Certification Report
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
BSI-DSZ-CC-0225-2003
for
IBM LPAR for POWER 4
for the IBM pSeries
Firmware Releases:
3R031021 (p630), 3K031021 (p650) and 3H031021 (p690)
from
IBM Corporation
- Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Telefon +49 228 9582-0, Infoline +49 228 9582-111, Telefax +49 228 9582-455
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Telefon (0228) 9582-0 - Telefax (0228) 9582-455 - Infoline (0228) 9582-111
SOGIS-MRA
BSI-DSZ-CC-0225-2003
IBM LPAR for POWER 4
for the IBM pSeries
Firmware Releases:
3R031021 (p630), 3K031021 (p650) and 3H031021 (p690)
from
IBM Corporation
Common Criteria Arrangement
The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an accredited and licensed/
approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Part 1
Version 0.6, Part 2 Version 1.0, extended by CEM supplementation “ALC_FLR – Flaw
remediation”, Version 1.1, February 2002, for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security
Evaluation, Version 2.1 (ISO/IEC 15408:1999).
Evaluation Results:
Functionality: Product specific Security Target
Common Criteria Part 2 conformant
Assurance Package: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL4 augmented by ALC_FLR.1 (Basic Flaw Remediation)
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated
configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme
of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation
facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
The notes mentioned on the reverse side are part of this certificate.
Bonn, 26. January 2004
The President of the Federal Office
for Information Security
Dr. Helmbrecht L.S.
The rating of the strength of functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms suitable for encryption
and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2)
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty
of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
BSI-DSZ-CC-0225-2003 Certification Report
V
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the
task of issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a
distributor, hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product
according to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised
security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the
BSI or by BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This
report contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the
detailed Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security
functionality of the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and
weaknesses) and instructions for the user.
1
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of
17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0225-2003
VI
Contents
Part A: Certification
Part B: Certification Results
Part C: Excerpts from the Criteria
BSI-DSZ-CC-0225-2003 Certification Report
A-1
A Certification
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down
in the following:
· BSIG2
· BSI Certification Ordinance3
· BSI Schedule of Costs4
· Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal
Ministry of the Interior)
· DIN EN 45011 standard
· BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
· Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 2.15
· Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM)
- Part 1, Version 0.6
- Part 2, Version 1.0
· BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme
(AIS)
· CEM supplementation on “ALC_FLR – Flaw remediation”, Version 1.1,
February 2002
2
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of
17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 7 July 1992,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-
Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 29th October 1992, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1838
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 22nd September 2000 in the
Bundesanzeiger p. 19445
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0225-2003
A-2
2 Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries
a mutual recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are
based on ITSEC or CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1 ITSEC/CC - Certificates
The SOGIS-Agreement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on
ITSEC became effective on 3 March 1998. This agreement was signed by the
national bodies of Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands,
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. This
agreement on the mutual recognition of IT security certificates was extended to
include certificates based on the CC for all evaluation levels (EAL 1 – EAL 7).
2.2 CC - Certificates
An arrangement (Common Criteria Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC evaluation assurance levels up to and including
EAL 4 was signed in May 2000. It includes also the recognition of Protection
Profiles based on the CC. The arrangement was signed by the national bodies
of Australia, Canada, Finland France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands,
New Zealand, Norway, Spain, United Kingdom and the United States. Israel
joined the arrangement in November 2000, Sweden in February 2002, Austria
in November 2002, Hungary and Turkey in September 2003, Japan in
November 2003.
BSI-DSZ-CC-0225-2003 Certification Report
A-3
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform
procedure, a uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product IBM LPAR for POWER 4 (for IBM pSeries, firmware releases
3R031021 (p630), 3K031021 (p650) and 3H031021 (p690)) has undergone the
certification procedure at BSI.
The evaluation of the product IBM LPAR for POWER 4 was conducted by atsec
Information Security GmbH. The atsec Information Security GmbH is an
evaluation facility (ITSEF)6
recognised by BSI.
The sponsor is: IBM Deutschland GmbH
Anzinger Straße 29
81671 München
The developer is: IBM Corporation
Burnet Road 11400
Austin, TX 78758, USA
The certification is concluded with
· the comparability check and
· the production of this Certification Report.
This work was completed by the BSI on 26. January 2004.
The confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
· all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as
given in the following report, are observed,
· the product is operated in the environment described, where specified in
the following report.
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product indicated
here. The validity can be extended to new versions and releases of the product,
provided the sponsor applies for re-certification of the modified product, in
accordance with the procedural requirements, and the evaluation does not
reveal any security deficiencies.
For the meaning of the assurance levels and the confirmed strength of
functions, please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at the end of the
Certification Report.
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0225-2003
A-4
4 Publication
The following Certification Results contain pages B-1 to B-18.
