MINISTERIO DE LA PRESIDENCIA
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REF: 2014-11-INF-1611 v1
Difusión: Expediente
Fecha: 21.04.2016
Created by: CERT9
Revised by: CALIDAD
Approved by: TECNICO
CERTIFICATION REPORT
File: 2014-11 Eudemon1000E-N (USG6600) Series Firewall
Applicant: 440301192W HUAWEI Technologies Co., Ltd.
References:
[EXT-2420] Certification request of Eudemon1000E-N (USG6600) Series Firewall
[EXT-2977] Eudemon1000E-N(USG6600) Series Firewall Evaluation Technical
Report, version 2.0, 14-12-2015
The product documentation referenced in the above documents.
Certification report of the product Eudemon1000E-N (USG6600) Series Firewall, as
requested in [EXT-2420] dated 7/03/2014, and evaluated by the laboratory Epoche &
Espri S.L.U, as detailed in the Evaluation Technical Report [EXT-2977] received on
14/12/2015.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ..................................................................................................................................3
TOE SUMMARY ..................................................................................................................................................4
SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS................................................................................................5
SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS ..............................................................................................6
IDENTIFICATION..............................................................................................................................................7
SECURITY POLICIES .......................................................................................................................................8
ASSUMPTIONS AND OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT............................................................................8
THREATS .........................................................................................................................................................9
OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT FUNCTIONALITY.................................................................................9
ARCHITECTURE..............................................................................................................................................10
LOGICAL ARCHITECTURE.........................................................................................................................10
PHYSICAL ARCHITECTURE.......................................................................................................................12
DOCUMENTS ....................................................................................................................................................12
PRODUCT TESTING........................................................................................................................................13
PENETRATION TESTING.............................................................................................................................14
EVALUATED CONFIGURATION .................................................................................................................15
EVALUATION RESULTS................................................................................................................................15
COMMENTS & RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE EVALUATION TEAM.......................................16
CERTIFIER RECOMMENDATIONS ............................................................................................................16
GLOSSARY........................................................................................................................................................16
BIBLIOGRAPHY...............................................................................................................................................16
SECURITY TARGET........................................................................................................................................17
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This document constitutes the Certification Report for the certification file of the
product Eudemon1000E-N(USG6600) Series Firewall.
The TOE is a firewall system composed of a hardware platform and a software
running within the platform as a whole system.
The evaluation has been performed on product series with multiple HW platforms.
The applicable HW platforms of the TOE have been identified as shown in the
following table.
Series Model ESN
1000E Eudemon1000E-N7E 210235G7FYZ0C8000001
USG6620 2102359519Z0C9000004
USG6650 210235G7G410E7000104
USG6680 210235G7G70123401230
The version of the TOE SW installed in the testing platforms is
V100R001C20SPC100B021.
Developer/manufacturer: Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.
Sponsor: Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.
Certification Body: Centro Criptológico Nacional (CCN) del Centro Nacional de
Inteligencia (CNI).
ITSEF: Epoche & Espri S.L.U.
Protection Profile: No.
Evaluation Level: Common Criteria v3.1 R4 – EAL4+ALC_FLR.1
Evaluation end date: 14/12/2015.
All the assurance components required by the evaluation level EAL4+ (augmented
with ALC_FLR.1 Basic flaw remediation) have been assigned a “PASS” verdict.
Consequently, the laboratory Epoche & Espri S.L.U assigns the “PASS” VERDICT to
the whole evaluation due all the evaluator actions are satisfied for the EAL4 +
ALC_FLR.1, as defined by the Common Criteria v3.1 R4 and the CEM v3.1 R4.
Considering the obtained evidences during the instruction of the certification request
of the product Eudemon1000E-N(USG6600) Series Firewall version
V100R001C20SPC100B021 (running on the above mentioned platforms), a positive
resolution is proposed.
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TOE summary
The TOE consists of a hardware platform and software image integrated as a whole
system. The TOE is designed to provide firewall, VPN, VLAN, antivirus protection,
anti-spam protection and content filtering etc. to provide protection on TCP/IP
networks. It can protect computer networks from abuse.
