National Information Assurance Partnership
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
Validation Report
for
IOGEAR Secure KVM Switch Series
of Peripheral Sharing Switches
Report Number: CCEVS-VR-10822-2018
Dated: January 29, 2018
Version: 1.0
National Institute of Standards and Technology National Security Agency
Information Technology Laboratory Information Assurance Directorate
100 Bureau Drive 9800 Savage Road STE 6940
Gaithersburg, MD 20899 Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6940
®
TM
VALIDATION REPORT
IOGEAR Secure KVM Switch Series
ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Validation Team
Stelios Melachrinoudis
Daniel Faigin
John Butterworth
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
Leidos
Columbia, MD
VALIDATION REPORT
IOGEAR Secure KVM Switch Series
iii
Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary...................................................................................................................1
2 Identification..............................................................................................................................4
2.1 Threats...............................................................................................................................4
2.2 Organizational Security Policies.......................................................................................5
3 Architectural Information ..........................................................................................................6
4 Assumptions...............................................................................................................................9
4.1 Clarification of Scope .......................................................................................................9
5 Security Policy.........................................................................................................................10
5.1 Security Audit.................................................................................................................10
5.2 User Data Protection.......................................................................................................10
5.3 Identification and Authentication ...................................................................................10
5.4 Security Management .....................................................................................................11
5.5 Protection of the TSF......................................................................................................11
5.6 TOE Access ....................................................................................................................11
6 Documentation.........................................................................................................................12
7 Independent Testing.................................................................................................................13
7.1 Evaluation team independent testing ..............................................................................13
7.2 Vulnerability Survey.......................................................................................................13
8 Evaluated Configuration ..........................................................................................................14
9 Results of the Evaluation .........................................................................................................15
10 Validator Comments/Recommendations .................................................................................16
11 Annexes....................................................................................................................................17
12 Security Target.........................................................................................................................18
13 Abbreviations and Acronyms ..................................................................................................19
14 Bibliography ............................................................................................................................21
VALIDATION REPORT
IOGEAR Secure KVM Switch Series
iv
List of Figures
Figure 1 Simplified block diagram of a 2-Port KVM TOE............................................................ 7
VALIDATION REPORT
IOGEAR Secure KVM Switch Series
v
List of Tables
Table 1 IOGEAR Secure KVM Switch Series TOE Models ......................................................... 2
Table 2: Evaluation Details............................................................................................................. 3
Table 3: TOE Security Assurance Requirements ......................................................................... 15
Table 4 Security Target Identification .......................................................................................... 18
VALIDATION REPORT
IOGEAR Secure KVM Switch Series
1
1 Executive Summary
This report is intended to assist the end-user of this product and any security certification agent
for that end-user to determine the suitability of this Information Technology (IT) product in their
environment. End-users should review the Security Target (ST) [6]1
, (which is where specific
security claims are made) as well as this Validation Report (VR) (which describes how those
security claims were evaluated, tested, and any restrictions that may be imposed upon the
evaluated configuration) to help in that determination. Prospective users should carefully read
the Assumptions and Clarification of Scope in section 4 and the Validator Comments in section
10, where any restrictions on the evaluated configuration are highlighted.
This report documents the National Information Assurance Partnership (NIAP) assessment of the
evaluation of the IOGEAR Secure KVM Switch Series of peripheral sharing switches. It presents
the evaluation results, their justifications, and the conformance results. This VR is not an
endorsement of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) by any agency of the U.S. Government and no
warranty of the TOE is either expressed or implied. This VR applies only to the specific version
and configuration of the product as evaluated and as documented in the ST.
The evaluation of the IOGEAR Secure KVM Switch Series of peripheral sharing switches was
performed by Leidos Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL) in Columbia, Maryland, in
the United States and was completed in January 2018. The evaluation was conducted in
accordance with the requirements of the Common Criteria and Common Methodology for IT
Security Evaluation (CEM), version 3.1, revision 4 [4] and the assurance activities specified in
the Protection Profile for Peripheral Sharing Switch, Version 3.0 [10]. Leidos performed an
analysis of the NIAP Technical Decisions (https://www.niap-
ccevs.org/Documents_and_Guidance/view_tds.cfm). Leidos determined Technical Decisions
TD0083, TD0086, TD0136, TD0141, TD0144, and TD0251 applied to this evaluation. The
evaluation was consistent with NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
(CCEVS) policies and practices as described on their web site (www.niap-ccevs.org).
