BSI-DSZ-CC-0827-V7-2018
for
Infineon Technologies Smart Card IC (Security
Controller) M9900 A22, M9900 C22, M9900 D22,
M9900 G11, M9905 A11, M9906 A11 with optional
Software Libraries RSA2048, RSA4096, EC,
Toolbox, Base, FTL, SCL, HCL, and PSL, and with
specific IC dedicated software
from
Infineon Technologies AG
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.1 CC-Zert-327 V5.21
BSI-DSZ-CC-0827-V7-2018 (*)
Infineon Technologies Smart Card IC (Security Controller) M9900 A22,
M9900 C22, M9900 D22, M9900 G11, M9905 A11, M9906 A11 with
optional Software Libraries RSA2048, RSA4096, EC, Toolbox, Base,
FTL, SCL, HCL, and PSL, and with specific IC dedicated software
from Infineon Technologies AG
PP Conformance: Security IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0,
15 June 2007, BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007
Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 5 augmented by ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5
The IT Product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation
facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1
extended by Scheme Interpretations, and by advice of the Certification Body for
components beyond EAL 5 and CC Supporting Documents as listed in the Certification
Report for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version
3.1. CC and CEM are also published as ISO/IEC 15408 and ISO/IEC 18045.
(*) This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its
evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report and
Notification. For details on the validity see Certification Report part A chapter 4
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification
scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions
of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the
evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT Product by the Federal Office for
Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is
either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 14 September 2018
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Joachim Weber L.S.
Head of Branch
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
SOGIS
Recognition Agreement
Common Criteria
Recognition Arrangement
recognition for components
up to EAL 2 and ALC_FLR
only
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0827-V7-2018
This page is intentionally left blank.
4 / 34
BSI-DSZ-CC-0827-V7-2018 Certification Report
Contents
A. Certification.......................................................................................................................6
1. Preliminary Remarks.....................................................................................................6
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure................................................................6
3. Recognition Agreements...............................................................................................7
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification.................................................................8
5. Validity of the Certification Result..................................................................................8
6. Publication.....................................................................................................................9
B. Certification Results........................................................................................................10
1. Executive Summary.....................................................................................................11
2. Identification of the TOE..............................................................................................12
3. Security Policy.............................................................................................................17
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope......................................................................18
5. Architectural Information..............................................................................................18
6. Documentation............................................................................................................19
7. IT Product Testing........................................................................................................19
8. Evaluated Configuration..............................................................................................19
9. Results of the Evaluation.............................................................................................21
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE......................................................26
11. Security Target...........................................................................................................27
12. Definitions..................................................................................................................27
13. Bibliography...............................................................................................................28
C. Excerpts from the Criteria...............................................................................................31
D. Annexes..........................................................................................................................32
5 / 34
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0827-V7-2018
A. Certification
1. Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● Act on the Federal Office for Information Security1
● BSI Certification and Approval Ordinance2
● BSI Schedule of Costs3
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
● DIN EN ISO/IEC 17065 standard
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) [3]
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility, its
approval and licencing process (CC-Stellen) [3]
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.14
[1] also published as
ISO/IEC 15408.
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
2
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of Security Certificates and approval by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungs- und -Anerkennungsverordnung - BSIZertV) of 17 December
2014, Bundesgesetzblatt 2014, part I, no. 61, p. 2231
3
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
6 / 34
BSI-DSZ-CC-0827-V7-2018 Certification Report
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 [2] also published
as ISO/IEC 18045.
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
3. Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
3.1. European Recognition of CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and, in addition, at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS
Technical Domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL 1 to EAL 4. For "Smartcards and similar devices" a SOGIS Technical Domain is in
place. For "HW Devices with Security Boxes" a SOGIS Technical Domains is in place, too.
In addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of
the recognition agreement.
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, details on
recognition, and the history of the agreement can be seen on the website at
https://www.sogisportal.eu.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the related bodies of the signatory nations. A disclaimer
beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of recognition.
This certificate is recognized under SOGIS-MRA for all assurance components selected.
3.2. International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC
(Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08
September 2014. It covers CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP)
(exact use), CC certificates based on assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or
the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR) and CC certificates for Protection
Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on
the website: https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the related bodies
of the signatory nations. A disclaimer beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of
recognition.
This certificate is recognized according to the rules of CCRA-2014, i. e. up to and including
CC part 3 EAL 2+ ALC_FLR components.
4
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated
23 February 2007, p. 3730
7 / 34
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0827-V7-2018
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product Infineon Technologies Smart Card IC (Security Controller) M9900 A22, M9900
C22, M9900 D22, M9900 G11, M9905 A11, M9906 A11 with optional Software Libraries
RSA2048, RSA4096, EC, Toolbox, Base, FTL, SCL, HCL, and PSL, and with specific IC
dedicated software has undergone the certification procedure at BSI. This is a re-
certification based on BSI-DSZ-CC-0827-V6-2017. Specific results from the evaluation
process BSI-DSZ-CC-0827-V6-2017 were re-used.
The evaluation of the product Infineon Technologies Smart Card IC (Security Controller)
M9900 A22, M9900 C22, M9900 D22, M9900 G11, M9905 A11, M9906 A11 with optional
Software Libraries RSA2048, RSA4096, EC, Toolbox, Base, FTL, SCL, HCL, and PSL,
and with specific IC dedicated software was conducted by TÜV Informationstechnik
GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 4 September 2018. TÜV Informationstechnik
GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)5
recognised by the certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: Infineon Technologies AG.
The product was developed by: Infineon Technologies AG.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
5. Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report applies only to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report
and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance components and assurance levels please refer to CC
itself. Detailed references are listed in part C of this report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-assessment or
re-certification). Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation
and certification procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk
management needs regularly updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-
assessment on a regular e.g. annual basis.
In order to avoid an indefinite usage of the certificate when evolved attack methods would
require a re-assessment of the products resistance to state of the art attack methods, the
maximum validity of the certificate has been limited. The certificate issued on 14
5
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
8 / 34
BSI-DSZ-CC-0827-V7-2018 Certification Report
September 2018 is valid until 13 September 2023. Validity can be re-newed by re-
certification.