The product IBM LPAR for POWER 4 has been included in the BSI list of the
certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet: http://
www.bsi.bund.de). Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline
0228/9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the vendor7
of
the product. The Certification Report can also be downloaded from the above-
mentioned website.
7
IBM Corporation
Burnet Road 11400
Austin, TX 78758, USA
BSI-DSZ-CC-0225-2003 Certification Report
B-1
B Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
· the security target of the sponsor for the target of evaluation,
· the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
· complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0225-2003
B-2
Contents of the certification results
1 Executive Summary 3
2 Identification of the TOE 7
3 Security Policy 7
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 8
5 Architectural Information 9
6 Documentation 11
7 IT Product Testing 11
8 Evaluated Configuration 14
9 Results of the Evaluation 14
10 Comments/Recommendations 15
11 Annexes 16
12 Security Target 16
13 Definitions 16
14 Bibliography 18
BSI-DSZ-CC-0225-2003 Certification Report
B-3
1 Executive Summary
The target of evaluation (TOE) is the logical partitioning architecture (LPAR) for
POWER 4 for the IBM pSeries systems p630, p650 and p690 (firmware
releases 3R031021 (p630), 3K031021 (p650) and 3H031021 (p690)). It
consists of the Open Firmware, Run Time Abstraction Layer (RTAS) and the
Hypervisor executing in hypervisor mode on the above mentioned hardware
platforms.
The logical partitioning capable pSeries eServers p630, p650 and p690 support
a logical partitioned environment that enables the pSeries systems to run
multiple logical partitions concurrently.
In a logical partition, an operating system instance runs with dedicated
resources: processors, memory, and I/O slots. These resources are statically
assigned to the logical partition. The total amount of assignable resources is
limited by the physically installed resources in the system.
The LPAR for POWER 4 is responsible for managing the separation of the
partitions and allows only dedicated assignment of processors, main memory
and I/O slots to individual partitions. Any sharing of those resources between
different partitions is not supported by the LPAR architecture.
The separation between the different partitions in accordance with the pre-
configured resource assignments is then enforced with support of the pSeries
hardware.
The TOE as firmware is delivered together with the IBM pSeries eServers and
has the following versions:
- For the pSeries Server p630: 3R031021
- For the pSeries Server p650: 3K031021
- For the pSeries Server p690: 3H031021
The hardware underlying the TOE and the operating systems running inside a
logical partition are not part of the TOE.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) used in the Security Target
[7] are Common Criteria conformant as shown in the following table:
Security
Functional
Requirement
Identifier
FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
FDP_IFC.2 Complete information flow control
FDP_IFF.1 Simple security attributes
FDP_RIP.1 Subset residual information protection
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0225-2003
B-4
Security
Functional
Requirement
Identifier
FIA_UID.2 User identification before any action
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation
FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state
FPT_RVM.1 Non-bypassability of the TSP
FPT_SEP.1 TSF domain separation
FRU_FLT.1 Degraded fault tolerance
The evaluation of the product was conducted by atsec Information Security
GmbH. atsec is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)8
recognised by BSI. The
evaluation was completed on November 26th
2003.
The sponsor is: IBM Deutschland GmbH
Anzinger Straße 29
81671 München
The developer is: IBM Corporation
Burnet Road 11400
Austin, TX 78758, USA
1.1 Assurance package
The TOE security assurance requirements are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C of this report,
or [1], part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of assurance level EAL4
(Evaluation Assurance Level 4). The assurance level 4 is augmented by:
ALC_FLR.1 – Basic flaw remediation. For the evaluation of the CC component
ALC_FLR.1 the mutually recognised CEM supplementation “ALC_FLR – Flaw
remediation”, Version 1.1, February 2002 ([3]) was used.
1.2 Functionality
The TOE IBM LPAR for POWER 4 provides the following Security Functions
(please refer to the Security Target [7] for a complete listing and precise
definition):
Identification (ID)
The logical partition that calls a TOE function is identified. This is done by
using a partition number that is stored in a special register (LPID).
8
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
BSI-DSZ-CC-0225-2003 Certification Report
B-5
Access Control (AC)
The TOE assigns processors, memory regions and I/O slots to at most
one partition. This assignment is managed by a table in NVRAM, which
indicates for each resource to which partition the resource is allocated.
The TOE ensures that resources or part of resources are not shared
between partitions.
Interference Protection (IP)
The TOE does not allow communication between software running in
different partitions. No function of the TOE can be used for such
communication. The TOE also ensures that none of the resources it
manages is shared between partitions.
Object Reuse (OR)
On allocation of resources to a partition the TOE ensures that residual
information in those resources are cleared. This applies to processors
that are fully reset, memory objects that are cleared and I/O slot, which
are fully reset when they are allocated to a partition.
