Certification Report
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
BSI-DSZ-CC-0382-2007
for
GeNUScreen 1.0
from
GeNUA
Gesellschaft für Netzwerk- und
UNIX-Administration mbH
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)3018 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)3018 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)3018 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 ZS-01-01-F-326 V3.4
BSI-DSZ-CC-0382-2007
GeNUScreen 1.0
from
GeNUA
Gesellschaft für Netzwerk- und
UNIX-Administration mbH
Common Criteria Arrangement
The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an accredited and licensed/
approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, version 2.3
(ISO/IEC 15408:2005) for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation, version
2.3 (ISO/IEC 15408:2005).
Evaluation Results:
Functionality: Product specific Security Target
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance Package: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by ALC_FLR.2 - Flaw reporting procedures
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated
configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme
of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation
facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
The notes mentioned on the reverse side are part of this certificate.
Bonn, 04 July 2007
The President of the Federal Office
for Information Security
Dr. Helmbrecht L.S.
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)3018 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)3018 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)3018 9582-111
The rating of the strength of functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms suitable for encryption
and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2)
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty
of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
BSI-DSZ-CC-0382-2007 Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the
task of issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a
distributor, hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product
according to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised
security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the
BSI or by BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This
report contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the
detailed Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security
functionality of the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and
weaknesses) and instructions for the user.
1
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of
17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
V
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0382-2007
VI
Contents
Part A: Certification
Part B: Certification Results
Part C: Excerpts from the Criteria
BSI-DSZ-CC-0382-2007 Certification Report
A Certification
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down
in the following:
• BSIG2
• BSI Certification Ordinance3
• BSI Schedule of Costs4
• Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal
Ministry of the Interior)
• DIN EN 45011 standard
• BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
• Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), version 2.35
• Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), version 2.3
• BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS)
• Advice from the Certification Body on methodology for assurance
components above EAL4 (AIS 34)
2
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of
17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 07 July 1992,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik (BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 10 May 2006 in the Bundesanzeiger
dated 19 May 2006, p. 3730
A-1
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0382-2007
2 Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries
a mutual recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are
based on ITSEC or CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC - Certificates
The SOGIS-Agreement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on
ITSEC became effective in March 1998. This agreement has been signed by
the national bodies of Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United
Kingdom. This agreement on the mutual recognition of IT security certificates
was extended to include certificates based on the CC for all evaluation levels
(EAL 1 – EAL 7). The German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI)
recognizes certificates issued by the national certification bodies of France and
the United Kingdom within the terms of this Agreement.
2.2 International Recognition of CC - Certificates
An arrangement (Common Criteria Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC evaluation assurance levels up to and including
EAL 4 has been signed in May 2000 (CC-MRA). It includes also the recognition
of Protection Profiles based on the CC. As of February 2007 the arrangement
has been signed by the national bodies of:
Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, The
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Republic of Singapore, Spain, Sweden,
Turkey, United Kingdom, United States of America.
The current list of signatory nations resp. approved certification schemes can be
seen on the web site: http:\\www.commoncriteriaportal.org
A-2
BSI-DSZ-CC-0382-2007 Certification Report
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform
procedure, a uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product GeNUScreen 1.0 has undergone the certification procedure at BSI.
The evaluation of the product GeNUScreen 1.0 was conducted by Tele-
Consulting security | networking | training GmbH. The Tele-Consulting security |
networking | training GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)6
recognised by BSI.
The sponsor, vendor and distributor is:
GeNUA
Gesellschaft für Netzwerk- und
UNIX-Administration mbH
Domagkstrasse 7
85551 Heimstetten
The certification is concluded with
• the comparability check and
• the production of this Certification Report.
This work was completed by the BSI on 04 July 2007.
The confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
• all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in
the following report, are observed,
• the product is operated in the environment described, where specified in the
following report.
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product indicated
here. The validity can be extended to new versions and releases of the product,
provided the sponsor applies for re-certification of the modified product, in
accordance with the procedural requirements, and the evaluation does not
reveal any security deficiencies.
For the meaning of the assurance levels and the confirmed strength of
functions, please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at the end of the
Certification Report.
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
A-3
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0382-2007
A-4
4 Publication
The following Certification Results contain pages B-1 to B-20.
The product GeNUScreen 1.0 has been included in the BSI list of the certified
products, which is published regularly (see also Internet: http://
www.bsi.bund.de). Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49
228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the vendor7
of
the product. The Certification Report can also be downloaded from the above-
mentioned website.
7
GeNUA
Gesellschaft für Netzwerk- und
UNIX-Administration mbH
Domagkstrasse 7
85551 Heimstetten
BSI-DSZ-CC-0382-2007 Certification Report
B Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
• the security target of the sponsor for the target of evaluation,
• the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
• complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
B-1
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0382-2007
Contents of the certification results
1 Executive Summary 3
2 Identification of the TOE 10
3 Security Policy 11
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 11
5 Architectural Information 13
6 Documentation 14
7 IT Product Testing 14
8 Evaluated Configuration 14
9 Results of the Evaluation 15
10 Comments/Recommendations 17
11 Annexes 17
12 Security Target 17
13 Definitions 17
14 Bibliography 19
B-2
BSI-DSZ-CC-0382-2007 Certification Report
1 Executive Summary
The TOE ist the firewall system GeNUScreen 1.0 developed by GeNUA
Gesellschaft für Netzwerk- und UNIX-Administration mbH
The TOE consists of
1. several firewall components that work as network filters and encrypting
gateways,
2. a central Management Server that is used to configure, administrate and
monitor the firewall components.