The owner of the certificate is obliged:
1. when advertising the certificate or the fact of the product's certification, to refer to
the Certification Report as well as to provide the Certification Report, the Security
Target and user guidance documentation mentioned herein to any customer of the
product for the application and usage of the certified product,
2. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately about vulnerabilities of the
product that have been identified by the developer or any third party after issuance
of the certificate,
3. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately in the case that security relevant
changes in the evaluated life cycle, e.g. related to development and production sites
or processes, occur, or the confidentiality of documentation and information related
to the Target of Evaluation (TOE) or resulting from the evaluation and certification
procedure where the certification of the product has assumed this confidentiality
being maintained, is not given any longer. In particular, prior to the dissemination of
confidential documentation and information related to the TOE or resulting from the
evaluation and certification procedure that do not belong to the deliverables
according to the Certification Report part B, or for those where no dissemination
rules have been agreed on, to third parties, the Certification Body at BSI has to be
informed.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
6. Publication
The product Infineon Technologies Smart Card IC (Security Controller) M9900 A22, M9900
C22, M9900 D22, M9900 G11, M9905 A11, M9906 A11 with optional Software Libraries
RSA2048, RSA4096, EC, Toolbox, Base, FTL, SCL, HCL, and PSL, and with specific IC
dedicated software has been included in the BSI list of certified products, which is
published regularly (see also Internet: https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]). Further
information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer6
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
6
Infineon Technologies AG
Am Campeon 1-12
85579 Neubiberg
9 / 34
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0827-V7-2018
B. Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
10 / 34
BSI-DSZ-CC-0827-V7-2018 Certification Report
1. Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the Infineon Technologies Smart Card IC (Security
Controller) M9900 A22, M9900 C22, M9900 D22, M9900 G11, M9905 A11, M9906 A11
with optional Software Libraries RSA2048, RSA4096, EC, Toolbox, Base, FTL, SCL, HCL,
and PSL, and with specific IC dedicated software.
The TOE provides a real 32-bit CPU-architecture and is compatible to the ARMv7-M
instruction set. The major components of the core system are the 32-bit CPU (Central
Processing Unit), the Cache system, the MPU (Memory Protection Unit) and MED
(Memory Encryption/Decryption Unit).
The TOE consists of the hardware part, the firmware parts and the software parts. The
software parts are differentiated into: the asymmetric cryptographic libraries RSA and EC,
the symmetric cryptographic library SCL for DES and AES and the additional optional
libraries PSL, Toolbox, Base, FTL and HCL.
This TOE is intended to be used in smart cards for particularly security relevant
applications and for its previous use as developing platform for smart card operating
systems. The term Smartcard Embedded Software is used in the following for all operating
systems and applications stored and executed on the TOE. The TOE is the platform for the
Smartcard Embedded Software.
The Security Target [6] and [9] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified
Protection Profile Security IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, 15 June 2007, BSI-
CC-PP-0035-2007 [8].
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 5
augmented by ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 7. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and
some of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functionality:
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
SF_DPM Device Phase Management
SF_PS Protection against Snooping
SF_PMA Protection against Modification Attacks
SF_PLA Protection against Logical Attacks
SF_CS Cryptographic Support
Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 7.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6] and [9],
chapter 4.1.2 . Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of
Assumptions, Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security
Target [6] and [9], chapter 4.
11 / 34
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0827-V7-2018
This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8.
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2. Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
Infineon Technologies Smart Card IC (Security Controller) M9900 A22, M9900 C22,
M9900 D22, M9900 G11, M9905 A11, M9906 A11 with optional Software Libraries
RSA2048, RSA4096, EC, Toolbox, Base, FTL, SCL, HCL, and PSL, and with specific
IC dedicated software.
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery / Note
1 HW M9900 Smart Card IC,
Firmware-ID:
80001141 (BOS-V1) and
80001142 (BOS-V2)
A22 (produced
in Dresden)
Bare dies, plain wafers,
complete modules or IC
cases.
1a HW M9900 Smart Card IC
Firmware-ID:
80001141 (BOS-V1) and
80001142 (BOS-V2)
C22 (produced
in Dresden)
Equal to the M9900 A22, with
additional wafer level
package (WLP).
1b HW M9900 Smart Card IC
Firmware-ID:
80001141 (BOS-V1) and
80001142 (BOS-V2)
D22 (produced
in Dresden)
Equal to the M9900 A22, with
additional wafer level ballgrid
array (WLB).
1c HW M9900 Smart Card IC
Firmware-ID:
80001141 (BOS-V1) and
80001142 (BOS-V2)
G11 (produced
in Tainan)
Bare dies, plain wafers,
complete modules or IC
cases.
1d HW M9905 Smart Card IC
Firmware-ID:
80001151 (BOS-V1)
A11 (produced
in Dresden)
Bare dies, plain wafers,
complete modules or IC
cases.
1f HW M9906 Smart Card IC
Firmware-ID:
80001150 (BOS-V1)
A11 (produced
in Dresden)
Bare dies, plain wafers,
complete modules or IC
cases.
Firmware
12 / 34
BSI-DSZ-CC-0827-V7-2018 Certification Report
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery / Note
2 FW Flash Loader FW Identifier
80 00 11 41 or
80 00 11 42 or
80 00 11 50 or
80 00 11 51
Stored in reserved area of the
ROM on the IC (patch in
NVM).
3 FW BOS Boot System (the IC
Dedicated Test Software)
FW Identifier
80 00 11 41 or
80 00 11 42 or
80 00 11 50 or
80 00 11 51
Stored in Test ROM on the
IC.
4 FW RMS Resource
Management System (the
IC Dedicated Support
Software)
FW Identifier
80 00 11 41 or
80 00 11 42 or
80 00 11 50 or
80 00 11 51
Stored in reserved area of the
ROM on the IC (patch in
NVM).
5 FW Mifare-compatible Reader
Mode Support Library
(out of scope of
evaluation)
01.02.0800 Stored in reserved area of the
ROM on the IC (patch in
NVM).