TSF Protection (TP)
The underlying hardware of the POWER 4 processors allow the TOE to
reserve areas in main memory and in NVRAM for its own operation. The
TOE will not allocate those memory areas to any partition thereby
protecting its own data structures and code from any type of access by
software running in any partition.
1.3 Strength of Function
No security function of the TOE is based on a permutational or probabilistic
algorithm. Therefore no strength of function was claimed.
1.4 Summary of threats and Organisational Security Policies (OSPs)
addressed by the evaluated IT product
The following threats have been claimed to be averted by the TOE.
T.UAPACCESS
A user of the TOE may get access to information in resources belonging to
other partitions.
T.UATACCESS
A user of the TOE may access information resources belonging to the
TOE via other than the defined TOE user functions.
T.CRASHPAR
Software running in one partition may either crash another partition or
dominate resources in a way that another partition is no longer able to
execute their software at an acceptable performance.
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0225-2003
B-6
For a precise definition of the threats please refer to the Security Target [7].
Note that also threats for the TOE environment have been defined in the
Security Target. They are listed in chapter 4 of this report.
1.5 Special configuration requirements
The configuration requirements for the TOE are defined in the Security Target
[7] and are summarised here (for the complete information please refer to the
Security Target):
- The TOE is running on the following hardware platforms:
IBM pSeries Symmetric Multiprocessor (SMP) Systems, using POWER 4
CPUs (p630, p650 and p690)
- The following peripherals can be run with the TOE:
All devices that are connected via the PCI bus;
The service processor (no external device other than the HMC connected).
Please note that the HMC may only be attached during configuration of the
TOE, but must be detached as soon as the partitions are initialised (see [7],
chapter 2.9)
The hardware management console (not to be used when the TOE is
running except for starting a partition and restarting a hanging partition)
Floppy disk drive and CD-ROM attached to the ISA bus via a SCSI adapter.
1.6 Assumptions about the operating environment
The following constraints concerning the operating environment are made in the
Security Target.
The following constraints are based on the assumptions defined in [7], chapter
3.4. The are summarised here:
Assumption Summary
A.LOCATE Processing resources are run in facilities with controlled
access.
A.PROTECT Protection against manipulation.
A.SP-HMC The Service processor and the HMC work properly.
A.MANAGE Competent personnel for management
A.NO_EVIL_ADMIN Administrators are non-hostile
A.NOPMOD Modification of resource assignment only after shutdown
A.CONNECT All connections to I/O devices, the Service Processor and
the HMC are within the controlled access facilities. No
network connection to HMC and Service Processor.
A.NOSERVICE No partition has Service Authority
A.PDEF Installation and Configuration of the TOE is done correctly
BSI-DSZ-CC-0225-2003 Certification Report
B-7
Assumption Summary
A.HW_FUNC The underlying hardware works as specified
1.7 Disclaimers
The Certification Results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the
Certificate and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in
this Certification Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product
by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation
that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT
product by BSI or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2 Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation is called:
IBM LPAR for POWER 4
for IBM pSeries
Firmware Releases
3R031021 (p630), 3K031021 (p650) and 3H031021 (p690))
The TOE is firmware operating on IBM pSeries hardware providing services for
operating systems running in logical partitions. The TOE and its documentation
is supplied together with the pSeries hardware and comprises the following
documents [9], [10], [11] and [12] (please also refer to chapter 6 of this report).
3 Security Policy
The security policy model specified by the Security Targets SFRs and in even
more detail in a separate Security Policy Model document. The following
policies are enforced by the TOE:
Identification-Policy:
Each subject is uniquely identified when it is accessing objects in an LPAR
environment. A subject cannot change the identification it has been assigned.
Resource-Access-Control Policy:
Each subject can only access those objects it has been assigned by the LPAR
administrator. For processors and memory objects the LPAR administrator
provides only the number of the objects to be assigned. The LPAR Partition
Manager will then determine the object assignment within the numbers defined
by the LPAR administrator.
Separation Information-Flow Control Policy:
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0225-2003
B-8
Each subject can only access those objects it has been assigned by the LPAR
administrator. For processors and memory objects the LPAR administrator
provides only the number of the objects to be assigned. The LPAR Partition
Manager will then determine the object assignment within the numbers defined
by the LPAR administrator.
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
Compliance to the following Organisational Security Policy is claimed in the
Security Target:
P.PARTDEF
The organisation operating the TOE has a defined policy for the amount of
processors and memory and the actual I/O slots to be allocated to the
individual partitions. This policy is defined in accordance with the
operational needs of the software running in the individual partitions. This
policy is implemented by an administrator of the organisation using the
HMC.
