BSI-DSZ-CC-0831-V5-2022
for
SMGW Version 2.0
from
Power Plus Communications AG
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 CC-Zert-327 V5.45
BSI-DSZ-CC-0831-V5-2022(*)
Smart Meter Gateway
SMGW
Version 2.0
from Power Plus Communications AG
PP Conformance: Protection Profile for the Gateway of a Smart
Metering System, Version 1.3, 31 March 2014, BSI-
CC-PP-0073-2014
Functionality: PP conformant
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by AVA_VAN.5 and ALC_FLR.2
The IT Product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation
facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1
extended by Scheme Interpretations and by advice of the Certification Body for
components beyond EAL 5 as listed in the Certification Report for conformance to the
Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1. CC and CEM are also
published as ISO/IEC 15408 and ISO/IEC 18045.
(*) This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its
evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report and
Notification. For details on the validity see Certification Report part A chapter 5.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification
scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions
of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the
evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT Product by the Federal Office for
Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is
either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 20 December 2022
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Sandro Amendola L.S.
Head of Division
SOGIS
Recognition Agreement
for components up to
EAL 4
Common Criteria
Recognition Arrangement
recognition for components
up to EAL 2 and ALC_FLR
only
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0831-V5-2022
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0831-V5-2022 Certification Report
Contents
A. Certification......................................................................................................................6
1. Preliminary Remarks....................................................................................................6
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure...............................................................6
3. Recognition Agreements..............................................................................................7
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification................................................................8
5. Validity of the Certification Result.................................................................................8
6. Publication....................................................................................................................9
B. Certification Results.......................................................................................................10
1. Executive Summary....................................................................................................11
2. Identification of the TOE.............................................................................................12
3. Security Policy............................................................................................................14
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.....................................................................14
5. Architectural Information.............................................................................................14
6. Documentation...........................................................................................................15
7. IT Product Testing.......................................................................................................15
8. Evaluated Configuration.............................................................................................16
9. Results of the Evaluation............................................................................................16
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE.....................................................18
11. Security Target..........................................................................................................19
12. Definitions.................................................................................................................19
13. Bibliography..............................................................................................................21
C. Excerpts from the Criteria..............................................................................................23
D. Annexes.........................................................................................................................24
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0831-V5-2022
A. Certification
1. Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● Act on the Federal Office for Information Security1
● BSI Certification and Approval Ordinance2
● BMI Regulations on Ex-parte Costs 3
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern und für Heimat (Federal
Ministry of the Interior and Community)
● DIN EN ISO/IEC 17065 standard
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) [3]
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility, its
approval and licencing process (CC-Stellen) [3]
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.14
[1] also published as
ISO/IEC 15408
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 [2] also published
as ISO/IEC 18045
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
2
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of Security Certificates and approval by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungs- und -Anerkennungsverordnung - BSIZertV) of 17 December
2014, Bundesgesetzblatt 2014, part I, no. 61, p. 2231
3
BMI Regulations on Ex-parte Costs - Besondere Gebührenverordnung des BMI für individuell
zurechenbare öffentliche Leistungen in dessen Zuständigkeitsbereich (BMIBGebV), Abschnitt 7 (BSI-
Gesetz) - dated 2 September 2019, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1365
4
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern und für Heimat of 12 February 2007 in the
Bundesanzeiger dated 23 February 2007, p. 3730
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0831-V5-2022 Certification Report
3. Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
3.1. European Recognition of CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and, in addition, at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS
Technical Domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL 1 to EAL 4. For "Smartcards and similar devices" a SOGIS Technical Domain is in
place. For "HW Devices with Security Boxes" a SOGIS Technical Domains is in place, too.
In addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of
the recognition agreement.
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, details on
recognition, and the history of the agreement can be seen on the website at
https://www.sogis.eu.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the related bodies of the signatory nations. A disclaimer
beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of recognition.
This certificate is recognized according to the rules of SOGIS-MRA, i.e. up to and including
CC part 3 EAL 4 components. The evaluation contained the component AVA_VAN.5 that is
not mutually recognised in accordance with the provisions of the SOGIS MRA. For mutual
recognition the EAL 4 components of these assurance families are relevant.