The Management Server allows authorised administrators to configure filter
rules and protection policies on the firewall components by use of a web-based
graphical user interface (GUI) at the Management Server. It also enables
authorised administrators to update the software on the firewall components.
The GUI must be used from a trusted machine connected to the Management
Server through a trusted network.
After installation, all communication between the Management Server and the
firewall components is protected by Secure Shell (SSH) transforms against
eavesdropping and modification (Please note that SSH is considered being
outside the TOE scope).
The firewall components employ IPsec encryption and authentication to protect
data flows between the subnets assigned to them by the authorised
administrators. Please note that the key management protocol (IKE) used for
the IPsec communication is not part of the TOE.
Management consists of definition/modification and transmission of firewall
policies and security policies for network traffic. The GUI also allows transfer of
audit data from the firewall components.
The IT product GeNUScreen 1.0 was evaluated by Tele-Consulting security |
networking | training GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 27 June 2007.
The Tele-Consulting security | networking | training GmbH is an evaluation
facility (ITSEF)8
recognised by BSI.
The sponsor, vendor and distributor is
GeNUA
Gesellschaft für Netzwerk- und
UNIX-Administration mbH
Domagkstrasse 7
85551 Heimstetten
8
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
B-3
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0382-2007
1.1 Assurance package
The TOE security assurance requirements are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in part 3 of the Common Criteria (see Annex C or [1], part
3 for details). The TOE meets the assurance requirements of assurance level
EAL 4+ (Evaluation Assurance Level augmented). The following table shows
the augmented assurance components.
Requirement Identifier
EAL4 TOE evaluation: methodically designed, tested, and reviewed
+: ALC_FLR.2 Life cycle support – Flaw reporting procedures
Table 1: Assurance components and EAL-augmentation
1.2 Functionality
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) selected in the Security
Target are Common Criteria Part 2 conformant as shown in the following tables.
The following SFRs are taken from CC part 2:
Security Functional Requirement Addressed issue
FAU Security audit
FAU_SAR.1 Audit review
FAU_SAR.3 Selectable audit review
FCS Cryptographic support
FCS_COP.1 (IPSEC-AES) Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1(IPSEC-HMAC) Cryptographic operation
FCS_CKM.4 (IPSEC) Cryptographic key destruction
FDP User data protection
FDP_IFC.1 (FW) Subset information flow control
FDP_IFF.1 (FW) Simple security attributes
FDP_ITT.1 (IPSEC) Basic internal transfer protection
FDP_IFC.1 (IPSEC) Subset information flow control
FIA Identification and authentication
FIA_UAU.2 User authentication before any action
FIA_UID.2 User identification before any action
FMT Security Management
FMT_SMF.1 (FW) Specification of Management Functions
FMT_MSA.3 (FW) Static attribute initialization
B-4
BSI-DSZ-CC-0382-2007 Certification Report
Security Functional Requirement Addressed issue
FMT_MSA.3 (IPSEC) Static attribute initialisation
FMT_SMF.1 (IPSEC) Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMF.1 (Gen) Security management functions
Table 2: SFRs for the TOE taken from CC Part 2
The following CC part 2 extended SFRs are defined:
Security Functional Requirement Addressed issue
FAU Security audit
FAU_GEN.1EX Audit data generation
Table 3: SFRs for the TOE, CC part 2 extended
Note: only the titles of the Security Functional Requirements are provided. For
more details and application notes please refer to the ST chapter 5.1.
The following Security Functional Requirements are defined for the IT-
Environment of the TOE:
Security Functional Requirement Addressed issue
FDP User data protection
FDP_ITT.1 (IKE) Basic internal TSF data transfer protection
FDP_IFC.1 (IKE) Subset information flow control
FDP_IFF.1 (IKE) Simple security attributes
FDP_ITT.1 (SSH) Basic internal TSF data transfer protection
FDP_IFC.1 (SSH) Subset information flow control
FDP_IFF.1 (SSH) Simple security attributes
FCS Cryptographic support
FCS_CKM.1 (IKE-AES) Cryptographic key generation
FCS_COP.1 (IKE-AES) Cryptographic operation
FCS_CKM.1 (IKE-DH) Cryptographic key generation
FCS_COP.1 (IKE-DH) Cryptographic operation
FCS_CKM.1 (IKE-HMAC) Cryptographic key generation
FCS_COP.1 (IKE-HMAC) Cryptographic operation
FCS_CKM.1 (IKE-RSA) Cryptographic key generation
FCS_COP.1 (IKE-RSA) Cryptographic operation
FCS_CKM.4 (IKE) Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.1 (SSH-AES) Cryptographic key generation
FCS_COP.1 (SSH-AES) Cryptographic operation
B-5
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0382-2007
Security Functional Requirement Addressed issue
FCS_CKM.1 (SSH-DH) Cryptographic key generation
FCS_COP.1 (SSH-DH) Cryptographic operation
FCS_CKM.1 (SSH-HMAC) Cryptographic key generation
FCS_COP.1 (SSH-HMAC) Cryptographic operation
FCS_CKM.1 (SSH-RSA) Cryptographic key generation
FCS_CKM.4 (SSH) Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1 (SSH-RSA) Cryptographic operation
FMT Security Management
FMT_SMF.1 (IKE) Specification of Management Functions
FMT_MSA.2 (IKE) Secure security attributes
FMT_MSA.3 (IKE) Static attribute initialisation
FMT_SMF.1 (SSH) Specification of Management Functions
FMT_MSA.2 (SSH) Secure security attributes
FMT_MSA.3 (SSH) Static attribute initialisation
FPT Protection of the TSF
FPT_STM.1 (ENV) Reliable timestamps
Table 4: SFRs for the IT-Environment
Note: only the titles of the Security Functional Requirements are provided. For
more details and application notes please refer to the ST chapter 5.4.
