KyberPASS
Virtual Private Network Version 4.1.1
with Hydra 3DES (CBC mode) encryption
Security Target
Version 1.5 (Sanitised)
Final
August 2000
Prepared for:
XCP Security Systems Pty Ltd
Level 2, 541 Blackburn Road
Mt. Waverley, VIC 3149
Prepared by:
90East (Asia Pacific) Pty Ltd
7-9 Geelong St
Fyshwick, ACT 2609
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Table of Contents
CONVENTIONS AND TERMINOLOGY..............................................................................................................................4
CONVENTIONS..............................................................................................................................................................................4
TERMINOLOGY .............................................................................................................................................................................4
DOCUMENT ORGANISATION..............................................................................................................................................4
1 INTRODUCTION................................................................................................................................................................6
1.1 ST AND TOE IDENTIFICATION....................................................................................................................................6
1.2 SECURITY TARGET OVERVIEW...................................................................................................................................6
1.3 COMMON CRITERIA CONFORMANCE .........................................................................................................................7
2 TOE DESCRIPTION ..........................................................................................................................................................8
2.1 OVERVIEW OF THE KYBERPASS VPN SYSTEM ......................................................................................................8
2.2 SECURITY SERVICES...................................................................................................................................................12
2.3 APPLICATION CONTEXT .............................................................................................................................................13
3 TOE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT............................................................................................................................13
3.1 SECURE USAGE ASSUMPTIONS..................................................................................................................................13
3.2 THREATS TO SECURITY..............................................................................................................................................14
3.3 ORGANISATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES...................................................................................................................15
4 SECURITY OBJECTIVES ............................................................................................................................................16
4.1 SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE TOE......................................................................................................................16
4.2 SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE ENVIRONMENT ...................................................................................................17
5 IT SECURITY REQUIREMENTS ..............................................................................................................................18
5.1 TOE SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS......................................................................................................18
5.1.1 Security audit (FAU) ............................................................................................................................................19
5.1.2 Cryptographic support(FCS) ............................................................................................................................19
5.1.3 User data protection (FDP)................................................................................................................................21
5.1.4 Identification and authentication(FIA) ............................................................................................................26
5.1.5 Security management (FMT) ..............................................................................................................................27
5.1.6 Protection of the TOE Security Functions (FPT) ...........................................................................................29
5.2 TOE SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS........................................................................................................31
5.2.1 Configuration management (ACM) ...................................................................................................................31
5.2.2 Delivery and operation (ADO) ...........................................................................................................................31
5.2.3 Development (ADV) .............................................................................................................................................32
5.2.4 Guidance documents (AGD) ...............................................................................................................................32
5.2.5 Tests (ATE).............................................................................................................................................................33
5.3 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR THE IT ENVIRONMENT ........................................................................................34
5.4 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR THE NON-IT ENVIRONMENT ..............................................................................34
6 PP CLAIMS ........................................................................................................................................................................36
7 RATIONALE......................................................................................................................................................................37
7.1 SECURITY OBJECTIVES RATIONALE.........................................................................................................................37
7.1.1 All Assumptions, Policies and Threats Addressed..........................................................................................37
7.2 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS RATIONALE ..................................................................................................................40
7.2.1 Suitability of the Security Requirements...........................................................................................................40
7.2.2 Satisfaction of Dependencies..............................................................................................................................43
7.2.3 Strength of function claims..................................................................................................................................44
7.3 RATIONALE FOR EXTENSIONS...................................................................................................................................44
7.4 PP CLAIMS RATIONALE.............................................................................................................................................44
8 APPENDIX A - ACRONYMS .......................................................................................................................................45
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List of Tables
TABLE 1 - TOE COMPONENT IDENTIFICATION..........................................................................................................................11
TABLE 2 - TOE SECURITY FEATURES.........................................................................................................................................12
TABLE 3 - TABLE OF SECURE USAGE ASSUMPTIONS................................................................................................................13
TABLE 4 - TABLE OF THREATS ADDRESSED BY THE TOE........................................................................................................14
TABLE 5 - TABLE OF THREATS ADDRESSED BY THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT ...........................................................15
TABLE 6 - TABLE OF ORGANISATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES..................................................................................................15
TABLE 7 - SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE TOE.......................................................................................................................16
TABLE 8 - SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE ENVIRONMENT ....................................................................................................17
TABLE 9 - FUNCTIONAL COMPONENTS.......................................................................................................................................18
TABLE 10 - TOE ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS.........................................................................................................................31
TABLE 11 - ALL THREATS TO SECURITY ADDRESSED BY OBJECTIVES..................................................................................37
TABLE 12 - ALL ORGANISATIONAL POLICIES MET BY OBJECTIVES........................................................................................38
TABLE 13 - ALL SECURE USAGE ASSUMPTIONS MET BY OBJECTIVES...................................................................................38
TABLE 14 - ALL SECURITY OBJECTIVES NECESSARY...............................................................................................................39
TABLE 15 - SECURITY OBJECTIVE TO FUNCTIONAL COMPONENT MAPPING........................................................................40
TABLE 16 - MAPPING OF FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS TO SECURITY OBJECTIVES............................................................41
TABLE 17 - MAPPING OF ENVIRONMENT REQUIREMENTS TO SECURITY OBJECTIVES........................................................42
TABLE 18 - FUNCTIONAL AND ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS DEPENDENCIES......................................................................44
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Conventions and Terminology
Conventions
The notation, formatting, and conventions used in this Security Target are consistent with
those used in Version 2.1 of the Common Criteria (CC). Selected presentation choices are
discussed here to aid the Security Target reader. The CC allows several operations to be
performed on functional requirements; refinement, selection, assignment, and iteration
are defined in paragraph 2.1.4 of Part 2 of the CC.
• The assignment operation is used to assign a specific value to an unspecified
parameter, such as the length of a password. An assignment is indicated by showing
the value in square brackets [assignment_value(s)].
• The refinement operation is used to add detail to a requirement, and thus further
restricts a requirement. Refinement of security requirements is denoted by bold text.
• The selection operation is picking one or more items from a list in order to narrow the
scope of a component element. Selections are denoted by underlined italicised text.
• Iterated functional and assurance requirements are given unique identifiers by
appending to the base requirement identifier from the CC an iteration number inside
parenthesis, i.e., FMT_MTD.1.1 (1) and FMT_MTD.1.1 (2).
All operations described above are used in this Security Target. Italicised text is used for
both official document titles and text meant to be emphasised more than plain text.
Terminology
In the Common Criteria, many terms are defined in Section 2.3 of Part 1. The following
terms are a subset of those definitions. They are listed here to aid the user of the Security
Target.
User - Any entity (human user or external IT entity) outside the TOE that interacts with
the TOE.
Administrator - A role which users may be associated with to administer the security
parameters of the TOE. Such users are not subject to any access control requirements
once authenticated to the TOE and are therefore trusted to not compromise the security
policy enforced by the TOE.
Application - Any IT product or system, untrusted or trusted, outside the TOE that
interacts with the TOE.
Role - A predefined set of rules establishing the allowed interactions between a user and
the TOE.
Identity - A representation (eg a string) uniquely identifying an authorised user, that can
be either the full or abbreviated name of that user or a pseudonym.
Authentication data - Information used to verify the claimed identity of a user.
Document Organisation
Section 1 provides the introductory material for the Security Target.
Section 2 provides general purpose and TOE description.
Section 3 provides a discussion of the expected environment for the TOE. This section
also defines the set of threats that are to be addressed by either the technical
countermeasures implemented in the TOE hardware or software or through the
environmental controls.
Section 4 defines the security objectives for both the TOE and the TOE environment.
Section 5 contains the functional and assurance requirements derived from the Common
Criteria, Part 2 and 3, respectively, that must be satisfied by the TOE.
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Section 6 has been sanitised by the sponsor of the evaluation and now documents PP
conformance claims appropriate to the TOE
Section7 provides the mappings for objectives, threats, organisation security policies and
assumptions appropriate for the TOE. Next section 7 maps the security functional
requirements to the objectives and identifies dependencies.
Section 8 is a reference section that is provided to identify background material.
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1 Introduction
This introductory section presents security target (ST) identification information and an
overview of the ST structure. A brief discussion of the ST development methodology is
also provided.
1.1 ST and TOE Identification
This section provides information needed to identify and control this ST and its Target of
Evaluation (TOE). This ST targets an Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL) 1 level of
assurance.
ST Title: KyberPASS Virtual Private Network Version 4.1.1
August 2000
TOE Identification: KyberPASS Virtual Private Network Version 4.1.1
CC Version: Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Version 2.1 Final
ST Evaluation: Australasian Information Security Evaluation Program,
Defence Signals Directorate, Australian Department of
Defence
Author(s) Rod Murn
Keywords: Virtual private network, security target, encryption, public
key technology
1.2 Security Target Overview
Note for readers:The KyberPASS product is built on the client / server model and
comprises the KyberPASS Authentication Server (server) and KyberWIN (client). Where
reference is made to KyberPASS functionality, it means that the function or capability is
present in both the server and the client. Where specific reference is made to the server
(KyberPASS Authentication Server), it means that the function is present in that
component only. The same meaning applies correspondingly to the client (KyberWIN).
KyberPASS is a virtual Private Network (VPN) product that provides all the fundamental
security services that are required to allow private, controlled access to sensitive
computing resources. KyberPASS utilises industry-standard public/private key-based
strong digital signature authentication (possession of a token, knowledge of a password,
and third party public key infrastructure (PKI) authentication) for identifying and
authenticating users attempting access to the private network. KyberPASS is PKI-
enabled, connecting to any standard LDAP V3 PKI. KyberPASS supports private key
tokens that can be stored on hard disks, diskettes, PCMCIA cards, and PKCS-11
compliant smart cards and biometrics scanners.
KyberPASS provides automatic session encryption using the Hydra 3DES product in
Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode, with key exchange protected by public/private key
encryption. Session keys and the session security policy are securely exchanged between
the KyberWIN client workstation and the KyberPASS Authentication Server. The session
keys are used only once.
