BSI-DSZ-CC-0991-2016
for
secunet wall packet filter, Version 5.1.0
from
secunet Security Networks AG
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 CC-Zert-327 V5.14
BSI-DSZ-CC-0991-2016 (*)
Packet Filter
secunet wall packet filter, Version 5.1.0
from secunet Security Networks AG
PP Conformance: None
Functionality: Product specific Security Target
Common Criteria Part 2 conformant
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by ALC_FLR.2
SOGIS
Recognition Agreement
The IT Product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation
facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1
extended by Scheme Interpretations for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT
Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1. CC and CEM are also published as ISO/IEC 15408
and ISO/IEC 18045.
(*) This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its
evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report and
Notification. For details on the validity see Certification Report part A chapter 4.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification
scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions
of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the
evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT Product by the Federal Office for
Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is
either expressed or implied.
Common Criteria
Recognition Arrangement
for components up to
EAL 2
Bonn, 10 March 2016
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Bernd Kowalski L.S.
Head of Department
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0991-2016
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0991-2016 Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0991-2016
Contents
A. Certification........................................................................................................................7
1. Specifications of the Certification Procedure.................................................................7
2. Recognition Agreements................................................................................................7
3. Performance of Evaluation and Certification..................................................................9
4. Validity of the Certification Result...................................................................................9
5. Publication....................................................................................................................10
B. Certification Results.........................................................................................................11
1. Executive Summary.....................................................................................................12
2. Identification of the TOE...............................................................................................13
3. Security Policy..............................................................................................................14
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.......................................................................14
5. Architectural Information...............................................................................................15
6. Documentation.............................................................................................................15
7. IT Product Testing.........................................................................................................15
8. Evaluated Configuration...............................................................................................18
9. Results of the Evaluation..............................................................................................18
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE.......................................................18
11. Security Target............................................................................................................19
12. Definitions...................................................................................................................19
13. Bibliography................................................................................................................22
C. Excerpts from the Criteria................................................................................................23
CC Part 1:........................................................................................................................23
CC Part 3:........................................................................................................................24
D. Annexes...........................................................................................................................31
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0991-2016 Certification Report
A. Certification
1. Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● Act on the Federal Office for Information Security2
● BSI Certification and Approval Ordinance3
● BSI Schedule of Costs4
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
● DIN EN ISO/IEC 17065 standard
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process
(CC-Produkte) [3]
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility, its
approval and licencing process (CC-Stellen) [3]
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.15
[1] also published as
ISO/IEC 15408.
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 [2] also published
as ISO/IEC 18045.
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
2. Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1. European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and, in addition, at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS
Technical Domains only.
2
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of Security Certificates and approval by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungs- und -Anerkennungsverordnung - BSIZertV) of 17 December
2014, Bundesgesetzblatt 2014, part I, no. 61, p. 2231
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated
23 February 2007, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0991-2016
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL 1 to EAL 4 and ITSEC Evaluation Assurance Levels E1 to E3 (basic). For
"Smartcards and similar devices" a SOGIS Technical Domain is in place. For "HW Devices
with Security Boxes" a SOGIS Technical Domains is in place, too. In addition, certificates
issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of the recognition
agreement.
The new agreement has been signed by the national bodies of Austria, Finland, France,
Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. The
current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, details on recognition,
and the history of the agreement can be seen on the website at https://www.sogisportal.eu.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the nations listed above.
This certificate is recognized under SOGIS-MRA for all assurance components selected.
2.2. International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC
(Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08
September 2014. It covers CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP)
(exact use), CC certificates based on assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or
the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR) and CC certificates for Protection
Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).
The CCRA-2014 replaces the old CCRA signed in May 2000 (CCRA-2000). Certificates
based on CCRA-2000, issued before 08 September 2014 are still under recognition
according to the rules of CCRA-2000. For on 08 September 2014 ongoing certification
procedures and for Assurance Continuity (maintenance and re-certification) of old
certificates a transition period on the recognition of certificates according to the rules of
CCRA-2000 (i.e. assurance components up to and including EAL 4 or the assurance
family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR)) is defined until 08 September 2017.
