National Information Assurance Partnership
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
Validation Report
Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.
Samsung Galaxy Devices on
Android 9
Report Number: CCEVS-VR-10979-2019
Dated: August 2, 2019
Version: 0.2
National Institute of Standards and Technology National Security Agency
Information Technology Laboratory Information Assurance Directorate
100 Bureau Drive 9800 Savage Road STE 6940
Gaithersburg, MD 20899 Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6940
Samsung Galaxy Devices on Android 9 Validation Report Version 0.2, August 2, 2019
ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Validation Team
John Butterworth
Jenn Dotson
Sheldon Durant
Lisa Mitchell
Linda Morrison
Clare Olin
The MITRE Corporation
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
James Arnold
Tammy Compton
Gossamer Security Solutions,Inc.
Catonsville, MD
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Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary.................................................................................................... 1
2 Identification............................................................................................................... 2
3 Architectural Information ........................................................................................... 3
3.1 TOE Evaluated Platforms ................................................................................... 4
3.2 TOE Architecture................................................................................................ 6
3.3 Physical Boundaries............................................................................................ 7
4 Security Policy............................................................................................................ 7
4.1 Security audit ...................................................................................................... 7
4.2 Cryptographic support......................................................................................... 7
4.3 User data protection............................................................................................ 7
4.4 Identification and authentication......................................................................... 8
4.5 Security management.......................................................................................... 8
4.6 Protection of the TSF .......................................................................................... 8
4.7 TOE access.......................................................................................................... 9
4.8 Trusted path/channels ......................................................................................... 9
5 Assumptions................................................................................................................ 9
6 Clarification of Scope ................................................................................................. 9
7 Documentation.......................................................................................................... 10
8 IT Product Testing .................................................................................................... 10
8.1 Developer Testing............................................................................................. 11
8.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing ............................................................. 11
9 Evaluated Configuration........................................................................................... 11
10 Results of the Evaluation .......................................................................................... 13
10.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ASE) .......................................................... 13
10.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV) ............................................................ 14
10.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD) ............................................... 14
10.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC) ................................... 14
10.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE) ............... 14
10.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN)....................................................... 15
10.7 Summary of Evaluation Results........................................................................ 15
11 Validator Comments/Recommendations .................................................................. 15
12 Annexes..................................................................................................................... 17
13 Security Target.......................................................................................................... 17
14 Glossary .................................................................................................................... 17
15 Bibliography.............................................................................................................. 18
Samsung Galaxy Devices on Android 9 Validation Report Version 0.2, August 2, 2019
1
1 Executive Summary
This report documents the assessment of the National Information Assurance Partnership
(NIAP) validation team of the evaluation of Samsung Galaxy Devices on Android 9 solution
provided by Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. It presents the evaluation results, their
justifications, and the conformance results. This Validation Report is not an endorsement of
the Target of Evaluation by any agency of the U.S. government, and no warranty is either
expressed or implied.
The evaluation was performed by the Gossamer Security Solutions (Gossamer) Common
Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL) in Catonsville, MD, United States of America, and was
completed in July 2019. The information in this report is largely derived from the Evaluation
Technical Report (ETR) and associated test reports, all written by Gossamer Security
Solutions. The evaluation determined that the product is both Common Criteria Part 2
Extended and Part 3 Conformant, and meets the assurance requirements of the Protection
Profile for Mobile Device Fundamentals, Version 3.1, 16 June 2017, General Purpose
Operating Systems Protection Profile/Mobile Device Fundamentals Protection Profile
Extended Package (EP) Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) Clients, Version 1.0, 08
February 2016 and PP-Module for Virtual Private Network (VPN) Clients, Version 2.1, 05
October 2017.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the Samsung Galaxy Devices on Android 9.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) identified in this Validation Report has been evaluated at a
NIAP approved Common Criteria Testing Laboratory using the Common Methodology for
IT Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev 5) for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT
Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev 5). This Validation Report applies only to the specific
version of the TOE as evaluated. The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the
provisions of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme and the
conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the
evidence provided.
The validation team monitored the activities of the evaluation team, provided guidance on
technical issues and evaluation processes, and reviewed the individual work units and
successive versions of the ETR. The validation team found that the evaluation showed that
the product satisfies all of the functional requirements and assurance requirements stated in
the Security Target (ST). Therefore the validation team concludes that the testing
laboratory’s findings are accurate, the conclusions justified, and the conformance results are
correct. The conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation technical report are
consistent with the evidence produced.
The technical information included in this report was obtained from the Samsung Electronics
Co., Ltd. Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. Samsung Galaxy Devices on Android 9
(MDFPP31/WLANCEP10/VPNC21) Security Target, Version 0.4, 06/24/2019 and analysis
performed by the Validation Team.
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2 Identification
The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST) effort to establish commercial facilities to perform trusted product
evaluations. Under this program, security evaluations are conducted by commercial testing
laboratories called Common Criteria Testing Laboratories (CCTLs) using the Common
Evaluation Methodology (CEM) in accordance with National Voluntary Laboratory
Assessment Program (NVLAP) accreditation.
