Certification Report
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
BSI-DSZ-CC-0283-2006
for
IBM Tivoli Directory Server Version 6.0
Fix Pack 1, Interim Fix 5
from
IBM Corporation
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 228 9582-0, Fax +49 228 9582-455, Infoline +49 228 9582-111
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0283-2006 ZS-01-01-F-330 V3.21
BSI-DSZ-CC-0283-2006
IBM Tivoli Directory Server Version 6.0
Fix Pack 1, Interim Fix 5
from
IBM Corporation
Common Criteria Arrangement
The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an accredited and licensed/
approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Part 1
Version 0.6, Part 2 Version 1.0 extended by CEM supplementation “ALC_FLR – Flaw
remediation”, Version 1.1, February 2002 for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT
Security Evaluation, Version 2.1 (ISO/IEC 15408:1999) and including final interpretations for
compliance with Common Criteria Version 2.2 and Common Methodology Part 2, Version 2.2.
UEvaluation Results:
Functionality: Product specific Security Target
Common Criteria Part 2 conformant
Assurance Package: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL4 augmented by ALC_FLR.1 – Basic flaw remediation
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated
configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification
scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the
evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
The notes mentioned on the reverse side are part of this certificate.
nd
P
Bonn, March 2P , 2006
The Vice President of the Federal Office
for Information Security
Hange L.S.
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 228 9582-0 - Fax +49 228 9582-455 - Infoline +49 228 9582-111
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no
warranty of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other
organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0283-2006 ZS-01-01-F-330 V3.21
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0283-2006
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIGTPF
1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the
FPT
task of issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a
distributor, hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product
according to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised
security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the
BSI or by BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This
report contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the
detailed Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security
functionality of the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and
weaknesses) and instructions for the user.
TP PT Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of
17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
V
1
BSI-DSZ-CC-0283-2006 Certification Report
Contents
Part A: Certification
Part B: Certification Results
Part C: Excerpts from the Criteria
VI
1
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0283-2006
A Certification
Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down
in the following:
• BSIGPF
2
FP
• BSI Certification OrdinancePF
3
FP
• BSI Schedule of CostsPF
4
FP
• Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal
Ministry of the Interior)
• DIN EN 45011 standard
• BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
• Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 2.1PF
5
FP
• Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM)
• Part 1, Version 0.6
• Part 2, Version 1.0
• BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS)
• CEM supplementation on “ALC_FLR – Flaw remediation”, Version 1.1,
February 2002
The use of Common Criteria Version 2.1, Common Methodology, part 2,
Version 1.0 and final interpretations as part of AIS 32 results in compliance of
the certification results with Common Criteria Version 2.2 and Common
Methodology Part 2, Version 2.2 as endorsed by the Common Criteria
recognition arrangement committees.
2
TP PT Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of
17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
3
TP PT Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 7 July 1992,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
TP PT Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik (BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
TP PT Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 22 September 2000 in the Bundes-
anzeiger p. 19445
A-1
BSI-DSZ-CC-0283-2006 Certification Report
2 Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries
a mutual recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are
based on ITSEC or CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1 ITSEC/CC - Certificates
The SOGIS-Agreement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on
ITSEC became effective on 3 March 1998. This agreement was signed by the
national bodies of Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands,
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. This
agreement on the mutual recognition of IT security certificates was extended to
include certificates based on the CC for all evaluation levels (EAL 1 – EAL 7).
2.2 CC - Certificates
An arrangement (Common Criteria Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC evaluation assurance levels up to and including
EAL 4 was signed in May 2000. It includes also the recognition of Protection
Profiles based on the CC. The arrangement was signed by the national bodies
of Australia, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, United Kingdom and the United
States. Israel joined the arrangement in November 2000, Sweden in February
2002, Austria in November 2002, Hungary and Turkey in September 2003,
Japan in November 2003, the Czech Republic in September 2004, the Republic
of Singapore in March 2005, India in April 2005.
A-2
3
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0283-2006
Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform
procedure, a uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product IBM Tivoli Directory Server Version 6.0, Fix Pack 1, Interim Fix 5
has undergone the certification procedure at BSI. This is a re-certification based
on BSI-DSZ-CC-0235-2004. For this evaluation specific results from the
evaluation process based on BSI-DSZ-CC-0235-2004 were re-used.
The evaluation of the product IBM Tivoli Directory Server Version 6.0, Fix Pack
1, Interim Fix 5 was conducted by atsec information security GmbH. The atsec
information security GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)TPF
6
recognised by BSI.
FPT
The sponsor and vendor is:
IBM Corporation
11501 Burnet Road
Austin, TX 78758-3415, USA
The certification is concluded with
• the comparability check and
• the production of this Certification Report.
This work was completed by the BSI on March 2nd, 2006.
The confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
• all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in
the following report, are observed,
• the product is operated in the environment described, where specified in the
following report.
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product indicated
here. The validity can be extended to new versions and releases of the product,
provided the sponsor applies for re-certification of the modified product, in
accordance with the procedural requirements, and the evaluation does not
reveal any security deficiencies.
For the meaning of the assurance levels and the confirmed strength of
functions, please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at the end of the
Certification Report.
TP PT Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
A-3
6
BSI-DSZ-CC-0283-2006 Certification Report
4 Publication
The following Certification Results contain pages B-1 to B-X32X.
The product IBM Tivoli Directory Server Version 6.0, Fix Pack 1, Interim Fix 5
has been included in the BSI list of the certified products, which is published
regularly (see also Internet: http:// www.bsi.bund.de). Further information can be
obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the vendorTPF
7
of
FPT
the product. The Certification Report can also be downloaded from the above-
mentioned website.
