between these two endpoints.
1.6.1.5.9 Third Party Application Control
The BlackBerry Enterprise Server administrator can control third-party Java applications on the
TOE in the following ways:
 Allow or disallow third-party applications from being downloaded to the TOE
 Configure policies that define the type of connections that third-party applications can
establish (for example, opening network connections inside the enterprise firewall)
 Allow or prevent the installation of specific third-party applications on the TOE
 Limit the permissions of third-party applications, including the resources that the
application can access and the types of connections that it can establish
1.6.1.5.10 Content Protection
The content protection feature encrypts data that is stored on the TOE using Advanced
Encryption Standard with 256 bit encryption (AES-256). The TOE also encrypts email messages
and meeting requests that it receives when it is locked. If the content protection feature is
enabled, the data identified in the following table is protected.
Table 1. User Data Protected by Content Protection Feature
Application User Data
Email Subject, email addresses, message body, attachments
Calendar
Subject, location, organiser, attendees, notes included in the appointment or
meeting request
Memo Pad Title, information in the note body
Tasks Subject, information in the task body
Contacts All information except for title and category
Auto Text All entries that the original text is replaced with
BlackBerry Browser Pushed content, saved web sites, browser cache
1.6.1.5.11 Protected storage of external memory on a BlackBerry device
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The BlackBerry device is designed to encrypt multimedia data stored on an external memory
device according to the External File System Encryption Level IT policy rule or the corresponding
BlackBerry device setting.
The BlackBerry device is designed to support:
 File encryption by encrypting specific files on the external memory device using AES-256
 Access control to objects on the external memory device using code signing
The external memory device stores the media card master keys that the BlackBerry device is
designed to use to decrypt and encrypt files on the external memory device. The BlackBerry
device is designed to use either a device key stored in the Non-Volatile (NV) store in the
BlackBerry device Random Access Memory (RAM) or a user-provided password to encrypt the
master keys.
The BlackBerry device is designed to permit code signing keys in the header information of the
encrypted file on the external memory device. The BlackBerry device is designed to check the
code signing keys when the BlackBerry device opens the input or output streams of the encrypted
file.
The BlackBerry device, any computer platform, and other devices that use the external memory
device can modify encrypted files (for example, truncate files) on the external memory device.
The BlackBerry device is not designed to perform integrity checks on the encrypted file data.
1.6.2 TOE Security Function Policies
The TOE enforces access and flow control security functional policies (SFPs) that control access
to TOE functionality and resources.
1.6.2.1 IT Policy SFP
The IT policy security function policy (ITPolicy_SFP) controls the application of an IT policy
configuration received from a BlackBerry Enterprise Server. The IT policy configuration is only
applied if the TOE determines the configuration was sent by an authorised BlackBerry Enterprise
Server.
1.6.2.2 Local Administration SFP
The local administration SFP (LocalAdmin_SFP) controls the ability of the TOE user to manage
the TSF through the local administration screens. The TOE user can modify a particular
configuration item only if permitted by the IT policy configuration. The TOE user is explicitly
denied the ability to modify the IT policy configuration of the TOE.
1.6.2.3 GME SFP
The GME SFP (GME_SFP) controls the information flow between the TOE and a BlackBerry
Enterprise Server, and PIN messaging between the TOE and another BlackBerry device.
1.6.2.4 IT Command SFP
The IT command SFP (ITCommand_SFP) controls the execution of a wireless IT command
received from a BlackBerry Enterprise Server. The IT command is only executed if the TOE
determines the command was sent by an authorised BlackBerry Enterprise Server.
1.6.2.5 PIM SFP
The PIM SFP (PIM_SFP) controls the wireless synchronisation of PIM data between the TOE and
the corresponding enterprise email account.
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1.6.2.6 Application Download SFP
The application download SFP (ApplicationDownload_SFP) controls the downloading and
installation of third-party applications.
1.6.2.7 Application Flow SFP
The application flow SFP (ApplicationFlow_SFP) controls the communication initiated by a third-
party application with an entity external to the TOE.
1.6.2.8 Cellular SFP
The cellular SFP (Cellular_SFP) controls the ability to send and receive cellular phone
communication as well as SMS and Multimedia Messaging Service (MMS) messaging.
1.6.2.9 Radio SFP
The Radio SFP (Radio_SFP) controls the ability to send and receive Bluetooth, WiFi and Global
Positioning System (GPS) communications.
1.6.2.10 Software Configuration SFP
The software configuration SFP (SWConfiguraion_SFP) allows or prevents the installation of
specific third-party applications on the TOE and limits the permissions of third-party applications,
including the resources that the application can access and the types of connections that it can
establish.
1.6.2.11 Multimedia SFP
The multimedia SFP (Multimedia_SFP) controls the ability to take pictures, record video and
voice notes, and store multimedia user data on the external memory device.
1.6.2.12 S/MIME SFP
The S/MIME SFP (S/MIME_SFP) controls the ability to send and receive S/MIME messages.
1.6.3 TOE Boundary
1.6.3.1 Physical Boundary
The TOE can be executed on all Java-based BlackBerry devices with at least 64 MB of memory.
All BlackBerry devices share a set of core components, while several components are dependent
on the device model. A block diagram of BlackBerry device hardware is shown in the following
figure for reference purposes.
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BlackBerry® Device Software 8
Core Components
CPU
LCD
Earpiece
Notification
LED
USB port
RAM
Clock
System
controller
Microphone
Input device
Escape
button
Keyboard
Cellular
radio
Headset
jack
Keyboard look
and feel
Flash
Memory
Additional buttons
(e.g., mute, power)
Additional I/O devices
(e.g., speakerphone)
Supported cellular
network
Model Dependent
Input device look and feel
(e.g. trackwheel, trackball)
Bluetooth
radio
WiFi radio
GPS
External Components
External
Memory
Figure 2. BlackBerry Device Hardware Block Diagram
The TOE includes a rich suite of applications and provides an application programming interface
(API) to allow for third-party development of additional applications. The API consists of a Java
Platform Micro Edition runtime environment, based on the CLDC 1.1 and MIDP 2.0 specifications,
and BlackBerry API extensions that provide additional capabilities and tighter integration with
BlackBerry devices. Supporting the API is the BlackBerry Platform, which is comprised of the
BlackBerry Java Virtual Machine and the BlackBerry operating system. The TOE is defined as a
software TOE that includes the BlackBerry Platform and the API that it supports but excludes the
BlackBerry device hardware. The physical boundary of the TOE is shown in the following figure.
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BlackBerry® Device Software 9
Figure 3. TOE Physical Boundary
1.6.3.2 Logical Boundary
The functionality examined in this evaluation is limited to the following core features of the TOE:
 Secure communication with the BlackBerry Enterprise Server
 Secure communication with other BlackBerry devices
 Remote management of the TOE
 Content protection on the TOE
 File encryption on an external memory device
 Third-party application control
 Wireless communication, including secure S/MIME email messaging
 Wireless PIM data synchronisation
 Management of multimedia applications
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2 Conformance Claim
The target of evaluation (TOE) is Part 2 extended, Part 3 conformant, and EAL 4 augmented to
the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 3.
'The EAL 4 augmentation is ALC_FLR.1, Basic flaw remediation.
The TOE is not conformant to a protection profile.
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BlackBerry® Device Software 11
3 Security Problem Definition
3.1 Threats
The following threats are addressed by the TOE:
T.DataDisclosure Unauthorised entities may monitor and gain access to user data
exchanged between the TOE and the BlackBerry Enterprise Server or
another BlackBerry device.
T.LossOrTheft The TOE may be lost or stolen, and an unauthorised individual may
attempt to access user data or TOE security functions.
T.ViolatePolicy The TOE user may inadvertently attempt to manage or use the TOE
security functions in violation of the enterprise security policy.
The following threats are addressed by the environment in which the TOE operates:
T.Modify The TSF-enforcing mechanisms may be modified by an unauthorised
individual.
3.2 Organisational Security Policies
The TOE must comply with the following organisational security policies:
P.Provision The TOE must be provisioned for a specific individual in the enterprise
messaging environment by the BlackBerry Enterprise Server
administrator prior to use by the individual.
P.Policy The configuration of the TOE security functions and applications must
adhere to the enterprise security policy in conjunction with the Baseline
Configuration defined in Section 8.
P.Notify The TOE user must immediately notify the BlackBerry Enterprise Server
administrator if the TOE is lost or stolen.
P.Wireless The TOE must support wireless PIM data synchronisation and at least
the following methods of wireless communication: wireless email,
S/MIME email, and SMS messaging; cellular phone communication; and
wireless access to the enterprise network and the Internet.
P.TrustedThirdPartyApps
The BlackBerry Enterprise Server administrator shall ensure:
- Application control policy is assigned with the Disposition application
control policy rule set to Required or Optional for specific, trusted
applications only.
- Application control policy is assigned with the Disposition application
control policy rule set to Disallowed for unspecified or untrusted
applications.
3.3 Assumptions
The following assumptions are made about the environment in which the TOE operates:
A.Network The wireless network required by the TOE is available, and the TOE has
permission to use the network.
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A.ProperUser The TOE user is not malicious, attempts to interact with the TOE in
compliance with the enterprise security policy, and exercises precautions
to reduce the risk of loss or theft of the TOE.
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4 Security Objectives
4.1 TOE Security Objectives
The following are the TOE security objectives:
O.DataExchange The TOE must ensure that all user data exchanged between it and the
BlackBerry Enterprise Server or another BlackBerry device is protected
from unauthorised disclosure
O.DataStorage The TOE must provide the capability to protect stored user data from
unauthorised disclosure.
O.Admin The TOE must provide the capability for the TOE user to manage its
security functions and execute administrative commands.
O.RemoteAdmin The TOE must provide the capability for the BlackBerry Enterprise
Server administrator to remotely manage the TOE security functions and
execute administrative commands.
O.FlexibleAdmin The remote management capability of the TOE must allow for a high
degree of flexibility in managing the TOE security functions.
O.NoOverride The TOE must prevent the TOE user from overriding the management of
security functions performed remotely by the BlackBerry Enterprise
Server administrator.
O.Wireless The TOE must provide the capability to wirelessly synchronise PIM data;
send and receive email, S/MIME email, PIN, SMS and MMS messages;
send and receive cellular phone communication; access the enterprise
network and the Internet; communicate via WiFi and GPS and
communicate with Bluetooth devices.
4.2 Environmental Security Objectives
The following security objectives must be met by the environment in which the TOE operates:
O.Network The TOE must be able to communicate with the BlackBerry
Infrastructure.
O.ProperUser The TOE user must be trusted to interact with the TOE in a manner that
maintains its security, complies with the enterprise security policy, and
reduces the risk of loss or theft of the TOE.
O.Notify The TOE user must immediately notify the BlackBerry Enterprise Server
administrator if the TOE is lost or stolen.
O.Provision The BlackBerry Enterprise Server administrator must provision the TOE
for the intended TOE user prior to its use.
O.Integrity The integrity of the TOE must be verified.
O.AdminID The BlackBerry Enterprise Server must identify authorised users and
associate them to an administrative role before permitting them access
to BlackBerry Enterprise Server functions or data.
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BlackBerry® Device Software 14
4.3 Security Objectives Rationale
The following table maps the security objectives to the assumptions, threats, and organisational
policies identified for the TOE and its environment.
Table 2. Mapping of Security Objectives
A.Network
A.ProperUser
T.DataDisclosure
T.LossOrTheft
T.ViolatePolicy
T.Modify
P.Provision
P.Policy
P.Notify
P.Wireless
P.TrustedThirdParty
Apps
O.DataExchange X
O.DataStorage X
O.Admin X
O.RemoteAdmin X
O.FlexibleAdmin X
O.NoOverride X X
O.Wireless X
O.Network X
O.ProperUser X X
O.Notify X
O.Provision X
O.Integrity X
O.AdminID X X
4.3.1 A.Network
The O.Network objective ensures the wireless network connectivity required by the TOE exists.
4.3.2 A.ProperUser
The O.ProperUser objective ensures the TOE user is trusted to interact with the TOE in
compliance with the enterprise security policy and take precautions to reduce the risk of TOE loss
or theft.
4.3.3 T.DataDisclosure
The O.DataExchange objective ensures the user data exchanged between the TOE and the
BlackBerry Enterprise Server or another BlackBerry device cannot be disclosed by unauthorised
entities.
4.3.4 T.LossOrTheft
The O.DataStorage objective ensures that the TOE may protect stored user data from
unauthorised disclosure through the use of cryptographic means or deletion if the TOE is lost or
stolen. The O.RemoteAdmin objective ensures that the BlackBerry Enterprise Server
administrator may configure the security functions of the TOE and execute administrative
commands if the TOE is lost or stolen. The O.NoOverride objective ensures that the TOE user is
not able to override the ability of the BlackBerry Enterprise Server administrator to remotely
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BlackBerry® Device Software 15
execute administrative commands if the TOE is lost or stolen. The O.ProperUser objective
ensures that the TOE user exercises precautions to reduce the risk of loss or theft.
4.3.5 T.ViolatePolicy
The O.NoOverride objective ensures that the TOE user cannot override the remote management
of the TOE security functions performed by the BlackBerry Enterprise Server administrator.
4.3.6 T.Modify
The O.Integrity objective ensures that the TOE has not been modified by an unauthorised
individual by verifying the integrity of the TOE. The O.AdminID objective ensures that only
authorised users gain access to the BlackBerry Enterprise Server functions and data.
4.3.7 P.Provision
The O.Provision objective ensures that the BlackBerry Enterprise Server administrator provisions
the TOE for the intended TOE user prior to its use.
4.3.8 P.Policy
The O.Admin objective ensures that the TOE user can configure the TOE security functions to
match the enterprise security policy. The O.FlexibleAdmin objective ensures that there is a high
degree of flexibility in remotely managing the TOE security functions so that the TOE complies
with the enterprise security policy.
4.3.9 P.Notify
The O.Notify objective ensures that the TOE user immediately notifies the BlackBerry Enterprise
Server administrator if the TOE is lost or stolen.
4.3.10 P.Wireless
The O.Wireless objective ensures that the TOE supports the minimum methods of wireless
communication.
4.3.11 P.TrustedThirdPartyApps
The O.AdminID objective ensures that only authorised users gain access to the BlackBerry
Enterprise Server functions and data.
Security Target
BlackBerry® Device Software 16
5 Extended Components Definition
5.1 FCS_VAL_EXP.1 Cryptographic Module Validation
The Common Criteria does not provide an SFR to require that a cryptographic module contained
with the TOE boundary meets the requirements of FIPS 140-2. The full statement of
FCS_VAL_EXP.1 follows:
FCS_VAL_EXP.1, Cryptographic module validation
FCS_VAL_EXP.1.1 The following cryptographic modules of the TSF shall meet the
requirements of FIPS 140-2, Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules:
[assignment: list of cryptographic modules].
Dependencies: FCS_CKM.4, FCS_COP.1
5.2 FDP_SDP_EXP.1 Stored Data Non-Disclosure
The Common Criteria does not provide an SFR to require that user data be protected from
unauthorised disclosure using cryptographic functions. The full statement of FDP_SDP_EXP.1
follows:
FDP_SDP_EXP.1, Stored data non-disclosure
FDP_SDP_EXP.1.1 The TSF shall protect user data stored within the TOE from
unauthorised disclosure using [assignment: cryptographic algorithm].
Dependencies: FCS_COP.1
5.3 FDP_SDP_EXP.2 Stored Data Deletion
The Common Criteria does not provide an SFR to require that all user data be deleted when
specific actions occur. The full statement of FDP_SDP_EXP.2 follows:
FDP_SDP_EXP.2, Stored data deletion
FDP_SDP_EXP.2.1 The TSF shall delete all user data stored within the TOE when
the following events occur: [assignment: events that invoke action].
Dependencies: None
5.4 FTA_SSL_EXP.4 Event-Initiated Session Locking
The Common Criteria does not provide an SFR to require that an interactive session with the
TOE be locked when events other than user invocation or an elapsed time interval occur. The full
statement of FTA_SSL_EXP.4 follows:
FTA_SSL_EXP.4, Event-initiated session locking
FTA_SSL_EXP.4.1 The TSF shall lock an interactive session by:
a. clearing or overwriting display devices, making the current contents unreadable;
b. disabling any activity of the user’s data access/display devices other than
unlocking the session.
when the following events occur: [assignment: list of events].
FTA_SSL_EXP.4.2 The TSF shall require the following events to occur prior
to unlocking the session: [assignment: events to occur].
Dependencies: FIA_UAU.1
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6 Security Requirements
This section identifies the security functional and assurance requirements that are applicable to
the TOE.
