BSI-DSZ-CC-1087-2026
for
VMware ESXi, Version 8.0g
from
Broadcom, Inc.
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 CC-Zert-327 V5.56
BSI-DSZ-CC-1087-2026 (*)
Operating System
VMware ESXi, Version 8.0g
from Broadcom, Inc.
PP Conformance: none
Functionality: Product specific Security Target
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by ALC_FLR.2
valid until: 24 February 2031
The IT Product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation
facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1
extended by Scheme Interpretations for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT
Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1. CC and CEM are also published as ISO/IEC 15408
and ISO/IEC 18045.
(*) This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its
evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report and
Notification. For details on the validity see Certification Report part A chapter 5.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification
scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions
of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the
evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT Product by the Federal Office for
Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is
either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 25 February 2026
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Fabian Hodouschek L.S. Sandro Amendola
Head of Certification Director-General Directorate General S
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 87 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
SOGIS
Recognition Agreement
Common Criteria
Recognition Arrangement
recognition for components
up to EAL 2 and ALC_FLR
only
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1087-2026
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1087-2026 Certification Report
Contents
A. Certification.....................................................................................................................6
1. Preliminary Remarks....................................................................................................6
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure...............................................................6
3. Recognition Agreements..............................................................................................7
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification................................................................8
5. Validity of the Certification Result.................................................................................8
6. Publication...................................................................................................................9
B. Certification Results......................................................................................................10
1. Executive Summary...................................................................................................11
2. Identification of the TOE............................................................................................12
3. Security Policy...........................................................................................................13
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.....................................................................13
5. Architectural Information............................................................................................13
6. Documentation...........................................................................................................14
7. IT Product Testing......................................................................................................14
8. Evaluated Configuration.............................................................................................15
9. Results of the Evaluation...........................................................................................15
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE.....................................................16
11. Security Target.........................................................................................................16
12. Regulation specific aspects (eIDAS, QES)..............................................................16
13. Definitions................................................................................................................17
14. Bibliography.............................................................................................................18
C. Excerpts from the Criteria.............................................................................................19
D. Annexes........................................................................................................................ 20
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1087-2026
A. Certification
1. Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● Act on the Federal Office for Information Security1
● BSI Certification and Approval Ordinance2
● BSI Schedule of Costs3
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
● DIN EN ISO/IEC 17065 standard
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) [3]
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility, its
approval and licensing process (CC-Stellen) [3]
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 2 December 2025, BGBI.
2025, no. 301, p. 2
2
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of Security Certificates and approval by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungs- und -Anerkennungsverordnung – BSIZertV) of 02 December
2025, Bundesgesetzblatt 2025, no. 301
3
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1087-2026 Certification Report
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.14
[1] also published as
ISO/IEC 15408
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 [2] also published
as ISO/IEC 18045
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
3. Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates – as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC – under certain conditions was agreed.
3.1. European Recognition of CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and, in addition, at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS
Technical Domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL 1 to EAL 4. For "Smartcards and similar devices" a SOGIS Technical Domain is in
place. For "HW Devices with Security Boxes" a SOGIS Technical Domains is in place, too.
In addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of
the recognition agreement.
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, details on
recognition, and the history of the agreement can be seen on the website at
https://www.sogis.eu.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the related bodies of the signatory nations. A disclaimer
beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of recognition.
This certificate is recognized under SOGIS-MRA for all assurance components selected.
3.2. International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC
(Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08
September 2014. It covers CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP)
(exact use), CC certificates based on assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or
the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR) and CC certificates for Protection
Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on
the website: https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the related bodies
of the signatory nations. A disclaimer beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of
recognition.
4
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated
23 February 2007, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1087-2026
This certificate is recognized according to the rules of CCRA-2014, i. e. up to and including
CC part 3 EAL 2 and ALC_FLR components.
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product VMware ESXi, Version 8.0g has undergone the certification procedure at BSI.
The evaluation of the product VMware ESXi, Version 8.0g was conducted by TÜV
Informationstechnik GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 24 February 2026. TÜV
Informationstechnik GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)5
recognised by the certification
body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: Broadcom, Inc..
The product was developed by: Broadcom, Inc..
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
5. Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report applies only to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
evaluated guidance documentation, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment as specified in the following report and in the
Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance components and assurance levels please refer to CC
itself. Detailed references are listed in part C of this report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security
Target. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the certified version of the
product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed. Therefore, the sponsor
should apply for the certified product being monitored within the assurance continuity
program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-assessment or re-certification).
Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation and certification
procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk management needs regularly
updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-assessment on a regular e.g. annual
basis. Therefore the BSI reserves the right to revoke the certificate, especially if a
exploitable vulnerability of the certified product gets to known.
In order to avoid an indefinite usage of the certificate when evolved attack methods would
require a re-assessment of the products resistance to state of the art attack methods, the
maximum validity of the certificate has been limited. The certificate issued on 25 February
2026 is valid until 24 February 2031. Validity can be re-newed by re-certification.
The owner of the certificate is obliged:
5
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1087-2026 Certification Report
1. when advertising the certificate or the fact of the product's certification, to refer to
the Certification Report as well as to provide the Certification Report, the Security
Target and user guidance documentation mentioned herein to any customer of the
product for the application and usage of the certified product,
2. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately about vulnerabilities of the
product that have been identified by the developer or any third party after issuance
of the certificate,
3. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately in the case that security relevant
changes in the evaluated life cycle, e.g. related to development and production sites
or processes, occur, or the confidentiality of documentation and information related
to the Target of Evaluation (TOE) or resulting from the evaluation and certification
procedure where the certification of the product has assumed this confidentiality
being maintained, is not given any longer. In particular, prior to the dissemination of
confidential documentation and information related to the TOE or resulting from the
evaluation and certification procedure that do not belong to the deliverables
according to the Certification Report part B, or for those where no dissemination
rules have been agreed on, to third parties, the Certification Body at BSI has to be
informed.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
6. Publication
The product VMware ESXi, Version 8.0g has been included in the BSI list of certified
products, which is published regularly in the listing found at the BSI Website
https://www.bsi.bund.de/dok/Zertifizierung-Gesamtlisten. Further information can be
obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 (0)228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer6
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
6
Broadcom, Inc.
3421 Hillview Ave
California 94304 Palo Alto
USA
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1087-2026
B. Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1087-2026 Certification Report
1. Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is VMware ESXi Version 8.0g, a VMware software product
implementing a hypervisor. The TOE is designed as a virtualization platform, providing the
ability to implement and virtualize different workloads across multiple virtual machines
(VMs) while providing isolation and efficient use of compute, storage, and network
resources. This allows for implementation of cloud environments in support of wide array
of various data center workloads or on-demand infrastructure.
The Security Target [5] is the basis for this certification. It is not based on a certified
Protection Profile.
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 4
augmented by ALC_FLR.2.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [5], chapter 6.1. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and some
of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functionality:
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
SF1.Security Audit The TSF generates audit records locally for a all audit events
listed in the ST [5], Table 10: Additional Auditable Events. Each
audit record includes date, time, applicable subject and
objective identities, the outcome of the event, and any additional
information required by the TOE’s conformance claims on a per-
event basis.
SF2.Random Number Generation The TOE provides random numbers for the purpose of TLS
through its OpenSSL library.
SF3.User Data Protection A Guest VM cannot access the data of another Guest VM, or
transfer data to another Guest VM other than through the
mechanisms described in the ST [5], chapter 6.1.3.4 FDP_IFF.1
Simple security attribute (virtual networking) when expressly
enabled by an authorized user with administrator role.
SF4.Identification and Authentication Users must be successfully identified by the TOE for all remote
interfaces to the TOE. Identification and Authentication is based
on a username and password, session IDs, tokens or tickets. An
administrative user can import certificate trust anchors that are
used for token (JWT and SAML) validation.
SF5.Security Management The TOE has one administrator role that can perform all
management functions defined in the ST [5], chapter 6.1.5.2
Specification of Management. No other user can perform
management functions. The TOE has several management
interfaces that can be used for that purpose.
SF6.Protection of the TSF The TOE ensures that each virtual machine is isolated from any
other virtual machines co-existing on the TOE. This isolation is
provided at the virtualization layer of the TOE.
SF7.Cryptographic Support and
Encrypted Channels
The TOE uses cryptography to secure data in transit between
itself and its operational environment. All TOE cryptographic
services are implemented by the OpenSSL cryptographic library.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1087-2026
Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities
For more details please refer to the Security Target [5], chapter 7.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [5], chapter 3.2.
Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of Assumptions,
Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security Target [5],
chapters 3.3 to 3.5.
This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8.