As of September 2014 the signatories of the new CCRA-2014 are government
representatives from the following nations: Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech Republic,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan,
Malaysia, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Korea,
Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, and the United States.
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on
the website: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the nations listed
above.
This certificate is recognized according to the rules of CCRA-2014, i.e. up to and including
CC part 3 EAL 2 components. The evaluation contained components above EAL 2 that are
not mutually recognised in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA-2014, for mutual
recognition the EAL 2 components of these assurance families are relevant.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0991-2016 Certification Report
3. Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product secunet wall packet filter, Version 5.1.0 has undergone the certification
procedure at BSI.
The evaluation of the product secunet wall packet filter, Version 5.1.0 was conducted by
SRC Security Research & Consulting GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 9 March
2016. SRC Security Research & Consulting GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)6
recognised by the certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: secunet Security Networks
AG.
The product was developed by: secunet Security Networks AG.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
4. Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report
and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance levels please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at
the end of the Certification Report or in the CC itself.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-certification).
Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation and certification
procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk management needs regularly
updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-assessment on a regular e.g. annual
basis.
In order to avoid an indefinite usage of the certificate when evolved attack methods require
a re-assessment of the products resistance to state of the art attack methods, the
maximum validity of the certificate has been limited. The certificate issued on 10 March
2016 is valid until 09. March 2021. Validity can be re-newed by re-certification.
The owner of the certificate is obliged:
1. when advertising the certificate or the fact of the product's certification, to refer to
the Certification Report as well as to provide the Certification Report, the Security
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0991-2016
Target and user guidance documentation mentioned herein to any customer of the
product for the application and usage of the certified product,
2. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately about vulnerabilities of the
product that have been identified by the developer or any third party after issuance
of the certificate,
3. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately in the case that security relevant
changes in the evaluated life cycle, e.g. related to development and production sites
or processes, occur, or the confidentiality of documentation and information related
to the Target of Evaluation (TOE) or resulting from the evaluation and certification
procedure where the certification of the product has assumed this confidentiality
being maintained, is not given any longer. In particular, prior to the dissemination of
confidential documentation and information related to the TOE or resulting from the
evaluation and certification procedure that do not belong to the deliverables
according to the Certification Report part B, or for those where no dissemination
rules have been agreed on, to third parties, the Certification Body at BSI has to be
informed.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
5. Publication
The product secunet wall packet filter, Version 5.1.0 has been included in the BSI list of
certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet: https://www.bsi.bund.de
and [5]). Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer7
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
7
secunet Security Networks AG
Kronprinzenstraße 30
45128 Essen
Deutschland
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0991-2016 Certification Report
B. Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0991-2016
1. Executive Summary
The target of evaluation (TOE) is the product secunet wall packet filter, Version 5.1.0
provided by secunet Security Networks AG.
The secunet wall packet filter 5.1.0 allows the integration of packet filtering capability into a
firewall or VPN components which are parts of the SINA product family. Therefore, the
packet filter has to be delivered to an application developer.
The application developer integrates the secunet wall packet filter 5.1.0 into an application
in order to build a network component. The administrator of this application is defined as
TOE end-user.
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is not based on a certified
Protection Profile.
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 4
augmented by ALC_FLR.2.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6], chapter 5. They are all selected from Common Criteria Part 2. Thus the
TOE is CC Part 2 conformant.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functionality:
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
SF.1 Information Flow Control • Information flow control (as routers) on
the network layer (IP) and transport layer
(TCP/UDP) is being provided.
• IP datagrams are reassembled before
further processing is performed, IP
datagrams which cannot be reassembled in a
predefined span of time are dropped.
• Packets with spoofed source- or
destination-IP addresses and packets with
source routing options are dropped.
SF.2 Security Audit • Audit records are generated for start-up
and shutdown of the audit functions and for
datagrams received or sent through a
network components network interfaces if
they match configured patterns.