These Security Functional Requirements assigned to the TOE are implemented
by the following TOE Security Functions:
B-6
BSI-DSZ-CC-0382-2007 Certification Report
TOE Security Function Addressed issue
SF_AU.1 Audit record generation
SF_AU.2 Specification of audit record contents
SF_AU.3 Display of audit records
SF_DF.1 Network layer (IP) and transport layer (TCP/UDP/ICMP)
based information flow protection as routers or bridges
SF_DF.2 Re-assebmling of fragmented IP-datagrams
SF_DF.3 Dropping of spoofed and source routed IP packets
SF_DF.4 IPsec protected communication between firewall comonents
SF_DF.5 Header modification to reduce susceptability of information
flow against hijacking attacks
SF_AC.1 Management of network traffic filter rules and IPsec tunnels
on the Management Server by authorised administrators
SF_AI.1 Successfull identifcation and authentication of administrator at
the Management Server before he can perform any security
function
Table 5: Security Functions
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 6.1.
1.3 Strength of Function
The TOE’s strength of functions is claimed ‘medium’ (SOF-medium) for specific
functions as indicated in the Security Target [6] chapter 6.2.
The rating of the strength of functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms
suitable for encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2).
For details see chapter 9 of this report.
1.4 Summary of threats and Organisational Security Policies
(OSPs) addressed by the evaluated IT product
Users (subjects) and assets which are used for the description can be found in
the Security Target [6], chapter 3.1.
The following table reproduces the threats as they are defined in the Security
Target, chapter 3.4. Please note that there are no Organisational Security
Policies defined for the TOE.
B-7
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0382-2007
Threat name Threat definition
T.NOAUTH A user might attempt to bypass the security functions of the
TOE to gain unauthenticated access to resources in the
protected networks.
T.SNIFF A user outside the TOE might gain access to the sensitive
data passing between the protected networks. Attack method
is packet inspection of Internet traffic.
T.SELPRO A user from inside or outside the networks protected by the
TOE components might gain access to the TOE and read,
modify or destroy security sensitive data on the TOE, by
sending IP packets to the TOE and exploiting a weakness of
the protocol used.
T.MEDIAT A user might send non-permissible data from outside the
protected networks through the TOE that result in gaining
access to resources in protected networks which is not
allowed by the policy. The attack method is construction of IP
packets to circumvent filters.
T.MSNIFF A user outside the TOE might gain access to the configuration
or audit data passing between the Management Server and a
firewall component. Attack method is packet inspection of
Internet traffic.
T.MODIFY A user outside the TOE might modify the sensitive data
passing between the protected networks. Attack method is
packet interception and modification of Internet traffic.
T.MMODIFY A user outside the TOE might modify the configuration or audit
data passing between the Management Server and a firewall
component. Attack method is packet interception and
modification of Internet traffic.
Table 6: Threats defined in the Security Target of the TOE
1.5 Special configuration requirements
To guarantee that all Firewall components are set up correctly and know each
other's and the Management Server's public keys, the following procedure is
required:
1. A secure network is set up with only the Management Server and the
Firewall components on it.
2. The management server must be installed from CD. During installation,
public/private key pairs are generated which are used later to identify and
authorize the Administrator.
3. The administrator initializes his/her account with a non-guessable password.
4. The administrator uses the GUI to create configurations for all the Firewall
components. The configuration includes the creation of public/private key
pairs for the Firewall components for later authentication by the Internet Key
Exchange (IKE) and Secure Shell (SSH) protocols.
B-8
BSI-DSZ-CC-0382-2007 Certification Report
5. The Firewall components are installed by PXE boot from the Management
Server. Among other things, the process installs on each firewall component
1. the authorised administrator's public key
2. the individual Firewall component's public/private key pair
3. all the public keys of all the firewall components with which the
individual firewall component is configured to communicate directly.
1.6 Assumptions about the operating environment
The following table reproduces the assumptions that are defined in the Security
Target, chapter 3.2.