6.1 Conventions
6.1.1 Component Operations
The following typographic conventions are used to identify the permissible operations, as
identified in section 8 of CC Part 1, on functional and assurance components:
 Iteration – The iteration operation is identified by enumerating the component. For
example, performing the iteration operation on the functional component FMT_MOF.1.1
would result in the component enumeration FMT_MOF.1 (1) and FMT_MOF.1 (2).
Functional elements are also enumerated for clarity, for example, FMT_MOF.1.1 (1) and
FMT_MOF.1.1 (2).
 Assignment – The assignment operation is identified with regular text contained in
brackets. For example, an assignment operation can be performed on FMT_SMR.1.1 as
follows: “The TSF shall maintain the roles [root, guest, and user].”
 Selection – The selection operation is identified with italicised text contained in brackets.
For example, a selection operation can be performed on FPT_ITT.1.1 as follows: “The
TSF shall protect TSF data from [disclosure] when it is transmitted between separate
parts of the TOE.”
 Refinement – The refinement operation is identified with underscored text. For example,
a refinement operation can be performed on FTA_TAB.1.1 as follows: “Before
establishing a user session, the TSF shall display an advisory warning message that
requires acknowledgement by the user regarding unauthorised use of the TOE.”
6.1.2 Explicitly Defined Requirements
Explicitly defined functional and assurance requirements are named according to the normal
Common Criteria convention with “_EXP” appended. For example, FCS_VAL_EXP.1 is an
explicitly defined functional requirement for the FCS, Cryptographic support, functional class.
6.2 Security Functional Requirements
The following functional requirements, listed according to their functional class, are applicable to
the TOE.
6.2.1 Class FCS, Cryptographic Support
6.2.1.1 FCS_VAL_EXP.1, Cryptographic module validation
FCS_VAL_EXP.1.1 The following cryptographic modules of the TSF shall meet the
requirements of FIPS 140-2, Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules: [
BlackBerry Cryptographic Kernel Version 3.8.5.85
].
Dependencies: FCS_CKM.4, FCS_COP.1
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6.2.1.2 FCS_CKM.1, Cryptographic key generation (1)
FCS_CKM.1.1 (1) The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [FIPS 186-2 Appendix 3.1 PRNG] and specified
cryptographic key sizes [256 bits, 112 bits] that meet the following: [FIPS 186-2 Appendix 3.1].
Dependencies: [FCS_CKM.2 or FCS_COP.1], FCS_CKM.4, FMT_MSA.2
6.2.1.3 FCS_CKM.1, Cryptographic key generation (2)
FCS_CKM.1.1 (2) The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a
specified key generation algorithm [ECDH and ECMQV] and specified cryptographic key sizes
[256 bits] that meet the following: [IEEE P1363 Draft 13].
Dependencies: [FCS_CKM.2 or FCS_COP.1], FCS_CKM.4, FMT_MSA.2
6.2.1.4 FCS_CKM.4, Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.4.1 The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key destruction method [zeroization] that meets the following: [FIPS 140-2
zeroization requirements].
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or FCS_CKM.1], FMT_MSA.2
6.2.1.5 FCS_COP.1, Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform [data encryption and decryption, random number
generation, digital signature verification, and key agreement] in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm [
 data encryption and decryption: AES, Triple DES
 random number generation: FIPS 186-2 Appendix 3.1 PRNG
 digital signature verification: ECDSA
 key agreement: ECDH, ECMQV
] and cryptographic key sizes [
 data encryption and decryption: 256 (AES), 192 bits (AES), 112 bits (2-key Triple DES),
128 bits (AES)
 random number generation: not applicable
 digital signature verification: 571 bits
 key agreement: 521 bits
1
] that meet the following: [
 data encryption and decryption: FIPS 197 (AES), FIPS 46-3 (Triple DES), NIST SP 800-
38A (CBC mode of operation)
 random number generation: FIPS 186-2
 digital signature verification: FIPS 186-2, ANSI X9.62-1998
 key agreement: IEEE P1363 Draft 13
1
The key agreement process results in a 256-bit key for use with AES.
Security Target
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].
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or FCS_CKM.1], FCS_CKM.4, FMT_MSA.2
6.2.2 Class FDP, User Data Protection
6.2.2.1 FDP_ACC.1, Subset access control (1)
FDP_ACC.1.1 (1) The TSF shall enforce the [ITPolicy_SFP] on [the application of an IT
policy configuration received from a BlackBerry Enterprise Server (per ITCommand_SFP)].
Dependencies: FDP_ACF.1
6.2.2.2 FDP_ACF.1, Security attribute based access control (1)
FDP_ACF.1.1 (1) The TSF shall enforce the [ITPolicy_SFP] to objects based on the
following: [attributes for the listed subjects and objects:
 IT command (subject):
o UID of source BlackBerry Enterprise Server
o IT command type
2
o IT command data
3
 Current software configuration and IT policy configuration (object):
o UID of source BlackBerry Enterprise Server
o ECDSA public key
].
FDP_ACF.1.2 (1) The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation
among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed: [
 If there is no current IT policy configuration (i.e. the TOE has not yet been provisioned)
then the new IT policy configuration is applied.
 If there is a current IT policy configuration then the new IT policy configuration is applied
if the following conditions are satisfied:
o The UID of the source BlackBerry Enterprise Server for the new and current IT
policy configuration match.
o The ECDSA signature verifies successfully using the ECDSA public key included
with the current IT policy configuration.
].
FDP_ACF.1.3 (1) The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on
the following additional rules: [none].
FDP_ACF.1.4 (1) The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the
following additional rules: [none].
Dependencies: FDP_ACC.1, FMT_MSA.3
2
Per ITCommand_SFP, the IT command type is known to be Set IT Policy.
3
Per ITCommand_SFP, the IT command data is known to contain the new IT policy configuration (which encapsulates
the software configuration), an ECDSA public key, an ECDSA signature of the new IT policy configuration and the
included ECDSA public key.
Security Target
BlackBerry® Device Software 20
6.2.2.3 FDP_ACC.1, Subset access control (2)
FDP_ACC.1.1 (2) The TSF shall enforce the [LocalAdmin_SFP] on [the ability of the TOE
user to manage the TSF through the local administration screens].
Dependencies: FDP_ACF.1
6.2.2.4 FDP_ACF.1, Security attribute based access control (2)
FDP_ACF.1.1 (2) The TSF shall enforce the [LocalAdmin_SFP] to objects based on the
following: [attributes for the listed subjects and objects:
 TOE user (subject)
 Current IT policy configuration (object)
].
FDP_ACF.1.2 (2) The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation
among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed: [
 If the Password Required IT policy rule is set to TRUE then the TOE user cannot
disable the functionality specified in FIA_UAU.1 and FIA_UID.1.
 If the User Can Change Timeout IT policy rule is set to TRUE then the device user can
modify the time interval specified in FTA_SSL.1
 If the User Can Change Timeout IT policy rule is set to FALSE then the device user
cannot modify the time interval specified in FTA_SSL.1
 If the Disable Bluetooth IT policy rule is set to FALSE then the device user can enable
and disable the flow of Bluetooth communication.
 If the Disable Bluetooth IT policy rule is set to TRUE then the device user cannot enable
the flow of Bluetooth communication.
 If the Disable WLAN IT policy rule is set to FALSE then the device user can enable and
disable the flow of WiFi communication.
 If the Disable WLAN IT policy rule is set to TRUE then the device user cannot enable the
flow of WiFi communication.
 If the Content Protection Strength IT policy rule is NULL then the device user can
enable and disable the functionality specified in FDP_SDP_EXP.1.
 If the Content Protection Strength IT policy rule is not NULL then the device user
cannot disable the functionality specified in FDP_SDP_EXP.1.
 If the Force Lock When Holstered IT policy rule is set to FALSE then the device user
can enable and disable session locking for the device-in-holster event specified in
FTA_SSL_EXP.4.
 If the Force Lock When Holstered IT policy rule is set to TRUE then the device user
cannot disable session locking for the device-in-holster event specified in
FTA_SSL_EXP.4.
 If the S/MIME Allowed Content Ciphers IT policy rule is NULL then the device user can
enable and disable all supported functionality specified in FCS_COP.1.
 If the S/MIME Allowed Content Ciphers IT policy rule is not NULL then the device user
can enable and disable the designated subset of functionality specified in FCS_COP.1.
Security Target
BlackBerry® Device Software 21
 If the Disable GPS IT policy rule is set to FALSE then the device user can enable and
disable the flow of GPS communication.
 If the Disable GPS IT policy rule is set to TRUE then the device user cannot enable the
flow of GPS communication.
 If the Disable JavaScript in Browser IT policy rule is set to FALSE then the device user
can enable the JavaScript.
 If the Disable JavaScript in Browser IT policy rule is set to TRUE then the device user
cannot enable the JavaScript.
 If the Disable USB Mass Storage Mode IT policy rule is set to FALSE then the device
user can access an external file system that is connected to the USB port.
 If the Disable USB Mass Storage Mode IT policy rule is set to TRUE then the device
user cannot access an external file system that is connected to the USB port.
 If the Set Maximum Password Attempts IT policy rule is set by administrator to one of
the values within the range [3-10] then the device user can change the value to make the
configuration more restrictive.
].
FDP_ACF.1.3 (2) The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on
the following additional rules: [none].
FDP_ACF.1.4 (2) The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the
following additional rules: [
 The TOE user can modify the current IT policy configuration to make it more restrictive.
].
Dependencies: FDP_ACC.1, FMT_MSA.3
6.2.2.5 FDP_ACC.1, Subset access control (3)
FDP_ACC.1.1 (3) The TSF shall enforce the [SWConfiguration_SFP] on [the ability of a
third party application to access TOE resources and user data].
Dependencies: FDP_ACF.1
6.2.2.6 FDP_ACF.1, Security attribute based access control (3)
FDP_ACF.1.1 (3) The TSF shall enforce the [SWConfiguration_SFP] to objects based on
the following: [attributes for the listed subjects and objects:
 Device (subject):
o Current software configuration
 TOE resources (object):
o Bluetooth Serial Port Profile API
o Key store API
o Input simulation
o Interprocess communication
o Authenticator framework API
 User data (object):
o Email
Security Target
BlackBerry® Device Software 22
o Organizer Data
o Files
o Security Data
].
FDP_ACF.1.2 (3) The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation
among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed: [
If the BlackBerry Device Keystore application control policy rule is set to ALLOWED
then an application can access the key store APIs on the TOE.
If the BlackBerry Device Keystore Medium Security application control policy rule is
set to ALLOWED then an application can access the key store APIs on the TOE.
If the Bluetooth Serial Profile application control policy rule is set to ALLOWED then an
application can access the Bluetooth® Serial Port Profile API on the TOE.
If the Event Injection application control policy rule is set to ALLOWED then an
application can simulate input events on the TOE, such as pressing keys or performing
trackball actions.
If the Interprocess Communication application control policy rule is set to ALLOWED
then an application can perform interprocess communication operations.
If the Message Access application control policy rule is set to ALLOWED then an
application can send and receive email messages on the TOE.
If the PIM Data Access application control policy rule is set to ALLOWED then an
application can access the TOE PIM APIs, which control access to the user's personal
information on the TOE, such as the address.
If the User Authenticator API application control policy rule is set to ALLOWED then an
application can access the user authenticator framework API.
].
FDP_ACF.1.3 (3) The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on
the following additional rules: [none].
FDP_ACF.1.4 (3) The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the
following additional rules: [
The TOE user can modify the current software configuration to make it more restrictive.
].
Dependencies: FDP_ACC.1, FMT_MSA.3
6.2.2.7 FDP_ETC.2, Export of user data with security attributes
FDP_ETC.2.1 The TSF shall enforce the [GME_SFP] when exporting user data,
controlled under the SFP(s), outside the TOE to the BlackBerry Infrastructure.
FDP_ETC.2.2 The TSF shall export the user data with the user data’s associated
security attributes.
FDP_ETC.2.3 The TSF shall ensure that the security attributes, when exported outside
the TSC, are unambiguously associated with the exported user data.
FDP_ETC.2.4 The TSF shall enforce the following additional rules when user data is
exported from the TSC to the BlackBerry Infrastructure: [none].
Security Target
BlackBerry® Device Software 23
Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1]
6.2.2.8 FDP_IFC.1, Subset information flow control (1)
FDP_IFC.1.1 (1) The TSF shall enforce the [GME_SFP] on [all communication to and
from the TOE that is routed through the BlackBerry Infrastructure (i.e. all communication between
the TOE and a BlackBerry Enterprise Server, and PIN messaging between the TOE and another
BlackBerry device)].
Dependencies: FDP_IFF.1
6.2.2.9 FDP_IFF.1, Simple security attributes (1)
FDP_IFF.1.1 (1) The TSF shall enforce the [GME_SFP] based on the following types of
subject and information security attributes: [for the listed subjects and information:
 Device (subject):
o PIN
o GME service book
o Current IT policy configuration
 Communication (information):
o UID of BlackBerry Enterprise Server
o PIN of remote BlackBerry device
].
FDP_IFF.1.2 (1) The TSF shall permit an information flow between a controlled subject
and controlled information via a controlled operation if the following rules hold: [
 For communication with a BlackBerry Enterprise Server:
o The PIN of the TOE and the UID of the BlackBerry Enterprise Server must be
included in the information sent to the BlackBerry Infrastructure for routing to the
BlackBerry Enterprise Server.
 For PIN messaging:
o Receiving PIN messages is always permitted.
o If the Allow Peer-to-Peer Messages IT policy rule is set to TRUE then sending
PIN messages is permitted.
o The PIN of the TOE and the PIN of the remote device must be included in the
information sent to the BlackBerry Infrastructure for routing to the remote device.
].
FDP_IFF.1.3 (1) The TSF shall enforce the following additional rules: [none].
FDP_IFF.1.4 (1) The TSF shall explicitly authorise an information flow based on the
following rules [
 For communication with a BlackBerry Enterprise Server:
o When sending information to a BlackBerry Enterprise Server, the TOE generates
a session key and uses it to encrypt the information. The session key is
encrypted with the master encryption key and the encrypted information and
Security Target
BlackBerry® Device Software 24
encrypted session key are sent to the BlackBerry Infrastructure for routing to the
BlackBerry Enterprise Server.
o When receiving information from a BlackBerry Enterprise Server via the
BlackBerry Infrastructure, the TOE uses the master encryption key to decrypt the
encrypted session key and then uses the session key to decrypt the information.
o Encryption and decryption is performed using the AES algorithm.
 For PIN messaging:
o When sending a PIN message to another BlackBerry device, the TOE generates
a session key and uses it to encrypt the information. The session key is
encrypted with the peer-to-peer encryption key and the encrypted information
and encrypted session key are sent to the BlackBerry Infrastructure for routing to
the remote device.
o When receiving a PIN message from another BlackBerry device via the
BlackBerry Infrastructure, the TOE uses the peer-to-peer encryption key to
decrypt the encrypted session key and then uses the session key to decrypt the
information.
o Encryption and decryption is performed using the Triple DES algorithm.
].
FDP_IFF.1.5 (1) The TSF shall explicitly deny an information flow based on the following
rules: [none].
6.2.2.10 FDP_IFC.1, Subset information flow control (2)
FDP_IFC.1.1 (2) The TSF shall enforce the [ITCommand_SFP] on [the execution of a
wireless IT command received from a BlackBerry Enterprise Server (via the BlackBerry
Infrastructure per GME_SFP)].
Dependencies: FDP_IFF.1
6.2.2.11 FDP_IFF.1, Simple security attributes (2)
FDP_IFF.1.1 (2) The TSF shall enforce the [ITCommand_SFP] based on the following
types of subject and information security attributes: [for the listed subjects and information:
 IT command (subject):
o UID of source BlackBerry Enterprise Server
o Timestamp
o IT command type
o IT command data
 Timestamp of previously executed IT command (information)
 Current IT policy configuration (information):
o UID of source BlackBerry Enterprise Server
].
FDP_IFF.1.2 (2) The TSF shall permit an information flow between a controlled subject
and controlled information via a controlled operation if the following rules hold: [
Security Target
BlackBerry® Device Software 25
 The timestamp of the IT command must be more recent than the timestamp of the
previously executed IT command.
 If the IT command type is Set IT Policy then the IT command is executed with the
supplied IT command data
4
per ITPolicy_SFP.
 If the UID included in the IT command matches the UID in the current IT policy
configuration then the IT command is executed, per the following command type:
o Erase Data and Disable Handheld – Performs a security wipe of the device per
FDP_SDP_EXP.2.
o Set Password and Lock – Sets the device password to the password specified
in the IT command data and locks the device per FTA_SSL_EXP.4.
].
