National Information Assurance Partnership
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
Validation Report
for the
Apple iOS 11 VPN Client on iPhone and iPad
Report Number: CCEVS-VR-VID10876
Dated: May 10, 2018
Version: 1.0
National Institute of Standards and Technology National Security Agency
Information Technology Laboratory Information Assurance Directorate
100 Bureau Drive 9800 Savage Road STE 6940
Gaithersburg, MD 20899 Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6940
®
TM
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Validation Team
Sheldon Durrant, MITRE Corporation
Kenneth Stutterheim, The Aerospace Corporation
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
Anthony Busciglio
Kevin Micciche
Acumen Security, LLC
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Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary............................................................................................................... 4
2 Identification.......................................................................................................................... 5
3 Architectural Information .................................................................................................... 6
4 Security Policy........................................................................................................................ 7
4.1 Cryptographic Support..................................................................................................................................7
4.2 User Data Protection ......................................................................................................................................7
4.3 Identification and Authentication .................................................................................................................7
4.4 Security Management ....................................................................................................................................7
4.5 Protection of the TSF .....................................................................................................................................7
4.6 Trusted Path/Channels ..................................................................................................................................8
5 Assumptions, Threats & Clarification of Scope ................................................................. 9
5.1 Assumptions....................................................................................................................................................9
5.2 Threats.............................................................................................................................................................9
5.3 Clarification of Scope...................................................................................................................................10
6 Documentation..................................................................................................................... 11
7 TOE Evaluated Configuration ........................................................................................... 12
7.1 Evaluated Configuration..............................................................................................................................12
8 IT Product Testing............................................................................................................... 14
8.1 Developer Testing .........................................................................................................................................14
8.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing.......................................................................................................14
8.3 Test Configuration........................................................................................................................................14
8.4 Test Tools ......................................................................................................................................................15
9 Results of the Evaluation .................................................................................................... 16
9.1 Evaluation of Security Target .....................................................................................................................16
9.2 Evaluation of Development Documentation...............................................................................................16
9.3 Evaluation of Guidance Documents............................................................................................................16
9.4 Evaluation of Life Cycle Support Activities...............................................................................................17
9.5 Evaluation of Test Documentation and the Test Activity .........................................................................17
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity ..............................................................................................................17
9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results..................................................................................................................18
10 Validator Comments & Recommendations ...................................................................... 19
11 Annexes................................................................................................................................. 20
12 Security Target .................................................................................................................... 21
13 Glossary................................................................................................................................ 22
14 Bibliography......................................................................................................................... 23
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1 Executive Summary
This Validation Report (VR) is intended to assist the end user of this product and any security
certification Agent for that end user in determining the suitability of this Information Technology
(IT) product for their environment. End users should review the Security Target (ST), which is
where specific security claims are made, in conjunction with this VR, which describes how those
security claims were tested and evaluated and any restrictions on the evaluated configuration.
Prospective users should carefully read the Assumptions and Clarification of Scope in Section 5
and the Validator Comments in Section 10, where any restrictions on the evaluated configuration
are highlighted.
This report documents the National Information Assurance Partnership (NIAP) assessment of the
evaluation of the Apple iOS 11 VPN Client Target of Evaluation (TOE). It presents the
evaluation results, their justifications, and the conformance results. This VR is not an
endorsement of the TOE by any agency of the U.S. Government and no warranty of the TOE is
either expressed or implied. This VR applies only to the specific version and configuration of
the product as evaluated and documented in the ST.