The Leidos evaluation team determined that the IOGEAR Secure KVM Switch Series of
peripheral sharing switches is conformant to the claimed Protection Profile (PP) and, when
installed, configured and operated as specified in the evaluated guidance documentation,
satisfied all of the security functional requirements stated in the ST. The information in this VR
is largely derived from the publicly available Assurance Activities Report (AAR) [7] and the
associated proprietary test report [8] produced by the Leidos evaluation team.
Each device in the IOGEAR Secure KVM Switch series is a peripheral sharing switch that
allows for securely sharing one set of peripherals between multiple computers. A user may
1
See section 14 Bibliography.
VALIDATION REPORT
IOGEAR Secure KVM Switch Series
2
connect a mouse, keyboard, user authentication device (for example, CAC reader), speaker, and
one or two video displays to a Secure KVM Switch. The user may switch the set of peripherals
between connected computers. The maximum number of connected computers is two, four, or
eight depending on model. The user can switch the peripherals between any of the connected
computers while preventing unauthorized data flows or leakage between computers.
The TOE is the following models of the IOGEAR Secure KVM Switch Series.
Table 1 IOGEAR Secure KVM Switch Series TOE Models
Configuration 2-Port 4-Port 8-Port
DisplayPort
Single Head GCS1412TAA3 GCS1414TAA3 GCS1418TAA3
Dual Head GCS1422TAA3 GCS1424TAA3 GCS1428TAA3
HDMI
Single Head GCS1312TAA3 GCS1314TAA3 GCS1318TAA3
Dual Head GCS1322TAA3 GCS1324TAA3 GCS1328TAA3
DVI
Single Head GCS1212TAA3 GCS1214TAA3 GCS1218TAA3
Dual Head GCS1222TAA3 GCS1224TAA3 GCS1228TAA3
In Table 1, DisplayPort and HDMI configurations support HDMI monitor peripherals. DVI
configurations support DVI monitors. All TOE devices support both USB and PS/2 keyboards
and mice.
The validation team monitored the activities of the evaluation team, examined evaluation
evidence, provided guidance on technical issues and evaluation processes, and reviewed the
evaluation results produced by the evaluation team. The validation team found that the
evaluation results showed that all assurance activities specified in the claimed PP had been
completed successfully and that the product satisfied all of the security functional and assurance
requirements as stated in the ST.
Therefore the validation team concludes that the testing laboratory’s findings are accurate, the
conclusions justified, and the conformance results are correct. The conclusions of the testing
laboratory in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence produced.
The products, when configured as specified in the guidance documentation, satisfy all of the
security functional requirements stated in the IOGEAR Secure KVM Switch Security Target.
Item Identifier
Evaluated Product IOGEAR Secure KVM Switches Series devices identified in Table 1
Sponsor & Developer IOGEAR
15365 Barranca Pkwy,
Irvine, CA 92618
VALIDATION REPORT
IOGEAR Secure KVM Switch Series
3
Item Identifier
CCTL Leidos
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
6841 Benjamin Franklin Drive
Columbia, MD 21046
Completion Date January 2018
CC Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012
Interpretations There were no applicable interpretations used for this evaluation.
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation: Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012
PP Protection Profile for Peripheral Sharing Switch, Version 3.0
Disclaimer The information contained in this Validation Report is not an
endorsement of the IOGEAR Secure KVM Switch Series by any
agency of the U.S. Government and no warranty of the IOGEAR Secure
KVM Switch Series is either expressed or implied.
Evaluation Personnel Gregory Beaver
Cody Cummins
Gary Grainger
Kevin Steiner
Validation Personnel Stelios Melachrinoudis, Lead Validator
Daniel Faigin, Senior Validator
John Butterworth, ECR Team
Table 2: Evaluation Details
VALIDATION REPORT
IOGEAR Secure KVM Switch Series
4
2 Identification
The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) effort to establish commercial facilities to perform trusted product
evaluations. Under this program, security evaluations are conducted by commercial testing
laboratories called Common Criteria Testing Laboratories (CCTLs) in accordance with National
Voluntary Laboratory Assessment Program (NVLAP) accreditation.
