

# NXP JCOP 7.0 on SN300 Secure Element

## Security Target Lite

Rev. 1.4 — 19 September 2022

Product evaluation document

NSCIB-CC-0441502

### Document information

Information	Content
Keywords	NXP, ASE, JCOP 7.0 on SN300 Secure Element, Single Chip Secure Element and NFC Controller, JCOP, Common Criteria, EAL5 augmented
Abstract	This document is the Security Target Lite of NXP JCOP 7.0 on SN300 Secure Element, developed and provided by NXP Semiconductors. The TOE complies with Evaluation Assurance Level 5 of the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Version 3.1 with augmentations.



## Revision History

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### Revision history

Revision number	Date	Description
1.3	2022-07-22	First external release
1.4	2022-09-19	Update User Guidance. Update with lab comments.

# 1 ST Introduction (ASE\_INT)

## 1.1 ST Reference

"NXP JCOP 7.0 on SN300 Secure Element", Security Target Lite, Revision 1.4, 19 September 2022.

## 1.2 TOE Reference

Table 1. TOE Reference

Content	Version
Product Type	Java Card
TOE name	NXP JCOP 7.0 on SN300 Secure Element
TOE version(s)	JCOP 7.0 R1.62.0.1

## 1.3 TOE Overview

### 1.3.1 Usage and Major Security Features of the TOE

The JCOP 7.0 on SN300 Secure Element combines a Java Card Operating System on an Embedded Secure Element with a NFC Controller on a single die. It also provides a Power Management Unit and IC specific software services.

The Main Operating System (Main JCOP) creates separate and independently updatable secondary Operating Systems (Guest OS) providing a converged product consisting of

- A Java Card Secure Element (eSE) Operating System
- A Java Card eUICC Operating System with UICC functionality in accordance with the GSMA Specification and external ISO-7816 connectivity

All Secondary OSs at the platform level are underpinned by the same Java Card and Global Platform technology, but are dedicated to their own application.

The TOE is the Java Card eSE OS embedded on the SN300 Secure Element with IC Dedicated Software. It excludes the NFC Controller, the Power Management Unit and Java Card eUICC OS.

The component of the SN300 on which the TOE executes is the embedded Secure Element, abbreviated to SN300\_SE. [Figure 1](#) provides an overview of the TOE and the place in the system.




Figure 1. Place in the System

The TOE communicates, via the CommunicationOS, with the Host Processor through an I2C interface and with the integrated NFC controller through the System Mailbox. The integrated NFC controller is not in scope of this evaluation, however provides up to four gates for external users to communicate with the TOE, supporting Card Emulation Mode Type A, Type B and Type F as well as a wired Interface using APDUCard over UART or SPMI Gate.

The usage of the TOE is focused on security critical applications in small form factors. One main usage scenario is the use in mobile phones, which can use the TOE to enable mobile payment or mobile ticketing with the phone based on the security of the TOE.

The TOE provides a variety of security features. The hardware of the Micro Controller already protects against physical attacks by applying various sensors to detect manipulations. Hardware accelerators process data in ways protected against leakage by side channel analysis. With the software stack the TOE provides many cryptographic primitives for encryption, decryption, signature generation, signature verification, key generation, secure management of PINs and secure storage of confidential data (e.g. keys, PINs). Also the software stack implements several countermeasures to protect the TOE against attacks.

**Secure Element Hardware:**

The TOE incorporates an high frequency clocked ARM Cortex M33 processor augmented with its dedicated coprocessor (SYM-lite), a secure copy machine (SMA), and a Public-Key Cryptography (PKC) coprocessor, which are all connected to a bus system. This bus system gives access to memories, hardware peripherals and communication interfaces. The PKC coprocessor provides large integer arithmetic operations, which can be used by Security IC Embedded Software for asymmetric-key cryptography. Hardware peripherals include coprocessors for symmetric-key

cryptography and for calculation of error-detecting codes, and also a random number generator. On-chip memories are Flash memory, ROM and RAMs. The Flash memory can be used to store data and code of Security IC Embedded Software. It is designed for reliable non-volatile storage.

The security functionality of the TOE is designed to act as an integral part of a security system composed of hardware and Security IC Embedded Software to strengthen it as a whole. Several security mechanisms of the TOE are completely implemented in and controlled by the SN300 Secure Element. Other security mechanisms is treated by Security IC Embedded Software. All security functionality is targeted for use in a potential insecure environment, in which the TOE maintains

- correct operation of the security functionality
- integrity and confidentiality of data and code stored to its memories and processed in the device
- controlled access to memories and hardware components supporting separation of different applications.

This is ensured by the construction of TOE and its security functionality.

The following list contains the main features of the TOE:

- hardware to perform computations on multiprecision integers, which are suitable for public-key cryptography
- hardware to calculate the Data Encryption Standard with up to three keys
- hardware to calculate the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) with different key lengths
- hardware to support Cipher Block Chaining (CBC), Cipher Feedback (CFB) and Counter (CTR) modes of operation for symmetric-key cryptographic block ciphers
- hardware to support Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) of operation and Galois Message Authentication Code (GMAC) for symmetric-key cryptographic block ciphers
- hardware to calculate Cyclic Redundancy Checks (CRC)
- hardware to serve with True Random Numbers
- hardware to control access to memories and hardware components

In addition, the hardware embeds sensors, which ensure proper operating conditions of the device. Integrity protection of data and code involves error correction and error detection codes, light sensing and other security functionality. Memory encryption and masking mechanisms are implemented to preserve confidentiality of data. The IC hardware is shielded against physical attacks. And the lockstep (redundant) CPU ensures protection against faults in the CPU.

#### **Cryptographic algorithms and functionality:**

- AES
- Triple-DES (3DES)
- RSA for en-/decryption and signature generation and verification
- RSA key generation
- ECDSA signature generation and verification
- ECDH key exchange
- ECC key generation
- ECC point operations and key validation
- Diffie Hellman key exchange on Montgomery Curves over GF(p)

- Key generation for the Diffie Hellman key exchange on Montgomery Curves over  $GF(p)$
- EdDSA signature generation and verification
- EdDSA key generation
- ECDAA signature generation
- SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, SHA-3/224, SHA-3/256, SHA-3/384, SHA-3/512, SHAKE128/256 algorithms
- HMAC algorithms
- Multi-precision arithmetic operations including exact division, modular addition, modular subtraction, modular multiplication, modular inversion, arithmetic comparison and exact addition and subtraction.
- Data Protection Module for a secure storage of the the sensitive data.
- Random number generation according to class DRG.3 or DRG.4 of AIS20 [7] and initialized (seeded) by the hardware random number generator of the TOE.

**Java Card 3.1 functionality:**

- Executing Java Card bytecodes.
- Managing memory allocation of code and data of applets.
- Enforcing access rules between applets and the JCRE.
- Mapping of Java method calls to native implementations of e.g. cryptographic operation.
- Garbage Collection fully implemented with complete memory reclamation including compactification.
- Support for Extended Length APDUs.
- Support for Extended CAP file format.
- Persistent Memory Management and Transaction Mechanism.
- Optional JC3.1 Cryptographic APIs [13] are not implemented. A call to those APIs throw an exception of type ISO7816.SW\_FUNC\_NOT\_SUPPORTED in this case.

**GlobalPlatform 2.3.1 functionality:**

- Loading of Java Card packages.
- Instantiating applet instances.
- Java package deletion.
- Java applet instance deletion.
- Creating Supplementary Security Domains.
- Associating applets to Security Domains.
- Installation of keys.
- Verification of signatures of signed applets.
- CVM Management (Global PIN) fully implemented.
- Secure Channel Protocol is supported (SCP03).
- Delegated Management, DAP (RSA 1024 and ECC 256).
- Supported Amendments A, C, D, E, H.

**NXP Proprietary Functionality**

- Runtime Configuration Interface: Config Applet that can be used for configuration of the TOE.

- OS Update Component: Proprietary functionality that can update JCOP OS, Crypto Lib, Flash Services Software or Updater OS. This component allows only NXP authorised updates to the product.
- Applet Migration: Keep User Data, Key Data or PIN Data after updating an applet.
- Restricted Mode: In Restricted Mode only very limited functionality of the TOE is available such as reading logging information or resetting the Attack Counter.
- Image4 (IM4) : Software which ensures the customer authorisation of any product updates using OS update or Applet Migration features, and provides features to make the update management easier.
- Error Detection Code (EDC) API.

#### Functionality without specific security claims

- 5G features as per SIM Alliance 2.3
- eUICC features hosted in eUICC domain outside the boundaries of the TOE
- Programmable Timeout for SMB with Limitations in UGM [49] Section 6
- CPLC data made available through SystemInfo, see UGM [49] Section 1.3.3.
- Proprietary Bytecode Compression applied after BCV. Some standard bytecodes are replaced by optimized byte codes (one to one) with exactly the same operation.
- Compliance to Secure Element configuration, Common Implementation Configuration, UICC Configuration, and UICC Configuration Contactless Extension.

The TOE is offered with the NXP Trust Provisioning Service, which involves secure reception, generation, treatment and insertion of customer data and code at NXP.

### 1.3.2 TOE Type

The TOE is the eSE Java Card Operating System and the SN300 Secure Element (including Dedicated Software) on which it is running. It excludes the NFC Controller, the Power Management Unit, as well as other Guest Operating Systems (like eUICC or CommunicationOS) that are considered as domains external to the TOE.

The eSE Java Card Operation System includes GP functionality. It can be used to load, install, instantiate and execute off-card verified Java Card applets. The eSE, which is externally accessible via SPI or by the System mailbox connected to the Integrated NFC controller, supports Type A,B and F contactless communications.

### 1.3.3 Required non-TOE Hardware/Software/Firmware

As a subsystem of a physical chip, the TOE (SN300\_eSE) needs the other subsystems of the chip (the Power Management Unit and the NFC controller) to behave properly and communicate with the external world.

Three groups of users with their requirements shall be distinguished here.

1. **End-users** group, which uses the TOE with one or more loaded applets in the final form factor as an embedded Secure Element. These users only require a communication device to be able to communicate with the TOE.

The eSE domain of the TOE communicates via the Secure Mail Box, which is connected to the Integrated NFC controller and via SPI direct interface. The NFC controller facilitates contactless or wired interfaces supporting:

- Card Emulation Type A, Type B and Type F according to ETSI 102 622 [28].
  - Wired Mode by using the APDUCard Gate according to ETSI 102 622 [29]. The wired interface is expected to be connected to an applications processor.
2. **Administrators of cards** can configure the TOE by using the Config Applet or install additional applets. These users require the same equipment as end-users.
  3. **Applet developers** which develop Java Card applets and executes them on the TOE. These applet developers need in addition to the communication device a set of tools for the development of applets. This set of tools can be obtained from the TOE vendor and comprises elements such as PC development environment, byte code verifier, compiler, linker and debugger.

## 1.4 TOE Description

The JCOP 7.0 on SN300 Secure Element consists of the following components that are part of the TOE:

- SN300 Secure Element excluding NFC (see [Section 1.4.1](#))
- Master JCOP (see [Section 1.4.5](#))
- JCOP eSE (see [Section 1.4.6](#))
- Updater OS (see [Section 1.4.4](#))
- FlashOS (see [Section 1.4.3](#))
- Shared Code
  - Crypto Library (see [Section 1.4.2.1](#))
  - Other Shared Code (see [Section 1.4.2](#))

Furthermore there are components on the platform that are **not part of the TOE**:

- NFC Controller Subsystem
- Power Management Unit
- JCOP eUICC
- JCOP xxx (optional)
- CommunicationOS

All components and the TOE boundaries are depicted in [Figure 2](#). The components are described in more detail in the following sections.






Figure 2. Components of the TOE

### 1.4.1 Secure Element Subsystem

The SN300 is a hardware platform designed to meet the developing needs of the mobile communications market. It embeds a Secure Element Subsystem (SN300\_SE), supported by an integrated NFC Controller Subsystem (SN300\_NFC) and Power Management Unit (SN300\_PMU).

The hardware part of the SN300\_SE is referred to as Secure Element Hardware in the following.

#### 1.4.1.1 Hardware Description

The separation of operating systems is based on the ARM Trustzone-M concept. One Main OS operates in secured privileged state, several Guest OSs operate in separated non-secured states. Each state comes along with an assigned "Context". This Context aware system allows for Virtualization of its components to build an access control mechanism for memories and peripherals that can also be used to share software components between different Operating systems. The separation is enforced throughout the whole system by the Memory Protection Unit, Secure Cache Controller and peripheral bridges.

The SN300 Secure Element implements 512 Kbytes ROM, 2.5 Mbytes Flash, 96 Kbytes System RAM, 5 Kbytes PKC RAM and a Buffer RAM for Flash erase/programming and for Flash read caching. All these memories are accessible over the bus system on data/address busses, and the PKC RAM can also be directly accessed by the PKC coprocessor on a separate data/address bus.

The hardware controls write, read and execute access to the memories over the bus system against system operation modes. Context information is attached to all bus transactions throughout the whole system. Any peripheral on the bus can use the context information to check if access is allowed for the actual context, apply context specific cyphering or to assign associated errors or interrupts to a particular context.

The SN300 Secure Element implements a wide range of hardware components. It embeds the Fast Accelerator for Modular Exponentiation of 3rd Generation (Fame3.5),

which can be utilized by the software to accelerate computations required for public-key cryptography like such related to RSA, Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) .

The Secure Generic Interface (SGI) is a symmetric crypto engine that serves the IC Security Embedded Software with interfacing to a DES coprocessor, an AES coprocessor and a GCM coprocessor. The DES coprocessor provides Triple-DES encryption and decryption in 2-key or 3-key operation with cryptographic key sizes 112 and 168 bits. The AES coprocessor performs AES encryption and decryption calculations with key lengths of 128, 192 or 256 bits. The GCM coprocessor implements a Galois Field Multiplier to support Galois/Counter Mode (AES-GCM) of operation performed by the Crypto Library. Besides ECB mode, the SGI hardware supports chaining mode for e.g. Cipher Block Chaining Mode (CBC), Cipher Feedback Mode (CFB) and Counter Mode (CTR).

The SYM-Lite is a CPU co-processor providing crypto-supporting general purpose operations over sensitive data, outside - but under control of - the CPU.

The Secure Copy Machine (SMA) is a secure DMA. Purpose of the SMA is to copy data between memories and between memories and peripherals in a secure way.

Two CRC coprocessors each serve with checksum computation based on CRC generation polynomials CRC-16 and CRC-32. The Random Number Generator generates true random numbers, which are compliant to AIS31 and FIPS 140-3.

SN300 Secure Element also implements a watchdog counter with time-out mechanism that can be utilized by the software to abort irregular program executions, and provides a CPU Guard with several security functionality, which can be utilized by the software to secure its execution.

The Hardware components can be controlled by the IC Security Embedded Software via Special Function Registers, which are accessible over the bus system on two separate busses. The peripheral control bus is provided for communication and thus gives access to the Special Function Registers of the DMA controller, the communication interfaces, the I/O switch matrix and a component for checksum computations over data streams of the communication interfaces. The Special Function Registers of all other hardware components are accessed on the control bus.

The SN300 Secure Element implements complex security functionality to protect code and data during processing and while stored to the device. This includes appropriate memory encryptions and masking schemes to preserve confidentiality. This also includes error detection codes (the Flash Secure Fetch Plus) to protect against integrity and manifold light sensing to detect perturbations which can lead to integrity violation. Active shielding is present and operating conditions are monitored by sensors on temperature, power supplies and frequencies.

The TOE hardware operates with a power supply provided by the shared Power Management Unit ("SN300\_PMU"). The device can be set into sleep and power-down modes, which have different levels of reduced availability of hardware components with appropriately reduced power consumption.

#### 1.4.1.2 IC Dedicated Support Software

The IC Dedicated Support Software of the SN300\_SE comprises:

- Test software named *FactoryOS*
- Boot software named *BootOS*
- Memory Driver software named *Flash Driver Software*

BootOS, FactoryOS and Flash Driver Software are stored to ROM. Patches to the BootOS are stored to Flash.

The BootOS is executed during start-up after power-on or reset of the TOE. It sets up the device and its configuration, and finally jumps to a start address in either Mission Mode or Test Mode (if not finally locked).

The FactoryOS provides controlled access to different levels of testing capabilities of SN300 Secure Element. Full testing capabilities are under restricted access to NXP for production testing of the TOE and also for in-depth analysis of field returns. In addition, limited testing capabilities are accessible to NXP for basic analysis of field returns, which target to preserve the product in its original condition. Beyond that, the FactoryOS provides some basic functional testing of the SN300 Secure Element and also with a readout of the TOE IC hardware identification flags (if enabled via OEF option). The FactoryOS implements security functionality to protect from unauthorized access and ensures that also authorized access cannot compromise confidentiality of content stored to access controlled Flash areas as well as System Pages. Factory OS implements security functionality against unauthorized access in the field.

Flash Driver Software provides a Hardware Abstraction Layer that is stored to ROM. It supports basic operation of the Flash memory to enable usage of the Flash during Boot Mode and Test Mode.

## 1.4.2 Shared Code

The Shared Code Subsystem is a software layer containing software components that can be accessed by several OSs. This Shared Code is executed by inheriting the access rights from the caller OS.

The Shared Code of the JCOP OSes comprises the following components:

- Common Native Code (JCOP and Crypto Library [Section 1.4.2.1](#))
- Common JavaCard implementation
- Common GlobalPlatform implementation
- Common JCOPX implementation

### 1.4.2.1 Crypto Library

The Crypto Library (or parts thereof) comprises a set of cryptographic functions.

#### AES

- The AES algorithm is intended to provide encryption and decryption functionality.
- The following modes of operation are supported for AES: ECB, CBC, CFB, CTR, GCM, XTS, CBC-MAC, CCM and CMAC.

#### TDES

- The Triple-DES (TDES) algorithm is intended to provide encryption and decryption functionality.
- The following modes of operation are supported for Triple-DES: ECB, CBC, CFB, CTR, CBC-MAC, RetailMAC and CMAC.

#### RSA Plain/CRT

- The RSA algorithm can be used for encryption and decryption as well as for signature generation, signature verification, message and signature encoding EME-OAEP, EMSA-PSS, EME-PKCS1- v1\_5 and EMSA-PKCS1-v1\_5.