TP PT IBM Corporation
11501 Burnet Road
Austin, TX 78758-3415, USA
A-4
7
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0283-2006
B Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
• the security target of the sponsor for the target of evaluation,
• the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
• complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
B-1
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
BSI-DSZ-CC-0283-2006 Certification Report
Contents of the certification results
Executive Summary 3
Identification of the TOE 10
Security Policy 12
Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 13
Architectural Information 15
Documentation 18
IT Product Testing 19
Evaluated Configuration 21
Results of the Evaluation 23
Comments/Recommendations 25
Annexes 26
Security Target 27
Definitions 28
Bibliography 30
B-2
1
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0283-2006
Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is IBM Tivoli Directory Server Version 6.0, Fix
Pack 1, Interim Fix 5 (also called ITDS in short). ITDS is an implementation of
the Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) and meets the requirements
of LDAP Version 3 as defined in RFC 2251–2256 and LDAP Version 2 as
defined in RFC 1777.
It is a re-certification of BSI-DSZ-CC-0235-2004. The TOE includes additional
functionality and is certified at a higher Evaluation Assurance Level. For more
details refer to the Security Target [7].
LDAP is essentially a specialised database where the update operation is less
frequent and dedicated to the common goal within the enterprise on
consolidating and unifying the management of identity. IBM Tivoli Directory
Server is built for identity management with role supports, fine-grained access
control and entry ownership.
The IBM Tivoli Directory Server is a software product only, delivered over the
Internet (secure download procedure offered by IBM has to be used) as a
package including
• the TOE (the LDAP server and the administration daemon executables),
• user and administrative tools (like IBM Directory Server Client SDK or the
Web Administration Tool),
• a WebSphere Application Server,
• and an IBM DB2 database.
Note: Although delivered together with the TOE, the user and administrator
tools, the WebSphere Application Server and the DB2 database are all
excluded from the TOE and are considered part of the environment. The TOE
comprises the LDAP server and the administration daemon executables
only.
The TOE environment can also include applications that are not delivered with
the IBM Directory Server, but are used as unprivileged tools, for example the
web browser that may be used to administrate the TOE or the Adobe Acrobat
Reader to access the supplied online documentation.
The TOE provides the following evaluated security functionality:
• Identification and authentication
• Access control
• Auditing
• Management
• Reference mediation
B-3
BSI-DSZ-CC-0283-2006 Certification Report
To ensure a secure usage, a set of guidance documents is provided together
with ITDS. Details can be found in chapter 6 of this report.
The TOE can use a variety of different hardware and operating system
platforms to operate on. For the operating systems used during the evaluation
of the TOE please refer to chapter 2 and 7. Please note that no hardware is
provided with the TOE.
The IT product IBM Tivoli Directory Server Version 6.0, Fix Pack 1, Interim Fix 5
was evaluated by atsec information security GmbH. The evaluation was
completed on February 24th, 2006. The atsec information security GmbH is an
evaluation facility (ITSEF)TPF
8
recognised by BSI.
FPT
The sponsor and vendor is
IBM Corporation
11501 Burnet Road
Austin, TX 78758-3415, USA
1.1 Assurance package
The TOE security assurance requirements are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in part 3 of the Common Criteria (see Annex C or [1], part
3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of assurance level EAL4+
(Evaluation Assurance Level 4 augmented).
The assurance level is augmented by ALC_FLR.1 – Basic flaw remediation. For
the evaluation of the CC component ALC_FLR.1 the mutually recognised CEM
supplementation “ALC_FLR – Flaw remediation”, Version 1.1, February 2002,
[5] was used.
1.2 Functionality
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) selected in the Security
Target are Common Criteria Part 2 conformant as shown in the following table.
The following SFRs are taken from CC part 2:
Security Functional
Requirement
Addressed issue
FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
FAU_GEN.2 User identity association
FAU_SAR.1 Audit review
FAU_SAR.2 Restricted audit review
FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage
8
TP PT Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
B-4
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0283-2006
Security Functional
Requirement
Addressed issue
FDP_ACC.2 Complete access control
FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
FIA_AFL.1aPF
9
FP Authentication failure handling
FIA_AFL.1b Authentication failure handling
FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition
FIA_SOS.1a Verification of secrets
FIA_SOS.1b Verification of secrets
FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FMT_MOF.1a Management of security functions behaviour
FMT_MOF.1b Management of security functions behaviour
FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation
FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF data
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security Roles
FPT_RVM.1 Non-bypassability of the TSP
Table 1: SFRs for the TOE taken from CC Part 2
Note: only the titles of the Security Functional Requirements are provided. For
more details and application notes please refer to the ST [7] chapter 5.1.
The following Security Functional Requirements are defined for the IT-
Environment of the TOE:
Security Functional
Addressed issue
Requirement
FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps
Table 2: SFRs for the IT-Environment
Note: only the titles of the Security Functional Requirements are provided. For
more details and application notes please refer to the ST [7] chapter 5.2.
TP PT Notation of SFR component iteration: [FXX_XXX.ya] means iteration “a” of the SFR
[FXX_XXX.y]
B-5
9
BSI-DSZ-CC-0283-2006 Certification Report
These Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the TOE Security
Functions:
TOE Security Function Addressed issue
F.AUDIT Audit Generation
F.ACCESS_CONTROL Access control to particular LDAP operations
F.I&A Identification & authentication of TOE user
F.MANAGEMENT Management of the behaviour of Roles, authentication
functionality, authorisation on directory entries and audit
functionality
F.REF_MEDIATION Non-bypassability of the TSF
Table 3: TOE Security Functions
For more details please refer to the Security Target [7], chapter 6.1.
1.3 Strength of Function
The TOE’s strength of functions is claimed ‘medium’ (SOF-medium) for
password based user authentication as indicated in the Security Target [7],
chapter 1.2 and 8.3.2.
1.4 Summary of threats and Organisational Security Policies
(OSPs) addressed by the evaluated IT product
A summary of the threats defined in the ST [7], chapter 3.2.1 is provided here.
For the precise description of the threats please refer to [7]:
Threat Name Summary
T.ENTRY Unauthorised, malicious access to a resource/information
protected by the TOE.
T.ACCESS Unauthorised execution of operations.
T.ACCOUNT Security relevant actions occur without awareness by
Directory Administrators.
T.BYPASS Bypass of the TOE security functions.
Table 4: Threats addressed by the TOE
Please note that T.ACCESS is not entirely averted by the TOE. Instead,
additional support from the TOE’s environment is needed. For information which
parts are averted by the TOE and which by the environment of the TOE, please
refer to [7], chapter 8.1 (Security Objective Rationale) and to chapter 4.3 of this
report.