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KyberPASS Authentication Server checks the attributes of a user’s X.509 digital
certificate to control routing paths and check access permissions. Depending on the
definitions set in the KyberPASS Authentication Server rules table, a user may be
allowed, disallowed, or automatically routed to specific servers. KyberPASS uses MD5
Message Authentication Code hashing and digital signatures to verify and authenticate
each data packet sent during a session.
KyberPASS Authentication Server audits all connection attempts, both successful and
unsuccessful. It also records usage statistics and other relevant session information.
KyberPASS Authentication Server is integrated with the Microsoft NT Server Event
Logging and Alert Monitor such that automatic alarms and event messages can be
generated when pre-defined thresholds have been reached. KyberPASS Authentication
Server audit logs support non-repudiation. All user connections to the private network,
including Microsoft Networking SMB sessions, are logged and signed with the user’s
PKI digital signature.
KyberPASS uses an industry standard RSA Public Key Cryptography engine and
includes a simple Public Key repository on the KyberPASS Security server and a key
management system to add and revoke Public Keys. KyberPASS Authentication Server is
capable of retrieving Public Keys from any LDAP V3 X.509 directory.
1.3 Common Criteria Conformance
The TOE is conformant with Parts 2 and 3 of the CC, version 2.1.
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2 TOE Description
This section provides context for the TOE evaluation by identifying the product type and
describing the evaluated configuration.
2.1 Overview of the KyberPASS VPN System
This section presents an overview of the KyberPASS VPN version 4.1.1 to assist
potential users in determining whether it meets their needs. The KyberPASS VPN, known
as the TOE, consists of five distinct components:
• The KyberPASS Authentication Server, the inter-network security and policy
management system that controls the flow traffic between network subjects and
objects.
• The KyberWIN security client, the client system that interfaces with the security
server to authenticate and protect user communications.
• The Hydra triple-DES symmetric (CBC mode) key encryption engine to protect user
communications.
• The NT Workstation, by means of which administrators manage the security of the
KyberPASS Authentication Server.
• The Client Workstation, by means of which users establish secure sessions with
target hosts.
The KyberPASS Authentication Server is the heart of the KyberPASS product. It
authenticates users and provides a secure data encryption/decryption transport between
users and the network servers they access.
Public Key cryptography is used by the KyberPASS Security server, working with
KyberWIN on each user’s workstation, to verify a user’s identity (authentication), and to
verify that the user is permitted to access an organisation’s secure systems.
KyberPASS can also be configured to encrypt the data being transferred between a
workstation and a server to ensure privacy. In this case, a Hydra session key is created to
encrypt the data.
KyberPASS supports TCP/IP compatible communications software products, such as
terminal emulators (eg Telnet and TN3270), World Wide Web browsers (eg Netscape and
Explorer), and file transfer programs, such as FTP.
The KyberPASS Authentication Client (KyberWIN) provides transparent access to
KyberPASS. KyberWIN runs on the user’s workstation and works with KyberPASS.
When access to a server protected by KyberPASS is attempted by any of the user’s
TCP/IP communications software products, KyberWIN will communicate with the user
and with the KyberPASS Authentication Server to identify the user. The authentication
and encryption process is transparent to the user and to the communications software
products.
KyberPASS Control provides a control panel for starting and stopping all KyberPASS
Authentication Server functions. It also provides automatic control of KyberPASS for
unattended operations.
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X.500 Directory Manager is used to define and maintain the definitions for X.500
directory access. It supports access to local X.500 directories using proprietary database
software and an LDAP compliant server interface, and to remote third-party X.500
databases which are LDAP compliant. In addition, it supports the creation and
management of a number of special purpose directories for use by the KyberPASS
services and other KyberPASS products.
Configuration Manager is the management facility that allows the KyberPASS
administrator to set the addresses and control parameters that define which public key
repository the KyberPASS Authentication Server is to access, and which servers
KyberPASS is to protect.
Display Manager is the KyberPASS administrator’s tool to monitor traffic through the
KyberPASS server. The administrator’s interface is a multi-window display.
Log Viewer provides a multi-window viewing and printing service for each of the
KyberPASS activity and security audit logs.
The following is a typical sequence of events followed by KyberPASS and KyberWIN
that illustrate the process of establishing and using a secure tunnel.
1. A user attempts to connect to a server using a TCP/IP client application, eg FTP.
2. KyberPASS Authentication Server accepts the connection and sends a challenge back
to KyberWIN.
3. KyberWIN receives the challenge and prompts the user with a Windows panel to
identify himself with a password and private key.
4. KyberWIN uses the private key to digitally sign a logon request.
5. KyberWIN sends the logon request to the KyberPASS Authentication Server.
6. The KyberPASS Authentication Server searches the X.500 directories and retrieves
the user’s public key from a LDAP compliant server, validates the digital signature,
confirms access authority, and if the user is authenticated and authorised, sends a
secure session ticket to KyberWIN.
7. Now that a secure session has been set up, the user continues working with the
connection to the target server. The TCP/IP client application makes Winsock calls.
KyberWIN intercepts the Winsock calls and adds a secure session ticket.
8. If data encryption is turned on, KyberWIN also encrypts/decrypts the data content as
it passes back and forth between it and the KyberPASS Authentication Server.
9. KyberWIN passes the TCP/IP packet to Winsock, which then follows the normal
network protocols and routing to the KyberPASS Authentication Server.
10. KyberPASS Authentication Server receives the TCP/IP data packet, validates the
secure session ticket, and removes the ticket. If KyberWIN has encrypted the data
content, then the KyberPASS Authentication Server decrypts the data.
11. Using pre-defined proxy connections, it hands the “clear” TCP/IP data packet from
an inbound address to an outbound address within the KyberPASS Authentication
Server, then on to the target server.
12. Traffic from a server to a user follows the same steps, in reverse.
The following diagram demonstrates the process of a KyberWIN/KyberPASS
Authentication Server secure session:
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KyberPASS provides an IP address proxy service for servers under its protection. The
external network only sees KyberPASS’ IP addresses. Only authenticated traffic gets
through and only to IP addresses and TCP services defined in KyberPASS’ proxy
connections. A proxy connection can be defined for each TCP/IP service supported on
each protected enterprise server. A proxy includes:
1. Proxy IP In - Address (ie Network Interface Card (NIC) attached to InterNet).
2. In Address - TCP Service/Port number, (ie service to be proxied).
3. Proxy IP Out - Address (ie NIC attached to EnterpriseNet).
4. Enterprise server address.
5. Enterprise server TCP Service/Port number.
6. Authentication policies for this proxy connection.
To protect multiple servers, the administrator can use Windows NT Server to configure
several IP addresses on the inbound and outbound network access cards for each server
connection. Proxy connections can be configured for multiple services on each enterprise
server. Security policies are set for each proxy connection. An organisation defines a
security policy for each application based on their corporate security requirements.
Security policy options are:
Policies
• No authentication (pass thru)
• Logon Authentication (strong user authentication)
• Packet Authentication (data integrity plus logon authentication)
• Packet Encryption (data confidentiality, plus integrity, plus logon authentication)
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Options
• Packet Compression
Authentication policies are held centrally by the KyberPASS server and transmitted to
KyberWIN during session establishment.
The Server Workstation, an Intel Pentium-based PC with Microsoft Windows NT 4.0
operating system, provides system and security management, including management of
the audit data.
The physical scope of the TOE includes the hardware and software elements identified in
Table 1.
TOE Components Hardware/Software Elements
KyberPASS Authentication Server KyberPASS Authentication Server
KyberPASS Control
X.500 Directory Manager
Configuration Manager
Display Manager
Log Viewer
RSA Data Security Inc Bsafe library
Hydra 3DES (CBC mode) crypto primitive
KyberWIN Client Workstation` KyberWIN Client.
RSA Data Security Inc Bsafe library
Hydra 3DES (CBC mode) crypto primitive
Server Workstation
(NT Workstation)
Intel Pentium with at least 64MB RAM
PCI bus architecture
CD-ROM for installing from CD-ROM media
Hard disk drive with at least 1 GB storage
Video board and monitor capable of running SVGA
Two or more Network Access Cards
WinNT 4.0 Server – including Service Pack 4 or later
NT services used by the TOE:
• File System
• NT Security Sub-system
• Event Log Services
• NT Registry Services
Client Workstation Intel 486 – 100MHz with at least 16MB RAM
HDD with at least 1MB free disk space
Windows ’95 with Winsock 2.0 or DUN 1.3 upgrade, or
Windows ’98 or NT 4.0 with latest Service Pack
Table 1 - TOE Component Identification
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2.2 Security Services
The TOE provides the following security features:
Feature Description
Identification and Authentication The KyberPASS Authentication Server and KyberWIN client
require users and administrators to identify themselves before
they can perform any action.
System Security Management The Server workstation provides console access to the NT
operating system for security administration of KyberPASS.
The workstation also provides access to the management
functions relating to the administration of privileged accounts.
Access Control The KyberPASS Authentication Server restricts access to
protected servers to those users defined in its access control
lists.
System Architecture The KyberPASS Server maintains a security domain for its own
execution that protects it from interference and tampering by
untrusted subjects.
Security Audit The KyberPASS Authentication Server detects the occurrence
of selected events and stores information relating to those
events on the NT workstation. The NT workstation also detects
the occurrence of certain events and records the related
information.
TSF Data Import & Export KyberPASS uses public key cryptography to protect the
transfer of TSF data.
Secure Packet Transfer KyberPASS uses a combination of asymmetric (public key)
and symmetric (secret key) cryptography to protect the
interchange of user data.
Key and Credential Management The KyberPASS Authentication Server provides a limited
number of functions (add, delete) for the management of user
identity certificates.
Information Flow Control The KyberPASS Authentication Server controls the flow of IP
packets between any client and the application servers under
its control.
Associations KyberPASS provides a trusted information interchange
channel between any client and the application servers under
its control.