The evaluation was completed by Acumen Security in May 2018. The information in this report
is largely derived from the proprietary Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) and associated test
report, all written by Acumen Security as synopsized in the Apple iOS 11 VPN Client Assurance
Activity Report, Version 1.4, May 2018. The evaluation determined that the product is both
Common Criteria Part 2 Extended and Part 3 Conformant, and meets the assurance requirements
defined in the Protection Profile for IPsec Virtual Private Network (VPN) Clients, Version 1.4,
21 October 2014 [VPNPP].
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) identified in this Validation Report has been evaluated at a
NIAP approved Common Criteria Testing Laboratory using the Common Methodology for IT
Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev. 4) for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT
Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev. 4), as interpreted by the Assurance Activities contained in
the Protection Profile for IPsec Virtual Private Network (VPN) Clients, Version 1.4, 21 October
2013 and all applicable NIAP technical decisions for the technology. This Validation Report
applies only to the specific version of the TOE as evaluated. The evaluation has been conducted
in accordance with the provisions of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation
Scheme and the conclusions of the testing laboratory in the Evaluation Technical Report are
consistent with the evidence provided.
The validation team provided guidance on technical issues and evaluation processes and
reviewed the individual work units documented in the ETR and the Assurance Activities Report
(AAR). The validation team found that the evaluation showed that the product satisfies all the
functional requirements and assurance requirements stated in the Security Target. Based on these
findings, the validation team concludes that the testing laboratory's findings are accurate, the
conclusions justified, and the conformance results are correct. The conclusions of the testing
laboratory in the Evaluation Technical Report are consistent with the evidence produced.
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2 Identification
The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of
Standards effort to establish commercial facilities to perform trusted product evaluations.
Under this program, security evaluations are conducted by commercial testing
laboratories called Common Criteria Testing Laboratories (CCTLs). CCTLs evaluate
products against Protection Profile containing Assurance Activities, which are
interpretation of CEM work units specific to the technology described by the PP.
The NIAP Validation Body assigns validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality
and consistency across evaluations. Developers of information technology products
desiring a security evaluation contract with a CCTL and pay a fee for their product's
evaluation. Upon successful completion of the evaluation, the product is added to NIAP's
Product Compliance List.
The target of evaluation is the Apple iOS 11 VPN Client, and the associated TOE guidance
documentation.
Table 1 provides information needed to completely identify the product, including:
 The Target of Evaluation (TOE): the fully qualified identifier of the product as
evaluated.
 The Security Target (ST), describing the security features, claims, and assurances
of the product.
 The conformance result of the evaluation.
 The Protection Profile(s) to which the product is conformant.
 The organizations and individuals participating in the evaluation.
Item Identifier
Evaluation Scheme United States NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
TOE Apple IOS 11 VPN Client on iPhone and iPad
Protection Profile Protection Profile for IPsec Virtual Private Network (VPN) Clients, Version 1.4
Security Target Apple iOS VPN Client Security Target, Version 1.3
Evaluation Technical
Report
Apple iOS 11 VPN Client Evaluation Technical Report, Version 1.3, April 2018
CC Version Version 3.1, Revision 4
Conformance Result CC Part 2 Extended and CC Part 3 Conformant
Sponsor Apple Inc.
Developer Apple Inc.
Common Criteria
Testing Lab (CCTL)
Acumen Security
Rockville, MD
CCEVS Validators Sheldon Durrant, Kenneth Stutterheim
Table 1 Identification
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3 Architectural Information
Note: The following architectural description is based on the description presented in the
Security Target.
The TOE is a VPN client on a mobile operating system. The TOE is the VPN Client software
along with the TOE documentation required to implement the TOE into the evaluated
configuration. All other documentation available for download is not to be relied upon when
configuring the TOE. The Apple iOS 11 operating system has been separately validated as
VID10851. The mobile operating system and hardware platforms are part of the TOE
environment. When deployed, the TOE provides a tunnel to a VPN Gateway.
The Operating System on which the TOE runs is Apple iOS version 11. This is the same version
of iOS which has undergone Common Criteria evaluation against the Protection Profile for
Mobile Device Fundamentals. Each TOE platform contains two cryptographic modules; the
Apple iOS CoreCrypto Kernel Module and the Apple iOS CoreCrypto Module. These provide all
TOE required cryptographic services.
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4 Security Policy
The TOE is comprised of several security features, as identified below.
 Cryptography Support
 User Data Protection
 Identification and Authentication
 Security Management
 Protection of the TSF
 Trusted Path/Channels
The TOE provides the security functionality required by [VPNPP].