B-6
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0283-2006
The TOE has to comply to the following Organisational Security Policy (OSP).
More details can be found in the ST [7], chapter 3.3:
OSP Name Summary
P.PUBLIC Of the information under the control of the TOE, only public
information should be made available to unauthenticated or
anonymous users.
Table 5: OSPs addressed by the TOE
1.5 Special configuration requirements
According to the Security Target the TOE can be run on
• Microsoft Windows 2000,
• IBM AIX 5.2,
• Sun Solaris 9,
• HP UX-11i,
• Red Hat Advanced Server 3.0 and
• SuSE Linux Enterprise Server 8.
No explicit restrictions on the usable hardware were made in the Security
Target [7].
Please note that
• the underlying hardware and the operating system used by the Directory
Server,
• the DB2 Database used as back-end data store,
• the LDAP clients and
• the TLS/SSL module used for the protection of the path between the LDAP
clients and the server and between LDAP replication servers
are not part of the TOE. They are hence out of evaluation scope. Please refer
to the ST [7], chapter 2.3 for more information.
The following usage restrictions have to be met for the evaluated configuration
of the TOE:
• The TOE and the DB2 database will run on the same machine.
• In case of replication, when different instances of the TOE run on different
machines, they will all have their own DB2 databases running on their
respective machine.
B-7
BSI-DSZ-CC-0283-2006 Certification Report
• It is possible to install multiple server instances of ITDS, but in the case of
Microsoft Windows 2000 the evaluated configuration is restricted to one
server instance of the ITDS on each single machine.
• When using replication, both master/peer server, forwarding and replicas
may be included which means that more than a single server will be used.
Each server will have its own administration daemon, directory server and
database, as in the single server configuration.
1.6 Assumptions about the operating environment
The following constraints concerning the operating environment are made in the
Security Target. They are based on the assumptions defined in the ST [7],
chapter 3.1 and are summarised in the following table:
Assumption Name Summary
A.PHYSICAL The TOE is operated in a physically secure environment.
A.ADMIN The TOE Administrators are trustworthy to perform
discretionary actions in accordance with security policies and
not to interfere with the abstract machine (i.e. the hardware
and operating system software the TOE runs on).
A.TOENEV The TOE Environment Administrators are trustworthy to
perform discretionary actions in accordance with security
policies, assuring that the TOE environment is competently
installed and administered.
A.COMM It is assumed that communication links between the TOE and
external systems are protected against unauthorized
modification and disclosure of communication data.
A.COOP Authorized end users possess the necessary authorization to
access at least some of the information and are trusted and
expected to act in a co-operating manner in a benign
environment.
A.ROUTE It is assumed that in a replicated environment, all the update
requests are made to the master server only. It is also
assumed that all replicas are under the same administration
and the protection in the TOE environment is as for the TOE
(master server).
A.TIME It is assumed that a reliable time function is provided by the
TOE environment.
Table 6: Assumption for TOE operating environment
B-8
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0283-2006
1.7 Disclaimers
The Certification Results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the
Certificate and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in
this Certification Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product
by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation
that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT
product by BSI or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
B-9
2
BSI-DSZ-CC-0283-2006 Certification Report
Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
IBM Tivoli Directory Server Version 6.0, Fix Pack 1, Interim Fix 5
The IBM Tivoli Directory Server is a software product only, delivered over the
Internet (secure download procedure offered by IBM has to be used) as a
package including:
Component TOE / Not
TOE
IBM Tivoli Directory Server package
The LDAP daemon executable and
Administration daemon executable.
Installation and Configuration Tools and GSKit (SSL package only)
TOE
Not TOE
User and administrative tools
(like the IBM Directory Server Client SDK 6.0 or the Web Administration Tool).
Not TOE
A WebSphere Application server. Not TOE
An IBM DB2 database. Not TOE
Table 7: Product / TOE Components
Note: Although delivered together with the TOE, the user and administrator
tools, the WebSphere Application server and the DB2 database as well as
GSKit, Installation and Configuration Tools are all excluded from the TOE. They
are considered to be part of the environment.
The TOE is the LDAP server and the administration daemon executables
only.
The TOE environment can also include applications that are not delivered with
the IBM Tivoli Directory Server, but are used as unprivileged tools, for example
the web browser that may be used to administrate the TOE or the Adobe
Acrobat Reader to access the supplied online documentation.
The TOE can be subdivided into two major components:
• The LDAP Server executable and
• the LDAP Server Administration Daemon executable.
The LDAP server may be partitioned again into two parts: the front-end and the
back-end. The front-end is the network interface to LDAP clients and the back-
end is the interface to a DB2 database. The Administration Daemon provides an
LDAP interface to clients, used for the administration of the LDAP server. For
more details refer to chapter 5.
To install and configure the TOE in a certification conformant configuration the
user has to follow the guidance documentation as listed in chapter 6. The
Security Guide [10] provides guidance on how to configure the TOE in
B-10
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0283-2006
accordance with the Security Target [7]. For the secure operation of the TOE
document [9] has to be followed.
B-11
3
BSI-DSZ-CC-0283-2006 Certification Report
Security Policy
The TOE is an implementation of the Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
(LDAP). The main purpose of the TOE is to provide identification and
authentication, access control and audit functionality. This is supplemented by
management and non-bypassability.
Therefore the Security Policy of the TOE is defined by the following TOE
security functional requirements:
• All SFR components being part of the CC class FIA (like FIA_SOS.1
defining the password policy constraints).
• FDP_ACC.2 and FDP_ACF.1 defining the Directory Access Control SFP, a
Security Policy that controls access to directory entries protected by the
TOE.
A detailed description/definition of the Security Policy enforced by the TOE is
given in the Security Target [7], chapter 5.1.
B-12
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0283-2006
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
4.1 Usage assumptions
Based on the Organisational Security Policy (OSP) to which the TOE complies
the following usage assumption exist (for the detailed and precise definition
refer to the ST [7], chapter 3.3):
• Of the information under the control of the TOE, only information classified
as public information should be made available to unauthenticated or
anonymous users (P.PUBLIC).