The series firewall resides between the network it is protecting and an external
network such as the Internet, restricting the information flow between the networks to
that permitted by a policy (set of rules) defined by the Security Administrator. They
detect and eliminate the most damaging, content-based threats from email and Web
traffic such as viruses, worms, intrusions, inappropriate Web content and more in
real-time; without degrading network performance. In addition to providing stateful
application-level protection, the TOE delivers a full range of network-level services
including; firewall, Virtual Private Network (VPN), Virtual Local Area Network (VLAN),
antivirus protection, anti-spam protection and content filtering etc.; using dedicated,
easily managed platforms.
TOE major security features
The major security features implemented by the TOE and subject to evaluation (no
assurance can be supposed to any other functionality) to, can be summarised as
follows:
- Authentication
 The TOE can authenticate administrative users by user name and password.
Administration may either be performed locally using the Local Console CLI
or remotely using the Network Web-Based GUI or Network CLI. The TOE
provides a local authentication scheme for this, or can optionally enforce
authentication decisions obtained from a Radius or TACACS+ server in the IT
environment.
 Authentication is always enforced for network remote sessions via SSH,
SFTP (Secure FTP),and HTTPS (Web-Based GUI) sessions. Authentication
for access via the console is always enabled and password protected.
- Access Control
 The TOE has the ability to control the administrator permissions for every
administrator account. This control is performed using three different control
policies: administrator roles, administrator levels and users built-in.
- Communication Security
 The TOE provides communication security by implementing SSH protocol.
Two versions of SSH: SSH1 (SSH1.5) and SSH2 (SSH2.0) are implemented.
- Flow Control Policy
 The TOE provides a policy mechanism based on security rules and traffic
engineering rules. For each policy item, aspects like packet source and
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destination addresses, in and out interfaces, security zones, and ports can be
used as filters, and actions like allow, block or even traffic engineering
processes can be assigned. Through such mechanism, we can define a
policy and drop attacks for the TOE itself.
 The TOE also offers a feature Access Control List (ACL) for filtering incoming
and outgoing information flow.
- Security functionality management
 Security functionality management includes not only authentication,
administrator role, but also managing security related data consisting of
configuration profile and runtime parameters.
- Cryptographic functions
 Cryptographic functions are required by security features as dependencies,
where:
 AES is used as default encryption algorithm for SSH;
 3DES is used as optional encryption algorithm for SSH;
 RSA is used in user authentication when user tries to authenticate and
gain access to the TOE;
 HMAC-SHA is used as verification algorithm for packets of SSH
protocols.
- Security Audit
SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS
The product was evaluated with all the evidences required to fulfil the evaluation
level EAL4+ and the evidences required by the additional component ALC_FLR.1
Basic flaw remediation, according to Common Criteria v3.1 R4.
Class Family/Component
ASE:
Security Target evaluation
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
ADV: Development ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
ADV_FSP.4 Complete functional specification
ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the
TSF
ADV_TDS.3 Basic modular design
AGD: Guidance documents AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
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AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ALC: Life-cycle support ALC_CMC.4 Production support, acceptance
procedures and automation
ALC_CMS.4 Problem tracking CM coverage
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
ALC_DVS.1 Identification of security measures
ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model
ALC_TAT.1 Well-defined development tools
ALC_FLR.1 Basic flaw remediation
ATE: Tests ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage
ATE_DPT.1 Testing: basic design
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing - sample
AVA: Vulnerability assessment AVA_VAN.3 Focused vulnerability analysis
SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS
The product security functionality satisfies the following functional requirements,
according to the Common Criteria v3.1 R4:
Class Family/Component
FAU GEN.1
GEN.2
SAR.1
SAR.3
STG.1
STG.3
FCS COP.1/AES
COP.1/DES
COP.1/3DES
COP.1/RSA
COP.1/MD5
COP.1/HMAC-MD5
COP.1/HMAC-SHA
CKM.1/AES
CKM.1/DES
CKM.1/3DES
CKM.1/RSA
CKM.1/HMAC_MD5
CKM.1/HMAC_SHA
CKM.4/3DES
CKM.4/AES
CKM.4/DES
CKM.4/RSA
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CKM.4/HMAC_MD5
CKM.4/HMAC-SHA
FDP ACC.1
ACF.1
IFC.1
IFF.1
FIA AFL.1
ATD.1
SOS.1/OSPF
SOS.1/BGP
SOS.1/SSH
UAU.2
UID.2
FMT MOF.1
MSA.1
MSA.3
SMF.1
SMR.1
FPT STM.1
FTA SSL.3
TSE.1
FTP TRP.1
ITC.1
IDENTIFICATION
Product: Eudemon1000E-N(USG6600) Series Firewall
SW version: V100R001C20SPC100B021
HW platforms ESN:
Series Model ESN
1000E Eudemon1000E-N7E 210235G7FYZ0C8000001
USG6620 2102359519Z0C9000004
USG6650 210235G7G410E7000104
USG6680 210235G7G70123401230
Security Target: Eudemon1000E-N(USG6600) Series Firewall － Security Target,
version 1.13, October 2015
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Protection Profile: No.