4.1 Cryptographic Support
The TOE provides IPsec VPN functionality for clients wishing to securely communicate with
remote parties over unsecured networks. The TOE supports IPsec sessions established using
IKEv2. The VPN tunnels are configured and controlled by Network Extension Framework,
which is a part of the host operating system’s Core OS Layer.
Each TOE platform contains two cryptographic modules; the Apple iOS CoreCrypto Kernel
Module and the Apple iOS CoreCrypto Module. These provide all TOE required cryptographic
services including cryptographic key generation, key storage, AES encryption and decryption,
cryptographic signature services, cryptographic hashing, keyed-hash message authentication and
random bit generation.
4.2 User Data Protection
The TOE zeroizes all memory used to store packet contents upon reallocation for another
purpose.
4.3 Identification and Authentication
All validation of X.509 certificates is performed by the iOS 11 platform that the TOE is running
on.
4.4 Security Management
The TOE provides the ability to manage all security functionality required by the Protection
Profile via the use of configuration files (profiles).
4.5 Protection of the TSF
The TOE platform performs cryptographic self-tests at startup which ensures the TOE’s ability
to properly operate. The TOE platform also verifies all software updates via digital signature.
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4.6 Trusted Path/Channels
The TOE is an IPsec VPN client. The TOE has the ability to establish IKEv2/IPsec protected
communications with VPN gateways.
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5 Assumptions, Threats & Clarification of Scope
5.1 Assumptions
The specific conditions listed in the following subsections are assumed to exist in the TOE’s
environment. These assumptions include both practical realities in the development of the TOE
security requirements and the essential environmental conditions on the use of the TOE.
Assumption Assumption Definition
A.NO_TOE_BYPASS Information cannot flow onto the network to which the VPN
client's host is connected without passing through the TOE.
A.PHYSICAL Physical security, commensurate with the value of the TOE and the
data it contains, is assumed to be provided by the environment.
A.TRUSTED_CONFIG Personnel configuring the TOE and its operational environment
will follow the applicable security configuration guidance.
Table 2 Assumptions
5.2 Threats
The following table lists the threats addressed by the TOE and the IT Environment. The
assumed level of expertise of the attacker for all the threats identified below is Enhanced-Basic.
Threat Threat Definition
T.TSF_CONFIGURATION Failure to allow configuration of the TSF may prevent its users
from being able to adequately implement their particular
security policy, leading to a compromise of user information.
T.TSF_FAILURE Security mechanisms of the TOE may fail, leading to a
compromise of the TSF.
T.UNAUTHORIZED_ACCESS A user may gain unauthorized access to the TOE data and TOE
executable code. A malicious user, process, or external IT entity
may masquerade as an authorized entity in order to gain
unauthorized access to data or TOE resources. A malicious user,
process, or external IT entity may misrepresent itself as the TOE
to obtain identification and authentication data.
T.UNAUTHORIZED_UPDATE A malicious party attempts to supply the end user with an update
to the product that may compromise the security features of the
TOE.
T.USER_DATA_REUSE User data may be inadvertently sent to a destination not intended
by the original sender because it is not rendered inaccessible
after it is done being used.
Table 3 Threats
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5.3 Clarification of Scope
All evaluations (and all products) have limitations, as well as potential misconceptions that need
clarifying. This text covers some of the more important limitations and clarifications of this
evaluation. Note that:
 As with any evaluation, this evaluation only shows that the evaluated configuration meets
the security claims made, with a certain level of assurance. The level of assurance for this
evaluation is defined within the Protection Profile for IPsec Virtual Private Network
(VPN) Clients, Version 1.4, 21 October 2013 [VPNPP].
 This evaluation covers only the specific device models and software as identified in this
document, and not any earlier or later versions released or in process
 Consistent with the expectations of the Protection Profile, this evaluation did not
specifically search for, nor seriously attempt to counter, vulnerabilities that were not
“obvious” or vulnerabilities to objectives not claimed in the ST. The CEM defines an
“obvious” vulnerability as one that is easily exploited with a minimum of understanding
of the TOE, technical sophistication and resources.