3.2. International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC
(Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08
September 2014. It covers CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP)
(exact use), CC certificates based on assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or
the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR) and CC certificates for Protection
Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on
the website: https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the related bodies
of the signatory nations. A disclaimer beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of
recognition.
This certificate is recognized according to the rules of CCRA-2014, i. e. up to and including
CC part 3 EAL 2 and ALC_FLR components.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0831-V5-2022
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product SMGW, Version 2.0 has undergone the certification procedure at BSI. This is
a re-certification based on BSI-DSZ-CC-0831-V4-2021. Specific results from the
evaluation process BSI-DSZ-CC-0831-V4-2021 were re-used.
The evaluation of the product SMGW, Version 2.0 was conducted by TÜV
Informationstechnik GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 14 December 2022. TÜV
Informationstechnik GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)5
recognised by the certification
body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: Power Plus Communications
AG.
The product was developed by: Power Plus Communications AG.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
5. Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report applies only to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report
and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance components and assurance levels please refer to CC
itself. Detailed references are listed in part C of this report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-assessment or
re-certification). Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation
and certification procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk
management needs regularly updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-
assessment on a regular e.g. annual basis.
In order to avoid an indefinite usage of the certificate when evolved attack methods would
require a re-assessment of the products resistance to state of the art attack methods, the
maximum validity of the certificate has been limited. Considering the specific legal
circumstances this certificate will have a validity of 8 years combined with a regular
mandatory re-assessment after every 2 years. The certificate issued on 20 December
2022 is valid until 19 December 2030. Validity can be re-newed by re-certification.
5
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0831-V5-2022 Certification Report
The owner of the certificate is obliged:
1. when advertising the certificate or the fact of the product's certification, to refer to
the Certification Report as well as to provide the Certification Report, the Security
Target and user guidance documentation mentioned herein to any customer of the
product for the application and usage of the certified product,
2. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately about vulnerabilities of the
product that have been identified by the developer or any third party after issuance
of the certificate,
3. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately in the case that security relevant
changes in the evaluated life cycle, e.g. related to development and production sites
or processes, occur, or the confidentiality of documentation and information related
to the Target of Evaluation (TOE) or resulting from the evaluation and certification
procedure where the certification of the product has assumed this confidentiality
being maintained, is not given any longer. In particular, prior to the dissemination of
confidential documentation and information related to the TOE or resulting from the
evaluation and certification procedure that do not belong to the deliverables
according to the Certification Report part B, or for those where no dissemination
rules have been agreed on, to third parties, the Certification Body at BSI has to be
informed.
4. to monitor the resistance of the certified product against new attack methods and to
provide a positive qualified confirmation by applying for a re-certification or re-
assessment process on a regular basis every two years starting from the issuance
of the certificate.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
6. Publication
The product SMGW, Version 2.0 has been included in the BSI list of certified products,
which is published regularly (see also Internet: https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]). Further
information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer6
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
6
Power Plus Communications AG
Dudenstraße 6
68167 Mannheim
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0831-V5-2022
B. Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0831-V5-2022 Certification Report
1. Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the “SMGW Version 2.0” consisting of the “SMGW
Software”, Version 2.1.3 and the “SMGW Hardware”, Version 2.0.
The Smart Meter Gateway (SMGW) is an electronic unit comprising hardware, software
and firmware used for collection, storage and provision of meter data from one or more
meters of one or multiple commodities.
The Gateway connects a wide area network (WAN) with a network of devices of one or
more smart metering devices (local metrological network, LMN) and the consumer home
area network (HAN), which hosts controllable local systems (CLS). The security
functionality of the TOE comprises protection of confidentiality, authenticity, integrity of
data and information flow control mainly to protect the privacy of consumers, to ensure a
reliable billing process and to protect the smart metering system and a corresponding
large scale infrastructure of the smart grid.