Based on the personnel assumptions the following usage constraints exists (for
the precise definition please to [7]):
- The TOE has to be managed by competent individuals (A.MANAGE)
- The Administrators of the TOE are assumed not to be careless, willfully
negligent, or hostile (A.NO_EVIL_ADMIN)
- Assignment of TOE resources will only be made after a shutdown of all
partitions (A.NOPMOD)
4.1 Environmental assumptions
The following assumptions about physical, connectivity and other aspects
defined by the Security Target have to be met (refer to Security Target [7],
chapter 3.4.1 and 3.4.3):
- The processing resources of the TOE, the Hardware Management Console
and the Service Processor are located within controlled access facilities
(A.LOCATE)
- The TOE, software for policy enforcement, the Hardware Management
Console and the Service Processor are secured against physical
manipulation (A.PROTECT)
- The Hardware Management Console and the Service Processor work
properly (A.SP-HMC)
- All direct connections to I/O devices, the Service Processor and the
Hardware Management Console have to reside within controlled access
facilities. No network connection is established to the Hardware
Management Console or the Service Processor. (A.CONNECT)
BSI-DSZ-CC-0225-2003 Certification Report
B-9
- No Partition has Service Authority (A.NOSERVICE)
- Installation and Configuration of the TOE, the Hardware Management
Console and the Service Processor is done correctly. Assignment of
resources to partitions is done according to a defined policy (A.PDEF)
- The hardware underlying the TOE operates correctly in accordance with its
specification. Periodical checks are performed to verify that this is the case
(A.HW_FUNC)
Please consider also the requirements for the evaluated configuration specified
in chapter 8 of this report.
4.2 Clarification of scope
The threats listed below have to be averted in order to support the TOE security
capabilities but are not addressed by the TOE itself. They have to be addressed
by the operating environment of the TOE (for detailed information about the
threats and how the environment may cover them refer to the Security
Target [7]).
- Data loss due to hardware malfunction (TE.HWMF)
- Unauthorised modification of NVRAM content by using the Hardware
Management Console or the Service Processor (TE.MODNVRAM)
- Insufficient capabilities of the underlying hardware to support the self-
protection of the TSF (TE.HW_SEP)
5 Architectural Information
General overview
The target of evaluation (TOE) is the logical partitioning architecture LPAR for
POWER 4 processors. The logical partitioning capable pSeries eServers p630,
p650 and p690 support a logical partitioned environment that enables the
pSeries systems to run multiple logical partitions concurrently. The maximum
number of partitions that can concurrently run depends on the specific
partitioning-capable pSeries server model. For example, the pSeries 690
support up to 16 partitions running concurrently while the pSeries 650 supports
up to 8 partitions and the pSeries 630 supports up to 4 partitions (depending on
the number of interrupt controllers present in the system).
In a logical partition, an operating system instance runs with dedicated
resources: processors, memory, and I/O slots. These resources are statically
assigned to the logical partition. The total amount of assignable resources is
limited by the physically installed resources in the system.
Because the implementation of logical partitioning is static, one has to shut
down every operating system instance in all logical partitions to change the
resource assignment of running logical partitions.
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0225-2003
B-10
The logical resources that can be assigned to a partition are:
- Processors
- Main memory regions
- I/O slots
The assignment of those resources to the individual logical partitions is stored in
non-volatile RAM (NVRAM). This part of the NVRAM is maintained by the
service processor and cannot be read or modified directly by software running
in a logical partition. The assignment itself is performed by a System
Administrator, who uses a “Hardware Management Console” (HMC) to define
those assignments. The HMC communicates with a “Service Processor” that
accepts the commands from the HMC and sets the values to define the logical
partitions in the non-volatile RAM (NVRAM) accordingly.
The TOE includes installation from using the Service Processor Menus only.
The Service Authority functionality that allows update of the firmware code from
a partition is disabled.
The functionality of the TOE is supported by the underlying processors,
because the POWER 4 processor supplies three states: problem state,
supervisor state and hypervisor state.