SF.3 Management • The TOE is capable of performing the
following management functions
“Modification of network traffic filter rules” and
“Modification of configuration data”
• The TOE maintains the role
administrator.
• The TOE is initialized with a strict packet
filter rule set.
Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 6.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0991-2016 Certification Report
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6], chapter 3.1.
Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of Assumptions,
Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security Target [6],
chapter 3.
This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8.
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2. Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
secunet wall packet filter, Version 5.1.0
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release SHA-256 hash sum
1 SW secunet wall packet filter 5.1.0 Identification:
lpf-5_1_0/ bzImage
fab2e89dcae54f6908f8db02af60a
6e8591d6d5be57291b7d2626ca8
d49eec1d
2 SW secunet wall packet filter 5.1.0 Identification:
lpf-5_1_0/
sources.tar.bz2
d82223426c7dbea5d723fc5486cd
b4798f4ac79f340a0133f857b5317
d63c173
3 DOC application developer
guidance [8]
File name:
Applikationsentwickler-
Handbuch.pdf
Version 1.0
09.03.2015
18d280f08122d6c3ad49ce2bb
2d87d35aabff70d6eec7c8bf50
ca5ca49d9404e
4 Release Notes [9]
File name: ReleaseNotes.pdf
14.04.2015 fb5abbbbd543638832b9b972b3b
54f3e18679404db279a88734aae
894752f01d
5 public signing key
ASCII-encoded PGP public
key
File name:
secuwall-sign.asc
N/A, The public key must be
identified by the fingerprint (see
below).
6 signed hash file
A text file that contains hash
values of the items 1 to 4
above. It is enclosed in an
openPGP block that is signed
with the secunet private key.
File name:
sha256sums.asc
N/A
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0991-2016
The TOE is personally delivered to the application developer on a CD/DVD. The fingerprint
of the public key is transferred differently (personally by the project manager). The project
manager also provides the application developer with the information on how to verify the
authenticity of the TOE.
The TOE can be uniquely identified by the SHA-256 checksums in the file
sha256sums.asc which also contains a signature that can be verified with the public key in
the file secuwall-sign.asc.
The authenticity check is divided into two steps: first the user (i.e. the application
developer) has to check the authenticity of the delivered public PGP key. Therefore the
user asks the project manager in person or via telephone for the fingerprint of the public
signing key. To perform the PGP operations a PGP implementation must be used, e.g. the
open source tool GnuPG. The delivered public key must be imported to calculate the
fingerprint. If this fingerprint does not match the fingerprint from the project manager, the
user must cancel the process and repeat the delivery process. Otherwise he can proceed
to the second step: verification of the digital signature of the hash sum file (item 6 in table
2). The PGP tool must be used to verify the integrity of the hash sum file. If the hash sum
file was signed with the correct key, the SHA256 sums of all files need to be calculated by
using a tool that calculates the SHA-256 hash sum from a given file. Then the calculated
hash sums must be compared to the values listed in the file sha256sums.asc (item 6 in
table 2). If everything is correct, the user can further check if the version numbers of
packet filter binary file (item 1 in table 2) and the application developer guidance (item 3 in
table 2) match the versions mentioned in the certification report. So the user can ensure
that he has received the the certified TOE.
The end user, i.e. the administrator of the final application can check the correctness of the
image 'bzImage' (item 1 in table 2). Therefore he can use the same sha256 tools as
decribed for the application developer. Details about the process will be given to the
administrator by the application developer, as described in the application developer
guidance [8] in section 5.6.2.
3. Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues:
● Information Flow Protection: The TOE enforces the Packet Filter information flow policy.
● Security Audit: The TOE collects audit data and sends it to a memory buffer in order to
identify attempts to violate a policy.