Besides a certified security module (product name “TCOS Smart Meter Security Module
Version 1.0 Release 2/P60C144PVE”, BSI-DSZ-CC-0957-V2-2016), the hardware device
“Smart Meter Gateway” also includes a hard-wired communication adapter which both are
not part of the TOE but which are always inseparable parts of the delivered entity. This
communication adapter can be either a BPL, an Ethernet, an LTE, an LTE450 or a G.hn
communication adapter.
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified
Protection Profile for the Gateway of a Smart Metering System, Version 1.3, 31 March
2014, BSI-CC-PP-0073-2014 [8].
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 4
augmented by AVA_VAN.5 and ALC_FLR.2.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6], chapter 6.2 to 6.10. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2
and some of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functionality:
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
SF.1: Authentication of
Communication and Role
Assignment for external entities
Authentication, confidentiality and integrity protection by TLS secured
communication channels with external entities.
SF.2: Acceptance and Deposition
of meter data, Encryption of meter
data for WAN transmission
Reception of meter data from a paired meter via the LMN interface,
storage of meter data in the filesystem of the TOE and transmission
of meter data to external entities via the WAN interface is
cryptographically protected from disclosure and manipulation.
SF.3: Administration, Configuration
and SW Update
Administration and configuration as well as updating the TOE’s
software by an authenticated Gateway Administrator (GWA).
SF.4: Displaying Consumption Data Displaying consumption data to authenticated consumers at interface
IF_GW_CON.
SF.5: Audit and Logging Generation of audit data for all security relevant actions and storage
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0831-V5-2022
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
of audit records in system-, calibration- and consumer-logfiles.
SF.6: TOE Integrity Protection Detectable physical tampering through the TOE's sealed packaging
of the device.
TSF integrity protection by secure boot process and regular as well
as on-demand self tests.
Preservation of a secure state in case of failures.
Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 7.1 to 7.6.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6], chapter 3.2.
Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of Assumptions,
Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security Target [6],
chapter 3.3 to 3.5.
This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8.
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2. Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
SMGW, Version 2.0
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
1 HW SMGW Hardware (as
built in part of the Smart
Meter Gateway)
Version 2.0
(Value 2A on the hardware revision
number)
Secure delivery process
as described below this
table
2 SW SMGW Software Version 2.1.3
identified by the value 00771-34512
Pre-installed on the HW
or updated by the GWA
3 DOC Handbuch für
Verbraucher, Smart Meter
Gateway
[10]
Version: 4.9
SHA-256:
5EBA7AA630DEBBB98382A83912798
F19CEA80A153F840CE786E44EC84
C501BD5
Personal handover by
the developer or
download from https
secured website
4 DOC Handbuch für Service-
Techniker, Smart Meter
Gateway
[11]
Version: 5.4
SHA-256:
C6217EC2AF3EFCB1DDE60F8707E6
771F5B1A698C12D4CA5F5091EED0
94D12386
Personal handover by
the developer or
download from https
secured website
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0831-V5-2022 Certification Report
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
5 DOC Handbuch für Hersteller
von Smart-Meter
Gateway-
Administrationssoftware,
Smart Meter Gateway
[12]
Version: 4.8
SHA-256:
DB2DDBFCC4F51A122A8EBDB8A9B
545A041D13E41BC2100EED7F720D8
7A8E04CE
Personal handover by
the developer or
download from https
secured website
6 DOC Logmeldungen, SMGW
[13]
Version: 3.3
SHA-256:
152ed8251431b38c9214de45ce05adcf
b6828c16bc5b3666b888c52bf5862b58
Personal handover by
the developer or
download from https
secured website
7 DOC Auslieferungs- und
Fertigungsprozeduren,
Anhang Sichere
Auslieferung
[14]
Version: 1.4
SHA-256:
17e280428e1602759b7bfa7dbbfde2e8
d65ad7d518a96f0ab41a7130a9f38205
Personal handover by
the developer or
download from https
secured website
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
The main circuit board of the TOE is built into a sealed case of the complete product
(Smart Meter Gateway) and can be identified by the laser engraving on the case showing
the hardware revision number. The revision number follows the following structure:
“SMGW-X-YY-111-n0”. Thereby the X stands for the communication variant (B=BPL,
E=Ethernet, J/K=LTE, N=G.hn, V=LTE450). YY stands for the product generation and
corresponds to the TOE hardware version (2A=Version 2.0). The n stands for the SIM card
type (0=none, 1=SIM card assembled at factory and SIM slot, 2=SIM card assembled at
factory only, 3=SIM slot only). For more details see ST [6], chapter 1.2.