The NIAP Validation Body assigns Validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality and
consistency across evaluations. Developers of information technology products desiring a
security evaluation contract with a CCTL and pay a fee for their product’s evaluation. Upon
successful completion of the evaluation, the product is added to NIAP’s Validated Products
List.
Table 1 provides information needed to completely identify the product, including:
 The Target of Evaluation (TOE): the fully qualified identifier of the product as evaluated.
 The Security Target (ST), describing the security features, claims, and assurances of the
product.
 The conformance result of the evaluation.
 The Protection Profile to which the product is conformant.
 The organizations and individuals participating in the evaluation.
Table 1: Evaluation Identifiers
Item Identifier
Evaluation Scheme United States NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
TOE Samsung Galaxy Devices on Android 9
Protection Profile
(Specific models identified in Section 3.1)
Protection Profile for Mobile Device Fundamentals, Version 3.1, 16 June 2017,
General Purpose Operating Systems Protection Profile/Mobile Device
Fundamentals Protection Profile Extended Package (EP) Wireless Local Area
Network (WLAN) Clients, Version 1.0, 08 February 2016 and PP-Module for
Virtual Private Network (VPN) Clients, Version 2.1, 05 October 2017
ST Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. Samsung Galaxy Devices on Android 9
(MDFPP31/WLANCEP10/VPNC21) Security Target, Version 0.4, 06/24/2019
Evaluation Technical
Report
Evaluation Technical Report for Samsung Galaxy Devices on Android 9, Version
0.2, July 2, 2019
CC Version Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
rev 5
Conformance Result CC Part 2 extended, CC Part 3 conformant
Sponsor Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.
Developer Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.
Common Criteria
Testing Lab (CCTL)
Gossamer Security Solutions, Inc.
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Item Identifier
CCEVS Validators John Butterworth
Jenn Dotson
Sheldon Durrant
Lisa Mitchell
Linda Morrison
Clare Olin
The MITRE Corporation
3 Architectural Information
Note: The following architectural description is based on the description presented in the
Security Target.
The TOE is a mobile device based on Android 9 with a built-in IPsec VPN client and
modifications made to increase the level of security provided to end users and enterprises.
The TOE is intended for use as part of an enterprise mobility solution providing mobile staff
with enterprise connectivity.
The TOE includes a Common Criteria mode (or “CC mode”) that an administrator can invoke
using an MDM. The TOE must meet the following prerequisites in order for an administrator
to transition the TOE to and remain in the CC configuration.
 Require a boot and device lock password (swipe, PIN, pattern, accessibility (direction),
screen locks are not allowed). Acceptable biometrics vary with the device for the device
lock.
 The maximum password failure retry policy should be less than or equal to 30.
 A screen lock password required to decrypt data on boot.
 Revocation checking must be enabled.
 External storage must be encrypted.
 Password (non-container) recovery policy and password history must not be enabled.
 When CC mode has been enabled, the TOE behaves as follows:
o The TOE sets the system wide Android CC mode property to be enabled.
o The TOE prevents loading of custom firmware/kernels and requires all
updates occur through FOTA.
o The TOE utilizes CAVP approved cryptographic ciphers for TLS.
o The TOE ensures FOTA updates utilize 2048-bit PKCS #1 RSA-PSS
formatted signatures (with SHA-512 hashing).
The TOE includes a containerization capability, Knox Workspace container, which is part of
the Knox Platform. This container provides a way to segment applications and data into two
separate areas on the device, such as a personal area and a work area, each with its own
separate apps, data and security policies. For this effort, the TOE was evaluated both without
and with a Knox Workspace container created. Thus, the evaluation includes several Knox-
specific claims that apply to a Knox Workspace container when created.
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There are different models of the TOE, the Samsung Galaxy Devices on Android 9, and these
models differ in their internal components (as described in Evaluated Configuration section
below).
3.1 TOE Evaluated Platforms
The model numbers of the mobile devices used during evaluation testing are as follows:
Device Name Model
Number
Chipset
Vendor
CPU
Android
Version
Kernel
Version
Build Number
Galaxy S10e SM-G970F Samsung Exynos 9820 9 4.14.85 PPR1.180610.011
Galaxy S10+ SM-G975U Qualcomm SM8150 9 4.14.78 PPR1.180610.011
Galaxy S9+ SM-G965F Samsung Exynos 9810 9 4.9.59 PPR1.180610.011
Galaxy S9+ SM-G965U Qualcomm SDM845 9 4.9.112 PPR1.180610.011
Galaxy Note8 SM-N950F Samsung Exynos 8895 9 4.4.111 PPR1.180610.011
Galaxy Note8 SM-N950U Qualcomm MSM8998 9 4.4.153 PPR1.180610.011
Table 1 Evaluated Devices
In addition to the evaluated devices, the following device models are claimed as equivalent
with a note about the differences between the evaluated device and the equivalent models.