- The RSA decryption/signature generation can be calculated using keys either in "Straight Forward" format or in CRT format.
- The RSA key generation can be used to generate key pairs either in "Straight Forward" format (i.e. using the "Simple Straight Forward Method") or in CRT format (i.e. using the "Chinese-Remainder-Theorem" method).
- The RSA public key generation can be used to compute the public key that belongs to a given private CRT key.

The TOE supports various key sizes for RSA from 512 to 4096 bits.

#### **ECDSA (ECC over GF(p))**

- The ECDSA algorithm can be used for signature generation and signature verification.
- The ECC key generation algorithm can be used to generate key pairs for ECDSA and ECDH.
- The ECDH key exchange algorithm can be used to establish cryptographic keys. It can be also used as secure point multiplication.
- Provide ECC point operations and key validation.

The TOE supports various key sizes for ECC over GF(p) from 128 to 640 bits.

#### **ECDA**

- The ECDA library component can be used for ECDA signature generation as specified in the TPM 2.0 [\[42\]](#) specification.

#### **EdDSA & MontDH**

- The EdDSA and MontDH over GF(p) library component implements the EdDSA and MontDH over GF(p) related functions:
  - EdDSA key generation, signature generation and signature verification (generalization of Ed25519 and Ed448), support for filling of EdDSA domain parameters
  - MontDH key generation and key exchange for the DH key exchange scheme MontDH (generalization of Curve25519 and Curve448).

The TOE supports various key sizes for ECC over GF(p) from 128 to 640 bits.

#### **SHA**

- The SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, SHA-3/224, SHA-3/256, SHA-3/384, SHA-3/512, SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 algorithms can be used for different purposes such as computing hash values in the course of digital signature creation or key derivation.
- The Crypto Library implements two versions of each algorithm with different security level: Standard SHA and Secured SHA. The difference between the standard and high security level of the SHA implementations is that the high security level is protected against differential side channel attacks.

#### **HMAC**

- The HMAC algorithm can be used to calculate Keyed-Hash Authentication code. The TOE supports the calculation of HMAC authentication code with SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, SHA-3/224, SHA-3/256, SHA-3/384 or SHA-3/512, SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 hash algorithms. The HMAC algorithm can use either the high security level or standard security level version of SHA, depending on required security level.

#### **Random number generation**

- Library component to access random numbers generated by a software pseudo random number generator (DRNG). The DRNG is used to fulfill the random numbers Java Card API. It is used as a general purpose random source, i.e. for the generation of cryptographical challenges, generation of session keys, generation of random IVs, etc. A hardware TRNG is used to seed the DRNG internally to the crypto library with no other usage.

#### **Multi-precision Arithmetic**

- The Crypto Library provides functions to implement various arithmetic operations including exact division, secure modular addition, secure modular subtraction, secure modular multiplication, secure modular inversion, secure arithmetic comparison and secure exact addition.

#### **Data Protection Module**

- The Crypto Library provides functions to store sensitive data, e.g. symmetric and asymmetry keys, required by the Crypto Library components.

#### **Resistance of cryptographic algorithms against attacks**

The cryptographic algorithms are resistant against attacks as described in JIL [8], which include Side Channel Attacks, Perturbation attacks, Differential Fault Analysis (DFA) and timing attacks, except for standard/high security level SHA and HMAC, which are only resistant against Side Channel Attacks and timing attacks.

### **1.4.3 FlashOS**

The FlashOS subsystem consists of the following components

- Service Core

The Services Software comprises the Flash Services Software, the Services Framework Software and the part of the Services HAL (Hardware Abstraction Layer) that is not stored to ROM.

#### **Flash Services Software**

- The Flash Services Software manages technical demands of the Flash memory and serves the Security IC Embedded Software with an interface for Flash erase and/or programming.
- The Flash Services Software maintains the Flash with re-freshing, tearing-safe updates of Flash contents and wear leveling techniques to ensure integrity and consistency of its content and optimize its endurance.

#### **Services Framework Software**

- The Services Framework Software provides the utility functionality and interface for actual services. This comprises the control of services related functionality such as the resource management, patch handling, service and system configurations functionality.

### **1.4.4 Updater OS**

The Updater OS is a standalone operating system. Besides the capability to update JCOP OS, Updater OS is also capable to update itself. The Updater OS version can be queried by using a SELECT OS Update AID Command (see UGM [49]). Updater OS shares parts of the Native OS with JCOP OS, e.g.: communication interface, wrapper to Security Software (Flash Services and CryptoLib).

The Updater OS Component can update JCOP OS and Updater OS itself and contains two sub components:

- OS Selector (no security claimed): After a hardware reset it provides the functionality to either boot Updater OS or JCOP OS. OS Selector also ensures that
  - only one OS is active (running) at a time.
  - at any time, at least one OS can be booted.
  - an invalid OS (e.g. partly flashed) can never be booted.
- OS updater
  - it handles APDUs to write a new OS (either JCOP OS or Updater OS) to flash.
  - it verifies integrity of the new OS before updating.
  - it decrypts the new OS before updating.
  - it checks if the new OS can be authenticated and checks if the update can be authorized.
  - it ensures that the activation and setting of the information that identifies the new OS is done atomically.
  - if the update fails the system stays in a secure state.

**1.4.5 Master JCOP**

Main JCOP is a secure microkernel. It is responsible to schedule several Guest Operating Systems. The arrangement of operating systems is determined by a static system configuration passed to the Main JCOP. Main JCOP is in charge of:

- Providing messaging and scheduling APIs to guest OSs (eSE, eUICC, FlashOS, SystemOS, CommOS,..)
- Providing services APIs to Guest OSs (like Memory Management, Fault/Errors handling...)
- Providing specific APIs available to SystemOS, CommOS, or FlashOS
- Providing APIs for Hardware Peripherals virtualization

Messaging and scheduling allows Guest OSs to exchange messages, receive signals, handle interrupts, and manage their background activity. The scheduling consists of evaluating the priority of the Guest OSs and the messages, transmitting the message, and switching the context.

The virtualization APIs provide a complete virtualisation of the hardware peripherals like Random Number Generator (TRNG), symmetric/asymmetric crypto accelerators, PUF,...

**1.4.6 JCOP eSE**

JCOP OS consists of Native OS, JCVM, JCRE, JCAPI, Extension API, GP framework and Config Applet, Applet Migration and IM4. JCVM, JCRE, JCAPI and GP framework are implemented according to the Java Card Specification listed in [Table 2](#) and the applicable Global Platform Specification and Amendments are listed in [Table 3](#).

**Table 2. Java Card Specification Version**

Name	Version
JCVM and JCRE version	Version 3.1 Classic Edition <a href="#">[14]</a> <a href="#">[15]</a>
JC API version	Version 3.1 Classic Edition <a href="#">[13]</a>

**Table 3. Global Platform and Amendments**

Name	Version
GP Framework	Version 2.3.1 <a href="#">[18]</a>
Amendment A, Confidential Card Content Management	Version 1.2 <a href="#">[19]</a>
Amendment C, Contactless Services	Version 1.3 <a href="#">[20]</a>
Amendment D, Secure Channel Protocol 03	Version 1.2 <a href="#">[21]</a>
Amendment E, Security Upgrade for Card Content Management	Version 1.1 <a href="#">[22]</a>
Amendment H, Executable Load File Upgrade	Version 1.1 <a href="#">[24]</a>
Secure Element Configuration	Version 2.0 <a href="#">[26]</a>
Common Implementation Configuration	Version 2.1 <a href="#">[25]</a>
GP Card API	Version 1.7 <a href="#">[27]</a>

JCOP7.0 eSE OS identification is obtained using the Version Query command that provides the Platform ID and the Platform Release (a.k.a. Platform String; see UGM [\[49\]](#)). The Platform Identification data, which includes the Hardware Type, JCOP Version, Build Number, Mask ID, a Patch ID and Non-Volatile Memory Size, identifies the JCOP7.0 platform (combination of HW and SW). The Platform Release is a data string that allows to identify the eSE OS component. [Table 6](#) in [Section 1.6](#) lists all possible values for the Platform ID that are valid for this TOE.

#### 1.4.6.1 Applet Migration

Applet migration can be performed in the following way(s):

1. Using NXP proprietary feature of JCOP that allows to update an applet to a newer version while keeping the (personalization) data of the applet
2. Using Global Platform Amd-H.

Card Content Management and Applet Migration can be combined in a sequence of commands which are distributed to the secure elements, this is called Distributed Card Content Management.

#### 1.4.6.2 Image4 (IM4) Feature

The IM4 feature provides control over the Applet Migration and OS update processes. This control consists in enforcing that

- Applet Migration and OS update steps can be performed only in a particular state of the TOE.
- only allowed OS update plans can be applied to the TOE.

No security claims are made for IM4. The use of IM4 does not compromise any of the security of the OS update or the Applet Migration mechanisms and all restrictions implied by these mechanisms remain in force. The IM4 implementation does not replace or modify the existing mechanisms by which the SE decrypts, authenticates and authorizes JCOP updates.

### 1.4.6.3 Native Applications

Historically MIFARE & FELICA have been implemented as native applications on smartcard controllers, but it is no longer the case. JCOP 7.0 provides Java Card APIs providing specific support for MIFARE & FELICA standards with access to MIFARE dedicated accelerators and Felica specific Cryptography. The complete implementation of the MIFARE and Felica standards in JCOP 7.0 rely upon applets using these accelerated APIs. JCOP 7.0 receives, processes and routes commands from the NFC controller according to the pipe used, with MIFARE being received as Type-A APDUs, either Level 4 ISO wrapped or MIFARE raw commands, and FELICA coming through as raw Type-F commands requiring JCOP to decode, process and route correctly.

## 1.4.7 Interfaces of the TOE

### Electrical interface

The electrical interface of the TOE are the lines between the I/O interface of the SN300\_SE and the communication pads, that are exclusively used by the SN300\_SE subsystem. The interface can be configured to establish communication with the TOE via the following interfaces:

- Serial Peripheral Interface (SPI)
- 2x I<sup>2</sup>C interfaces
- I<sup>3</sup>C interface (shared pins with second I<sup>2</sup>C interface)
- ISO/IEC 7816 compliant interface by use of ISO/IEC 7816 UART
- SPMI Interface
- GPIO interface by use of Special Function Registers

The TOE also provides an electrical interface to the SN300\_PMU subsystem, which connects power supply voltage input and ground as reference voltage, and an interface to the Power-Clock-Reset Module of the SN300\_NFC subsystem. Communication between SN300\_SE and SN300\_NFC supported by System Mailbox interface.

### Logical interface

The logical interface of the TOE accessible to the Security IC Embedded Software is implemented via the CommOS. It provides the following communication channels:

- Secure System Mailbox interface for data exchange with SN300\_NFC subsystem
- interface to each Guest JCOP for data exchange
- external interface to access Host Processor

### Physical interface

The chip surface must be considered as an interface of the TOE as well. This interface could be exposed to environmental stress or physically manipulated by an attacker.

## 1.5 TOE Life Cycle

The life cycle for this Java Card is based on the general smart card life cycle defined in the Java Card Protection Profile - Open Configuration [11], see Figure 3. Authentic delivery of the TOE is supported by the NXP Trust provisioning Service.






Figure 3. TOE Life Cycle within Product Life Cycle

Table 4.

Phase	Name	Description
1	Security IC Embedded Software Development	The IC Embedded Software Developer is in charge of <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• smartcard embedded software development including the development of Java Card applets and</li> <li>• specification of IC pre-personalization requirements, though the actual data for IC pre-personalization comes from phase 4, 5, or 6.</li> </ul>

Table 4. ...continued

Phase	Name	Description
2	Security IC Development	<p>The IC Developer</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>designs the IC,</li> <li>develops IC Dedicated Software,</li> <li>provides information, software or tools to the IC Embedded Software Developer, and</li> <li>receives the embedded software from the developer, through trusted delivery and verification procedures.</li> </ul> <p>From the IC design, IC Dedicated Software and Smartcard Embedded Software, the IC Developer</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>constructs the smartcard IC database, necessary for the IC photomask fabrication.</li> </ul>
3	Security IC Manufacturing	<p>The IC Manufacturer is responsible for</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>producing the IC through three main steps: IC manufacturing, IC testing, and IC pre-personalization.</li> </ul> <p>The IC Mask Manufacturer</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>generates the masks for the IC manufacturing based upon an output from the smartcard IC database. Configuration items may be changed/deleted.</li> </ul> <p>The NXP Trust Provisioning Service ensures confidentiality and integrity of any customer data in this phase. This includes secure treatment and insertion of data and code received from the customer as well as random or derived data, which are generated by NXP.</p>
4	Security IC Packaging	<p>The IC Packaging Manufacturer is responsible for</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>IC packaging and testing.</li> </ul> <p>The delivery processes between all involved sites provide accountability and traceability of the dies. Authentic delivery of the TOE is supported by its NXP Trust Provisioning Service.</p>
5	Composite Product Integration	<p>The Composite Product Manufacturer is responsible for the smartcard product finishing process.</p>
6	Personalization	<p>The Personalizer is responsible for</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>smartcard (including applet) personalization and final tests. User Applets may be loaded onto the chip at the personalization process and configuration items may be changed/deleted. The Config Applet can be used to set Configuration Items.</li> </ul>
7	Operational Usage	<p>The Consumer (e.g. Original Equipment Manufacturer) of Composite Product is responsible for</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>smartcard product delivery to the smartcard end-user, and the end of life process.</li> <li>applets may be loaded onto the chip.</li> <li>triggering an OS update.</li> <li>Applet Migration.</li> <li>Config Applet: changing Config Items.</li> <li>perform card content management according to Global Platform and Amendments specifications.</li> </ul>
8	OS Update	<p>The IC Developer is responsible for providing an updated IC Dedicated Software. The OS update in the field is performed by the consumer as per step 7.</p>

The TOE is delivered to the customer at the end of Phase 4, meaning the evaluation process is limited to phases 1 to 4. User Applet development is outside the scope of this evaluation. Applets can be loaded into Flash memory. Applet loading into Flash memory can be done in phases 3, 4, 5, and 6. Applet loading in phase 7 is also allowed. This means post-issuance loading of applets is allowed. The certification is only valid for platforms that return the Platform Identifier as stated in [Table 5](#). The delivery process from NXP to their customers (to phase 4 or phase 5 of the life cycle) guarantees, that the customer is aware of the exact versions of the different parts of the TOE as outlined above. TOE documentation is delivered in electronic form (encrypted according to defined mailing procedures).

*Note: Phases 1 to 3 are under the TOE developer scope of control. Therefore, the objectives for the environment related to phase 1 to 3 are covered by Assurance measures, which are materialized by documents, process and procedures evaluated through the TOE evaluation process. During phases 4 to 7 the TOE is no more under the developer control. In this environment, the TOE protects itself with its own Security functions. But some additional usage recommendation must also be followed in order to ensure that the TOE is correctly and securely handled, and protected against damage or comprimission. This ST assumes (A.USE\_DIAG, A.USE\_KEYS) that users handle securely the TOE and related Objectives for the environment are defined (OE.USE\_DIAG, OE.USE\_KEYS).*

## 1.6 TOE Identification

The delivery comprises the following items:

**Table 5. Delivery items**

Type	Name	Identification	Delivery form
IC Hardware	NXP SN300 Series - Secure Element	SN300_SE B1.1 J9 (see UGM, <a href="#">Table 9</a> , and <a href="#">Table 11</a> )	Package WLCSP
Embedded Software	JCOP 7.0 OS including CryptoLib and FlashOS	1.62.0.1 (see UGM below and <a href="#">Table 6</a> )	On-chip software stored into the FLASH area of the TOE.
Document	JCOP 7.0 User Guidance Manual (UGM)	<a href="#">[49]</a>	Electronic Document (PDF via NXP Docstore)
Document	JCOP 7.0 UGM Addendum	<a href="#">[50]</a>	Electronic Document (PDF via NXP Docstore)
Document	JCOP 7.0 UGM Anomaly	<a href="#">[51]</a>	Electronic Document (PDF via NXP Docstore)
Document	JCOP 7.0 R1.62.0.1 (JCOP 7.0 17.4-1.62) UGM for JCOP eSE	<a href="#">[52]</a>	Electronic Document (PDF via NXP Docstore)
Document	JCOP 7.0 UGM Addendum for JCOP eSE	<a href="#">[53]</a>	Electronic Document (PDF via NXP Docstore)
Document	JCOP 7.0 UGM Addendum System Management	<a href="#">[54]</a>	Electronic Document (PDF via NXP Docstore)

### 1.6.1 Platform Identifier

The Platform can be identified by the Platform ID and the Platform String. See [Table 6](#).

When JCOP eSE OS is addressed, the Platform ID and the Platform String can be obtained by using the Version Query command (GET DATA command with tag 0xDF4C). See UGM [49] chapter 1.3.5 and [52]).

The TOE is JCOP 7.0 on SN300 and has one configuration:

- JCOP 7.0 R1.62.0.1

**Table 6. Product Identification**

Product Name	Version	Platform ID (Tag 0x82)	Platform String (Tag 0x83, 0x84)
JCOP 7.0 on SN300	JCOP 7.0 R1.62.0.1 <sup>[1]</sup>	N5A2M50001380000	7016201

[1] includes CryptoLib v1.0.0 and FlashOS v1.52.0

The Platform ID has the following form: **Nabcccxxxxxyzz**

The "N" is constant, the other letters are variables. For a detailed description of these variables, please see [Table 7](#).

**Table 7. Platform ID Format**

Variable	Meaning	Value	Parameter Settings
a	Hardware Type	5	NFC hardware
b	JCOP OS Version	A	JCOP 7.0
ccc	Non-Volatile Memory Size	2M5	2.5MB
xxxxxx	Build Number (hexadecimal)	000138	svn revision number JCOP 7.0 OS
yy	Mask ID	00	Mask 00
zz	Patch ID	00	Patch 00

The Platform String has the following form **wxyzzvc** and is to be interpreted as "JCOP w.x Ry.zz.v.c"

**Table 8. Platform String Format**

Variable	Meaning	Value	Parameter Settings
w	JCOP Major version	7	JCOP 7.0
x	JCOP Minor version	0	
y	JCOP OS Major release	1	R1.62.0
zz	JCOP OS Minor release	62	
v	Variant identifier	0	
c	JCOP instance	1	eSE

**1.6.1.1 Sequence Number**

Additionally to the Platform Identifier the TOE can also be identified by its sequence number:

1. If Updater OS is active then the "SELECT OS Update AID" command will return the Current Sequence Number of Updater OS and the Reference Sequence Number.
2. If JCOP OS is active then the "Get OS Info" command will return the Current Sequence Number of JCOP OS (Final Sequence Number).