FDP_IFF.1.3 (2) The TSF shall enforce the following additional rules: [none].
 If an IT command is executed then the timestamp of the previously executed IT
command is replaced with the timestamp of the current IT command.
].
FDP_IFF.1.4 (2) The TSF shall explicitly authorise an information flow based on the
following rules: [none].
FDP_IFF.1.5 (2) The TSF shall explicitly deny an information flow based on the following
rules: [
 If the timestamp of the IT command is older than the timestamp of the previously
executed IT command then the IT command is not executed.
 If there is no existing IT policy configuration (i.e. the TOE has not yet been provisioned)
and the IT command type is not Set IT Policy then the IT command is not executed.
].
Dependencies: FDP_IFC.1, FMT_MSA.3
6.2.2.12 FDP_IFC.1, Subset information flow control (3)
FDP_IFC.1.1 (3) The TSF shall enforce the [PIM_SFP] on [the wireless synchronisation of
PIM data between the TOE and the corresponding enterprise email account (via a BlackBerry
Enterprise Server)].
Dependencies: FDP_IFF.1
6.2.2.13 FDP_IFF.1, Simple security attributes (3)
FDP_IFF.1.1 (3) The TSF shall enforce the [PIM_SFP] based on the following types of
subject and information security attributes: [for the listed subjects and information:
 Device (subject):
o Current IT policy configuration
 PIM data (information)
4
For the Set IT Policy command type, the IT command data contains a new IT policy configuration (which
encapsulates the software configuration), an ECDSA public key, and an ECDSA signature of the new IT policy
configuration and ECDSA public key.
Security Target
BlackBerry® Device Software 26
].
FDP_IFF.1.2 (3) The TSF shall permit an information flow between a controlled subject
and controlled information via a controlled operation if the following rules hold: [
 If the Disable All Wireless Sync IT policy rule is set to FALSE then the wireless
synchronisation of PIM data is permitted.
].
FDP_IFF.1.3 (3) The TSF shall enforce the following additional rules: [none].
FDP_IFF.1.4 (3) The TSF shall explicitly authorise an information flow based on the
following rules: [none].
FDP_IFF.1.5 (3) The TSF shall explicitly deny an information flow based on the following
rules: [
 If the Disable All Wireless Sync IT policy rule is set to TRUE then the wireless
synchronisation of PIM data is not permitted.
].
Dependencies: FDP_IFC.1, FMT_MSA.3
6.2.2.14 FDP_IFC.1, Subset information flow control (4)
FDP_IFC.1.1 (4) The TSF shall enforce the [ApplicationDownload_SFP] on [downloading
and installing third-party applications].
Dependencies: FDP_IFF.1
6.2.2.15 FDP_IFF.1, Simple security attributes (4)
FDP_IFF.1.1 (4) The TSF shall enforce the [ApplicationDownload_SFP] based on the
following types of subject and information security attributes: [for the listed subjects and
information:
 Device (subject):
o Current IT policy configuration
o Current software configuration
 Third-party application (information)
].
FDP_IFF.1.2 (4) The TSF shall permit an information flow between a controlled subject
and controlled information via a controlled operation if the following rules hold: [
 If the Disallow Third Party Application Downloads IT policy rule is set to FALSE then
third-party applications may be downloaded and installed.
 If the Disposition application control policy rule is set to REQUIRED then third-party
application is mandatory and will be downloaded and installed on the TOE. If the control
policy rule is set to OPTIONAL then the specific application is considered optional on the
TOE, i.e. it can be pushed to the TOE from the BlackBerry Enterprise Server and the
user can decide whether or not the application should be removed from the TOE.
].
FDP_IFF.1.3 (4) The TSF shall enforce the following additional rules: [none].
Security Target
BlackBerry® Device Software 27
FDP_IFF.1.4 (4) The TSF shall explicitly authorise an information flow based on the
following rules: [none].
FDP_IFF.1.5 (4) The TSF shall explicitly deny an information flow based on the following
rules: [
 If the Disallow Third Party Application Downloads IT policy rule is set to TRUE then
third-party applications may not be downloaded and installed.
 If the Disposition application control policy rule is set to DISALLOWED then third-party
application may not be downloaded and installed.
].
Dependencies: FDP_IFC.1, FMT_MSA.3
6.2.2.16 FDP_IFC.1, Subset information flow control (5)
FDP_IFC.1.1 (5) The TSF shall enforce the [ApplicationFlow_SFP] on [communication
initiated by a third-party application with an entity external to the TOE].
Dependencies: FDP_IFF.1
6.2.2.17 FDP_IFF.1, Simple security attributes (5)
FDP_IFF.1.1 (5) The TSF shall enforce the [ApplicationFlow_SFP] based on the following
types of subject and information security attributes: [for the listed subjects and information:
 Device (subject):
o Current IT policy configuration
o Current software configuration
 Third party application (subject):
 Communication (information):
o Location of external entity
].
FDP_IFF.1.2 (5) The TSF shall permit an information flow between a controlled subject
and controlled information via a controlled operation if the following rules hold: [
 If the Allow External Connections IT policy rule is set to TRUE then third-party
applications are permitted to initiate connections to entities on the external network (e.g.
to a public gateway).
 If the Allow Internal Connections IT policy rule is set to TRUE then third-party
applications are permitted to initiate connections to entities on the internal network (e.g.
to the Mobile Data Service of a BlackBerry Enterprise Server).
 If the Allow Third Party Apps to Use Serial Port IT policy rule is set to TRUE then third-
party applications are permitted to initiate connections to entities through the USB port of
the device.
 If the External Network Connections application control policy rule is set to PROMPT
USER an application prompts the user before it makes external connections through the
TOE firewall. If the control policy rule is set to ALLOWED then third-party application can
make external network connections through the TOE firewall.
Security Target
BlackBerry® Device Software 28
 If the Internal Network Connections application control policy rule is set to PROMPT
USER an application prompts the user before it makes internal connections through the
TOE firewall. If the control policy rule is set to ALLOWED then third-party application can
make internal network connections.
 If the Local Connections application control policy rule is set to ALLOWED then an
application can make local network connections.
 If the Device GPS application control policy rule is set to PROMPT USER then an
application can access the GPS APIs on the TOE if the user allows it. If the control policy
is set to ALLOWED then the application can access the GPS API
].
FDP_IFF.1.3 (5) The TSF shall enforce the following additional rules: [none].
FDP_IFF.1.4 (5) The TSF shall explicitly authorise an information flow based on the
following rules: [none].
FDP_IFF.1.5 (5) The TSF shall explicitly deny an information flow based on the following
rules: [
 If the Allow External Connections IT policy rule is set to FALSE then third-party
applications are not permitted to initiate connections to entities on the external network.
 If the Allow Internal Connections IT policy rule is set to FALSE then third-party
applications are not permitted to initiate connections to entities on the internal network.
 If the Allow Third Party Apps to Use Serial Port IT policy rule is set to FALSE then
third-party applications are not permitted to initiate connections to entities through the
USB port of the device.
 If the External Network Connections application control policy rule is set to NOT
PERMITTED then third-party application can not make external network connections
through the TOE firewall.
 If the Internal Network Connections application control policy rule is set to NOT
PERMITTED then third-party application can not make internal network connections.
 If the Local Connections application control policy rule is set to NOT PERMITTED then
an application can not make local network connections.
 If the Device GPS application control policy rule is set to NOT PERMITTED then third-
party application can not access the GPS APIs.
].
Dependencies: FDP_IFC.1, FMT_MSA.3
6.2.2.18 FDP_IFC.1, Subset information flow control (6)
FDP_IFC.1.1 (6) The TSF shall enforce the [Cellular_SFP] on [cellular phone
communication, SMS messaging, MMS messaging].
Dependencies: FDP_IFF.1
6.2.2.19 FDP_IFF.1, Simple security attributes (6)
FDP_IFF.1.1 (6) The TSF shall enforce the [Cellular_SFP] based on the following types of
subject and information security attributes: [for the listed subjects and information:
Security Target
BlackBerry® Device Software 29
 Device (subject):
o Current IT policy configuration
o Current software configuration
 Cellular phone communication (information)
 SMS messages (information)
 MMS messages (information)
].
FDP_IFF.1.2 (6) The TSF shall permit an information flow between a controlled subject
and controlled information via a controlled operation if the following rules hold: [
 If the Allow Phone IT policy rule is set to TRUE then cellular phone communication is
permitted.
 If the Allow SMS IT policy rule is set to TRUE then SMS messaging is permitted.
 If the Disable MMS IT policy rule is set to FALSE then MMS messaging is permitted.
 If the Phone Access application control policy rule is set to PROMPT USER then an
application can make calls and access call logs on the TOE if the user allows it. If the
control policy rule is set to ALLOWED then an application can make calls and access call
logs on the TOE.
].
FDP_IFF.1.3 (6) The TSF shall enforce the following additional rules: [none].
FDP_IFF.1.4 (6) The TSF shall explicitly authorise an information flow based on the
following rules: [
 Cellular phone communication to emergency numbers (e.g. 911) is always permitted.
].
FDP_IFF.1.5 (6) The TSF shall explicitly deny an information flow based on the following
rules: [
 If the Allow Phone IT policy rule is set to FALSE then cellular phone communication is
not permitted.
 If the Allow SMS IT policy rule is set to FALSE then SMS messaging is not permitted.
 If the Disable MMS IT policy rule is set to TRUE then MMS messaging is not permitted.
 If the Phone Access application control policy rule is set to NOT PERMITTED then an
application can not make calls and access call logs on the TOE.
].
Dependencies: FDP_IFC.1, FMT_MSA.3
6.2.2.20 FDP_IFC.1, Subset information flow control (7)
FDP_IFC.1.1 (7) The TSF shall enforce the [Radio_SFP] on [Bluetooth communication,
WiFi communication and GPS communication].
Dependencies: FDP_IFF.1
Security Target
BlackBerry® Device Software 30
6.2.2.21 FDP_IFF.1, Simple security attributes (7)
FDP_IFF.1.1 (7) The TSF shall enforce the [Radio_SFP] based on the following types of
subject and information security attributes: [
 Device (subject):
o Current IT policy configuration
 Bluetooth communication (information)
 WiFi communication (information)
 GPS communication (information)
].
FDP_IFF.1.2 (7) The TSF shall permit an information flow between a controlled subject
and controlled information via a controlled operation if the following rules hold: [
 If the Disable Bluetooth IT policy rule is set to FALSE then Bluetooth communication is
permitted.
 If the Disable WLAN IT policy rule is set to FALSE then WiFi communication is
permitted.
 If the Disable GPS IT policy rule is set to FALSE then GPS communication is permitted.
].
FDP_IFF.1.3 (7) The TSF shall enforce the following additional rules: [none].
FDP_IFF.1.4 (7) The TSF shall explicitly authorise an information flow based on the
following rules: [none].
FDP_IFF.1.5 (7) The TSF shall explicitly deny an information flow based on the following
rules: [
 If the Disable Bluetooth IT policy rule is set to TRUE then Bluetooth communication is
not permitted.
 If the Disable WLAN IT policy rule is set to TRUE then WiFi communication is not
permitted.
 If the Disable GPS IT policy rule is set to TRUE then GPS communication is not
permitted.
].
Dependencies: FDP_IFC.1, FMT_MSA.3
6.2.2.22 FDP_IFC.1, Subset information flow control (8)
FDP_IFC.1.1 (8) The TSF shall enforce the [Multimedia_SFP] on [multimedia
applications].
Dependencies: FDP_IFF.1
6.2.2.23 FDP_IFF.1, Simple security attributes (8)
FDP_IFF.1.1 (8) The TSF shall enforce the [Multimedia_SFP] based on the following
types of subject and information security attributes: [
 Device (subject):
Security Target
BlackBerry® Device Software 31
o Current IT policy configuration
 Multimedia application (information)
].
FDP_IFF.1.2 (8) The TSF shall permit an information flow between a controlled subject
and controlled information via a controlled operation if the following rules hold: [
 If the Disable Voice Note Recording IT policy rule is set to FALSE then voice note
recording is permitted.
 If the Disable Photo Camera IT policy rule is set to FALSE then taking pictures is
permitted.
 If the Disable Video Camera IT policy rule is set to FALSE then video recording is
permitted.
 If the Disable External Memory IT policy rule is set to FALSE then storing data on the
external memory is permitted.
 If the Disable USB Mass Storage IT policy rule is set to FALSE then using of an external
file system connected to the USB port is permitted.
].
FDP_IFF.1.3 (8) The TSF shall enforce the following additional rules: [none].
FDP_IFF.1.4 (8) The TSF shall explicitly authorise an information flow based on the
following rules: [none].
FDP_IFF.1.5 (8) The TSF shall explicitly deny an information flow based on the following
rules: [
 If the Disable Voice Note Recording IT policy rule is set to TRUE then voice note
recording is not permitted.
 If the Disable Photo Camera IT policy rule is set to TRUE then taking pictures is not
permitted.
 If the Disable Video Camera IT policy rule is set to TRUE then video recording is not
permitted.
 If the Disable External Memory IT policy rule is set to TRUE then storing data on the
external memory is not permitted.
 If the Disable USB Mass Storage IT policy rule is set to TRUE then using of an external
file system connected to the USB port is not permitted.
].
Dependencies: FDP_IFC.1, FMT_MSA.3
6.2.2.24 FDP_ITC.2, Import of user data with security attributes
FDP_ITC.2.1 The TSF shall enforce the [GME_SFP] when importing user data,
controlled under the SFP, from the BlackBerry Infrastructure.
FDP_ITC.2.2 The TSF shall use the security attributes associated with the imported
user data.
FDP_ITC.2.3 The TSF shall ensure that the protocol used provides for the
unambiguous association between the security attributes and the user data received.
Security Target
BlackBerry® Device Software 32
FDP_ITC.2.4 The TSF shall ensure that interpretation of the security attributes of the
imported user data is as intended by the source of the user data.
FDP_ITC.2.5 The TSF shall enforce the following additional rules when importing user
data controlled under the SFP from the BlackBerry Infrastructure: [none].
Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1], [FTP_ITC.1 or FTP_TRP.1], FPT_TDC.1
6.2.2.25 FDP_SDP_EXP.1, Stored data non-disclosure
FDP_SDP_EXP.1.1 The TSF shall protect user data stored within the TSC from unauthorised
disclosure using [AES-256].
Dependencies: FCS_COP.1
6.2.2.26 FDP_SDP_EXP.2, Stored data deletion
FDP_SDP_EXP.2.1 The TOE shall delete all user data stored within the TSC when the
following events occur: [
 The Erase Data and Disable Handheld IT command is received per ITCommand_SFP.
 The device user invokes a security wipe per FMT_SMF.1.
 The maximum number of unsuccessful authentication attempts is reached per
FIA_AFL.1.
].
Dependencies: None.
6.2.3 Class FIA, Identification and Authentication
6.2.3.1 FIA_AFL.1, Authentication failure handling
FIA_AFL.1.1 The TSF shall detect when [a configurable positive integer within [3 and
10]] unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related to [the number of unsuccessful
authentication attempts since the last successful authentication].
FIA_AFL.1.2 When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has
been met or surpassed, the TSF shall [perform a security wipe of all user data].
Dependencies: FIA_UAU.1
6.2.3.2 FIA_SOS.1, Verification of secrets
FIA_SOS.1.1 The TSF shall provide a mechanism to verify that secrets meet [a
combination of the following metrics:
 The minimum length of the device password must be a BlackBerry Enterprise Server
administrator configurable number between 4 and 14.
 The character composition of the device password must satisfy one of the following
conditions chosen by the BlackBerry Enterprise Server administrator:
o Contain at least one alpha and one numeric character
o Contain at least one alpha, one numeric, and one special character
Security Target
BlackBerry® Device Software 33
o Contain at least one uppercase alpha, one lowercase alpha, one numeric, and
one special character
 The device password cannot match a BlackBerry Enterprise Server administrator
configurable number between 1 and 15 previous device passwords.
].
Dependencies: None
6.2.3.3 FIA_UAU.1, Timing of authentication
FIA_UAU.1.1 The TSF shall allow [the following actions:
 Display general status information (e.g. battery level, date, time, number of unread
messages)
 Receive email, SMS, MMS and PIN messages
 Receive calendar appointments
 Synchronise PIM data
 Receive cellular phone communication
 Send emergency cellular phone communication (e.g. 911)
] on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated.
FIA_UAU.1.2 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before
allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
Dependencies: FIA_UID.1
6.2.3.4 FIA_UAU.7, Protected authentication feedback
FIA_UAU.7.1 The TSF shall provide only [an asterisk for each character typed] to the
user while authentication is in progress.