Table 2 - TOE Security Features
Software and hardware features outside the scope of the defined TOE Security Functions
(TSF) and thus not evaluated are:
• Cut-Through Proxies;
• The Alert Monitor
• Failover;
• Public Key pair and Certificate generation;
• Network Address Translation (NAT);
• Private-Link;
• Setup Wizard;
• TFTP Configuration Server;
• Remote Administration (Telnet interface);
• Acceptance of updates for internal data structures (e.g., routing tables) from
authorised host; and
• Windows NT 4.0 features not used by the TOE.
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2.3 Application Context
KyberPASS provides a virtual private network connection between selected, internal
applications hosts and clients on an external network. As the external network may be an
uncontrolled network such as the Internet, the KyberPASS Authentication Server must be
protected from external attacks aimed at it by an assured firewall product and competent
operational management procedures.
The KyberPASS Authentication Server workstation itself has no need to access resources
on the external network nor resources in the applications host domain it protects. In this
way, the workstation and the NT operating system and associated services can be
considered as a trusted sub-system of the TOE.
3 TOE Security Environment
In order to clarify the nature of the security problem that the TOE is intended to solve,
this section describes the following:
• Any assumptions about the security aspects of the environment and/or of the
manner in which the TOE is intended to be used.
• Any known or assumed threats to the assets against which specific protection
within the TOE or its environment is required.
• Any organisational security policy statements or rules with which the TOE must
comply.
The TOE is intended to be used in Non-National Security environments where sensitive
information up to the Protected level is processed or National Security environments
where material up to Restricted is processed.
3.1 Secure Usage Assumptions
The following assumptions relating to the operation of the TOE are made.
Name Description
A.ATTACK The TOE will be used to protect attractive IT assets and possible attackers can be
assumed to have a high level of expertise, resources and motivation.
A.PHYSICAL As the server function of the TOE sits atop an NT workstation, logical access
controls can be compromised if an attacker gets physical access to the console.
Strong physical security countermeasures will therefore be in place.
A.FIREWALL As the server function of the TOE sits atop the NT O/S, logical access controls can
be compromised if an attacker gets online access to the NT workstation. Therefore,
the server function of the TOE will be protected by an EAL-2 -assured or greater
firewall product, operated in accordance with government best practice.
A.PLATFORM The server function of the TOE depends on the NT operating system for security
management functions. The TOE Operator will operate the server function of the
TOE from an NT workstation in line with the TOE developer's recommendations, as
contained in the Administrators and Secure Usage Guides.
A.SPILLAGE The TOE provides optional encryption of packets between the server and the client.
In situations where encryption of user data is notthe default, an explicit user
judgement is required to decide whether to invoke the encryption facility when
receiving data over insecure telecommunications path.
A.NOEVIL As the security functions of the TOE can be readily compromised by authorised
administrators, it is assumed that they will have successfully completed a security
background check before being granted access to the TOE management functions
and are assumed to be non-hostile and can be trusted to do their duties correctly.
A.NO-USER-CODE The operating environment provides no user-accessible code that allows
modification of the KyberPASS security configuration by other than authorised
administrators.
Table 3 - Table of Secure Usage Assumptions
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3.2 Threats to Security
Threats may be addressed either by the TOE or by its intended environment (for example,
using personnel, physical, or administrative safeguards). These two classes of threats are
discussed separately.
Threats Addressed by the TOE
The TOE addresses the following treats.
Name Description
T.ABUSE An authorised user of the TOE (intentionally or otherwise) performing actions
that individual is authorised to perform may compromise the TOE security
function.
T.ACCESS An authorised user of the TOE, however without permission from the person
who owns or is responsible for cryptographic key material in use by the TOE,
may intentionally or otherwise access that material.
T.ATTACK An attacker (whether an insider or outsider) performing actions that bypass the
TOE security functions may gain access to the protected applications hosts
that it is meant to protect.
T.AUDIT-
CONFIDENTIALITY
An unauthorised individual or process may gain access to the records of
security-related events kept by the TOE.
T.AUDIT-CORRUPTED An unauthorised individual or process may modify or destroy the records of
security-related events kept by the TOE.
T.CAPTURE An attacker may eavesdrop on, or otherwise capture, cryptographic key
material or related user data being transferred across a network.
T.DENY A user as either originator or recipient) may participate in the transfer of
information and then deny having done so.
T.ERROR An unauthorised individual or user of the TOE may, by inducing errors in the
TOE, cause unauthorised disclosure or modification of cryptographic key
material or related user data being transferred across a network.
T.IMPERSON An attacker (an outsider or insider) may, by impersonation of an authorised
user of the TOE, gain unauthorised access to cryptographic key material or
related user data being transferred across a network.
T.INTEGRITY User, hardware or transmission errors may compromise the integrity of
information being transferred across a network.
T.MIX A subject that is not the authorised recipient may, through the inadvertant
mixing of plaintext and cyphertext on the same logical circuit, gain access to
sensitive material.
T.MODIFY An attacker may, through unauthorised modification or destruction,
compromise the integrity of cryptographic key material or related user data
being transferred across a network.
T.RECORD-EVENT The TOE may not record in the audit trail the security-relevant events affecting
the secure operation of the TOE.
T.RESOURCES System error or non-malicious user action may exhaust the shared, internal
resources of the TOE
T.TRACEABLE The TOE may not be able to provide an auditable link between a security-
relevant event and the user or system process that initiated it.
Table 4 - Table of Threats Addressed by the TOE
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Threats Addressed by the Operating Environment
The TOE Operating Environment addresses the following threats.
Name Description
TE.ADMIN-ERROR The security of the TOE may be reduced or defeated due to errors or omissions
in the administration of the security features of the TOE.
TE.ENTRY-NON-
TECHNICAL
An individual, either internally or externally, using non-technical means may gain
access to cryptographic key material or related user data being transferred
across a network.
TE.INSTALL The TOE may be delivered or installed in a manner that undermines security.
TE.OPERATE Improper operation of the TOE may cause a failure of the TOE security function.
Table 5 - Table of Threats Addressed by the Operational Environment
3.3 Organisational Security Policies
The table following describes the organisational security policies relevant to the operation
of the TOE.
Name Description
P.AUDIT Details of user activity will be recorded in an audit trail that must be preserved in
line with relevant organisational archive requirements.
P.CRYPTO All cryptographically-relevant material is to be the subject of rigorous levels of
physical and technical control as defined in ACSI 57.
P.NETWORK The organisation's IT security policy will be maintained in the environment of
distributed systems interconnected via insecure networking.
P.INFO-FLOW The flow of information between IT components in a client-server architecture
utilising insecure networks must be controlled and protected from disclosure.
P.USER-DUE-CARE Users who have been issued authenticators that facilitate usage of IT systems
will ensure that those authenticators are appropriately protected.
Table 6 - Table of Organisational Security Policies
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4 Security Objectives
The security objectives are a concise statement of the intended response to the security
problem. These objectives indicate, at a high level, how the security problem, as
characterised in the "Security Environment" section of the ST, is to be addressed. Just as
some threats are to be addressed by the TOE and others by its intended environment, so
some security objectives are for the TOE and others are for its environment. These two
classes of security objectives are discussed separately.
4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE
The security objectives for the TOE are as described in the following table.
Name Description
O.I&A The TOE must uniquely identify all users, and must authenticate the claimed
identity before granting a user access to the TOE facilities.
O.DAC The TOE must provide its operator with the means of controlling and limiting
access to the objects and resources it owns or is responsible for.
O.AUDIT The TOE must provide the means for recording security-relevant events in
sufficient detail to help an administrator of the TOE to:
(a) Detect attempted security violations; and
(b) Hold individual users accountable for any actions they perform that are
relevant to the security of the TOE.
O.ADMIN The TOE, in conjunction with the underlying operating system where necessary,
must provide functions to enable an authorised administrator to effectively
manage the TOE and its security functions, and ensuring that only authorised
administrators can access such functionality.
O.INTEGRITY The TOE must provide the means for detecting loss of integrity of TSF data.
O.BYPASS The TOE must prevent users or processes from bypassing or circumventing TOE
security policy enforcement.
O.MESSAGE-INTEGRITY The TOE must provide a means of detecting the loss of integrity of messages
transferred between users across the telecommunications network.
O.DATA-
CONFIDENTIALITY
The TOE must provide the means of protecting the confidentiality of user
information when it is transferred across an insecure telecommunications
network.
O.INFO-FLOW The TOE must ensure that any information flow control policies are enforced -
(1) between TOE components and (2) at the TOE external interfaces.
O.KEY-CONFIDENTIALITY The TOE must provide the means of protecting the confidentiality of
cryptographic keys when they are transferred across an insecure
telecommunications network and when kept in short and long-term storage.
O.NETWORK The TOE must be able to meet its security objectives in a distributed
environment. This may be either as a distributed TOE and as a TOE networked
with other IT resources.
O.NOREPUD The TOE must provide a means for generating evidence that can be used to
prevent an originator of data from successfully denying ever having sent that
data, and evidence that can be used to prevent a recipient of data from
successfully denying ever having received that data.
O.RBAC The TOE must prevent users from gaining access to and performing operations
on its resources for which their role is not explicitly authorised.
O.SEPARATION The TOE must provide a security domain for its own execution that protects it
from compromise by unauthorised subjects.
O.RESOURCES The TOE must protect itself from user or system errors that result in shared
resource exhaustion.
Table 7 - Security Objectives for the TOE
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4.2 Security Objectives for the Environment
The security objectives for the TOE environment are those specified in the table below.
Name Description
OE.INSTALL Those responsible for the operation of the TOE must ensure that:
(a) The TOE is delivered, installed and operated in a manner that preserves
IT security.
(b) The underlying operating system and / or network services are installed
and operated in accordance with the operational documentation for the
relevant products.
OE.PHYSICAL Those responsible for the operation of the TOE must ensure that those parts of
the TOE that are critical to security policy enforcement are protected from
physical attack that might compromise TOE security functions.
OE.FIREWALL Those responsible for the operation of the TOE must ensure that the TOE is
protected from network-based attacks that might compromise TOE security
functions.
OE.CRYPTOMANAGE Those responsible for the TOE must ensure that procedures and / or
mechanisms are in place to ensure that storage and handling of cryptographic-
related IT assets is conducted in accordance with the rules defined by the
P.CRYPTO policy.