**1.6.1.2 IC Identifier**

When the System OS is addressed, the Version Query command can be used to retrieve the identifier of the different components of the SE software and hardware. The Version Query Command is a proprietary GET DATA command with tag 0xDF4C. The Data returned by the Version Query includes the Tag for Hardware ID (tag 0x8C), which is 2 bytes long.

**Table 9. Hardware ID Data Format**

Tag	Length	Value (MSB only)	Comment
0x8C	2	0x42	SN300 B1.1

The MSB of the Hardware ID provides physical identification of the IC (including ROM contents). Note that the Hardware ID together with the Platform ID uniquely identify the SN300 B1.1 J9 (including SN300 dedicated Flash content).

**1.6.2 Evaluated Hardware Configurations**

Each configuration of the SN300\_SE consists of a physical configuration (i.e. hardware component incl. ROM code and related documentation) and a logical configuration (i.e. Software components and configuration data stored to Flash memory).

The definition of the configuration identifiers of SN300\_SE is detailed in [Table 10](#).

**Table 10. Configuration identifiers of the SN300\_SE**

Name	Symbol	Description
Series	<i>srs</i>	Series identifier in NXP product family
IC version	<i>xy.z</i>	<i>x</i> : base layer identifier of the development type <i>y</i> : fixed metal masks identifier of the development type <i>z</i> : customizable metal masks identifier of the development type, includes the IC Dedicated Software stored to ROM
NXP software	<i>w</i>	<i>w</i> : NXP software combination identifier of the development type (fixed to "J" for SN300 Series)
NXP hardware configuration	<i>v</i>	Version identifier of the NXP hardware configuration, identifies the version of configuration data stored to Flash (combination of Factory Page, System Control Page, System Update Page and System Patch Page)

The symbols in the second column in [Table 10](#) build the product name of a SN300\_SE configuration according to the following rule:

- *srs xy.z wv*<sup>1</sup>

Evaluated **physical** configuration of the SN300\_SE is

<sup>1</sup> This naming scheme is reflected in the Type ID for TOE identification given in [\[45\]](#): "srs xy.z" refers to byte 0 of the Type ID, "w" to byte 1 and "v" to byte 2.

- **SN300\_SE B1.1**

All components of SN300\_SE B1.1 that are common for any logical configuration are listed in [Table 11](#) with their respective version numbers.

Evaluated **logical** configuration of the SN300\_SE, stored to flash memory is

- **SN300\_SE B1.1 J9**

All components that are specific for SN300\_SE B1.1 J9 are listed in [Table 12](#) with their respective version numbers.

SN300\_SE identification methods are described in [\[45\]](#).

**Table 11. Components of SN300\_SE B1.1 common for any logical configuration**

Category	Component	Identification	Delivery form
IC Hardware	base layer and fixed metal masks	B1.1	Package
IC Dedicated Support Software	FactoryOS	1.11.3	On-chip software. Stored to the ROM of the TOE
	BootOS (ROM)	1.11.1	On-chip software. Stored to the ROM of the TOE
	Flash Driver Software	1.11.2	On-chip software. Stored to the ROM of the TOE
Documentation, Product Data Sheet	SN300 family; Single Chip Secured (NFC) controller, Product data sheet	<a href="#">[44]</a>	Electronic Document (PDF via NXP Docstore)
	SN300V TOE Identification, Data sheet addendum	<a href="#">[45]</a>	Electronic Document (PDF via NXP Docstore)
Documentation, Application Note	SN300_SE Programmers's Manual, Application Note	<a href="#">[46]</a>	Electronic Document (NXP internal Document)
	ARM® Cortex®-M33 Processor Technical Reference Material	<a href="#">[47]</a>	Electronic Document (www.arm.com)

**Table 12. Components of SN300\_SE B1.1 specific for J9**

Category	Component	Identification	Delivery form
Configuration Data	Factory Page	211006	On-chip configuration page. Stored to the FLASH area of the TOE
	System Control Page	211102	On-chip configuration page. Stored to the FLASH area of the TOE
	System Update Page	211001	On-chip configuration page. Stored to the FLASH area of the TOE
	System Patch Page	v1113_s5_v1	On-chip configuration page. Stored to the FLASH area of the TOE

Logical configuration options are provided for each physical configuration of SN300\_SE, which do not modify the physical scope. Evaluated logical configuration options are all or a subset of the order entry options available in the electronic Order Entry Form [\[48\]](#).

[Table 13](#) identifies these evaluated logical configuration options.

Table 13. Evaluated logical configuration options

Name of order entry option	Evaluated values
SNSE_SWOPT_RAM_INIT_SIZE	0..6144
SNSE_SWOPT_RECONSTRUCT_PUF	NO / RECON / RECON_LOCK
SNSE_SWOPT_USE_PUF	YES / NO
SNSE_SWOPT_ALLOW_SUP_TABLE	YES / NO
SNSE_SWOPT_ALLOW_SUP_SENSOR	YES / NO
SNSE_SWOPT_ENABLE_CHMODE	YES / NO
SNSE_SWOPT_ENABLE_AUTHCMD	YES / NO
SNSE_SWOPT_AUTH_REENABLE_TESTMODE	YES / NO

The SN300\_SE is integral part of the SN300 IC. Order information is given in [\[44\]](#).

Information on how to identify the logical configuration options of the SN300\_SE after TOE Delivery and the delivery method used for SN300 are described in [\[45\]](#).

Note that SN300 without any Security IC Embedded Software for the TOE is available for NXP internal use only.

## 1.7 Evaluated Package Types

The TOE is delivered as a packaged device. The security of the TOE does not rely on the way the pads are connected to the package. Therefore the security functionality of JCOP 7.0 on SN300 is not affected by the delivered package type.

The only available package type is "Wafer Level Chip Scale Package" (WLCSP). This package is a thin fine-pitch ball grid array package. All (enabled) pins of the TOE are externally accessible. Any additional security provided by the plastic package is ignored for the security of the TOE.

## 2 Conformance Claims (ASE\_CCL)

This chapter is divided into the following sections: "CC Conformance Claim", "PP Claim", and "Conformance Claim Rationale".

### 2.1 CC Conformance Claim

This Security Target claims conformance to version 3.1 of Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation according to

- Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1: Introduction and general model, Version 3.1, Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-001, April 2017 [\[1\]](#).
- Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2: Security functional components, Version 3.1, Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-002, April 2017 [\[2\]](#).
- Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3: Security assurance components, Version 3.1, Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-003, April 2017 [\[3\]](#).

The following methodology will be used for the evaluation:

- Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Evaluation methodology, Version 3.1, Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-004, April 2017 [\[4\]](#).

This Security Target claims to be CC Part 2 extended and CC Part 3 conformant. [Section 7](#) of this Security Target defines the extended Security Functional Requirements, and also demonstrates that they are consistent with the above conformance claims.

This Security Target claims conformance to the assurance package **EAL5 augmented**. The augmentations to EAL5 are

- AVA\_VAN.5 "Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis"
- ALC\_DVS.2 "Sufficiency of security measures"
- ALC\_FLR.1 "Basic flaw remediation"
- ASE\_TSS.2 "TOE summary specification with architectural design summary"

As demonstrated in [Section 8](#), this claim includes or exceeds the minimum assurance level for the Protection Profile identified in [Section 2.2](#).

### 2.2 PP Claim

This Security Target claims conformance to the following Protection Profiles.

#### 2.2.1 Security IC Platform (BSI-PP-0084-2014)

This Security Target claims strict conformance to Security IC Platform Protection Profile [\[10\]](#).

This claim includes conformance to packages defined in the Protection Profile:

- Package "TDES" (with augmentations)
- Package "AES" (with augmentations)

Other packages of the PP are not supported.

The TOE as defined in the Protection Profile is the Security IC including IC Dedicated Software without Security IC Embedded Software. Therefore, any reference to the TOE in the Protection Profile applies to the Secure Element Hardware only, and not to the entire TOE of this Security Target given in the TOE reference in [Table 1](#).



From the Security IC life-cycle defined in the Protection Profile, all roles involved from Phase 1 up to Phase 6 are performed by NXP. Therefore, "TOE Delivery" has to be seen as an internal process.

## 2.2.2 Java Card - Open Configuration (BSI-CC-PP-0099-V2-2020)

This Security Target claims demonstrable conformance to the Java Card Protection Profile - Open Configuration [11], with "Sensitive Result" augmentation package. Other packages of the PP are not supported.

This ST is more restrictive than the PP [11] which [Section 2.3](#) provides a rationale for.

## 2.3 Conformance Claim Rationale

### 2.3.1 TOE Type

The TOE type as stated in [Section 1.3](#) of this ST corresponds to the TOE type of the Java Card Platform PP [11], implementing the Java Card Specification Version 3.1 [14] [15] [13] with a co-existing eUICC Application, also underpinned by the Java Card and Global Platform Technologies, but accessible via separate, independent communications channels.

### 2.3.2 Security IC

Security IC is the type of TOE defined in [Section 1.3.2](#) of this Security Target. Its components are detailed in [Section 1.4](#) of this Security Target. These descriptions are consistent with the TOE definition in section 1.2.2 of the Protection Profile [10].

#### 2.3.2.1 SPD Statement for Security IC Component

The security problem definition in [Section 4](#) of this Security Target includes all threats, organizational security policies and assumptions which are identified in the Protection Profile [10], and this without any restrictions or modifications.

In addition, this Security Target contains the following threats:

- T.Unauthorized-Access

The thread T.Unauthorized-Access is introduced for attackers with high attack potential who may try to gain access to restricted memory areas or restricted hardware components.

The SPD statement presented in [Section 4](#), copies the OSP from the Protection Profile [10] but also adds the following OSP:

- P.Add-Components

The OSP P.Add-Components is introduced for support of additional security functionalities like Integrity check of the Flash memory and GCM/GMAC modes.

#### 2.3.2.2 Security Objectives Statement for Security IC Component

The statement of security objectives in the ST presented in [Section 5](#) includes all security objectives as presented in the Protection Profile [10], but also includes a number of additional security objectives. The additional security objectives are:

- O.MEM-ACCESS
- O.SFR-ACCESS
- O.FLASH-INTEGRITY
- O.GCM-SUPPORT

The security objectives O.MEM-ACCESS and O.SFR-ACCESS are related to additional access protection to restricted memories areas and restricted hardware functionalities.

The security objectives O.FLASH-INTEGRITY and O.GCM-SUPPORT are related to additional security functionalities like Flash memory integrity and GCM/GMAC modes.

### 2.3.2.3 Security Functional Requirements Statement for Security IC Component

The Security Functional Requirements for the Security IC component are copied from the Protection Profile [10], but also include a number of additional SFRs.

FCS\_COP.1[GCM] is added for hardware support of the GCM and GMAC but the SFR is defined in the JavaCard Core\_LC API in Section 7.2.1.1.2 since it is also a JC API.

FDP\_ACC.1/MEM, FDP\_ACF.1/MEM, FDP\_MSA.1/MEM, FDP\_MSA.3/MEM, FMT\_SMF.1 are added for access control to restricted memory areas.

FDP\_ACC.1/SFR, FDP\_ACF.1/SFR, FDP\_MSA.1/SFR, FDP\_MSA.3/SFR, FMT\_SMF.1 are added for access control to restricted hardware components.

## 2.3.3 Java Card - Open Configuration

### 2.3.3.1 SPD Statement for Java Card Component

The SPD statement that is presented in Section 4 includes the threats as presented in the PP [11], but also includes additional threats. The additional threats are:

- T.CONFID-UPDATE-IMAGE.LOAD
- T.INTEG-UPDATE-IMAGE.LOAD
- T.UNAUTH-LOAD-UPDATE-IMAGE
- T.INTERRUPT-OSU
- T.CONFIG
- T.COM\_EXPLOIT
- T.LIFE\_CYCLE
- T.UNAUTHORIZED\_CARD\_MNGT
- T.INTEG-APPLI-DATA[REFINED]
- T.RESTRICTED-MODE
- T.AM\_DATASTORE\_ACCESS
- T.CONFID-CONT
- T.INTEG-CONT
- T.EXE-CONT
- T.CONT-DOS
- T.CONT-SID

The threats

- T.CONFID-UPDATE-IMAGE.LOAD
- T.INTEG-UPDATE-IMAGE.LOAD
- T.UNAUTH-LOAD-UPDATE-IMAGE

- T.INTERRUPT-OSU

are included for the OS Update which is additional functionality the PP allows.

The threats

- T.CONFID-CONT
- T.INTEG-CODE
- T.EXE-CONT
- T.CONT-DOS
- T.CONT-SID

are introduced for multiple Guest OSs embeded on the same product inside and outside the TOE boundaries.

The threat T.CONFIG is an additional threat to cover unauthorized modifications and read access of the configuration area in the TOE. It is an addition to the threats defined in the PP [11]. The threat T.RESTRICTED-MODE is included for the Restricted Mode which is additional functionality the PP allows. The threat T.COM\_EXPLOIT is included to cover communication channels attacks and it is an addition to the threats in the PP [11].

The threat T.LIFE\_CYCLE is included to cover content management attacks and it is an addition to the threats in the PP [11].

The threat T.UNAUTHORIZED\_CARD\_MNGT refines the threats T.INSTALL and T.DELETION from the PP [11].

The threat T.INTEG-APPLI-DATA[REFINED] refines the threat T.INTEG-APPLI-DATA in the PP [11].

The threat T.AM\_DATASTORE\_ACCESS is included for Applet Migration which is additional functionality the PP allows.

Note that the threat T.EXE-CODE-REMOTE is not included, since the TOE does not support Java Card RMI. The Java Card Protection Profile [11] makes the use of Java Card RMI optional.

The SPD statement presented in [Section 4](#), copies the OSP from the PP [11], and adds the following additional OSPs:

- OSP.PROCESS-TOE
- OSP.KEY-CHANGE
- OSP.SECURITY-DOMAINS

The OSP OSP.PROCESS-TOE is introduced for the pre-personalisation feature of the TOE and is an addition to the OSPs in PP [11]. The OSP OSP.KEY-CHANGE is introduced for the SD feature of the TOE and is an addition to the OSPs in PP [11]. The OSP OSP.SECURITY-DOMAINS is introduced for the SD feature of the TOE and is an addition to the OSPs in PP [11].

The SPD statement includes two of the three assumptions from the PP [11]. The assumption A.Deletion is excluded. The Card Manager is part of the TOE and therefore the assumption is no longer relevant. Leaving out the assumption, makes the SPD of this ST more restrictive than the SPD in the PP [11]. As the Card Manager is part of the TOE, it is ensuring that the deletion of applets through the Card Manager is secure, instead of assuming that it is handled by the Card Manager in the environment of the TOE.

Besides the assumptions from the PP [11], the following assumptions are added:

- A.PROCESS-SEC-IC

- A.USE\_DIAG
- A.USE\_KEYS
- A.APPS-PROVIDER
- A.VERIFICATION-AUTHORITY
- A.TRUSTED-GUESTOS

The assumption A.PROCESS-SEC-IC is taken from the underlying Security IC Platform PP [10].

The assumptions A.USE\_DIAG and A.USE\_KEYS are included because the Card Manager is part of the TOE and no longer part of the environment.

The assumptions A.APPS-PROVIDER and A.VERIFICATION-AUTHORITY are added because Security Domains from the GlobalPlatform Specification are introduced. All the applets and packages are signed by the APSD and the correctness is verified on the TOE by VASD before the package or applet is installed or loaded. A.APPS-PROVIDER and A.VERIFICATION-AUTHORITY are additions to PP [11] for card content management environment.

The assumptions A.TRUSTED-GUESTOS is included because the Guest Operating Systems that are hosted in external contexts are provided by a trusted actor.

### 2.3.3.2 Security Objectives Statement for Java Card Component

The statement of security objectives in the ST presented in [Section 5](#) includes all security objectives as presented in the PP [11], but also includes a number of additional security objectives. The additional security objectives are:

- OT.IDENTIFICATION
- OT.CONFID-UPDATE-IMAGE.LOAD
- OT.AUTH-LOAD-UPDATE-IMAGE
- OT.SECURE\_LOAD\_ACODE
- OT.SECURE\_AC\_ACTIVATION
- OT.TOE\_IDENTIFICATION
- OT.CARD-CONFIGURATION
- OT.ATTACK-COUNTER
- OT.RESTRICTED-MODE
- OT.DOMAIN-RIGHTS
- OT.APPLI-AUTH
- OT.COMM\_AUTH
- OT.COMM\_INTEGRITY
- OT.COMM\_CONFIDENTIALITY
- OT.DATASTORE\_ACCESS
- OT.CONT\_SEP
- OT.CONT\_PRIV
- OT.CONT\_DOS

The security objectives OT.IDENTIFICATION is part of the security objectives of the Secure Element Hardware (see [Section 1.4.1](#)), but is also relevant for the pre-personalisation feature of the TOE, which is additional functionality the PP allows.

The security objectives

- OT.CONFID-UPDATE-IMAGE.LOAD
- OT.AUTH-LOAD-UPDATE-IMAGE

- OT.SECURE\_LOAD\_ACODE
- OT.SECURE\_AC\_ACTIVATION
- OT.TOE\_IDENTIFICATION

are included for the OS Update which is additional functionality the PP allows.

The security objectives

- OT.CONT\_SEP
- OT.CONT\_PRIV
- OT.CONT\_DOS

are included for the protection and separation of the contexts inside and outside the TOE boundaries.

The security objectives OT.CARD-CONFIGURATION is included for the Config Applet which is additional functionality the PP allows.

The security objectives OT.ATTACK-COUNTER and OT.RESTRICTED-MODE are included for the restricted mode which is additional functionality the PP allows.