Assumption name Assumption definition
A.PHYSEC Each component of the TOE is physically secure. Only
authorised administrators have physical access to the TOE.
This must hold for the Management Server and the Firewall
components.
A.INIT The TOE was initialised according to the procedure described
in the guidance documentation.
A.NOEVIL Authorised administrators are non-hostile and follow all
administrator guidance; however, they are capable of error.
They use passwords that are not easily guessable.
A.SINGEN Information can not flow between the internal and external
network, unless it passes through the TOE.
A.NOADDSERV The Management Server is exclusively configured to manage
the Firewall components. No incoming traffic from untrusted
networks is allowed to the HTTP service on the Management
Server.
A.NOFWSERV The Firewall components are configured to accept no
incoming connections except SSH-protected data from the
Management Server, IPsec Key agreement protocol
connections and IPsec connections initiated by IPsec Key
agreement from other firewall components of the TOE.
A.TIMESTMP The environment provides reliable timestamps.
A.ADMIN Authorised Administrators using the GUI on the Management
Server work in a trusted network directly connected to the
Server.
Table 7: Assumptions defined in the Security Target of the TOE
1.7 Disclaimers
The Certification Results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the
Certificate and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in
this Certification Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product
by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation
B-9
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0382-2007
that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT
product by BSI or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2 Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
GeNUScreen 1.0
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
1 HW Management Server
Model: 200, 400, 600, or
800 (in accordance with the
specification in ST 2.2.1)
N/A Hardware
2 HW Two or more firewall
Components
Model: 100C, 300S, 500S,
200, 400, 600, or 800 (in
accordance with the
specification in ST 2.2.2)
N/A Hardware
3 SW Management Server
Installation CD
GeNUScreen Version 1.0 Z
1.0 Patchlevel 0 CD-ROM
4 DOC Administrator Guidance 2.D038 Paper document / CD-ROM
Table 8: Deliverables of the TOE
Please note that the procedure to verify the authenticity of the SW TOE parts is
described in the administrator guidance. The hash values needed for this
validation are:
MD5(ports39.tgz) = 16ac51a360c7df63a208d2448bf08eb2
MD5(etc39.tgz) = bcacdd62b8e2b5c12f9d7287b699752e
MD5(comp39.tgz) = 93bf28b0b888e3fdb4ef1965b173afad
MD5(center39.tgz) = d7ea32e814c8f61b6bc217729b12a354
MD5(base39.tgz) = f1ade146a54b742909297af4f5109ee1
SHA1(ports39.tgz) = fc402a22b98e950b088fce3fd9931ee9066cfe20
SHA1(etc39.tgz) = 7a7d14aafd27663f168293f49ecf70f677ab2601
SHA1(comp39.tgz) = d90af5def769558fd23910aca8050bc055462389
SHA1(center39.tgz) = 721ea2c7404a2437cad8c958ec9223ec87dc8593
SHA1(base39.tgz) = 45923e48d9679930d9e23fef8a4078901eadbcd8
B-10
BSI-DSZ-CC-0382-2007 Certification Report
RMD160(ports39.tgz) = ba61f987799dc190f60b54a885ead46eeedee007
RMD160(etc39.tgz) = 1e809f28105091293c1d203a9246a83988f961f5
RMD160(comp39.tgz) = 14e49b5e09dc3eaa3aef27d0137aab9ca181d48a
RMD160(center39.tgz) = 77b6b1eff4d86fc7ddf862c0391647d65d5e88a0
RMD160(base39.tgz) = a11fadca5284aa3e599d629b1ed841f8d10c82a6
The hash values for the validation of the guidance document (as contained in
the directory /cdrom/) are:
MD5(handbuch.pdf) = 5280ae2511aa9b710b1d815154af8f33
SHA1(handbuch.pdf) = 50973dc1aa6df85247d94db9eb2b98a791c2a31c
RMD160(handbuch.pdf) = 9d14056ee647e5750a1506dc0b16bb9233b0ca11
3 Security Policy
There are five securtiy policies defined for the TOE. Two policies are explictly
defined:
• FW-SFP: Data flow control policy (implemented by the security function
SF_DF)
• IPSEC-SFP: IPsec protected communication between firewall components
(implemented by the security function SF_DF)
All other policies are implictly defined and cover the following areas:
• Audit Policy (implemented by the security function SF_AU)
• Identification and Authentication Policy (implemented by the security
function SF_IA)
• Security Management Policy (implemented by the security functions SF_AU,
SF_DF and SF_AC)
A more detailed definition is provided by the definition of the SFRs as given in
the Security Target [6] and in the Security Policy Modell as provided for the
assurance component ADV_SPM.1 (confidential document).
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
For a detailed description of the assumptions see chapter 1.6 of this report.
4.1 Usage assumptions
The assumptions A.PHYSEC, A.INIT, A.NOEVIL and A.ADMIN describe the
assumed usage of the TOE.
B-11
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0382-2007
4.2 Environmental assumptions
A.SINGEN, A.NOADDSERV, A.NOFWSERV and A.TIMESTMP describe the
assumptions about the environment of use of the TOE.