OE.TRUST Those responsible for the TOE must ensure that only highly trusted users are
given privileges that enable them to:
(a) Set or alter the audit trail configuration.
(b) Create or modify user roles.
(c) Load or modify crypto-variables.
OE.ENTRY-NON-
TECHNICAL
The TOE environment must provide sufficient protection against non-technical
attacks, such as social engineering attacks.
OE.TRAINING Those responsible for the TOE must ensure that all personnel given
administrator privileges or who are to perform crypto-custodian duties are given
training sufficient to enable them to fulfill their duties securely.
OE.SPILLAGE TOE administrators must ensure that the system is configured to encrypt user
connections as the default. If for operational reasons 'no-encryption' is required
as the default operating mode, the TOE administrators must ensure that users
are aware of this fact and do not send or request any sensitive material.
OE.NO-USER-CODE TOE administrators must ensure that the TOE environment is such that there
are no user-accessible code that could be used to bypass TOE security
functions.
OE.PLATFORM TOE administrators must ensure that they follow the developer's instructions and
use the NT User Manager to establish the proper environment for controlling the
configuration of the TOE.
Table 8 - Security Objectives for the Environment
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5 IT Security Requirements
5.1 TOE Security Functional Requirements
This section contains the functional requirements for the TOE. The functional
requirements are listed in summary form in Table 9, below.
No. Component Component Name
Class FAU: Audit
1 FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
2 FAU_GEN.2 User identity association
3 FAU_STG.2 Guarantees of Audit Availability
Class FCS: Cryptographic Support
4 FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation
5 FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution
6 FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
7 FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation
Class FDP: User Data Protection
8 FDP_ACC.2 Complete access control
9 FDP_ACF.1 Security Attribute Access control
10 FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control
11 FDP_IFF.1 Simple security attributes
12 FDP_ITC.1 Import of User Data Without Security Attributes
13 FDP_ITT.1 Basic internal transfer protection
14 FDP_ITT.3 Integrity monitoring
Class FIA: Identification and Authentication
15 FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition
16 FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
17 FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
18 FIA_UAU.6 Re-authenticating
Class FMT: Security Management
19 FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
20 FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
21 FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation
22 FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF data
23 FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Class FPT: Protection of the TOE Security Functions
24 FPT_ITT.2 TSF data transfer separation
25 FPT_ITT.3 TSF data integrity monitoring
26 FPT_RVM.1 Non-bypassability of the TSP
27 FPT_SEP.2 SFP domain separation
28 FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps
Table 9 - Functional Components
The following sections contain the functional components from the Common Criteria
(CC) Part 2 with the operations completed. The standard CC text is in regular font; the
text inserted by the Security Target (ST) author is in italic font enclosed in brackets.
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5.1.1 Security audit (FAU)
Audit data generation (FAU_GEN.1)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FAU_GEN.1.1 The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the following auditable events:
a) Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions;
b) All auditable events for the detailed level of audit; and
c) All auditable events as described in the [SA-1 security function].
FAU_GEN.1.2 The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the following information:
a) Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity, and the
outcome (success or failure) of the event; and
b) For each audit event type, based on the auditable event definitions of the
functional components included in the ST, [SA-1 security function].
Dependencies: FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps
User identity association (FAU_GEN.2)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FAU_GEN.2.1 The TSF shall be able to associate each auditable event with the identity of the user that
caused the event.
Dependencies FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
Guarantees of audit data availability (FAU_STG.2)
Hierarchical FAU_STG.1
FAU_STG.2.1 The TSF shall protect the stored audit records from unauthorised deletion.
FAU_STG.2.2 The TSF shall be able to prevent modifications to the audit records.
FAU_STG.2.3 The TSF shall ensure that [all recorded] audit records will be maintained when the
following conditions occur: audit storage exhaustion.
Dependencies FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
5.1.2 Cryptographic support (FCS)
Cryptographic key generation (FCS_CKM.1)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS_CKM.1.1 The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic
key generation algorithm [Triple DES (3DES)] and specified cryptographic key sizes
[168] that meet the following: [requirements for cryptographic key generation, as defined
by the national COMSEC authority, DSD].
Dependencies FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
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Cryptographic key distribution (FCS_CKM.2)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS_CKM.2.1 The TSF shall distribute cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic
key distribution method [Diffie-Hellman] that meets the following: [PKCS#3; and
requirements for cryptographic key distribution as defined by the national COMSEC
authority, DSD].
Dependencies FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
Cryptographic key destruction (FCS_CKM.4)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS_CKM.4.1 The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic
key destruction method [overwrite] that meets the following: [requirements for
cryptographic key destruction as defined by the national COMSEC authority, DSD].
Dependencies FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform [
a) cryptographic key generation;
b) data encryption and decryption;
c) cryptographic key encryption and decryption;
d) digital signature verification;
e) secure hash;
f) cryptographic key agreement]
in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [
a) triple DES (3DES);
b) triple DES (3DES);
c) RSA;
d) RSA;
e) MD5;
f) Diffie-Hellman]
and cryptographic key sizes [
a) 168;
b) 168;
c) 1024,
d) 1024;
e) N/A;
f) 512]
.that meet the following: [requirements for cryptographic key management (generation,
distribution & destruction) as defined by the national COMSEC authority, DSD and as re-
iterated in the TOE Usage Notes].
Dependencies FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
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5.1.3 User data protection (FDP)
Complete access control (1) (FDP_ACC.2 (1))
Hierarchical to: FDP_ACC.1
FDP_ACC.2.1 (1) The TSF shall enforce the [Access Control (Proxy) SFP] on [
a) Subject: application client;
b) object: protected host applications data;
c) operation: access.]
and all operations among subjects and objects covered by the SFP.
FDP_ACC.2.2 (1) The TSF shall ensure that all operations between any subject in the TSC and any object
within the TSC are covered by an access control SFP.
Dependencies FDP_ACF.1 (1) Security attribute based access control
Complete access control (2) (FDP_ACC.2 (2))
Hierarchical to: FDP_ACC.1
FDP_ACC.2.1 (2) The TSF shall enforce the [Access Control (Client) SFP] on [
a) subject: client application user;
b) object: user's private key;
c) operation: access]
and all operations among subjects and objects covered by the SFP.
FDP_ACC.2.2 (2) The TSF shall ensure that all operations between any subject in the TSC and any object
within the TSC are covered by an access control SFP.
Dependencies FDP_ACF.1 (2) Security attribute based access control
Complete access control (3) (FDP_ACC.2 (3))
Hierarchical to: FDP_ACC.1
FDP_ACC.2.1 (3) The TSF shall enforce the [System Security Management SFP] on [
a) subject: authorised administrators
b) object: proxy configuration data, audit file data, X.500 directory data
c) operation: access and change]
and all operations among subjects and objects covered by the SFP.
FDP_ACC.2.2 (3) The TSF shall ensure that all operations between any subject in the TSC and any object
within the TSC are covered by an access control SFP.
Dependencies FDP_ACF.1 (3) Security attribute based access control
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Security attribute based access control (1) (FDP_ACF.1 (1))
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FDP_ACF.1.1 (1) The TSF shall enforce the [Access Control (Proxy) SFP] to target application hosts
based on [
a) source IP address;
b) user X.509 certificate attributes;
c) time of day].
FDP_ACF.1.2 (1) The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled
subjects and controlled objects is allowed: [
1. Deny all access to protected applications hosts unless the requesting user's
security attributes match those as defined for the requested proxy (host / service
combination) and that access, based on such a match, is allowed.]
FDP_ACF.1.3 (1) The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the following
additional rules: [none].
FDP_ACF.1.4 (1) The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the rules: [none].
Dependencies FDP_ACC.2 (1) Complete access control (hierarchical to FDP_ACC.1)
FMT_MSA.3 (1) Static attribute initialisation
ITENV.1
ITENV.2
Security attribute based access control (2) (FDP_ACF.1 (2))
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FDP_ACF.1.1 (2) The TSF shall enforce the [Access Control (Client) SFP] on the user private keybased
on [user identity].
FDP_ACF.1.2 (2) The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled
subjects and controlled objects is allowed: [
1. Deny all access to the container holding the user private key unless the user can
provide the correct password.]
FDP_ACF.1.3 (2) The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the following
additional rules: [none].
FDP_ACF.1.4 (2) The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the rules: [none]
Dependencies FDP_ACC.2 (2) Complete access control (hierarchical to FDP_ACC.1)
ITENV.1
ITENV.2
Security attribute based access control (3) (FDP_ACF.1 (3))
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FDP_ACF.1.1 (3) The TSF shall enforce the [System Security Management SFP] on the [
a) proxy configuration data,
b) audit file data,
c) X.500 directory data]
based on [administrator identity].
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FDP_ACF.1.2 (3) The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled
subjects and controlled objects is allowed: [
1. Deny all access to the proxy configuration data, audit file data, X.500 directory
data unless the administrator can provide the correct password
2. Deny all change to the proxy configuration data and X.500 directory definition
data unless the administrator can provide the correct password.]
FDP_ACF.1.3 (3) The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the following
additional rules: [none].
FDP_ACF.1.4 (3) The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the rules: [none].
Dependencies FDP_ACC.2 (3) Complete access control (hierarchical to FDP_ACC.1)
FMT_MSA.3 (1) Static attribute initialisation
ITENV.1
ITENV.2
Subset information flow control (1) (FDP_IFC.1 (1))
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FDP_IFC.1.1 (1) The TSF shall enforce the [Information Flow Control SFP] on [
a) Subject: KyberPASS-protected applications host;
b) object: IP packets;
c) operation: release from subject to user client application]
Dependencies FDP_IFF.1 (1) Simple security attributes
ITENV.2
Subset information flow control (2) (FDP_IFC.1 (2))
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FDP_IFC.1.1 (2) The TSF shall enforce the [TSF Data Import and Export SFP] on [
a) subject: KyberPASS Authentication server;
b) object: proxy session key;
c) operation: transfer to the KyberWIN client]
Dependencies FDP_IFF.1 (2) Simple security attributes
ITENV.2
Subset information flow control (3) (FDP_IFC.1 (3))
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FDP_IFC.1.1 (3) The TSF shall enforce the [Secure Packet Transfer SFP] on [
a) subjects: KyberPASS Authentication server and client application;
b) object: data packets;
c) operation: protection from disclosure or change].