The security objectives

- OT.DOMAIN-RIGHTS
- OT.APPLI-AUTH
- OT.COMM\_AUTH
- OT.COMM\_INTEGRITY
- OT.COMM\_CONFIDENTIALITY

are objectives for the TOE as the GlobalPlatform API and the definitions for Secure Channel, Security Domains and Card Content Management are used from it.

The ST contains OE.CAP\_FILE, OE.VERIFICATION and OE.CODE-EVIDENCE from Security Objectives for the Operational Environment from [11]. Additionally, some of the Security Objectives for the Operational Environment from [11] are listed as TOE Security Objectives in this ST:

- OT.SCP.RECOVERY instead of OE.SCP.RECOVERY
- OT.SCP.SUPPORT instead of OE.SCP.SUPPORT
- OT.SCP.IC instead of OE.SCP.IC
- OT.CARD-MANAGEMENT instead of OE.CARD-MANAGEMENT

OT.SCP.RECOVERY, OT.SCP.SUPPORT, and OT.SCP.IC are objectives for the TOE as the Smart Card Platform belongs to the TOE for this evaluation. OT.CARD-MANAGEMENT is an objective for the TOE as the Card Manager belongs to the TOE for this evaluation. Moving objectives from the environment to the TOE, adds objectives to the TOE without changing the overall objectives. The statement of security objectives is therefore equivalent to the security objectives in the PP [11] to which conformance is claimed. The security objective OT.DATASTORE\_ACCESS addresses the need for access control policy to be enforced for the Applet Migration feature.

The security objectives OT.INSTALL, OT.LOAD, and OT.DELETION from the PP [11] are not included since these functionality and objectives are covered by the refined OT.CARD-MANAGEMENT.

Note that the following objectives are defined as optional in the Protection Profile and are not included in the TOE, therefore are not included in the Security Target:

- O.REMOTE

- O.BIO-MNGT
- O.EXT-MEM
- O.SENSITIVE\_ARRAYS\_INTEG

The optional O.SENSITIVE\_RESULTS\_INTEG is included as OT.SENSITIVE\_RESULTS\_INTEG using the rationale defined in the PP.

The ST introduces eight additional security objectives for the environment. The additional objectives for the environment are:

- OE.USE\_DIAG
- OE.USE\_KEYS
- OE.PROCESS\_SEC\_IC
- OE.CONFID-UPDATE-IMAGE.CREATE
- OE.APPS-PROVIDER
- OE.VERIFICATION-AUTHORITY
- OE.KEY-CHANGE
- OE.SECURITY-DOMAINS
- OE.TRUSTED-GUESTOS

The security objective for the environment OE.PROCESS\_SEC\_IC is from the hardware platform (see [Section 1.4.1](#)) that is part of this product evaluation. Therefore the statement of security objectives for the environment is equivalent to the statement in the Security IC PP [\[10\]](#).

OE.USE\_KEYS and OE.USE\_DIAG are included because the Card Manager is part of the TOE and not a security objective for the environment as in PP [\[11\]](#).

The security objective for the environment OE.CONFID-UPDATE-IMAGE.CREATE is to cover the confidentiality during creation and transmission phase of D.UPDATE\_IMAGE and therefore partly covers the threats introduced by the update mechanism which is additional functionality.

OE.APPS-PROVIDER and OE.VERIFICATION-AUTHORITY cover trusted actors which enable the creation, distribution and verification of secure applications.

OE.KEY-CHANGE covers the switch to trusted keys for the AP. OE.SECURITY-DOMAINS covers the management of security domains in the context of the GlobalPlatform Specification.

OE.TRUSTED-GUESTOS covers the trusted and secure development of external Guest OSs that are outside the TOE boundaries. The external Guest OSs are secured and not threatening.

The statement of security objectives for the environment is therefore considered to be equivalent to the security objectives in the PP [\[11\]](#) to which conformance is claimed.

### 2.3.3.3 SFRs Statement for Java Card Component

The Security Functional Requirements Statement copies most SFRs as defined in the PP [\[11\]](#), with the exception of a number of options. For the copied set of SFRs the ST is considered equivalent to the statement of SFRs in the PP [\[11\]](#). Moreover as requested by the PP [\[11\]](#) the ST adds additional threats, objectives and SFRs to fully cover and describe additional security functionality implemented in the TOE.

The TOE restricts remote access from the CAD to the services implemented by the applets on the card to none, and as a result the SFRs concerning Java Card RMI (FDP\_ACF.1[JCRMI], SFRs FDP\_IFC.1/JCRMI, FDP\_IFF.1/JCRMI, FMT\_MSA.1/

EXPORT, FMT\_MSA.1/REM\_REFS, FMT\_MSA.3/JCRMI, FMT\_SMF.1/JCRMI, FMT\_REV.1/JCRMI, and FMT\_SMR.1/JCRMI) are not included in the ST. In the PP [11] the use of the Java Card RMI is optional. The TOE does not implement Java Card RMI.

The TOE does not allow external memory access to the services implemented by the applets on the card, and as a result the SFRs concerning "Management of External Memory (EXT-MEM)" (FDP\_ACC.1/EXT\_MEM, FDP\_ACF.1/EXT\_MEM, FMT\_MSA.1/EXT\_MEM, FMT\_MSA.3/EXT\_MEM and FMT\_SMF.1/EXT\_MEM) are not included in the ST. In the PP [11] the use of the "Management of External Memory (EXT-MEM)" is optional. The TOE does not implement "Management of External Memory (EXT-MEM)".

The SFR FDP\_ITC.2/INSTALLER from the PP [11] is replaced by FDP\_ITC.2[CCM] which enforces the Firewall access control policy and the Secure Channel Protocol information flow policy and which is more restrictive than the PACKAGE LOADING information flow control SFP from PP [11].

The set of SFRs that define the card content management mechanism CarG are partly replaced or refined and are considered to be equivalent or more restrictive because of the newly introduced SFPs:

1. Security Domain access control policy
2. Secure Channel Protocol information flow policy

These SFPs provide a concrete and more restrictive implementation of the PACKAGE LOADING information flow control SFP from PP [11] by following the information flow policy defined by Global Platform specifications. The table below lists the SFRs from CarG of PP [11] and their corresponding refinements in this ST.

**Table 14. CarG SFRs refinements**

SFR from PP [11]	Refinement
FCO_NRO.2/CM	FCO_NRO.2[SC]
FDP_IFC.2/CM	FDP_IFC.2[SC]
FDP_IFF.1/CM	FDP_IFF.1[SC]
FDP_UIT.1/CM	FDP_UIT.1[CCM]
FIA_UID.1/CM	FIA_UID.1[SC]
FMT_MSA.1/CM	FMT_MSA.1[SC]
FMT_MSA.3/CM	FMT_MSA.3[SC]
FMT_SMF.1/CM	FMT_SMF.1[SC]
FMT_SMR.1/CM	FMT_SMR.1[SD]
FTP_ITC.1/CM	FTP_ITC.1[SC]

The following SFRs realize refinements of SFRs from PP [11] and add functionality to the TOE making the Security Functional Requirements Statement more restrictive than the PP [11]:

FDP\_ROL.1[CCM], FPT\_FLS.1[CCM] and FPT\_PHP.3 realize additional security functionality for the card manager which is allowed by the PP [11].

The set of SFRs that define the security domains mechanism as specified by GlobalPlatform, realize refinements of SFRs from PP [11] (see above Table 14) and additional security functionality which is allowed by the PP [11]. This set of SFRs comprise

- FDP\_ACC.1[SD]
- FDP\_ACF.1[SD]
- FMT\_MSA.1[SD]
- FMT\_MSA.3[SD]
- FMT\_SMF.1[SD]
- FMT\_SMR.1[SD]

The set of SFRs that define the secure channel mechanism as specified by GlobalPlatform, realize refinements of SFRs from PP [11] (see above Table 14) and additional security functionality which is allowed by the PP [11]. This set of SFRs comprise

- FCO\_NRO.2[SC]
- FDP\_IFC.2[SC]
- FDP\_IFF.1[SC]
- FMT\_MSA.1[SC]
- FMT\_MSA.3[SC]
- FMT\_SMF.1[SC]
- FIA\_UID.1[SC]
- FIA\_UAU.1[SC]
- FIA\_UAU.4[SC]
- FTP\_ITC.1[SC]

The set of SFRs belonging to the CoreG\_LC group related to the Java Card API, which are refined multiple times, comprise

- FCS\_CKM.1
- FCS\_COP.1

The SFRs FAU\_SAS.1[SCP], FIA\_AFL.1[PIN] and FCS\_RNG.1 realize additional security functionality which is allowed by the PP [11].

The set of SFRs that define the Config Applet realize additional security functionality, which is allowed by the PP [11]. This set of SFRs comprise FDP\_IFC.2[CFG], FDP\_IFF.1[CFG], FIA\_UID.1[CFG], FMT\_MSA.1[CFG], FMT\_MSA.3[CFG], FMT\_SMF.1[CFG], FMT\_SMR.1[CFG].

The set of SFRs that define the OS Update realize additional security functionality, which is allowed by the PP [11]. This set of SFRs comprise FDP\_IFC.2[OSU], FDP\_IFF.1[OSU], FMT\_MSA.3[OSU], FMT\_MSA.1[OSU], FMT\_SMR.1[OSU], FMT\_SMF.1[OSU], FIA\_UID.1[OSU], FIA\_UAU.1[OSU], FIA\_UAU.4[OSU] and FPT\_FLS.1[OSU].

The set of SFRs that define the Restricted Mode realize additional security functionality, which is allowed by the PP [11]. This set of SFRs comprise FDP\_ACC.2[RM], FDP\_ACF.1[RM], FMT\_MSA.3[RM], FMT\_MSA.1[RM], FMT\_SMF.1[RM], FIA\_UID.1[RM] and FIA\_UAU.1[RM].

The set of SFRs that define the Applet Migration realize additional security functionality, which is allowed by the PP [11]. This set of SFRs comprise FDP\_ACC.1[AMD], FDP\_ACF.1[AMD], FMT\_MSA.3[AMD], FMT\_MSA.1[AMD], FMT\_SMF.1[AMD], FMT\_SMR.1[AMD] and FIA\_UID.1[AMD].

The set of SFRs that define the Context Separation realize additional security functionality, which is allowed by the PP [11]. This set of SFRs comprise FDP\_ACC.2[CONTSEP], FDP\_ACF.1[CONTSEP], FMT\_MSA.3[CONTSEP],



FMT\_MSA.1[CONTSEP], FMT\_SMF.1[CONTSEP], FMT\_SMR.1[CONTSEP] and  
FIA\_UID.1[CONTSEP].

## 3 Security Aspects

This chapter describes the main security issues of the Java Card System and its environment addressed in this ST, called "security aspects", in a CC-independent way. In addition to this, the security aspects also give a semi-formal framework to express the CC security environment and objectives of the TOE. They can be instantiated as assumptions, threats, objectives (for the TOE and the environment) or organizational security policies. The description is based on [11].

### 3.1 Confidentiality

<b>SA.CONFID-UPDATE-IMAGE</b>	<b>Confidentiality of Update Image</b> The update image must be kept confidential. This concerns the non disclosure of the update image in transit to the card.
<b>SA.CONFID-APPLI-DATA</b>	<b>Confidentiality of Application Data</b> Application data must be protected against unauthorized disclosure. This concerns logical attacks at runtime in order to gain read access to other application's data. This must also consider that applets receiving an ArrayView must not be able to access beyond the boundaries and access rights defined during the creation of the ArrayView.
<b>SA.CONFID-JCS-CODE</b>	<b>Confidentiality of Java Card System Code</b> Java Card System code must be protected against unauthorized disclosure. Knowledge of the Java Card System code may allow bypassing the TSF. This concerns logical attacks at runtime in order to gain a read access to executable code, typically by executing an application that tries to read the memory area where a piece of Java Card System code is stored.
<b>SA.CONFID-JCS-DATA</b>	<b>Confidentiality of Java Card System Data</b> Java Card System data must be protected against unauthorized disclosure. This concerns logical attacks at runtime in order to gain a read access to Java Card System data. Java Card System data includes the data managed by the Java Card RE, the Java Card VM and the internal data of Java Card platform API classes as well.

### 3.2 Integrity

<b>SA.INTEG-UPDATE-IMAGE</b>	<b>Integrity of Update Image</b> The update image must be protected against unauthorized modification. This concerns the modification of the image in transit to the card.
<b>SA.INTEG-APPLI-CODE</b>	<b>Integrity of Application Code</b> Application code must be protected against unauthorized modification. This concerns logical attacks at runtime in order to gain write access to the memory zone where executable code is stored. In post-issuance application loading, this threat also concerns the modification of application code in transit to the card.

<b>SA.INTEG-APPLI-DATA</b>	<b>Integrity of Application Data</b> Application data must be protected against unauthorized modification. This concerns logical attacks at runtime in order to gain unauthorized write access to application data. In post-issuance application loading, this threat also concerns the modification of application data contained in a CAP file in transit to the card. For instance, a CAP file contains the values to be used for initializing the static fields of the CAP file. This must also consider the Integrity of data accessed through the use of <code>ArrayView</code> .
<b>SA.INTEG-JCS-CODE</b>	<b>Integrity of Java Card System Code</b> Java Card System code must be protected against unauthorized modification. This concerns logical attacks at runtime in order to gain write access to executable code.
<b>SA.INTEG-JCS-CODE</b>	<b>Integrity of Java Card System Data</b> Java Card System data must be protected against unauthorized modification. This concerns logical attacks at runtime in order to gain write access to Java Card System data. Java Card System data includes the data managed by the Java Card RE, the Java Card VM and the internal data of Java Card API classes as well.

### 3.3 Unauthorized Execution

<b>SA.EXE-APPLI-CODE</b>	<b>Execution of Application Code</b> Application (byte)code must be protected against unauthorized execution. This concerns: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. invoking a method outside the scope of the accessibility rules provided by the access modifiers of the Java programming language (<a href="#">[16]</a>)</li> <li>2. jumping inside a method fragment or interpreting the contents of a data memory area as if it was executable code.</li> <li>3. unauthorized execution of a remote method from the CAD (if the TOE provides JCRMI functionality).</li> </ol>
<b>SA.EXE-JCS-CODE</b>	<b>Execution of Java Card System Code</b> Java Card System bytecode must be protected against unauthorized execution. Java Card System bytecode includes any code of the Java Card RE or API. This concerns: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. invoking a method outside the scope of the accessibility rules provided by the access modifiers of the Java programming language (<a href="#">[16]</a>)</li> <li>2. jumping inside a method fragment or interpreting the contents of a data memory area as if it was executable code. Note that execute access to native code of the Java Card System and applications is the concern of SA.NATIVE.</li> </ol>
<b>SA.FIREWALL</b>	<b>Firewall</b> The Firewall shall ensure controlled sharing of class instances <sup>[1]</sup> , and isolation of their data and code between CAP files (that is, controlled execution contexts) as well as between CAP files and the JCRE context. An applet shall not read, write, compare a piece of data belonging to an applet that is not in the same context, or execute one of the methods of an applet in another context without its authorization.

**SA.NATIVE****Native Code Execution**

Because the execution of native code is outside of the JCS TSF scope, it must be secured so as to not provide ways to bypass the TSFs of the JCS. Loading of native code, which is as well outside those TSFs, is submitted to the same requirements. Should native software be privileged in this respect, exceptions to the policies must include a rationale for the new security framework they introduce.

[1] This concerns in particular the arrays, which are considered as instances of the Object class in the Java programming language.

### 3.4 Bytecode Verification

**SA.VERIFICATION****Bytecode Verification**

Bytecode must be verified prior to being executed. Bytecode verification includes:

1. how well-formed CAP file is and the verification of the typing constraints on the bytecode,
2. binary compatibility with installed CAP files and the assurance that the export files used to check the CAP file correspond to those that will be present on the card when loading occurs.

### 3.5 Card Management

**SA.CARD-MANAGEMENT** **Card Management**

1. The card manager (CM) shall control the access to card management functions such as the installation, update or deletion of applets.
2. The card manager shall implement the card issuer's policy on the card.

**SA.INSTALL****Installation**

1. The TOE must be able to return to a safe and consistent state when the installation of a CAP file or an applet fails or be cancelled (whatever the reasons).
2. Installing an applet must have no effect on the code and data of already installed applets. The installation procedure should not be used to bypass the TSFs. In short, it is an atomic operation, free of harmful effects on the state of the other applets.
3. The procedure of loading and installing a CAP file shall ensure its integrity and authenticity. In case of Extended CAP files, installation of a CAP shall ensure installation of all the packages in the CAP file.

**SA.SID**

**Subject Identification**

1. Users and subjects of the TOE must be identified.
2. The identity of sensitive users and subjects associated with administrative and privileged roles must be particularly protected; this concerns the Java Card RE, the applets registered on the card, and especially the default applet and the currently selected applet (and all other active applets in Java Card System). A change of identity, especially standing for an administrative role (like an applet impersonating the Java Card RE), is a severe violation of the SFR. Selection controls the access to any data exchange between the TOE and the CAD and therefore, must be protected as well. The loading of a CAP file or any exchange of data through the APDU buffer (which can be accessed by any applet) can lead to disclosure of keys, application code or data, and so on.

**SA.OBJ-DELETION**

**Object Deletion**

1. Deallocation of objects should not introduce security holes in the form of references pointing to memory zones that are not longer in use, or have been reused for other purposes. Deletion of collection of objects should not be maliciously used to circumvent the TSFs.
2. Erasure, if deemed successful, shall ensure that the deleted class instance is no longer accessible.

**SA.DELETION**

**Deletion**

1. Deletion of installed applets (or CAP files) should not introduce security holes in the form of broken references to garbage collected code or data, nor should they alter integrity or confidentiality of remaining applets. The deletion procedure should not be maliciously used to bypass the TSFs.
2. Erasure, if deemed successful, shall ensure that any data owned by the deleted applet is no longer accessible (shared objects shall either prevent deletion or be made inaccessible). A deleted applet cannot be selected or receive APDU commands. CAP file deletion shall make the code of the CAP file is no longer available for execution. In case of Extended CAP files, deletion of a CAP shall ensure that code and data for all the packages in the CAP file is no longer available for execution.
3. Power failure or other failures during the process shall be taken into account in the implementation so as to preserve the SFRs. This does not mandate, however, the process to be atomic. For instance, an interrupted deletion may result in the loss of user data, as long as it does not violate the SFRs.