Evaluation Level: Common Criteria v3.1 R4 – EAL4 + ALC_FLR.1
SECURITY POLICIES
There are no Organizational Security Policies defined for this evaluation.
ASSUMPTIONS AND OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
The following assumptions are constraints to the conditions used to assure the
security properties and functionalities compiled by the security target [ST]. These
assumptions have been applied during the evaluation in order to determine if the
identified vulnerabilities can be exploited.
In order to assure the secure use of the TOE, it is necessary to start from these
assumptions for its operational environment. If this is not possible and any of them
could not be assumed, it would not be possible to assure the secure operation of the
TOE.
Assumption Name Assumption Definition
A.PhysicalProtection The TOE is physically protected so that only the
authorized user of the TOE has physical access.
A.NetworkElements The environment is supposed to provide
supporting mechanism to the TOE:
 A Radius server or TACACS+ server for
external authentication/authorization
decisions;
 Peer router(s) for the exchange of dynamic
routing information;
 Remote entities (PCs) used for
administration of the TOE.
A.NetworkSegregation It is assumed that the ETH management
interface in the TOE will be accessed only
through an independent local network. This
network is separate from the networks that use
the other interfaces of the TOE.
A.NoEvil The administration users who manage the TOE
and TOE environmental components are
appropriately trained, non-hostile, and follow all
guidance.
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THREATS
The threats to the IT assets against which protection is required by the TOE or by
the security environment are listed below.
The information assets to be protected are the information stored, processed or
generated by the TOE. Configuration data for the TOE, TSF data (such as user
account information and passwords, routing configuration data, etc.) and other
information that the TOE facilitates access to (such as system software, patches and
network traffic routed by the TOE) are all considered part of information assets.
The threats defined are:
Threat Name Threat Definition
T.UnwantedTraffic Any network user that sends
unwanted/unexpected traffic to/through
the TOE will cause the TOE and/or
resources on the network to become
too slow or unavailable, or
reach resources on the network that it
is not allowed to reach.
T.UnauthenticatedAccess A user who is not an administrator
gains access to the management
interface of the TOE
T.UnauthorizedAccess An administrator authorized to perform
certain actions and access certain
information gains access to commands
or information he is not authorized for.
T.Eavesdrop An eavesdropper is able to intercept,
and potentially modify or re-use
information assets that are exchanged
between:
TOE and LMT/RMT (management
traffic)
TOE and other routers/switches
(routing information)
OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT FUNCTIONALITY
The product requires the cooperation from its operational environment to fulfil some
of the objectives of the defined security problem. The security objectives declared for
the TOE operational environment are categorized below.
Security Objectives that are to be satisfied by the environment:
Environment Security Objective Definition
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Environment Security Objective Definition
OE.NetworkElements The operational environment shall
provide network devices that the TOE
needs to cooperate with:
 A Radius server or TACACS+ server
for external authentication /
authorization decisions;
 Peer router(s) for the exchange of
dynamic routing information;
 Remote entities (PCs) used for
administration of the TOE.
OE.Physical The operational environment shall protect
the TOE against unauthorized physical
access.