● Management: The TSF is capable of performing the following management functions
such as modification of network traffic filter rules and modification of configuration data
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The list of objectives
which have to be met by the the environment can be found in the Security Target [6],
chapter 4.2.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0991-2016 Certification Report
5. Architectural Information
The TOE is a packet filter. The secunet wall packet filter consists of software on machines
to implement packet filter functionality for the network components; i.e. the secunet wall
packet filter is part of the network components. The secunet wall packet filter relies on
information available at OSI layer 3 and layer 4 for policy enforcement. The functionality
for packet filtering is part of the operating system (Linux). The secunet wall packet filter
supports IPv4 protocol. This chapter gives an overview of the subsystems of the TOE and
the corresponding TSF which were objects of this evaluation.
The security functions of the TOE are:
● SF.1 Information Flow Control
● SF.2 Security Audit
● SF.3 Management
According to the TOE design specification these security functions are enforced by the
following subsystems:
● IP Kernel Stack (supports the TSF SF.1)
● Netfilter (supports the TSFs SF.1, SF.2 and SF.3)
● /proc file system (supports the TSF SF.3)
● User-Space I/O (supports the TSF SF.3)
6. Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7. IT Product Testing
Developer Testing:
TOE Test Configuration
The TOE was tested on a stand-alone computer with three virtual workstations. The TOE
was running in a virtual machine which was configured according to chapter 1.2.2 of the
Security Taget [6].
Besides the requirements described in chapter 1.2.2 of the Security Taget [6] the test
environment also needed to fulfil the security objectives for the environment. These
security objectives were fulfilled by the services which were installed on the virtual
machine. The needed components are described in the application developer guidance
[6]. The TOE environment and the related test equipment for the tests were consistent with
the ones described in the Security Taget [6] and in the application developer guidance [6].
The tests of the TOE were carried out by executing the test environment. The test setup
includes three virtual workstations, two standard workstations and one with the TOE
installed. The used non-TOE hardware for the test environment were a computer
according to the minimum requirements as described in the security target, i.e. with an
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0991-2016
Intel i686 compatible CPU, PCI bus system, 256 MB RAM, two 1000Mbit Ethernet
Interfaces, storage drive, USB Controller, Compact Flash Adapter.
Testing Approach
The developer specified and implemented test cases for each defined subsystem. The test
cases divided into those of the IP Kernel Stack, the Netfilter, the User-Space I/O and
Netfilter and the User-Space I/O and /proc file system. Thus all subsystems are covered
by several test cases and each SFR-enforcing module is covered by at least one test
case.
For the tests of the TOE the developer used the test environment with three virtual
workstations. This test environment consists of an executable bash script that starts up the
virtual machines and initializes the complete test network. Then each test case is located
in one bash script. If a test case script is executed the packets are generated and the
evidence is written into log files. The developer carried out interactive as well as
non-interactive tests. Altogether there are 45 test cases with more than 480 single tests
covered by the test specification.
Conclusion
The results of the TOE tests prove the correct implementation. All test cases were
executed successfully and ended up with the expected result.
Evaluator independent testing:
TOE Test Configuration
The TOE can have only one configuration. The TOE separates two networks from another
(see chapter 1.2.1 of the Security Target [6]). For testing the TOE the evaluator used the
following hardware configuration: Intel Core i7-4600U CPU 2.10 GHz, 8 GB RAM. This
configuration is consistent with the one described in the security target. Two virtual
machines simulate the different networks and on a third machine the TOE is installed. The
virtual host is able to start tests and is used as a management workstation.
The evaluator used the same configuration as the developer.
Testing Approach
The evaluators repeated the developer tests in the evaluator's lab to verify the correct
implementation of the security relevant functionality of the TOE and to cover all TSFIs of
the TOE.
Some newly added independent evaluator tests were done to verify the security provided
by the TOE. These tests were to send TCP packets with different ports, UDP packets with
different ports, and an ICMP ping packet.
Conclusion
The test results fulfil the requirements of ATE_IND.2.