Dependencies FDP_IFF.1 (3) Simple security attributes
ITENV.2
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Simple security attributes (1) (FDP_IFF.1 (1))
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FDP_IFF.1.1 (1) The TSF shall enforce the [Information Flow Control SFP] based on the following types
of subject and information security attributes: [
a) IP address of the connection requestor;
b) IP address of the target host;
c) type of service requested;
d) proxy allowed]
FDP_IFF.1.2 (1) The TSF shall permit an information flow between a controlled subject and controlled
information via a controlled operation if the following rules hold: [
If proxy (secure connection between requestor and target host) established, release the IP
packet.]
FDP_IFF.1.3 (1) The TSF shall enforce [no additional information flow control SFP rules].
FDP_IFF.1.4 (1) The TSF shall provide [no additional information flow control SFP capabilities].
FDP_IFF.1.5 (1) The TSF shall explicitly authorise an information flow based on the following rules:[no
additional rules].
FDP_IFF.1.6 (1) The TSF shall explicitly deny an information flow based on the following rules: [none].
Dependencies FDP_IFC.1 (1) Subset information flow control
FMT_MSA.3 (1) Static attribute initialisation
FMT_MSA.3 (2) Static attribute initialisation
ITENV.1
ITENV.2
Simple security attributes (2) (FDP_IFF.1 (2))
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FDP_IFF.1.1 (2) The TSF shall enforce the [TSF Data Import and Export SFP] based on [
a) the private authentication key belonging to the KyberPASS
Authentication server
b) the private authentication key belonging to the KyberWIN client]
FDP_IFF.1.2 (2) The TSF shall permit an information flow between a controlled subject and controlled
information via a controlled operation if the following rules hold: [
1. If the private authentication keys of the KyberWIN client and the KyberPASS
Authentication server successfully exchanged, generate and exchange the Hydra
session key using the Diffie-Hellman mechanism. ]
FDP_IFF.1.3 (2) The TSF shall enforce [no additional information flow control SFP rules].
FDP_IFF.1.4 (2) The TSF shall provide [no additional information flow control SFP capabilities].
FDP_IFF.1.5 (2) The TSF shall explicitly authorise an information flow based on the following rules:[no
additional rules].
FDP_IFF.1.6 (2) The TSF shall explicitly deny an information flow based on the following rules: [none].
Dependencies FDP_IFC.1 (2) Subset information flow control
FMT_MSA.3 (1) Static attribute initialisation
FMT_MSA.3 (2) Static attribute initialisation
ITENV.1
ITENV.2
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Simple security attributes (3) (FDP_IFF.1 (3))
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FDP_IFF.1.1 (3) The TSF shall enforce the [Secure Packet Transfer SFP] based on [the proxy
establishment connection rules].
FDP_IFF.1.2 (3) The TSF shall permit an information flow between a controlled subject and controlled
information via a controlled operation if the following rules hold: [
1. If the KyberPASS Authentication server connection rules specify packet
encryption, encrypt all packets with the Hydra session key.
2. If the KyberPASS Authentication server connection rules specify packet integrity,
generate an MD5 digest for all packets exchanged and ensure that each packet is
verified by its recipient, through reference to the digest.]
FDP_IFF.1.3 (3) The TSF shall enforce [no additional information flow control SFP rules].
FDP_IFF.1.4 (3) The TSF shall provide [no additional information flow control SFP capabilities].
FDP_IFF.1.5 (3) The TSF shall explicitly authorise an information flow based on the following rules:[no
additional rules].
FDP_IFF.1.6 (3) The TSF shall explicitly deny an information flow based on the following rules: [none].
Dependencies FDP_IFC.1 (3) Subset information flow control
FMT_MSA.3 (1) Static attribute initialisation
ITENV.1
ITENV.2
Import of user data without security attributes (FDP_ITC.1)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FDP_ITC.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [TSF Data Import & Export SFP] when importing user data,
controlled under the SFP, from outside of the TSC.
FDP_ITC.1.2 The TSF shall ignore any security attributes associated with the user data when imported
from outside the TSC.
FDP_ITC.1.3 The TSF shall enforce the following rules when importing user data controlled under the
SFP from outside the TSC:[None].
Dependencies FDP_IFC.1 (2) Subset information flow control
FMT_MSA.3 (2) Static attribute initialisation
Basic internal transfer protection (FDP_ITT.1)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FDP_ITT.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [Secure Packet Transfer SFP] to prevent the disclosure of user
data when it is transmitted between physically-separated parts of the TOE.
Dependencies FDP_IFC.1 (3) Subset information flow control
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Integrity monitoring (FDP_ITT.3)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FDP_ITT.3.1 The TSF shall enforce the [Secure Packet Transfer SFP] to monitor user data transmitted
between physically-separated parts of the TOE for the following errors: [integrity errors].
FDP_ITT.3.2 Upon detection of a data integrity error, the TSF shall [request re-transmission of the
packet].
Dependencies FDP_IFC.1 (3) Subset information flow control
FDP_ITT.1 Basic internal transfer protection
5.1.4 Identification and authentication (FIA)
User attribute definition (FIA_ATD.1)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FIA_ATD.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the following list of security attributes belonging to individual
users: [
a) X509 identity certificate;
b) User private cryptographic key;
c) User private key initiator password].
Dependencies No dependencies
Timing of authentication (FIA_UAU.1)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FIA_UAU.1.1 The TSF shall allow [
1. A user to attempt to connect to a target application serverusing a TCP/IP
service.
2. The KyberPASS security server to accept the connection request and send a
challenge back to the user.
3. KyberWIN to intercept the challenge and to prompt the user to identify and
authenticate himself with a private key and password.
4. KyberWIN to use the private key to digitally sign a logon request and send it to
the KyberPASS security server.
5. KyberPASS security server to search its X.500 directory and retrieve the user's
public key, to validate the digital signature, confirm the user's access authority
and to send a secure session ticket to KyberWIN]
On behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated to the protected
server.
FIA_UAU.1.2 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing any
other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
Dependencies FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
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Re-authenticating (FIA_UAU.6)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FIA_UAU.6.1 The TSF shall re-authenticate the user under the conditions[
1. 'logon renewal' - if the connection time exceeds the maximum time permitted
since the user was last formally authenticated.
2. Logoff after inactivity period - if there has been no mouse or keyboard activity for
a specified period of time].
Dependencies No dependencies
Timing of identification (FIA_UID.1)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FIA_UID.1.1 The TSF shall allow [
1. A user to attempt to connect to a protected server using a TCP/IP service.
2. The KyberPASS security server to accept the connection request and send a
challenge back to the user.
3. KyberWIN to intercept the challenge and to prompt the user to identify himself
with a private key and password.]
on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified.
FIA_UID.1.2 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any other
TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
Dependencies No dependencies
5.1.5 Security management (FMT)
Management of security attributes (1) (FMT_MSA.1 (1))
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_MSA.1.1 (1) The TSF shall enforce the [Access Control (Proxy) SFP ] to restrict the ability to modify
[add, change or delete] the security attributes [Subject KyberPASS Authentication Server
proxy attributes]
to [authorised system administrators].
Dependencies FDP_ACC.1 (1) Subset access control
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
ITENV.1
ITENV.2
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Management of security attributes (2) (FMT_MSA.1 (2))
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_MSA.1.1 (2) The TSF shall enforce the [System Security Management SFP] to restrict the ability to
modify [add, change or delete] the security attributes [
a) User attributes: (X.509 certificate);
b) Subject (KyberPASS Authentication Server) attributes: (those required to
define the information flows]
to [authorised system administrators].
Dependencies FDP_ACC.1 (3) Subset access control
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
ITENV.1
ITENV.2
Secure security attributes (FMT_MSA.2)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_MSA.2.1 The TSF shall ensure that only secure values are accepted for security attributes.
Dependencies ADV_SPM.1 Informal TOE security policy model
FDP_ACC.1 (1) Subset access control
FMT_MSA.1 (1) Management of security attributes
FMT_MSA.1 (2) Management of security attributes
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Static attribute initialisation (1) (FMT_MSA.3 (1))
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_MSA.3.1 (1) The TSF shall enforce the [Access Control (Proxy) SFP] to provide restrictive default
values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.
FMT_MSA.3.2 (1) The TSF shall allow the [authorised administrator] to specify alternative initial values to
override the default values when an object or information is created.
Dependencies FMT_MSA.1 (1) Management of security attributes
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Static attribute initialisation (2) (FMT_MSA.3 (2))
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_MSA.3.1 (2) The TSF shall enforce the [Information Flow Control SFP] to provide restrictive default
values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.
FMT_MSA.3.2 (2) The TSF shall allow the [authorised administrator] to specify alternative initial values to
override the default values when an object or information is created.
Dependencies FMT_MSA.1 (2) Management of security attributes
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
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Management of TSF data (1) (FMT_MTD.1 (1))
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_MTD.1.1 (1) The TSF shall restrict the ability to modify [change] the [
a) system configuration
b) TOE security attributes]
to [authorised administrators].
Dependencies FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
ITENV.1
ITENV.2
Management of TSF data (2) (FMT_MTD.1 (2))
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_MTD.1.1 (2) The TSF shall restrict the ability to modify [change] the [user private key initiator
(password)] to [authorised users].
Dependencies FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
ITENV.1
ITENV.2
Security roles (FMT_SMR.1)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_SMR.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the roles [administrator and user].
FMT_SMR.1.2 The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
Dependencies FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
5.1.6 Protection of the TOE Security Functions (FPT)
TSF data transfer separation (FPT_ITT.2)
Hierarchical to: FPT_ITT.1
FPT_ITT.2.1 The TSF shall protect TSF data from disclosure, when it is transmitted between separate
parts of the TOE.