Major structural units of the TOE
The TOE contains the following structural units:
- The Open Firmware (boot time firmware) that initialises the hardware and
the TOE
- The Hypervisor that provides controlled access to managed resources, such
as page tables, TCE tables as well as virtualised hardware
- The Run-Time Abstraction Services (RTAS) that provides a common
interface to the underlying system for the operating system
The following figure provides a general overview of the TOE and the
interdependencies with the TOE environment:
BSI-DSZ-CC-0225-2003 Certification Report
B-11
6 Documentation
The following documentation is provided with the product by the developer to
the customer:
[9] IBM Hardware Management Console for pSeries Installation and
Operations Guide, SA38-0590-05, Sixth Edition, September 2003, IBM
Corporation
[10] Readme: pSeries 630 Model 6C4 and Model 6E4 Firmware Update
(70286C4F.html), Version 3R031021
[11] Readme: pSeries 650 Model 6M2 Firmware Update (70386M2F.html),
Version 3K031021
[12] Readme: pSeries 690 Model 681 Firmware Update (7040681F.html),
Version 3H031021
7 IT Product Testing
Test Configuration
The TOE as specified in the Security Target as well as preliminary versions of
the TOE have been tested on the following pSeries eServer platforms:
p630 (two different machines)
- 2 POWER 4 CPUs
- 8 GB / 16 GB Main Memory
- ISA Bus Diskette Drive
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0225-2003
B-12
- 2 Wide/Ultra-3 SCSI I/O Controller
- Wide/Fast-20 SCSI I/O Controller
- 1 SCSI disk drives (18 GB / 4 GB) manufactured by IBM
- SCSI DVD-RAM drive, manufactured by IBM
- 2 IBM 10/100 Mbits Ethernet PCI adapter
- HMC
- PS/2 Keyboard
- Three Button Mouse
p650
- 4 POWER 4 CPUs
- 20 GB Main Memory
- ISA Bus Diskette Drive
- 2 Wide/Ultra-3 SCSI I/O Controller
- 3 Dual Channel Ultra3 SCSI Adapter
- 4 LVD SCSI Disk Drive (9100 MB, 18200 MB and two 73400 MB),
manufactured by IBM
- 1 SCSI Multimedia CD-ROM Drive, manufactured by IBM
- 2 IBM 10/100 Mbits Ethernet PCI adapter
- 1 2-Port 10/100/1000 Base-TX PCI-X Adapter
- 2 2-Port Gigabit Ethernet PCI-X Adapter
p690
- 8 POWER 4 CPUs
- 16 GB Main Memory
- ISA Bus Diskette Drive
- 2 Wide/Ultra-3 SCSI I/O Controller
- 2 LVD SCSI Disk Drive (36400 MB), manufactured by IBM
- 1 SCSI Multimedia CD-ROM Drive, manufactured by IBM
- IBM 10/100 Mbps Ethernet PCI Adapter
- HMC
- Standard I/O Serial Port
Test Coverage/Depth
The developer has provided a test coverage and depth of testing analysis,
demonstrating that all aspects of TSF behavior are tested.
BSI-DSZ-CC-0225-2003 Certification Report
B-13
Tests for the evaluated configuration of the TOE have been devised to test all
aspects of TSF behaviour, as it has been specified throughout the functional
specification and high-level design. A correspondence analysis provided by the
developer shows coverage of all TSF, subsystems and interfaces that affect the
security functional behaviour of the TOE. The coverage has been determined to
be overall sufficient.
Summary of developer testing effort
Test Configuration
The tests have been carried out on the test configuration as described above.
Testing Approach
Because of the nature of the TOE the developer mainly used manual tests to
demonstrate that all aspects of TSF behavior are tested. Detailed test
instruction for each test cases have been used to ensure the tests to be
repeatable.
Complete testing on all platforms underlying the TOE (p630, p650, p690) have
been performed.
Testing results
The test records of the developer show that all tests on all test platforms were
executed successfully, i.e. the actual test results met the expected test results.
Summary of evaluator testing effort
Test Configuration
All tests were run at the developer’s sites in Austin, TX and Munich, Germany.
The developer granted access to their testing environment.
The TOE was installed as required by the respective guidance documentation
and the Security Target.
Testing Approach
The evaluator testing effort consists of two parts. The first one is the rerun of the
developer test cases and the second is the execution of the tests created by the
evaluator.
Testing results
All evaluator test were executed successfully.
Evaluator penetration testing:
Penetration tests have been performed by the evaluation facility to assess
possible vulnerabilities found during the evaluation of the different CC
assurance classes. As for AVA_VLA.2 required a low attack potential was
assumed. The TOE withstood the penetration efforts.
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0225-2003
B-14
8 Evaluated Configuration
The Target of Evaluation is called IBM LPAR for POWER 4. The TOE is
firmware operating on the IBM pSeries p630, p650 and p690 hardware.
The following firmware releases comprise the TOE:
- For the pSeries Server p630: 3R031021
- For the pSeries Server p650: 3K031021
- For the pSeries Server p690: 3H031021
The hardware underlying the TOE and the operating systems running inside a
logical partition are not part of the TOE. For setting up the TOE a Service
Processor and a Hardware Management Console are used which are also not
part of the TOE.
For setting up and running the TOE according to the evaluated configuration all
guidance documents (refer to chapter 6) and the implications given by the
Security Target have to be followed. These implications can also be found in
chapter 1.5 and 1.6 of this report.
9 Results of the Evaluation
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [8] was provided by the ITSEF
according to the Common Criteria [1], the Common Evaluation Methodology [2],
the requirements of the Scheme [4] and all interpretations and guidelines of the
Scheme (AIS) [5] as relevant for the TOE.