The software part of the TOE consists of the operating system and the SMGW application.
It can be identified by a two-parts value, which consists of two revision numbers of the
underlying version control system for the TOE, where the first part stands for the operating
system and the second part stands for the SMGW application.
The guidance documentation for the different user roles [10], [11], [12] explains how to
retrieve the software version information from the TOE.
The certified delivery process considers the complete delivery, starting with the
manufacturer, through the different stages of storages, to the final place of installation in
the consumers premises.
In this standard delivery process the hardware parts are delivered within a special and
secure transport box (pylocx box).
Deviant to the standard delivery process, a personal handover by two employees of the
producer or developer is also allowed for up to ten devices. Details can be found in the
guidance document [14].
The software is pre-installed on the hardware and therefore also part of the physical
delivery. In case of a software update of an already installed SMGW, the certified software
update package will be securely transmitted from the developer to the GWA, who will use
the TOE update functions to install the new software version.
The guidance documents mentioned in table 2 can either be downloaded by an https
secured website https://service.ppc-ag.de (standard delivery) or (in case of personal
delivery) they will be personally given to the consumer. In case they are downloaded, they
can be uniquely identified by checking the hash sum from table 2 above, which are also
included in the Security Target [6], chapter 1.2.
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3. Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues:
Security audit, secure communication, cryptographic support, user data protection,
identification and authentication, security management, privacy protection, protection of
the TSF and trusted channels.
Specific details concerning the above mentioned security policies can be found in the
Security Target [6], chapter 7.
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are
of relevance:
● Trustworthy authorised and authenticated external entities
● Trustworthy and well-trained Gateway Administrators and Service Technicians
● Basic level of physical protection by installation in a non-public environment within the
premises of the consumer
● Processing Profiles are obtained from a trustworthy and reliable source only
● Usage of certified Security Module for specific cryptographic services
● Certification of firmware updates prior to installation in the SMGWs
● Reliability and availability of WAN network connections, trustworthiness and availability
of time sources, assumptions on LMN and HAN network connections
● Secure generation of ECC key pair and secure transmission to SMGW by the GWA
Details can be found in the Security Target [6], chapter 4.2.
5. Architectural Information
The TOE consists of three subsystems called “Hardware”, “Betriebssystem” and “SMGW-
Anwendung”.
The subsystem “Hardware” is the physical basement of the TOE and implements the
electronic part as well as the case and seal of the device. It also offers the physical
connection to other hardware parts (e.g. power circuit board, communication adapter)
which are not in the scope of the TOE.
The subsystem “Betriebssystem” controls the hardware and manages the different bus
systems, memory and the CPU. Furthermore, it provides the basic input/output
functionality. Additionally, it sends and receives commands by using the physical interfaces
of the hardware. The subsystem itself runs on a Linux-based kernel.
The main functions of the subsystem “SMGW-Anwendung” are to collect meter data from
connected meters, internal processing and storage of the received meter data, sending the
processed meter data to authorized external entities and the overall security management
of the TOE.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0831-V5-2022 Certification Report
6. Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7. IT Product Testing
7.1. Test configuration
All developer and evaluator tests in the context of the evaluation have been conducted
using ten TOE samples in different configurations. Hereby, three configurations correspond
to the TOE version 00753-34505. This version is functionally consistent with the version
under evaluation as specified in the ST [6] (SW version 00771-34512). The ITSEF verified
by source code analysis that neither the TOE behaviour, nor any further security-relevant
effects might result by the performed source code adaptions. All other configurations are
based on the same TOE version, but were slightly modified (e.g. a TOE with SSH
capabilities) to enable detailed testing. For most of the test cases, the unmodified TOE
was used. Only where necessary, the modified TOE configurations were used,
demonstrably without influencing the tested security functionality.