Evaluated Device CPU Equivalent Devices Differences
Galaxy S10e(Samsung) Exynos 9820 Galaxy S10 (Samsung)
Galaxy S10+(Samsung)
Galaxy S10 5G (Samsung)
 S10 & S10+ have ultrasonic
fingerprintsensor
 S10 & S10+ have larger
screen sizes
 S10 5G has different cellular
modem
Galaxy S10+(Qualcomm) SM8150 Galaxy S10e(Qualcomm)
Galaxy S10 (Qualcomm)
Galaxy S10 5G (Qualcomm)
Galaxy Fold (Qualcomm)
 S10e & Fold has sideimage
fingerprintsensor
 S10 & S10e have smaller
screen sizes
 S10 5G has different cellular
modem
 Fold has 2 screens
Galaxy S9+ (Samsung) Exynos 9810 Galaxy S9 (Samsung)
Galaxy Note9 (Samsung)
 S9 has smaller screen
 Note9 includes S Pen &
functionality to take
advantage of itfor input (not
security related)
Galaxy S9+ (Qualcomm) SDM845 Galaxy S9 (Qualcomm)
Galaxy Note9 (Qualcomm)
 S9 has smaller screen
 Note9 includes S Pen &
functionality to take
advantage of itfor input (not
security related)
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Galaxy Note8 (Samsung) Exynos 8895 Galaxy S8 (Samsung)
Galaxy S8+ (Samsung)
 S8 & S8+ do not includeS
Pen
 S8 & S8+ aresmaller
Galaxy Note8 (Qualcomm) MSM8998 Galaxy S8 (Qualcomm)
Galaxy S8+ (Qualcomm)
Galaxy S8 Active
(Qualcomm)
Galaxy Tab S4 (All)
 S8, S8+ & S8 Active do not
includeS Pen
 S8, S8+ & S8 Active are
smaller
 S8 Active has a IP68 & MIL-
STD-810G certified body
 Tab S4 is tabletform factor
(no voice calling)
 T835 & T837 have LTE
 T830 models only have Wi-Fi
Table 2 Equivalent Devices
In general, the devices include a final letter or number at the end of the name that denotes
that the device is for a specific carrier or region (for example, U = US Carrier build and F =
International, which were used during the evaluation).
For each device there are specific models which are validated. This table lists the specific
carrier models that have the validated configuration (covering both evaluated and equivalent
devices).
Device Name Chipset
Vendor
Base Model
Number
Carrier Models
Galaxy S10 5G Samsung SM-G977 B, N
Galaxy S10 5G Qualcomm SM-G977 P, T, U
Galaxy S10+ Samsung SM-G975 F, N
Galaxy S10+ Qualcomm SM-G975 U, SC-04L*, SCV42*
Galaxy S10 Samsung SM-G973 F, N
Galaxy S10 Qualcomm SM-G973 U, SC-03L*, SCV41*
Galaxy S10e Samsung SM-G970 F, N
Galaxy S10e Qualcomm SM-G970 U
Galaxy Fold Qualcomm SM-F900 F, N, U, SC-06L*, SCV44*
Galaxy Note9 Samsung SM-N960 F, N
Galaxy Note9 Qualcomm SM-N960 U, SC-01L*, SCV40*
Galaxy Tab S4 Qualcomm SM-T830 None
SM-T835 N, None
SM-T837 A, R4, P, V, T
Galaxy S9+ Samsung SM-G965 F, N
Galaxy S9+ Qualcomm SM-G965 U, SC-03K*, SCV39*
Galaxy S9 Samsung SM-G960 F, N
Galaxy S9 Qualcomm SM-G960 U, SC-02K*, SCV38*
Galaxy Note8 Samsung SM-N950 F, N
Galaxy Note8 Qualcomm SM-N950 U, SC-01K*, SCV37*
Galaxy S8+ Samsung SM-G950 F, N
Galaxy S8+ Qualcomm SM-G950 U
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Device Name Chipset
Vendor
Base Model
Number
Carrier Models
Galaxy S8 Samsung SM-G955 F, N
Galaxy S8 Qualcomm SM-G955 U
Galaxy S8 Active Qualcomm SM-G892 A, U
Table 3 Carrier Models
The carrier models marked by * are explicit model numbers for those carriers and do not
follow the standard specified for other models. Where Carrier Models specifies “None” that
means a device without a suffix is also a device that can be placed into a validated
configuration.
3.2 TOE Architecture
The TOE combines with a Mobile Device Management solution (note that this evaluation
does not include an MDM agent nor server) that enables the Enterprise to watch, control and
administer all deployed mobile devices, across multiple mobile service providers as well as
facilitate secure communications through a VPN. This partnership provides a secure mobile
environment that can be managed and controlled by the environment and reduces the risks
that can be introduced through a Bring-Your-Own-Device (BYOD) model which can be
extended to Corporate-Owned-Personally-Enabled (COPE) or other corporate-owned
deployments.
Data on theTOE is protected through the implementation of Samsung On-Device Encryption
(ODE) or File-Based Encryption (FBE) (depending on the device see the Security Target for
a list of devices and which DAR encryption is used) that utilizes a CAVP certified
cryptographic algorithms to encrypt device storage. This functionality is combined with a
number of on-device policies including local wipe, remote wipe, password complexity,
automatic lock and privileged access to security configurations to prevent unauthorized
access to the device and stored data.
The Samsung Knox Software Development Kit (SDK) builds on top of the existing Android
security model by expanding the current set of security configuration options to more than
600 configurable policies and including additional security functionality such as application
whitelisting and blacklisting.