The NIAP Validation Body assigns validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality and
consistency across evaluations. Developers of information technology products desiring a
security evaluation contract with a CCTL and pay a fee for their product’s evaluation. Upon
successful completion of the evaluation, the product is added to NIAP’s Product Compliant List
(PCL) (https://www.niap-ccevs.org/Product/).
The following table identifies the evaluated Security Target and TOE.
Name Description
ST Title IOGEAR Secure KVM Switch Series Security Target
ST Version V1.0
Publication Date January 19, 2018
Vendor and ST Author IOGEAR
TOE Reference IOGEAR Secure KVM Switch Series identified in Table 1
TOE Software Version Firmware version v1.1.101
Keywords KVM Switch, Peripheral Sharing Switch
2.1 Threats
The ST identifies the following threats that the TOE and its operational environment are intended
to counter the following threats.
 A connection via the PSS between computers may allow unauthorized data flow through
the PSS or its connected peripherals.
 A connection via the PSS between computers may allow unauthorized data flow through
bit-by-bit signaling.
 A PSS may leak (partial, residual, or echo) user data between the intended connected
computer and another unintended connected computer. More specifically, a PSS may
leak user keyboard entries to a PSS-connected computer other than the selected computer
in real-time or at a later time.
VALIDATION REPORT
IOGEAR Secure KVM Switch Series
5
 A threat in which the user is connected to a computer other than the one to which they
intended to be connected.
 The use of an unauthorized peripheral device with a specific PSS peripheral port may
allow unauthorized data flows between connected devices or enable an attack on the PSS
or its connected computers.
 The use of an authorized peripheral device with the PSS may still cause unauthorized
data flows between connected devices or enable an attack on the PSS or its connected
computers. Such threats are possible due to known or unknown device vulnerabilities or
due to additional functions within the authorized peripheral device.
 An attached device (computer or peripheral) with malware, or otherwise under the
control of a malicious user, could modify or overwrite code embedded in the TOE’s
volatile or non-volatile memory to allow unauthorized information flows between
connected devices.
 A malicious human agent could physically tamper with or modify the TOE to allow
unauthorized information flows between connected devices.
 A malicious human agent could replace the TOE during shipping, storage, or use with an
alternate device that does not enforce the TOE security policies.
 Detectable failure of a PSS may cause an unauthorized information flow, weakening of
PSS security functions, or unintended switching.
 Microphone connected to the TOE used for audio eavesdropping or to transfer data
across an air-gap through audio signaling.
 Audio output device used by an attacker as a low-gain microphone for audio
eavesdropping. This threat is an abuse of the computer and TOE audio output path to
reverse the analog data flow from the headphones to the computer. The computer then
amplifies and filters the weak signal, and then digitizes and streams it to another location.
2.2 Organizational Security Policies
There are no Organizational Security Policies for the Protection Profile for Peripheral Sharing
Switch [10].
VALIDATION REPORT
IOGEAR Secure KVM Switch Series
6
3 Architectural Information
The IOGEAR Secure KVM Switch series are keyboard, video, mouse (KVM) switches with the
following characteristics:
 2/4/8 port USB HDMI single and dual display for DisplayPort (6 devices)
 2/4/8 port USB HDMI single and dual display for HDMI (6 devices)
 2/4/8 port USB DVI single and dual display for DVI (6 devices).
IOGEAR Secure KVM Switch series devices allow for the connection of a mouse, keyboard,
user authentication device such as smart card or CAC reader (optional), speaker (optional), and
one or two video displays (depending on specific device type) to the Secure KVM Switch, which
is then connected to 2, up to 4, or up to 8 separate computers (again depending on specific device
type). The user can then switch the connected peripherals between any of the connected
computers using a push button on the front of the device. The selected computer is always
identifiable by a bright orange LED associated with the applicable selection button.
IOGEAR Secure KVM Switch series devices support USB connections for the keyboard, mouse
and user authentication device and DVI or HDMI connections for the video display(s). IOGEAR
Secure KVM Switch series devices additionally support PS/2 keyboard and mouse connections.
Separate USB cables are used to connect the keyboard/mouse combination and the user
authentication device to the connected computers. IOGEAR Secure KVM Switch series devices
support, depending on device type, the following video connections from the connected
computers: DisplayPort; HDMI; and DVI. IOGEAR Secure KVM Switch series devices
supporting DisplayPort convert the DisplayPort video signal to HDMI for output to the
connected video display(s). IOGEAR Secure KVM Switch series devices also support audio
output connections from the computers to a connected audio output device. Only speaker
connections are supported and the use of an analog microphone or line-in audio device is
prohibited.