7.2. Developer tests
The developer’s testing approach was to systematically test the TOE security functionality
and the TSFI as well as the TOE behaviour on the level of the subsystems. Thereby all
security functions as defined in the ST [6], chapter 7.1 – 7.6 have been tested. In order to
do this, the developer selected a subset of more than 400 test cases of the tests that were
produced during the development of the TOE, which was suitable to sufficiently cover the
TSF.
All test results were as expected.
7.3. Independent and penetration testing
The evaluation body chose to broadly cover all existing TSFI without specific restrictions.
The evaluation body chose to repeat a defined subset of the developer tests with the intent
to cover the existing interfaces and the implemented security functionality in order to verify
the developer test results.
Independent and penetration tests of the evaluation body are mainly performed on stand-
alone test equipment, containing approx. 3000 automated test cases in about 150 test
suites developed by TÜVIT, partitioned according to the security functions defined in the
ST [6], chapter 7.1 to 7.6. Using this environment, every necessary role with
corresponding rights (Gateway Administrator, Service Technicians, Consumers) and
meters might be emulated at the appropriate TSFI. In particular, for testing the TSFI for
connecting meters, it contains a “meter simulator”, which allows to emulate and connect
multiple meters, controlling their behaviour (e.g. for inducing errors). Using a dedicated
crypto proxy, it is further possible to extract the nested CMS data, supported by the
enhanced Wireshark, which was enriched by the implementation of various dissectors.
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Furthermore, all differences between the certified SW version of the TOE during the
previous certification (BSI-DSZ-CC-0831-V4-2021) and the actual one under evaluation
(BSI-DSZ-CC-0831-V5-2022) were analysed by detailed source code analyses without
further indication of potential vulnerabilities.
The evaluation body conducted penetration testing based on functional areas of concern
derived from SFRs and architectural mechanisms. The areas were prioritised with regard
to various factors, e.g. attack surface, estimated flaw likelihood, developer testing
coverage, detectability of flaws during developer testing. In summary, all security
functionalities as well as all TSFIs were tested.
The evaluation body considered security analysis and penetration testing in the areas
system hardening, domain separation, secure boot, self-protection, kernel hardening, data
protection, access control, security management, audit, users and attributes, flow control,
secure communication, and privacy.
The penetration testing activities were performed as tests and as analytical tasks.
Whenever an analysis was estimated to yield better results, the evaluators chose the
analytical approach. Analytical activities were especially applied in the areas secure boot,
self-protection, domain separation, kernel and system hardening as well as non-
bypassability. Combined approaches were also applied.
The overall evaluation result was that no deviations were found between the expected and
the actual test results; moreover, no attack scenario with the attack potential High was
actually successful.
8. Evaluated Configuration
This certification covers the following configuration of the TOE:
The TOE as identified in chapter 2 has been evaluated. The SMGW Version 2.0 consists
of the “SMGW Software”, Version 2.1.3 and the “SMGW Hardware”, Version 2.0.
Note that there are no further configurations since the different variants of the
communication adapter are outside of the TOE scope.
9. Results of the Evaluation
9.1. CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used for those components up to EAL 5
extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 [4] (AIS 34)
and guidance specific for the technology of the product [4] (AIS 46, 48).
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the EAL 4 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report)
● The components AVA_VAN.5 and ALC_FLR.2 augmented for this TOE evaluation.
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As the evaluation work performed for this certification procedure was carried out as a re-
evaluation based on the certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-0831-V4-2021, re-use of specific
evaluation tasks was possible. The focus of this re-evaluation was on
● Performance enhancement and bug-fixing,
● Update of SELinux rules,
● New hardware configuration including a new processor,
● Replacement of tool for updates from OPKG to RAUC,
● Replacement of version control system from svn to Git,
● Replacement of database tool from sqlite to postgresql,
● Update of linux kernel.