Optional.
6 FW Management of Mifare-
compatible Cards Library
(out of scope of
evaluation)
01.03.0927,
01.04.1275
Stored in reserved area of the
ROM on the IC (patch in
NVM).
Optional.
Software / Libraries (optional)
7 SW RSA library RSA2048
2.05.005 (not
for G11) or
2.07.003
RSA4096
2.05.005 (not
for G11) or
2.07.003
Optional.
8 SW EC library 2.05.005 (not
for G11) or
2.07.003
Optional.
9 SW Toolbox 2.05.005 (not
for G11) or
2.07.003
Optional.
10 SW Base library 2.05.005 (not
for G11) or
2.07.003
Optional.
13 / 34
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0827-V7-2018
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery / Note
11 SW Symmetric Crypto Library 2.01.011,
2.02.010 or
2.04.003.
For G11:
None.
Optional.
12 SW Platform Support Layer 4.00.010,
5.00.06
For G11:
None.
Optional.
13 SW Management of Mifare-
compatible Cards
01.03.0927 or
01.04.1275
Optional.
14 SW Mifare-compatible Reader
Mode Support
01.02.0800 Optional.
15 SW Flash Translation Layer 1.01.0008 Optional.
16 SW Hash Cryptographic
Library
1.01.003
For G11:
None.
Optional.
Guidance
17 DOC SLE 97 32-bit Security
Controller Family based
on SC300 in 90 nm
CMOS Technology
M9900 Solid Flash
Controller for HD-SIM
Applications Hardware
Reference Manual
2013-10-25,
v2.2
Document in electronic form.
18 DOC M9900 Errata Sheet 2016-11-21,
v2.1
Document in electronic form.
19 DOC M9905 M9906 Errata
Sheet
2017-01-30,
v2.2
Document in electronic form.
20 DOC M9900 Security
Guidelines User’s Manual
2018-07-03 Document in electronic form.
21 DOC 32-bit ARM-based
Security Controller SLE
97 Programmer’s
Reference Manual
2017-03-29,
v3.7
Document in electronic form.
22 DOC ARMv7-M Architecture
Reference Manual
(ID021310)
2010-02-12 Document in electronic form.
14 / 34
BSI-DSZ-CC-0827-V7-2018 Certification Report
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery / Note
23 DOC SLE 97 /SLC 14 Family
Production and
Personalization User’s
Manual
2014-08-10 Document in electronic form.
Optional Guidance
24 DOC CL97 Asymmetric Crypto
Library for Crypto@2304T
RSA / EC / Toolbox User
Interface (v2.05.005)
2017-05-10 Optional (Document in
electronic form.)
25 DOC CL97 Asymmetric Crypto
Library for Crypto@2304T
RSA / ECC / Toolbox
User Interface
(v2.07.003)
2018-05-24 Optional (Document in
electronic form.)
26 DOC SLE 97 Flash Translation
Layer User’s Manual
(for FTL v1.01.0008)
2012-07-10,
v1.0
Optional (Document in
electronic form.)
27 DOC HCL97-CPU-L90 Hash
Crypto Library for CPU
SHA
(for HCL v1.01.003)
2018-05-22,
v1.01.003
Optional (Document in
electronic form.)
28 DOC SLI97 Family PSL
Reference Manual User’s
Manual
(PSL v4.00.09, but also
applicable to PSL
v4.00.10)
2016-08-04 Optional (Document in
electronic form.)
29 DOC SLI97 Release Notes
(PSL V4.00.10)
2018-06-07,
v1.1
Optional (Document in
electronic form.)
30 DOC SLx97 Platform Support
Layer Library
Programmer’s Reference
Manual
(PSL v5.00.06)
2018-07-06,
v5.4
Optional (Document in
electronic form.)
31 DOC PSL Security
Guidelines
(PSL v4.00.10)
2018-06-07,
v1.6
Optional (Document in
electronic form.)
32 DOC PSL Security
Guidelines
(PSL v5.00.06)
2018-07-06,
v2.5
Optional (Document in
electronic form.)
33 DOC SCL97 Symmetric Crypto
Library for SCPv3 DES /
AES 32-bit Security
Controller User Interface
(V2.01.011)
2016-08-02 Optional (Document in
electronic form.)
15 / 34
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0827-V7-2018
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery / Note
34 DOC SCL97 Symmetric Crypto
Library for SCPv4 DES /
AES 32-bit Security
Controller User Interface
(V2.02.010)
2016-12-09 Optional (Document in
electronic form.)
35 DOC SCL97 Symmetric Crypto
Library for SCPv3 DES /
AES 32-bit Security
Controller User Interface
(for SCL v2.04.003)
2018-05-22 Optional (Document in
electronic form.)
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
The individual TOE hardware is uniquely identified by its identification data. The
identification data contains the lot number, the wafer number and the coordinates of the
chip on the wafer. Each individual TOE can therefore be traced unambiguously and thus
assigned to the entire development and production process.
As the TOE is under control of the user software, the TOE Manufacturer can only
guarantee the integrity up to the delivery procedure. It is in the responsibility of the
Composite Product Manufacturer to include mechanisms in the implemented software
(developed by the IC Embedded Software Developer) which allows detection of
modifications after the delivery.
In detail, regarding identification:
The TOE can be delivered in various configurations, achieved by means of blocking and
depending on the customer order.
All product derivatives of this TOE, including all configuration possibilities differentiated by
the Generic Chip Identification Mode (GCIM) data and the configuration information output,
are manufactured by Infineon Technologies AG. However, the Smartcard Embedded
Software respectively user software is not part of the TOE.
New configurations can occur at any time depending on the user blocking or by different
configurations applied by the manufacturer. In any case the user is able to clearly identify
the TOE hardware, its configuration and proof the validity of the certificate independently,
meaning without involving the manufacturer. The various blocking options, as well as the
means used for the blocking, are done during the manufacturing process or at user
premises. Entirely all means of blocking and the firmware respectively software parts
involved in the blocking used at Infineon Technologies AG and/or the user premises, are
subject of the evaluation. All resulting configurations of a TOE derivative are subject of the
certificate. All resulting configurations are either at the predefined limits or within the
predefined configuration ranges. - For more information about blocking, see chapter 8
below.