4.3 Clarification of scope
The following table presents the security objectives which have to be fulfilled by
the TOE environment to support the TOE to meet its security goals and to avert
the threats:
Objective name Objective definition
OE.PHYSEC Those responsible for the TOE must assure that the
Management Server and the Firewall components are placed
at a secured place where only authorised people have access.
OE.INIT Those responsible for the TOE must ensure that the initial
configuration is performed according to the user guidance
documentation.
Helps to avert the threats: T.SNIFF, T.MSNIFF, T.MODIFY
and T.MMODIFY
OE.SINGEN Those responsible for the TOE must assure that the Firewall
components provide the only connection for the different
networks.
Helps to avert the threat: T.MEDIAT
OE.NOADDSERV The Management Server must be exclusively configured to
manage the Firewall components. No incoming traffic from
untrusted networks must be allowed to the administrative GUI
on the Management Server.
Helps to avert the threat: T.SELPRO
OE.NOFWSERV The Firewall components must be configured to accept no
incoming connections except SSH-protected data from the
Management Server, IPsec Key agreement protocol
connections from other Firewall components of the TOE and
IPsec connections initiated by IPsec Key agreement.
Helps to avert the threat: T.SELPRO
OE.CRYPTO The IT environment must supply SSH authorization and SSH
transport protection as defined in [RFC4253]. The IT
environment must supply Internet key agreement and the
necessary algorithms as defined in [RFC2409], [PKCS #1,
v2.0], [RFC2104], [RFC3526], [RFC3602], [FIPS-180-2] and
[FIPS-197].
Helps to avert the threats: T.MSNIFF and T.MMODIFY
Table 9: Security Objectives for the environment which contribute to the aversion of threats
B-12
BSI-DSZ-CC-0382-2007 Certification Report
Please note that the table above only contains those security objectives for the
environment which are related to threats. Security objectives for the
environment which are related to assumptions/OSP only have not been listed.
A detailed assignment which security objective for the environment is related to
which threat can be found in the Security Target, chapter 8.2 as a written
rationale.
5 Architectural Information
The TOE is the firewall system GeNUScreen 1.0 developed by GeNUA
Gesellschaft für Netzwerk- und UNIX-Administration mbH
The TOE consists of
1. Several (at least two) firewall components that work as network filters and
encrypting gateways,
2. a central Management Server that is used to configure, administrate and
monitor the firewall components.
The Management Server allows authorised administrators to configure filter
rules and protection policies on the firewall components by use of a web-based
graphical user interface (GUI) at the Management Server. It also enables
authorised administrators to update the software on the firewall components.
The GUI must be used from a trusted machine connected to the Management
Server through a trusted network.
After installation, all communication between the Management Server and the
firewall components is protected by Secure Shell (SSH) transforms against
eavesdropping and modification (Please note that SSH is considered being
outside the TOE scope).
The firewall components employ IPsec encryption and authentication to protect
data flows between the subnets assigned to them by the authorised
administrators. Please note that the key management protocol (IKE) used for
the IPsec communication is not part of the TOE.
Management consists of definition/modification and transmission of firewall
policies and security policies for network traffic. The GUI also allows transfer of
audit data from the firewall components.
Core functionality
As core functionality the TOE offers a flexible and secure operating system with
a TCP/IP-stack, routing functionality, packet filtering and cryptographic
functionality which can be employed in a variety of different usage scenarios.
Functionality of the GeNUScreen component
• Statefull packet filter
• IPsec gateway
• Bridging (level-2) packet filter
B-13
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0382-2007
Functionality of the GeNUCenter Management System
• Central firewall management
• Central logging station
• Central status monitor
On the abstraction layer of the high-level design the two TOE components are
defined by the following subsystems:
• Subsystems of the firewall component: IPsec Code, network filter, service
programs, audit.
• Subsystem of the Management component: WebGUI and backend daemon.
6 Documentation
The following guidance documentation is provided together with the TOE:
“GeNUScreen Installations- und Konfigurationshandbuch, ", [8]
This document contains all necessary instructions for correct installation and
configuration of the TOE.
7 IT Product Testing
The test platform was set up by the developer according to the ST and all
relevant guidance, ensuring that the evaluated configuration as defined in the
ST was tested. The developer test scripts were performed successfully on the
evaluated configuration of the TOE. Complete coverage was achieved for all the
TOE security functions as described in the functional specification. The overall
test depth of the developer tests comprises the high-level design subsystems as
required for the assurance level of the evaluation.
The test scripts provided by the developer have been successfully repeated by
the evaluation facility. The achieved test results matched the expected results
as documented by the developer in the developer test documentation.
Furthermore, a set of independent penetration tests has been performed by the
evaluation facility, without being able to compromise the TOE in the intended
environment.
8 Evaluated Configuration
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called: GeNUScreen 1.0
It consists of the deliverables as outlined in chapter 2 of this report.
For installing the TOE a special procedure has to be followed. It is described in
the user guidance documentation of the TOE [8] and summarised in chapter 1.5
of this report.
B-14
BSI-DSZ-CC-0382-2007 Certification Report
Please note that all information contained in the Security Target [6] and the
guidance documentation [8] have to be followed in order to set-up, configure
and use the TOE in a secure manner conformant to the evaluated configuration.
