National Information Assurance Partnership
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
Validation Report
LG Electronics Inc.
20 Yoido-dong, Youngdungpogu
Seoul 152-721, Korea
LG G6 Smartphone
Report Number: CCEVS-VR-10791-2017
Dated: May 2, 2017
Version: 0.3
National Institute of Standards and Technology National Security Agency
Information Technology Laboratory Information Assurance Directorate
100 Bureau Drive 9800 Savage Road STE 6940
Gaithersburg, MD 20899 Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6940
®
TM
LG G6 Smartphone Validation Report Version 0.3, May 2, 2017
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Validation Team
Joanne Fitzpatrick
Stelios Melachrinoudis
Jean Petty
MITRE Corporation
Bedford, MA
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
Tammy Compton
Raymond Smoley
Gossamer Security Solutions, Inc.
Catonsville, MD
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Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary.................................................................................................... 1
2 Identification............................................................................................................... 1
3 Architectural Information ........................................................................................... 3
3.1 TOE Evaluated Platforms ................................................................................... 3
3.2 TOE Architecture................................................................................................ 4
3.3 Physical Boundaries............................................................................................ 4
4 Security Policy............................................................................................................ 4
4.1 Cryptographic support ........................................................................................ 5
4.2 User data protection ............................................................................................ 5
4.3 Identification and authentication......................................................................... 5
4.4 Security management.......................................................................................... 5
4.5 Protection of the TSF.......................................................................................... 6
4.6 TOE access.......................................................................................................... 6
4.7 Trusted path/channels ......................................................................................... 6
5 Assumptions................................................................................................................ 6
6 Clarification of Scope ................................................................................................. 7
7 Documentation............................................................................................................ 7
8 IT Product Testing ...................................................................................................... 7
8.1 Developer Testing............................................................................................... 7
8.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing ............................................................... 8
9 Evaluated Configuration ............................................................................................. 8
10 Results of the Evaluation ............................................................................................ 8
10.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ASE)............................................................ 8
10.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV).............................................................. 9
10.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD) ................................................. 9
10.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC) ..................................... 9
10.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE) ................. 9
10.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN)....................................................... 10
10.7 Summary of Evaluation Results........................................................................ 10
11 Validator Comments/Recommendations .................................................................. 10
12 Annexes..................................................................................................................... 11
13 Security Target.......................................................................................................... 11
14 Glossary .................................................................................................................... 11
15 Bibliography ............................................................................................................. 12
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1 Executive Summary
This report documents the assessment of the National Information Assurance Partnership
(NIAP) validation team of the evaluation of LG G6 Smartphone solution provided by LG
Electronics Inc. It presents the evaluation results, their justifications, and the conformance
results. This Validation Report is not an endorsement of the Target of Evaluation by any
agency of the U.S. government, and no warranty is either expressed or implied.
The evaluation was performed by the Gossamer Security Solutions (Gossamer) Common
Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL) in Catonsville, MD, United States of America, and was
completed in May 2017. The information in this report is largely derived from the Evaluation
Technical Report (ETR) and associated test reports, all written by Gossamer Security
Solutions. The evaluation determined that the product is both Common Criteria Part 2
Extended and Part 3 Conformant, and meets the assurance requirements of EAL 1.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the LG G6 Smartphone.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) identified in this Validation Report has been evaluated at a
NIAP approved Common Criteria Testing Laboratory using the Common Methodology for
IT Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev 4) for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT
Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev 4). This Validation Report applies only to the specific
version of the TOE as evaluated. The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the
provisions of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme and the
conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the
evidence provided.
The validation team monitored the activities of the evaluation team, provided guidance on
technical issues and evaluation processes, and reviewed the individual work units and
successive versions of the ETR. The validation team found that the evaluation showed that
the product satisfies all of the functional requirements and assurance requirements stated in
the Security Target (ST). Therefore the validation team concludes that the testing
laboratory’s findings are accurate, the conclusions justified, and the conformance results are
correct. The conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation technical report are
consistent with the evidence produced.
The Gossamer Security Solutions evaluation team concluded that the Common Criteria
requirements for Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL) 1.