The Knox Platform for Enterprise provides a set of flexible deployment options for Work
environments, including the ability to enhance the BYOD or COPE models by creating a
separate container for the Enterprise (the Workspace). Within the Knox Workspace, the
Enterprise can provision separate applications and ensure they are kept separate from
anything the user may do outside the Knox Workspace. The Enterprise can use policy
controls to manage a Work environment on the device as a whole or within the Knox
Workspace container specifically, as needed by the organization.
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3.3 Physical Boundaries
The TOE is a multi-user mobile device based on Android 9 that incorporates the Samsung
Knox SDK. The TOE does not include the user applications that run on top of the operating
system, but does include controls that limit application behavior. The TOE includes an IPsec
VPN client integrated into the firmware (as opposed to a downloadable application). Within
an Enterprise environment, theEnterprise can manage the configuration of the mobile device,
including the VPN client, through a compliant device management solution.
The TOE communicates and interacts with 802.11-2012 Access Points and mobile data
networks to establish network connectivity.
4 Security Policy
This section summarizes the security functionality of the TOE:
1. Security audit
2. Cryptographic support
3. User data protection
4. Identification and authentication
5. Security management
6. Protection of the TSF
7. TOE access
8. Trusted path/channels
4.1 Security audit
The TOE generates logs for a range of security relevant events. The TOE stores the logs
locally so they can be accessed by an administrator or they can be exported to an MDM.
4.2 Cryptographic support
The TOE includes multiple cryptographic libraries with CAVP certified algorithms for a
wide range of cryptographic functions including the following: asymmetric key generation
and establishment, symmetric key generation, encryption/decryption, cryptographic hashing
and keyed-hash message authentication. These functions are supported with suitable random
bit generation, key derivation, salt generation, initialization vector generation, secure key
storage, and key and protected data destruction. These primitive cryptographic functions are
used to implement security protocols such as TLS, EAP-TLS, IPsec, and HTTPS and to
encrypt the media (including the generation and protection of data and key encryption keys)
used by the TOE. Many of these cryptographic functions are also accessible as services to
applications running on the TOE.
4.3 User data protection
The TOE controls access to system services by hosted applications, including protection of
the Trust Anchor Database. Additionally, the TOE protects user and other sensitive data
using encryption so that even if a device is physically lost, the data remains protected. The
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functionality provided by a Knox Workspace container enhances the security of user data by
providing an additional layer of separation between different categories of apps and data
while the device is in use. The TOE ensures that residual information is protected from
potential reuse in accessible objects such as network packets.
4.4 Identification and authentication
The TOE supports a number of features related to identification and authentication. From a
user perspective, except for making phone calls to an emergency number, a password or
Biometric Authentication Factor (BAF) must be correctly entered to unlock the TOE. In
addition, even when the TOE is unlocked the password must be re-entered to change the
password or re-enroll the biometric template. Passwords are obscured when entered so they
cannot be read from the TOE's display, the frequency of entering passwords is limited and
when a configured number of failures occurs, the TOE will be wiped to protect its contents.
Passwords can be constructed using upper and lower case characters, numbers, and special
characters and passwords between 4 and 16 characters are supported.
The TOE can also serve as an 802.1X supplicant and can use X.509v3 and validate
certificates for EAP-TLS, TLS and IPsec exchanges. The TOE can also act as a client or
server in an authenticated Bluetooth pairing. In addition to storing X.509 certificates used
for IPsec connections, the TOEcan also securely store pre-shared keys for VPN connections.
4.5 Security management
The TOE provides all the interfaces necessary to manage the security functions (including
the VPN client) identified throughout this Security Target as well as other functions
commonly found in mobile devices. Many of the available functions are available to users of
the TOE while many are restricted to administrators operating through a Mobile Device
Management solution once the TOE has been enrolled. Once the TOE has been enrolled and
then un-enrolled, it removes all MDM policies and disables CC mode.
4.6 Protectionof the TSF
The TOE implements a number of features to protect itself to ensure the reliability and
integrity of its security features. It protects particularly sensitive data such as cryptographic
keys so that they are not accessible or exportable. It also provides its own timing mechanism
to ensure that reliable time information is available (e.g., for log accountability). It enforces
read, write, and execute memory page protections, uses address space layout randomization,
and stack-based buffer overflow protections to minimize the potential to exploit application
flaws. It also protects itself from modification by applications as well as isolates the address
spaces of applications from one another to protect those applications.
The TOE includes functions to perform self-tests and software/firmware integrity checking
so that it might detect when it is failing or may be corrupt. If any self-tests fail, the TOE will
not go into an operational mode. It also includes mechanisms (i.e., verification of the digital
signature of each new image) so that the TOE itself can be updated while ensuring that the
updates will not introduce malicious or other unexpected changes in the TOE. Digital
signature checking also extends to verifying applications prior to their installation.
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4.7 TOE access
The TOE can be locked, obscuring its display, by the user or after a configured interval of
inactivity. The TOE also has the capability to display an advisory message (banner) when
users unlock the TOE for use.
The TOE is also able to attempt to connect to wireless networks as configured.