Evaluator penetration testing:
TOE Test Configuration
All configurations of the TOE being intended to be covered by the current evaluation were
tested. For testing the TOE the evaluator uses a similar configuration as used in the
developer tests. The description of the required non-TOE hardware, software and firmware
is described in section 1.2.2 of the Security Taget [6]. A stand-alone PC with (Intel(R) Core
(TM) i7-4600U clocked with 2.10 GHz, 8GB RAM, operating system (host system) Debian
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0991-2016 Certification Report
Wheezy 7.9 and additional packages screen, qemu, kqemu, bridgemodules and
bridge-utils) was used to virtualize the complete testing network environment including the
TOE.
Two Debian GNU/Linux systems, 'Source' and 'Destination' were installed and used in the
testing network environment, each with three virtual interfaces. The TOE was mounted on
a third virtual machine identical to the one used in the independent evaluator functional
tests. The TOE has been set up between the virtual systems 'Source' and 'Destination'.
The systems are connected using the bridge mode for the network of virtual machines.
Testing Approach
For the penetration tests the differential Firewall analysis method was used. In this method
someone needs to be able to compare the traffic on the “outside” to the traffic on the
“inside” in real-time and alert when this contradicts. Therefore two “monitoring” points must
be placed logically in front and behind the packet filter. At the two monitoring points a
sniffer is placed at which the network traffic is analysed.
The sensor is placed on the “inside” to alert if traffic is detected and violating the firewall
rules. In the operational environment of the TOE it is also possible that malicious or
unintended traffic is coming from the inside of the network passing the TOE. It was tested
that the packet filter responds to both network interfaces in the same way. Therefore the
extensive testing of one interface was sufficient to prove if the TOE is resistant to
penetration tests.
Attack Scenarios being tested
After the setup of the test environment the different attack scenarios were defined. These
attack scenarios were mapped to test cases and executed in the test environment.
The following list gives a short overview about the attack scenarios which have been
tested:
● Port scan with or without different source ports to detect open ports.
● Bypassing the packet filter with fuzzy generated TCP, UDP or ICMP packets.
● Using the publicly available change log to find vulnerabilities.
● Bypassing the packet filter with a flood attack with “syn” or fragmented packets.
● Bypassing the packet filter with packets with a spoofed source address.
● Manipulation of the log output by sending incorrect payload in packets.
● Bypassing the access rule checks.
SFRs penetration tested
Only direct attacks against the implementation of SFRs need to be considered. It can be
assumed that the SFRs are implemented correctly and that they cannot be bypassed,
deactivated or manipulated. The tested SFRs are listed in the following:
● FDP_IFF.1 Simple security attributes
● FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
● FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
The remaining SFRs were analysed, but not tested through penetration due to
non-exploitability of the related attack scenarios in the TOEs operational environment.
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Conclusion
The overall test result is that no deviations were found between the expected and the
actual test results; moreover, no attack scenario with the attack potential enhanced basic
was actually successful. Therefore the test results fulfil the requirements of AVA_VAN.3.
8. Evaluated Configuration
This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE:
The TOE configuration is defined by the notation “secunet wall packet filter 5.1.0” with the
hash values for the TOE as given in table 2. The TOE has to be configured following the
TOE guidance. No other than the kernel modules provided with the TOE may be loaded.
The TOE may not be recompiled.
9. Results of the Evaluation
9.1. CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used.
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the EAL 4 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report)
● The components ALC_FLR.2 augmented for this TOE evaluation.
The evaluation has confirmed:
● PP Conformance: None.
● for the Functionality: Product specific Security Target
Common Criteria Part 2 conformant
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by ALC_FLR.2
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2. Results of cryptographic assessment
The TOE does not include cryptographic mechanisms. Thus, no such mechanisms were
part of the assessment.
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE
itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
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The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
If available, certified updates of the TOE should be used. If non-certified updates or
patches are available the user of the TOE should request the sponsor to provide a
re-certification. In the meantime a risk management process of the system using the TOE
should investigate and decide on the usage of not yet certified updates and patches or
take additional measures in order to maintain system security.
The Guidance for the application developer [8] contains guidelines for the administrator of
the final application, i.e. the end user, on how to check the integrity and how to securely
use the product. Therefore, the instructions in the guidance [8], chapter 5.6 have to be
forwarded to the end user of the final product.