FPT_ITT.2.2 The TSF shall separate user data from TSF data when such data is transmitted
between separate parts of the TOE.
Dependencies No dependencies
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TSF data integrity monitoring (FPT_ITT.3)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FPT_ITT.3.1 The TSF shall be able to detect [modification of data] for TSF data transmitted between
separate parts of the TOE.
FPT_ITT.3.2 Upon detection of a data integrity error, the TSF shall take the following actions: [
a) Resend
b) Session termination.]
Dependencies FPT_ITT.1 Basic internal TSF data transfer protection
Non-bypassability of the TSP (FPT_RVM.1)
Hierarchical to: No other components
FPT_RVM.1.1 The TSF shall ensure that TSP enforcement functions are invoked and succeed
before each function within the TSC is allowed to proceed.
Dependencies No dependencies
SFP domain separation (FPT_SEP.2)
Hierarchical to: FPT_SEP.1
FPT_SEP.2.1 The unisolated portion of the TSF shall maintain a security domain for its own execution
that protects it from interference and tampering by untrusted subjects.
Note: The TSF shall maintain its own security domain for the protection of: [the
Authentication Server's private key and the temporary cryptographic keys established for
a proxy, ie the Hydra session key and the secure session ticket.]
FPT_SEP.2.2 The TSF shall enforce separation between the security domains of subjects in the TSC.
FPT_SEP.2.3 The TSF shall maintain the part of the TSF related to the [Access Control SFP and the
Information Flow SFP] in a security domain for their own execution that protects them
from interference and tampering by the remainder of the TSF and by subjects untrusted
with respect to those SFPs.
Dependencies No dependencies
Reliable time stamps (FPT_STM.1)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FPT_STM.1.1 The TSF shall be able to provide reliable time stamps for its own use.
Dependencies No dependencies
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5.2 TOE Security Assurance Requirements
This section contains the assurance requirements for the TOE. The assurance
requirements are listed in summary form in Table 10, below.
No. Component Component Name
Class ACM: Configuration management
1 ACM_CAP.1 CM capabilities
Class ADV: Development
2 ADV_RCR.1 Representation correspondence
3 ADV_FSP.1 Functional specification
Class ADO: Delivery and operation
4 ADO_IGS.1 Installation, generation and start-up
Class ATE: Tests
5 ATE_IND.1 Independent testing
Class AGD: Guidance documents
6 AGD_ADM.1 Administrator guidance
7 AGD_USR.1 User guidance
Table 10 - TOE Assurance Requirements
5.2.1 Configuration management (ACM)
Version numbers (ACM_CAP.1)
ACM_CAP.1.1C The reference for the TOE shall be unique to each version of the TOE.
ACM_CAP.1.1D The developer shall provide a reference for the TOE.
ACM_CAP.1.2C The TOE shall be labeled with its reference.
5.2.2 Delivery and operation (ADO)
Installation, generation, and start-up procedures (ADO_IGS.1)
ADO_IGS.1.1C The documentation shall describe the steps necessary for secure installation, generation,
and start-up of the TOE.
ADO_IGS.1.1D The developer shall document procedures necessary for the secure installation, generation,
and start-up of the TOE.
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5.2.3 Development (ADV)
Informal functional specification (ADV_FSP.1)
ADV_FSP.1.1C The functional specification shall describe the TSF and its external interfaces using an
informal style.
ADV_FSP.1.1D The developer shall provide a functional specification.
ADV_FSP.1.2C The functional specification shall be internally consistent.
ADV_FSP.1.3C The functional specification shall describe the purpose and method of use of all external
TSF interfaces, providing details of effects, exceptions and error messages, as appropriate.
ADV_FSP.1.4C The functional specification shall completely represent the TSF.
Informal correspondence demonstration (ADV_RCR.1)
ADV_RCR.1.1C For each adjacent pair of provided TSF representations, the analysis shall demonstrate
that all relevant security functionality of the more abstract TSF representation is correctly
and completely refined in the less abstract TSF representation.
ADV_RCR.1.1D The developer shall provide an analysis of correspondence between all adjacent pairs of
TSF representations that are provided.
5.2.4 Guidance documents (AGD)
Administrator guidance (AGD_ADM.1)
AGD_ADM.1.1C The administrator guidance shall describe the administrative functions and interfaces
available to the administrator of the TOE.
AGD_ADM.1.1D The developer shall provide administrator guidance addressed to system administrative
personnel.
AGD_ADM.1.2C The administrator guidance shall describe how to administer the TOE in a secure manner.
AGD_ADM.1.3C The administrator guidance shall contain warnings about functions and privileges that
should be controlled in a secure processing environment.
AGD_ADM.1.4C The administrator guidance shall describe all assumptions regarding user behaviour that
are relevant to secure operation of the TOE.
AGD_ADM.1.5C The administrator guidance shall describe all security parameters under the control of the
administrator, indicating secure values as appropriate.
AGD_ADM.1.6C The administrator guidance shall describe each type of security-relevant event relative to
the administrative functions that need to be performed, including changing the security
characteristics of entities under the control of the TSF.
AGD_ADM.1.7C The administrator guidance shall be consistent with all other documentation supplied for
evaluation.
AGD_ADM.1.8C The administrator guidance shall describe all security requirements for the IT
environment that are relevant to the administrator.
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User guidance (AGD_USR.1)
AGD_USR.1.1C The user guidance shall describe the functions and interfaces available to the non-
administrative users of the TOE.
AGD_USR.1.1D The developer shall provide user guidance.
AGD_USR.1.2C The user guidance shall describe the use of user-accessible security functions provided by
the TOE.
AGD_USR.1.3C The user guidance shall contain warnings about user-accessible functions and privileges
that should be controlled in a secure processing environment.
AGD_USR.1.4C The user guidance shall clearly present all user responsibilities necessary for secure
operation of the TOE, including those related to assumptions regarding user behaviour
found in the statement of TOE security environment.
AGD_USR.1.5C The user guidance shall be consistent with all other documentation supplied for
evaluation.
AGD_USR.1.6C The user guidance shall describe all security requirements for the IT environment that are
relevant to the user.
5.2.5 Tests (ATE)
Independent testing - conformance (ATE_IND.1)
ATE_IND.1.1C The TOE shall be suitable for testing.
ATE_IND.1.1D The developer shall provide the TOE for testing.
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5.3 Security Requirements for the IT Environment
The TOE has the following security requirements allocated to its IT and Non-IT
environment.
ITENV.1 KyberPASS Configuration Manager for Setting User Attributes
KyberPASS relies on the Configuration Manager to configure the system by setting
user attributes. Configuration Manager relies, in turn, on the Windows NT operating
system to provide this capability. The KyberPASS Administrator Guide suggests the
creation of two NT accounts (administrator and a local operator) through the User
Manager mechanism of the NT Security Subsystem.
ITENV.2 KyberPASS Configuration Manager for Modifying TSF Data
KyberPASS relies on the Configuration Manager to protect the system by establishing
the TSF data and controlling changes to it. Configuration Manager relies, in turn, on
the Windows NT operating system to provide this capability via the NT Security
Subsystem.
5.4 Security Requirements for the Non-IT Environment
NONITENV.1 KyberPASS Server protected by Firewall.
The KyberPASS Server must be protected from unauthorised modification by
potentially hostile outsiders by a firewall of at least EAL-2 level of assurance, or
equivalent.
NONITENV.2 KyberPASS Server is to be Physically Protected.
The KyberPASS Server must be located within a controlled access facility that will
prevent unauthorised physical access.
NONITENV.3 Access to the KyberPASS Server is restricted to administrators only.
The KyberPASS Server and associated directly-attached console must be physically
secure and available to authorised administrators only.
NONITENV.4 Protection against non-technical attacks.
The TOE environment must provide sufficient protection against non-technical attacks,
such as social-engineering attacks.
NONITENV.5 Protection against spillage of sensitive data.
The TOE environment must provide the ability to warn users that session encryption
has been defaulted to 'off' and to use their judgement over what material is to be sent
over the communications line.
NONITENV.6 KyberPASS Server administrators are trusted.
The TOE environment must provide a mechanism that ensures that the likelihood of
administration staff perform illegal actions is minimised.
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NONITENV.7 KyberPASS Server has no user-accessible code.
The TOE environment must ensure that at any time no user-accessible code that may
modify TOE security functions exists on the KyberPASS Server.
NONITENV.8 KyberPASS Server is installed and configured according to developer
guidance.
The KyberPASS Server must be installed and configured in line with the developer's
guidance and administrators must ensure that the configuration remains in step with
developer's ongoing guidance.
NONITENV.9 Protection against unauthorised access to / loss of cryptographic keys.
The TOE environment must ensure that at all times cryptographic keys are protected
against unauthorised access, loss or destruction.
NONITENV.10 KyberPASS Server administrators are well-trained.
The TOE environment must ensure that administrators are trained and motivated to
make the right choices when providing administrative support to the TOE.
NONITENV.11 Cryptographic Services Strength of Function (SOF) Requirement
KyberPASS relies on a GATEKEEPER-compliant CA product to meet the SOF
requirement for the public / private key cryptographic services that it uses.
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6 PP Claims
The KyberPASS with Hydra 3DES encryption Security Target was not written to address
any existing Protection Profile.
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7 Rationale
7.1 Security Objectives Rationale
The purpose of this rationale is to demonstrate that the identified security objectives are
suitable, that is they are sufficient to address the security needs, and that they are
necessary, ie, there are no redundant security objectives.
7.1.1 All Assumptions, Policies and Threats Addressed
The need to demonstrate that there are no redundant security objectives is satisfied as
follows:
• The first section (tables 11-13) shows that all of the secure usage assumptions,
organisational security policies, and threats to security have been addressed.
• The second section shows that each IT security objective and each Non-IT security
objective counters at least one assumption, policy, or threat.