4.8 Trusted path/channels
The TOE supportsthe use of IEEE 802.11-2012, 802.1X, EAP-TLS, TLS, HTTPSand IPsec
to secure communications channels between itself and other trusted network devices.
5 Assumptions
The Security Problem Definition, including the assumptions, may be found in the following
documents:
 Protection Profile for Mobile Device Fundamentals, Version 3.1, 16 June 2017,
General Purpose Operating Systems Protection Profile/Mobile Device Fundamentals
Protection Profile Extended Package (EP) Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN)
Clients, Version 1.0, 08 February 2016 and PP-Module for Virtual Private Network
(VPN) Clients, Version 2.1, 05 October 2017
That information has not been reproduced here and the MDFPP31/WLANCEP10/VPNC21
should be consulted if there is interest in that material.
The scope of this evaluation was limited to the functionality and assurances covered in the
MDFPP31/WLANCEP10/VPNC21 as described for this TOE in the Security Target. Other
functionality included in the product was not assessed as part of this evaluation. All other
functionality provided by the devices needs to be assessed separately, and no further
conclusions can be drawn about their effectiveness.
6 Clarification of Scope
All evaluations (and all products) have limitations, as well as potential misconceptions that
need clarification. This text covers some of the more important limitations and clarifications
of this evaluation. Note that:
 As with any evaluation, this evaluation only shows that the evaluated configuration
meets the security claims made with a certain level of assurance (the assurance
activities specified in the Mobile Device Fundamentals Protection Profile and
General Purpose Operating Systems Protection Profile/Mobile Device Fundamentals
Protection Profile Extended Package (EP) Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN)
Clients and Virtual Private Network (VPN) Clients PP-Module and performed by the
evaluation team).
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 This evaluation covers only the specific device models and software as identified in
this document, and not any earlier or later versions released or in process.
 Apart from the VPN and MDF Admin Guides, additional customer documentation
for the specific mobile device models was not included in the scope of the evaluation
and therefore should not to be relied upon when configuring or operating the device
as evaluated.
 This evaluation did not specifically search for, nor attempt to exploit, vulnerabilities
that were not “obvious” or vulnerabilities to objectives not claimed in the ST. The
CEM defines an “obvious” vulnerability as one that is easily exploited with a
minimum of understanding of the TOE, technical sophistication and resources.
 The functionality evaluated is scoped exclusively to the security functional
requirements specified in the MDFPP31/WLANCEP10/VPNC21 and applicable
Technical Decisions. Any additional security related functional capabilities of the
TOE were not covered by this evaluation.
 While an MDM can be used in configuring the TOE into CC Mode, an MDM agent
and server were not included and thus MDM functionality was not evaluated.
 The security functionality provided by the Knox Workspace container is limited to
the Knox-specific claims made in this evaluation. All other functionality provided by
the container is out of scope.
7 Documentation
The following documents were available with the TOE for evaluation:
 Samsung Android 9 on Galaxy Devices Administrator Guide, version 5.0, June 24,
2019
 Samsung VPN Client on Galaxy Devices Administrator Guide, version 5.0, May 22,
2019
Any additional customer documentation provided with the product, or that is available
online was not included in the scope of the evaluation and therefore should not to be relied
upon when configuring or operating the device as evaluated.
To use the product in the evaluated configuration, the product must be configured as
specified in the Guidance Documentation listed above. Consumers are encouraged to
download the configuration guides from the NIAP website to ensure the device is
configured as evaluated.
8 IT Product Testing
This section describes the testing efforts of the developer and the Evaluation Team. It is
derived from information contained in the proprietary Detailed Test Report
(MDFPP31/WLANCEP10/VPNC21) for Samsung Galaxy Devices on Android 9, Version
0.2, June 28, 2019 (DTR), as summarized in the evaluation Assurance Activity Report.
Samsung Galaxy Devices on Android 9 Validation Report Version 0.2, August 2, 2019
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8.1 DeveloperTesting
No evidence of developer testing is required in the assurance activities for this product.
8.2 Evaluation TeamIndependent Testing
The evaluation team verified the product according a Common Criteria Certification
document and ran the tests specified in the MDFPP31/WLANCEP10/VPNC21 including the
tests associated with optional requirements. The AAR, in sections 1.1 and 3.4.1, lists the
tested devices, provides a list of test tools, and has diagrams of the test environment.
9 Evaluated Configuration
The model numbers of the mobile devices used during evaluation testing are as follows:
Device Name Model
Number
Chipset
Vendor
CPU
Android
Version
Kernel
Version
Build Number
Galaxy S10e SM-G970F Samsung Exynos 9820 9 4.14.85 PPR1.180610.011
Galaxy S10+ SM-G975U Qualcomm SM8150 9 4.14.78 PPR1.180610.011
Galaxy S9+ SM-G965F Samsung Exynos 9810 9 4.9.59 PPR1.180610.011
Galaxy S9+ SM-G965U Qualcomm SDM845 9 4.9.112 PPR1.180610.011
Galaxy Note8 SM-N950F Samsung Exynos 8895 9 4.4.111 PPR1.180610.011
Galaxy Note8 SM-N950U Qualcomm MSM8998 9 4.4.153 PPR1.180610.011
Table 4 Evaluated Devices
In addition to the evaluated devices, the following device models are claimed as equivalent
with a note about the differences between the evaluated device and the equivalent models.