In addition, the following aspects need to be fulfilled when using the TOE:
● The user must not load any new modules into the kernel. In case a new module is
loaded the TOE is no longer certified.
11. Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [6] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report.
12. Definitions
12.1. Acronyms
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
ASCII American Standard Code for Information Interchange
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
CPU Central Processin Unit
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
ICMP Internet Control Message Protocol
IP Internet Protocol
IPv4 Internet Protocol Version 4
IPv6 Internet Protocol Version 6
IT Information Technology
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ITSEC Information Technology Security Evaluation Criteria
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
NDP Neighbour Discovery Protocol
OEM Original Equipment Manufacturer
OSI Open Systems Interconnection
PGP Pretty Good Privacy, a data encryption and decryption program
PP Protection Profile
RAM Random Access Memory
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SSH Secure Shell
ST Security Target
TCP Transmission Control Protocol
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionalities
UDP User Datagram Protocol
VPN Virtual Private Network
12.2. Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Collaborative Protection Profile - A Protection Profile collaboratively developed by an
International Technical Community endorsed by the Management Committee.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in CC
part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in CC part 3.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on
well-established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Package - named set of either security functional or security assurance requirements
Protection Profile - A formal document defined in CC, expressing an implementation
independent set of security requirements for a category of IT Products that meet specific
consumer needs.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
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Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - An IT Product and its associated administrator and user guidance
documentation that is the subject of an Evaluation.
TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
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13. Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 4, September 2012
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 4, September 2012
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 4, September 2012
http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 4, September 2012,
http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[3] BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process
(CC-Produkte) and Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation
Facility, approval and licencing (CC-Stellen), https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE8
https://www.bsi.bund.de/AIS
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
on the BSI Website, https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierungsreporte
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-0991-2016, Version 1.0, 08.03.2016, Secunet Wall packet
filter 5.1.0 Security Target, secunet Security Networks AG
[7] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 1.0, 09.03.2016, Evaluation Technical Report
(ETR) – secunet wall packet filter 5.1.0, SRC Security Research & Consulting
GmbH (confidential document)
[8] Guidance documentation for the TOE, Applikationsentwicklerhandbuch, Version 1.0,
09.03.2016, secunet Security Networks AG
[9] secunet wall packet filter 5.1.0, Release Notes für pf-5_1_0, secunet Security
Networks AG, 14.04.2015
8
specifically
• AIS 32, Version 7, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
• AIS 38, Version 2, Reuse of evaluation results
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C. Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part 1:
Conformance Claim (chapter 10.4)
“The conformance claim indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is met
by a PP or ST that passes its evaluation. This conformance claim contains a CC
conformance claim that:
● describes the version of the CC to which the PP or ST claims conformance.
● describes the conformance to CC Part 2 (security functional requirements) as either:
– CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 conformant if all SFRs in that
PP or ST are based only upon functional components in CC Part 2, or
– CC Part 2 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 extended if at least one SFR in
that PP or ST is not based upon functional components in CC Part 2.
● describes the conformance to CC Part 3 (security assurance requirements) as either:
– CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 conformant if all SARs in that
PP or ST are based only upon assurance components in CC Part 3, or
– CC Part 3 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 extended if at least one SAR in
that PP or ST is not based upon assurance components in CC Part 3.
Additionally, the conformance claim may include a statement made with respect to
packages, in which case it consists of one of the following:
● Package name Conformant - A PP or ST is conformant to a pre-defined package
(e.g. EAL) if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST are identical to the SFRs in the package, or
– the SARs of that PP or ST are identical to the SARs in the package.
● Package name Augmented - A PP or ST is an augmentation of a predefined package
if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST contain all SFRs in the package, but have at least
one additional SFR or one SFR that is hierarchically higher than an SFR in the
package.
– the SARs of that PP or ST contain all SARs in the package, but have at least
one additional SAR or one SAR that is hierarchically higher than an SAR in the
package.