The deletion procedure and its characteristics (whether deletion is either physical or logical, what happens if the deleted application was the default applet, the order to be observed on the deletion steps) are implementation-dependent. The only commitment is that deletion shall not jeopardize the TOE (or its assets) in case of failure (such as power shortage).

Deletion of a single applet instance and deletion of a whole CAP file are functionally different operations and may obey different security rules. For instance, specific CAP files or packages can be declared to be undeletable (for instance, the Java Card API packages), or the dependency between installed CAP files may forbid the deletion (like a CAP file using super classes or super interfaces declared in another CAP file).

3.6 Services

**SA.ALARM**

**Alarm**

The TOE shall provide appropriate feedback upon detection of a potential security violation. This particularly concerns the type errors detected by the bytecode verifier, the security exceptions thrown by the Java Card VM, or any other security-related event occurring during the execution of a TSF.

**SA.OPERATE**

**Operate**

1. The TOE must ensure continued correct operation of its security functions.
2. In case of failure during its operation, the TOE must also return to a well-defined valid state before the next service request.

**SA.RESOURCES**

**Resources**

The TOE controls the availability of resources for the applications and enforces quotas and limitations in order to prevent unauthorized denial of service or malfunction of the TSFs. This concerns both execution (dynamic memory allocation) and installation (static memory allocation) of applications and CAP files.

**SA.CIPHER**

**Cipher**

The TOE shall provide a means to the applications for ciphering sensitive data, for instance, through a programming interface to low-level, highly secure cryptographic services. In particular, those services must support cryptographic algorithms consistent with cryptographic usage policies and standards.

**SA.KEY-MNGT**

**Key Management**

The TOE shall provide a means to securely manage cryptographic keys. This includes:

1. Keys shall be generated in accordance with specified cryptographic key generation algorithms and specified cryptographic key sizes,
2. Keys must be distributed in accordance with specified cryptographic key distribution methods,
3. Keys must be initialized before being used,
4. Keys shall be destroyed in accordance with specified cryptographic key destruction methods.

**SA.PIN-MNGT**

**PIN Management**

The TOE shall provide a means to securely manage PIN objects. This includes:

1. Atomic update of PIN value and try counter,
2. No rollback on the PIN-checking function,
3. Keeping the PIN value (once initialized) secret (for instance, no clear-PIN-reading function),
4. Enhanced protection of PIN's security attributes (state, try counter ...) in confidentiality and integrity.

**SA.SCP****Smart Card Platform**

The smart card platform must be secure with respect to the SFRs. Then:

1. After a power loss, RF signal loss or sudden card removal prior to completion of some communication protocol, the SCP will allow the TOE on the next power up to either complete the interrupted operation or revert to a secure state.
2. It does not allow the SFRs to be bypassed or altered and does not allow access to other low-level functions than those made available by packages of Java Card API. That includes the protection of its private data and code (against disclosure or modification) from the Java Card System.
3. It provides secure low-level cryptographic processing to the Java Card System.
4. It supports the needs for any update to a single persistent object or class field to be atomic, and possibly a low-level transaction mechanism.
5. It allows the Java Card System to store data in a "persistent technology memory" or in volatile memory, depending on its needs (for instance, transient objects must not be stored in non-volatile memory). The memory model is structured and allows for low-level control accesses (segmentation fault detection).
6. It safely transmits low-level exceptions to the TOE (arithmetic exceptions, checksum errors), when applicable.
7. Finally, it is required that the IC is designed in accordance with a well-defined set of policies and standards (for instance, those specified in [10]), and will be tamper resistant to actually prevent an attacker from extracting or altering security data (like cryptographic keys) by using commonly employed techniques (physical probing and sophisticated analysis of the chip). This especially matters to the management (storage and operation) of confidential application data such as cryptographic keys.

**SA.TRANSACTION****Transaction**

The TOE must provide a means to execute a set of operations atomically. This mechanism must not jeopardise the execution of the user applications. The transaction status at the beginning of an applet session must be closed (no pending updates).

**3.7 Config Applet****SA.CONFIG-APPLET****Config Applet**

The Config Applet is a JCOP functionality which allows to:

1. Read and modify configuration items in the configuration area of the TOE,
2. Disable Access to configuration item.

**3.8 OS Update****SA.OSU****OS Update**

The Updater OS allows to update JCOP OS, the Crypto Lib and the Flash services software as well as the Updater OS itself. It ensures that only valid updates can be installed on the TOE.

### 3.9 Restricted Mode

**SA.RM****Restricted Mode**

If the Attack Counter reaches its limit the TOE goes into Restricted Mode. In this mode it is possible to perform a limited set of functions, like authenticate against the ISD, reset the Attack Counter or read logging information. The GlobalPlatform state of the ISD is not changed.

### 3.10 Applet Migration

**SA.APPLLET-MIGR****Applet Migration**

In case an applet gets updated it can keep its User Data: Keys, PIN and byte arrays. The data is exported by the applet instances to be updated in a datastore and is imported by the new applet instance. Card Content management may be combined with Applet Migration to create Distributed Card Content Management.

### 3.11 Context Separation

**SA.CONTEXT-SEPAR  
ATION****Context Separation**

The hardware enforced Context Separation ensures that all the operating systems hosted on the secure element are running in dedicated contexts. The external operating systems that are outside the boundaries of the TOE (typically eUICC, Communication OS, JCOP xxx) cannot interact (read/write data, fetch unshared code, impersonate) with the TOE in an uncontrolled and unauthorized way. The communications between the TOE and external Operating systems is allowed through dedicated communication channels under the control of the Main JCOP.



## 4 Security Problem Definition (ASE\_SPD)

The following sections list the assets, threats, organisational security policies and assumptions of the TOE.

These are listed separately for each component to allow tracing of the conformance to the corresponding Protection Profile.

### 4.1 SPD related to the IC Protection Profile

#### 4.1.1 Assets related to the IC Protection Profile

Assets are security-relevant elements to be directly protected by the TOE. Confidentiality of assets is always intended with respect to un-trusted people or software, as various parties are involved during the first stages of the smart card product life-cycle. Details concerning the threats are given in [Section 4.1.2](#) hereafter.

Assets have to be protected, some in terms of confidentiality and some in terms of integrity or both integrity and confidentiality. These assets might get compromised by the threats that the TOE is exposed to.

The assets and emanating high-level security concerns SC1 to SC4 in section 3.1 of the Protection Profile [\[10\]](#) entirely apply to this Security Target.

In compliance with Application Note 8 in the Protection Profile [\[10\]](#) this Security Target identifies the access restrictions of the TOE to its memories and hardware as a further asset (SC5). The high-level security concerns of this Security Target for the Secure Element Hardware are summarized below.

- SC1 - Integrity of user data of the Composite TOE and of Security IC Embedded Software, while being executed/processed and while being stored in the TOE's protected memories
- SC2 - Confidentiality of user data of the Composite TOE and of Security IC Embedded Software, while being executed/processed and while being stored in the TOE's protected memories
- SC3 - Correct operation of the security services provided by the TOE for Security IC Embedded Software
- SC4 - Deficiency of Random Numbers
- SC5 - Correct operation of access restrictions to memories and hardware as provided by the TOE for Security IC Embedded Software

To be able to protect the assets the TOE shall protect its TOE security functionality. Critical information about the TOE security functionality shall be protected by the development environment and the operational environment. Critical information includes the following.

- Logical design data
- Physical design data
- IC Dedicated Software
- Configuration data
- Initialization data and pre-personalization data
- Specific development aids
- Test and characterization related data
- Material for software development support

- Photomasks

#### 4.1.2 Threats related to the IC Protection Profile

The threats defined in section 3.2 of the Protection Profile [10] are listed in Table 15. They entirely apply to this Security Target.

Table 15. Threats defined in the Protection Profile

Name	Title
T.Malfunction	Malfunction due to Environmental Stress
T.Abuse-Func	Abuse of Functionality
T.Phys-Probing	Physical Probing
T.Phys-Manipulation	Physical Manipulation
T.Leak-Inherent	Inherent Information Leakage
T.Leak-Forced	Forced Information Leakage
T.RND_HW	Deficiency of Random Numbers

The threat T.RND\_HW explicitly includes deficiencies of hardware (true) random numbers and corresponds to the thread T.RND in [10].

The deficiencies of the entire random number sources (including e.g. software (pseudo) random numbers) are consolidated by threat T.RND in section Section 4.2.2.9.

In compliance with Application Note 4 of the Protection Profile [10] the TOE provides security functionality that protects against the additional threat listed in Table 16.

Table 16. Threats added in this Security Target

Name	Title
T.Unauthorized-Access	Unauthorized Memory or Hardware Access

The threat in Table 16 is defined below.

**T.Unauthorized-Access**  
**Adverse action:**

**Unauthorized Memory or Hardware Access**

An attacker may try to read, modify or execute code or data stored to restricted memory areas. An attacker may try to access or operate restricted hardware components by executing code that accidentally or deliberately accesses these restricted hardware components.

- Any code executed or data used in a system operation mode, may accidentally or deliberately access code or data or hardware components restricted to other system operation modes.
- Any code executed or data used in a certain context may accidentally or deliberately access code or data or hardware components restricted to the highest context level.
- Any code executed or data used in a context level, which is assigned to a certain application, may accidentally or deliberately access code or data or hardware components restricted to another context

level of the same system operation mode but assigned to another application.

**Threat agent:** Attacker with high attack potential.  
**Asset:** Code and data belonging to Security IC Embedded Software as well as code and data belonging to IC Dedicated Software.

The TOE provides security functionality for control of access to its memories and hardware components. This control targets to prevent

- Boot OS and Factory OS from being compromised by other software component types,
- Flash Driver Software from being compromised by other Security IC Embedded Software - and vice versa,
- Security IC Embedded Software assigned to the highest context level from being compromised by Security IC Embedded Software assigned to any lower context level,
- separate applications of Security IC Embedded Software, which are assigned to different contexts of the same system operation mode, from being compromised by each other.

#### 4.1.3 OSPs related to the IC Protection Profile

The organizational security policies defined in section 3.3 and section 7.4 of the Protection Profile [10] are listed in Table 17. They entirely apply to this Security Target.

Table 17. Organizational security policies defined in the Protection Profile

Name	Title
P.Process-TOE	Identification during TOE Development and Production
P.Crypto-Service	Cryptographic services of the TOE

In compliance with Application Note 5 of the Protection Profile [10] the TOE provides security components and security functionality, which require additional organizational security policies that are listed in Table 18.

Table 18. Organizational security policies added in this Security Target

Name	Title
P.Add-Components	Additional Specific Hardware Security Components

The organizational security policies in Table 18 are defined as follows.

**P.Add-Components**                      **Additional Specific Hardware Security Components**  
 The TOE shall provide the following additional security functionality to the Security IC Embedded Software:

- Integrity support of content stored to Flash memory
- Computation of Cyclic Redundancy Checks
- Support for Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC

#### 4.1.4 Assumptions related to the IC Protection Profile

The assumptions defined in section 3.4 of the Protection Profile [10] are listed in Table 19. They entirely apply to this Security Target.

Table 19. Assumptions defined in the Protection Profile

Name	Title
A.Process-Sec-IC	Protection during Packaging, Finishing and Personalisation
A.Resp-AppI	Treatment of user data of the Composite TOE

## 4.2 SPD for Java Card System

### 4.2.1 Assets for Java Card System

Assets are security-relevant elements to be directly protected by the TOE. Confidentiality of assets is always intended with respect to un-trusted people or software, as various parties are involved during the first stages of the smart card product life-cycle. Details concerning the threats are given in [Section 4.2.2](#) hereafter.

Assets have to be protected, some in terms of confidentiality and some in terms of integrity or both integrity and confidentiality. These assets might get compromised by the threats that the TOE is exposed to.

The assets of the Security IC Embedded Software to be protected by the TOE are listed below. They are grouped according to whether it is data created by and for the user (User data) or data created by and for the TOE (TSF data). This definition of grouping is taken from Section 5.1 of PP [\[11\]](#).

#### 4.2.1.1 User data

Table 20. User Data Assets

D.APP_CODE	The code of the applets and libraries loaded on the card. To be protected from unauthorized modification.
D.APP_C_DATA	Confidential sensitive data of the applications, like the data contained in an object, an array view, a static field, a local variable of the currently executed method, or a position of the operand stack. To be protected from unauthorized disclosure.
D.APP_I_DATA	Integrity sensitive data of the applications, like the data contained in an object, an array view, a static field, a local variable of the currently executed method, or a position of the operand stack. To be protected from unauthorized modification.
D.APP_KEYS	Cryptographic keys owned by the applets. To be protected from unauthorized disclosure and modification.
D.PIN	Any end-user's PIN. To be protected from unauthorized disclosure and modification.
D.APSD_KEYS	Refinement of D.APP_KEYS of <a href="#">[11]</a> . Application Provider Security Domains cryptographic keys needed to establish secure channels with the AP. These keys can be used to load and install applications on the card if the Security Domain has the appropriate privileges. To be protected from unauthorized disclosure and modification.
D.ISD_KEYS	Refinement of D.APP_KEYS of <a href="#">[11]</a> . Issuer Security Domain cryptographic keys needed to perform card management operations on the card. To be protected from unauthorized disclosure and modification.

**Table 20. User Data Assets...continued**

D.VASD_KEYS	Refinement of D.APP_KEYS of [11]. Verification Authority Security Domain cryptographic keys needed to verify applications Mandated DAP signature. To be protected from unauthorized disclosure and modification.
D.CARD_MNGT_DATA	The data of the card management environment, like for instance, the identifiers, the privileges, life cycle states, the memory resource quotas of applets and security domains. To be protected from unauthorized modification.

**4.2.1.2 TSF data**

**Table 21. TSF Data Assets**

D.API_DATA	Private data of the API, like the contents of its private fields. To be protected from unauthorized disclosure and modification.
D.CRYPTO	Cryptographic data used in runtime cryptographic computations, like a seed used to generate a key. To be protected from unauthorized disclosure and modification.
D.JCS_CODE	The code of the Java Card System. To be protected from unauthorized disclosure and modification.
D.JCS_DATA	The internal runtime data areas necessary for the execution of the JCVM, such as, for instance, the frame stack, the program counter, the class of an object, the length allocated for an array, any pointer used to chain data-structures. To be protected from unauthorized disclosure or modification.
D.SEC_DATA	The runtime security data of the JCRE, like, for instance, the AIDs used to identify the installed applets, the currently selected applet, the current context of execution and the owner of each object. To be protected from unauthorized disclosure and modification.
D.UPDATE_IMAGE	Can be an update for JCOP 7.0 OS and Updater OS. It is sent to the TOE, received by the Updater OS. It includes executable code, configuration data, as well as a Sequence Number (Received Sequence Number) and Image Type. To be protected from unauthorized disclosure and modification. It is decrypted using the Package Decryption Key and its signature is verified using the Verification Key. Is also referred to as Additional Code, see [9].
D.CONFIG_ITEM	A configuration that can be changed using the Config Applet.
D.RESTRICTED_MODE_STATE	The Restricted Mode is entered when the attack counter reaches its limit (the Attack Counter is incremented when a potential attack is detected and decrements after sufficient time in a powered state without detecting any new attacks). Once the Restricted Mode is entered, it shall not be possible to exit without the approval of authorized users.
D.TOE_IDENTIFIER	Identification Data to identify the TOE.

**4.2.2 Threats for Java Card System**

The threats for the Security IC Embedded Software are listed below. The definition of the grouping is taken from Section 5.2 of PP [11].

## 4.2.2.1 Confidentiality

- T.CONFID-APPLI-DA TA** **Confidentiality of Application Data**  
The attacker executes an application to disclose data belonging to another application. See SA.CONFID-APPLI-DATA for details. Directly threatened asset(s): D.APP\_C\_DATA, D.PIN and D.APP\_KEYS.
- T.CONFID-JCS-CODE** **Confidentiality of Java Card System Code**  
The attacker executes an application to disclose the Java Card System code. See SA.CONFID-JCS-CODE for details. Directly threatened asset(s): D.JCS\_CODE.
- T.CONFID-JCS-DATA** **Confidentiality of Java Card System Data**  
The attacker executes an application to disclose data belonging to the Java Card System. See SA.CONFID-JCS-DATA for details. Directly threatened asset(s): D.API\_DATA, D.SEC\_DATA, D.JCS\_DATA and D.CRYPTO.

## 4.2.2.2 Integrity

- T.INTEG-APPLI-CODE E** **Integrity of Application Code**  
The attacker executes an application to alter (part of) its own code or another application's code. See SA.INTEG-APPLI-CODE for details. Directly threatened asset(s): D.APP\_CODE.
- T.INTEG-APPLI-CODE E.LOAD** **Integrity of Application Code - Load**  
The attacker modifies (part of) its own or another application code when an application CAP file is transmitted to the card for installation. See SA.INTEG-APPLI-CODE for details. Directly threatened asset(s): D.APP\_CODE.
- T.INTEG-APPLI-DATA [REFINED]** **Integrity of Application Data**  
The attacker executes an application to alter (part of) another application's data. See SA.INTEG-APPLI-DATA for details. Directly threatened asset(s): D.APP\_I\_DATA, D.PIN, D.APP\_KEYS, D.ISD\_KEYS, D.VASD\_KEYS and S.APSD\_KEYS. This threat is a refinement of the Threat T.INTEG-APPLI-DATA from [11].
- T.INTEG-APPLI-DATA .LOAD** **Integrity of Application Data - Load**  
The attacker modifies (part of) the initialization data contained in an application CAP file when the CAP file is transmitted to the card for installation. See SA.INTEG-APPLI-DATA for details. Directly threatened asset(s): D.APP\_I\_DATA and D.APP\_KEYS.
- T.INTEG-JCS-CODE** **Integrity of Java Card System Code**  
The attacker executes an application to alter (part of) the Java Card System code. See SA.INTEG-JCS-CODE for details. Directly threatened asset(s): D.JCS\_CODE.
- T.INTEG-JCS-DATA** **Integrity of Java Card System Data**  
The attacker executes an application to alter (part of) Java Card System or API data. See SA.INTEG-JCS-DATA for details. Directly threatened asset(s): D.API\_DATA, D.SEC\_DATA, D.JCS\_DATA and D.CRYPTO.