Threat Label Threat Short Description Associated Security
Objective
T.ABUSE Abuse of privilege O.AUDIT
O.DAC
OE.TRUST
T.ACCESS Unauthorised access to the TOE O.SEPARATION
O.DAC
O.RBAC
OE.CRYPTOMANAGE
T.ATTACK Unauthorised action. O.DAC
O.BYPASS
O.I&A
OE.PHYSICAL
OE.FIREWALL
OE.NO-USER-CODE
T.AUDIT-CONFIDENTIALITY Disclosure of audit record. O.RBAC
T.AUDIT-CORRUPTED Unauthorised modification of audit records. O.INTEGRITY
T.CAPTURE Eavesdrop on information transfer. O.DATA-CONFIDENTIALITY
O.KEY-CONFIDENTIALITY
OE.SPILLAGE
OE.CRYPTOMANAGE
T.DENY Repudiation of information transfer. O.AUDIT
O.NOREPUD
T.ERROR Unauthorised disclosure. O.SEPARATION
OE.CRYPTOMANAGE
T.IMPERSON Impersonation of an authorised user. O.I&A
OE.CRYPTOMANAGE
T.INTEGRITY Compromise of information integrity O.MESSAGE-INTEGRITY
T.MIX Mixing of plaintext and cyphertext. O.DATA-CONFIDENTIALITY
O.INFO-FLOW
T.MODIFY Unauthorised information modification or
destruction
O.INTEGRITY
O.ADMIN
T.RECORD-EVENT Security-relevant events may not be recorded. O.AUDIT
T.RESOURCES Exhaustion of internal system resources. O.RESOURCES
T.TRACEABLE Security-relevant events may not be traceable. O.AUDIT
TE.ADMIN-ERROR Compromise due to administration errors and
omissions.
OE.TRAINING
TE.ENTRY-NON-TECHNICAL Compromise through non-technical means. OE.ENTRY-NON-TECHNICAL
TE.INSTALL Incorrect delivery or installation. OE.TRAINING
OE.INSTALL
TE.OPERATE Compromise due to improper operation OE.TRAINING
OE.PLATFORM
Table 11 - All Threats to Security Addressed by Objectives
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Policy Label Policy Short Description Associated Security Objective
P.AUDIT IT usage must be recorded and preserved. O.AUDIT
P.CRYPTO Cryptographic material must be subject to
rigorous control.
O.KEY-CONFIDENTIALITY
O.ADMIN
P.NETWORK IT security policy must be maintained in a
distributed environment.
O.NETWORK
P.INFO-FLOW Information flow controlled and protected
from disclosure.
O.INFO-FLOW
P.USER-DUE-CARE Users must protect their authenticators. OE.PHYSICAL
OE.ENTRY-NON-TECHNICAL
Table 12 - All Organisational Policies met by Objectives
Assumption Label Assumption Short Description Associated Security Objective
A.ATTACK Attackers have high levels of skill. OE.INSTALL
OE.PHYSICAL
OE.FIREWALL
A.FIREWALL Approved firewall to protect facility. OE.FIREWALL
A.PHYSICAL NT workstation protected by strong
physical safeguards
OE.PHYSICAL
A.PLATFORM TOE depends on the NT operating system
for security management functions
O.ADMIN
O.DAC
OE.PLATFORM
A.SPILLAGE User judgement required when encryption
function not invoked
O.DATA-CONFIDENTIALITY
O.ADMIN
OE.SPILLAGE
A.NO-USER-CODE No user-accessible code in TOE O.DAC
O.RBAC
OE.NO-USER-CODE
A.NOEVIL Administrators are non-hostile. O.KEY-CONFIDENTIALITY
OE.TRUST
Table 13 - All Secure Usage Assumptions met by Objectives
Table 14 shows that there are no unnecessary IT security objectives.
Objective Label Objective Short Description Threat / Policy/ Assumption
O.ADMIN Facilities provided to manage the TOE. P.CRYPTO
T.MODIFY
A.PLATFORM
A.SPILLAGE
O.AUDIT Facilities to be provided to record activity
on the TOE.
T.RECORD-EVENT
T.TRACEABLE
T.ABUSE
T.DENY
P.AUDIT
O.DAC Facilities to be provided to control access
to objects.
T.ATTACK
T.ABUSE
T.ACCESS
A.PLATFORM
A.NO-USER-CODE
O.DATA-
CONFIDENTIALITY
Facilities to be provided to protect data in
transit.
T.MIX
T.CAPTURE
A.SPILLAGE
O.I&A Facilities to be provided to identify all
users.
T.IMPERSON
T.ATTACK
O.INFO-FLOW Facilities to be provided to enforce flow
policies.
T.MIX
P.INFO-FLOW
O.INTEGRITY Facilities to be provided to prevent loss of
data integrity.
T.MODIFY
T.AUDIT-CORRUPTED
O.KEY-CONFIDENTIALITY Facilities to be provided to protect
cryptographic keys.
P.CRYPTO
T.CAPTURE
A.NOEVIL
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Objective Label Objective Short Description Threat / Policy/ Assumption
O.MESSAGE-INTEGRITY Facilities to be provided to detect
message integrity loss.
T.INTEGRITY
O.NETWORK Security objectives to be met in a
distributed environment.
P.NETWORK
O.NOREPUD Facilities to be provided to prevent
repudiation of data sent.
T.DENY
OE.TRAINING Operators are given sufficient training to
perform their duties
TE.INSTALL
TE.OPERATE
TE.ADMIN-ERROR
O.RBAC Facilities to be provided to prevent
unauthorised user activities.
T.ACCESS
T.AUDIT-CONFIDENTIALITY
A.NO-USER-CODE
O.BYPASS No bypass of policy enforcement T.ATTACK
O.SEPARATION Maintenance of TOE security domain. T.ERROR
T.ACCESS
O.RESOURCES Shared resource exhaustion. T.RESOURCES
OE.PHYSICAL Protected from physical attack. T.ATTACK
P.USER-DUE-CARE
A.ATTACK
A.PHYSICAL
OE.ENTRY-NON-
TECHNICAL
Protection against non-technical attacks. P.USER-DUE-CARE
TE.ENTRY-NON-TECHNICAL
OE.INSTALL TOE installed and operated properly TE.INSTALL
A.ATTACK
OE.FIREWALL TOE protected from network attacks T.ATTACK
A.ATTACK
A.FIREWALL
OE.CRYPTOMANAGE Crypto assets managed properly T.ACCESS
T.CAPTURE
T.ERROR
T.IMPERSON
OE.TRUST Administrators are highly trusted T.ABUSE
A.NOEVIL
OE.SPILLAGE System is configured with session
encryption as default
T.CAPTURE
A.SPILLAGE
OE.NO-USER-CODE No user-accessible code in the TOE
operating environment
A.NO-USER-CODE
T.ATTACK
OE.PLATFORM Administrator will operate the server
function in line with developer's guidance
TE.OPERATE
A.PLATFORM
Table 14 - All Security Objectives Necessary
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7.2 Security Requirements Rationale
7.2.1 Suitability of the Security Requirements
The purpose of this section is to show that the identified security requirements are
suitable to meet the security objectives. Tables 15, 16 and 17 show that each security
requirement (and SFRs in particular) is necessary, that is, each security objective is
addressed by at least one security requirement and vice versa. Note that several objectives
are partially satisfied by the TOE and partially satisfied by the IT environment. Security
Objectives for the TOE are satisfied by Common Criteria functional components.
Security Objectives for the Environment are satisfied by IT requirements for the
environment (ITENV.n and NONITENV.x).