Note that when a TOE is successfully evaluated to a given ST, any conformance claims of
the ST also hold for the TOE. A TOE can therefore also be e.g. CC Part 2 conformant.
Finally, the conformance claim may also include two statements with respect to Protection
Profiles:
● PP Conformant - A PP or TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the
conformance result.
● Conformance Statement (Only for PPs) - This statement describes the manner in
which PPs or STs must conform to this PP: strict or demonstrable. For more
information on this Conformance Statement, see Annex D.”
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CC Part 3:
Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation (chapter 10)
“Evaluating a PP is required to demonstrate that the PP is sound and internally consistent,
and, if the PP is based on one or more other PPs or on packages, that the PP is a correct
instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the PP to be
suitable for use as the basis for writing an ST or another PP.
Assurance Class Assurance Components
Class APE: Protection
Profile evaluation
APE_INT.1 PP introduction
APE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
APE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
APE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
APE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
APE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
APE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
APE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
APE: Protection Profile evaluation class decomposition”
Class ASE: Security Target evaluation (chapter 11)
“Evaluating an ST is required to demonstrate that the ST is sound and internally
consistent, and, if the ST is based on one or more PPs or packages, that the ST is a
correct instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the
ST to be suitable for use as the basis for a TOE evaluation.”
Assurance Class Assurance Components
Class ASE: Security
Target evaluation
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
ASE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
ASE_TSS.2 TOE summary specification with architectural design
summary
ASE: Security Target evaluation class decomposition
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Security assurance components (chapter 7)
“The following Sections describe the constructs used in representing the assurance
classes, families, and components.“
“Each assurance class contains at least one assurance family.”
“Each assurance family contains one or more assurance components.”
The following table shows the assurance class decomposition.
Assurance Class Assurance Components
ADV: Development ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification
ADV_FSP.2 Security-enforcing functional specification
ADV_FSP.3 Functional specification with complete summary
ADV_FSP.4 Complete functional specification
ADV_FSP.5 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional error information
ADV_FSP.6 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional formal specification
ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF
ADV_IMP.2 Implementation of the TSF
ADV_INT.1 Well-structured subset of TSF internals
ADV_INT.2 Well-structured internals
ADV_INT.3 Minimally complex internals
ADV_SPM.1 Formal TOE security policy model
ADV_TDS.1 Basic design
ADV_TDS.2 Architectural design
ADV_TDS.3 Basic modular design
ADV_TDS.4 Semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.5 Complete semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.6 Complete semiformal modular design with formal
high-level design presentation
AGD:
Guidance documents
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ALC: Life cycle support
ALC_CMC.1 Labelling of the TOE
ALC_CMC.2 Use of a CM system
ALC_CMC.3 Authorisation controls
ALC_CMC.4 Production support, acceptance procedures and
automation
ALC_CMC.5 Advanced support
ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.2 Parts of the TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.3 Implementation representation CM coverage
ALC_CMS.4 Problem tracking CM coverage
ALC_CMS.5 Development tools CM coverage
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
ALC_DVS.1 Identification of security measures
ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures
ALC_FLR.1 Basic flaw remediation
ALC_FLR.2 Flaw reporting procedures
ALC_FLR.3 Systematic flaw remediation
ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model
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Assurance Class Assurance Components
ALC_LCD.2 Measurable life-cycle model
ALC_TAT.1 Well-defined development tools
ALC_TAT.2 Compliance with implementation standards
ALC_TAT.3 Compliance with implementation standards - all parts
ATE: Tests
ATE_COV.1 Evidence of coverage
ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage
ATE_COV.3 Rigorous analysis of coverage
ATE_DPT.1 Testing: basic design
ATE_DPT.2 Testing: security enforcing modules
ATE_DPT.3 Testing: modular design
ATE_DPT.4 Testing: implementation representation
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE_FUN.2 Ordered functional testing
ATE_IND.1 Independent testing – conformance
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing – sample
ATE_IND.3 Independent testing – complete
AVA: Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability survey
AVA_VAN.2 Vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.3 Focused vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.4 Methodical vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis
Assurance class decomposition
Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 8)
“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances the
level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of
assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE at
the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the operational use
of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are included in
the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable
assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be considered
for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide utility.”