The technical information included in this report was obtained from the LG Electronics Inc.
G6 Smartphone (MDFPP30/WLANCEP10) Security Target, version 0.3, February 28, 2017
and analysis performed by the Validation Team.
2 Identification
The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST) effort to establish commercial facilities to perform trusted product
evaluations. Under this program, security evaluations are conducted by commercial testing
laboratories called Common Criteria Testing Laboratories (CCTLs) using the Common
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Evaluation Methodology (CEM) for Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL) 1 through 4 in
accordance with National Voluntary Laboratory Assessment Program (NVLAP)
accreditation.
The NIAP Validation Body assigns Validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality and
consistency across evaluations. Developers of information technology products desiring a
security evaluation contract with a CCTL and pay a fee for their product’s evaluation. Upon
successful completion of the evaluation, the product is added to NIAP’s Validated Products
List.
Table 1 provides information needed to completely identify the product, including:
 The Target of Evaluation (TOE): the fully qualified identifier of the product as evaluated.
 The Security Target (ST), describing the security features, claims, and assurances of the
product.
 The conformance result of the evaluation.
 The Protection Profile to which the product is conformant.
 The organizations and individuals participating in the evaluation.
Table 1: Evaluation Identifiers
Item Identifier
Evaluation Scheme United States NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
TOE LG G6 Smartphone
Protection Profile
(Specific models identified in Section 3.1)
Protection Profile For Mobile Device Fundamentals, Version 3.0, 10 June 2016
and the Mobile Device Fundamentals Protection Profile Extended Package (EP)
Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) Clients, Version 1.0, 08 February 2016
(WLANCEP10)
ST LG G6 Smartphone Security Target, version 0.3, February 28, 2017
Evaluation Technical
Report
Evaluation Technical Report for LG G6 Smartphone, version 0.3, April 24, 2017
CC Version Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
rev 4
Conformance Result CC Part 2 extended, CC Part 3 conformant
Sponsor LG Electronics Inc.
Developer LG Electronics Inc.
Common Criteria
Testing Lab (CCTL)
Gossamer Security Solutions, Inc.
CCEVS Validators Joanne Fitzpatrick, ECR Team
Stelios Melachrinoudis, Lead Validator
Jean Petty, Senior Validator
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3 Architectural Information
Note: The following architectural description is based on the description presented in the
Security Target.
The TOE is a mobile device designed to support enterprises and individual users alike. Based
upon Android 7.0 with a Linux 3.18 kernel and improved by LG (for example, adding NIST
approved cryptographic algorithms, strengthening X.509 certificate checking, bolstering
keystore protection, and applying security patches) to meet the MDFPP requirements, the
TOE provides wireless connectivity and provides an execution environment for mobile
applications.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the Error! Reference source not found. featuring the
following specifications:
Feature G6
Display 5.7 Inch, QHD+ 2,880 x 1,440 resolution 18:9 aspect ratio display
Camera Front 5MP with F2.2 Aperture (Wide Angle) / Rear 13MP with F1.8 Aperture OIS
(Standard Angle) and 13MP with F2.4 Aperture (Wide Angle)
Communi
cations
X12 LTE (up to 600 Mbps LTE Category 12/13 with 3x Carrier Aggregation) / Wi-Fi
(802.11 a, b, g, n, ac) / USB Type-C / Bluetooth 4.2 BLE / NFC
Processor/
chipset
ARMv8 Qualcomm MSM8996 Pro Snapdragon 821 Application Processor
RAM 4 GB RAM
Storage 32GB Flash; microSD (up to 2TB)
Battery Li-polymer 3,300 mAh
The TOE allows basic telephony features (make and receive phone calls, send and receive
SMS/MMS messages) as well as advanced network connectivity (allowing connections to
both 802.11 Wi-Fi and 2G/3G/4G LTE mobile data networks). The TOE supports using
client certificates to connect to access points offering WPA2 networks with 802.1x/EAP-
TLS, or alternatively connecting to cellular base stations when utilizing mobile data.
The TOE offers mobile applications an Application Programming Interface (API) including
that provided by the Android framework and extensions to the MDM API by LG.