Evaluated Device CPU Equivalent Devices Differences
Galaxy S10e(Samsung) Exynos 9820 Galaxy S10 (Samsung)
Galaxy S10+(Samsung)
Galaxy S10 5G (Samsung)
 S10 & S10+ have ultrasonic
fingerprintsensor
 S10 & S10+ have larger
screen sizes
 S10 5G has different cellular
modem
Galaxy S10+(Qualcomm) SM8150 Galaxy S10e(Qualcomm)
Galaxy S10 (Qualcomm)
Galaxy S10 5G (Qualcomm)
Galaxy Fold (Qualcomm)
 S10e & Fold has sideimage
fingerprintsensor
 S10 & S10e have smaller
screen sizes
 S10 5G has different cellular
modem
 Fold has 2 screens
Galaxy S9+ (Samsung) Exynos 9810 Galaxy S9 (Samsung)
Galaxy Note9 (Samsung)
 S9 has smaller screen
Samsung Galaxy Devices on Android 9 Validation Report Version 0.2, August 2, 2019
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 Note9 includes S Pen &
functionality to take
advantage of itfor input (not
security related)
Galaxy S9+ (Qualcomm) SDM845 Galaxy S9 (Qualcomm)
Galaxy Note9 (Qualcomm)
 S9 has smaller screen
 Note9 includes S Pen &
functionality to take
advantage of itfor input (not
security related)
Galaxy Note8 (Samsung) Exynos 8895 Galaxy S8 (Samsung)
Galaxy S8+ (Samsung)
 S8 & S8+ do not includeS
Pen
 S8 & S8+ aresmaller
Galaxy Note8 (Qualcomm) MSM8998 Galaxy S8 (Qualcomm)
Galaxy S8+ (Qualcomm)
Galaxy S8 Active
(Qualcomm)
Galaxy Tab S4 (All)
 S8, S8+ & S8 Active do not
includeS Pen
 S8, S8+ & S8 Active are
smaller
 S8 Active has a IP68 & MIL-
STD-810G certified body
 Tab S4 is tabletform factor
(no voice calling)
 T835 & T837 have LTE
 T830 models only have Wi-Fi
Table 5 Equivalent Devices
In general, the devices include a final letter or number at the end of the name that denotes
that the device is for a specific carrier or region (for example, U = US Carrier build and F =
International, which were used during the evaluation).
For each device there are specific models which are validated. This table lists the specific
carrier models that have the validated configuration (covering both evaluated and equivalent
devices).
Device Name Chipset
Vendor
Base Model
Number
Carrier Models
Galaxy S10 5G Samsung SM-G977 B, N
Galaxy S10 5G Qualcomm SM-G977 P, T, U
Galaxy S10+ Samsung SM-G975 F, N
Galaxy S10+ Qualcomm SM-G975 U, SC-04L*, SCV42*
Galaxy S10 Samsung SM-G973 F, N
Galaxy S10 Qualcomm SM-G973 U, SC-03L*, SCV41*
Galaxy S10e Samsung SM-G970 F, N
Galaxy S10e Qualcomm SM-G970 U
Galaxy Fold Qualcomm SM-F900 F, N, U, SC-06L*, SCV44*
Galaxy Note9 Samsung SM-N960 F, N
Galaxy Note9 Qualcomm SM-N960 U, SC-01L*, SCV40*
Galaxy Tab S4 Qualcomm SM-T830 None
SM-T835 N, None
SM-T837 A, R4, P, V, T
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Device Name Chipset
Vendor
Base Model
Number
Carrier Models
Galaxy S9+ Samsung SM-G965 F, N
Galaxy S9+ Qualcomm SM-G965 U, SC-03K*, SCV39*
Galaxy S9 Samsung SM-G960 F, N
Galaxy S9 Qualcomm SM-G960 U, SC-02K*, SCV38*
Galaxy Note8 Samsung SM-N950 F, N
Galaxy Note8 Qualcomm SM-N950 U, SC-01K*, SCV37*
Galaxy S8+ Samsung SM-G950 F, N
Galaxy S8+ Qualcomm SM-G950 U
Galaxy S8 Samsung SM-G955 F, N
Galaxy S8 Qualcomm SM-G955 U
Galaxy S8 Active Qualcomm SM-G892 A, U
Table 6 Carrier Models
The carrier models marked by * are explicit model numbers for those carriers and do not
follow the standard specified for other models. Where Carrier Models specifies “None” that
means a device without a suffix is also a device that can be placed into a validated
configuration.
10 Results of the Evaluation
The results of the assurance requirements are generally described in this section and are
presented in detail in the proprietary ETR. The reader of this document can assume that all
assurance activities and work units received a passing verdict.
A verdict for an assurance component is determined by the resulting verdicts assigned to the
corresponding evaluator action elements. The evaluation was conducted based upon CC
version 3.1 rev 5 and CEM version 3.1 rev 5. The evaluation determined the Samsung
Galaxy Devices on Android 9 TOE to be Part 2 extended, and to meet the SARs contained
in the MDFPP31/WLANCEP10/VPNC21.