Based on personnel assumptions defined in the ST [7] the following usage
conditions exist:
• The Administrators of the TOE are trustworthy to perform discretionary
actions in accordance with security policies and not to interfere with the
abstract machine (A.ADMIN). Whereas abstract machine means the
hardware and operating system software the TOE runs on.
• The TOE Environment Administrators are trustworthy to perform
discretionary actions in accordance with security policies, assuring that the
TOE environment is competently installed and administered (A.TOEENV).
• Authorised users are expected to act in a co-operating manner in a benign
environment (A.COOP).
For a detailed description of the usage assumptions refer to the Security Target
[7], especially chapter 3.1.
4.2 Environmental assumptions
The following assumptions about physical and connectivity aspects defined by
the Security Target have to be met (refer to Security Target [7], chapter 3.1):
• The TOE is operated in a physically secure environment (A.PHYSICAL).
• Communication links between TOE and external systems are protected
against modification and disclosure of transmitted data (A.COMM).
• An a replicated environment all the update requests are made to the master
server only. Furthermore it is assumed that all replicas are under the same
administration and the protection in the TOE environment is as for the
master server (A.ROUTE).
• A reliable time function is provided by the environment (A.TIME).
Please consider also the requirements for the evaluated configuration specified
in chapter 8 of this report.
B-13
BSI-DSZ-CC-0283-2006 Certification Report
4.3 Clarification of scope
The threats listed below must be countered in order to support the TOE security
capabilities but are either (i) not addressed by, or (ii) only partly addressed by
the TOE. These threats must therefore be addressed in conjunction with the
operating environment. Please refer to the Security Target [7], chapter 3.2.2
and chapter 8.1 for more details.
Threat Name Summary
TE.CRASH Human error or a failure of software, hardware, power supply,
or an accidental event may cause an abrupt interruption to the
TOE operation, resulting in loss or corruption of data.
TE.SOPHISTICATED An unauthorised individual may gain access to TOE resources
or information by using sophisticated technical attack, using IT
security-defeating tools applied to the TOE or the underlying
system components.
TE.PASS An attacker may bypass the TOE to access resources or
resources protected by the TOE by attacking the underlying
operating system or database, in order to gain access to TOE
resources and information.
Table 8: Threats addressed by the operating environment
B-14
5
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0283-2006
Architectural Information
General overview
The target of evaluation is the IBM Tivoli Directory Server Version 6.0, Fix Pack
1, Interim Fix 5 (ITDS). ITDS is an implementation of the Lightweight Directory
Access Protocol (LDAP), which is compliant with the Internet Engineering Task
Force (IETF) LDAP Version 2 specifications, i.e. RFC 1777 and Version 3
specifications, i.e. RFC 2251 - 2256.
The server is a software only product and can be installed and operated on a
variety of hardware/software platforms (refer to chapter 8).
LDAP essentially provides access to and management of a specialised
database where the update operation is less frequent and dedicated to the
common goal within the enterprise on consolidating and unifying the
management of identity.
IBM Tivoli Directory Server is built for identity management with role support,
fine-grained access control and entry ownership. It provides the foundation for
improved security, rapid development and deployment of Web applications.
The IBM DB2 Universal Database is used as back end data store to provide
high performance, reliability and stability in an enterprise or e-business.
The IBM Tivoli Directory Server Version 6.0, Fix Pack 1, Interim Fix 5 is a
software product only, delivered over the Internet as a package including the
TOE, user and administrative tools, a WebSphere Application server, and a
DB2 database. The user and administrator tools, the WebSphere Application
server and the DB2 database are all excluded from the TOE and are considered
part of the environment.
The TOE environment includes applications that are not delivered with the ITDS
product, but are used as unprivileged tools, for example the web browser that
may be used to administrate the TOE or the Adobe Acrobat Reader to access
the supplied online documentation.
In order to improve performance and availability, directories may be replicated.
This means that one master directory may be replicated to a number of copies
allowing improved availability to read accesses. Any changes made to the
master affecting the replicas, will be transmitted out to them. A user accessing a
server may then either go to the master or to any of the replicas.
Replication is enabled as replication agreements between a server and a client.
A replication agreement is part of the directory tree of the master. Replication is
controlled by the access control. This has been restricted in the evaluated
configuration to the Directory Administrator, Member of the Administrative
Group and Master DN. Only these roles are able to set up and change
replication agreements.
In the evaluated configuration, there must not be more than one master for a
given entry at any particular point in time. Since gateway servers only serve a
B-15
BSI-DSZ-CC-0283-2006 Certification Report
purpose in a configuration including more than one concurrently updateable
master server they are not meaningful in an evaluated configuration. Conflict
resolution is not included in the TOE. Since an entry can only be updated on
one server at any point in time, there should never be any replication conflicts.
Major structural units of the TOE
The TOE consists of the LDAP Server and the Administration Daemon
executables as part of the product IBM Tivoli Directory Server.
User clients are connecting both to the LDAP server and to the administration
daemon, using the LDAP protocol, but using different port numbers. The LDAP
server component is providing the LDAP functionality to users and
administrators, while the administration daemon is only used by the
administrator for starting, stopping and querying the status of the TOE.
The following figure provides a more detailed overview of the TOE:
Figure 1: TOE Architecture
TOE security functionality
Identification and authentication
Identification and authentication are used to determine the identity of the
LDAP clients; that is, verifying that users are who they say they are. A user
name and password is a basic authentication scheme. This user identity is
used for determining access rights and for user accountability. The
administrator can manage users, set passwords for users, and place
restrictions on user-selected passwords by specifying rules in the
password policy managed by the administrator. Both end users and
administrators are subject to the password policy.
Access Control
After users are authenticated, it must be determined whether they have
authorization or permission to perform the requested operation on the
specific object. Authorization is often based on access control lists (ACLs).
B-16
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0283-2006
An ACL is a list of authorizations that can be attached to objects and
attributes in the directory. An ACL lists what type of access each user or a
group of users is allowed or denied. To make ACLs shorter and more
manageable, users with the same access rights are often put into groups.