The hardware part of the TOE is identified by M9900 A22/G11/C22/D22, M9905 A11,
M9906 A11. Another characteristic of the TOE is the chip identification data. The chip
identification data is accessible via the Generic Chip Identification Mode (GCIM). This
GCIM outputs amongst other identifiers for the platform, chip mode, ROM code, chip type,
design step, fabrication facility, wafer, die position, firmware, temperature range, and
system frequency.
16 / 34
BSI-DSZ-CC-0827-V7-2018 Certification Report
For further, detailed information regarding TOE identification see [6] and [9], p.7f (remark
1).
In detail, regarding delivery:
“TOE Delivery” is uniquely used to indicate
● after Phase 3 (or before Phase 4) if the TOE is delivered in form of wafers or sawn
wafers (dice) or
● after Phase 4 (or before Phase 5) if the TOE is delivered in form of packaged products.
Therefore three different delivering procedures have to be taken into consideration:
● Delivery of the IC dedicated software components (IC dedicated SW, guidance) from the
TOE manufacturer to the IC embedded software developer.
● Delivery of the IC embedded software (ROM / Flash data, initialisation and pre-
personalization data, Bundle Business package) from the IC embedded software
developer to the TOE manufacturer.
● Delivery of the final TOE from the TOE manufacturer to the composite product
manufacturer. After phase 3 the TOE is delivered in form of wafers or sawn wafers, after
phase 4 in form of modules (with or without inlay antenna).
The TOE is delivered via the logistics sites:
● DHL Singapore (Distribution Center Asia),
● G&D Neustadt,
● K&N Großostheim (Distribution Center Europe),
● K&N Hayward (Distribution Center USA).
3. Security Policy
The security policy enforced is defined by the selected set of Security Functional
Requirements and implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues:
The Security Policy of the TOE is to provide basic security functionalities to be used by the
smart card operating system and the smart card application, thus providing an overall
smart card system security. Therefore, the TOE will implement a symmetric cryptographic
block cipher algorithms (Triple-DES and AES), to ensure the confidentiality of plain text
data by encryption and to support secure authentication protocols and it will provide a
random number generation of appropriate quality.
The SCL uses the symmetric cryptographic co-processor (SCP) of the hardware to provide
the user with a software interface to the DES and AES calculations and adds
countermeasures against leakage and fault attacks. Please note that the “*_Sec1”
functions of the SCLs are not covered by this evaluation, in contrast to the evaluated
“*_Sec2” counterparts.
The RSA library is used to provide a high level interface to RSA (Rivest, Shamir, Adleman)
cryptography implemented on the hardware component Crypto@2304T and includes
countermeasures against SPA, DPA and DFA attacks. The EC library is used to provide a
high level interface to Elliptic Curve cryptography implemented on the hardware
component Crypto@2304T and includes countermeasures against SPA, DPA and DFA
attacks.
17 / 34
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0827-V7-2018
The PSL library provides the user with a standardised software interface to access
different hardware and software parts of the TOE. The security relevant services, which
can be accessed via the PSL are the RSA library, the EC library, the SCL, the HCL (only
for PSL v5.00.06) and the random number generation.
As the TOE is a hardware security platform, the security policy of the TOE is also to
provide protection against leakage of information (e.g. to ensure the confidentiality of
cryptographic keys during AES, Triple-DES, RSA and EC cryptographic functions
performed by the TOE), against physical probing, against malfunctions, against physical
manipulations and against abuse of functionality. Hence the TOE shall
● maintain the integrity and the confidentiality of data stored in the memory of the TOE
and
● maintain the integrity, the correct operation and the confidentiality of security
functionalities (security mechanisms and associated functions) provided by the TOE.
Specific details concerning the above mentioned security policies can be found in Chapter
7 and 8 of the Security Target (ST).
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are
of relevance:
Protection during composite manufacturing (OE.Process-Sec-IC) [Phase 5-6, optional
Phase 4], usage of hardware platform (OE.Plat-Appl) and treatment of user data
(OE.Resp-Appl) [both Phase 1]. Details can be found in the Security Target [6] and [9],
chapter 5.2.
5. Architectural Information
The TOE is a SmartCard (Security IC). Detailed information on the TOE hardware
architecture is to be found in [6] and [9] section 2.1.
Regarding the different libraries available and their dependencies:
The RSA2048 and RSA4096 libraries are variants of the same RSA library. They differ only
in the maximum key size: the RSA2048 library supports keys of up to 2112 bits and the
RSA4096 library supports keys of up to 4224 bits. All other functionalities are identical.
The RSA library, ECC library, and Toolbox library are parts of the Asymmetric
Cryptographic Library (ACL). All selected parts of the ACL have to be of the same version
number. If at least one of the ACL parts is selected a Base Library (not in scope of the
evaluation) is automatically included.
The Platform Support Library (PSL) provides a standardised interface to the hardware,
directly or via the ACL or SCL libraries. As such it functions as a wrapper and provides no
security relevant parts. If the PSL library v4.00.10 is part of the shipment, the RSA, EC,
Base libraries v2.05.005 and the SCL library v2.01.011 are automatically included. If the
PSL library v5.00.06 is part of the shipment, the RSA, EC, Base libraries v2.07.003, the
SCL library v2.04.003 and the HCL library v1.01.003 are automatically included.
18 / 34
BSI-DSZ-CC-0827-V7-2018 Certification Report
If the Symmetric Cryptographic Processor is blocked no hardware-based DES and AES
calculations can be performed by the TOE. Furthermore the SCL cannot be used.
Blocking the Crypto2304T co-processor means that the RSA, ECC and Toolbox library
cannot be used, because they perform their basic calculations on this co-processor.
6. Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7. IT Product Testing
The developer performed five categories of tests:
● Simulation Tests (Design Verification),
● Qualification Tests / Software Verification,
● Verification Tests,
● Security Evaluation Tests, and
● Production Tests.