The verdicts for the CC, Part 3 assurance components (according to EAL4 with
ALC_FLR.1 augmentation and the Security Target evaluation) are summarised
in the following table:
Assurance Classes and Components Verdict
Security Target CC Class ASE PASS
TOE description ASE_DES.1 PASS
Security environment ASE_ENV.1 PASS
ST introduction ASE_INT.1 PASS
Security objectives ASE_OBJ.1 PASS
PP claims ASE_PPC.1 PASS
IT security requirements ASE_REQ.1 PASS
Explicitly stated IT security requirements ASE_SRE.1 PASS
TOE summary specification ASE_TSS.1 PASS
Configuration management CC Class ACM PASS
Partial CM automation ACM_AUT.1 PASS
Generation support and acceptance procedures ACM_CAP.4 PASS
Problem tracking CM coverage ACM_SCP.2 PASS
Delivery and Operation CC Class ADO PASS
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Assurance Classes and Components Verdict
Detection of modification ADO_DEL.2 PASS
Installation, generation, and start-up procedures ADO_IGS.1 PASS
Development CC class ADV PASS
Fully defined external interfaces ADV_FSP.2 PASS
Security enforcing high-level design ADV_HLD.2 PASS
Subset of the implementation of the TSF ADV_IMP.1 PASS
Descriptive low-level design ADV_LLD.1 PASS
Informal correspondence demonstration ADV_RCR.1 PASS
Informal TOE security policy model ADV_SPM.1 PASS
Guidance documents CC Class AGD PASS
Administrator guidance AGD_ADM.1 PASS
User guidance AGD_USR.1 PASS
Life cycle support CC Class ALC PASS
Identification of security measures ALC_DVS.1 PASS
Developer defined life-cycle model ALC_LCD.1 PASS
Well-defined development tools ALC_TAT.1 PASS
Tests CC Class ATE PASS
Analysis of coverage ATE_COV.2 PASS
Testing: high-level design ATE_DPT.1 PASS
Functional testing ATE_FUN.1 PASS
Independent testing - sample ATE_IND.2 PASS
Vulnerability assessment CC Class AVA PASS
Validation of analysis AVA_MSU.2 PASS
Strength of TOE security function evaluation AVA_SOF.1 PASS
Independent vulnerability analysis AVA_VLA.2 PASS
No security function of the TOE is based on a permutational or probabilistic
algorithm. Therefore no strength of function was claimed.
The TOE has no vulnerabilities which are exploitable with low attack potential in
the intended operating environment.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the product IBM LPAR for
POWER 4 (for IBM pSeries, firmware releases 3R031021 (p630), 3K031021
(p650) and 3H031021 (p690)) in the configuration as defined in the Security
Target and summarised in this report (refer to the Security Target [7] and the
chapters 2, 4 and 8 of this report). The validity can be extended to new versions
and releases of the product, provided the sponsor applies for re-certification of
the modified product, and if the evaluation of the modified product does not
reveal any security deficiencies.
10 Comments/Recommendations
The User Guidance documentation (refer to chapter 6 of this report) contains
necessary information about the secure usage of the TOE. Additionally, for
secure usage of the TOE the fulfilment of the assumptions about the
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environment in the Security Target [7] and the Security Target as a whole has to
be taken into account. Therefore a user/administrator has to follow the guidance
in these documents.
11 Annexes
None.
12 Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the security target [7] of the target of evaluation
(TOE) is provided within a separate document.
13 Definitions
13.1 Acronyms
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal
Office for Information Security
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
HMC Hardware Management Console
IT Information Technology
LPAR Logical Partition Architecture
LPID Logical Partition ID
NVRAM non-volatile RAM
PP Protection Profile
SF Security Function
SFP Security Function Policy
SOF Strength of Function
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSC TSF Scope of Control
TSF TOE Security Functions
TSP TOE Security Policy
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13.2 Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more assurance component(s) from CC
Part 3 to an EAL or assurance package.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not
contained in part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the
CC.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics
based on well-established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - An entity within the TSC that contains or receives information and
upon which subjects perform operations.
Protection Profile - An implementation-independent set of security require-
ments for a category of TOEs that meet specific consumer needs.
Security Function - A part or parts of the TOE that have to be relied upon for
enforcing a closely related subset of the rules from the TSP.
Security Target - A set of security requirements and specifications to be used
as the basis for evaluation of an identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined
semantics.
Strength of Function - A qualification of a TOE security function expressing
the minimum efforts assumed necessary to defeat its expected security
behaviour by directly attacking its underlying security mechanisms.
SOF-basic - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that
the function provides adequate protection against casual breach of TOE
security by attackers possessing a low attack potential.