The directory administrator can manage access control by specifying the
access rights to objects for individual users or groups.
Auditing
The IBM Directory Server can perform auditing of security-relevant events,
such as user authentication and modification to the directory tree. The
audit function provides a means for accountability by generating audit
records containing the time, user identity, and additional information about
the operation. The behaviour of the audit function, such as selection of
auditable events, as well as audit review and clearing of audit files, is
managed by the directory administrator.
Management
The IBM Directory Server is supporting the roles of Directory
Administrator, Administrative Group Members, Global Administrative
Group Members, Master DN and End User, allowing the Directory
Administrator to manage the functions for identification and authentication,
authorization and audit. The Members of the Administrative Group and the
Global Administrative Group Members has a well-defined sub-set of the
rights of the Directory Administrator. Both the Directory Administrator, the
Members of the Administrative Group and the Global Administrative Group
Members can manage the users and user attributes. The master server
DN is a role used for replication between LDAP servers.
Reference Mediation
The IBM Directory Server is designed that all security policy enforcement
functions are invoked and must succeed before any function is allowed to
proceed. This means that any request for access to a directory entry is
checked for access according to the rules defined before access is
granted.
B-17
6
BSI-DSZ-CC-0283-2006 Certification Report
Documentation
The following documentation is provided with the product by the developer to
the customer:
• IBM Tivoli Directory Server Version 6.0 Administration Guide,
SC32-1674-00, First Edition (April 2005), [9]
• IBM Tivoli Directory Server Version 6.0 Common Criteria Guide,
SC32-1681-00, First Edition (November 2005), [10]
• IBM Tivoli Directory Server Version 6.0, Installation and Configuration
Guide, SC32-1673-00, First Edition (April 2005), [11]
• IBM Tivoli Directory Server Version 6.0, Messages Guide
SC32-1678-00, First Edition (April 2005), [12]
• IBM Tivoli Directory Server Version 6.0, Problem Determination Guide,
First Edition (April 2005), [13]
• IBM Tivoli Directory Server Version 6.0, Server Plug-ins Reference,
SC32-1676-00, First Edition (April 2005), [14]
• IBM Tivoli Directory Server Version 6.0, C-Client SDK Programming
Reference, SC32-1675-00, First Edition (April 2005), [15]
• IBM Tivoli Directory Server 6.0, Release Notes, First Edition (April 2005),
[16]
• IBM Tivoli Directory Server Version 6.0, Performance Tuning Guide,
SC32-1677-00, First Edition (April 2005), [17]
B-18
7
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0283-2006
IT Product Testing
Test configuration
The Security Target [7] defines the following platforms for running the TOE:
• Microsoft Windows 2000,
• IBM AIX 5.2,
• Sun Solaris 9,
• HP UX-11i,
• Red Hat Advanced Server 3.0 and
• SuSE Linux Enterprise Server 8.
Developer tests have been performed on all platforms, whereas evaluator tests
were executed on a sampled subset of those platforms (only one Linux platform
was tested since the TOE codebase was the same for both Linux distributions).
Each platform was set up in accordance with the Security Target [7] and all the
relevant guidance (refer to chapter 6 of this report).
Depth/Coverage of Testing
The security functionality of the TOE as well as all TSFI as detailed in the
Functional Specification were completely covered by the developer tests. The
developer tests provided for a sufficient depth as required by EAL4. The test
areas provided by the developer covered the subsystems as defined in the
high-level design documentation of the TOE as well as their interfaces.
Summary of Developer Testing Effort
UTest configuration:
Tests have been carried out on the platforms as described above.
UTesting approach:
The developer divided the testing effort needed for the TOE into several test
areas representing groups of similar functionality. Each test area comprised
several function tests that probe for the behaviour of the functions to be tested.
For each single test case, the developer provided sufficient information on the
setup of the test environment, on the instructions needed to actually run the test
and on the results expected for that test case.
UTesting results:
The developer testing for the evaluated configuration of the TOE was performed
successfully on all platforms listed above.
Summary of Evaluator Testing Effort
B-19
BSI-DSZ-CC-0283-2006 Certification Report
UTest configuration
The evaluation lab performed tests on a subset of the platforms listed above. A
reasonable argument for the subset chosen was provided. The TOE was setup
as required by the Security Target and the respective guidance documentation.
UTesting approach:
The evaluator testing effort comprised two test sessions. The first session
concentrated on repeating developer test cases, whereas the second session
addressed execution of tests devised by the evaluator. These evaluator tests
concentrated on features newly introduced since the previous evaluation.
UTesting results:
All actual test results obtained by the evaluator matched the expected results.
UEvaluator penetration testing:
Within the vulnerability analysis, the evaluator identified potential vulnerabilities
and decided to determine their potential of being exploited by devising
additional penetration tests probing for ways a potential attacker might
circumvent security functions.
The penetration tests did not show any obvious vulnerability which was
exploitable with the attack potential assumed for EAL4 in the intended
environment.
B-20
8
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0283-2006
Evaluated Configuration
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
IBM Tivoli Directory Server Version 6.0, Fix Pack 1, Interim Fix 5
The IBM Tivoli Directory Server is a software product only, delivered over the
Internet (secure download procedure offered by IBM has to be used) as a
package including:
Component TOE / Not
TOE
IBM Tivoli Directory Server package
The LDAP daemon executable and
Administration daemon executable.
Installation and Configuration Tools and GSKit (SSL package only)
TOE
Not TOE
User and administrative tools
(like the IBM Directory Server Client SDK 6.0 or the Web Administration Tool).
Not TOE
A WebSphere Application server. Not TOE
An IBM DB2 database. Not TOE
Table 9: Product / TOE Components
Note: Although delivered together with the TOE, the user and administrator
tools, the WebSphere Application server and the DB2 database as well as
GSKit, Installation and Configuration Tools are all excluded from the TOE. They
are considered to be part of the environment.
The TOE is the LDAP server and the administration daemon executables
only.
The TOE environment can also include applications that are not delivered with
the IBM Tivoli Directory Server, but are used as unprivileged tools, for example
the web browser that may be used to administrate the TOE or the Adobe
Acrobat Reader to access the supplied online documentation.