3.1 TOE Evaluated Platforms
The evaluated configuration for the G6 Smartphone comes in the following different carrier
versions:
Product Carrier Security SW Version OS version Build number WFA Cert#
LG G6 AT&T MDF v3.0 Release 1 Android 7.0 NRD90U WFA69452
LG G6 Verizon MDF v3.0 Release 1 Android 7.0 NRD90U WFA69251
LG G6 Sprint MDF v3.0 Release 1 Android 7.0 NRD90U WFA69457
LG G6 T-Mobile MDF v3.0 Release 1 Android 7.0 NRD90U WFA69454
LG G6 Open,
U.S.
Cellular,
LRA
MDF v3.0 Release 1 Android 7.0 NRD90U WFA69455
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NOTE: Carrier specific versions of the evaluated product are released based upon that
carrier’s own schedule, so some carriers may not have released the evaluated version of the
TOE by the time this report is published. Therefore, consumers should ensure that they have
the evaluated version of the product software.
3.2 TOE Architecture
The TOE provides a rich API to mobile applications and provides users installing an
application to either approve or reject an application based upon the API access that the
application requires.
The TOE also provides users with the ability to protect Data-At-Rest with AES encryption,
including all user and mobile application data stored in the user’s data partition. The TOE
affords special protection to all user and application cryptographic keys stored in the TOE.
Moreover, the TOE provides users the ability to AES encrypt data and files stored on an SD
Card inserted into the device.
Finally, the TOE can interact with a Mobile Device Management system (not part of this
evaluation) to allow enterprise control of the configuration and operation of the device so as
to ensure adherence to enterprise-wide policies (for example, enabling CC mode, or
restricting use of the device’s camera, etc.).
The TOE includes several different levels of execution including (from lowest to highest)
hardware, a Trusted Execution Environment, Android’s Linux kernel, Android’s user space,
Android’s Android Runtime (ART) environment for mobile applications, and the mobile
applications themselves.
3.3 Physical Boundaries
The TOE’s physical boundary is the physical perimeter of its enclosure (without the rear
access cover present, so that one can access and replace the device’s battery, SIM, and SD
Card).
4 Security Policy
This section summaries the security functionality of the TOE:
1. Cryptographic support
2. User data protection
3. Identification and authentication
4. Security Management
5. Protection of the TSF
6. TOE access
7. Trusted path/channels
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4.1 Cryptographic support
The TOE includes cryptographic components (including its BoringSSL library, its Kernel
Loadable Cryptographic module, and its Application Processor) with CAVP certified
algorithms for a wide range of cryptographic functions including: asymmetric key generation
and establishment, symmetric key generation, encryption/decryption, cryptographic hashing
and keyed-hash message authentication. These functions are supported with suitable random
bit generation, key derivation, salt generation, initialization vector generation, secure key
storage, and key and protected data destruction. These primitive cryptographic functions are
used to implement security protocols such as TLS and HTTPS and also to encrypt Data-At-
Rest (including the generation and protection of keys and key encryption keys) used by the
TOE. Many of these cryptographic functions are also accessible as services to applications
running on the TOE.
4.2 User data protection
The TOE is designed to control access to system services by hosted applications, including
protection of the Trust Anchor Database. Additionally, the TOE is designed to protect user
and other sensitive data using encryption so that even if a device is physically lost, the data
remains protected. The TOE supports Android for Work profiles to provide additional
separation between application and application data belonging to the Android for Work
profile. Please see the Admin Guide for additional details regarding how to set up and use
Android for Work profiles.
4.3 Identification and authentication
The TOE supports a number of features related to identification and authentication. From a
user perspective, except for making phone calls to an emergency number, a password (i.e.,
Password Authentication Factor) must be correctly entered to unlock the TOE. Also, even
when the TOE is unlocked the password must be re-entered to change the password.
Passwords are obscured when entered so they cannot be read from the TOE's display and the
frequency of entering passwords is limited and when a configured number of failures occurs,
the TOE will be wiped to protect its contents. Passwords can be constructed using upper and
lower cases characters, numbers, and special characters and passwords up to 16 characters
are supported.