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 52, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2. Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
VMware ESXi, Version 8.0g
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
1 SW/
ISO
ESXi 8.0g Install ISO
SHA-256:
66121a7158a84a36b1d6a6d6a4d0
1374f9e75df06291477cf171e513de
42c78d
v8.0g
build 25191479
Broadcom Support Portal
download
2 DOC/
pdf
Installation and Operational
Guidance for ESXi 8.0g
SHA-256:
04cc3c3ca7c59a804ca0bfee0267c
c550799c65cd8256dbf7cc9d08a17
1f923e
v1.0 Common Criteria Security
Certification Portal
3 DOC/
pdf
Entropy Administrator Guide
for ESXi 8.0g
SHA-256:
3979e3483a039acac5c9df057f2acf
bae9fcf68f4a9b4cc6e010a7eb6312
b914
v1.0 Common Criteria Security
Certification Portal
4 DOC/
zip
Evaluated Configuration
Documentation Package
SHA-256:
55f7810e1764adde3036c236119ab
d0cbe2e6b56a6e327fc911202c81b
87304a
V1.0 Common Criteria Security
Certification Portal
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1087-2026 Certification Report
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
5 DOC/
zip
VMware vSphere
Management SDK
SHA-256:
230dc4dbc6ddb7ed549d63cc693c7
5d63e32b1f089903094cb8a757bac
96bc5a
8.0.0 Broadcom Developer Portal
download
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
After downloading the deliverables from the designated Broadcom portals, the user can
check the integrity and authenticity by calculating and comparing the SHA-256 value of the
downloaded deliverable with the reference provided here and in the security target [5].
3. Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues: Security Audit, Random Number
Generation, User Data Protection, Identification and Authentication, Security Management,
Protection of the TSF and Cryptographic Support and Encrypted Channels.
Specific details concerning the above mentioned security policies can be found in Security
Target [5], Chapter 7.
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are
of relevance:
● OE.PHYSICAL: Physical security, commensurate with the value of the TOE and the data
it contains, is provided by the environment. As a consequence, no local attacker can
mount attacks like e.g T.UNAUTHORIZED_MODIFICATION
● OE.NETWORK: The network environment provides the ability to provide physically or
logically partitioned networks
● OE.TRUSTED_ADMIN: TOE Administrators are trusted to follow and apply all admin-
istrator guidance in a trusted manner
● OE.TIME: The operational environment provides reliable time stamps to the TOE
● OE.ENTROPY: An external entropy source, such as an HSM, is provided that generates
entropy that is EAL4+ certified at PTG.2
Details can be found in the Security Target [5], chapter 4.2.
5. Architectural Information
The TOE comprises the following subsystems: VMX, Virtual Machine Monitor (VMM),
Networking, VMKernel Core, vmKernel Hardware, VMKernel RM CPU, VMkernel RM
Memory, VMFS ObjectCache/VolumeCache/LVM, vSCSI/PSA/Software iSCSI,
Userworlds, HostD, vmSyslogd, VMFS Snapshots, FileSystemSwitch,
FileSystemDeviceSwitch, VMFS Tools, TLS, vmacore, Settingsd, ESXTokenD, PAM,
Busybox, rhttpproxy and NFS Client.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1087-2026
A high level description of the IT product and its major components can be found in the
Security Target [5], chapter 1.5.1.
6. Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7. IT Product Testing
All evaluated software configurations of the TOE have been tested (see Section 8).
The tests were executed on a DELL EMC PowerEdge R740xd with Intel Xeon Gold 6130
CPUs (Intel Skylake Microarchitecture).
Developer Testing Approach
Test cases are organized based on the security functions they test. This ensures that each
security aspect of the system is thoroughly evaluated. Within each security function, test
cases are further categorized by the Security Functional Requirements (SFRs) they affect,
and then by the relevant subsystem and module.
The developer’s testing effort has been proven sufficient to demonstrate that the security
functionality / TSFI perform as specified.
Evaluator Testing
The evaluator testing comprises a repetition of selected developer tests plus
independently developed evaluator tests. The subset of developer’s tests contains tests to
test the functionality and TSFI that is tested by the developer. It contains automatic and
manual tests. The evaluator strategically selected a subset of the developer's tests as
repetitions to complement the independent tests made by the evaluator, ensuring
comprehensive coverage of all SFRs and TSFIs.