9 Results of the Evaluation
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR), [7] was provided by the ITSEF
according to the Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of
the Scheme [3] and all interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as
relevant for the TOE.
The evaluation methodology CEM [2] was used for those components identical
with EAL4 and ALC_FLR.2.
The verdicts for the CC, Part 3 assurance components (according to EAL 4
augmented by ALC_FLR.2 and the class ASE for the Security Target
evaluation) are summarised in the following table.
Assurance classes and components Verdict
Security Target evaluation CC Class ASE PASS
TOE description ASE_DES.1 PASS
Security environment ASE_ENV.1 PASS
ST introduction ASE_INT.1 PASS
Security objectives ASE_OBJ.1 PASS
PP claims ASE_PPC.1 PASS
IT security requirements ASE_REQ.1 PASS
Explicitly stated IT security requirements ASE_SRE.1 PASS
TOE summary specification ASE_TSS.1 PASS
Configuration management CC Class ACM PASS
Partial CM automation ACM_AUT.1 PASS
Generation support and acceptance procedures ACM_CAP.4 PASS
Problem tracking CM coverage ACM_SCP.2 PASS
Delivery and operation CC Class ADO PASS
Detection of modification ADO_DEL.2 PASS
Installation, generation, and start-up procedures ADO_IGS.1 PASS
Development CC Class ADV PASS
Fully defined external interfaces ADV_FSP.2 PASS
Security enforcing high-level design ADV_HLD.2 PASS
Subset of the implementation of the TSF ADV_IMP.1 PASS
Descriptive low-level design ADV_LLD.1 PASS
Informal correspondence demonstration ADV_RCR.1 PASS
B-15
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0382-2007
Assurance classes and components Verdict
Informal TOE security policy model ADV_SPM.1 PASS
Guidance documents CC Class AGD PASS
Administrator guidance AGD_ADM.1 PASS
User guidance AGD_USR.1 PASS
Life cycle support CC Class ALC PASS
Identification of security measures ALC_DVS.1 PASS
Flaw reporting procedures ALC_FLR.2 PASS
Developer defined life-cycle model ALC_LCD.1 PASS
Well-defined development tools ALC_TAT.1 PASS
Tests CC Class ATE PASS
Analysis of coverage ATE_COV.2 PASS
Testing: high-level design ATE_DPT.1 PASS
Functional testing ATE_FUN.1 PASS
Independent testing – sample ATE_IND.2 PASS
Vulnerability assessment CC Class AVA PASS
Validation of analysis AVA_MSU.2 PASS
Strength of TOE security function evaluation AVA_SOF.1 PASS
Independent vulnerability analysis AVA_VLA.2 PASS
Table 10: Verdicts for the assurance components
The evaluation has shown that:
• Security Functional Requirements specified for the TOE are Common
Criteria Part 2 extended
• the assurance of the TOE is Common Criteria Part 3 conformant, EAL 4
augmented by ALC_FLR.2 - Flaw reporting procedures.
• The following TOE Security Functions fulfil the claimed Strength of Function:
Security Function SF_AI.1 (Authentication and Identification)
The rating of the strength of functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms
suitable for encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2).
This holds for the TOE Security Function SF_DF.4 (cryptographically protected
communication between firewall components).
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE GeNUScreen 1.0
as outlined in chapter 2 of this report.
The validity can be extended to new versions and releases of the product,
provided the sponsor applies for re-certification or assurance continuity of the
modified product, in accordance with the procedural requirements, and the
evaluation of the modified product does not reveal any security deficiencies.
B-16
BSI-DSZ-CC-0382-2007 Certification Report
10 Comments/Recommendations
The guidance document [8] and the Security Target [6] contain necessary infor-
mation about the usage of the TOE and all security hints therein have to be
considered.
11 Annexes
None.
12 Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [6] of the Target of Evaluation
(TOE) is provided within a separate document.
13 Definitions
13.1 Acronyms
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal
Office for Information Security, Bonn, Germany
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
IT Information Technology
PP Protection Profile
SF Security Function
SFP Security Function Policy
SOF Strength of Function
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSC TSF Scope of Control
TSF TOE Security Functions
TSP TOE Security Policy
13.2 Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more assurance component(s) from CC
Part 3 to an EAL or assurance package.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not
contained in part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the
CC.
B-17
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0382-2007
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics
based on well-established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - An entity within the TSC that contains or receives information and
upon which subjects perform operations.
Protection Profile - An implementation-independent set of security require-
ments for a category of TOEs that meet specific consumer needs.
Security Function - A part or parts of the TOE that have to be relied upon for
enforcing a closely related subset of the rules from the TSP.
Security Target - A set of security requirements and specifications to be used
as the basis for evaluation of an identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined
semantics.
Strength of Function - A qualification of a TOE security function expressing
the minimum efforts assumed necessary to defeat its expected security
behaviour by directly attacking its underlying security mechanisms.
SOF-basic - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that
the function provides adequate protection against casual breach of TOE
security by attackers possessing a low attack potential.