Dependencies: FIA_UAU.1
6.2.3.5 FIA_UID.1, Timing of identification
FIA_UID.1.1 The TSF shall allow [the actions specified in FIA_UAU.1.1] on behalf of
the user to be performed before the user is identified.
FIA_UID.1.2 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before
allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
Dependencies: None
6.2.4 Class FMT, Security Management
6.2.4.1 FMT_MSA.1, Management of security attributes (1)
FMT_MSA.1.1 (1) The TSF shall enforce the [ITCommand_SFP and ITPolicy_SFP] to
restrict the ability to [modify] the security attributes [IT command type and data] to [the BlackBerry
Enterprise Server administrator].
Security Target
BlackBerry® Device Software 34
Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1], FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1
6.2.4.2 FMT_MSA.1, Management of security attributes (2)
FMT_MSA.1.1 (2) The TSF shall enforce the [LocalAdmin_SFP, PIM_SFP,
ApplicationDownload_SFP, ApplicationFlow_SFP, Cellular_SFP, Multimedia_SFP and
Radio_SFP] to restrict the ability to [modify] the security attributes [current IT policy configuration]
to [the BlackBerry Enterprise Server administrator].
Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1], FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1
6.2.4.3 FMT_MSA.1, Management of security attributes (3)
FMT_MSA.1.1 (3) The TSF shall enforce the [GME_SFP] to restrict the ability to [modify]
the security attributes [current IT policy configuration and GME service book] to [the BlackBerry
Enterprise Server administrator].
Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1], FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1
6.2.4.4 FMT_MSA.1, Management of security attributes (4)
FMT_MSA.1.1 (4) The TSF shall enforce the [LocalAdmin_SFP and SWConfiguraion_SFP]
to restrict the ability to [modify] the security attributes [software configuration] to [the BlackBerry
Enterprise Server administrator].
Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1], FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1
6.2.4.5 FMT_MSA.2, Secure security attributes
FMT_MSA.2.1 The TSF shall ensure that only secure values are accepted for security
attributes.
Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1], FMT_MSA.1, FMT_SMR.1
6.2.4.6 FMT_MSA.3, Static attribute initialisation (1)
FMT_MSA.3.1 (1) The TSF shall enforce the [ITPolicy_SFP] to provide [permissive] default
values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.
FMT_MSA.3.2 (1) The TSF shall allow the [BlackBerry Enterprise Server administrator] to
specify alternative initial values to override the default values when an object or information is
created.
Dependencies: FMT_MSA.1, FMT_SMR.1
6.2.4.7 FMT_MSA.3, Static attribute initialisation (2)
FMT_MSA.3.1 (2) The TSF shall enforce the [LocalAdmin_SFP] to provide [permissive]
default values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.
FMT_MSA.3.2 (2) The TSF shall allow the [BlackBerry Enterprise Server administrator] to
specify alternative initial values to override the default values when an object or information is
created.
Security Target
BlackBerry® Device Software 35
Dependencies: FMT_MSA.1, FMT_SMR.1
6.2.4.8 FMT_MSA.3, Static attribute initialisation (3)
FMT_MSA.3.1 (3) The TSF shall enforce the [GME_SFP] to provide [permissive] default
values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.
FMT_MSA.3.2 (3) The TSF shall allow the [BlackBerry Enterprise Server administrator] to
specify alternative initial values to override the default values when an object or information is
created.
Dependencies: FMT_MSA.1, FMT_SMR.1
6.2.4.9 FMT_MSA.3, Static attribute initialisation (4)
FMT_MSA.3.1 (4) The TSF shall enforce the [ITCommand_SFP] to provide [restrictive]
default values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.
FMT_MSA.3.2 (4) The TSF shall allow the [BlackBerry Enterprise Server administrator] to
specify alternative initial values to override the default values when an object or information is
created.
Dependencies: FMT_MSA.1, FMT_SMR.1
6.2.4.10 FMT_MSA.3, Static attribute initialisation (5)
FMT_MSA.3.1 (5) The TSF shall enforce the [PIM_SFP, ApplicationDownload_SFP,
ApplicationFlow_SFP, Cellular_SFP, Multimedia_SFP and Radio_SFP] to provide [permissive]
default values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.
FMT_MSA.3.2 (5) The TSF shall allow the [BlackBerry Enterprise Server administrator] to
specify alternative initial values to override the default values when an object or information is
created.
Dependencies: FMT_MSA.1, FMT_SMR.1
6.2.4.11 FMT_MSA.3, Static attribute initialisation (6)
FMT_MSA.3.1 (6) The TSF shall enforce the [SWConfiguration_SFP] to provide
[permissive] default values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.
FMT_MSA.3.2 (6) The TSF shall allow the [BlackBerry Enterprise Server administrator] to
specify alternative initial values to override the default values when an object or information is
created.
Dependencies: FMT_MSA.1, FMT_SMR.1
6.2.4.12 FMT_SAE.1, Time-limited authorisation
FMT_SAE.1.1 The TSF shall restrict the capability to specify an expiration time for [
 Device password (between 1 and 65535 days)
] to [the BlackBerry Enterprise Server administrator].
Security Target
BlackBerry® Device Software 36
FMT_SAE.1.2 For each of the security attributes, the TSF shall be able to [
 Device password – force the user to change the password
] after the expiration time for the indicated security attribute has passed.
Dependencies: FMT_SMR.1, FPT_STM.1
6.2.4.13 FMT_SMF.1, Specification of management functions
FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following security
management functions: [
 On behalf of the device user:
o Enable and disable the functionality specified in FDP_SDP_EXP.1 (unless
prevented per LocalAdmin_SFP)
o Set the time interval for FTA_SSL.1 (unless prevented per LocalAdmin_SFP)
o Enable and disable session locking when the device is placed in its holster per
FTA_SSL_EXP.4 (unless prevented per LocalAdmin_SFP)
o Cooperatively generate a new master encryption key with the BlackBerry
Enterprise Server
o Perform a security wipe of the device per FDP_SDP_EXP.2
o Enable and disable Bluetooth functionality (unless prevented per
LocalAdmin_SFP)
o Enable and disable WiFi functionality (unless prevented per LocalAdmin_SFP)
o Modify the device password
o Enable and disable GPS functionality (unless prevented per LocalAdmin_SFP)
o Enable or disable file encryption on an external memory
o Enable or disable mass storage mode
 On behalf of the BlackBerry Enterprise Server administrator:
o Modify the peer-to-peer encryption key
o Inject a new GME service book
o Lock the TOE session and set the device password
o Perform a security wipe of the device per FDP_SDP_EXP.2
o Modify the device password
o Apply an IT policy configuration to perform one or more of the following
management functions:
 Enable and disable the functionality specified in FDP_SDP_EXP.1
 Configure the password length, pattern checks, and history per
FIA_SOS.1
 Enable and disable the password history per FIA_SOS.1
 Enable and disable the functionality specified in FMT_SAE.1
 Set the maximum time interval for FTA_SSL.1
 Set the time interval for FTA_SSL.1
Security Target
BlackBerry® Device Software 37
 Enable and disable session locking when the device is placed in its
holster per FTA_SSL_EXP.4
 Configure the behaviour specified in PIM_SFP,
ApplicationDownload_SFP, ApplicationFlow_SFP, Cellular_SFP,
Multimedia_SFP and Radio_SFP
o Apply a software configuration to perform the following management functions:
 Configure the behaviour specified in SWConfiguraion_SFP
].
Dependencies: None
6.2.5 Class FPT, Protection of the TSF
6.2.5.1 FPT_STM.1, Reliable time stamps
FPT_STM.1.1 The TSF shall be able to provide reliable time stamps for its own use.
Dependencies: None
6.2.5.2 FPT_TDC.1, Inter-TSF basic TSF data consistency
FPT_TDC.1.1 The TSF shall provide the capability to consistently interpret [all data]
when shared between the TSF and the BlackBerry Infrastructure.
FPT_TDC.1.2 The TSF shall use [the GME specification] when interpreting the TSF
data from the BlackBerry Infrastructure.
Dependencies: None
6.2.6 Class FTA, TOE Access
6.2.6.1 FTA_SSL.1, TSF-initiated session locking
FTA_SSL.1.1 The TSF shall lock an interactive session after [a time interval of
inactivity configurable per ITPolicy_SFP and LocalAdmin_SFP] by:
a. clearing or overwriting display devices, making the current contents unreadable;
b. disabling any activity of the user’s data access/display devices other than unlocking the
session.
FTA_SSL.1.2 The TSF shall require the following events to occur prior to unlocking the
session: [user authentication].
Dependencies: FIA_UAU.1
6.2.6.2 FTA_SSL.2, User-initiated locking
FTA_SSL.2.1 The TSF shall allow user-initiated locking of the user’s own interactive
session by:
a. clearing or overwriting display devices, making the current contents unreadable;
Security Target
BlackBerry® Device Software 38
b. disabling any activity of the user’s data access/display devices other than unlocking the
session.
FTA_SSL.2.2 The TSF shall require the following events to occur prior to unlocking the
session: [user authentication].
Dependencies: FIA_UAU.1
6.2.6.3 FTA_SSL_EXP.4, Event-initiated session locking
FTA_SSL_EXP.4.1 The TSF shall lock an interactive session by:
a. clearing or overwriting display devices, making the current contents unreadable;
b. disabling any activity of the user’s data access/display devices other than unlocking the
session.
when the following events occur: [
 The device is placed in its holster, if so configured per LocalAdmin_SFP.
 The Set Password and Lock IT command is received per ITCommand_SFP.
].
FTA_SSL_EXP.4.2 The TSF shall require the following events to occur prior to unlocking the
session: [user authentication].
Dependencies: FIA_UAU.1
6.2.7 Class FTP, Trusted Path / Channels
6.2.7.1 FTP_ITC.1, Inter-TSF trusted channel
FTP_ITC.1.1 The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself and the
BlackBerry Infrastructure that is logically distinct from other communication channels and
provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel data from
modification or disclosure.
FTP_ITC.1.2 The TSF shall permit [the TSF, the BlackBerry Infrastructure] to initiate
communication via the trusted channel.
FTP_ITC.1.3 The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for [sending
data to a BlackBerry Enterprise Server or another device].
Dependencies: None
6.3 Security Assurance Requirements
6.3.1 Selection of Security Assurance Requirements
The selection of EAL 4 assurance package is commensurate with the protected environment in
which the TOE executes, and the augmentation of ALC_FLR.1 is appropriate to provide
assurance to consumers that security flaws are tracked and corrected.
Security Target
BlackBerry® Device Software 39
The assurance requirements for the TOE are specified by the assurance components in the
following table. The components are taken from Part 3 of the Common Criteria and are EAL 4
augmented, with augmented components listed in bold text.
Table 3. TOE Assurance Components
Assurance Class Assurance Components
Security Target evaluation
ASE_CCL.1, Conformance claims
ASE_ECD.1, Extended components definition
ASE_INT.1, ST introduction
ASE_OBJ.2, Security objectives
ASE_REQ.2, Derived security requirements
ASE_SPD.1, Security problem definition
ASE_TSS.1, TOE summary specification
Development
ADV_FSP.4, Complete functional specification
ADV_TDS.3, Basic modular design
ADV_ARC.1, Security architecture description
ADV_IMP.1, Implementation representation of the TSF
Guidance documents
AGD_OPE.1, Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1, Preparative procedures
Life cycle support
ALC_FLR.1, Basic flaw remediation
ALC_CMC.4, Production support, acceptance procedures and automation
ALC_CMS.4, Problem tracking CM coverage
ALC_DEL.1, Delivery procedures
ALC_DVS.1, Identification of security measures
ALC_LCD.1, Developer defined life-cycle model
ALC_TAT.1, Well-defined development tools
Tests
ATE_COV.2, Analysis of coverage
ATE_FUN.1, Functional testing
ATE_IND.2, Independent testing – sample
ATE_DPT.2, Testing: security enforcing modules
Vulnerability assessment AVA_VAN.3, Focused vulnerability analysis
6.4 Security Requirements Rationale
6.4.1 Satisfaction of Security Objectives
The following table maps the SFRs to the security objectives for the TOE and its environment.
Security Target
BlackBerry® Device Software 40
Table 4. Mapping of SFRs to Security Objectives
O.DataExchange
O.DataStorage
O.Admin
O.RemoteAdmin
O.FlexibleAdmin
O.NoOverride
O.Wireless
FCS_VAL_EXP.1 X X
FCS_CKM.1 (1) X X
FCS_CKM.1 (2) X X
FCS_CKM.4 X X
FCS_COP.1 X X X
FDP_ACC.1 (1) X
FDP_ACF.1 (1) X
FDP_ACC.1 (2) X
FDP_ACF.1 (2) X
FDP_ACC.1 (3) X
FDP_ACF.1 (3) X
FDP_ETC.2 X
FDP_IFC.1 (1) X X X
FDP_IFF.1 (1) X X X
FDP_IFC.1 (2) X
FDP_IFF.1 (2) X
FDP_IFC.1 (3) X X
FDP_IFF.1 (3) X X
FDP_IFC.1 (4) X
FDP_IFF.1 (4) X
FDP_IFC.1 (5) X X
FDP_IFF.1 (5) X X
FDP_IFC.1 (6) X X
FDP_IFF.1 (6) X X
FDP_IFC.1 (7) X X
FDP_IFF.1 (7) X X
FDP_IFC.1 (8) X X X
FDP_IFF.1 (8) X X X
FDP_ITC.2 X
FDP_SDP_EXP.1 X
FDP_SDP_EXP.2 X
FIA_AFL.1 X
FIA_SOS.1 X
FIA_UAU.1 X
Security Target
BlackBerry® Device Software 41
O.DataExchange
O.DataStorage
O.Admin
O.RemoteAdmin
O.FlexibleAdmin
O.NoOverride
O.Wireless
FIA_UAU.7 X
FIA_UID.1 X
FMT_MSA.1 (1) X X
FMT_MSA.1 (2) X X
FMT_MSA.1 (3) X X
FMT_MSA.1 (4) X X
FMT_MSA.2 X X
FMT_MSA.3 (1) X
FMT_MSA.3 (2) X
FMT_MSA.3 (3) X
FMT_MSA.3 (4) X
FMT_MSA.3 (5) X
FMT_MSA.3 (6) X
FMT_SAE.1 X
FMT_SMF.1 X X X X
FPT_STM.1 X
FPT_TDC.1 X
FTA_SSL.1 X
FTA_SSL.2 X
FTA_SSL_EXP.4 X
FTP_ITC.1 X
6.4.1.1 O.DataExchange
FCS_CKM.1 (1), FCS_CKM.1 (2), FCS_CKM.4 and FCS_COP.1 ensure that the TOE
implements the cryptographic functionality required to generate and destroy keys and encrypt and
decrypt data. FCS_VAL_EXP.1 ensures that the cryptographic operations are implemented
correctly.
FDP_IFC.1 (1) and FDP_IFF.1 (1) ensure that the TOE encrypts and decrypts data sent to and
received from a BlackBerry Enterprise Server or another BlackBerry device.
FMT_MSA.2 ensures that only secure values can be used for cryptographic operations.
FDP_ETC.2, FDP_ITC.2, and FPT_TDC.1 ensure that the security attributes of the user data is
correctly handled between the TOE and the BlackBerry Infrastructure.
FDP_ITC.1 ensures that the communication channel between the TOE and the BlackBerry
Infrastructure is logically distinct.
Security Target
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6.4.1.2 O.DataStorage
FCS_CKM.1 (1), FCS_CKM.1 (2), FCS_CKM.4 and FCS_COP.1 ensure that the TOE
implements the cryptographic functionality required to generate and destroy keys and encrypt and
decrypt data. FCS_VAL_EXP.1 ensures that the cryptographic operations are implemented
correctly.
FDP_IFC.1.1 (8), FDP_IFF.1.1 (8) and FDP_SDP_EXP.1 ensures that stored user data is
protected from unauthorised disclosure using cryptographic means, and FDP_SDP_EXP.2
ensures that all stored user data can be deleted to prevent disclosure.
FMT_MSA.2 ensures that only secure values can be used for cryptographic operations.
6.4.1.3 O.Admin
FMT_SMF.1 ensures that the TOE user can manage the TOE security functions.
FTA_SSL.2 ensures that the TOE user can lock the session with the TOE.
6.4.1.4 O.RemoteAdmin
FDP_ACC.1 (1), FDP_ACF.1 (1), FMT_MSA.1 (1), and FMT_MSA.3 (1) ensure that the
BlackBerry Enterprise Server administrator can remotely manage the TOE security functions by
issuing an IT policy configuration.
FDP_IFC.1 (1) and FDP_IFF.1 (1) ensure that the BlackBerry Enterprise Server administrator can
remotely manage the communication between the TOE and the BlackBerry Enterprise Server.