To install and configure the TOE in a certification conformant configuration the
user has to follow the guidance documentation as listed in chapter 6. The
Security Guide [10] provides guidance on how to configure the TOE in
accordance with the Security Target [7]. For the secure operation of the TOE
document [9] has to be followed.
According to the Security Target the TOE can be run on
• Microsoft Windows 2000,
• IBM AIX 5.2,
• Sun Solaris 9,
• HP UX-11i,
B-21
BSI-DSZ-CC-0283-2006 Certification Report
• Red Hat Advanced Server 3.0 and
• SuSE Linux Enterprise Server 8.
No explicit restrictions on the usable hardware were made in the Security
Target [7].
The Administrators of the TOE and its environment are seen as trustworthy to
perform discretionary actions in accordance with security policies. The TOE and
its environment is competently installed and administered. Authorised users are
expected to act in a co-operating manner in a benign environment.
The TOE is operated in a physically secure environment. Communication links
(between the TOE and external systems) are protected against modification and
disclosure of transmitted data. A reliable time is provided by the TOE
environment.
B-22
9
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0283-2006
Results of the Evaluation
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR), [8] was provided by the ITSEF
according to the Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of
the Scheme [3] and all interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as
relevant for the TOE.
The evaluation methodology CEM [2] was used for those components identical
with EAL4. It was supplemented by the methodology for “ALC_FLR – Flaw
remediation”, Version 1.1, February 2002.
The assurance refinements outlined in the Security Target were followed in the
course of the evaluation of the TOE.
The verdicts for the CC, Part 3 assurance components (according to EAL4
augmented by ALC_FLR.1 – Basic flaw remediation and the class ASE for the
Security Target evaluation) are summarised in the following table.
Assurance Classes and Components Verdict
Security Target CC Class ASE PASS
TOE description ASE_DES.1 PASS
Security environment ASE_ENV.1 PASS
ST introduction ASE_INT.1 PASS
Security objectives ASE_OBJ.1 PASS
PP claims ASE_PPC.1 PASS
IT security requirements ASE_REQ.1 PASS
Explicitly stated IT security requirements ASE_SRE.1 PASS
TOE summary specification ASE_TSS.1 PASS
Configuration management CC Class ACM PASS
Partial CM automation ACM_AUT.1 PASS
Generation support and acceptance procedures ACM_CAP.4 PASS
TOE CM coverage ACM_SCP.1 PASS
Delivery and Operation CC Class ADO PASS
Detection of modification ADO_DEL.2 PASS
Installation, generation, and start-up procedures ADO_IGS.1 PASS
Development CC class ADV PASS
Fully defined external interfaces ADV_FSP.2 PASS
Security enforcing high-level design ADV_HLD.2 PASS
Subset of the implementation of the TSF ADV_IMP.1 PASS
Descriptive low-level design ADV_LLD.1 PASS
Informal correspondence demonstration ADV_RCR.1 PASS
Informal TOE security policy model ADV_SPM.1 PASS
Guidance documents CC Class AGD PASS
Administrator guidance AGD_ADM.1 PASS
User guidance AGD_USR.1 PASS
Life cycle support CC Class ALC PASS
Identification of security measures ALC_DVS.1 PASS
Basic flaw remediation ALC_FLR.1 PASS
B-23
BSI-DSZ-CC-0283-2006 Certification Report
Assurance Classes and Components Verdict
Well-defined development tools ALC_TAT.1 PASS
Tests CC Class ATE PASS
Analysis of coverage ATE_COV.2 PASS
Testing: high-level design ATE_DPT.1 PASS
Functional testing ATE_FUN.1 PASS
Independent testing - sample ATE_IND.2 PASS
Vulnerability assessment CC Class AVA PASS
Examination of guidance AVA_MSU.1 PASS
Strength of TOE security function evaluation AVA_SOF.1 PASS
Independent vulnerability analysis AVA_VLA.2 PASS
Table 10: Security Assurance Requirement verdicts
This is a re-certification based on BSI-DSZ-CC-0235-2004. For this evaluation
specific results from the evaluation process based on BSI-DSZ-CC-0235-2004
were re-used. In comparance to the former certificate the Level of Assurance
has been increased and new functionality was subject to analysis (refer to the
ST [7] for details).
The evaluation has shown that:
• Security Functional Requirements specified for the TOE are Common
Criteria Part 2 conformant
• the assurance of the TOE is Common Criteria Part 3 conformant, EAL4
augmented by ALC_FLR.1
• The following TOE Security Functions fulfil the claimed Strength of Function
(SOF-medium): Identification/Authentication with passwords
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the IBM Tivoli Directory
Server Version 6.0, Fix Pack 1, Interim Fix 5 as outlined in chapter 2 and 8 of
this report.
The validity can be extended to new versions and releases of the product,
provided the sponsor applies for re-certification or assurance continuity of the
modified product, in accordance with the procedural requirements and the
evaluation of the modified product does not reveal any security deficiencies.
B-24
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0283-2006
10 Comments/Recommendations
The operational documents as outlined in chapter 6 of this report contain
necessary information about the usage of the TOE and all security hints therein
have to be considered.
B-25
BSI-DSZ-CC-0283-2006 Certification Report
11 Annexes
None.
B-26
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0283-2006
12 Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the security target [7] of the target of evaluation
(TOE) is provided within a separate document.
B-27
BSI-DSZ-CC-0283-2006 Certification Report
13 Definitions
13.1 Acronyms
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal
Office for Information Security, Bonn, Germany
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
IT Information Technology
PP Protection Profile
SF Security Function
SFP Security Function Policy
SOF Strength of Function
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSC TSF Scope of Control
TSF TOE Security Functions
TSP TOE Security Policy
13.2 Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more assurance component(s) from CC
Part 3 to an EAL or assurance package.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not
contained in part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the
CC.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics
based on well-established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - An entity within the TSC that contains or receives information and
upon which subjects perform operations.
Protection Profile - An implementation-independent set of security require-
ments for a category of TOEs that meet specific consumer needs.