SOF-medium - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows
that the function provides adequate protection against straightforward or
intentional breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a moderate attack
potential.
SOF-high - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that
the function provides adequate protection against deliberately planned or
organised breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a high attack
potential.
Subject - An entity within the TSC that causes operations to be performed.
Target of Evaluation - An IT product or system and its associated
administrator and user guidance documentation that is the subject of an
evaluation.
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TOE Security Functions - A set consisting of all hardware, software, and
firmware of the TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the
TSP.
TOE Security Policy - A set of rules that regulate how assets are managed,
protected and distributed within a TOE.
TSF Scope of Control - The set of interactions that can occur with or within a
TOE and are subject to the rules of the TSP.
14 Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 2.1, August 1999
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
(CEM), Part 1, Version 0.6; Part 2: Evaluation Methodology, Version 1.0,
August 1999
[3] CEM supplementation on “ALC_FLR – Flaw remediation”, Version 1.1,
February 2002
[4] BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
[5] Applicaton Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for
the TOE.
[6] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148, BSI 7149), periodically
updated list published also on the BSI Web-site
[7] Security Target BSI-DSZ-0225-2003, Version 1.6, 2003-11-05, LPAR for
POWER 4, IBM Corporation
[8] Evaluation Technical Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0225, Version 1.1, 2003-11-
26, atsec information security GmbH (confidential document)
User Guidance Documentation:
[9] IBM Hardware Management Console for pSeries Installation and
Operations Guide, SA38-0590-05, Sixth Edition, September 2003, IBM
Corporation
[10] Readme: pSeries 630 Model 6C4 and Model 6E4 Firmware Update
(70286C4F.html), Version 3R031021
[11] Readme: pSeries 650 Model 6M2 Firmware Update (70386M2F.html),
Version 3K031021
[12] Readme: pSeries 690 Model 681 Firmware Update (7040681F.html),
Version 3H031021
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C Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part 1:
Caveats on evaluation results (chapter 5.4) / Final Interpretation 008
The conformance result indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is
met by a TOE or PP that passes its evaluation. This conformance result is presented
with respect to Part 2 (functional requirements), Part 3 (assurance requirements) and, if
applicable, to a pre-defined set of requirements (e.g., EAL, Protection Profile).
The conformance result consists of one of the following:
Part 2 conformant - A PP or TOE is Part 2 conformant if the functional requirements
are based only upon functional components in Part 2
Part 2 extended - A PP or TOE is Part 2 extended if the functional requirements
include functional components not in Part 2
plus one of the following:
Part 3 conformant - A PP or TOE is Part 3 conformant if the assurance requirements
are based only upon assurance components in Part 3
Part 3 extended - A PP or TOE is Part 3 extended if the assurance requirements
include assurance requirements not in Part 3.
Additionally, the conformance result may include a statement made with respect to sets
of defined requirements, in which case it consists of one of the following:
Package name Conformant - A PP or TOE is conformant to a pre-defined named
functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the requirements (functions or
assurance) include all components in the packages listed as part of the conformance
result.
Package name Augmented - A PP or TOE is an augmentation of a pre-defined
named functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the requirements (functions
or assurance) are a proper superset of all components in the packages listed as part of
the conformance result.
Finally, the conformance result may also include a statement made with respect to
Protection Profiles, in which case it includes the following:
PP Conformant - A TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the
conformance result.
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CC Part 3:
Assurance categorisation (chapter 2.5)
„The assurance classes, families, and the abbreviation for each family are shown in
Table 2.1.
Assurance Class Assurance Family Abbreviated Name
Class ACM:
Configuration
management
CM automation ACM_AUT
CM capabilities ACM_CAP
CM scope ACM_SCP
Class ADO: Delivery
and operation
Delivery ADO_DEL
Installation, generation and start-up ADO_IGS
Class ADV:
Development
Functional specification ADV_FSP
High-level design ADV_HLD
Implementation representation ADV_IMP
TSF internals ADV_INT
Low-level design ADV_LLD
Representation correspondence ADV_RCR
Security policy modeling ADV_SPM
Class AGD: Guidance
documents
Administrator guidance AGD_ADM
User guidance AGD_USR
Class ALC: Life cycle
support
Development security ALC_DVS
Flaw remediation ALC_FLR
Life cycle definition ALC_LCD
Tools and techniques ALC_TAT
Class ATE: Tests Coverage ATE_COV
Depth ATE_DPT
Functional tests ATE_FUN
Independent testing ATE_IND
Class AVA:
Vulnerability
assessment
Covert channel analysis AVA_CCA
Misuse AVA_MSU
Strength of TOE security functions AVA_SOF
Vulnerability analysis AVA_VLA
Table 2.1 -Assurance family breakdown and mapping“
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Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 6)
„The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances
the level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of
assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE
at the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the
operational use of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from Part 3 are included in
the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable
assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be
considered for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide
utility.