FDP_IFC.1 (2), FDP_IFF.1 (2), FMT_MSA.1 (1), and FMT_MSA.3 (4) ensure that the BlackBerry
Enterprise Server administrator can remotely manage the TOE security functions by issuing IT
commands.
FDP_IFC.1 (3), FDP_IFF.1 (3), FMT_MSA.1 (2), and FMT_MSA.3 (5) ensure that the BlackBerry
Enterprise Server administrator can manage the flow of PIM data to and from the TOE.
FDP_IFC.1 (4), FDP_IFF.1 (4), FMT_MSA.1 (2), and FMT_MSA.3 (5) ensure that the BlackBerry
Enterprise Server administrator can manage the downloading of third-party applications to the
TOE.
FDP_IFC.1 (5), FDP_IFF.1 (5), FMT_MSA.1 (2), and FMT_MSA.3 (5) ensure that the BlackBerry
Enterprise Server administrator can manage the flow of data to and from third-party applications
on the TOE.
FDP_IFC.1 (6), FDP_IFF.1 (6), FMT_MSA.1 (2), and FMT_MSA.3 (5) ensure that the BlackBerry
Enterprise Server administrator can manage the flow of cellular phone communication, SMS
messaging and MMS messaging to and from the TOE.
FDP_IFC.1 (7), FDP_IFF.1 (7), FMT_MSA.1 (2), and FMT_MSA.3 (5) ensure that the BlackBerry
Enterprise Server administrator can manage the flow of Bluetooth, WiFi and GPS communication
to and from the TOE.
FDP_IFC.1 (8), FDP_IFF.1 (8), FMT_MSA.1 (2), and FMT_MSA.3 (5) ensure that the BlackBerry
Enterprise Server administrator can manage the multimedia applications, including camera, video
recorder, voice note recorder and multimedia data storage on external memory.
FMT_SMF.1 ensures that the BlackBerry Enterprise Server administrator can manage the
security functions of the TOE.
FMT_MSA.1 (4), and FMT_MSA.3 (6) ensure that the BlackBerry Enterprise Server administrator
can remotely manage the TOE security functions by issuing a software configuration.
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BlackBerry® Device Software 43
6.4.1.5 O.FlexibleAdmin
FMT_SMF.1, FIA_AFL.1, FIA_UAU.1, FIA_UAU.7, FIA_UID.1, FTA_SSL.1, and
FTA_SSL_EXP.4 ensure that the BlackBerry Enterprise Server administrator can manage the
TOE authentication mechanism to comply with the enterprise security policy.
FMT_SMF.1, FIA_SOS.1, FMT_SAE.1, and FPT_STM.1 ensure that the BlackBerry Enterprise
Server administrator can configure the TOE password handling to comply with the enterprise
security policy.
6.4.1.6 O.NoOverride
FDP_ACC.1 (2), FDP_ACC.1 (3), FDP_ACF.1 (2) and FDP_ACF.1 (3) ensure that the TOE user
cannot override the management of security functions performed by the BlackBerry Enterprise
Server administrator.
FMT_MSA.1 (1), FMT_MSA.1 (2), FMT_MSA.1 (3), FMT_MSA.1 (4), FMT_MSA.3 (2), and
FMT_SMF.1 ensure that the BlackBerry Enterprise Server administrator can specify which
security functions can be managed by the TOE user.
6.4.1.7 O.Wireless
FDP_IFC.1 (1), FDP_IFF.1 (1) and FCS_COP.1 (2) ensure that the TOE supports wireless email
and PIN messaging.
FDP_IFC.1 (3) and FDP_IFF.1 (3) ensure that the TOE supports wireless PIM data
synchronisation.
FDP_IFC.1 (5) and FDP_IFF.1 (5) ensure that the TOE supports wireless access to the
enterprise network and the Internet.
FDP_IFC.1 (6) and FDP_IFF.1 (6) ensure that the TOE supports cellular phone communication,
SMS messaging and MMS messaging.
FDP_IFC.1 (7) and FDP_IFF.1 (7) ensure that the TOE supports communication with Bluetooth,
WiFi and GPS devices.
FDP_IFC.1 (8) and FDP_IFF.1 (8) ensure that the TOE supports multimedia applications,
including photo camera, video camera, external memory and voice notes recording.
6.4.2 Dependencies of Security Functional Requirements
The following table demonstrates that each SFR dependency is either satisfied or sufficient
rationale provided.
Table 5. SFR Dependencies
Requirement Dependencies Satisfied By
FCS_VAL_EXP.1
FCS_CKM.4 FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1 FCS_COP.1
FCS_CKM.1 (1)
FCS_CKM.2 or
FCS_COP.1
FCS_COP.1
FCS_CKM.4 FCS_CKM.4
FMT_MSA.2 FMT_MSA.2
FCS_CKM.1 (2)
FCS_CKM.2 or
FCS_COP.1
FCS_COP.1
FCS_CKM.4 FCS_CKM.4
FMT_MSA.2 FMT_MSA.2
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Requirement Dependencies Satisfied By
FCS_CKM.4
FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2
or FCS_CKM.1
FCS_CKM.1 (1), FCS_CKM.1 (2)
FMT_MSA.2 FMT_MSA.2
FCS_COP.1
FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2
or FCS_CKM.1
FCS_CKM.1 (1), FCS_CKM.1 (2), FDP_ITC.1
FCS_CKM.4 FCS_CKM.4
FMT_MSA.2 FMT_MSA.2
FDP_ACC.1 (1) FDP_ACF.1 FDP_ACF.1 (1)
FDP_ACF.1 (1)
FDP_ACC.1 FDP_ACC.1 (1)
FMT_MSA.3 FMT_MSA.3 (1)
FDP_ACC.1 (2) FDP_ACF.1 FDP_ACF.1 (2)
FDP_ACF.1 (2)
FDP_ACC.1 FDP_ACC.1 (2)
FMT_MSA.3 FMT_MSA.3 (2)
FDP_ACC.1 (3) FDP_ACF.1 FDP_ACF.1 (4)
FDP_ACF.1 (3)
FDP_ACC.1 FDP_ACC.1 (4)
FMT_MSA.3 FMT_MSA.3 (2)
FDP_ETC.2 FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1 FDP_IFC.1 (1)
FDP_IFC.1 (1) FDP_IFF.1 FDP_IFF.1 (1)
FDP_IFF.1 (1)
FDP_IFC.1 FDP_IFC.1 (1)
FMT_MSA.3 FMT_MSA.3 (3)
FDP_IFC.1 (2) FDP_IFF.1 FDP_IFF.1 (2)
FDP_IFF.1 (2)
FDP_IFC.1 FDP_IFC.1 (2)
FMT_MSA.3 FMT_MSA.3 (4)
FDP_IFC.1 (3) FDP_IFF.1 FDP_IFF.1 (3)
FDP_IFF.1 (3)
FDP_IFC.1 FDP_IFC.1 (3)
FMT_MSA.3 FMT_MSA.3 (5)
FDP_IFC.1 (4) FDP_IFF.1 FDP_IFF.1 (4)
FDP_IFF.1 (4)
FDP_IFC.1 FDP_IFC.1 (4)
FMT_MSA.3 FMT_MSA.3 (5)
FDP_IFC.1 (5) FDP_IFF.1+ FDP_IFF.1 (5)
FDP_IFF.1 (5)
FDP_IFC.1 FDP_IFC.1 (5)
FMT_MSA.3 FMT_MSA.3 (5)
FDP_IFC.1 (6) FDP_IFF.1 FDP_IFF.1 (6)
FDP_IFF.1 (6)
FDP_IFC.1 FDP_IFC.1 (6)
FMT_MSA.3 FMT_MSA.3 (5)
FDP_IFC.1 (7) FDP_IFF.1 FDP_IFF.1 (8)
FDP_IFF.1 (7)
FDP_IFC.1 FDP_IFC.1 (8)
FMT_MSA.3 FMT_MSA.3 (5)
FDP_IFC.1 (8) FDP_IFF.1 FDP_IFF.1 (10)
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Requirement Dependencies Satisfied By
FDP_IFF.1 (8)
FDP_IFC.1 FDP_IFC.1 (10)
FMT_MSA.3 FMT_MSA.3 (5)
FDP_ITC.2
FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1 FDP_IFC.1 (1)
FTP_ITC.1 or FTP_TRP.1 FTP_ITC.1
FPT_TDC.1 FPT_TDC.1
FDP_SDP_EXP.1 FCS_COP.1 FCS_COP.1
FDP_SDP_EXP.2 None –
FIA_AFL.1 FIA_UAU.1 FIA_UAU.1
FIA_SOS.1 None –
FIA_UAU.1 FIA_UID.1 FIA_UID.1
FIA_UAU.7 FIA_UAU.1 FIA_UAU.1
FIA_UID.1 None –
FMT_MSA.1 (1)
FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1 FDP_ACC.1 (1), FDP_IFC.1 (2)
FMT_SMF.1 FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMR.1 (ENV)
FMT_MSA.1 (2)
FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1
FDP_IFC.1 (3) , FDP_IFC.1 (4) , FDP_IFC.1 (5) , FDP_IFC.1 (6) ,
FDP_IFC.1 (7) , FDP_IFC.1 (8)
FMT_SMF.1 FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1 environment, security objective for OE
FMT_MSA.1 (3)
FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1 FDP_IFC.1 (1)
FMT_SMF.1 FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1 environment, security objective for OE
FMT_MSA.1 (4)
FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1 FDP_ACC.1 (3)
FMT_SMF.1 FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1 environment, security objective for OE
FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1 Not applicable5
FMT_MSA.1 Not applicable6
FMT_SMR.1 Not applicable6
FMT_MSA.3 (1)
FMT_MSA.1 FMT_MSA.1
FMT_SMR.1 environment, security objective for OE
FMT_MSA.3 (2)
FMT_MSA.1 FMT_MSA.1
FMT_SMR.1 environment, security objective for OE
FMT_MSA.3 (3)
FMT_MSA.1 FMT_MSA.1
FMT_SMR.1 environment, security objective for OE
5
The TSF automatically generates symmetric keys and performs encryption and decryption as needed and does not
require input or administration from the TOE user. Similarly, digital signature verification is performed automatically.
Consequently, the dependencies on FDP_ACC.1 (or FDP_IFC.1), FMT_MSA.1, and FMT_SMR.1 are not applicable.
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BlackBerry® Device Software 46
Requirement Dependencies Satisfied By
FMT_MSA.3 (4)
FMT_MSA.1 FMT_MSA.1
FMT_SMR.1 environment, security objective for OE
FMT_MSA.3 (5)
FMT_MSA.1 FMT_MSA.1
FMT_SMR.1 environment, security objective for OE
FMT_MSA.3 (6)
FMT_MSA.1 FMT_MSA.1
FMT_SMR.1 environment, security objective for OE
FMT_SAE.1
FMT_SMR.1 environment, security objective for OE
FPT_STM.1 FPT_STM.1
FMT_SMF.1 None –
FPT_STM.1 None –
FPT_TDC.1 None –
FTA_SSL.1 FIA_UAU.1 FIA_UAU.1
FTA_SSL.2 FIA_UAU.1 FIA_UAU.1
FTA_SSL_EXP.4 FIA_UAU.1 FIA_UAU.1
FTP_ITC.1 None –
6.4.3 Refinements of Security Functional Requirements on the TOE
6.4.3.1 FDP_ACF.1 (1) Security Attribute Based Access Control
In FDP_ACF.1.4 (1) “based on the” was changed to “based on the following additional rules” to
improve legibility and does not affect the meaning of the functional requirement.
6.4.3.2 FDP_ACF.1 (2) Security Attribute Based Access Control
In FDP_ACF.1.4 (2) “based on the” was changed to “based on the following additional rules” to
improve legibility and does not affect the meaning of the functional requirement.
6.4.3.3 FDP_ETC.2 Export of User Data with Security Attributes
The GME_SFP is only applicable for communication between the TOE and the BlackBerry
Infrastructure, thus “to the BlackBerry Infrastructure” was added FDP_ETC.2.1 and FDP_ETC.2.4
for clarity. Also in FDP_ETC.2.4 “the following rules” was changed to “the following additional
rules” to improve legibility and does not affect the meaning of the functional requirement.
6.4.3.4 FDP_IFF.1 (1) Simple Security Attributes
In FDP_IFF.1.3 (1) “enforce the” was changed to “enforce the following additional rules” and in
FDP_IFF.1.4 (1) “provide the following” was changed to “provide the following additional
capabilities”. Both refinements were made to improve legibility and do not affect the meaning of
the functional requirement.
6.4.3.5 FDP_IFF.1 (2) Simple Security Attributes
In FDP_IFF.1.3 (2) “enforce the” was changed to “enforce the following additional rules” and in
FDP_IFF.1.4 (2) “provide the following” was changed to “provide the following additional
capabilities”. Both refinements were made to improve legibility and do not affect the meaning of
the functional requirement.
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6.4.3.6 FDP_IFF.1 (3) Simple Security Attributes
In FDP_IFF.1.3 (3) “enforce the” was changed to “enforce the following additional rules” and in
FDP_IFF.1.4 (3) “provide the following” was changed to “provide the following additional
capabilities”. Both refinements were made to improve legibility and do not affect the meaning of
the functional requirement.
6.4.3.7 FDP_IFF.1 (4) Simple Security Attributes
In FDP_IFF.1.3 (4) “enforce the” was changed to “enforce the following additional rules” and in
FDP_IFF.1.4 (4) “provide the following” was changed to “provide the following additional
capabilities”. Both refinements were made to improve legibility and do not affect the meaning of
the functional requirement.
6.4.3.8 FDP_IFF.1 (5) Simple Security Attributes
In FDP_IFF.1.3 (5) “enforce the” was changed to “enforce the following additional rules” and in
FDP_IFF.1.4 (5) “provide the following” was changed to “provide the following additional
capabilities”. Both refinements were made to improve legibility and do not affect the meaning of
the functional requirement.
6.4.3.9 FDP_IFF.1 (6) Simple Security Attributes
In FDP_IFF.1.3 (6) “enforce the” was changed to “enforce the following additional rules” and in
FDP_IFF.1.4 (6) “provide the following” was changed to “provide the following additional
capabilities”. Both refinements were made to improve legibility and do not affect the meaning of
the functional requirement.
6.4.3.10 FDP_IFF.1 (7) Simple Security Attributes
In FDP_IFF.1.3 (7) “enforce the” was changed to “enforce the following additional rules” and in
FDP_IFF.1.4 (7) “provide the following” was changed to “provide the following additional
capabilities”. Both refinements were made to improve legibility and do not affect the meaning of
the functional requirement.
6.4.3.11 FDP_IFF.1 (8) Simple Security Attributes
In FDP_IFF.1.3 (8) “enforce the” was changed to “enforce the following additional rules” and in
FDP_IFF.1.4 (8) “provide the following” was changed to “provide the following additional
capabilities”. Both refinements were made to improve legibility and do not affect the meaning of
the functional requirement.
6.4.3.12 FDP_ITC.2 Import of User Data with Security Attributes
The GME_SFP is only applicable for communication between the TOE and the BlackBerry
Infrastructure, thus “outside the TOE” was changed to “to the BlackBerry Infrastructure” in
FDP_ITC.2.1 and FDP_ITC.2.5 for clarity. Also in FDP_ITC.2.5 “the following rules” was
changed to “the following additional rules” to improve legibility and does not affect the meaning of
the functional requirement.
6.4.3.13 FPT_TDC.1 Inter-TSF Basic TSF Data Consistency
The GME specification is only used for communication between the TSF and the BlackBerry
Infrastructure, thus in FPT_TDC.1.1 and FPT_TDC.1.2 “another trusted IT product” was changed
to “the BlackBerry Infrastructure” for clarity.
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6.4.3.14 FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF Trusted Channel
The requirement is placed on communication between the TSF and the BlackBerry Infrastructure,
thus “another trusted IT product” was changed to “the BlackBerry Infrastructure” in FPT_TDC.1.1
and FPT_TDC.1.2 for clarity.
6.4.4 Selection of Security Assurance Requirements
The selection of EAL 4 assurance package is commensurate with the environment in which the
TOE executes, and the augmentation of ALC_FLR.1 is appropriate to provide assurance to
customers that security flaws are tracked and corrected.
The selected security assurance requirements are also applicable and appropriate for the
explicitly stated security functional requirements, as the associated documentary evidence
provide sufficient assurance for EAL 4, augmented by ALC_FLR.1.
The following table demonstrates that all SAR dependencies are satisfied.