The developer tests cover all security functionalities and all security mechanisms as
identified in the functional specification.
The evaluators were able to repeat the tests of the developer either using the library of
programs, tools and prepared chip samples delivered to the evaluator or at the developer’s
site. They performed independent tests to supplement, augment and to verify the tests
performed by the developer. For the developer tests repeated by the evaluators other test
parameters were used and the test equipment was varied. Security features of the TOE
realised by specific design and layout measures were checked by the evaluators during
layout inspections both in design data and on the final product.
The evaluation has shown that the actual version of the TOE provides the security
functionalities as specified by the developer. The test results confirm the correct
implementation of the TOE security functionalities.
For penetration testing the evaluators took all security functionalities into consideration.
Intensive penetration testing was planned based on the analysis results and performed
forthe underlying mechanisms of security functionalities. The penetration tests considered
both the physical tampering of the TOE and attacks which do not modify the TOE
physically. The penetration tests results confirm that the TOE is resistant to attackers with
high attack potential in the intended environment for the TOE.
8. Evaluated Configuration
This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE:
● Smartcard IC M9900 A22 (Dresden; or C22 / D22 for the additional derivatives WLP /
WLB),
19 / 34
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0827-V7-2018
● Smartcard IC M9900 G11 (Tainan),
● Smartcard IC M9905 A11 (Dresden), and
● Smartcard IC M9906 A11 (Dresden).
This TOE is represented by various configurations called products, which are all derived
from the equal hardware design M9900, M9905 and M9906. The same mask is used to
produce different products of the TOE.
The M9900, M9905 and M9906 product offers different configuration options, which a
customer can choose. The mechanism to choose a configuration can be done by the
following methods:
● by product selection or dialog-based in Tools,
● via Bill-per-Use (BpU) and Flash Loader (FL),
The degree of freedom for configuring the TOE is predefined by Infineon Technologies AG.
The list of predefined TOE configurations is given in the SLE97 Hardware Reference
Manual.
All these possible TOE configurations equal and/or within the specified ranges are covered
by the certificate.
Beside fix TOE configurations, which can be ordered as usual, this TOE implements
optionally the so called Bill-Per-Use (BPU) ability. This solution enables the customer to
tailor the product on his own to the required configuration by blocking parts of the chip on
demand into the final configuration at his own premises, without further delivery or
involving support by Infineon Technology AG. Customers, who are intended to use this
feature receiving the TOE in a predefined configuration including the Flash Loader
software, enhanced with the BPU blocking software. The blocking information is part of a
chip configuration area and can be modified by customers using specific APDUs. Once a
final blocking is done, further modifications are disabled.
The BPU software part is only present on the products which have been ordered with the
BPU option. In all other cases this software is not present on the product. - For more
details please refer to the Security Target Lite [9], chapter 2.1.8.
Depending on the blocking configuration a product can have different user available
configuration.
As noted above the user has the possibility to tailor the crypto co-processor part of the
TOE during the manufacturing process by deselecting the Asymmetric Cryptographic
Processor (Crypto@2304T) or the Symmetric Cryptographic Processor (SCP). Hence if
the asymmetric cryptographic co-processor is blocked, the user will not be able to use the
RSA, EC and Toolbox library, because they use this co-processor to perform their basic
calculations. The hardware based DES and AES calculations, as well as the SCL
operations are not available in case that the SCP is blocked. In order to use the PSL both
co-processors, as well as the asymmetric and symmetric cryptographic libraries need to be
available (see also chapter 5 “architectural information”).
20 / 34
BSI-DSZ-CC-0827-V7-2018 Certification Report
9. Results of the Evaluation
9.1. CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used for those components up to EAL 5
extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and guidance
specific for the technology of the product [4] (AIS 34).
The following guidance specific for the technology was used:
● Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 1, Durchführung
der Ortsbesichtigung in der Entwicklungsumgebung des Herstellers, Version 14, 2017-
10-11,
● Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 14, Anforderungen
an Aufbau und Inhalt der ETR-Teile (Evaluation Technical Report) für Evaluationen nach
CC (Common Criteria), Version 7, 2010-08-03,
● Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 19, Anforderungen
an Aufbau und Inhalt der Zusammenfassung des ETR (Evaluation Technical Report) für
Evaluationen nach CC (Common Criteria), Version 9, 2014-11-03,
● Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 20,
Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für deterministische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren, Version 3, 2013-05-15,
● Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 23,
Zusammentragen von Nachweisen der Entwickler, Version 4, 2017-03-15,
● Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) – AIS 25, Anwendungen der
CC auf integrierte Schaltungen, Version 9, 2017-03-15,,
● Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 26,
Evaluationsmethodologie für in Hardware integrierte Schaltungen, Version 9, 2013-03-
21,
● Special Attack Methods for Smartcards and Similar Devices, Version 1.4, 2011-06-08,
● Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 31,
Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für physikalische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren, Version 3, 2013-05-15,
● Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 32, CC-
Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema, Version 7, 2011-06-08,
● Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) – AIS 34, Evaluation
Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL5+ (CC v2.3 & v3.1) and EAL6 (CC
v3.1), Version 3, 2009-09-03,
● Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 35, Öffentliche
Fassung eines Security Target (ST-lite), Version 2, 2007-11-12,
● Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 36,
Kompositionsevaluierung, Version 5, 2017-03-15,
21 / 34
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0827-V7-2018
● Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 37, Terminologie
und Vorbereitung von Smartcard-Evaluierungen, Version 3, 2010-05-17,
● Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) – AIS 38, Reuse of evaluation
results, Version 2, 2007-09-28,
● Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS), AIS 41, Guidelines for PPs
and STs, Version 2, 2011-01-31,
● Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 46, Informationen
zur Evaluierung von kryptographischen Algorithmen und ergänzende Hinweise für die
Evaluierung von Zufallszahlengeneratoren, Version 3, 2013-12-04
are considered.