SOF-medium - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows
that the function provides adequate protection against straightforward or
intentional breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a moderate attack
potential.
SOF-high - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that
the function provides adequate protection against deliberately planned or
organised breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a high attack
potential.
Subject - An entity within the TSC that causes operations to be performed.
Target of Evaluation - An IT product or system and its associated
administrator and user guidance documentation that is the subject of an
evaluation.
TOE Security Functions - A set consisting of all hardware, software, and
firmware of the TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the
TSP.
TOE Security Policy - A set of rules that regulate how assets are managed,
protected and distributed within a TOE.
TSF Scope of Control - The set of interactions that can occur with or within a
TOE and are subject to the rules of the TSP.
B-18
BSI-DSZ-CC-0382-2007 Certification Report
14 Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, version
2.3, August 2005
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
(CEM), Evaluation Methodology, version 2.3, August 2005
[3] BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for
the TOE.
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148, BSI 7149), periodically
updated list published also on the BSI Web-site
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-0382-2007, GeNUScreen 1.0 Security Target
Version 431, 11.06.2007, GeNUA mbH
[7] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 2, 27.06.2007, Evaluationsbericht
BSI-DSZ-CC-0382 zu GeNUScreen 1.0 der GeNUA mbH durch Tele-
Consulting GmbH (confidential document)
[8] GeNUScreen Installations- und Konfigurationshandbuch, Version 1.0 Z,
Ausgabe 25.06.2007, Revision: build.2.D038
B-19
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0382-2007
B-20
This page is intentionally left blank.
BSI-DSZ-CC-0382-2007 Certification Report
C Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part1:
Conformance results (chapter 7.4)
„The conformance result indicates the source of the collection of requirements
that is met by a TOE or PP that passes its evaluation. This conformance result
is presented with respect to CC Part 2 (functional requirements), CC Part 3
(assurance requirements) and, if applicable, to a pre-defined set of
requirements (e.g., EAL, Protection Profile).
The conformance result consists of one of the following:
a) CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or TOE is CC Part 2 conformant if the
functional requirements are based only upon functional components in
CC Part 2.
b) CC Part 2 extended - A PP or TOE is CC Part 2 extended if the
functional requirements include functional components not in CC Part 2.
plus one of the following:
a) CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or TOE is CC Part 3 conformant if the
assurance requirements are based only upon assurance components in
CC Part 3.
b) CC Part 3 extended - A PP or TOE is CC Part 3 extended if the
assurance requirements include assurance requirements not in CC Part
3.
Additionally, the conformance result may include a statement made with respect
to sets of defined requirements, in which case it consists of one of the following:
a) Package name Conformant - A PP or TOE is conformant to a pre-
defined named functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the
requirements (functions or assurance) include all components in the
packages listed as part of the conformance result.
b) Package name Augmented - A PP or TOE is an augmentation of a pre-
defined named functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the
requirements (functions or assurance) are a proper superset of all
components in the packages listed as part of the conformance result.
Finally, the conformance result may also include a statement made with respect
to Protection Profiles, in which case it includes the following:
a) PP Conformant - A TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of
the conformance result.“
C-1
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0382-2007
CC Part 3:
Assurance categorisation (chapter 7.5)
“The assurance classes, families, and the abbreviation for each family are
shown in Table 1.
Assurance Class Assurance Family
CM automation (ACM_AUT)
ACM: Configuration management CM capabilities (ACM_CAP)
CM scope (ACM_SCP)
ADO: Delivery and operation Delivery (ADO_DEL)
Installation, generation and start-up (ADO_IGS)
Functional specification (ADV_FSP)
High-level design (ADV_HLD)
Implementation representation (ADV_IMP)
ADV: Development TSF internals (ADV_INT)
Low-level design (ADV_LLD)
Representation correspondence (ADV_RCR)
Security policy modeling (ADV_SPM)
AGD: Guidance documents Administrator guidance (AGD_ADM)
User guidance (AGD_USR)
Development security (ALC_DVS)
ALC: Life cycle support Flaw remediation (ALC_FLR)
Life cycle definition (ALC_LCD)
Tools and techniques (ALC_TAT)
Coverage (ATE_COV)
ATE: Tests Depth (ATE_DPT)
Functional tests (ATE_FUN)
Independent testing (ATE_IND)
Covert channel analysis (AVA_CCA)
AVA: Vulnerability assessment Misuse (AVA_MSU)
Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF)
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA)
Table 1: Assurance family breakdown and mapping”
C-2
BSI-DSZ-CC-0382-2007 Certification Report
Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 11)
“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that
balances the level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of
acquiring that degree of assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate
concepts of assurance in a TOE at the end of the evaluation, and of
maintenance of that assurance during the operational use of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are
included in the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful
and desirable assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and
components will be considered for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and
STs for which they provide utility.”
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 11.1)
“Table 6 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a
hierarchically ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families.
Each number in the resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component
where applicable.
As outlined in the next section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation
assurance levels are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance.