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 8.1)
“Table 1 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically
ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the
resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.
As outlined in the next Section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance levels
are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance. They are hierarchically ordered
inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in
assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher
assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope,
and/or depth) and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance
families (i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as described
in Chapter 7 of this CC Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than one
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component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every component
are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of
assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the addition of assurance
components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the substitution
of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance component in the
same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only
EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance
component” is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with
it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the
added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be augmented with extended
assurance requirements.
Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL 1) - functionally tested (chapter 8.3)
“Objectives
EAL 1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the threats
to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent assurance is
required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with respect to the
protection of personal or similar information.
EAL 1 requires only a limited security target. It is sufficient to simply state the SFRs that
the TOE must meet, rather than deriving them from threats, OSPs and assumptions
through security objectives.
EAL 1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including
independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance
documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL 1 evaluation could be successfully
conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner
consistent with its documentation.”
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL 2) - structurally tested (chapter 8.4)
“Objectives
EAL 2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design
information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the
developer than is consistent with good commercial practise. As such it should not require a
substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL 2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready
availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when securing
legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.”
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL 3) - methodically tested and checked (chapter 8.5)
“Objectives
EAL 3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive
security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound
development practises.
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EAL 3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate
level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation of the TOE
and its development without substantial re-engineering.”
Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL 4) - methodically designed, tested, and reviewed
(chapter 8.6)
“Objectives
EAL 4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering
based on good commercial development practises which, though rigorous, do not require
substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL 4 is the highest level at
which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL 4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs
and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL 5) - semiformally designed and tested (chapter
8.7)
“Objectives
EAL 5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering based
upon rigorous commercial development practises supported by moderate application of
specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be designed and
developed with the intent of achieving EAL 5 assurance. It is likely that the additional costs
attributable to the EAL 5 requirements, relative to rigorous development without the
application of specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL 5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a
rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to
specialist security engineering techniques.”
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL 6) - semiformally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.8)
“Objectives
EAL 6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security engineering
techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a premium TOE for
protecting high value assets against significant risks.
EAL 6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in high
risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL 7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.9)
“Objectives
EAL 7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely high
risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs. Practical
application of EAL 7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security functionality
that is amenable to extensive formal analysis.”
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Assurance
Class
Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL 1 EAL 2 EAL 3 EAL 4 EAL 5 EAL 6 EAL 7
Development ADV_ARC 1 1 1 1 1 1
ADV_FSP 1 2 3 4 5 5 6
ADV_IMP 1 1 2 2
ADV_INT 2 3 3
ADV_SPM 1 1
ADV_TDS 1 2 3 4 5 6
Guidance
Documents
AGD_OPE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AGD_PRE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life cycle
Support
ALC_CMC 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
ALC_CMS 1 2 3 4 5 5 5
ALC_DEL 1 1 1 1 1 1
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 1 1 1 2
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3
Security Target
Evaluation
ASE_CCL 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_ECD 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_INT 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_OBJ 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
ASR_REQ 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
ASE_SPD 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_TSS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3
ATE_DPT 1 1 3 3 4
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN 1 2 2 3 4 5 5
Table 1: Evaluation assurance level summary”
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Class AVA: Vulnerability assessment (chapter 16)
“The AVA: Vulnerability assessment class addresses the possibility of exploitable
vulnerabilities introduced in the development or the operation of the TOE.”
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VAN) (chapter 16.1)
“Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether potential vulnerabilities
identified, during the evaluation of the development and anticipated operation of the TOE
or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses or quantitative or statistical analysis of the
security behaviour of the underlying security mechanisms), could allow attackers to violate
the SFRs.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that an attacker will be able to discover flaws
that will allow unauthorised access to data and functionality, allow the ability to interfere
with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users.”
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D. Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
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