The TOE can also serve as an 802.1X supplicant and can both use X.509v3 and validate
certificates for EAP-TLS, TLS, and HTTPS exchanges.
4.4 Security management
The TOE provides all the interfaces necessary to manage the security functions identified
throughout this Security Target as well as other functions commonly found in mobile
devices. Many of the available functions are available to users of the TOE while many are
restricted to administrators operating through a Mobile Device Management solution once
the TOE has been enrolled. Once the TOE has been enrolled and then un-enrolled, it will
remove Enterprise applications, remove MDM policies, and disable CC mode.
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4.5 Protection of the TSF
The TOE implements a number of features designed to protect itself to ensure the reliability
and integrity of its security features. It protects particularly sensitive data such as
cryptographic keys so that they are not accessible or exportable. It also provides its own
timing mechanism to ensure that reliable time information is available (e.g., for log
accountability). It enforces read, write, and execute memory page protections, uses address
space layout randomization, and stack-based buffer overflow protections to minimize the
potential to exploit application flaws. It is also designed to protect itself from modification
by applications as well as to isolate the address spaces of applications from one another to
protect those applications.
The TOE includes functions to perform self-tests and software/firmware integrity checking
so that it might detect when it is failing or may be corrupt. If any of the self-tests fail, the
TOE will not go into an operational mode. It also includes mechanisms (i.e., verification of
the digital signature of each new image) so that the TOE itself can be updated while ensuring
that the updates will not introduce malicious or other unexpected changes in the TOE. Digital
signature checking also extends to verifying applications prior to their installation as all
applications must have signatures (even if self-signed).
4.6 TOE access
The TOE can be locked, obscuring its display, by the user or after a configured interval of
inactivity. The TOE also has the capability to display an administrator specified (using an
MDM) advisory message (banner) when the user unlocks the TOE for the first use after
reboot.
The TOE is also able to attempt to connect to wireless networks as configured.
4.7 Trusted path/channels
The TOE supports the use of 802.11-2012, 802.1X, and EAP-TLS to secure communications
channels between itself and other trusted network devices.
5 Assumptions
The Security Problem Definition, including the assumptions, may be found in the following
documents:
 Protection Profile For Mobile Device Fundamentals, Version 3.0, 10 June 2016
 Mobile Device Fundamentals Protection Profile Extended Package (EP) Wireless
Local Area Network (WLAN) Clients, Version 1.0, 08 February 2016
(WLANCEP10)
That information has not been reproduced here and the MDFPP30/WLANCEP10 should be
consulted if there is interest in that material.
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The scope of this evaluation was limited to the functionality and assurances covered in the
MDFPP30/WLANCEP10 as described for this TOE in the Security Target. Other
functionality included in the product was not assessed as part of this evaluation. All other
functionality provided by the devices needs to be assessed separately, and no further
conclusions can be drawn about their effectiveness.
6 Clarification of Scope
All evaluations (and all products) have limitations, as well as potential misconceptions that
need clarification. This text covers some of the more important limitations and clarifications
of this evaluation. Note that:
 As with any evaluation, this evaluation only shows that the evaluated configuration
meets the security claims made with a certain level of assurance (the assurance
activities specified in the Mobile Device Fundamentals Protection Profile and the
Wireless Local Area Network Clients Extended Package and performed by the
evaluation team).
 This evaluation covers only the specific device models and software as identified in
this document, and not any earlier or later versions released or in process.
 This evaluation did not specifically search for, nor attempt to exploit, vulnerabilities
that were not “obvious” or vulnerabilities to objectives not claimed in the ST. The
CEM defines an “obvious” vulnerability as one that is easily exploited with a
minimum of understanding of the TOE, technical sophistication and resources.
 The functionality evaluated is scoped exclusively to the security functional
requirements specified in the MDFPP/WLANCEP and applicable Technical
Decisions. Any additional security related functional capabilities of the TOE were
not covered by this evaluation.
7 Documentation
The following documents were available with the TOE for evaluation:
 LG Electronics Inc. LG Android 7 devices (G6) Guidance Documentation, Version
0.1, February 8, 2017
8 IT Product Testing
This section describes the testing efforts of the developer and the Evaluation Team. It is
derived from information contained in the Detailed Test Report (MDFPP30/WLANCEP10)
for G6 Smartphone, Version 0.3, April 24, 2017 (DTR).