4.2.2.3 Identity Usurpation

- T.SID.1**                      **Subject Identification 1**

An applet impersonates another application, or even the Java Card RE, in order to gain illegal access to some resources of the card or with respect to the end user or the terminal. See SA.SID for details. Directly threatened asset(s): D.SEC\_DATA (other assets may be jeopardized should this attack succeed, for instance, if the identity of the JCRE is usurped), D.PIN and D.APP\_KEYS.
- T.SID.2**                      **Subject Identification 2**

The attacker modifies the TOE's attribution of a privileged role (e.g. default applet and currently selected applet), which allows illegal impersonation of this role. See SA.SID for further details. Directly threatened asset(s): D.SEC\_DATA (any other asset may be jeopardized should this attack succeed, depending on whose identity was forged).

4.2.2.4 Unauthorized Execution

- T.EXE-CODE.1**                **Code Execution 1**

An applet performs an unauthorized execution of a method. See SA.EXE-JCS-CODE and SA.EXE-APPLI-CODE for details. Directly threatened asset(s): D.APP\_CODE.
- T.EXE-CODE.2**                **Code Execution 2**

An applet performs an execution of a method fragment or arbitrary data. See SA.EXE-JCS-CODE and SA.EXE-APPLI-CODE for details. Directly threatened asset(s): D.APP\_CODE.
- T.NATIVE**                      **Native Code Execution**

An applet executes a native method to bypass a TOE Security Function such as the firewall. See SA.NATIVE for details. Directly threatened asset(s): D.JCS\_DATA.

4.2.2.5 Denial of Service

- T.RESOURCES**                **Consumption of Resources**

An attacker prevents correct operation of the Java Card System through consumption of some resources of the card: RAM or NVRAM. See SA.RESOURCES for details. Directly threatened asset(s): D.JCS\_DATA.

#### 4.2.2.6 Card Management

##### T.UNAUTHORIZED\_CARD\_MNGT

##### Unauthorized Card Management

The attacker performs unauthorized card management operations (for instance impersonates one of the actor represented on the card) in order to take benefit of the privileges or services granted to this actor on the card such as fraudulent:

- load of a CAP file
- installation of a CAP file
- extradition of a CAP file or an applet
- personalization of an applet or a Security Domain
- deletion of a CAP file or an applet
- privileges update of an applet or a Security Domain

Directly threatened asset(s): D.ISD\_KEYS, D.APSD\_KEYS, D.APP\_C\_DATA, D.APP\_I\_DATA, D.APP\_CODE, D.SEC\_DATA, and D.CARD\_MNGT\_DATA (any other asset may be jeopardized should this attack succeed, depending on the virulence of the installed application).

This security objective is a refinement of the Threats T.INSTALL and T.DELETION from [\[11\]](#).

##### T.COM\_EXPLOIT

##### Communication Channel Remote Exploit

An attacker remotely exploits the communication channels established between a third party and the TOE in order to modify or disclose confidential data. All assets are threatened.

##### T.LIFE\_CYCLE

##### Life Cycle

An attacker accesses to an application outside of its expected availability range thus violating irreversible life cycle phases of the application (for instance, an attacker repersonalizes the application). Directly threatened asset(s): D.APP\_I\_DATA, D.APP\_C\_DATA, and D.CARD\_MNGT\_DATA.

#### 4.2.2.7 Services

##### T.OBJ-DELETION

##### Object Deletion

The attacker keeps a reference to a garbage collected object in order to force the TOE to execute an unavailable method, to make it to crash, or to gain access to a memory containing data that is now being used by another application. See SA.OBJ-DELETION for further details. Directly threatened asset(s): D.APP\_C\_DATA, D.APP\_I\_DATA and D.APP\_KEYS.

#### 4.2.2.8 Miscellaneous

##### T.PHYSICAL

##### Physical Tampering

The attacker discloses or modifies the design of the TOE, its sensitive data or application code by physical (opposed to logical) tampering means. This threat includes IC failure analysis, electrical probing, unexpected tearing, and DPA. That also includes the modification of the runtime execution of Java Card System or SCP software through alteration of the intended execution order of (set of) instructions through physical tampering techniques. This threatens all the identified assets. This threat refers to the point (7) of the security aspect SA.SCP, and all aspects related to confidentiality and integrity of code and data.



## 4.2.2.9 Random Numbers

## T.RND

**Deficiency of Random Numbers**

An attacker may predict or obtain information about random numbers generated by the TOE for instance because of a lack of entropy of the random numbers provided. An attacker may gather information about the produced random numbers which might be a problem because they may be used for instance to generate cryptographic keys. Here the attacker is expected to take advantage of statistical properties of the random numbers generated by the TOE without specific knowledge about the TOE's generator. Malfunctions or premature ageing are also considered which may assist in getting information about random numbers.

## 4.2.2.10 Config Applet

## T.CONFIG

**Unauthorized configuration**

The attacker tries to change configuration items without authorization. Directly threatened asset(s): D.CONFIG\_ITEM.

## 4.2.2.11 OS Update

## T.CONFID-UPDATE-IMAGE.LOAD

**Confidentiality of Update Image - Load**

The attacker discloses (part of) the image used to update the TOE in the field while the image is transmitted to the card for installation. See SA.CONFID-UPDATE-IMAGE for details. Directly threatened asset(s): D.UPDATE\_IMAGE, D.JCS\_CODE, and D.JCS\_DATA.

## T.UNAUTH-LOAD-UPDATE-IMAGE

**Load unauthorized version of Update Image**

The attacker tries to upload an unauthorized Update Image. Directly threatened asset(s): D.JCS\_CODE, D.JCS\_DATA, D.UPDATE\_IMAGE.

## T.INTEG-UPDATE-IMAGE.LOAD

**Integrity of Update Image - Load**

The attacker modifies (part of) the image used to update the TOE in the field while the image is transmitted to the card for installation. See SA.INTEG-UPDATE-IMAGE for details. Directly threatened asset(s): D.UPDATE\_IMAGE, D.JCS\_CODE, and D.JCS\_DATA.

## T.INTERRUPT-OSU

**OS Update procedure interrupted**

The attacker tries to interrupt the OS Update procedure (Load Phase through activation of additional code) leaving the TOE in a partially functional state. Directly threatened asset(s): D.JCS\_CODE, D.JCS\_DATA, D.UPDATE\_IMAGE, D.TOE\_IDENTIFIER.

## 4.2.2.12 Restricted Mode

## T.RESTRICTED-MODE

**UNAUTHORIZED ESCAPE FROM RESTRICTED MODE**

The attacker tries to exit the Restricted Mode without authorization. Directly threatened asset: D.RESTRICTED\_MODE\_STATE.

## 4.2.2.13 Applet Migration

## T.AM\_DATASTORE\_ACCESS

**Unauthorized access to applet datastore**

An attacker tries to import illegally data to an applet to which this data does not belong to. Directly threatened assets: D.APP\_C\_DATA, D.APP\_I\_DATA, D.APP\_KEYS, D.PIN.

4.2.2.14 Context Separation

<b>T.CONFID-CONT</b>	<p><b>Disclosure of Context data and code</b></p> <p>An attacker from one context discloses data or code belonging to another context (like Application Data, Java Card System Code, Java Card System Data). This threat extends the threats T.CONFID-APPLI-DATA, T.CONFID-JCS-DATA, T.CONFID-JCS-CODE to multiple contexts.</p>
<b>T.INTEG-CONT</b>	<p><b>Modification of Context data and code</b></p> <p>An attacker from one context alters data or code belonging to another context (like application code, application data, transmitted application package, Java Card System code, Java Card System Data). This threat extends the threats T.INTEG-APPLI-CODE, T.INTEG-APPLI-CODE.LOAD, T.INTEG-APPLI-DATA, T.INTEG-APPLI-DATA.LOAD, T.INTEG-JCS-CODE, T.INTEG-JCS-DATA to multiple contexts.</p>
<b>T.EXE-CONT</b>	<p><b>Code execution from another context</b></p> <p>An attacker from one context performs an unauthorized execution of a method, method fragment, arbitrary data, or native code of another context. This threat extends the threats T.EXE-CODE.1, T.EXE-CODE.2, T.NATIVE to multiple contexts.</p>
<b>T.CONT-DOS</b>	<p><b>Deny of service between Contexts</b></p> <p>An attacker from one context prevents the correct execution of Main JCOP or another context through consumption of some critical resources of the TOE. This threat extends the threats T.RESOURCES to multiple contexts.</p>
<b>T.CONT-SID</b>	<p><b>Subject Identification between Contexts</b></p> <p>An Attacker impersonates one context with an OS running in another context. This Threat extends the threats T.SID.1, T.SID.2 to multiple contexts.</p>

4.2.3 OSPs for Java Card System

The organizational security policies to be enforced with respect to the TOE environment that are related to the Security IC Embedded Software are listed below. The definition of the grouping is taken from Section 5.3 of PP [11].

<b>OSP.VERIFICATION</b>	<p><b>File Verification</b></p> <p>This policy shall ensure the consistency between the export files used in the verification and those used for installing the verified file. The policy must also ensure that no modification of the file is performed in between its verification and the signing by the verification authority. See SA.VERIFICATION for details.</p> <p>If the application development guidance provided by the platform developer contains recommendations related to the isolation property of the platform, this policy shall also ensure that the verification authority checks that these recommendations are applied in the application code.</p>
<b>OSP.PROCESS-TOE</b>	<p><b>Identification of the TOE</b></p> <p>An accurate identification must be established for the TOE. This requires that each instantiation of the TOE carries this identification.</p>
<b>OSP.KEY-CHANGE</b>	<p><b>Security Domain Keys Change</b></p> <p>The AP shall change its initial security domain keys (APSD) before any operation on its Security Domain.</p>

**OSP.SECURITY-DOM Security Domains****AINS**

Security domains can be dynamically created, deleted and blocked during usage phase in post-issuance mode.

**4.2.4 Assumptions for Java Card System**

The assumptions for the Security IC Embedded Software are listed below. The definition of the grouping is taken from Section 5.4 of PP [11].

Note that the assumption A.DELETION as defined in PP [11] is excluded. The Card Manager is part of the TOE and therefore the assumption is no longer relevant.

**A.CAP\_FILE****Applets without Native Methods**

CAP Files loaded post-issuance do not contain native methods. The Java Card specification explicitly "does not include support for native methods" ([14]) outside the API.

**A.VERIFICATION****Bytecode Verification**

All the bytecodes are verified at least once, before the loading, before the installation or before the execution, depending on the card capabilities, in order to ensure that each bytecode is valid at execution time.

**A.USE\_DIAG****Usage of TOE's Secure Communication Protocol by OE**

It is assumed that the operational environment supports and uses the secure communication protocols offered by the TOE.

**A.USE\_KEYS****Protected Storage of Keys Outside of TOE**

It is assumed that the keys which are stored outside the TOE and which are used for secure communication and authentication between Smart Card and terminals are protected for confidentiality and integrity in their own storage environment. This is especially true for D.APSD\_KEYS, D.ISD\_KEYS, and D.VASD\_KEYS.

**Info:** This is to assume that the keys used in terminals or systems are correctly protected for confidentiality and integrity in their own environment, as the disclosure of such information which is shared with the TOE but is not under the TOE control, may compromise the security of the TOE.

**A.PROCESS-SEC-IC****Protection during Packaging, Finishing and Personalisation**

It is assumed that security procedures are used after delivery of the TOE by the TOE Manufacturer up to delivery to the end consumer to maintain confidentiality and integrity of the TOE and of its manufacturing and test data (to prevent any possible copy, modification, retention, theft or unauthorised use). This means that the Phases after TOE Delivery are assumed to be protected appropriately. The assets to be protected are: The information and material produced and/or processed by the Security IC Embedded Software Developer in Phase 1 and by the Composite Product Manufacturer can be grouped as follows:

1. the Security IC Embedded Software including specifications, implementation and related documentation,
2. pre-personalisation and personalisation data including specifications of formats and memory areas, test related data,
3. the User Data and related documentation, and
4. material for software development support

as long as they are not under the control of the TOE Manufacturer.

- A.APPS-PROVIDER    Application Provider**  
The AP is a trusted actor that provides basic or secure applications. He is responsible for his security domain keys (D.APSD\_KEYS).  
**Info:** An AP generally refers to the entity that issues the application. For instance it can be a financial institution for a payment application such as EMV or a transport operator for a transport application.
- A.TRUSTED-GUEST OS**  
The external Guest OS provider is a trusted actor that is responsible for the security and trust of his OS.  
**Info:** This mitigates the risk of an hostile external guest OS.
- A.VERIFICATION-AUTHORITY    Verification Authority**  
The VA is a trusted actor who is able to verify bytecode of an application loaded on the card, guarantee and generate the digital signature attached to an application and ensure that its public key for verifying the application signature is on the TOE.  
**Info:** As a consequence, it guarantees the success of the application validation upon loading.

## 5 Security Objectives

### 5.1 Security Objectives for the TOE

#### 5.1.1 Security Objectives related to the IC Protection Profile

The security objectives for the Secure Element Hardware are defined in section 4.1, section 7.2.1 and section 7.4 of the Protection Profile [10]. They are listed in Table 22 and apply entirely to this Security Target.

**Table 22. Security objectives for the TOE defined in the Protection Profile**

Name	Title
O.Malfunction	Protection against Malfunctions
O.Abuse-Func	Protection against Abuse of Functionality
O.Phys-Probing	Protection against Physical Probing
O.Phys-Manipulation	Protection against Physical Manipulation
O.Leak-Inherent	Protection against Inherent Information Leakage
O.Leak-Forced	Protection against Forced Information Leakage
O.RND_HW	Random Numbers
O.Identification	TOE Identification
O.TDES	Cryptographic service Triple-DES
O.AES	Cryptographic service AES

The objective O.RND\_HW explicitly includes deficiencies of hardware (true) random numbers and corresponds to the objective O.RND in [10].

In compliance with Application Note 9 of the Protection Profile [10] the TOE provides security functionality that results in the additional security objectives for the TOE listed in Table 23.

**Table 23. Security Objectives for the TOE added in this Security Target**

Name	Title
O.MEM-ACCESS	Memory Access Control
O.SFR-ACCESS	Special Function Register Access Control
O.FLASH-INTEGRITY	Integrity support of data stored to Flash memory
O.GCM-SUPPORT	Support for NIST Galois/Counter Mode and GMAC

The security objectives in Table 23 are defined as follows:

- O.MEM-ACCESS**      **Memory Access Control**

The TOE controls access of the Cortex-M33 processor, the DMA Controller and the PKC coprocessor over the bus system to ROM, Flash address space, System RAM and PKC RAM. The TOE also controls access of the PKC coprocessor over its Direct Memory Access (DMA) channel to PKC RAM. Control of access is enforced on these ports by generic limitations as well as restrictions based on system operation modes and CPU privilege levels.
- O.SFR-ACCESS**      **Special Function Register Access Control**

The TOE controls access of the Cortex-M33 processor over the bus system to the Special Function Registers of the hardware peripherals. Control of access is enforced on these ports by generic limitations as well as restrictions based on system operation modes and CPU privilege levels.
- O.FLASH-INTEGRITY**      **Integrity support of data stored to Flash memory**

The TOE preserves integrity of content stored to its Flash memory with wearout detection capabilities.
- O.GCM-SUPPORT**      **Support for Galois/Counter Mode and GMAC**

The TOE provides secure hardware based multiplication operation on blocks and incrementing function for the Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC.

From the Security IC life-cycle defined in the Protection Profile [10], all roles involved from Phase 1 up to Phase 6 are performed by NXP. Therefore, "TOE Delivery" has to be seen as an internal process. Therefore objectives for loader functionality from the Protection Profile are not applicable. Instead, the Security IC Embedded Software provides own objectives for loader functionality, that are listed in section [Section 5.1.2.9](#).

## 5.1.2 Security Objectives for Java Card System

### 5.1.2.1 Identification

- OT.SID**      **Subject Identification**

The TOE shall uniquely identify every subject (applet, or CAP file) before granting it access to any service.

### 5.1.2.2 Execution

- OT.FIREWALL**      **Firewall**

The TOE shall ensure controlled sharing of data containers owned by applets of different CAP files or the JCRE and between applets and the TSFs. See SA.FIREWALL for details.

<b>OT.GLOBAL_</b> <b>ARRAYS_CONFID</b>	<b>Confidentiality of Global Arrays</b> The TOE shall ensure that the APDU buffer that is shared by all applications is always cleaned upon applet selection. The TOE shall ensure that the global byte array used for the invocation of the install method of the selected applet is always cleaned after the return from the install method.
<b>OT.GLOBAL_</b> <b>ARRAYS_INTEG</b>	<b>Integrity of Global Arrays</b> The TOE shall ensure that only the currently selected applications may have a write access to the APDU buffer and the global byte array used for the invocation of the install method of the selected applet.
<b>OT.ARRAY_VIEW_</b> <b>CONFID</b>	<b>Confidentiality of Array View</b> The TOE shall ensure that no application can read elements of an array view not having array view security attribute ATTR_READABLE_VIEW. The TOE shall ensure that an application can only read the elements of the array view within the bounds of the array view.
<b>OT.ARRAY_VIEW_</b> <b>INTEG</b>	<b>Integrity of Array View</b> The TOE shall ensure that no application can write to an array view not having array view security attribute ATTR_WRITABLE_VIEW. The TOE shall ensure that an application can only write within the bounds of the array view.
<b>OT.SENSITIVE_</b> <b>RESULTS_INTEG</b>	<b>Sensitive Result</b> The TOE shall ensure that the sensitive results (com.nxp.id.jcopx.security.SensitiveResultX) of sensitive operations executed by applications through the Java Card API are protected in integrity specifically against physical attacks.
<b>OT.NATIVE</b>	<b>Native Code</b> The only means that the Java Card VM shall provide for an application to execute native code is the invocation of a method of the Java Card API, or any additional API. See SA.NATIVE for details.
<b>OT.OPERATE</b>	<b>Correct Operation</b> The TOE must ensure continued correct operation of its security functions. See SA.OPERATE for details.
<b>OT.REALLOCATION</b>	<b>Secure Re-Allocation</b> The TOE shall ensure that the re-allocation of a memory block for the runtime areas of the Java Card VM does not disclose any information that was previously stored in that block.
<b>OT.RESOURCES</b>	<b>Resources availability</b> The TOE shall control the availability of resources for the applications. See SA.RESOURCES for details.