Table 6. SAR Dependencies
Requirement Dependencies Satisfied By
ASE_CCL.1
ASE_ECD.1 ASE_ECD.1
ASE_INT.1 ASE_INT.1
ASE_REQ.1 ASE_REQ.1
ASE_ECD.1 None –
ASE_INT.1 None –
ASE_OBJ.2 ASE_SPD.1 ASE_SPD.1
ASE_REQ.2
ASE_ECD.1 ASE_ECD.1
ASE_OBJ.2 ASE_OBJ.2
ASE_SPD.1 None –
ASE_TSS.1
ADV_FSP.1 ADV_FSP.1
ASE_ECD.1 ASE_ECD.1
ASE_OBJ.2 ASE_OBJ.2
ADV_FSP.4 ADV_TDS.1 ADV_TDS.1
ADV_TDS.3 ADV_FSP.4 ADV_FSP.4
ADV_ARC.1
ADV_FSP.1 ADV_FSP.1
ADV_TDS.1 ADV_TDS.1
ADV_IMP.1
ADV_TDS.3 ADV_TDS.3
ALC_TAT.1 ALC_TAT.1
AGD_OPE.1 ADV_FSP.1 ADV_FSP.1
AGD_PRE.1 None –
ALC_FLR.1 None –
ALC_CMC.4
ALC_CMS.1 ALC_CMS.1
ALC_DVS.1 ALC_DVS.1
ALC_LCD.1 ALC_LCD.1
ALC_CMS.4 None –
ALC_DEL.1 None –
ALC_DVS.1 None –
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Requirement Dependencies Satisfied By
ALC_LCD.1 None –
ALC_TAT.1 ADV_IMP.1 ADV_IMP.1
ATE_COV.2
ADV_FSP.2 ADV_FSP.1
ATE_FUN.1 ATE_FUN.1
ATE_FUN.1 ATE_COV.1 ATE_COV.1
ATE_IND.2
ADV_FSP.2 ADV_FSP.2
AGD_OPE.1 AGD_OPE.1
AGD_PRE.1 AGD_PRE.1
ATE_FUN.1 ATE_FUN.1
ATE_COV.1 ATE_COV.1
ATE_DPT.1
ADV_TDS.3 ADV_TDS.3
ADV_ARC.1 ADV_ARC.1
ATE_FUN.1 ATE_FUN.1
AVA_VAN.3
ADV_FSP.2 ADV_FSP.2
ADV_TDS.3 ADV_TDS.3
ADV_IMP.1 ADV_IMP.1
ADV_ARC.1 ADV_ARC.1
AGD_OPE.1 AGD_OPE.1
AGD_PRE.1 AGD_PRE.1
6.4.5 Refinements of Security Assurance Requirements on the TOE
Refinement operations are not performed on any of the SARs on the TOE.
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7 TOE Summary Specification
7.1 Security Functions
The TOE implements the following security functions:
7.1.1 F.GME Gateway Message Envelope Protocol
The TOE implements the RIM-proprietary GME protocol to wirelessly communicate with the
BlackBerry Infrastructure for routing data to a BlackBerry Enterprise Server or another BlackBerry
device. When sending data to either type of destination, the TOE sends its PIN, the data, and the
identifier of the destination entity to the BlackBerry Infrastructure. The BlackBerry Infrastructure,
in turn, routes the provided information. The identifier for a BlackBerry Enterprise Server is its
UID, and the identifier for a BlackBerry device is its PIN. Receiving data from a BlackBerry
Enterprise Server or another BlackBerry device is also accomplished through communication with
the BlackBerry Infrastructure using the GME protocol. The communication between the TOE and
the BlackBerry Infrastructure is initiated by the TOE when sending information from the TOE and
is initiated by the BlackBerry Infrastructure when receiving information to the TOE. The TOE
contains a GME service book that contains the UID of the BlackBerry Enterprise Server that
administers the TOE.
The ability to send data to another BlackBerry device (i.e. send a PIN message) is determined by
the value of the Allow Peer-to-Peer Messages IT policy rule, as described in F.ITPolicy.
7.1.2 F.Transport Secure Data Transport
Data transmitted between the TOE and a BlackBerry Enterprise Server or another BlackBerry
device, as described in F.GME, is encrypted using AES-256 or Triple DES. If the destination is a
BlackBerry Enterprise Server then the encryption algorithm is AES. If the destination is another
BlackBerry device then the Triple DES algorithm is used.
When sending data, the TOE splits the data into 2 KB datagrams and encrypts each datagram
with a unique session key created using the FIPS 186-2 PRNG. If the destination is a BlackBerry
Enterprise Server then the session key is encrypted with the master encryption key, and if the
destination is another BlackBerry device then the session key is encrypted with the peer-to-peer
encryption key. The TOE then transmits the encrypted datagram and encrypted session key to
the BlackBerry Infrastructure for routing, as described in F.GME.
When receiving data from a BlackBerry Enterprise Server or another BlackBerry device, the TOE
selects the master encryption key or peer-to-peer encryption key accordingly and decrypts the
encrypted session key. The session key is then used to decrypt the encrypted datagram.
7.1.3 F.Kernel BlackBerry Cryptographic Kernel
The BlackBerry Cryptographic Kernel is the cryptographic module responsible for supporting
secure data transport from the TOE, wireless generation of a new master encryption key through
key agreement, and the content protection feature. It implements the following cryptographic
algorithms:
 AES-256 (CBC mode of operation)
 Triple DES (CBC mode of operation)
 SHA-1, -256, and -512
 HMAC SHA-1, -256, and -512
 RSA PKCS#1 (1024 bit, signature verification only)
 FIPS 186-2 Appendix 3.1 PRNG
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 ECDSA (571 bit, signature verification only)
 EC Diffie-Hellman
 EC MQV
Version 3.8.5.85 of the BlackBerry Cryptographic Kernel is included in Device Software Version
5.0.0 and has been awarded FIPS 140-2 validation certificate no.1252.
7.1.4 F.Wireless Wireless Communication
The TOE provides the following wireless capabilities:
 Email messaging – The TOE allows the device user to send and receive email messages
using their enterprise email account. Email messaging is accomplished by
communication between the TOE and a BlackBerry Enterprise Server, as described in
F.Transport.
 PIM synchronisation – The TOE bi-directionally synchronises PIM data with the user’s
enterprise email account via communication with the BlackBerry Enterprise Server, as
described in F.Transport.
 PIN messaging – The TOE allows the device user to send and receive PIN messages to
and from other BlackBerry devices, as described in F.Transport.
 Cellular phone – The TOE allows the device user to send and receive cellular phone
communication.
 SMS messaging – The TOE allows the device user to send and receive SMS messages.
 MMS messaging – The TOE allows the device user to send and receive MMS messages.
 Bluetooth communication – The TOE supports the Hands Free and Headset Bluetooth
profiles that allow the TOE to communicate with other Bluetooth devices.
 WiFi communication – The TOE supports a type of local area network that uses high-
frequency radio waves rather than wires to communicate between nodes.
 GPS communication – The TOE supports location-based applications and location-based
services.
The TOE provides remote management capabilities of its wireless communication functionality
through the use of IT policy, as described in F.ITPolicy.
7.1.5 F.Administration Local Administration
The TOE provides management capabilities that allow the device user to perform the following
administrative functions:
 Lock device
 Modify device password
 Perform security wipe of the device
 Cooperatively generate new master encryption key with BlackBerry Enterprise Server
The TOE also allows the device user to perform the following administrative functions, dependent
upon the IT policy configuration per F.ITPolicy:
 Modify security timeout
 Enable and disable device locking when holstered
 Enable and disable content protection on the TOE
 Enable and disable Bluetooth functionality
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 Enable and disable WiFi functionality
 Modify allowed and disallowed S/MIME content ciphers
7.1.6 F.ITCommand Wireless IT Commands
The TOE is able to execute IT commands issued by the BlackBerry Enterprise Server
administrator. An IT command is only executed if the TOE determines that the source BlackBerry
Enterprise Server is authorised to issue the command. The TOE determines proper authorisation
by verifying that the timestamp of the IT command is not older than the timestamp of the most
recently executed IT command and that the UID of the source BlackBerry Enterprise Server
matches the UID of the BlackBerry Enterprise Server that issued the current IT policy
configuration. Depending on the IT command type, data may be included to support the
execution of the IT command.
The TOE is able to execute the IT commands described in the following table.
Table 7. IT Commands
IT Command
Includes IT
Command Data?
Description
Erase Data and Disable
Handheld
No
Erases all user data on the device. The device is returned to its
factory default settings and is no longer integrated with the email
account of the device user.
Set Password and Lock Yes
Sets the device password to the password specified in the IT
command data and locks the device.
Set IT Policy Yes
Sets the current IT policy configuration enforced by the TOE to
the IT policy configuration specified in the IT command data. See
F.ITPolicy for more information.
7.1.7 F.ITPolicy Wireless IT Policy
The TOE is able to enforce the IT policy configuration specified and issued by the BlackBerry
Enterprise Server administrator. An IT policy configuration is only enforced if the TOE determines
the source BlackBerry Enterprise Server is authorised to specify the configuration. The TOE
determines proper authorisation by verifying that the ECDSA signature of the new IT policy
configuration and the included ECDSA public key verifies successfully using the ECDSA public
key included with the current IT policy configuration.
6
If the TOE determines an IT policy configuration is to be enforced then it replaces the current IT
policy configuration with the new configuration. If there is no current IT policy configuration then
the new configuration is automatically enforced.
The TOE is able to enforce an IT policy configuration that consists of the IT policy rules specified
in the following table, which is a subset of the entire set of IT policy rules supported by the TOE.
Refer to Baseline Configuration on page 69 for configuration information on the listed IT policy
rules.
Table 8. IT Policy Rules
IT Policy Rule Description
Allow Browser
Controls whether the user can use the default browser included on the
device.
6
Note that the conditions specified in F.ITCommand must be satisfied before the TOE will execute the Set IT Policy
IT command.
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IT Policy Rule Description
Allow External Connections
Controls whether third-party applications on the device can initiate external
connections (e.g., to WAP or other public gateway).
Allow Internal Connections
Controls whether third-party applications on the device can initiate internal
connections (e.g., to the Mobile Data Service).
Allow Peer-to-Peer Messages
Specifies whether device users can send PIN messages. This rule does not
prevent device users from receiving PIN messages.
Allow Phone
Specifies whether device users can access phone capabilities. This rule
does not prevent device users from making emergency phone calls.
Allow SMS Specifies whether device users can send and receive SMS messages.
Allow Third Party Apps to Use Serial Port
Specifies whether third-party applications can use the USB port on the
device.
Content Protection Strength
Forces the use of the content protection feature and specifies the strength of
the ECDH key pair used to generate an AES-256 key while the device is
locked.
Null – Content protection is not forcibly enabled
0 – 160 bits
1 – 256 bits
2 – 521 bits
Disable 3DES Transport Crypto
Forces the device to encrypt and decrypt packets to and from the BlackBerry
Enterprise Server that sent the IT policy using AES instead of Triple DES.
Disable All Wireless Sync Disables wireless synchronisation of PIM data.
Disable Bluetooth Disables all Bluetooth support.
Disable External Memory
Specifies whether to prevent the expandable memory (microSD) feature from
working on supported BlackBerry devices.
Disable GPS
Specifies whether the GPS functionality on the BlackBerry device is turned
on.
Disable JavaScript in Browser
Specifies whether to prevent JavaScript execution in the BlackBerry
Browser.
Disable MMS
Specifies whether to prevent the BlackBerry device user from using
Multimedia Messaging Service (MMS) functionality on the BlackBerry device.
Disable Photo Camera
Specifies whether the ability to take still pictures with the camera is turned off
on the BlackBerry device.
Disable USB Mass Storage
Specifies whether to prevent the USB Mass Storage feature from working on
supported BlackBerry devices.
Disable Video Camera
Specifies whether the ability to record video with the camera is turned off on
the BlackBerry device.\n\nSet this rule to True to turn off the video camera
feature.
Disable Voice Note Recording
Specifies whether the voice note recording feature on the BlackBerry device
is turned on.
Disable WLAN Disables use of WLAN on the device.
Disallow Third Party Application
Downloads
Specifies whether third-party applications may be downloaded and installed
on the device.
Enable Long Term Timeout
Controls whether the device locks after a predefined period of time,
regardless of user activity.
Force Lock When Holstered Specifies whether the device is locked when placed in the holster.
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IT Policy Rule Description
Maximum Password Age
Specifies the number of days until a device password expires and the user is
prompted to provide a new password.
0 – The password never expires.
1-65535 – The password expires after the specified number of days.
Maximum Password History
Specifies the maximum number of previous device passwords against which
new passwords can be checked to prevent reuse of the old passwords.
0 – The password is not checked against previous passwords.
1-15 – The password is checked against the specified number of previous
passwords.
Maximum Security Timeout
Specifies the maximum time, in minutes, allowed before a device security
timeout occurs. The device user can select any timeout value less than the
maximum value.
Minimum Password Length
Specifies the minimum allowable length, in characters, of the device
password.
Password Pattern Checks
Creates a pattern check on the device password.
0 – No restrictions.
1 – The password must contain at least one alpha and one numeric
character.
2 – The password must contain at least one alpha, one numeric, and one
special character.
3 – The password must contain at least one uppercase alpha, one lowercase
alpha, one numeric, and one special character.
Password Required Specifies whether the use of a device password is required.
Periodic Challenge Time
Specifies the interval, in minutes, after which the user is prompted to enter a
password, regardless of user activity.
Set Maximum Password Attempts
Specifies the number of unsuccessful authentication attempts (i.e. the
number of incorrect passwords entered) allowed on the device before the
device data is erased and the device disabled.
Set Password Timeout
Specifies the amount of time, in minutes, before the security timeout occurs
on the device.
S/MIME Allowed Content Ciphers
Specifies the content ciphers that the BlackBerry device can use to encrypt
S/MIME messages.
Suppress Password Echo
Disables the echoing (printing to the screen) of characters typed into the
device password screen7
.
User Can Change Timeout Specifies whether the device user can change the specified security timeout.
7.1.8 F.Authentication Authentication
The TOE provides a password-based authentication mechanism with the following functionality
that can be configured per F.Administration or F.ITPolicy:
 Limited feedback during authentication (an asterisk is displayed for each character typed)
 Authentication failure handling (a security wipe of device executed after multiple failed
authentication attempts)
 Password pattern checking
 Time-based password expiration, requiring the user to change the password
 Session locking, requiring user re-authentication, based on the following events:
7
BlackBerry devices that use SureType® technology, briefly display feedback to the user before masking password
characters with an asterisk
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o A time interval of inactivity elapsing
o User invocation
o TOE placed in holster
o Set Password and Lock IT command received per F.ITCommand
The following actions may be performed by the TOE prior to user authentication:
 Receive email, PIN, SMS and MMS messages
 Receive calendar appointments
 Synchronise PIM data
 Receive cellular phone communication
 Make emergency cellular phone communication (e.g. 911)
7.1.9 F.Time Time
The TOE provides reliable date and time information.
7.1.10 F.Applications Third-Party Applications
The TOE provides the ability to download, install, and execute third-party applications subject to
the restrictions specified by the BlackBerry Enterprise Server administrator per F.ITPolicy.
7.1.11 F.Content Protection of Stored Content
The TOE provides the content protection and security wipe features to protect stored user data
from unauthorised disclosure. The content protection feature encrypts stored data using AES-
256. When enabled, the content protection feature encrypts the following stored user data:
 Email – Subject, email addresses, message body, attachments
 Calendar – Subject, location, organiser, attendees, notes included in the appointment or
meeting request
 MemoPad – Title, information in the note body
 Tasks – Subject, information in the task body
 Contacts – All information except for title and category
 Auto Text – All entries that the original text is replaced with
 BlackBerry Browser – Content that is pushed to the TOE, websites that are saved on the
TOE, browser cache
If the content protection feature in enabled and the device receives new user data while locked,
ECDH key agreement is used to generate a temporary AES-256 key to encrypt the new user
data. The content protection feature may be enabled and configured by the user or BlackBerry
Enterprise Server administrator per F.Administration and F.ITPolicy, respectively.
The security wipe feature programmatically erases all stored user data and can be invoked
automatically or manually. If the TOE is configured to require user authentication then the feature
is automatically invoked when the maximum number of unsuccessful authentication attempts is
reached. The feature can also be invoked manually by the user or BlackBerry Enterprise Server
administrator per F.Administration and F.ITCommand, respectively.
7.1.12 F.S/MIME S/MIME
The TOE provides added confidentiality and further protects the integrity and privacy of
messages as well as additional layer of security and end-to-end authentication.