8.1 Developer Testing
No evidence of developer testing is required in the assurance activities for this product.
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8.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing
The evaluation team verified the product according a Common Criteria Certification
document and ran the tests specified in the MDFPP30/WLANCEP10 including the tests
associated with optional requirements.
9 Evaluated Configuration
The evaluated configuration consists of the following series and models:
Product Carrier Security SW Version OS version Build number WFA Cert#
LG G6 AT&T MDF v3.0 Release 1 Android 7.0 NRD90U WFA69452
LG G6 Verizon MDF v3.0 Release 1 Android 7.0 NRD90U WFA69251
LG G6 Sprint MDF v3.0 Release 1 Android 7.0 NRD90U WFA69457
LG G6 T-Mobile MDF v3.0 Release 1 Android 7.0 NRD90U WFA69454
LG G6 Open,
U.S.
Cellular,
LRA
MDF v3.0 Release 1 Android 7.0 NRD90U WFA69455
10 Results of the Evaluation
The results of the assurance requirements are generally described in this section and are
presented in detail in the proprietary ETR. The reader of this document can assume that all
EAL1 work units received a passing verdict.
A verdict for an assurance component is determined by the resulting verdicts assigned to the
corresponding evaluator action elements. The evaluation was conducted based upon CC
version 3.1 rev 4 and CEM version 3.1 rev 4. The evaluation determined the Product Name
TOE to be Part 2 extended, and to meet the Part 3 Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL 1).
10.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ASE)
The evaluation team applied each ASE CEM work unit. The ST evaluation ensured the ST
contains a description of the environment in terms of policies and assumptions, a statement
of security requirements claimed to be met by the LG G6 Smartphone products that are
consistent with the Common Criteria, and product security function descriptions that support
the requirements.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
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10.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV)
The evaluation team applied each ADV CEM work unit. The evaluation team assessed the
design documentation and found it adequate to aid in understanding how the TSF provides
the security functions. The design documentation consists of a functional specification
contained in the Security target and Guidance documents. Additionally the evaluator
performed the assurance activities specified in the MDFPP30/WLANCEP10 related to the
examination of the information contained in the TSS.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
10.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD)
The evaluation team applied each AGD CEM work unit. The evaluation team ensured the
adequacy of the user guidance in describing how to use the operational TOE. Additionally,
the evaluation team ensured the adequacy of the administrator guidance in describing how
to securely administer the TOE. All of the guides were assessed during the design and testing
phases of the evaluation to ensure they were complete.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
10.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC)
The evaluation team applied each ALC CEM work unit. The evaluation team found that the
TOE was identified.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
10.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE)
The evaluation team applied each ATE CEM work unit. The evaluation team ran the set of
tests specified by the assurance activities in the MDFPP30/WLANCEP10 and recorded the
results in a Test Report, summarized in the AAR.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
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10.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN)
The evaluation team applied each AVA CEM work unit. The evaluation team performed a
public search for vulnerabilities and did not discover any public issues with the TOE.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
10.7 Summary of Evaluation Results
The evaluation team’s assessment of the evaluation evidence demonstrates that the claims in
the ST are met. Additionally, the evaluation team’s testing also demonstrated the accuracy
of the claims in the ST.
The validation team’s assessment of the evidence provided by the evaluation team is that it
demonstrates that the evaluation team followed the procedures defined in the CEM, and
correctly verified that the product meets the claims in the ST.
11 Validator Comments/Recommendations
The validators encourage the consumers of these products to understand the relationship
between the products and any functionality that may be provided via Mobile Device
Management solutions. This evaluation neither covers, nor endorses, the use of any particular
MDM solution; only the MDM interfaces of the products were exercised as part of the
evaluation. In practice, the LG MDM is not available, though its settings could be managed
via a suitable MDM and corresponding agent. Alternatively, LG has developed a
downloadable application that can be utilized to put the device into CC mode – MDM
Test.apk. The LG Android 7 devices (G6) Guidance Documentation contains instructions on
how the application can be acquired. As of the conclusion of this evaluation, an administrator
can send an e-mail to support-enterprise-mobility@lge.com to request the application.