Security Function - A part or parts of the TOE that have to be relied upon for
enforcing a closely related subset of the rules from the TSP.
Security Target - A set of security requirements and specifications to be used
as the basis for evaluation of an identified TOE.
B-28
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0283-2006
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined
semantics.
Strength of Function - A qualification of a TOE security function expressing
the minimum efforts assumed necessary to defeat its expected security
behaviour by directly attacking its underlying security mechanisms.
SOF-basic - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that
the function provides adequate protection against casual breach of TOE
security by attackers possessing a low attack potential.
SOF-medium - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows
that the function provides adequate protection against straightforward or
intentional breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a moderate attack
potential.
SOF-high - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that
the function provides adequate protection against deliberately planned or
organised breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a high attack
potential.
Subject - An entity within the TSC that causes operations to be performed.
Target of Evaluation - An IT product or system and its associated
administrator and user guidance documentation that is the subject of an
evaluation.
TOE Security Functions - A set consisting of all hardware, software, and
firmware of the TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the
TSP.
TOE Security Policy - A set of rules that regulate how assets are managed,
protected and distributed within a TOE.
TSF Scope of Control - The set of interactions that can occur with or within a
TOE and are subject to the rules of the TSP.
B-29
BSI-DSZ-CC-0283-2006 Certification Report
14 Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 2.1, August 1999
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
(CEM), Part 1, Version 0.6; Part 2: Evaluation Methodology, Version 1.0,
August 1999
[3] BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for
the TOE.
[5] Applicaton Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme AIS33, Version 2 –
“Methodologie zur Fehlerbehebung – Flaw Remediation”, 26.07.2002
[6] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148, BSI 7149), periodically
updated list published also on the BSI Web-site
[7] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0283, Version 1.7.3, 2006-01-06, Security
Target IBM Tivoli Directory Server Version 6.0 Fix Pack 1, Interim Fix 5,
IBM Corporation
[8] Evaluation Technical Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0283, Version 1.0,
2006-02-23, atsec information security GmbH (confidential document)
User Guidance Documentation:
[9] IBM Tivoli Directory Server Version 6.0 Administration Guide,
SC32-1674-00, First Edition (April 2005)
[10] IBM Tivoli Directory Server Version 6.0 Common Criteria Guide,
SC32-1681-00, First Edition (November 2005)
[11] IBM Tivoli Directory Server Version 6.0, Installation and Configuration
Guide, SC32-1673-00, First Edition (April 2005)
[12] IBM Tivoli Directory Server Version 6.0, Messages Guide SC32-1678-00,
First Edition (April 2005)
[13] IBM Tivoli Directory Server Version 6.0, Problem Determination Guide,
First Edition (April 2005)
[14] IBM Tivoli Directory Server Version 6.0, Server Plug-ins Reference,
SC32-1676-00, First Edition (April 2005)
[15] IBM Tivoli Directory Server Version 6.0, C-Client SDK Programming
Reference, SC32-1675-00, First Edition (April 2005)
[16] IBM Tivoli Directory Server 6.0, Release Notes, First Edition (April 2005).
B-30
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0283-2006
[17] IBM Tivoli Directory Server Version 6.0, Performance Tuning Guide,
SC32-1677-00, First Edition (April 2005)
B-31
BSI-DSZ-CC-0283-2006 Certification Report
This page is intentionally left blank.
B-32
C
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0283-2006
Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part 1:
Caveats on evaluation results (chapter 5.4) / Final Interpretation 008
The conformance result indicates the source of the collection of requirements
that is met by a TOE or PP that passes its evaluation. This conformance result
is presented with respect to Part 2 (functional requirements), Part 3 (assurance
requirements) and, if applicable, to a pre-defined set of requirements (e.g., EAL,
Protection Profile).
The conformance result consists of one of the following:
Part 2 conformant - A PP or TOE is Part 2 conformant if the functional
requirements are based only upon functional components in Part 2
Part 2 extended - A PP or TOE is Part 2 extended if the functional
requirements include functional components not in Part 2
plus one of the following:
Part 3 conformant - A PP or TOE is Part 3 conformant if the assurance
requirements are based only upon assurance components in Part 3
Part 3 extended - A PP or TOE is Part 3 extended if the assurance
requirements include assurance requirements not in Part 3.
Additionally, the conformance result may include a statement made with respect
to sets of defined requirements, in which case it consists of one of the following:
Package name Conformant - A PP or TOE is conformant to a pre-defined
named functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the requirements
(functions or assurance) include all components in the packages listed as part
of the conformance result.
Package name Augmented - A PP or TOE is an augmentation of a pre-defined
named functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the requirements
(functions or assurance) are a proper superset of all components in the
packages listed as part of the conformance result.
Finally, the conformance result may also include a statement made with respect
to Protection Profiles, in which case it includes the following:
PP Conformant - A TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the
conformance result.
C-1
BSI-DSZ-CC-0283-2006 Certification Report
CC Part 3:
Assurance categorisation (chapter 2.5)
"The assurance classes, families, and the abbreviation for each family are
shown in Table 2.1."
Assurance Class Assurance Family Abbreviated Name
Class ACM: Configuration
management
CM automation ACM_AUT
CM capabilities ACM_CAP
CM scope ACM_SCP
Class ADO: Delivery and
operation
Delivery ADO_DEL
Installation, generation and start-up ADO_IGS
Class ADV: Development Functional specification ADV_FSP
High-level design ADV_HLD
Implementation representation ADV_IMP
TSF internals ADV_INT
Low-level design ADV_LLD
Representation correspondence ADV_RCR
Security policy modeling ADV_SPM
Class AGD: Guidance
documents
Administrator guidance AGD_ADM
User guidance AGD_USR
Class ALC: Life cycle support Development security ALC_DVS
Flaw remediation ALC_FLR
Life cycle definition ALC_LCD
Tools and techniques ALC_TAT
Class ATE: Tests Coverage ATE_COV
Depth ATE_DPT
Functional tests ATE_FUN
Independent testing ATE_IND
Class AVA: Vulnerability
assessment
Covert channel analysis AVA_CCA
Misuse AVA_MSU
Strength of TOE security functions AVA_SOF
Vulnerability analysis AVA_VLA
Table 11: Assurance family breakdown and map
C-2
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0283-2006
Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 6)
"The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that
balances the level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of
acquiring that degree of assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate
concepts of assurance in a TOE at the end of the evaluation, and of
maintenance of that assurance during the operational use of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from Part 3 are
included in the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful
and desirable assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and
components will be considered for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and
STs for which they provide utility."