IOGEAR Secure KVM Switch series devices implement a secure isolation design for all 2/4/8-
Port and DVI/HDMI/DisplayPort models to share a single set of peripheral components.
IOGEAR Secure KVM Switch series devices support the following peripheral port types:
 USB keyboard,
 USB mouse,
 PS/2 keyboard,
 PS/2 mouse,
 USB authentication device (CAC reader or smart card reader),
 Audio output, and
 DVI or HDMI video (depending on device type).
Each peripheral has its own dedicated data path. USB keyboard and mouse peripherals are
filtered and emulated. The USB authentication device connection is on a separate circuit from
VALIDATION REPORT
IOGEAR Secure KVM Switch Series
7
the keyboard and mouse and, after filtering for qualification, has a direct connection path to the
selected computer. The TOE does not emulate the user authentication device function.
DisplayPort video from the selected computer is converted to HDMI for communication with the
connected video display and the AUX channel is monitored and converted to video.
IOGEAR Secure KVM Switch series devices are designed to enforce the allowed and disallowed
data flows between user peripheral devices and connected computers as specified in [10]. Data
leakage is prevented across the TOE to avoid compromise of the user's information. Modern
KVM security approaches address the risk of TOE local user data leakage through remote attacks
to coupled networks in addition to protecting user information passing through the TOE.
IOGEAR Secure KVM Switch series devices automatically clear the internal TOE keyboard and
mouse buffers.
The following figure shows the data path design using a 2-Port KVM as an example.
Figure 1 Simplified block diagram of a 2-Port KVM TOE
The data flow of USB and PS/2 keyboard/mouse is controlled by two types of host controller for
console human interface device (HID) keyboard and pointing devices: USB host controller and
PS/2 host controller. Details of the data flow architecture are provided in the proprietary
IOGEAR Secure KVM Switch Isolation Document. All keyboard and mouse connections are
VALIDATION REPORT
IOGEAR Secure KVM Switch Series
8
filtered first, and only authorized devices will be allowed. The TOE emulates data from
authorized USB or PS/2 keyboard and mouse to USB data for computer sources.
The TOE’s proprietary design mitigates the possibility of data leakage from a user’s peripheral
output device to the input device and ensures that no unauthorized data flows from the monitor to
a connected computer. Unidirectional buffers ensure that the audio data can travel only from the
selected computer to the audio device. There is no possibility of data leakage between
computers or from user peripheral input device to a non-selected computer. Each connected
computer has its own independent Device Controller, power circuit, and EEPROM.
Additionally, keyboard and mouse are always switched together.
All IOGEAR Secure KVM Switch series devices feature hardware security mechanisms
including tamper-evident labels, always active chassis-intrusion detection, and tamper-proof
hardware construction. Software security includes restricted USB connectivity (non-HID are
ignored when switching), an isolated channel per port that makes it impossible for data to be
communicated between computers, and automatic clearing of the keyboard and mouse buffer.
IOGEAR Secure KVM Switch series devices are compatible with standard personal/portable
computers, servers or thin-clients. The IOGEAR Port Authentication Utility must be installed on
a separate secure source computer using an installation wizard. The utility supports Microsoft
Windows 7 and higher. The dedicated secure source computer must have its own monitor,
keyboard, and mouse connected for installation and operation.
VALIDATION REPORT
IOGEAR Secure KVM Switch Series
9
4 Assumptions
The ST identifies the following assumptions about the use of the product:
 It is assumed that the computers and peripheral devices connected to the TOE are not
TEMPEST approved.
 It is assumed that the computers connected to the TOE are not equipped with special
analog data collection cards or peripherals such as: Analog to digital interface, high
performance audio interface, Digital Signal Processing function, and analog video
capture function.
 Physical security, commensurate with the value of the TOE and the data it contains, is
assumed to be provided by the environment.
 TOE Administrators and users are trusted to follow and apply all guidance in a trusted
manner.
 Personnel configuring the TOE and its operational environment will follow the applicable
security configuration guidance.