 The evaluation of security functionality of the product was limited to the functionality
specified in the claimed PP and applicable Technical Decisions. Any additional security
related functional capabilities that may be included in the product were not covered by
this evaluation.
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6 Documentation
The following documents were provided by the vendor with the TOE for evaluation:
 Apple iOS 11 VPN Client Security Target [ST], version 1.3;
 Apple iOS 11 VPN Client on iPhone and iPad Guidance Documentation [AGD], version
1.2
To use the product in the evaluated configuration, the product must be configured as specified in
these guides. Consumers are encouraged to download the CC configuration guide from the NIAP
website. Any additional customer documentation provided with the product, or that is available
online was not included in the scope of the evaluation and therefore should not to be relied upon
when configuring or operating the device as evaluated.
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7 TOE Evaluated Configuration
7.1 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is a VPN client on a mobile operating system. The TOE is the VPN Client software
only. The Apple iOS operating system has been separately validated (VID10851). The mobile
operating system and hardware platforms are part of the TOE environment. When deployed, the
TOE provides a tunnel to a VPN Gateway. The evaluated version of the TOE is iOS version 11.
As evaluated, the TOE software runs on the following devices,
Device Name Model Processor OS
iPhone X A1901
A1902
A1865
A11 Apple iOS 11
iPhone 8 Plus/iPhone 8 A1864, A1897, A1898/
A1863, A1905, A1906
A11 Apple iOS 11
iPhone 7 Plus/iPhone 7 A1661, A1784, A1785, A1786/
A1660, A1778, A1779, A1780
A10 Apple iOS 11
iPhone 6S Plus/iPhone 6S A1634, A1687, A1690, A1699/
A1633, A1688, A1691, A1700
A9 Apple iOS 11
iPhone SE A1662
A1723
A1724
A9 Apple iOS 11
iPhone 6 Plus/iPhone 6 A1522, A1524, A1593/
A1549, A1586, A1589
A8 Apple iOS 11
iPhone 5s A1453
A1457
A1518
A1528
A1530
A1533
A7 Apple iOS 11
iPad mini 3 A1599
A1600
A1601
A7 Apple iOS 11
iPad mini 4 A1538
A1550
A8 Apple iOS 11
iPad Air 2 A1566
A1567
A8X Apple iOS 11
iPad (5th gen) A1822
A1823
A9X Apple iOS 11
iPad Pro 12.9” (1st Gen) A1584
A1652
A9X Apple iOS 11
iPad Pro 9.7” A1673
A1674
A9X Apple iOS 11
iPad Pro 12.9” (2nd Gen) A1670
A1671
A10X Apple iOS 11
iPad Pro 10.5” A1701
A1709
A10X Apple iOS 11
Table 4 Hardware Devices
In the evaluated configuration, the device must be “supervised” and enrolled to an MDM
platform capable of configuring and publishing the necessary Configuration Profile payload to
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the device. Please note that for the testing of the product a MDM was not used, rather the Apple
Configurator 2.6 product was used.
The product must be configured as specified in the Apple iOS 11VPN Client on iPhone and iPad
Guidance Documentation listed in section 6.
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8 IT Product Testing
This section describes the testing efforts of the developer and the evaluation team. It is derived
from information contained in Evaluation Test Report for the Apple iOS 11 VPN Client on
iPhone and iPad, which is not publicly available. The publicly available Assurance Activities
Report provides an overview of testing and the prescribed assurance activities.
8.1 Developer Testing
No evidence of developer testing is required in the Assurance Activities for this product.
8.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing
The evaluation team verified the product according the vendor-provided guidance documentation
and ran the tests specified in the Protection Profile for IPsec Virtual Private Network (VPN)
Clients, Version 1.4, 21 October 2013 [VPNPP]. The Independent Testing activity is
documented in the Assurance Activities Report, which is publicly available, and is not duplicated
here. Multiple test beds were constructed to exercise both WiFi and LTE VPN capabilities and
claimed security functionality. The Assurance Activity Report for this evaluation may be
referenced if additional detail is required.