Objectives Requirements
O.ADMIN
FMT_MSA.1 (1), FMT_MSA.1 (2), FMT_MSA.2, FMT_MSA.3 (1), FMT_MSA.3 (2),
FMT_MTD.1 (1), FMT_SMR.1, ITENV.1, ITENV.2
O.AUDIT FAU_GEN.1, FAU_GEN.2, FAU_STG.2, ITENV.1
O.BYPASS FPT_RVM.1
O.DAC
FDP_ACC.2 (1), FDP_ACC.2 (2), FDP_ACF.1 (1), FDP_ACF.1 (2), ITENV.1,
ITENV.2
O.DATA-CONFIDENTIALITY FCS_COP.1, FDP_IFC.1 (3), FDP_IFF.1 (3)
O.I&A FIA_ATD.1, FIA_UAU.1, FIA_UAU.6, FIA_UID.1
O.INFO-FLOW
FDP_IFC.1 (1), FDP_IFC.1 (2), FDP_IFF.1 (1), FDP_IFF.1 (2), FDP_ITC.1,
FPT_SEP.2
O.INTEGRITY FDP_ITT.3
O.KEY-CONFIDENTIALITY
FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.2, FCS_CKM.4, FDP_ITC.1, FMT_SMR.1, FDP_IFC.1 (2),
FDP_IFF.1 (2), FMT_MTD.1 (2)
O.MESSAGE-INTEGRITY FCS_COP.1, FDP_IFC.1 (3), FDP_IFF.1 (3)
O.NETWORK FPT_ITT.2, FPT_ITT.3, FDP_ITT.1, FPT_SEP.2
O.NOREPUD FAU_GEN.1, FAU_GEN.2, FPT_STM.1, FCS_COP.1, ITENV.1
O.RBAC FDP_ACF.1 (3), FDP_ACC.2 (3), FIA_UID.1, FMT_SMR.1, ITENV.2, NONITENV.3
O.SEPARATION FPT_SEP.2
O.RESOURCES FAU_STG.2
OE.INSTALL NONITENV.8
OE.PHYSICAL NONITENV.2, NONITENV.3
OE.FIREWALL NONITENV.1
OE.CRYPTOMANAGE NONITENV.9, NONITENV.11
OE.TRUST NONITENV.6
OE.ENTRY-NON-
TECHNICAL
NONITENV.4
OE-TRAINING NONITENV.10
OE.SPILLAGE NONITENV.5
OE.NO-USER-CODE NONITENV.7
OE.PLATFORM ITENV.1, ITENV.2
Table 15 - Security Objective to Functional Component Mapping
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Component Component Name Objective
FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation O.AUDIT
O.NOREPUD
FAU_GEN.2 User identity association O.AUDIT
O.NOREPUD
FAU_STG.2 Guarantees of Audit Availability O.AUDIT
O.RESOURCES
FDP_ITC.1 Import of User Data Without Security Attributes O.INFO-FLOW
O.KEY-CONFIDENTIALITY
FDP_ACC.2 (1) Complete access control (1) O.DAC
FDP_ACC.2 (2) Complete access control (2) O.DAC
FDP_ACC.2 (3) Complete access control (3) O.RBAC
FDP_ACF.1 (1) Security Attribute Access control (1) O.DAC
FDP_ACF.1 (2) Security Attribute Access control (2) O.DAC
FDP_ACF.1 (3) Security Attribute Access control (3) O.RBAC
FDP_IFC.1 (1) Subset information flow control (1) O.INFO-FLOW
FDP_IFC.1 (2) Subset information flow control (2) O.INFO-FLOW
O.KEY-CONFIDENTIALITY
FDP_IFC.1 (3) Subset information flow control (3) O.MESSAGE-INTEGRITY
O.DATA-CONFIDENTIALITY
FDP_IFF.1 (1) Simple security attributes (1) O.INFO-FLOW
FDP_IFF.1 (2) Simple security attributes (2) O.INFO-FLOW
O.KEY-CONFIDENTIALITY
FDP_IFF.1 (3) Simple security attributes (3) O.MESSAGE-INTEGRITY
O.DATA-CONFIDENTIALITY
FDP_ITT.1 Basic internal transfer protection O.NETWORK
FDP_ITT.3 Integrity monitoring O.INTEGRITY
FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification O.RBAC
O.I&A
FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication O.I&A
FIA_UAU.6 Re-authenticating O.I&A
FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition O.I&A
FMT_MSA.1 (1) Management of security attributes (1) O.ADMIN
FMT_MSA.1 (2) Management of security attributes (2) O.ADMIN
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes O.ADMIN
FMT_MSA.3 (1) Static attribute initialisation (1) O.ADMIN
FMT_MSA.3 (2) Static attribute initialisation (2) O.ADMIN
FMT_MTD.1 (1) Management of TSF data (1) O.ADMIN
FMT_MTD.1 (2) Management of TSF data (2) O.KEY-CONFIDENTIALITY
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles O.KEY-CONFIDENTIALITY
O.RBAC
O.ADMIN
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation O.KEY-CONFIDENTIALITY
FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution O.KEY-CONFIDENTIALITY
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction O.KEY-CONFIDENTIALITY
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation O.DATA -CONFIDENTIALITY
O.MESSAGE-INTEGRITY
O.NOREPUD
FPT_ITT.2 TSF data transfer separation O.NETWORK
FPT_ITT.3 TSF data integrity monitoring O.NETWORK
FPT_RVM.1 Non-bypassability of the TSP O.BYPASS
FPT_SEP.2 SFP domain separation O.INFO-FLOW
O.NETWORK
O.SEPARATION
FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps O.NOREPUD
Table 16 - Mapping of Functional Requirements to Security Objectives
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Requirement
Label
Requirement Name Objective
ITENV.1 KyberPASS Configuration Manager for Setting User Attributes O.ADMIN
O.AUDIT
O.DAC
O.NOREPUD
OE.PLATFORM
ITENV.2 KyberPASS Configuration Manager for Modifying TSF Data O.ADMIN
O.DAC
O.RBAC
OE.PLATFORM
NONITENV.1 KyberPASS Server protected by Firewall. OE.FIREWALL
NONITENV.2 KyberPASS Server is to be Physically Protected. OE.PHYSICAL
NONITENV.3 Access to the KyberPASS Server is restricted to administrators
only.
OE.PHYSICAL
O.RBAC
NONITENV.4 Protection against non-technical attacks. OE.ENTRY-NON-TECHNICAL
NONITENV.5 Protection against spillage of sensitive data. OE.SPILLAGE
NONITENV.6 KyberPASS Server administrators are trusted. OE.TRUST
NONITENV.7 KyberPASS Server has no user-accessible code. OE.NO-USER-CODE
NONITENV.8 KyberPASS Server is installed and configured according to
developer guidance.
OE.INSTALL
NONITENV.9 Protection against unauthorised access to / loss of
cryptographic keys.
OE.CRYPTOMANAGE
NONITENV.10 KyberPASS Server administrators are well-trained. OE.TRAINING
NONITENV.11 Cryptographic Services Strength of Function (SOF)
Requirement
OE.CRYPTOMANAGE
Table 17 - Mapping of Environment Requirements to Security Objectives
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7.2.2 Satisfaction of Dependencies
Table 18 shows the dependencies between the functional requirements. All of the
dependencies are satisfied. (Note that (H) indicates the dependency is satisfied through
the inclusion of a component that is hierarchical to the one required).
Component
Reference
Requirement Dependencies
Dependency
Reference
Functional Requirements
1 FAU_GEN.1 FPT_STM.1 28
2 FAU_GEN.2 FAU_GEN.1, FIA_UID.1 1, 18
3 FAU_STG.2 FAU_GEN.1 1
4 FCS_CKM.1 FCS_CKM.4, FCS_COP.1, FMT_MSA.2 6, 7, 20
5 FCS_CKM.2 FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.4, FMT_MSA.2 4, 6, 20
6 FCS_CKM.4 FCS_CKM.1, FMT_MSA.2 4, 20
7 FCS_COP.1 FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.4, FMT_MSA.2 4, 6, 20
8a FDP_ACC.2 (1) FDP_ACF.1 (1) 9a
8b FDP_ACC.2 (2) FDP_ACF.1 (2) 9b
8c FDP_ACC.2 (3) FDP_ACF.1 (3) 9c
9a
FDP_ACF.1 (1) FDP_ACC.1 (1), FMT_MSA.3 (1), ITENV.1, ITENV.2
8a(H), 21a, 29,
30
9b FDP_ACF.1 (2) FDP_ACC.1 (2), ITENV.1, ITENV.2 8b(H), 29, 30
9c
FDP_ACF.1 (3) FDP_ACC.1 (3), FMT_MSA.3 (1), ITENV.1, ITENV.2
8c(H), 21a, 29,
30
10a FDP_IFC.1 (1) FDP_IFF.1 (1), ITENV.2 11a, 30
10b FDP_IFC.1 (2) FDP_IFF.1 (2), ITENV.2 11b, 30
10c FDP_IFC.1 (3) FDP_IFF.1 (3), ITENV.2 11c, 30
11a
FDP_IFF.1 (1)
FDP_IFC.1 (1), FMT_MSA.3 (1), FMT_MSA.3 (2),
ITENV.1, ITENV.2
10a, 21a, 21b,
29, 30
11b
FDP_IFF.1 (2)
FDP_IFC.1 (2), FMT_MSA.3 (1), FMT_MSA.3 (2),
ITENV.1, ITENV.2
10b, 21a, 21b,
29, 30
11c FDP_IFF.1 (3) FDP_IFC.1 (3), FMT_MSA.3 (1), ITENV.1, ITENV.2 10c, 21a, 29, 30
12 FDP_ITC.1 FDP_IFC.1 (2), FMT_MSA.3 (2) 10b, 21b
13 FDP_ITT.1 FDP_IFC.1 (3) 10c
14 FDP_ITT.3 FDP_ITT.1, FDP_IFC.1 (3) 10c, 13
15 FIA_ATD.1 No dependencies
16 FIA_UAU.1 FIA_UID.1 18
17 FIA_UAU.6 No dependencies
18 FIA_UID.1 No dependencies
19a FMT_MSA.1 (1) FMT_SMR.1, FDP_ACC.1 (1), ITENV.1, ITENV.2 10a, 23, 29, 30
19b FMT_MSA.1 (2) FMT_SMR.1, FDP_ACC.1 (3), ITENV.1, ITENV.2 10c, 23, 29, 30
20
FMT_MSA.2
ADV_SPM.1, FDP_IFC.1 (1), FMT_MSA.1 (1),
FMT_MSA.2 (2), FMT_SMR.1
10a, 19a, 19b,
23
21a FMT_MSA.3 (1) FMT_MSA.1 (1), FMT_SMR.1 19a, 23
21b FMT_MSA.3 (2) FMT_MSA.1 (2), FMT_SMR.1 19b, 23
22a FMT_MTD.1 (1) FMT_SMR.1, ITENV.1, ITENV.2 23, 29, 30
22b FMT_MTD.1 (2) FMT_SMR.1, ITENV.1, ITENV.2 23, 29, 30
23 FMT_SMR.1 FIA_UID.1 18
24 FPT_ITT.2 No dependencies
25 FPT_ITT.3 FPT_ITT.1 13
26 FPT_RVM.1 No dependencies
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Component
Reference
Requirement Dependencies
Dependency
Reference
27 FPT_SEP.2 No dependencies
28 FPT_STM.1 No dependencies
29 ITENV.1 No dependencies
30 ITENV.2 No dependencies
31 ACM_CAP.1 No dependencies
32 ADO_IGS.1 AGD_ADM.1 35
33 ADV_FSP.1 ADV_RCR.1 34
34 ADV_RCR.1 No dependencies
35 AGD_ADM.1 ADV_FSP.1 33
36 AGD_USR.1 ADV_FSP.1 33
37 ATE_IND.1 AGD_USR.1, ADV_FSP.1, AGD_ADM.1 36, 31, 35
Table 18 - Functional and Assurance Requirements Dependencies
The following dependency is not satisfied in this Security Target because it is not
considered relevant:
• ADV_SPM.1 is not an EAL1 assurance component and therefore this dependency
has been omitted.
7.2.3 Strength of function claims
Consequent upon the factors just outlined above and the fact that the EAL-1 assurance
level does not mandate the AVA_SOF SAR, the TOE makes no Strength of Function
claims.
7.3 Rationale for Extensions
Not applicable.
7.4 PP Claims Rationale
Not applicable.
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8 Appendix A - Acronyms
CC Common Criteria
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
IT Information Technology
PP Protection Profile
SF Security Function
SFP Security Function Policy
SOF Strength of Function
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSC TSF Scope of Control
TSF TOE Security Functions
TSFI TSF Interface
TSP TOE Security Policy