The evaluation has confirmed:
● PP Conformance: Protection Profile for the Gateway of a Smart Metering System,
Version 1.3, 31 March 2014, BSI-CC-PP-0073-2014 [8]
● For the Functionality: PP conformant
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
● For the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by AVA_VAN.5 and ALC_FLR.2
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2. Results of cryptographic assessment
The following table gives an overview of the cryptographic functionalities inside the TOE to
enforce the security policy and outlines the standard of application where its specific
appropriateness is stated.
Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in Bits Standard of
Application
Validity Period
Basic support
of integrity,
authenticity
SHA-256,
SHA-384,
SHA-512
[FIPS180-4] Hash length = 256,
384, 512
TR02102
[17]
2028+
Encryption /
decryption,
integrity of TSF
AES-XTS-128 [FIPS-197],
[IEEE 1619-2007],
[SP800-38E]
128 (Enc/Dec),
128 (Integrity)
TR02102
[17]
2028+
Key generation
for CMS
containers
ECKA-EG [X.9.63],
[RFC3565]
128 TR03116
[16]
2028+
Encryption /
decryption
/integrity of
CMS container
AES-CBC-CMAC [RFC5652],
[RFC6033],
[FIPS-197],
[RFC4493],
[SP800-38A]
128 TR03116
[16]
2028+
Encryption /
decryption /
integrity of
CMS container
AES-GCM [RFC5652],
[RFC5084],
[FIPS-197],
[SP800-38D]
128 (Enc/Dec),
96 (Integrity)
TR03116
[16]
2028+
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Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in Bits Standard of
Application
Validity Period
Key generation
for meter data
AES-CMAC [RFC4493],
[FIPS-197]
128 TR03116
[16]
2028+
Encryption/
decryption,
integrity of
meter data
AES-CBC-CMAC [RFC4493],
[FIPS-197],
[ISO10116]
128 TR03116
[16]
2028+
TLS record
encryption
AES-CBC
(1)*, (2)*
(*cmp. last row)
[RFC5246],
[FIPS-197],
[SP800-38A]
128, 256 TR03116
[16]
2028+
TLS record
layer
encryption and
integrity
AES-GCM
(3)*, (4)*
(*cmp. last row)
[RFC5246],
[RFC5288],
[FIPS-197],
[SP800-38D]
128, 256
(Enc/Dec),
32 (Integrity)
TR03116
[16]
2028+
TLS record
integrity
HMAC-SHA2 [RFC5246],
[FIPS180-4],
[RFC2104]
256, 384 TR03116
[16]
2028+
TLS key
derivation
function
TLS-PRF-SHA2 [RFC5246],
[FIPS180-4],
[RFC2104]
256, 384 (bit
length of PRF)
TR03116
[16]
2028+
Integrity of
configuration
data
CMAC [SP-800-38B] 128 TR02102
[17]
2028+
TLS-cipher
suites
TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES_128_CBC_SHA256 (1),
TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES_256_CBC_SHA384 (2),
TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES_128_GCM_SHA256 (3),
TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (4).
All cipher suites mandated by TR03116 [16].
2028+
Table 3: TOE cryptographic functionality
The strength of the these cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this
certification procedure (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE
itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The limited validity for the usage of cryptographic algorithms as outlined in chapter 9 has
to be considered by the user and his system risk management process, too.
If available, certified updates of the TOE should be used. If non-certified updates or
patches are available the user of the TOE should request the sponsor to provide a re-
certification. In the meantime a risk management process of the system using the TOE
should investigate and decide on the usage of not yet certified updates and patches or
take additional measures in order to maintain system security.
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11. Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [6] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report.