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The TOE is designed to support using a strong algorithm for S/MIME encryption. When the user
turns on S/MIME encryption on the BlackBerry Enterprise Server, the S/MIME Allowed Content
Ciphers IT policy rule default setting specifies that the BlackBerry device can use any of the
supported algorithms (other than the two weakest RC2 algorithms, RC2 (64-bit) and RC2 (40-bit))
to encrypt S/MIME messages.
User can set the S/MIME Allowed Content Ciphers IT policy rule to encrypt S/MIME messages
using any of AES (256-bit), AES (192-bit), AES (128-bit), Triple DES.
If the BlackBerry device has previously received a message from the intended recipient, the
BlackBerry device is designed to recall which content ciphers the recipient can support, and use
one of those ciphers. The BlackBerry device encrypts the message using Triple DES by default if
it does not know the decryption capabilities of the recipient.
7.1.13 F.SWConfiguration Software Configuration
The TOE provides the ability to control access of third-party applications to TOE resources and
user data subject to the restrictions specified by the BlackBerry Enterprise Server administrator.
The user can make application access control configuration more restrictive by changing
application permissions on the TOE.
The TOE is able to enforce a software configuration that consists of the software configuration
policy rules specified in the following table, which is a subset of the entire set of the software
configuration policy rules supported by the TOE.
Table 9. Software Configuration Rules
Software Configuration
Rule
Description
Disposition Specify whether the application is optional, required, or not allowed on the BlackBerry device. You
can use this application control policy rule to require that the BlackBerry device download a
specific application or prevent the BlackBerry device from downloading an unspecified or untrusted
application.
Interprocess Communication Specify whether or not the application can perform interprocess communication operations. You
can use this application control policy rule to prevent two or more applications from sharing data
and to prevent one application from using the connection permissions of another application.
Internal Network Connections Specify whether or not the application can make internal corporate network connections. You can
use this application control policy rule to allow or prevent the application from sending or receiving
data on the BlackBerry device using an internal protocol (for example, using the connection service)
or to require that the user respond to a prompt on the BlackBerry device to allow internal
connections through the BlackBerry device firewall.
External Network Connections Specify whether or not the application can make external network connections. You can use this
application control policy rule to allow or prevent the application from sending or receiving data on
the BlackBerry device using an external protocol (for example, using a WAP gateway, public
BlackBerry MDS Services, or TCP), or to require that the user respond to a prompt on their
BlackBerry device to allow external connections through the BlackBerry device firewall.
Local Connections Specify whether or not the application can make local network connections (for example,
connections to the BlackBerry device using a USB or serial port).
Phone Access Specify whether or not the application can make phone calls and access phone logs on the
BlackBerry device. You can use this application control policy rule to allow or prevent the
application from making calls on the BlackBerry device or to require that the user respond to a
prompt on the BlackBerry device to allow the application to make a phone call.
Message Access Specify whether or not the application can send and receive messages on the BlackBerry device
using the email API.
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Software Configuration
Rule
Description
PIM Data Access Specify whether or not the application can access the BlackBerry device PIM APIs, which control
access to the user’s personal information on the BlackBerry device, including the address book.
Note: Allowing the application to access PIM data APIs and use internal and external network
connection protocols creates an opportunity for an application to send all of the user’s personal data
from their BlackBerry device.
Browser Filters Specify whether or not the application can access browser filter APIs to register a browser filter
with the browser on the BlackBerry device. You can use this application control policy rule to allow
third-party Java applications to apply custom browser filters to web page content on the BlackBerry
device.
Event Injection Specify whether or not the application can inject synthetic input events, such as pressing keys and
performing trackwheel actions, on the BlackBerry device.
Bluetooth Serial Profile Specify whether or not the application can access the Bluetooth® Serial Port Profile (SPP) API.
Note: If you set the Disable Serial Port Profile IT policy rule to True, the Bluetooth enabled
BlackBerry device cannot use the Bluetooth SPP to establish a serial connection to a Bluetooth
enabled device.
BlackBerry Device Keystore Specify whether or not the application can access the BlackBerry device key store APIs.
If you set the Minimal Signing Key Store Security Level and the Minimal Encryption Key Store
Security Level IT policy rules to high, the BlackBerry device prompts the user for the BlackBerry
device key store password each time an application tries to access the user’s private key on the
BlackBerry device, and the BlackBerry device does not use this application policy control rule.
BlackBerry Device Keystore
Medium Security
Specify whether or not the application can access key store items at the medium security level (the
default level), which requires that the BlackBerry device prompt the user for the BlackBerry device
key store password when an application tries to access the user’s private key for the first time or
when the private key password timeout expires.
If you set the Minimal Signing Key Store Security Level and the Minimal Encryption Key Store
Security Level IT policy rules to high, the BlackBerry device prompts the user for the BlackBerry
device key store password each time an application tries to access their private key, and this
application policy control rule is not recognized.
Device GPS Specify whether or not the application can access the BlackBerry device Global Positioning System
(GPS) APIs. You can use this application control policy rule to allow or prevent the application
from accessing the GPS APIs on the BlackBerry device or to require that the user respond to a
prompt on the BlackBerry device to allow access to the GPS APIs.
User Authenticator API Specify whether or not the BlackBerry device allows an application to access the user authenticator
framework API. The user authenticator framework allows the registration of drivers (currently
smart card drivers only) that provide two-factor authentication to unlock the BlackBerry device.
This application control policy rule applies to the BlackBerry Device Software and third-party Java
applications.
7.1.14 F.Multimedia Multimedia Applications
The TOE provides multimedia applications, including photo camera, video camera, and voice
note recording, subject to the restrictions specified by the BlackBerry Enterprise Server
administrator per F.ITPolicy.
7.1.15 F.FileEncryption File Encryption
The TOE provides encryption of multimedia data stored on an external memory device using
AES-256.
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7.2 Assurance Measures
There exists TOE design documentation that consists of a functional specification, complete
interface specification, description of the basic modular design of the TOE, and a subset of the
implementation.
7.2.1 A.ConfigurationConfiguration Management
There exists configuration management documentation that lists, uniquely identifies, and
describes the configuration items that comprise the TOE. The configuration management system
used to manage the TOE uniquely identifies all configuration items.
7.2.2 A.Delivery Delivery Procedures
There exists TOE delivery documentation that describes the procedures used to securely deliver
the TOE.
7.2.3 A.Design Design Documentation
There exists TOE design documentation that consists of a functional specification, complete
interface specification, description of the basic modular design of the TOE, and a subset of the
implementation.
7.2.4 A.Guidance Guidance Documentation
The TOE includes guidance documentation that consists of a User Guide.
7.2.5 A.Remediation Flaw Remediation
There exists TOE flaw remediation documentation that describes the procedures used to track
reported TOE security flaws.
7.2.6 A.Testing Developer Testing
Developer testing of the TOE has been performed and there exists testing documentation that
consists of functional test plans, procedures, and results and evidence of coverage and depth of
the TOE security functions.
7.2.7 A.Evaluator Evaluator Testing
The TOE has been provided to the evaluation facility for independent testing.
7.2.8 A.SecurityTarget Security Target
There exists a Security Target document that describes the TOE.
7.3 TOE Security Specification
7.3.1 TOE Security Functions
The following table maps the TOE security functions to the SFRs.
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Table 10. Mapping of TOE Security Functions to SFRs
F.GME
F.Transport
F.Kernel
F.Wireless
F.Administration
F.ITCommand
F.ITPolicy
F.Authentication
F.Time
F.Applications
F.Content
F.S/MIME
F.SWConfiguration
F.Multimedia
F.FileEncryption
FCS_VAL_EXP.1 X
FCS_CKM.1 (1) X
FCS_CKM.1 (2) X
FCS_CKM.4 X
FCS_COP.1 X X X
FDP_ACC.1 (1) X
FDP_ACF.1 (1) X
FDP_ACC.1 (2) X
FDP_ACF.1 (2) X
FDP_ACC.1 (3) X
FDP_ACF.1 (3) X
FDP_ETC.2 X
FDP_IFC.1 (1) X X
FDP_IFF.1 (1) X X
FDP_IFC.1 (2) X
FDP_IFF.1 (2) X
FDP_IFC.1 (3) X
FDP_IFF.1 (3) X
FDP_IFC.1 (4) X
FDP_IFF.1 (4) X
FDP_IFC.1 (5) X
FDP_IFF.1 (5) X
FDP_IFC.1 (6) X
FDP_IFF.1 (6) X
FDP_IFC.1 (7) X
FDP_IFF.1 (7) X
FDP_IFC.1 (8) X
FDP_IFF.1 (8) X
FDP_ITC.2 X
FDP_SDP_EXP.1 X
FDP_SDP_EXP.2 X
FIA_AFL.1 X X
FIA_SOS.1 X X
FIA_UAU.1 X X X
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F.GME
F.Transport
F.Kernel
F.Wireless
F.Administration
F.ITCommand
F.ITPolicy
F.Authentication
F.Time
F.Applications
F.Content
F.S/MIME
F.SWConfiguration
F.Multimedia
F.FileEncryption
FIA_UAU.7 X X
FIA_UID.1 X X X
FMT_MSA.1 (1) X X
FMT_MSA.1 (2) X X
FMT_MSA.1 (3) X X
FMT_MSA.1 (4) X
FMT_MSA.2 X
FMT_MSA.3 (1) X X
FMT_MSA.3 (2) X
FMT_MSA.3 (3) X X
FMT_MSA.3 (4) X X
FMT_MSA.3 (5) X
FMT_MSA.3 (6) X
FMT_SAE.1 X X
FMT_SMF.1 X X X
FPT_STM.1 X
FPT_TDC.1 X
FTA_SSL.1 X X
FTA_SSL.2 X
FTA_SSL_EXP.4 X X X X
FTP_ITC.1 X
7.3.1.1 FCS_VAL_EXP.1, Cryptographic module validation
The cryptographic module embedded in the TOE is validated to meet the requirements of FIPS
140-2 (F.Kernel).
7.3.1.2 FCS_CKM.1, Cryptographic key generation (1)
The cryptographic module embedded in the TOE is validated to FIPS 140-2 and generates keys
using the FIPS 186-2 PRNG (F.Kernel).
7.3.1.3 FCS_CKM.1, Cryptographic key generation (2)
The cryptographic module embedded in the TOE is validated to FIPS 140-2 and generates keys
using ECDH and ECMQV key agreement (F.Kernel).
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7.3.1.4 FCS_CKM.4, Cryptographic key destruction
The cryptographic module embedded in the TOE is validated to FIPS 140-2 and destroys keys
according to the FIPS 140-2 key zeroization requirements (F.Kernel).
7.3.1.5 FCS_COP.1, Cryptographic operation (1)
The cryptographic module embedded in the TOE is validated to FIPS 140-2 and provides the
required cryptographic functionality (F.Kernel).
The TOE provides S/MIME messaging functionality (F.S/MIME).
The TOE provides file encryption on an external memory device (F.FileEncryption).
7.3.1.6 FDP_ACC.1, Subset access control (1)
The TOE accepts and enforces valid IT policy configurations received from the BlackBerry
Enterprise Server administrator (F.ITPolicy).
FDP_ACF.1, Security attribute based access control (1)
The TOE accepts and enforces valid IT policy configurations received from the BlackBerry
Enterprise Server administrator (F.ITPolicy).
7.3.1.7 FDP_ACC.1, Subset access control (2)
The TOE user cannot override the IT policy configuration specified by the BlackBerry Enterprise
Server administrator (F.Administration).
FDP_ACF.1, Security attribute based access control (2)
The TOE user cannot override the IT policy configuration specified by the BlackBerry Enterprise
Server administrator (F.Administration).
7.3.1.8 FDP_ACC.1, Subset access control (3)
The TOE accepts and enforces valid software configurations received from the BlackBerry
Enterprise Server administrator (F.SWConfiguration).
FDP_ACF.1, Security attribute based access control (3)
The TOE accepts and enforces valid software configurations received from the BlackBerry
Enterprise Server administrator (F.SWConfiguration).
7.3.1.9 FDP_ACC.1, Subset access control (3)
The TOE user cannot override the software configuration specified by the BlackBerry Enterprise
Server administrator (F.Administration).
FDP_ACF.1, Security attribute based access control (3)
The TOE user cannot override the software configuration specified by the BlackBerry Enterprise
Server administrator (F.Administration).
7.3.1.10 FDP_ETC.2, Export of user data with security attributes
When sending data to the BlackBerry Infrastructure for routing to a BlackBerry Enterprise Server
or another BlackBerry device, the GME protocol ensures that user data sent from the TOE is
associated with the PIN of the TOE (F.GME).
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7.3.1.11 FDP_IFC.1, Subset information flow control (1)
All communication between the TOE and a BlackBerry Enterprise Server or another BlackBerry
device is routed by the BlackBerry Infrastructure, and the communication between the TOE and
the BlackBerry Infrastructure follows the GME protocol (F.GME). All data transferred between the
TOE and a BlackBerry Enterprise Server or another BlackBerry device is protected (F.Transport).
7.3.1.12 FDP_IFF.1, Simple security attributes (1)
All communication between the TOE and a BlackBerry Enterprise Server or another BlackBerry
device is routed by the BlackBerry Infrastructure, and the communication between the TOE and
the BlackBerry Infrastructure follows the GME protocol (F.GME). All data transferred between the
TOE and a BlackBerry Enterprise Server or another BlackBerry device is protected (F.Transport).
7.3.1.13 FDP_IFC.1, Subset information flow control (2)
The TOE executes valid IT commands received from the BlackBerry Enterprise Server
administrator (F.ITCommand).
7.3.1.14 FDP_IFF.1, Simple security attributes (2)
The TOE executes valid IT commands received from the BlackBerry Enterprise Server
administrator (F.ITCommand).
7.3.1.15 FDP_IFC.1, Subset information flow control (3)
The TOE synchronises PIM data with the user’s enterprise email account (F.Wireless).
7.3.1.16 FDP_IFF.1, Simple security attributes (3)
The TOE synchronises PIM data with the user’s enterprise email account (F.Wireless).
7.3.1.17 FDP_IFC.1, Subset information flow control (4)
The TOE provides the ability to download third-party applications (F.Applications).
7.3.1.18 FDP_IFF.1, Simple security attributes (4)
The TOE provides the ability to download third-party applications (F.Applications).
7.3.1.19 FDP_IFC.1, Subset information flow control (5)
The TOE provides internal and external network access to third-party applications
(F.Applications).
7.3.1.20 FDP_IFF.1, Simple security attributes (5)
The TOE provides internal and external network access to third-party applications
(F.Applications).
7.3.1.21 FDP_IFC.1, Subset information flow control (6)
The TOE provides cellular phone communication functionality (F.Wireless).
7.3.1.22 FDP_IFF.1, Simple security attributes (6)
The TOE provides cellular phone communication functionality (F.Wireless).
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7.3.1.23 FDP_IFC.1, Subset information flow control (7)
The TOE provides Bluetooth, WiFi and GPS communication functionality (F.Wireless).
7.3.1.24 FDP_IFF.1, Simple security attributes (7)
The TOE provides Bluetooth, WiFi and GPS communication functionality (F.Wireless).
7.3.1.25 FDP_IFC.1, Subset information flow control (8)
The TOE provides the ability to control multimedia applications (F.Multimedia).
7.3.1.26 FDP_IFF.1, Simple security attributes (8)
The TOE provides the ability to control multimedia applications (F.Multimedia).
7.3.1.27 FDP_ITC.2, Import of user data with security attributes
When receiving data from a BlackBerry Enterprise Server or another BlackBerry device, the GME
protocol ensures that user data sent to the TOE from the BlackBerry Infrastructure is associated
with the PIN of the device (F.GME).
7.3.1.28 FDP_SDP_EXP.1, Stored data non-disclosure
The TOE is capable of cryptographically protecting stored user data (F.Content).
7.3.1.29 FDP_SDP_EXP.2, Stored data deletion
The TOE is capable of protecting stored user data from unauthorised disclosure by
programmatically erasing all user data (F.Content).
7.3.1.30 FIA_AFL.1, Authentication failure handling
The TOE can be configured to perform a security wipe of all user data after a configurable
number of failed authentication attempts (F.ITPolicy, F.Authentication).
7.3.1.31 FIA_SOS.1, Verification of secrets
The TOE can be configured to enforce quality metrics on the TOE password (F.ITPolicy,
F.Authentication).
7.3.1.32 FIA_UAU.1, Timing of authentication
The TOE can be configured to require password-based user authentication (F.Administration,
F.ITPolicy, F.Authentication).
7.3.1.33 FIA_UAU.7, Protected authentication feedback
The TOE can be configured to display an asterisk for each character typed during the
authentication process (F.ITPolicy, F.Authentication).
7.3.1.34 FIA_UID.1, Timing of identification
The TOE can be configured to require password-based user authentication (F.Administration,
F.ITPolicy, F.Authentication).