10.1 Evaluationof the Security Target(ASE)
The evaluation team applied each ASE CEM work unit. The ST evaluation ensured the ST
contains a description of the environment in terms of policies and assumptions, a statement
of security requirements claimed to be met by the Samsung Galaxy Devices on Android 9
products that are consistent with the Common Criteria, and product security function
descriptions that support the requirements.
The validators reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
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10.2 Evaluationof the Development(ADV)
The evaluation team applied each ADV CEM work unit. The evaluation team assessed the
design documentation and found it adequate to aid in understanding how the TSF provides
the security functions. The design documentation consists of a functional specification
contained in the Security Target and Guidance documents. Additionally, the evaluation team
performed the assurance activities specified in the MDFPP31/WLANCEP10/VPNC21
related to the examination of the information contained in the TSS.
The validators reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
10.3 Evaluationof the Guidance Documents (AGD)
The evaluation team applied each AGD CEM work unit. The evaluation team ensured the
adequacy of the user guidance in describing how to use the operational TOE. Additionally,
the evaluation team ensured the adequacy of the administrator guidance in describing how
to securely administer theTOE. All of theguides were assessed during the design and testing
phases of the evaluation to ensure they were complete.
The validators reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
10.4 Evaluationof the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC)
The evaluation team applied each ALC CEM work unit. The evaluation team found that the
TOE was identified.
The validators reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
10.5 Evaluationof the TestDocumentationand the TestActivity (ATE)
The evaluation team applied each ATE CEM work unit. The evaluation team ran the set of
tests specified by the assurance activities in the MDFPP31/WLANCEP10/VPNC21 and
recorded the results in a Test Report, summarized in the AAR.
The validators reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
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10.6 Vulnerability AssessmentActivity (VAN)
The evaluation team applied each AVA CEM work unit. The vulnerability analysis is in the
Detailed Test Report (DTR) prepared by the evaluator. The vulnerability analysis includes
a public search for vulnerabilities. The public search for vulnerabilities conducted on June
25, 2019 did not uncover any residual vulnerability.
The evaluator searched the National Vulnerability Database
(https://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/search) and Vulnerability Notes Database
(http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/) with the following search terms: ""Samsung S10", "Samsung
S9", "Samsung Note 8", "Samsung Tab S4", "Knox", "Android", "BoringSSL",
"strongswan", and "charon".
The validators reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
10.7 Summary of Evaluation Results
The evaluation team’s assessment of the evaluation evidence demonstrates that the claims in
the ST are met. Additionally, the evaluation team’s testing also demonstrated the accuracy
of the claims in the ST.
The validation team’s assessment of the evidence provided by the evaluation team is that it
demonstrates that the evaluation team followed the procedures defined in the CEM, and
correctly verified that the product meets the claims in the ST.
11 Validator Comments/Recommendations
The evaluated configuration requires that software updates to the TOE be restricted to FOTA.
The evaluators were unable to directly exercise this mechanism since it would have involved
placing invalid updates on the live public servers that are currently in use by present
customers. Hence, the evaluators had to take the products out of the evaluated configuration
to test the update features.
The validators suggest that the consumer pay particular attention to the evaluated
configuration of the device(s). The functionality evaluated is scoped exclusively to the
security functional requirements specified in the Security Target, and only the functionality
implemented by the SFR’s within the Security Target was evaluated. All other functionality
provided by the devices, to include software that was not part of the evaluated configuration,
needs to be assessed separately and no further conclusions can be drawn about their
effectiveness.
The biometric authentication factors tested as part of this evaluation were limited to
fingerprint and iris recognition; thus, they are the only two biometric authentication factors
allowed in the evaluated configuration.
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As mentioned in both the Security Target and the AAR, not all evaluated devices support
both iris and fingerprint authentication mechanisms. Specifically, fingerprint authentication
is not available on the Galaxy Tab 4 devices, and iris authentication is not available on the
Galaxy S10 or Galaxy Fold devices.
The validators encourage the consumers of these products to understand the relationship
between the products and any functionality that may be provided via Mobile Device
Management (MDM), Enterprise Device Management (EDM), and Enterprise Mobility
Management (EMM) solutions (hereafter collectively referred to as MDM solutions). This
evaluation neither covers, nor endorses, the use of any particular MDM solution; only the
MDM-like interfaces of the products were exercised as part of the evaluation. In practice, the
Samsung EDMapp and STIGtool are not available, though its settings could be managed via
a suitable MDM solution and corresponding agent. Samsung does not intend to make the
EDMApp and STIGtool available; however, the APIs used by these tools have been made
available by Samsung. Per Section 2.3.2 of the Admin Guide, “this EDM should support the
Samsung Knox APIs to enable the capabilities documented in this guide.” Further, the Admin
Guide states that the “Common Criteria Configuration section provides the specific
information about the Knox APIs that are necessary to support this configuration….”
Because the EDMApp and STIGtool apps are not available and do not intend to be made
available, a compatible MDM solution is required for the TOE to be placed in CC Mode,
which in turn, places it in the evaluated configuration.