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 6.1)
Table 6.1 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically
ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the
resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.
As outlined in the next section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance
levels are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance. They are hierarchically
ordered inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The
increase in assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a
hierarchically higher assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e.
increasing rigour, scope, and/or depth) and from the addition of assurance components
from other assurance families (i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as
described in chapter 2 of this Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than
one component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every
component are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of
assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation“ allows the addition of assurance
components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the
substitution of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance
component in the same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs
defined in the CC, only EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a
constituent assurance component“ is not recognised by the CC as a valid claim.
Augmentation carries with it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility
and added value of the added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be
extended with explicitly stated assurance requirements.
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Assurance
Class
Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL1 EAL2 EAL3 EAL4 EAL5 EAL6 EAL7
Configuration
management
ACM_AUT 1 1 2 2
ACM_CAP 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
ACM_SCP 1 2 3 3 3
Delivery and
operation
ADO_DEL 1 1 2 2 2 3
ADO_IGS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Development ADV_FSP 1 1 1 2 3 3 4
ADV_HLD 1 2 2 3 4 5
ADV_IMP 1 2 3 3
ADV_INT 1 2 3
ADV_LLD 1 1 2 2
ADV_RCR 1 1 1 1 2 2 3
ADV_SPM 1 3 3 3
Guidance
documents
AGD_ADM 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AGD_USR 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life cycle
support
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 2 2 3
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3
Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3
ATE_DPT 1 1 2 2 3
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_CCA 1 2 2
AVA_MSU 1 2 2 3 3
AVA_SOF 1 1 1 1 1 1
AVA_VLA 1 1 2 3 4 4
Table 6.1 - Evaluation assurance level summary“
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Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 6.2.1)
„Objectives
EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the
threats to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent
assurance is required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with
respect to the protection of personal or similar information.
EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including
independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance
documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could be successfully
conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner
consistent with its documentation, and that it provides useful protection against
identified threats.“
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 6.2.2)
„Objectives
EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design
information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the
developer than is consistent with good commercial practice. As such it should not
require a substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require
a low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready
availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when
securing legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.“
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked
(chapter 6.2.3)
„Objectives
EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive
security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound
development practices.
EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation
of the TOE and its development without substantial re-engineering.“
Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and
reviewed (chapter 6.2.4)
„Objectives
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security
engineering based on good commercial development practices which, though rigorous,
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do not require substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL4 is the
highest level at which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing
product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require
a moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity
TOEs and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.“
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested
(chapter 6.2.5)
„Objectives
EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering
based upon rigorous commercial development practices supported by moderate
application of specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be
designed and developed with the intent of achieving EAL5 assurance. It is likely that
the additional costs attributable to the EAL5 requirements, relative to rigorous
development without the application of specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require
a high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a
rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to
specialist security engineering techniques.“
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and
tested (chapter 6.2.6)
„Objectives
EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security
engineering techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a
premium TOE for protecting high value assets against significant risks.
EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in
high risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional
costs.“
Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 6.2.7)
„Objectives
EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely
high risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs.
Practical application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security
functionality that is amenable to extensive formal analysis.“
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Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF) (chapter 14.3)
AVA_SOF Strength of TOE security functions
„Objectives
Even if a TOE security function cannot be bypassed, deactivated, or corrupted, it may
still be possible to defeat it because there is a vulnerability in the concept of its
underlying security mechanisms. For those functions a qualification of their security
behaviour can be made using the results of a quantitative or statistical analysis of the
security behaviour of these mechanisms and the effort required to overcome them. The
qualification is made in the form of a strength of TOE security function claim.“
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA) (chapter 14.4)
AVA_VLA Vulnerability analysis
„Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether vulnerabilities identified,
during the evaluation of the construction and anticipated operation of the TOE or by
other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses), could allow users to violate the TSP.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that a user will be able to discover flaws
that will allow unauthorised access to resources (e.g. data), allow the ability to interfere
with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users.“
„Application notes
A vulnerability analysis is performed by the developer in order to ascertain the
presence of security vulnerabilities, and should consider at least the contents of all the
TOE deliverables including the ST for the targeted evaluation assurance level. The
developer is required to document the disposition of identified vulnerabilities to allow
the evaluator to make use of that information if it is found useful as a support for the
evaluator's independent vulnerability analysis.“
„Independent vulnerability analysis goes beyond the vulnerabilities identified by the
developer. The main intent of the evaluator analysis is to determine that the TOE is
resistant to penetration attacks performed by an attacker possessing a low (for
AVA_VLA.2), moderate (for AVA_VLA.3) or high (for AVA_VLA.4) attack potential.“