In the independent tests conducted by the evaluator, mindful consideration was given
ensuring a whole coverage of all SFRs and TSFIs. This was achieved by thoroughly
reviewing the TDS and the ST, and by strategically permutating the parameters of
functions that interact with specific interfaces to trigger error conditions and validate
expected failure responses. The independent tests include a vAPI Test package to
intensively test the vAPI Interface. Additionally, various tests are made to test the JWT and
SAML Hok Tokens. Interfaces included in the tests (including the repetition of developer
test and the independent tests by the evaluator) are: TLS protocol, VIM Protocol and VIM
Managed Objects (HTTPS is there also exercises by necessity), vAPI Protocol and vAPI
Services, Virtual CPU and Hypercalls.
During the evaluator’s testing the TOE operated as specified.
Therefore, the TOE passed the evaluators testing. Altogether the tests confirm the TOE
functionality as described in the developer documents.
Penetration Testing
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1087-2026 Certification Report
The evaluation body conducted penetration testing based on functional areas of concern
derived from SFRs and architectural mechanisms. These areas were prioritized with
regard to various factors, e.g. attack surface, estimated flaw likelihood, developer testing
coverage and detectability of flaws during developer testing.
The overall test result is that no deviations were found between the expected and the
actual test results; moreover, no attack scenario with the attack potential Enhanced-Basic
was actually successful.
8. Evaluated Configuration
This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE:
● VMware ESXi Version 8.0g build 25191479 as identified in the first row of table 2,
● installed and configured according to the guidelines as specified in the subsequent rows
in table 2,
● running on hardware and in an environment as described in chapter 7 and the guidance
as defined in table 2.
There is only one evaluated configuration of the TOE.
9. Results of the Evaluation
9.1. CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [6] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used.
For RNG assessment the scheme interpretations AIS 20 was used (see [4]).
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the EAL 4 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report)
● The components ALC_FLR.2 augmented for this TOE evaluation.
The evaluation has confirmed:
● PP Conformance: none
● for the Functionality: Product specific Security Target
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by ALC_FLR.2
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2. Results of cryptographic assessment
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this certification
procedure (see BSIG Section 52, Para. 4, Clause 2). But cryptographic functionalities with
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1087-2026
a security level of lower than 120 bits can no longer be regarded as secure without
considering the application context. Therefore, for these functionalities it shall be checked
whether the related crypto operations are appropriate for the intended system. Some
further hints and guidelines can be derived from the 'Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-02102'
(https://www.bsi.bund.de).
The table in annex B of part D of this report gives an overview of the cryptographic
functionalities inside the TOE to enforce the security policy and outlines its rating from
cryptographic point of view. Any Cryptographic Functionality that is marked in column
'Security Level above 120 Bits' of the following table with 'no' achieves a security level of
lower than 120 Bits (in general context) only.
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE
itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
The limited validity for the usage of cryptographic algorithms as outlined in chapter 9 has
to be considered by the user and his system risk management process, too.
If available, certified updates of the TOE should be used. If non-certified updates or
patches are available the user of the TOE should request the sponsor to provide a re-
certification. In the meantime a risk management process of the system using the TOE
should investigate and decide on the usage of not yet certified updates and patches or
take additional measures in order to maintain system security.
11. Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [5] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report.
12. Regulation specific aspects (eIDAS, QES)
None
13. Definitions
13.1. Acronyms
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1087-2026 Certification Report
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
cPP Collaborative Protection Profile
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
PP Protection Profile
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFR Security Functional Requirement
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TDS TOE Design
TSF TOE Security Functionality
TSFI TOE Security Functionality Interface
13.2. Glossary
Augmentation – The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Collaborative Protection Profile – A Protection Profile collaboratively developed by an
International Technical Community endorsed by the Management Committee.
Extension – The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in CC
part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in CC part 3.
Formal – Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Informal – Expressed in natural language.
Object – A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon
which subjects perform operations.
Package – named set of either security functional or security assurance requirements
Protection Profile – A formal document defined in CC, expressing an implementation
independent set of security requirements for a category of IT Products that meet specific
consumer needs.
Security Target – An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Subject – An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation – An IT Product and its associated administrator and user guidance
documentation that is the subject of an Evaluation.
TOE Security Functionality – Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
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14. Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 5, April 2017
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 5, April 2017,
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[3] BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) and Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility,
approval and licensing (CC-Stellen), https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE7
https://www.bsi.bund.de/AIS
[5] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-1087-2026, Version 2.0, 24 February 2026, Security
Target for the VMware ESXi 8.0g, Broadcom, Inc.