5.1.2.3 Services

<b>OT.ALARM</b>	<b>Alarm</b> The TOE shall provide appropriate feedback information upon detection of a potential security violation. See SA.ALARM for details.
<b>OT.CIPHER</b>	<b>Cipher</b> The TOE shall provide a means to cipher sensitive data for applications in a secure way. In particular, the TOE must support cryptographic algorithms consistent with cryptographic usage policies and standards. See SA.CIPHER for details.

**OT.KEY-MNGT**      **Key Management**  
The TOE shall provide a means to securely manage cryptographic keys. This concerns the correct generation, distribution, access and destruction of cryptographic keys. See SA.KEY-MNGT.

**OT.PIN-MNGT**      **PIN Management**  
The TOE shall provide a means to securely manage PIN objects. See SA.PIN-MNGT for details.  
AppNote: PIN objects may play key roles in the security architecture of client applications. The way they are stored and managed in the memory of the smart card must be carefully considered, and this applies to the whole object rather than the sole value of the PIN.

**OT.TRANSACTION**      **Transaction**  
The TOE must provide a means to execute a set of operations atomically. See SA.TRANSACTION for details.

**5.1.2.4 Object Deletion**

**OT.OBJ-DELETION**      **Object Deletion**  
The TOE shall ensure the object deletion shall not break references to objects. See SA.OBJ-DELETION for further details.

**5.1.2.5 Applet Management**

**OT.APPLI-AUTH**      **Application Authentication**  
The card manager shall enforce the application security policies established by the card issuer by requiring application authentication during application loading on the card. This security objective is a refinement of the Security Objective O.LOAD from [11].  
AppNote: Each application loaded onto the TOE has been signed by a VA. The VA will guarantee that the security policies established by the card issuer on applications are enforced. For example this authority (DAP) or a third party (Mandated DAP) can be present on the TOE as a Security Domain whose role is to verify each signature at application loading.

**OT.DOMAIN-RIGHTS**      **Domain Rights**  
The Card issuer shall not get access or change personalized AP Security Domain keys which belong to the AP. Modification of a Security Domain keyset is restricted to the AP who owns the security domain.  
AppNote: APs have a set of keys that allows them to establish a secure channel between them and the platform. These keys sets are not known by the TOE issuer. The security domain initial keys are changed before any operation on the SD (OE.KEY-CHANGE).

**OT.COMM\_AUTH**      **Communication Mutual Authentication**  
The TOE shall authenticate the origin of the card management requests that the card receives, and authenticate itself to the remote actor.

**OT.COMM\_INTEGRITY**      **Communication Request Integrity**  
The TOE shall verify the integrity of the card management requests that the card receives.

**OT.COMM\_CONFIDENTIALITY**      **Communication Request Confidentiality**  
The TOE shall be able to process card management requests containing encrypted data.



## 5.1.2.6 Card Management

**OT.CARD-MANAGEMENT** **Card Management**  
**ENT**

The TOE shall provide card management functionalities (loading, installation, extradition, deletion of applications and GP registry updates) in charge of the life cycle of the whole device and installed applications (applets). The card manager, the application with specific rights responsible for the administration of the smart card, shall control the access to card management functions. It shall also implement the card issuer's policy on card management.

The Security Objective from [11] for the environment OE.CARD-MANAGEMENT is listed as TOE Security Objective OT.CARD-MANAGEMENT for the TOE as the Card Manager belongs to the TOE for this evaluation. This security objective is a refinement for the Security Objectives O.INSTALL, O.LOAD, and O.DELETION from [11]. Thus, the following objectives are also covered:

- The TOE shall ensure that the installation of an applet performs as expected (See SA.INSTALL for details).
- The TOE shall ensure that the loading of a package into the card is secure.
- The TOE shall ensure that the deletion of a package from the TOE is secure.

AppNote: The card manager will be tightly connected in practice with the rest of the TOE, which in return shall very likely rely on the card manager for the effective enforcement of some of its security functions. The mechanism used to ensure authentication of the TOE issuer, that manages the TOE, or of the Service Providers owning a Security Domain with card management privileges is a secure channel. This channel will be used afterwards to protect commands exchanged with the TOE in confidentiality and integrity. The platform guarantees that only the ISD or the Service Providers owning a Security Domain with the appropriate privilege (Delegated Management) can manage the applications on the card associated with its Security Domain. This is done accordingly with the card issuer's policy on card management. The actor performing the operation must beforehand authenticate with the Security Domain. In the case of Delegated Management, the card management command will be associated with an electronic signature (GlobalPlatform token) verified by the ISD before execution.

The Security Objective from [11] for the environment OE.CARD-MANAGEMENT is listed as TOE Security Objective OT.CARD-MANAGEMENT for the TOE as the Card Manager belongs to the TOE for this evaluation. This security objective is a refinement for the Security Objectives O.INSTALL, O.LOAD, and O.DELETION from [11]. Thus, the following AppNote applicable to O.DELETION applies also:

- Usurpation of identity resulting from a malicious installation of an applet on the card may also be the result of perturbing the communication channel linking the CAD and the card. Even if the CAD is placed in a secure environment, the attacker may try to capture, duplicate, permute or modify the packages sent to the card. He may also try to send one of its own applications as if it came from the card issuer. Thus, this objective is intended to ensure the integrity and authenticity of loaded CAP files.

## 5.1.2.7 Smart Card Platform

<b>OT.SCP.IC</b>	<p><b>IC Physical Protection</b></p> <p>The IC shall provide all security features against physical attacks. This security objective for the environment refers to the point (7) of the security aspect SA.SCP.</p> <p>AppNote: The Security Objectives from [11] for the environment OE.SCP.RECOVERY, OE.SCP.SUPPORT, and OE.SCP.IC are listed as TOE Security Objectives (OT.SCP.RECOVERY, OT.SCP.SUPPORT, and OT.SCP.IC) in this section as the IC belongs to the TOE for this evaluation.</p>
<b>OT.SCP.RECOVERY</b>	<p><b>SCP Recovery</b></p> <p>If there is a loss of power, or if the smart card is withdrawn from the CAD while an operation is in progress, the SCP must allow the TOE to eventually complete the interrupted operation successfully, or recover to a consistent and secure state. This security objective for the environment refers to the security aspect SA.SCP</p> <p>AppNote: The Security Objectives from [11] for the environment OE.SCP.RECOVERY, OE.SCP.SUPPORT, and OE.SCP.IC are listed as TOE Security Objectives (OT.SCP.RECOVERY, OT.SCP.SUPPORT, and OT.SCP.IC) for the TOE in this section as the Smart Card Platform belongs to the TOE for this evaluation.</p>
<b>OT.SCP.SUPPORT</b>	<p><b>SCP Support</b></p> <p>The SCP shall support the TSFs of the TOE. This security objective refers to the security aspects 2, 3, 4 and 5 of SA.SCP</p> <p>AppNote: The Security Objectives from [11] for the environment OE.SCP.RECOVERY, OE.SCP.SUPPORT, and OE.SCP.IC are listed as TOE Security Objectives (OT.SCP.RECOVERY, OT.SCP.SUPPORT, and OT.SCP.IC) for the TOE in this section as the Smart Card Platform belongs to the TOE for this evaluation.</p>
<b>OT.IDENTIFICATION</b>	<p><b>TOE identification</b></p> <p>The TOE must provide means to store Initialization Data and Pre-personalization Data in its non-volatile memory. The Initialization Data (or parts of them) are used for TOE identification.</p>

## 5.1.2.8 Random Numbers

<b>OT.RND</b>	<p><b>Quality of random numbers</b></p> <p>The TOE will ensure the cryptographic quality of random number generation. For instance random numbers shall not be predictable and shall have sufficient entropy. The TOE will ensure that no information about the produced random numbers is available to an attacker since they might be used for instance to generate cryptographic keys.</p>
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## 5.1.2.9 OS Update Mechanism

<b>OT.CONFID-UPDATE-IMAGE.LOAD</b>	<p><b>Confidentiality of Update Image - Load</b></p> <p>The TOE shall ensure that the encrypted image transferred to the device is not disclosed during the installation. The keys used for decrypting the image shall be kept confidential.</p>
<b>OT.AUTH-LOAD-UPDATE-IMAGE</b>	<p><b>Authorization of Update Image - Load</b></p> <p>The TOE shall ensure that it is only possible to load an authorized image.</p>

The following Security Objectives have been added to comply to JIL "Security requirements for post-delivery code loading" [9].

<b>OT.SECURE_LOAD_ ACODE</b>	<b>Secure loading of the Additional Code</b> The Loader of the Initial TOE shall check an evidence of authenticity and integrity of the loaded Additional Code. The Loader enforces that only the allowed version of the Additional Code can be loaded on the Initial TOE. The Loader shall forbid the loading of an Additional Code not intended to be assembled with the Initial TOE. During the Load Phase of an Additional Code, the TOE shall remain secure.
<b>OT.SECURE_AC_ ACTIVATION</b>	<b>Secure activation of the Additional Code</b> Activation of the Additional Code and update of the Identification Data shall be performed at the same time in an Atomic way. All the operations needed for the code to be able to operate as in the Final TOE shall be completed before activation. If the Atomic Activation is successful, then the resulting product is the Final TOE, otherwise (in case of interruption or incident which prevents the forming of the Final TOE), the Initial TOE shall remain in its initial state or fail secure.
<b>OT.TOE_ IDENTIFICATION</b>	<b>Secure identification of the TOE</b> The Identification Data identifies the Initial TOE and Additional Code. The TOE provides means to store Identification Data in its non-volatile memory and guarantees the integrity of these data. After Atomic Activation of the Additional Code, the Identification Data of the Final TOE allows identifications of Initial TOE and Additional Code. The user shall be able to uniquely identify Initial TOE and Additional Code(s) which are embedded in the Final TOE.

**5.1.2.10 Config Applet**

<b>OT.CARD-CONFIGUR ATION</b>	<b>Card Configuration</b> The TOE shall ensure that the customer can only configure customer configuration items and that NXP can configure customer and NXP configuration items. Additionally, the customer can only disable the customer configuration and NXP can disable customer and NXP configuration.
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**5.1.2.11 Restricted Mode**

<b>OT.ATTACK-COUNT ER</b>	<b>Attack Counter Reset</b> The TOE shall ensure that the Attack Counter can only be decremented in a controlled way, either by reset from user with appropriate authorization, or by regular self decrementation after time elapse.
<b>OT.RESTRICTED-MO DE</b>	<b>Restricted Mode</b> The TOE shall ensure that in Restricted Mode all operations return an error except for the limited set of commands that are allowed by the TOE when in Restricted Mode.

**5.1.2.12 Applet Migration**

<b>OT.DATASTORE_ ACCESS</b>	<b>Datstore Access</b> The TOE shall ensure that only an authorized applet instance can access data from the datastore based on its AID. An applet instance is triggered to import/export data in the datastore only by authentic commands
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5.1.2.13 Context Separation

- OT.CONT\_SEP      Context separation**  
The TOE shall prevent a software running in one context from unauthorized access (read/write/execute) to another context memory, peripherals or resources. Any exchange between contexts (like OS or Services) shall be controlled by the TOE.
- OT.CONT\_PRIV      Privileges management**  
The TOE shall ensure that its kernel, also known as Main JCOP, has the highest privileges with regard to any other software-parts running in contexts inside or outside the TOE boundaries.
- OT.CONT\_DOS      Deny of Service**  
The TOE shall prevent Deny of Service by managing the scheduling of the contexts according to their priorities. Only Main JCOP shall be able to define and modify the priorities.

5.2 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment

5.2.1 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment related to the IC Protection Profile

The security objectives for the operational environment in section 4.3 of the Protection Profile [10] are listed in Table 24. They entirely apply to this Security Target.

Table 24. Security objectives for the operational environment defined in the Protection Profile

Name	Title
OE.Process-Sec-IC	Protection during composite product manufacturing <sup>[1]</sup>

[1] This Objective for the operational environment is also inherited from PP0099. The title includes the term "composite" which is not appropriate for the current product but the OE is still valid as it applies to phases after TOE delivery.

5.2.2 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment of Java Card System

- OE.CAP\_FILE      Applet**  
No CAP file loaded post-issuance shall contain native methods.
- OE.VERIFICATION      Bytecode Verification**  
All the bytecodes shall be verified at least once, before the loading, before the installation or before the execution, depending on the card capabilities, in order to ensure that each bytecode is valid at execution time. See SA.VERIFICATION for details.  
Additionally, the applet shall follow all the recommendations, if any, mandated in the platform guidance for maintaining the isolation property of the platform.  
Application Note:  
Constraints to maintain the isolation property of the platform are provided by the platform developer in application development guidance. The constraints apply to all application code loaded in the platform.

<b>OE.CODE-EVIDENCE</b>	<p><b>Code Evidence</b></p> <p>For application code loaded pre-issuance, evaluated technical measures implemented by the TOE or audited organizational measures must ensure that loaded application has not been changed since the code verifications required in OE.VERIFICATION.</p> <p>For application code loaded post-issuance and verified off-card according to the requirements of OE.VERIFICATION, the verification authority shall provide digital evidence to the TOE that the application code has not been modified after the code verification and that he is the actor who performed code verification.</p> <p>For application code loaded post-issuance and partially or entirely verified on-card, technical measures must ensure that the verification required in OE.VERIFICATION are performed. On-card bytecode verifier is out of the scope of this Protection Profile.</p> <p>Application Note: For application code loaded post-issuance and verified off-card, the integrity and authenticity evidence can be achieved by electronic signature of the application code, after code verification, by the actor who performed verification.</p>
<b>OE.APPS-PROVIDER</b>	<p><b>Application Provider</b></p> <p>The AP shall be a trusted actor that provides applications. The AP is responsible for its security domain keys.</p>
<b>OE.TRUSTED-GUEST OS</b>	<p><b>Trusted Guest OS</b></p> <p>The external Guest OS provider is a trusted actor that is responsible for the security and trust of his OS.</p>
<b>OE.VERIFICATION-AUTHORITY</b>	<p><b>Verification Authority</b></p> <p>The VA should be a trusted actor who is able to verify bytecode of an application loaded on the card, guarantee and generate the digital signature attached to an application and ensure that its public key for verifying the application signature is on the TOE.</p>
<b>OE.KEY-CHANGE</b>	<p><b>Security Domain Key Change</b></p> <p>The AP must change its security domain initial keys before any operation on it.</p>
<b>OE.SECURITY-DOMAINS</b>	<p><b>Security Domains</b></p> <p>Security domains can be dynamically created, deleted and blocked during usage phase in post-issuance mode.</p>
<b>OE.USE_DIAG</b>	<p><b>Secure TOE communication protocols</b></p> <p>Secure TOE communication protocols shall be supported and used by the environment.</p>
<b>OE.USE_KEYS</b>	<p><b>Protection of OPE keys</b></p> <p>During the TOE usage, the terminal or system in interaction with the TOE, shall ensure the protection (integrity and confidentiality) of their own keys by operational means and/or procedures.</p>
<b>OE.PROCESS_SECURITY</b>	<p><b>Protection during composite product manufacturing</b></p> <p>Security procedures shall be used after TOE Delivery up to delivery to the end-consumer to maintain confidentiality and integrity of the TOE and of its manufacturing and test data (to prevent any possible copy, modification, retention, theft or unauthorised use). This means that Phases after TOE Delivery up to the end of Phase 6 must be protected appropriately.</p>

**OE.CONFID-UPDATE- Confidentiality of Update Image - CREATE  
IMAGE.CREATE**

The off-card Update Image Creator ensures that the image is signed and transferred encrypted to the device and is not disclosed during the creation and transfer. The keys used for signing and encrypting the image are kept confidential.

**5.3 Security Objectives Rationale**

In this section each threat, Organizational Security Policy, and assumption identified in [Section 4](#) is traced to the security objectives with a rationale.

The security objectives for the TOE defined in [Section 5.1](#) are traced back to the threats countered by them, and to the organisational security policies enforced by them. The security objectives for the operational environment defined in [Section 5.2](#) are traced back to the assumptions they uphold.

**5.3.1 Security Objective Rationale related to the IC Protection Profile**

**5.3.1.1 Rationale for Threats**

[Table 25](#) traces the security objectives for the TOE in [Section 5.1.1](#) back to the threats countered by them and the organisational security policies enforced by them.

**Table 25. Tracing of security objectives to threads**

Name of threat	Name of security objective	Rationale
T.Malfunction	O.Malfunction	For all these threats the corresponding objectives are stated in a way, which directly corresponds to the description of the threat (refer to Section 3.2 of PP [10]). It is clear from the description of each objective (refer to Section 4.1 of PP [10]), that the corresponding threat is removed if the objective is valid. More specifically, in every case the ability to use the attack method successfully is countered, if the objective holds.
T.Abuse-Func	O.Abuse-Func	
T.Phys-Probing	O.Phys-Probing	
T.Phys-Manipulation	O.Phys-Manipulation	
T.Leak-Inherent	O.Leak-Inherent	
T.Leak-Forced	O.Leak-Forced	
T.RND_HW	O.RND_HW	
T.Unauthorized-Access	O.MEM-ACCESS	O.MEM-ACCESS targets to control all access ports available in the TOE to its memories and O.SFR-ACCESS targets to control all access ports available in the TOE to the Special Function Registers of its hardware components. Secondly, both objectives target to control accesses via these ports based on system operation modes, which are used to separate software component types from each other and based on CPU privilege levels, which can be used by a software component type to separate its operating system from the applications it may implement and also to separate its applications from each other.
	O.SFR-ACCESS	

5.3.1.2 Rationale for OSPs

This section traces the security objectives for the TOE in [Section 5.1.1](#) back to the organizational security policies they uphold.

Organizational Security Policies for Secure Element Hardware:

**P.Process-TOE**

Objective	Rationale
O.Identification	O.Identification requires that the TOE has to support the possibility of a unique identification. The unique identification can be stored on the TOE. Since the unique identification is generated by the production environment the production environment must support the integrity of the generated unique identification. The technical and organisational security measures that ensure the security of the development environment and production environment are evaluated based on the assurance measures that are part of the evaluation. The material produced and processed by the TOE Manufacturer and the associated development and production environments are subject of the evaluation. Therefore, the organisational security policy P.Process-TOE is covered by this objective, as far as organisational measures are concerned.