4.1 Clarification of Scope
All evaluations (and all products) have limitations, as well as potential misconceptions that need
clarification. This text covers some of the more important limitations and clarifications of this
evaluation. Note that:
1. As with any evaluation, this evaluation only shows that the evaluated configuration meets
the security claims made, with a certain level of assurance (the assurance activities
specified in the claimed PPs and performed by the evaluation team).
2. This evaluation covers only the specific hardware products, and firmware versions
identified in this document, and not any earlier or later versions released or in process.
3. The evaluation of security functionality of the product was limited to the functionality
specified in the claimed PPs. Any additional security related functional capabilities of the
product were not covered by this evaluation. Any additional non-security related
functional capabilities of the product, even those described in the ST, were not covered
by this evaluation.
4. This evaluation did not specifically search for, nor attempt to exploit, vulnerabilities that
were not “obvious” or vulnerabilities to objectives not claimed in the ST. The CEM [4]
defines an “obvious” vulnerability as one that is easily exploited with a minimum of
understanding of the TOE, technical sophistication and resources.
VALIDATION REPORT
IOGEAR Secure KVM Switch Series
10
5 Security Policy
IOGEAR Secure KVM Switch series devices enforce the following TOE security functional
policies as specified in the ST.
5.1 Security Audit
The TOE generates audit records for the authorized administrator actions. Each audit record
records a standard set of information such as date and time of the event, type of event, and the
outcome (success or failure) of the event.
5.2 User Data Protection
The TOE controls and isolates information flowing between the peripheral device interfaces and
a computer interface. The peripheral devices supported include:
 USB keyboard,
 USB mouse,
 PS/2 keyboard,
 PS/2 mouse,
 USB authentication device (CAC reader or smart card reader),
 Audio output, and
 DVI or HDMI video (depending on device type).
Some TOE models accept DisplayPort signals at the computer interface and convert the signals
to HDMI signals at the peripheral interface.
The TOE authorizes peripheral device connections with the TOE console ports based on the
peripheral device type.
The TOE ensures that any previous information content of a resource is made unavailable upon
the deallocation of the resource from a TOE computer interface immediately after the TOE
switch to another selected computer and on start-up of the TOE
5.3 Identification and Authentication
The TOE provides an identification and authentication function for the administrative user to
perform administrative functions such as configuring the user authentication device filtering
whitelist and blacklist (configurable device filtration). The authorized administrator must logon
by providing a valid password.
VALIDATION REPORT
IOGEAR Secure KVM Switch Series
11
5.4 Security Management
The TOE supports configurable device filtration (CDF). This function is restricted to the
authorized administrator and allows the TOE to be configured to accept or reject specific USB
devices using CDF whitelist and blacklist parameters. Additionally, the TOE provides security
management functions to reset to factory default and to change the administrator password.
5.5 Protection of the TSF
The TOE runs a suite of self-tests during initial startup and after activating the reset button. The
suite includes:
 Test of the basic TOE hardware and firmware integrity,
 Test of the basic computer-to-computer isolation, and
 Test of critical security functions (i.e., user control and anti-tampering).
The TOE provides users with the capability to verify the integrity of the TSF and the TSF
functionality.
The TOE resists physical attacks on the TOE enclosure for the purpose of gaining access to the
internal components or to damage the anti-tampering battery by becoming permanently disabled
when tampering is detected. The TOE preserves a secure state by disabling the TOE when there
is a failure of the power on self-test or a failure of the anti-tampering function.
The TOE provides unambiguous detection of physical tampering that might compromise the
TSF. The TSF provides the capability to determine whether physical tampering with the TSF's
devices or TSF's elements has occurred.
5.6 TOE Access
The TOE displays a continuous visual indication of the computer to which the user is currently
connected, including on power up, and on reset.
VALIDATION REPORT
IOGEAR Secure KVM Switch Series
12
6 Documentation
The guidance documentation examined during the course of the evaluation and delivered with the
TOE is as follows:
 IOGEAR 2/4/8-Port USB DVI/HDMI/DisplayPort Single/Dual View Secure KVM Switch
Administrator Guide, Version 1.02, 24 October 2017
 IOGEAR 2/4/8-Port USB DVI/HDMI/DisplayPort Single/Dual View Secure KVM Switch
User Manual, Version 1.02, 24 October 2017
 IOGEAR 2/4/8-Port USB DVI/HDMI/DisplayPort Single/Dual View Secure KVM Switch
Port Authentication Utility Guide, Version 1.02, 24 October 2017
 IOGEAR 2/4/8-Port USB DVI/HDMI/DisplayPort Single/Dual View Secure KVM Switch
Admin Log Audit Code, Version 1.01, 24 October 2017 (IOGEAR Proprietary)
o Note: The Admin Log Audit Code document is provided only to registered
customers.