12. Definitions
12.1. Acronyms
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
BPL Broadband Over Power Lines
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
CLS Controllable Local System
CMS Cryptographic Message Syntax
cPP Collaborative Protection Profile
CPU Central Processing Unit
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ECC Elliptic Curve Cryptography
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
G.hn Specification for home networking standardised in ITU G.996x
GPRS General Packet Radio Service
GWA Gateway Administrator
HAN Home Area Network
IP Internet Protocol
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
LAN Local Area Network
LMN Local Metrological Network
LTE Long Term Evolution – Mobile Radio Communication Standard
LTE450 LTE with 450 MHz Frequency
PP Protection Profile
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
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SIM Subscriber Identity Module
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SMGW Smart Meter Gateway
SSH Secure Shell
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
TSFI TSF Interfaces
WAN Wide Area Network
12.2. Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Collaborative Protection Profile - A Protection Profile collaboratively developed by an
International Technical Community endorsed by the Management Committee.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in CC
part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in CC part 3.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Package - named set of either security functional or security assurance requirements
Protection Profile - A formal document defined in CC, expressing an implementation
independent set of security requirements for a category of IT Products that meet specific
consumer needs.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - An IT Product and its associated administrator and user guidance
documentation that is the subject of an Evaluation.
TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
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13. Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 5, April 2017
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 5, April 2017
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[3] BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) and Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility,
approval and licencing (CC-Stellen), https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE7
https://www.bsi.bund.de/AIS
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
on the BSI Website, https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierungsreporte
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0831-V5-2022, Version 5.5, 2022-11-23, Security
Target, SMGW Version 2.0, Power Plus Communications AG
[7] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 1, 2022-12-09, TÜV Informationstechnik
GmbH (confidential document)
[8] Protection Profile for the Gateway of a Smart Metering System, Version 1.3, 31
March 2014, BSI-CC-PP-0073-2014
[9] Configuration list for the TOE, Version v160-RC13, 2022-11-09, EVG-CM-List,
Power Plus Communications AG (confidential document)
[10] Handbuch für Verbraucher, Smart Meter Gateway, Version 4.9, 2022-06-09,
Power Plus Communications AG
[11] Handbuch für Service-Techniker, Smart Meter Gateway, Version 5.4, 2022-09-15,
Power Plus Communications AG
[12] Handbuch für Hersteller von Smart-Meter Gateway-Administrations-Software, Smart
Meter Gateway, Version 4.8, 2022-07-19, Power Plus Communications AG
[13] Logmeldungen, SMGW Version 2.0, Version 3.3, 2022-07-18,
Power Plus Communications AG
7
specifically
• AIS 1, Version 14, Durchführung der Ortsbesichtigung in der Entwicklungsumgebung des Herstellers
• AIS 32, Version 7, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
• AIS 34, Version 3, Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL 5+ (CCv2.3 &
CCv3.1) and EAL 6 (CCv3.1)
• AIS 38, Version 2, Reuse of evaluation results
• AIS 46, Version 3, Informationen zur Evaluierung von kryptographischen Algorithmen und
ergänzende Hinweise für die Evaluierung von Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• • AIS 48, Version 1.0, Anforderungen an die Prüfung von Sicherheitsetiketten
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[14] Auslieferungs- und Fertigungsprozeduren, Anhang Sichere Auslieferung, Version
1.4, 2021-05-12, Power Plus Communications AG
[15] Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-03109-1, Anforderungen an die Interoperabilität der
Kommunikationseinheit eines intelligenten Messsystem, Version 1.1, 2021-09-17
[16] Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-03116-3, Kryptographische Vorgaben für Projekte der
Bundesregierung, Teil 3: Intelligente Messsysteme, 2022-02-23
[17] Technical Guideline BSI TR-02102-1 Cryptographic Mechanisms:
Recommendations and Key Lengths, 2022-01
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C. Excerpts from the Criteria
For the meaning of the assurance components and levels the following references to the
Common Criteria can be followed:
• On conformance claim definitions and descriptions refer to CC part 1 chapter 10.5
• On the concept of assurance classes, families and components refer to CC Part 3
chapter 7.1
• On the concept and definition of pre-defined assurance packages (EAL) refer to CC
Part 3 chapters 7.2 and 8
• On the assurance class ASE for Security Target evaluation refer to CC Part 3
chapter 12
• On the detailed definitions of the assurance components for the TOE evaluation
refer to CC Part 3 chapters 13 to 17
• The table in CC part 3 , Annex E summarizes the relationship between the
evaluation assurance levels (EAL) and the assurance classes, families and
components.
The CC are published at https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/cc/
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D. Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
Note: End of report
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