Over-The-Air (OTA) updates were not available during the evaluation; these are created by
Google and the mobile device vendors, then distributed to the wireless carriers (Verizon,
AT&T, etc.), for deployment to the respective devices via the carrier’s network. Therefore,
the OTA update functionality was not tested. Users and enterprise administrators should
remain cognizant of OTA updates and the update cycles offered by the carriers.
11.1 Additional considerations forBiometrics
As noted above, not all evaluated devices support both iris and fingerprint authentication
mechanisms. Specifically, fingerprint authentication is not available on the Galaxy Tab 4
devices and iris authentication is not available on the Galaxy S10 or Galaxy Fold devices.
A few considerations need to be made when allowing for a biometric factor at initial
configuration.
11.1.1 Hybrid Authentication to the KNOX Container
Hybrid authentication to the KNOX container (also referred to as multi-factor) does not
precisely follow the definition in the MDF PP. Hybrid authentication is defined as “one
where a user has to submit a combination of PIN and biometric samples with both to pass
and without the user being made aware of which factor failed, if either fails.”
In the evaluated configuration, a password is used in lieu of a PIN, but the user is made aware
of whether the password or biometric fails. While the vendor notes in the TSS that “the
TOE’s design ensures that no more than the configured maximum number of attempts is
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possible”, compromise of the password still reduces the security of the authentication system
(the SAFAR) to that of the weaker biometric authentication factor in the worst case. Parts e)
and f) of the “password and fingerprint authentication example” in Appendix H.4 of MDF
PP v3.1 (pgs 180-181) explain the risks of providing authentication feedback (i.e. whether
the password or biometric failed) in hybrid authentication.
11.1.2 Traditional Risks Associated with Using Biometrics
Because hybrid or multi-factor authentication is not supported at lockscreen, it is
recommended for customers and sponsors to understand and assume the risks provided when
configuring the evaluated device to allow for a biometric factor separate from the password
factor.
For this evaluation, biometric fingerprint has only been certified to the security strength of a
four-digit numerical PIN (1:10000 FAR), which is much lower than that of a minimum 4-
character password with 93 possible characters that can be used. CC evaluations providing
for a stronger security strength for biometrics are currently infeasible to complete in a 3-6-
month period. Thus, stronger claims must be assessed separately by specialized biometrics
testing labs. In addition, the mitigation of threats of compromise to biometric templates, as
well as system compromise through presentation attacks, is outside the scope of this
evaluation because the corresponding objective requirements in the MDF PP have not been
claimed.
12 Annexes
Not applicable
13 Security Target
The Security Target is identified as: Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. Samsung Galaxy Devices
on Android 9 (MDFPP31/WLANCEP10/VPNC21) Security Target, Version 0.4, 06/24/2019.
14 Glossary
The following definitions are used throughout this document:
 Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL). An IT security evaluation facility
accredited by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) and
approved by the CCEVS Validation Body to conduct Common Criteria-based
evaluations.
 Conformance. The ability to demonstrate in an unambiguous way that a given
implementation is correct with respect to the formal model.
 Evaluation. The assessment of an IT product against the Common Criteria using the
Common Criteria Evaluation Methodology to determine whether or not the claims made
are justified; or the assessment of a protection profile against the Common Criteria using
the Common Evaluation Methodology to determine if the Profile is complete, consistent,
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technically sound and hence suitable for use as a statement of requirements for one or
more TOEs that may be evaluated.
 Evaluation Evidence. Any tangible resource (information) required from the sponsor or
developer by the evaluator to perform one or more evaluation activities.
 Feature. Part of a product that is either included with the product or can be ordered
separately.
 Target of Evaluation (TOE). A group of IT products configured as an IT system, or an
IT product, and associated documentation that is the subject of a security evaluation
under the CC.
 Validation. The process carried out by the CCEVS Validation Body leading to the issue
of a Common Criteria certificate.
 Validation Body. A governmental organization responsible for carrying out validation
and for overseeing the day-to-day operation of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation
and Validation Scheme.
15 Bibliography
The Validation Team used the following documents to produce this Validation Report:
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation: Part 1:
Introduction and General Model, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.
[2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security
functional components, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.
[3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security
assurance components, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.
[4] Protection Profile for Mobile Device Fundamentals, Version 3.1, 16 June 2017,
General Purpose Operating Systems Protection Profile/Mobile Device Fundamentals
Protection Profile Extended Package (EP) Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN)
Clients, Version 1.0, 08 February 2016 and PP-Module for Virtual Private Network
(VPN) Clients, Version 2.1, 05 October 2017.
[5] Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. Samsung Galaxy Devices on Android 9
(MDFPP31/WLANCEP10/VPNC21) Security Target, Version 0.4, 06/24/2019 (ST).
[6] Assurance Activity Report (MDFPP31/WLANCEP10/VPNC21) for Samsung
Galaxy Devices on Android 9, Version 0.2, July 2, 2019 (AAR).
[7] Detailed Test Report (MDFPP31/WLANCEP10/VPNC21) for Samsung Galaxy
Devices on Android 9, Version 0.2, June 28, 2019 (DTR).
[8] Evaluation Technical Report for Samsung Galaxy Devices on Android 9, Version
0.2, July 2, 2019 (ETR).