The above documents are considered to be part of the evaluated TOE. The documentation is
available by download from www.iogear.com.
Any additional customer documentation delivered with the TOE or made available through
electronic downloads should not be relied upon for using the TOE in its evaluated configuration.
VALIDATION REPORT
IOGEAR Secure KVM Switch Series
13
7 Independent Testing
7.1 Evaluation team independent testing
This section describes the testing efforts of the evaluation team. It is derived from information
contained in the following proprietary document:
 IOGEAR Secure KVM Switch Series Common Criteria Test Report and Procedures,
Version 1.0, December 20, 2017 [8]
A non-proprietary summary of the test configuration, test tools, and tests performed may be
found in:
 Assurance Activities Report For IOGEAR Secure KVM Switch Series, Version 1.1,
January 19, 2018 [7]
The purpose of the testing activity was to confirm the TOE behaves in accordance with the TOE
security functional requirements as specified in the ST for a product claiming conformance to
Protection Profile for Peripheral Sharing Switch [10].
The evaluation team devised a Test Plan based on the Testing Assurance Activities specified in
Protection Profile for Peripheral Sharing Switch, [10]. The Test Plan described how each test
activity was to be instantiated within the TOE test environment. The evaluation team executed
the tests specified in the Test Plan and documented the results in the team test report listed
above.
Independent testing took place at the Leidos facility in Columbia, Maryland from August 7, 2017
to October 20, 2017 with follow up testing through December 20, 2017.
The evaluators received the TOE in the form that normal customers would receive it, installed
and configured the TOE in accordance with the provided guidance, and exercised the Team Test
Plan on equipment configured in the testing laboratory.
Given the complete set of test results from the test procedures exercised by the evaluators, the
testing requirements for Protection Profile for Peripheral Sharing Switch [10] were fulfilled.
7.2 Vulnerability Survey
A search of public domain sources for potential vulnerabilities in the TOE did not reveal any
known vulnerabilities.
The evaluator conducted penetration testing, based on the potential vulnerabilities identified in
the general KVM switch technologies. The testing did not exploit any vulnerability.
VALIDATION REPORT
IOGEAR Secure KVM Switch Series
14
8 Evaluated Configuration
The evaluated version of the TOE consists of the IOGEAR Secure KVM Switch series devices
identified in Table 1.
The TOE must be deployed as described in section 4 Assumptions of this document and be
configured in accordance with the documentation identified in Section 6.
VALIDATION REPORT
IOGEAR Secure KVM Switch Series
15
9 Results of the Evaluation
The evaluation was conducted based upon the assurance activities specified in Protection Profile
for Peripheral Sharing Switch [10] in conjunction with version 3.1 revision 4 of the CC and the
CEM ([1], [2], [3], and [4]). A verdict for an assurance component is determined by the resulting
verdicts assigned to the corresponding evaluator action elements.
The validation team’s assessment of the evidence provided by the evaluation team is that the
evidence demonstrates the evaluation team performed the assurance activities in the claimed PPs,
and correctly verified that the product meets the claims in the ST.
The details of the evaluation are recorded in the Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [9], which is
controlled by the Leidos CCTL. The security assurance requirements are listed in the following
table.
Table 3: TOE Security Assurance Requirements
Assurance Component ID Assurance Component Name
ADV_FSP.1 Basic function specification
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ALC_CMC.1 Labeling of the TOE
ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage
ATE_IND.1 Independent testing – conformance
AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability survey
VALIDATION REPORT
IOGEAR Secure KVM Switch Series
16
10 Validator Comments/Recommendations
The validators suggest that the consumer pay particular attention to the evaluated configuration
of the device(s). The functionality evaluated is scoped exclusively to the security functional
requirements specified in the Security Target, and only the functionality implemented by the
SFR’s within the Security Target was evaluated. All other functionality provided by the devices,
to include software, firmware, or hardware that was not part of the evaluated configuration,
needs to be assessed separately and no further conclusions can be drawn about their
effectiveness.