8.3 Test Configuration
Multiple test beds were used in the testing of the security functional requirements; below is a
high-level diagram that incorporates most of the components used.
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8.4 Test Tools
For this evaluation, the iOS VPN Client was tested at the Apple, Inc. facilities in Cupertino, CA.
Testing was conducted in concert with Apple engineering staff due to the special requirements
necessary for accessing the back-end of the TOE platform.
The following tools were used in support of TOE testing.
 Wireshark version 2.4.6
 StrongSwan version 5.3.3
 Windows Server 2008R2
 Variable Attenuator JFW PA2015
 R&S CMW500 LTE CallBox
 Apple Configurator version 2.6
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9 Results of the Evaluation
The results of the assurance requirements are generally described in this section and are
presented in detail in the proprietary documents: the Detailed Test Report (DTR) and the
Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) and are synopsized in the Apple iOS VPN Client Assurance
Activity Report, Version 1.4. The reader of this document can assume that activities and work
units received a passing verdict.
A verdict for an assurance component is determined by the resulting verdicts assigned to the
corresponding evaluator action elements. The evaluation was conducted based upon CC version
3.1 rev 4 and CEM version 3.1 rev 4. The evaluation determined the Apple iOS 11 VPN Client
on iPhone and iPad to be Part 2 extended, and meets the SARs contained in the PP. Additionally
the evaluator performed the Assurance Activities specified in the VPNPP.
9.1 Evaluation of Security Target
The evaluation team applied each ASE CEM work unit. The ST evaluation ensured the ST
contains a description of the environment in terms of policies and assumptions, a statement of
security requirements claimed to be met by the Apple iOS 11 VPN Client on iPhone and iPad
that are consistent with the Common Criteria, and product security function descriptions that
support the requirements. Additionally, the evaluator performed an assessment of the Assurance
Activities specified in the Protection Profile for IPsec Virtual Private Network (VPN) Clients,
Version 1.4, 21 October 2013 [VPNPP].
The validators reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in
accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation
team was justified.
9.2 Evaluation of Development Documentation
The evaluation team assessed the design documentation and found it adequate to aid in
understanding how the TSF provides the security functions. The design documentation consists
of a functional specification contained in the Security Target's TOE Summary Specification.
Additionally, the evaluator performed the Assurance Activities specified in the VPNPP related to
the examination of the information contained in the TOE Summary Specification.
The validators reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted
in accordance with the Assurance Activities, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation
team was justified.
9.3 Evaluation of Guidance Documents
The evaluation team ensured the adequacy of the user guidance in describing how to use the
operational TOE. Additionally, the evaluation team ensured the adequacy of the administrator
guidance in describing how to securely administer the TOE. The guides were assessed during the
17
design and testing phases of the evaluation to ensure they were complete. Additionally the
evaluator performed the Assurance Activities specified in the VPNPP related to the examination
of the information contained in the operational guidance documents.
The validators reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the Assurance Activities, and that the conclusion reached by
the evaluation team was justified.
9.4 Evaluation of Life Cycle Support Activities
The evaluation team found that the TOE was identified. Additionally, the team verified that both
the TOE and its supporting documentation are consistently reference the same version and use
the same nomenclature. The evaluation team also verified that the vendor website identified the
TOE version accurately.
The validators reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in
accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation
team was justified.
9.5 Evaluation of Test Documentation and the Test Activity
The evaluation team ran the set of tests specified by the Assurance Activities in the VPNPP and
recorded the results in a Test Report and Evaluation Technical Report and those results were
summarized in the Assurance Activities Report.
The validators reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence was
provided by the evaluation team to show that the evaluation activities addressed the test activities
in the VPNPP, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation team was justified.