Additionally the CC Supporting Mandatory Technical Documents
● Joint Interpretation Library – The Application of CC to Integrated Circuits, Version 3.0,
February 2009,
● Joint Interpretation Library – Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards, Version 2.9,
2013-01,
● CC Supporting Document, Mandatory Technical Document, Composite product
evaluation for Smart Cards and similar devices, Version 1.0, Revision 1, September
2007, CCDB-2007-09-001,
● CC Supporting Document Guidance, Smartcard Evaluation, Version 2.0, February 2010,
CCDB-2010-03-001
● CC Supporting Document, Guidance, ETR template for composite evaluation of Smart
Cards and similar devices, Version 1.0, Revision 1, September 2007, CCDB-2007-09-
002
are considered.
For RNG assessment the scheme interpretations AIS 20/31 was used (see [4]).
To support composite evaluations according to AIS 36 the document ETR for composite
evaluation [10] was provided and approved. This document provides details of this
platform evaluation that have to be considered in the course of a composite evaluation on
top of it.
The assurance refinements outlined in the Security Target were followed in the course of
the evaluation of the TOE.
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the EAL 5 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report)
● The components ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5 augmented for this TOE evaluation.
As the evaluation work performed for this certification procedure was carried out as a re-
evaluation based on the certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-0827-V6-2017, re-use of specific
evaluation tasks was possible. The focus of this re-evaluation was on libraries and
respective guidance documentation.
The evaluation has confirmed:
22 / 34
BSI-DSZ-CC-0827-V7-2018 Certification Report
● PP Conformance: Security IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, 15 June
2007, BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007 [8]
● for the Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 5 augmented by ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5
For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production environment see
annex B in part D of this report.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2. Results of cryptographic assessment
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this certification
procedure (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). But cryptographic functionalities with a
security level of lower than 100 bits can no longer be regarded as secure without
considering the application context. Therefore, for these functionalities it shall be checked
whether the related crypto operations are appropriate for the intended system. Some
further hints and guidelines can be derived from the 'Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-02102'
(https://www.bsi.bund.de).
The following table gives an overview of the cryptographic functionalities inside the TOE to
enforce the security policy and outlines its rating from cryptographic point of view. Any
Cryptographic Functionality that is marked in column 'Security Level above 100 Bits' of the
following table with 'no' achieves a security level of lower than 100 Bits (in general context)
only:
Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in Bits Security Level
above 100 Bits
Key Agreement ECDH [X963]
[FIPS186-4]
[RFC5639]
Key sizes corresponding to
the used elliptic curves
P-{192, 224, 256, 384, 521},
K-{163, 233, 283, 409}, B-
{163, 233, 283, 409} [DSS],
brainpoolP{160, 192,
224,256,320,384,512}r1,
brainpoolP{160, 192,
224,256,320,384,512}t1 [ECC]
Key sizes
160, 163, 192: no
Key sizes
>= 224 : yes
Cryptographic
Primitive
3DES in CBC
mode
[NIST SP800-
67]
[NIST SP800-
38A]
|k| = 112, 168 168: Yes,
112: No
3DES in ECB
mode
[NIST SP800-
67]
[NIST SP800-
38A]
|k| = 112, 168 No
3DES in CTR
mode
[NIST SP800-
67]
|k| = 112, 168 168: Yes,
112: No
23 / 34
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0827-V7-2018
Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in Bits Security Level
above 100 Bits
[NIST SP800-
38A]
3DES in CFB
mode
[NIST SP800-
67]
[NIST SP800-
38A]
|k| = 112, 168 168: Yes,
112: No
3DES in CMAC
mode
[NIST SP800-
67]
[NIST SP800-
38A]
|k| = 112, 168 168: Yes,
112: No
3DES CBC-MAC
mode
[ISO_9797-1]
[FIPS197]
|k| = 112, 168 No
AES in CBC
mode
[FIPS197] [NIST
SP800-38A]
|k| = 128, 192, 256 Yes
AES in ECB
mode
[FIPS197] [NIST
SP800-38A]
|k| = 128, 192, 256 No
AES in CTR
mode
[FIPS197] [NIST
SP800-38A]
|k| = 128, 192, 256 Yes
AES in CFB
mode
[FIPS197] [NIST
SP800-38A]
|k| = 128, 192, 256 Yes
AES in CBC-
MAC mode
[ISO_9797-1]
[FIPS197]
|k| = 128, 192, 256 Yes
AES in CMAC
mode
[NIST SP800-
38B] [FIPS197]
|k| = 128, 192, 256 Yes
RSA encryption /
decryption /
signature
generation /
verification (only
modular
exponentiation
part)
[PKCS #1]
for key
generation see
below table
Modulus length =
1976 - 4096
Yes
ECDSA
signature
generation /
verification
[X962]
[FIPS186-4]
[RFC5639]
Key sizes corresponding to
the used elliptic curves
P-{192, 224, 256, 384, 521},
K-{163, 233, 409, 283}, B-163,
{233, 283, 409} [DSS],
brainpoolP{160, 192,
224,256,320,384,512}r1,
brainpoolP{160, 192,
224,256,320,384,512}t1 [ECC]
Key sizes
160, 163, 192: no
Key sizes
>= 224 : yes
Physical True
RNG PTG.2
[AIS31] N/A N/A
24 / 34
BSI-DSZ-CC-0827-V7-2018 Certification Report
Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in Bits Security Level
above 100 Bits
SHA-1 Hash [FIPS180-4] N/A N/A
SHA-2 Hash [FIPS180-4] N/A N/A
Table 3: TOE cryptographic functionality
In addition to table 3 above, the following rating applies regarding RSA Key Gen:
Purpose Cryptographic Mechanism Standard
of
Implemen
- tation
Key Size
in Bits
Security Level
above 100 Bits
Key
Generation
(ACL
v2.07.003)
RSA Key Generation in ACL v2.07.003,
utilizing the preparative function
“CryptoGeneratePrime()” or the function
“CryptoRSAKeyGen()”
n/a 1976 -
4096
Yes
Table 4: TOE cryptographic functionality – RSA Key Gen
For the Cryptographic Functionality
● CryptoGeneratePrimeMask() which might be used in conjunction with RSA Key
Generation in ACL v2.05.005 and v2.07.003,
no statement on the respective cryptographic strength can be given.