7.3.1.35 FMT_MSA.1, Management of security attributes (1)
The TOE executes IT commands and enforces IT policy configurations issued by the BlackBerry
Enterprise Server administrator (F.ITCommand, F.ITPolicy).
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7.3.1.36 FMT_MSA.1, Management of security attributes (2)
The TOE executes IT commands and enforces IT policy configurations issued by the BlackBerry
Enterprise Server administrator (F.ITCommand, F.ITPolicy).
7.3.1.37 FMT_MSA.1, Management of security attributes (3)
The TOE executes IT commands and enforces IT policy configurations issued by the BlackBerry
Enterprise Server administrator (F.ITCommand, F.ITPolicy).
7.3.1.38 FMT_MSA.1, Management of security attributes (4)
The TOE enforces software configuration issued by the BlackBerry Enterprise Server
administrator (F.ITPolicy).
7.3.1.39 FMT_MSA.2, Secure security attributes
The BlackBerry Cryptographic Kernel ensures that only secure cryptographic values are accepted
and utilised, per the requirements of FIPS 140-2 (F.Kernel).
7.3.1.40 FMT_MSA.3, Static attribute initialisation (1)
The IT command type and data and UID of source BlackBerry Enterprise Server are specified by
the BlackBerry Enterprise Server administrator (F.ITCommand, F.ITPolicy).
7.3.1.41 FMT_MSA.3, Static attribute initialisation (2)
The IT policy configuration enforced by the TOE, which consequently limits the administrative
abilities of the TOE user, is specified by the BlackBerry Enterprise Server administrator
(F.ITPolicy).
7.3.1.42 FMT_MSA.3, Static attribute initialisation (3)
The IT policy configuration enforced by the TOE is specified by the BlackBerry Enterprise Server
administrator (F.ITPolicy). The GME service book of the TOE is issued by the BlackBerry
Enterprise Server administrator (F.GME).
7.3.1.43 FMT_MSA.3, Static attribute initialisation (4)
The IT command type and data and UID of source BlackBerry Enterprise Server are specified by
the BlackBerry Enterprise Server administrator (F.ITCommand, F.ITPolicy).
7.3.1.44 FMT_MSA.3, Static attribute initialisation (5)
The IT policy configuration enforced by the TOE is specified by the BlackBerry Enterprise Server
administrator (F.ITPolicy).
7.3.1.45 FMT_MSA.3, Static attribute initialisation (6)
The software configuration enforced by the TOE, which consequently limits the administrative
abilities of the TOE user, is specified by the BlackBerry Enterprise Server administrator
(F.ITPolicy).
7.3.1.46 FMT_SAE.1, Time-limited authorisation
The BlackBerry Enterprise Server administrator can specify an expiration time for the TOE
password, which when elapsed forces the user to change the password (F.ITPolicy,
F.Authentication).
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7.3.1.47 FMT_SMF.1, Specification of management functions
The TOE provides management capabilities to the local user (F.Administration) and the
BlackBerry Enterprise Server administrator (F.ITCommand, F.ITPolicy).
7.3.1.48 FPT_STM.1, Reliable time stamps
The TOE provides reliable date and time information (F.Time).
7.3.1.49 FPT_TDC.1, Inter-TSF basic TSF data consistency
The TOE communicates with the BlackBerry Infrastructure using the GME protocol (F.GME).
7.3.1.50 FTA_SSL.1, TSF-initiated session locking
The interactive session with the TOE locks after a specified time interval of inactivity configured
by the BlackBerry Enterprise Server administrator (F.Authentication, F.ITPolicy).
7.3.1.51 FTA_SSL.2, User-initiated locking
The user can lock the interactive session with the TOE (F.Authentication).
7.3.1.52 FTA_SSL_EXP.4, Event-initiated session locking
The BlackBerry Enterprise Server administrator can lock the user’s interactive session with the
TOE by issuing the Set Password and Lock IT command (F.Authentication, F.ITCommand).
The interactive session with the TOE can be configured to lock after the TOE is placed in its
holster (F.Administration, F.Authentication, F.ITPolicy).
7.3.1.53 FTP_ITC.1, Inter-TSF trusted channel
The GME protocol ensures a distinct communication channel between the TOE and the
BlackBerry Infrastructure, where either entity can initiate communication (F.GME).
7.3.2 TOE Assurance Measures
The following table maps the TOE assurance measures to the SARs.
Table 11. Mapping of TOE Assurance Measures to SARs
A.Configuration
A.Delivery
A.Design
A.Guidance
A.Remediation
A.Testing
A.Evaluator
A.Assessment
A.SecurityTarget
ASE_CCL.1 X
ASE_ECD.1 X
ASE_INT.1 X
ASE_OBJ.2 X
ASE_REQ.2 X
ASE_SPD.1 X
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A.Configuration
A.Delivery
A.Design
A.Guidance
A.Remediation
A.Testing
A.Evaluator
A.Assessment
A.SecurityTarget
ASE_TSS.1 X
ADV_FSP.4 X
ADV_ARC.1 X
ADV_TDS.3 X
ADV_IMP.1 X
AGD_OPE.1 X
AGD_PRE.1 X
ALC_CMC.4 X
ALC_CMS.4 X
ALC_DEL.1 X
ALC_DVS.1 X
ALC_LCD.1 X
ALC_TAT.1 X
ALC_FLR.1 X
ATE_COV.2 X
ATE_FUN.1 X
ATE_IND.2 X
ATE_DPT.1 X
AVA_VAN.3 X
7.3.2.1 ASE_CCL.1, Conformance claims
The Conformance claims section exists in the Security Target (A.SecurityTarget).
7.3.2.2 ASE_ECD.1, Extended components definition
The Extended components definition section exists in the Security Target (A.SecurityTarget).
7.3.2.3 ASE_INT.1, ST introduction
The ST introduction section exists in the Security Target (A.SecurityTarget).
7.3.2.4 ASE_OBJ.2, Security objectives
The Security objectives section exists in the Security Target (A.SecurityTarget).
7.3.2.5 ASE_REQ.2, Derived security requirements
The Derived security requirements section exists in the Security Target (A.SecurityTarget).
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7.3.2.6 ASE_SPD.1, Security problem definition
The Security problem definition section exists in the Security Target (A.SecurityTarget).
7.3.2.7 ASE_TSS.1, TOE summary specification
The TOE summary specification section exists in the Security Target (A.SecurityTarget).
7.3.2.8 ADV_FSP.4, Complete functional specification
There exists design documentation (A.Design).
7.3.2.9 ADV_ARC.1, Security architecture description
There exists design documentation (A.Design).
7.3.2.10 ADV_TDS.3, Basic modular design
There exists design documentation (A.Design).
7.3.2.11 ADV_IMP.1, Implementation representation of the TSF
There exists design documentation (A.Design).
7.3.2.12 AGD_OPE.1, Operational user guidance
The TOE includes operational user guidance documentation (A.Guidance).
7.3.2.13 AGD_PRE.1, Preparative procedures
The TOE includes preparative procedures documentation (A.Guidance).
7.3.2.14 ALC_CMC.4, Production support, acceptance procedures and automation
There exists production support, acceptance procedures and automation documentation
(A.Configuration)
7.3.2.15 ALC_CMS.4, Problem tracking CM coverage
There exists problem tracking CM coverage documentation (A.Configuration)
7.3.2.16 ALC_DEL.1, Delivery procedures
There exists delivery procedures documentation (A.Delivery)
7.3.2.17 ALC_DVS.1, Identification of security measures
There exists identification of security measures procedure documentation (A.Configuration)
7.3.2.18 ALC_LCD.1, Developer defined life-cycle model
There exists life-cycle model documentation (A.Configuration)
7.3.2.19 ALC_TAT.1, Well-defined development tools
There exists development tools documentation (A.Configuration)
7.3.2.20 ALC_FLR.1, Basic flaw remediation
There exists flaw remediation procedures documentation (A.Remediation).
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7.3.2.21 ATE_COV.2, Analysis of coverage
Developer testing of the TOE has been performed and there exists testing documentation
(A.Testing).
7.3.2.22 ATE_FUN.1, Functional testing
Developer testing of the TOE has been performed and there exists testing documentation,
including evidence of testing coverage (A.Testing).
7.3.2.23 ATE_DPT.1, Testing: basic design
Developer testing of the TOE has been performed and there exists testing documentation,
including evidence of depth of testing (A.Testing).
7.3.2.24 ATE_IND.2, Independent testing – sample
The TOE has been provided to the evaluation facility (A.Evaluator).
7.3.2.25 AVA_VAN.3, Focused vulnerability analysis
A vulnerability assessment of the TOE has been performed and documented (A.Assessment).
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8 Baseline Configuration
8.1 Baseline IT Policy Configuration
The baseline IT policy configuration is the evaluated configuration of the TOE that provides the
most flexibility to tailor the listed IT policy rules to comply with an enterprise security policy. The
deployed configuration of the TOE shall be at least as restrictive as the baseline configuration.
The following table identifies the valid range of values, default value, and baseline value for each
IT policy rule specified F.ITPolicy. With the exception of the values marked with an asterisk (“*”),
modifying the baseline values will result in a more restrictive configuration, and thus may be
configured to comply with an enterprise security policy while maintaining an evaluated
configuration.
Table 12. Baseline IT Policy Configuration
IT Policy Rule
Value
Range Default Baseline
Global Policy Group
Allow Browser {True, False} True True
Allow Phone {True, False} True True
Common Policy Group
Disable MMS {True, False} False False
Disable Voice Note Recording {True, False} False False
Security Policy Group
Allow External Connections {True, False} True True
Allow Internal Connections {True, False} True True
Allow Third Party Apps to Use Serial
Port
{True, False} True True
Content Protection Strength 0-2 Null Null
Disable 3DES Transport Crypto {True, False} False True*
Disable GPS {True, False} False False
Disable External Memory {True, False} True True
Disable USB Mass Storage {True, False} True True
Disallow Third Party Application
Downloads
{True, False} False False
Force Lock When Holstered {True, False} False False
Device-Only Policy Group
Allow Peer-to-Peer Messages {True, False} True True
Allow SMS {True, False} True True
Enable Long Term Timeout {True, False} False False
Maximum Password Age 0-65535 0 0
Maximum Security Timeout {1, 2, 5, 10, 15, 20, 30, 60} 60 608
Minimum Password Length 4-14 4 4
8
The allowed range of values for the Maximum Security Timeout IT policy is {2, 5, 10, 15, 20, 30, 60}. A value of 1
is not allowed in the evaluated configuration.
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IT Policy Rule
Value
Range Default Baseline
Password Pattern Checks 0-3 0 19
Password Required {True, False} False True*
User Can Change Timeout {True, False} True True
PIM Synch Policy Group
Disable All Wireless Sync {True, False} False False
Bluetooth Policy Group
Disable Bluetooth {True, False} False False
S/MIME Application Policy Group
S/MIME Allowed Content Ciphers 0-7 ALL {01,2 }10
Browser Policy Group
Disable JavaScript in Browser {True, False} False False
WLAN Policy Group
Disable WLAN {True, False} False False
Camera Policy Group
Disable Camera {True, False} False False
Disable Video Recorder {True, False} False False
Password Policy Group
Maximum Password History 0-15 0 0
Periodic Challenge Time 1-60 Null Null
Set Maximum Password Attempts 3-10 10 10
Set Password Timeout 1-60 60 60
Suppress Password Echo {True, False} False True*
8.2 Baseline Software Configuration
The baseline software configuration is the evaluated configuration of the TOE that provides the
most flexibility to tailor the listed software configuration rules to comply with an enterprise security
policy. The deployed configuration of the TOE shall be at least as restrictive as the baseline
configuration. The following table identifies the valid range of values, default value, and baseline
value for each software configuration rule specified in F.SWConfiguration. Modifying the baseline
values will result in a more restrictive configuration, and thus may be configured to comply with an
enterprise security policy while maintaining an evaluated configuration.
Table 13. Baseline Software Configuration
Software Configuration
Rule
Value
Range Default Baseline
Disposition {Optional, Required, Not Permitted} Optional Optional11
9
The allowed range of values for the Password Pattern Checks IT policy rule is 1-3. A value of 0 is not allowed in the
evaluated configuration.
10
The allowed range of values for the S/MIME Allowed Content Ciphers IT policy rule is 0,1,2 . The values of 3, 4, 6,
7 are not allowed in the evaluated configuration.
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Software Configuration
Rule
Value
Range Default Baseline
Interprocess Communication {Allowed, Not Permitted} Allowed Allowed
Internal Network Connections {Prompt User, Allowed, Not
Permitted}
Prompt User Prompt User
External Network Connections {Prompt User, Allowed, Not
Permitted}
Prompt User Prompt User
Local Connections {Allowed, Not Permitted} Allowed Allowed
Phone Access {Prompt User, Allowed, Not
Permitted}
Prompt User Prompt User
Message Access {Allowed, Not Permitted} Allowed Allowed
PIM Data Access {Allowed, Not Permitted} Allowed Allowed
Event Injection {Allowed, Not Permitted} Not Permitted Not Permitted
Bluetooth Serial Profile {Allowed, Not Permitted} Allowed Allowed
BlackBerry Device Keystore {Allowed, Not Permitted} Allowed Allowed
BlackBerry Device Keystore
Medium Security
{Allowed, Not Permitted}
Allowed
Allowed
Device GPS {Prompt User, Allowed, Not
Permitted}
Prompt User Prompt User
User Authenticator API {Allowed, Not Permitted} Allowed Allowed
8.3 Baseline User Guidance
In addition to the Smartphone being deployed on a BES with the Baseline (or stronger) policy, the
Smartphone user must also ensure that under options / password that 'Allow calls while locked' is
set to No. If it is set to yes, then contact information and a “place call” option on the menu of a
locked device can be viewed. It should be noted that a previously paired Bluetooth headset or
previously running application is expected to continue to function normally after a device has
locked.
11
Only applicable to trusted applications as defined by P.TrustedThirdParyApps in section 3.2.
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9 Glossary
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
API Application Programming Interface
ANSI American National Standards Institute
CBC Cipher block chaining
CDMA Code division multiple access
CLDC Connected limited device configuration
EAL Evaluation assurance level
ECDH Elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman
ECDSA Elliptic curve Digital Signature Algorithm
ECMQV Elliptic curve Menezes, Qu, Vanstone
EDGE Enhanced Data GSM Environment
EVDO Evolution for Data Only
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard
GME Gateway message envelope
GPRS GSM general packet radio service
GPS Global Positioning System
GSM Global system for mobile communication
HMAC Keyed-hashed message authentication code
iDEN Integrated digital enhanced network
IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
IT Information technology
MB Megabytes
MIDP Mobile information device profile
MMS Multimedia Messaging Service
NV Non-Volatile
PIM Personal information management
PIN Personal identification number
PRNG Pseudo-random number generator
RAM Random Access Memory
RIM Research In Motion
RNG Random number generator
SAR Security assurance requirement
SFP Security function policy
SFR Security functional requirement
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
S/MIME Secure/Multi-purpose Internet Mail Extensions
SMS Short Messaging Service
SPP Serial Port Profile
TOE Target of evaluation
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Triple DES Triple Data Encryption Standard
TSC TOE scope of control
TSF TOE security functionality
UID Unique identifier
USB Universal Serial Bus
WAP Wireless Application Protocol
WLAN
A type of local area network that uses high-frequency radio waves rather than
wires to communicate between nodes.
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*Check with service provider for availability, roaming arrangements and service plans. Certain features outlined in this
document require a minimum version of BlackBerry Enterprise Server software, BlackBerry Desktop Software, and/or
BlackBerry handheld software. May require additional application development. Prior to subscribing to or implementing
any third party products or services, it is your responsibility to ensure that the airtime service provider you are working with
has agreed to support all of the features of the third party products and services. Installation and use of third party
products and services with RIM's products and services may require one or more patent, trademark or copyright licenses
in order to avoid infringement of the intellectual property rights of others. You are solely responsible for determining
whether such third party licenses are required and are responsible for acquiring any such licenses. To the extent that such
intellectual property licenses may be required, RIM expressly recommends that you do not install or use these products
and services until all such applicable licenses have been acquired by you or on your behalf. Your use of third party
software shall be governed by and subject to you agreeing to the terms of separate software licenses, if any, for those
products or services. Any third party products or services that are provided with RIM's products and services are provided
"as is". RIM makes no representation, warranty or guarantee whatsoever in relation to the third party products and
services and RIM assumes no liability whatsoever in relation to the third party products and services even if RIM has been
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symbols are the exclusive properties of Research In Motion Limited. RIM, Research In Motion, 'Always On, Always
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