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 6.1)
Table 6.1 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a
hierarchically ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families.
Each number in the resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component
where applicable.
As outlined in the next section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation
assurance levels are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance.
They are hierarchically ordered inasmuch as each EAL represents more
assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in assurance from EAL to EAL is
accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher assurance component
from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope, and/or depth)
and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance families
(i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as
described in chapter 2 of this Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no
more than one component of each assurance family and all assurance
dependencies of every component are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other
combinations of assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation“ allows the
addition of assurance components (from assurance families not already
included in the EAL) or the substitution of assurance components (with another
hierarchically higher assurance component in the same assurance family) to an
EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only EALs may be
augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance component“
is not recognised by the CC as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with it the
obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the
added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be extended with
explicitly stated assurance requirements.
C-3
BSI-DSZ-CC-0283-2006 Certification Report
Assurance Class Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
EAL1 EAL2 EAL3 EAL4 EAL5 EAL6 EAL7
Configuration
management
ACM_AUT 1 1 2 2
ACM_CAP 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
ACM_SCP 1 2 3 3 3
Delivery and
operation
ADO_DEL 1 1 2 2 2 3
ADO_IGS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Development ADV_FSP 1 1 1 2 3 3 4
ADV_HLD 1 2 2 3 4 5
ADV_IMP 1 2 3 3
ADV_INT 1 2 3
ADV_LLD 1 1 2 2
ADV_RCR 1 1 1 1 2 2 3
ADV_SPM 1 3 3 3
Guidance
documents
AGD_ADM 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AGD_USR 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life cycle
support
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 2 2 3
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3
Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3
ATE_DPT 1 1 2 2 3
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_CCA 1 2 2
AVA_MSU 1 2 2 3 3
AVA_SOF 1 1 1 1 1 1
AVA_VLA 1 1 2 3 4 4
Table 12: Evaluation assurance level summary
Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 6.2.1)
"Objectives
EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but
the threats to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where
independent assurance is required to support the contention that due care has
been exercised with respect to the protection of personal or similar information.
EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer,
including independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the
guidance documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could
be successfully conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE,
and for minimal outlay.
C-4
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0283-2006
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a
manner consistent with its documentation, and that it provides useful protection
against identified threats.“
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 6.2.2)
"Objectives
EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of
design information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the
part of the developer than is consistent with good commercial practice. As such
it should not require a substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a low to moderate level of independently assured security in the
absence of ready availability of the complete development record. Such a
situation may arise when securing legacy systems, or where access to the
developer may be limited.“
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked
(chapter 6.2.3)
"Objectives
EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from
positive security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of
existing sound development practices.
EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate level of independently assured security, and require a thorough
investigation of the TOE and its development without substantial re-
engineering.“
C-5
BSI-DSZ-CC-0283-2006 Certification Report
Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and
reviewed (chapter 6.2.4)
"Objectives
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security
engineering based on good commercial development practices which, though
rigorous, do not require substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other
resources. EAL4 is the highest level at which it is likely to be economically
feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a moderate to high level of independently assured security in
conventional commodity TOEs and are prepared to incur additional security-
specific engineering costs.“
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested
(chapter 6.2.5)
"Objectives
EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security
engineering based upon rigorous commercial development practices supported
by moderate application of specialist security engineering techniques. Such a
TOE will probably be designed and developed with the intent of achieving EAL5
assurance. It is likely that the additional costs attributable to the EAL5
requirements, relative to rigorous development without the application of
specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a high level of independently assured security in a planned development
and require a rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable
costs attributable to specialist security engineering techniques.“
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and
tested (chapter 6.2.6)
"Objectives
EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security
engineering techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to
produce a premium TOE for protecting high value assets against significant
risks.
EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for
application in high risk situations where the value of the protected assets
justifies the additional costs.“
C-6
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0283-2006
Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 6.2.7)
"Objectives
EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in
extremely high risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies
the higher costs. Practical application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with
tightly focused security functionality that is amenable to extensive formal
analysis.“
C-7
BSI-DSZ-CC-0283-2006 Certification Report
C-8
Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF) (chapter 14.3)
AVA_SOF Strength of TOE security functions
"Objectives
Even if a TOE security function cannot be bypassed, deactivated, or corrupted,
it may still be possible to defeat it because there is a vulnerability in the concept
of its underlying security mechanisms. For those functions a qualification of their
security behaviour can be made using the results of a quantitative or statistical
analysis of the security behaviour of these mechanisms and the effort required
to overcome them. The qualification is made in the form of a strength of TOE
security function claim.“
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA) (chapter 14.4)
AVA_VLA Vulnerability analysis
"Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether vulnerabilities
identified, during the evaluation of the construction and anticipated operation of
the TOE or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses), could allow users to
violate the TSP.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that a user will be able to discover
flaws that will allow unauthorised access to resources (e.g. data), allow the
ability to interfere with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised
capabilities of other users.“
"Application notes
A vulnerability analysis is performed by the developer in order to ascertain the
presence of security vulnerabilities, and should consider at least the contents of
all the TOE deliverables including the ST for the targeted evaluation assurance
level. The developer is required to document the disposition of identified
vulnerabilities to allow the evaluator to make use of that information if it is found
useful as a support for the evaluator's independent vulnerability analysis.“
"Independent vulnerability analysis goes beyond the vulnerabilities identified by
the developer. The main intent of the evaluator analysis is to determine that the
TOE is resistant to penetration attacks performed by an attacker possessing a
low (for AVA_VLA.2), moderate (for AVA_VLA.3) or high (for AVA_VLA.4)
attack potential.“