NIAP established a Peripheral Sharing Switch Technical Rapid Response Team (PSS-TRRT) to
address questions and concerns related to evaluations claiming conformance to Protection
Profile for Peripheral Sharing Switch. A Technical Decision is an issue resolution statement
that clarifies or interprets protection profile requirements and assurance activities. PSS-TRRT
has formally posted five Technical Decisions related to Protection Profile for Peripheral Sharing
Switch, namely TD0083, TD0086, TD0136, TD0141, TD0144, and TD0251. (See
https://www.niap-ccevs.org/Documents_and_Guidance/view_tds.cfm.) All six PSS-TRRT
Technical Decisions applied to the IOGEAR Secure KVM Switch Series evaluation.
There was one TRRT decision made throughout the course of this evaluation. The TRRT
decision was captured in TD0251.
Per deprecated TD0141, the Application Note of FMT_MOF.1.1 stated the following:
If there are additional management functions performed by the TOE (including those
specified in Section 4.2.4, FMT_SMF), they should be added in the assignment.
However, the SFR text was originally missing an assignment, thus not adequately reflecting the
Application Note. As a result, the issue was raised to the PSS TRRT team. Upon review, the PSS
Technical Community (PSS TC) agreed to modify the SFR to include the missing assignment,
“[assignment: list of functions]”.
In addition to the items mentioned above, some additional product administration and usability
features are worth considering:
 If the product uses default passwords, the administrator should make sure these
passwords are changed.
 An audit feature is supported, but is of a limited nature given the product.
 The PSS PP requires that for compliant TOEs, wireless keyboards cannot be used and
that only authorized supported switched methods (e.g. push-buttons) can be used. This is
consistent with the PE-5 access controls for Output Devices as documented in the DoD
Joint Special Access Program (SAP) Implementation Guide (JSIG).
VALIDATION REPORT
IOGEAR Secure KVM Switch Series
17
11 Annexes
Not applicable.
VALIDATION REPORT
IOGEAR Secure KVM Switch Series
18
12 Security Target
Table 4 Security Target Identification
Name Description
ST Title IOGEAR Secure KVM Switch Series Security Target
ST Version V1.0
Publication Date January 19, 2018
VALIDATION REPORT
IOGEAR Secure KVM Switch Series
19
13 Abbreviations and Acronyms
AAR Assurance Activity Report
AUX Auxiliary (Channel)
CAC Common Access Card
CC Common Criteria
CCEVS Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
CCTL Common Criteria Test Lab
CDF Configurable Device Filtration
CEM Common Evaluation Methodology
DP DisplayPort
DVI Digital Visual Interface
EEPROM Electrically Erasable Programmable Read-Only Memory
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
HD High Definition
HDMI High Definition Multimedia Interface
HID Human Interface Device
IT Information Technology
KVM Keyboard, Video and Mouse
LED Light-Emitting Diode
MCCS Monitor Control Command Set
MCU Microcontroller Unit
NIAP National Information Assurance Partnership
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
NSA National Security Agency
NVLAP National Voluntary Laboratory Assessment Program
PC Personal Computer
PCL Product Compliant List
PP Protection Profile
VALIDATION REPORT
IOGEAR Secure KVM Switch Series
20
PSS Peripheral Sharing Switch
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functions
USB Universal Serial Bus
VR Validation Report
VALIDATION REPORT
IOGEAR Secure KVM Switch Series
21
14 Bibliography
The Validation Team used the following documents to produce this Validation Report:
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 1:
Introduction, Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012.
[2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security
Functional Requirements, Version 3.1 Revision 4, September 2012.
[3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security
Assurance Components, Version 3.1 Revision 4, September 2012.
[4] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Evaluation
Methodology, Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012.
[5] Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme - Guidance to CCEVS
Approved Common Criteria Testing Laboratories, Version 2.0, 8 Sep 2008.
[6] IOGEAR Secure KVM Switch Series Security Target, version 1.0, January 19, 2018
[7] Assurance Activities Report For IOGEAR Secure KVM Switch Series, Version 1.1,
January 19, 2018
[8] IOGEAR Secure KVM Switch Series Common Criteria Test Report and Procedures,
Version 1.0, December 20, 2017
[9] Evaluation Technical Report for IOGEAR Secure KVM Switch, Version 1.0,
January 19, 2018
[10] Protection Profile for Peripheral Sharing Switch (PSS), Version 3.0, 13 February
2015