[6] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 3, 24 February 2026, TÜV Informationstechnik
GmbH (confidential document)
[7] Configuration list for the TOE, Version 0.08, 19 February 2026, EAL 4: Configuration
List VMware ESXi 8.0g (confidential document)
[8] Guidance documentation for the TOE, Version 1.0, 13 February 2026, Installation
and Operational Guidance for ESXi 8.0g, Broadcom, Inc.
7
specifically
• AIS 20, Version 3, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für deterministische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 32, Version 7, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
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C. Excerpts from the Criteria
For the meaning of the assurance components and levels the following references to the
Common Criteria can be followed:
• On conformance claim definitions and descriptions refer to CC part 1 chapter 10.5
• On the concept of assurance classes, families and components refer to CC Part 3
chapter 7.1
• On the concept and definition of pre-defined assurance packages (EAL) refer to CC
Part 3 chapters 7.2 and 8
• On the assurance class ASE for Security Target evaluation refer to CC Part 3
chapter 12
• On the detailed definitions of the assurance components for the TOE evaluation
refer to CC Part 3 chapters 13 to 17
• The table in CC part 3, Annex E summarizes the relationship between the
evaluation assurance levels (EAL) and the assurance classes, families and
components.
The CC are published at https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/cc/
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D. Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
Annex B: Overview and rating of cryptographic functionalities implemented in the TOE
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1087-2026 Certification Report
Annex B of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1087-2026
Overview and rating of cryptographic functionalities implemented
in the TOE
No. Purpose Cryptographi
c Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size
in Bits
Security
Level
above
120 Bits
Comments
1 Key Generation
for TLS
RSA [FIPS186-5] 3072 and
more
Yes FCS_CKM.1/RSA
2 Authentication
during TLS
handshake
RSA [FIPS186-4] 3072 Yes FCS_COP.1/RSA
More information
about algorithms /
cipher suites can be
found in ST [5],
Table 13.
3 Derivation of TLS
Session Keys
from Shared
Secret
PRF-SHA384 [FIPS180-4],
[RFC2104],
[RFC5246]
384 Yes FCS_CKM.1/TLS,
FCS_COP.1/PRF
4 Key Agreement of
TLS Shared
Secret
ECDHE [RFC5246],
[RFC8422],
[SEC2],
[SP800-56A-rev3]
P-256,
P-384,
P-521
Yes FCS_CKM.2/TLS,
FCS_COP.1/EC-
DHE
5 Confidentiality
and
Authentication of
TLS data
AES-GCM [FIPS197],
[RFC5288],
[RFC5246],
[RFC5116],
[SP800-38D]
256 Yes FCS_COP.1/AES
6 Integrity of
Tokens
HMAC-
SHA-256
[FIPS198-1] 256 Yes FCS_COP.1/HMAC
Table 3: TOE cryptographic functionality
FIPS180-4 Secure Hash Standard (SHS)
Date 2015-08-04
Location https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/fips/180-4/upd1/final
FIPS186-4 Digital Signature Standard (DSS)
Date 2013-07-19
Location https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/fips/186-4/final
FIPS186-5 Digital Signature Standard (DSS)
Date 2023-02-03
Location https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/fips/186-5/final
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FIPS197 Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
Date 2023-05-09
Location https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/fips/197/final
FIPS198-1 The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC)
Date 2008-07-16
Location https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/fips/198-1/final
RFC2104 HMAC: Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication
Author(s) H. Krawczyk, M. Bellare, R. Canetti
Date 1997-02-01
Location http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2104.txt
RFC5116 An Interface and Algorithms for Authenticated Encryption
Author(s) D. McGrew
Date 2008-01-01
Location http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5116.txt
RFC5288 AES Galois Counter Mode (GCM) Cipher Suites for TLS
Author(s) J. Salowey, A. Choudhury, D. McGrew
Date 2008-08-01
Location http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5288.txt
RFC8422 Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites
for Transport Layer Security (TLS) Versions 1.2 and Earlier
Author(s) Y. Nir S., Josefsson M., Pegourie-Gonnard
Date 2018-08-01
Location http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc8422.txt
SEC2 Recommended Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters
Date 2000
Location http://www.secg.org
SP800-38D Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation:
Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC
Date 2007-11-28
Location https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/38/d/final
SP800-56A-Rev3 Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key-Establishment Schemes Using
Discrete Logarithm Cryptography
Date 2018-04-16
Location https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/56/a/r3/final
Note: End of report
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