They are hierarchically ordered inasmuch as each EAL represents more
assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in assurance from EAL to EAL is
accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher assurance component
from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope, and/or depth)
and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance families
(i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as
described in chapter 7 of this Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no
more than one component of each assurance family and all assurance
dependencies of every component are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other
combinations of assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the
addition of assurance components (from assurance families not already
included in the EAL) or the substitution of assurance components (with another
hierarchically higher assurance component in the same assurance family) to an
EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only EALs may be
augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance component”
is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with it
the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of
the added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be extended
with explicitly stated assurance requirements.
C-3
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0382-2007
Assurance Class Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL1 EAL2 EAL3 EAL4 EAL5 EAL6 EAL7
Configuration
management
ACM_AUT 1 1 2 2
ACM_CAP 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
ACM_SCP 1 2 3 3 3
Delivery and
operation
ADO_DEL 1 1 2 2 2 3
ADO_IGS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Development ADV_FSP 1 1 1 2 3 3 4
ADV_HLD 1 2 2 3 4 5
ADV_IMP 1 2 3 3
ADV_INT 1 2 3
ADV_LLD 1 1 2 2
ADV_RCR 1 1 1 1 2 2 3
ADV_SPM 1 3 3 3
Guidance
documents
AGD_ADM 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AGD_USR 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life cycle
support
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 2 2 3
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3
Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3
ATE_DPT 1 1 2 2 3
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_CCA 1 2 2
AVA_MSU 1 2 2 3 3
AVA_SOF 1 1 1 1 1 1
AVA_VLA 1 1 2 3 4 4
Table 6: Evaluation assurance level summary”
C-4
BSI-DSZ-CC-0382-2007 Certification Report
Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 11.3)
“Objectives
EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but
the threats to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where
independent assurance is required to support the contention that due care has
been exercised with respect to the protection of personal or similar information.
EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer,
including independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the
guidance documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could
be successfully conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE,
and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a
manner consistent with its documentation, and that it provides useful protection
against identified threats.”
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 11.4)
“Objectives
EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of
design information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the
part of the developer than is consistent with good commercial practice. As such
it should not require a substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a low to moderate level of independently assured security in the
absence of ready availability of the complete development record. Such a
situation may arise when securing legacy systems, or where access to the
developer may be limited.”
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked
(chapter 11.5)
“Objectives
EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from
positive security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of
existing sound development practices.
EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate level of independently assured security, and require a thorough
investigation of the TOE and its development without substantial re-
engineering.”
C-5
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0382-2007
Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and
reviewed (chapter 11.6)
“Objectives
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security
engineering based on good commercial development practices which, though
rigorous, do not require substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other
resources. EAL4 is the highest level at which it is likely to be economically
feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a moderate to high level of independently assured security in
conventional commodity TOEs and are prepared to incur additional security-
specific engineering costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested
(chapter 11.7)
“Objectives
EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security
engineering based upon rigorous commercial development practices supported
by moderate application of specialist security engineering techniques. Such a
TOE will probably be designed and developed with the intent of achieving EAL5
assurance. It is likely that the additional costs attributable to the EAL5
requirements, relative to rigorous development without the application of
specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a high level of independently assured security in a planned development
and require a rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable
costs attributable to specialist security engineering techniques.”
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and
tested (chapter 11.8)
“Objectives
EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security
engineering techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to
produce a premium TOE for protecting high value assets against significant
risks.
EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for
application in high risk situations where the value of the protected assets
justifies the additional costs.”
C-6
BSI-DSZ-CC-0382-2007 Certification Report
Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 11.9)
“Objectives
EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in
extremely high risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies
the higher costs. Practical application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with
tightly focused security functionality that is amenable to extensive formal
analysis.“
C-7
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0382-2007
C-8
Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF) (chapter 19.3)
“Objectives
Even if a TOE security function cannot be bypassed, deactivated, or corrupted,
it may still be possible to defeat it because there is a vulnerability in the concept
of its underlying security mechanisms. For those functions a qualification of their
security behaviour can be made using the results of a quantitative or statistical
analysis of the security behaviour of these mechanisms and the effort required
to overcome them. The qualification is made in the form of a strength of TOE
security function claim.”
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA) (chapter 19.4)
"Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether vulnerabilities
identified, during the evaluation of the construction and anticipated operation of
the TOE or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses), could allow users to
violate the TSP.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that a user will be able to discover
flaws that will allow unauthorised access to resources (e.g. data), allow the
ability to interfere with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised
capabilities of other users.”
"Application notes
A vulnerability analysis is performed by the developer in order to ascertain the
presence of security vulnerabilities, and should consider at least the contents of
all the TOE deliverables including the ST for the targeted evaluation assurance
level. The developer is required to document the disposition of identified
vulnerabilities to allow the evaluator to make use of that information if it is found
useful as a support for the evaluator's independent vulnerability analysis.”
“Independent vulnerability analysis goes beyond the vulnerabilities identified by
the developer. The main intent of the evaluator analysis is to determine that the
TOE is resistant to penetration attacks performed by an attacker possessing a
low (for AVA_VLA.2 Independent vulnerability analysis), moderate (for
AVA_VLA.3 Moderately resistant) or high (for AVA_VLA.4 Highly resistant)
attack potential.”