OE.NetworkSegregation The operational environment shall ensure
that the ETH management interface in
the TOE will be accessed only through
an independent local network This
network is separate from the networks
that use the other interfaces of the TOE.
OE.Manage Sites deploying the TOE will provide
competent, non-hostile TOE
administrators who are appropriately
trained and follow all administrator
guidance. TOE administrators will ensure
the system and its environment are used
securely.
ARCHITECTURE
LOGICAL ARCHITECTURE
The logical architecture is depicted in the following figure:
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The TOE software is divided into two different planes: Management Plane (MP) a
Data Plane (DP). MP is composed by only one subsystem called Management plane
Subsystem. DP is composed by three subsystems called Forwarding plane
Subsystem, Control plane Subsystem, and Content Filter Subsystem.
Management plane subsystem provides configuration management, protocol, status,
routing management and device management. (Security Function Management,
Cryptographic support, Access control, Authentication, Communication Security)
Forwarding plane subsystem provide firewall packet forwarding, security check and
traffic control. (Flow control policy, Communication Security)
Control plane subsystem provides user authentication(local or remote using a
RADIUS or TACACS server), relation analyze and remote query for specific
operation. (Authentication, Communication security)
Content Filter plane subsystem provides functionality which is not SFR-related such
as anti-virus, anti-spam, DPI (Deep Protocol Identification), and other non-security
features. This subsystem is irrelevant with the security features, and therefore will no
longer be mentioned along this security target.
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PHYSICAL ARCHITECTURE
The following table shows the base platforms models of the TOE.
Model Picture
USG6620/6630/6650/6660/6670/6680
Eudemon1000E-N3/N5/N6/N7/N7E
The SW running within the equipment is:
File name: sup.bin
MD5: ccbf426bc3039844d7d816126e10a56
DOCUMENTS
The product includes the following documents that shall be distributed and made
available together to the users of the evaluated version.
The manual and guides of the product are published at technical support web site
(http://www.huawei.com) of Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. The user can retrieve,
browse, and download all the documents online from this site.
 USG6000
1. Log in to the homepage of Huawei at
http://enterprise.huawei.com
2. If you are not a registered user, you need to go to 3 to register
first. If you are already a registered user, go to 4 to log in.
3. Click Register and register with the system according to the
prompt. After the registration succeeds, you will obtain your
account and password. Keep them safe.
4. Enter the user name, password, and displayed verification code,
and then click Login.
5. Click ‘Support’ button in top of the page. Choose Product
Support > Enterprise Networking > Security > NGFW, and click
Secospace USG6300, Secospace USG6500.
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6. Download HUAWEI USG6000 Series & NGFW Module
V100R001C20SPC100Product Documentation. All the manuals
of USG6000 V100R001C20SPC100 are in this compressed
package.
 Eudemon200E-N/1000E-N
1. Log in to the homepage of Huawei at
http://support.huawei.com/carrier/
2. Click “Access Earlier Website”.
3. If you are not a registered user, you need to go to 4 to register
first. If you are already a registered user, go to 5 to log in.
4. Click Register and register with the system according to the
prompt. After the registration succeeds, you will obtain your
account and password. Keep them safe.
5. Choose Data Communication > Product > Network Security >
Eudemon > Product Manual, and click Eudemon200E-
N(V100R001C20SPC100) or Eudemon1000E-
N(V100R001C20SPC100).
6. Download HUAWEI Eudemon200E-N/1000E-N Series & NGFW
Module V100R001C20SPC100Product Documentation. All the
manuals of Eudemon200E-N/1000E-N
V100R001C20SPC100are in this compressed package.
PRODUCT TESTING
The tests performed by both the evaluator and the developer are based on the TSFIs
description included in the functional specification, the SFRs description included in
[ST], and the subsystems and modules defined in the TOE design documentation.
The evaluator has performed an installation and configuration of the TOE and its
operational environment following the steps included in the installation and operation
manuals. The TOE configuration used to execute the independent tests is consistent
with the evaluated configuration according to security target [ST]. The evaluator has
repeated all the cases specified by the developer in the test documentation and has
compared the obtained results with those obtained by the developer and
documented in each associated report. The test repetition performed by the
evaluator has demonstrated that the test plan and report provided by the vendor
contains information enough to make a reader able to repeat all tests included.