Note that the products must be configured into Common Criteria Mode as directed in the LG
Android 7 devices (G6) Guidance Documentation, version 0.1, Section 3.1 in order to be in
the evaluated configuration.
Although Android for Work was used in testing to successfully demonstrate the TOEs ability
to satisfy FDP_ACF_EXT.1.2 per the DoD Annex; Android for Work is not required in the
Common Criteria evaluated configuration.
Over-The-Air (OTA) updates were not available during the evaluation; these are created by
Google and the mobile device vendors, then distributed to the wireless carriers (Verizon,
AT&T, etc), for deployment to the respective devices via the carriers network. Therefore the
OTA update functionality was not tested. Users and enterprise administrators should remain
cognizant of OTA updates and the update cycles offered by the carriers.
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The testing for FPT_JTA_EXT.1 requires the evaluator to test with an application to verify
that the assurance activity associated with the “control access using a signing key” selection
is satisfied. The lab and vendor raised a TRRT request stating that for both the “disable access
through hardware” and “control access using a signing key” selections, the test assurance
activities were disproportionate and that the developer should be trusted to faithfully
represent disabled or limited access to and usage of any JTAG interface as required, and how.
The TRRT disagreed for the “disable access through hardware” selection, stating that a test
would be required, and for “control access using a signing key”, a test would not be required.
Therefore, the vendor described in the TSS how access to the JTAG port was controlled.
12 Annexes
Not applicable
13 Security Target
The Security Target is identified as: LG G6 Smartphone (MDFPP30/WLANCEP10) Security
Target, Version 0.3, February 28, 2017.
14 Glossary
The following definitions are used throughout this document:
 Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL). An IT security evaluation facility
accredited by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) and
approved by the CCEVS Validation Body to conduct Common Criteria-based
evaluations.
 Conformance. The ability to demonstrate in an unambiguous way that a given
implementation is correct with respect to the formal model.
 Evaluation. The assessment of an IT product against the Common Criteria using the
Common Criteria Evaluation Methodology to determine whether or not the claims made
are justified; or the assessment of a protection profile against the Common Criteria using
the Common Evaluation Methodology to determine if the Profile is complete, consistent,
technically sound and hence suitable for use as a statement of requirements for one or
more TOEs that may be evaluated.
 Evaluation Evidence. Any tangible resource (information) required from the sponsor or
developer by the evaluator to perform one or more evaluation activities.
 Feature. Part of a product that is either included with the product or can be ordered
separately.
 Target of Evaluation (TOE). A group of IT products configured as an IT system, or an
IT product, and associated documentation that is the subject of a security evaluation
under the CC.
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 Validation. The process carried out by the CCEVS Validation Body leading to the issue
of a Common Criteria certificate.
 Validation Body. A governmental organization responsible for carrying out validation
and for overseeing the day-to-day operation of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation
and Validation Scheme.
15 Bibliography
The Validation Team used the following documents to produce this Validation Report:
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation: Part 1:
Introduction and General Model, Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012.
[2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security
functional components, Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012.
[3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security
assurance components, Version 3.1 Revision 4, September 2012.
[4] Protection Profile For Mobile Device Fundamentals, Version 3.0, 10 June 2016
[5] Mobile Device Fundamentals Protection Profile Extended Package (EP) Wireless
Local Area Network (WLAN) Clients, Version 1.0, 08 February 2016
[6] LG G6 Smartphone (MDFPP30/WLANCEP10) Security Target, Version 0.3,
February 28, 2017 (ST)
[7] Assurance Activity Report (MDFPP30/WLANCEP10) for G6 Smartphone, Version
0.3, April 24, 2017 (AAR)
[8] Detailed Test Report (MDFPP30/WLANCEP10) for G6 Smartphone, Version 0.3,
April 24, 2017 (DTR)
[9] Evaluation Technical Report for LG G6 Smartphone, Version 0.3, April 24, 2017
(ETR)