The Flash Loader's cryptographic strength was also not assessed by BSI. However, the
evaluation according to the TOE's Evaluation Assurance Level did not reveal any
implementation weaknesses.
Please note, that this holds true also for those algorithms, where no cryptographic 100-Bit-
Level assessment was given. Consequently, the targeted Evaluation Assurance Level has
been achieved for those functionalities as well.
Detailed results on conformance have been compiled into the report [27].
Reference of Legislatives and Standards quoted above:
[X963] American National Standard for Financial Services, ANS X9.63–
2011, Public Key Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry,
Key Agreement and Key Transport Using Elliptic Curve
Cryptography, 2011-12, American National Standard Institute.
[FIPS186-4] Federal Information Processing Standards Publication FIPS PUB
186-4, Digital Signature Standard (DSS), July 2013, U.S. department
of Commerce / National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST).
[RFC5639] RFC 5639, Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Brainpool Standard
Curves and Curve Generation, 2010-03.
[NIST SP800-67] NIST SP800-67 Revision 1, Recommendation for Triple Data
Encryption Algorithm (TDEA) Block Cipher, 2012-01, National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST).
25 / 34
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0827-V7-2018
[NIST SP800-38A] NIST SP800-38A, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of
Operation, Methods and Techniques, 2001, National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST).
[ISO_9797-1] Information technology - Security techniques - Message
Authentication Codes (MACs) - Part 1: Mechanisms using a block
cipher, 1999-12, ISO/IEC.
[FIPS197] Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 197,
ADVANCED ENCRYPTION STANDARD (AES), November 2001,
U.S. department of Commerce / National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST).
[PKCS #1] PKCS #1 v2.2: RSA Cryptography Standard, 2012-10, RSA
Laboratories.
[X962] American National Standard for Financial Services, ANS X9.62–
2005, Public Key Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry,
The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA), 2005-11,
American National Standard Institute.
[AIS31] Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS
31, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für
physikalische Zufallszahlengeneratoren, Version 3, 2013-05-15,
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik.
[FIPS180-4] FIPS PUB 180-4 Federal Information Processing Standards
Publication Secure Hash Standard (SHS), August 2015, Information
Technology Laboratory National Institute of Standards and
Technology.
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE
itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
Some security measures are partly implemented in this certified TOE, but require
additional configuration or control or measures to be implemented by a product layer on
top, e.g. the Embedded Software using the TOE. For this reason the TOE includes
guidance documentation (see table 2) which contains obligations and guidelines for the
developer of the product layer on top on how to securely use this certified TOE and which
measures have to be implemented in order to fulfil the security requirements of the
Security Target of the TOE. In the course of the evaluation of the composite product or
system it must be examined if the required measures have been correctly and effectively
implemented by the product layer on top. Additionally, the evaluation of the composite
product or system must also consider the evaluation results as outlined in the document
ETR for composite evaluation [10].
26 / 34
BSI-DSZ-CC-0827-V7-2018 Certification Report
Please also note that the “*_Sec1” functions of the SCLs (Symmetric Cryptographic
Libraries) are not covered by this evaluation, in contrast to the evaluated “*_Sec2”
counterparts.
The Security IC Embedded Software Developer receives all necessary recommendations
and hints to develop his software in form of the delivered documentation.
● All security hints described in the delivered documents [12]-[25] (also listed in Table 2)
have to be considered.
● The Composite Product Manufacturer receives all necessary recommendations and
hints to develop his software in form of the delivered documentation.
● All security hints described in [26] have to be considered.
In addition the following hints resulting from the evaluation of the ALC evaluation aspect
has to be considered:
● The IC Embedded Software Developer can deliver his software either to Infineon to let
them implement it in the TOE (in Flash memory) or to the Composite Product
Manufacturer to let him download the software in the Flash memory.
● The delivery procedure from the IC Embedded Software Developer to the Composite
Product Manufacturer is not part of this evaluation and a secure delivery is required.
11. Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [9] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report. It is a sanitised version of
the complete Security Target [6] used for the evaluation performed. Sanitisation was
performed according to the rules as outlined in the relevant CCRA policy (see AIS 35 [4]).
12. Definitions
12.1. Acronyms
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
cPP Collaborative Protection Profile
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
PP Protection Profile
27 / 34
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0827-V7-2018
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
12.2. Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Collaborative Protection Profile - A Protection Profile collaboratively developed by an
International Technical Community endorsed by the Management Committee.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in CC
part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in CC part 3.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Package - named set of either security functional or security assurance requirements
Protection Profile - A formal document defined in CC, expressing an implementation
independent set of security requirements for a category of IT Products that meet specific
consumer needs.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - An IT Product and its associated administrator and user guidance
documentation that is the subject of an Evaluation.
TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
13. Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 5, April 2017
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 5, April 2017,
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
28 / 34
BSI-DSZ-CC-0827-V7-2018 Certification Report
[3] BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) and Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility,
approval and licencing (CC-Stellen), https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE7
https://www.bsi.bund.de/AIS
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
on the BSI Website, https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierungsreporte
[6] Confidential Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0827-V7-2018, Version 3.7, 2018-08-17,
“Confidential Security Target M9900, M9905, M9906 including optional Software
Libraries RSA-EC-SCL-HCL-PSL”, Infineon (confidential document)
[7] Evaluation Technical Report, BSI-DSZ-CC-0827-V7-2018 Version 2, 2018-08-21,
“EVALUATION TECHNICAL REPORT SUMMARY (ETR SUMMARY)”, TÜV
Informationstechnik GmbH, (confidential document)
[8] Security IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, 15 June 2007, BSI-CC-PP-
0035-2007
[9] Security Target Lite for BSI-DSZ-CC-0827-V7-2018, Version 3.7, Date 2018-08-17,
“Security Target Lite M9900, M9905, M9906 including optional Software Libraries
RSA-EC-SCL-HCL-PSL”, Infineon (sanitised public document)
[10] ETR for composite evaluation according to AIS 36 for the Product BSI-DSZ-CC-
0827-V7-2018, Version 2, Date 2018-08-21, “EVALUATION TECHNICAL REPORT
FOR COMPOSITE EVALUATION (ETR COMP)”, TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH
(confidential document)
[11] Configuration list for the TOE, v1.4, 2018-06-06, “Configuration Management Scope
M9900, M9905, M9906 including optional Software Libraries RSA-EC-SCL-PSL”,
Infineon (confidential document)
[12] M9900 Security Guidelines User’s Manual, 2018-07-03, Infineon
[13] SLE97 M9900 Hardware Reference Manual, Revision 2.2, 2013-10-25, Infineon
[14] SLE 97, Programmer’s Reference Manual, Rev. 3.7, 2017-03-29, Infineon
[15] M9905 M9906 Families Errata Sheet, Rev. 2.2, 2017-01-30, Infineon
and
M9900 Errata Sheet, Rev. 2.1, 2016-11-21, Infineon
[16] ARMv7-M Architecture Reference Manual, ARM DDI 0403D ID021310, 2010-02-12,
ARM Limited
[17] CL97 Asymmetric Crypto Library for Crypto@2304T RSA / ECC / Toolbox User
Interface, Version 2.05.005, 2017-05-10, Infineon
[18] CL97 Asymmetric Crypto Library for Crypto@2304T RSA / ECC / Toolbox User
Interface, Version 2.07.003, 2018-05-24, Infineon
[19] SCL97 Symmetric Crypto Library for SCPv3 DES / AES 32-bit Security Controller
User Interface (v2.01.011), 2016-08-02, Infineon
and
7
See section 9.1 for a detailed list of used AIS and supporting documents
29 / 34
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0827-V7-2018
SCL97 Symmetric Crypto Library for SCPv4 DES / AES 32-bit Security Controller
User Interface (v2.02.010), 2016-12-09, Infineon
and
SCL97 Symmetric Crypto Library for SCPv3 DES / AES 32-bit Security Controller
User Interface (v2.04.003), 2018-05-22, Infineon
[20] PSL Security Guidelines (PSL version v4.00.09 and v4.00.10), revision 1.6, 2018-
06-07, Infineon
[21] SLI 97 Family PSL Reference Manual User's Manual (PSL v4.00.09 but applicable
to PSL v4.00.10), v4.00.09, 2016-08-04, Infineon
[22] SLI97 PSL Release Notes (PSL v4.00.10), v1.1, 2018-06-07, Infineon
[23] PSL Security Guidelines (PSL v5.00.06), v2.5, 2018-07-06, Infineon
[24] SLx97 Platform Support Layer Library Programmer’s Reference Manual (PSL
v5.00.06), v5.4, 2018-07-06, Infineon
[25] SLE 97 Flash Translation Layer User’s Manual, v1.0, 2012-07-10, Infineon
[26] SLE97 / SLC14 Family Production and Personalization User’s Manual, Edition Aug.
10, 2014, 2014-08-10, Infineon
[27] SINGLE EVALUATION REPORT ADDENDUM to ETR-Part ASE, AVA, AGD, ADV,
Cryptographic Standards Compliance Verification, v1, 2018-06-22, TÜV
Informationstechnik GmbH (confidential document)
30 / 34
BSI-DSZ-CC-0827-V7-2018 Certification Report
C. Excerpts from the Criteria
For the meaning of the assurance components and levels the following references to the
Common Criteria can be followed:
• On conformance claim definitions and descriptions refer to CC part 1 chapter 10.5
• On the concept of assurance classes, families and components refer to CC Part 3
chapter 7.1
• On the concept and definition of pre-defined assurance packages (EAL) refer to CC
Part 3 chapters 7.2 and 8
• On the assurance class ASE for Security Target evaluation refer to CC Part 3
chapter 12
• On the detailled definitions of the assurance components for the TOE evaluation
refer to CC Part 3 chapters 13 to 17
• The table in CC part 3 , Annex E summarizes the relationship between the
evaluation assurance levels (EAL) and the assurance classes, families and
components.
The CC are published at https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/cc/
31 / 34
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0827-V7-2018
D. Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
Annex B: Evaluation results regarding development
and production environment
32 / 34
BSI-DSZ-CC-0827-V7-2018 Certification Report
Annex B of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0827-V7-2018
Evaluation results regarding
development and production
environment
The IT product Infineon Technologies Smart Card IC (Security Controller) M9900 A22,
M9900 C22, M9900 D22, M9900 G11, M9905 A11, M9906 A11 with optional Software
Libraries RSA2048, RSA4096, EC, Toolbox, Base, FTL, SCL, HCL, and PSL, and with
specific IC dedicated software (Target of Evaluation, TOE) has been evaluated at an
approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation
(CEM), Version 3.1 extended by Scheme Interpretations and by advice of the Certification
Body for components beyond EAL 5 and CC Supporting Documents for conformance to
the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1.
As a result of the TOE certification, dated 14 September 2018, the following results
regarding the development and production environment apply. The Common Criteria
assurance requirements ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC_CMC.4, ALC_CMS.5,
ALC_DEL.1, ALC_DVS.2, ALC_LCD.1, ALC_TAT.2)
are fulfilled for the development and production sites of the TOE.
The relevant delivery sites are as follows:
Site ID Company name and address
DHL Singapore DHL Exel Supply Chain
Richland Business Centre
11 Bedok North Ave 4, Level 3,
Singapore 489949
G&D Neustadt Giesecke & Devrient Secure Data Management
GmbH
Austraße 101b
96465 Neustadt bei Coburg
Germany
K&N Großostheim Infineon Technology AG
Distribution Center Europe (DCE)
Kühne & Nagel
Stockstädter Strasse 10 – Building 8A
63762 Großostheim
Germany
K&N Hayward Kuehne & Nagel
30805 Santana Street
Hayward, CA 94544
USA
Table 5: TOE Delivery / Distribution Sites
33 / 34
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0827-V7-2018
For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in accordance
with the Security Target [6]. The evaluators verified, that the threats, security objectives
and requirements for the TOE life cycle phases up to delivery (as stated in the Security
Target [6] and [9]) are fulfilled by the procedures of these sites.
Note: End of report
34 / 34