Additionally, after the repetition, the evaluator has obtained the same results as the
expected ones. The independent testing has covered 100% of SFRs of the [ST] and
TSFIs defined in the functional specification for the TOE, sampling has not been
performed. The test cases have taken into account critical parameters values,
searching that the TOE behaves in a non-expected manner. There has not been any
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deviation from the expected results under the environment defined in security target
[ST].
The deployed testing platforms for the evaluation are presented in the following
figure:
PENETRATION TESTING
The evaluator has performed an installation and configuration of the TOE and its
operational environment following the steps included in the installation and operation
manuals. The TOE does NOT present exploitable vulnerabilities under the
environment defined in the security target [ST]. All identified vulnerabilities can be
considered closed if the TOE is installed and operated according to the security
target [ST] and related documentation. The overall test result is that no deviations
were found between the expected and the actual test results taking into account that
environment. No attack scenario with the attack potential “Basic” has been
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successful in the TOE’s operational environment as defined in the security target
[ST] when all measures required by the developer are applied.
EVALUATED CONFIGURATION
The TOE is defined by its name and version number:
- Eudemon1000E-N (USG6600) Series Firewall
SW version: V100R001C20SPC100B021
HW platforms ESN:
Series Environment ESN
1000E Local 210235G7FYZ0C8000001
Remote 2102359519Z0C9000004
Remote 210235G7G410E7000104
Remote 210235G7G70123401230
To set up the TOE in a way consistent to the evaluated configuration and the
operational environment defined in the security target [ST], users must follow the
steps included in the installation and operation manuals (see section DOCUMENTS).
EVALUATION RESULTS
The product “Eudemon1000E-N(USG6600) Series Firewall“ has been evaluated
against the “Eudemon1000E-N(USG6600) Series Firewall Security Target, Version
1.13, October 2015”.
All the assurance components required by the evaluation level EAL4 + ALC_FLR.1
have been assigned a “PASS” verdict. Consequently, the laboratory Epoche & Espri
S.L.U assigns the “PASS” VERDICT to the whole evaluation due all the evaluator
actions are satisfied for the evaluation level EAL4 + ALC_FLR.1, as defined by the
Common Criteria v3.1 R4 and the CEM v3.1 R4.
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COMMENTS & RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE
EVALUATION TEAM
The TOE usage is recommended given that there are not exploitable vulnerabilities
in the operational environment. Nonetheless, the following usage recommendations
are given:
- The fulfilment of the assumptions within indicated in the security target is a key
point as it implies TOE environment configurations that leave some potential
vulnerabilities out of the scope.
- It is very important the adequate fulfilling of the installation procedures; the
installation procedure may be vulnerable if those procedures are not followed.
CERTIFIER RECOMMENDATIONS
Considering the obtained evidences during the instruction of the certification request
of the product “Eudemon1000E-N(USG6600) Series Firewall, version
V100R001C20SPC100B021”, a positive resolution is proposed.
GLOSSARY
CCN Centro Criptológico Nacional
CNI Centro Nacional de Inteligencia
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
OC Organismo de Certificación
SFR Security Functional Requirement
TOE Target Of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
TSFI TSF Interface
BIBLIOGRAPHY
The following standards and documents have been used for the evaluation of the
product:
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[CC_P1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 1:
Introduction and general model, Version 3.1, R4 Final, Sept. 2012.
[CC_P2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2:
Security functional components, Version 3.1, R4 Final, Sept. 2012.
[CC_P3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3:
Security assurance components, Version 3.1, R4 Final, Sept. 2012.
[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation:
Version 3.1, R4 Final, Sept. 2012.
[ST] Eudemon1000E-N(USG6600) Series Firewall Security Target, Version 1.13,
October 2015
SECURITY TARGET
Along with this certification report, the complete security target of the evaluation is
available in the Certification Body:
- Eudemon1000E-N(USG6600) Series Firewall Security Target, Version 1.13,
October 2015