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity
The evaluation team performed a public search for vulnerabilities, performed vulnerability
testing and did not discover any issues with the TOE. The following sources of public
vulnerability information were searched:
 http://nv.nist.gov
 http://www.us-cert.gov
 http://www.securityfocus.com
 http://cve.mitre.org
The search terms used included:
 iOS
 Apple
18
 iPhone
 iPad
 IPsec
 Router
 VPN
 CoreCrypto
The validators reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation addressed the
vulnerability analysis Assurance Activities in the VPNPP, and that the conclusion reached by the
evaluation team was justified.
9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results
The evaluation team's assessment of the evaluation evidence demonstrates that the claims in
the ST are met. Additionally, the evaluation team's test activities also demonstrated the
accuracy of the claims in the ST.
The validation team's assessment of the evidence provided by the evaluation team is that it
demonstrates that the evaluation team performed the Assurance Activities in the VPNPP, and
correctly verified that the product meets the claims in the ST.
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10 Validator Comments & Recommendations
The TOE is the VPN Client software only. The Apple iOS 11 operating system has been
separately validated (NIAP PCL record VID10851-2018). Platform assurance activities, per the
PP, may rely upon the evidence provided in VID10851. The evaluation team had access to all
required artifacts from the platform evaluation.
Note that all device configuration was performed through the Apple Configurator 2.6, and not a
Mobile Device Management solution. Consumers are cautioned to ensure that any Mobile
Device Management solution employed is wholly compatible with the product. As of the date of
this evaluation there were no Apple certified MDM’s. Therefore no assumptions can be made,
nor should any be inferred, as to the correct operation of such products.
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11 Annexes
Not applicable.
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12 Security Target
Please see the Apple iOS VPN Client Security Target [ST], version 1.3.
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13 Glossary
The following definitions are used throughout this document:
 Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL). An IT security evaluation facility
accredited by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) and
approved by the CCEVS Validation Body to conduct Common Criteria-based
evaluations.
 Conformance. The ability to demonstrate in an unambiguous way that a given
implementation is correct with respect to the formal model.
 Evaluation. The assessment of an IT product against the Common Criteria using the
Common Criteria Evaluation Methodology to determine whether or not the claims made
are justified; or the assessment of a protection profile against the Common Criteria using
the Common Evaluation Methodology to determine if the Profile is complete, consistent,
technically sound and hence suitable for use as a statement of requirements for one or
more TOEs that may be evaluated.
 Evaluation Evidence. Any tangible resource (information) required from the sponsor or
developer by the evaluator to perform one or more evaluation activities.
 Feature. Part of a product that is either included with the product or can be ordered
separately.
 Target of Evaluation (TOE). A group of IT products configured as an IT system, or an
IT product, and associated documentation that is the subject of a security evaluation
under the CC.
 Validation. The process carried out by the CCEVS Validation Body leading to the issue
of a Common Criteria certificate.
 Validation Body. A governmental organization responsible for carrying out validation
and for overseeing the day-to-day operation of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation
and Validation Scheme.
23
14 Bibliography
The Validation Team used the following documents to produce this Validation Report:
1. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Part 1: Introduction
and general model, Version 3.1 Revision 4.
2. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Part 2: Security
functional requirements, Version 3.1 Revision 4.
3. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Part 3: Security
assurance requirements, Version 3.1 Revision 4.
4. Common Evaluation Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 3.1 Revision 4.
5. Apple iOS VPN Client Security Target, Version 1.3, April 2018
6. Protection Profile for IPsec Virtual Private Network (VPN) Clients, Version 1.4, 21
October 2013
7. Assurance Activity Report for a Target of Evaluation Apple iOS 11 VPN Client on
iPhone and iPad, Version 1.4, May 2018
8. Apple iOS 11 VPN Client on iPhone and iPad Guidance Documentation, April 2018,
Version 1.2
9. Apple VPN Client Security Target Evaluation Technical Report Version 1.1, 4/26/2018
<evaluation sensitive>
10. Vulnerability Analysis for Apple iOS 11 VPN Client <evaluation sensitive>
11. Apple iOS 11 VPN Client Evaluation Technical Report, Version 1.3, April 2018.
<evaluation sensitive>