**P.Crypto-Service**

Objective	Rationale
O.TDES	Security objectives O.TDES and O.AES together enforce organizational security policy P.Crypto-Service since they target such kind of cryptographic services defined in P.Crypto-Service.
O.AES	

**P.Add-Components**

Objective	Rationale
O.FLASH-INTEGRITY	Security objectives O.FLASH-INTEGRITY and O.GCM-SUPPORT together enforce organizational security policy P.Add-Components since they target at the components defined in P.Add-Components.
O.GCM-SUPPORT	

5.3.1.3 Rationale for Assumptions

This section traces the security objectives for the Security IC Embedded Software in [Security Objectives for the Security IC Embedded Software](#) and the security objectives for the operational environment in [Section 5.2.1](#) back to the assumptions they uphold.

Assumptions for **Secure Element Hardware**:

**A.Resp-Appl**

Name of security objective	Rationale
OE.Resp-Appl	This security objective taken from Protection Profile [10] requires the Security IC Embedded Software to implement the measures assumed in assumption A.Resp-Appl. That assumption is considered fulfilled, as the concrete requirements for the Security IC Embedded Software are defined in this Security Target.

### 5.3.2 Security Objective Rationale related to the Java Card System

#### 5.3.2.1 Rationale for Threats

This chapter provides the Security Objectives rationale for Java Card System.

The mappings in [Section 5.3.2.1.1](#) (Confidentiality), [Section 5.3.2.1.2](#) (Integrity), [Section 5.3.2.1.3](#) (Identity Usurpation), [Section 5.3.2.1.4](#) (Unauthorized Execution) and [Section 5.3.2.1.5](#) (Denial Of Service) are not augmented with the Context Separation Objectives in order to stay eSE context centric and to maintain modularity, clarity and alignment with the JavaCard Protection Profile [11]. The inter-context protection is then covered in [Section 5.3.2.1.14](#) which also covers, by extension, the threats of the above mentioned chapter with regards to external contexts.

##### 5.3.2.1.1 Confidentiality

#### T.CONFID-UPDATE-IMAGE.LOAD

Objective	Rationale
OT.CONFID-UPDATE-IMAGE.LOAD	Counters the threat by ensuring the confidentiality of D.UPDATE_IMAGE during installing it on the TOE.
OE.CONFID-UPDATE-IMAGE.CREATE	Counters the threat by ensuring that the D.UPDATE_IMAGE is not transferred in plain and that the keys are kept secret.

#### T.CONFID-APPLI-DATA

Objective	Rationale
OT.SID	Counters this threat by providing correct identification of applets.
OT.FIREWALL	Counters this threat by providing the Java Card Virtual Machine Firewall as specified in [15].
OT.GLOBAL_ARRAYS_CONFID	Counters this threat by preventing the disclosure of the information stored in the APDU buffer.
OT.ARRAY_VIEWS_CONFID	Counters this threat by preventing the disclosure of the information shared by applets using array views.
OT.OPERATE	Counters the threat by ensuring that the firewall, which is dynamically enforced, shall never stop operating.
OT.REALLOCATION	Counters this threat by preventing any attempt to read a piece of information that was previously used by an application but has been logically deleted. It states that any information that was formerly stored in a memory block shall be cleared before the block is reused.
OT.ALARM	Counters this threat by obtaining clear warning and error messages from the firewall, which is a software tool automating critical controls, so that the appropriate countermeasure can be taken.
OT.CIPHER	Contributes to counter this threat by protecting the data shared or information communicated between applets and the CAD using cryptographic functions.
OT.KEY-MNGT	Counters this threat by providing appropriate management of keys, PIN's which are particular cases of an application's sensitive data.



Objective	Rationale
OT.PIN-MNGT	Counters this threat by providing appropriate management of keys, PIN's which are particular cases of an application's sensitive data.
OT.TRANSACTION	Counters this threat by providing appropriate management of keys, PIN's which are particular cases of an application's sensitive data.
OT.CARD-MANAGEMENT	Contributes to counter this threat by controlling the access to card management functions.
OT.SCP.RECOVERY	Intended to support the OT.OPERATE and OT.ALARM objectives of the TOE, thus indirectly related to the threats that these objectives contribute to counter.
OT.SCP.SUPPORT	Intended to support the OT.OPERATE and OT.ALARM objectives of the TOE, thus indirectly related to the threats that these objectives contribute to counter.
OE.VERIFICATION	Contributes to counter the threat by checking the bytecode.

**T.CONFID-JCS-CODE**

Objective	Rationale
OT.NATIVE	Counters this threat by ensuring that no native applications can be run to modify a piece of code.
OT.CARD-MANAGEMENT	Contributes to counter this threat by controlling the access to card management functions.
OE.VERIFICATION	Contributes to counter the threat by checking the bytecode.

**T.CONFID-JCS-DATA**

Objective	Rationale
OT.SID	Counters this threat by providing correct identification of applets.
OT.FIREWALL	Contributes to counter this threat by providing means of separating data.
OT.OPERATE	Counters the threat by ensuring that the firewall, which is dynamically enforced, shall never stop operating.
OT.ALARM	Contributes to counter this threat by obtaining clear warning and error messages from the firewall, which is a software tool automating critical controls, so that the appropriate countermeasure can be taken.
OT.CARD-MANAGEMENT	Contributes to counter this threat by controlling the access to card management functions.
OT.SCP.RECOVERY	Intended to support the OT.OPERATE and OT.ALARM objectives of the TOE, thus indirectly related to the threats that these objectives contribute to counter.
OT.SCP.SUPPORT	Intended to support the OT.OPERATE and OT.ALARM objectives of the TOE, thus indirectly related to the threats that these objectives contribute to counter.
OE.VERIFICATION	Contributes to counter the threat by checking the bytecode.

5.3.2.1.2 Integrity

**T.INTEG-UPDATE-IMAGE.LOAD**

Objective	Rationale
OT.SECURE_LOAD_ACODE	Counters the threat directly by ensuring the authenticity and integrity of D.UPDATE_IMAGE.

**T.INTEG-APPLI-CODE**

Objective	Rationale
OT.NATIVE	Counters this threat by ensuring that no native code can be run to modify a piece of code.
OE.VERIFICATION	Contributes to counter the threat by checking the bytecode. Bytecode verification ensures that each of the instructions used on the Java Card platform is used for its intended purpose and in the intended scope of accessibility. As none of these instructions enables modifying a piece of code, no Java Card applet can therefore be executed to modify a piece of code.
OT.CARD-MANAGEMENT	Contributes to counter this threat by controlling the access to card management functions.
OE.CODE-EVIDENCE	The objective OE.CODE-EVIDENCE contributes to counter this threat by ensuring that integrity and authenticity evidences exist for the application code loaded into the platform.

**T.INTEG-APPLI-CODE.LOAD**

Objective	Rationale
OT.CARD-MANAGEMENT	Contributes to counter this threat by controlling the access to card management functions such as the installation, update or deletion of applets.
OE.CODE-EVIDENCE	Contributes to counter this threat by ensuring that the application code loaded into the platform has not been changed after code verification, which ensures code integrity and authenticity.
OT.APPLI-AUTH	Counters this threat by ensuring that the loading of packages is done securely and thus preserves the integrity of packages code.

**T.INTEG-APPLI-DATA[REFINED]**

Objective	Rationale
OT.SID	Counters this threat by providing correct identification of applets.
OT.FIREWALL	Contributes to counter this threat by providing means of separating data.
OT.GLOBAL_ARRAYS_INTEG	Counters this threat by ensuring the integrity of the information stored in the APDU buffer. Application data that is sent to the applet as clear text arrives in the APDU buffer, which is a resource shared by all applications.
OT.ARRAY_VIEWS_INTEG	Counters this threat by preventing the modification of the information shared by applets using array views.
OT.OPERATE	Counters the threat by ensuring that the firewall, which is dynamically enforced, shall never stop operating.

Objective	Rationale
OT.REALLOCATION	Counters the threat by preventing any attempt to read a piece of information that was previously used by an application but has been logically deleted. It states that any information that was formerly stored in a memory block shall be cleared before the block is reused.
OT.ALARM	Contributes to counter this threat by obtaining clear warning and error messages from the firewall, which is a software tool automating critical controls, so that the appropriate countermeasure can be taken.
OT.CIPHER	Contributes to counter this threat by protecting the data shared or information communicated between applets and the CAD using cryptographic functions.
OT.KEY-MNGT	Counters this threat by providing appropriate management of keys, PINs which are particular cases of an application's sensitive data.
OT.PIN-MNGT	Counters this threat by providing appropriate management of keys, PINs which are particular cases of an application's sensitive data.
OT.TRANSACTION	Counters this threat by providing appropriate management of keys, PINs which are particular cases of an application's sensitive data.
OT.CARD-MANAGEMENT	Contributes to counter this threat by controlling the access to card management functions.
OT.SCP.RECOVERY	Intended to support the OT.OPERATE and OT.ALARM objectives of the TOE, thus indirectly related to the threats that these objectives contribute to counter.
OT.SCP.SUPPORT	Intended to support the OT.OPERATE and OT.ALARM objectives of the TOE, thus indirectly related to the threats that these objectives contribute to counter.
OE.CODE-EVIDENCE	Contributes to counter this threat by ensuring that the application code loaded into the platform has not been changed after code verification, which ensures code integrity and authenticity.
OT.DOMAIN-RIGHTS	Contributes to counter this threat by ensuring that personalization of the application by its associated security domain is only performed by the authorized AP.
OE.VERIFICATION	Contributes to counter the threat by checking the bytecode.

**T.INTEG-APPLI-DATA.LOAD**

Objective	Rationale
OT.CARD-MANAGEMENT	Contributes to counter this threat by controlling the access to card management functions such as the installation, update or deletion of applets.
OE.CODE-EVIDENCE	Contributes to counter this threat by ensuring that the application code loaded into the platform has not been changed after code verification, which ensures code integrity and authenticity.
OT.APPLI-AUTH	Counters this threat by ensuring that the loading of packages is done securely and thus preserves the integrity of packages code.

**T.INTEG-JCS-CODE**

Objective	Rationale
OT.NATIVE	Counters this threat by ensuring that no native code can be run to modify a piece of code.
OE.VERIFICATION	Contributes to counter the threat by checking the bytecode. Bytecode verification ensures that each of the instructions used on the Java Card platform is used for its intended purpose and in the intended scope of accessibility. As none of these instructions enables modifying a piece of code, no Java Card applet can therefore be executed to modify a piece of code.
OT.CARD-MANAGEMENT	Contributes to counter this threat by controlling the access to card management functions.
OE.CODE-EVIDENCE	Contributes to counter this threat by ensuring that the application code loaded into the platform has not been changed after code verification, which ensures code integrity and authenticity.

**T.INTEG-JCS-DATA**

Objective	Rationale
OT.SID	Counters this threat by providing correct identification of applets.
OT.FIREWALL	Contributes to counter this threat by providing means of separation.
OT.OPERATE	Counters the threat by ensuring that the firewall shall never stop operating.
OT.ALARM	Contributes to counter this threat by obtaining clear warning and error messages from the firewall so that the appropriate countermeasure can be taken.
OT.CARD-MANAGEMENT	Contributes to counter this threat by controlling the access to card management functions.
OT.SCP.RECOVERY	Intended to support the OT.OPERATE and OT.ALARM objectives of the TOE, thus indirectly related to the threats that these objectives contribute to counter.
OT.SCP.SUPPORT	Intended to support the OT.OPERATE and OT.ALARM objectives of the TOE, thus indirectly related to the threats that these objectives contribute to counter.
OE.CODE-EVIDENCE	Contributes to counter this threat by ensuring that the application code loaded into the platform has not been changed after code verification, which ensures code integrity and authenticity.
OE.VERIFICATION	Contributes to counter the threat by checking the bytecodes.

5.3.2.1.3 Identity Usurpation

**T.SID.1**

Objective	Rationale
OT.SID	Counters this threat by providing unique subject identification.
OT.FIREWALL	Counters the threat by providing separation of application data (like PINs).

Objective	Rationale
OT.GLOBAL_ARRAYS_CONFID	Counters this threat by preventing the disclosure of the installation parameters of an applet (like its name). These parameters are loaded into a global array that is also shared by all the applications. The disclosure of those parameters could be used to impersonate the applet.
OT.GLOBAL_ARRAYS_INTEG	Counters this threat by preventing the disclosure of the installation parameters of an applet (like its name). These parameters are loaded into a global array that is also shared by all the applications. The disclosure of those parameters could be used to impersonate the applet.
OT.CARD-MANAGEMENT	Contributes to counter this threat by preventing usurpation of identity resulting from a malicious installation of an applet on the card.

**T.SID.2**

Objective	Rationale
OT.SID	Counters this threat by providing unique subject identification.
OT.FIREWALL	Contributes to counter this threat by providing means of separation.
OT.OPERATE	Counters the threat by ensuring that the firewall shall never stop operating.
OT.CARD-MANAGEMENT	Contributes to counter this threat by ensuring that installing an applet has no effect on the state of other applets and thus can't change the TOE's attribution of privileged roles.
OT.SCP.RECOVERY	Intended to support the OT.OPERATE and objectives of the TOE, thus indirectly related to the threats that these objectives contribute to counter.
OT.SCP.SUPPORT	Intended to support the OT.OPERATE and objectives of the TOE, thus indirectly related to the threats that these latter objectives contribute to counter.

5.3.2.1.4 Unauthorized Execution

**T.EXE-CODE.1**

Objective	Rationale
OT.FIREWALL	Counters the threat by preventing the execution of non-shareable methods of a class instance by any subject apart from the class instance owner.
OE.VERIFICATION	Contributes to counter the threat by checking the bytecodes. Bytecode verification ensures that each of the instructions used on the Java Card platform is used for its intended purpose and in the intended scope of accessibility. As none of these instructions enables modifying a piece of code, no Java Card applet can therefore be executed to modify a piece of code.

**T.EXE-CODE.2**

Objective	Rationale
OE.VERIFICATION	Contributes to counter the threat by checking the bytecodes. Bytecode verification ensures that each of the instructions used on the Java Card platform is used for its intended purpose and in the intended scope of accessibility. Especially the control flow confinement and the validity of the method references used in the bytecodes are guaranteed.

**T.NATIVE**

Objective	Rationale
OT.NATIVE	Counters this threat by ensuring that a Java Card applet can only access native methods indirectly that is, through an API.
OE.CAP_FILE	Contributes to counter this threat by ensuring that no native applets shall be loaded in post-issuance.
OE.VERIFICATION	Contributes to counter the threat by checking the bytecodes. Bytecode verification also prevents the program counter of an applet to jump into a piece of native code by confining the control flow to the currently executed method.

5.3.2.1.5 Denial of Service

**T.RESOURCES**

Objective	Rationale
OT.OPERATE	Counters the threat by ensuring correct working order.
OT.RESOURCES	Counters the threat directly by objectives on resource-management.
OT.CARD-MANAGEMENT	Counters this threat by controlling the consumption of resources during installation and other card management operations.
OT.SCP.RECOVERY	Intended to support the OT.OPERATE and OT.RESOURCES objectives of the TOE, thus indirectly related to the threats that these objectives contribute to counter.
OT.SCP.SUPPORT	Intended to support the OT.OPERATE and OT.RESOURCES objectives of the TOE, thus indirectly related to the threats that these objectives contribute to counter.

5.3.2.1.6 Card Management

**T.UNAUTHORIZED\_CARD\_MNGT**

Objective	Rationale
OT.CARD-MANAGEMENT	Contributes to counter this threat by controlling the access to card management functions such as the loading, installation, extradition or deletion of applets.
OT.DOMAIN-RIGHTS	Contributes to counter this threat by restricting the modification of an AP security domain keyset to the AP who owns it.
OT.COMM_AUTH	Contributes to counter this threat by preventing unauthorized users from initiating a malicious card management operation.
OT.COMM_INTEGRITY	Contributes to counter this threat by protecting the integrity of the card management data while it is in transit to the TOE.

Objective	Rationale
OT.APPLI-AUTH	Counters this threat by ensuring that the loading of a package is safe.

**T.COM\_EXPLOIT**

Objective	Rationale
OT.COMM_AUTH	Contributes to counter this threat by preventing unauthorized users from initiating a malicious card management operation.
OT.COMM_INTEGRITY	Contributes to counter this threat by protecting the integrity of the card management data while it is in transit to the TOE.
OT.COMM_CONFIDENTIALITY	Contributes to counter this threat by preventing from disclosing encrypted data transiting to the TOE.

**T.LIFE\_CYCLE**

Objective	Rationale
OT.CARD-MANAGEMENT	Contributes to counter this threat by controlling the access to card management functions such as the loading, installation, extradition or deletion of applets.
OT.DOMAIN-RIGHTS	Contributes to counter this threat by restricting the use of an AP security domain keysets, and thus the management of the applications related to this SD, to the AP who owns it.

5.3.2.1.7 Services

**T.OBJ-DELETION**

Objective	Rationale
OT.OBJ-DELETION	Counters this threat by ensuring that object deletion shall not break references to objects.

5.3.2.1.8 Miscellaneous

**T.PHYSICAL**

Objective	Rationale
OT.SCP.IC	Counters physical attacks. Physical protections rely on the underlying platform and are therefore an environmental issue.
OT.RESTRICTED-MODE	Contributes to counter the threat by ensuring that if the limit of the Attack Counter is reached only limited functionality is available.
OT.SENSITIVE_RESULTS_INTEG	If the sensitive result is supported by the TOE, this threat is partially covered by the security objective OT.SENSITIVE_RESULTS_INTEG which ensures that sensitive results are protected against unauthorized modification by physical attacks.

5.3.2.1.9 Random Numbers

**T.RND**

Objective	Rationale
OT.RND	Counters the threat by ensuring the cryptographic quality of random number generation. For instance random numbers shall not be predictable and shall have sufficient entropy. Furthermore, the TOE ensures that no information about the produced random numbers is available to an attacker.

5.3.2.1.10 Config Applet

**T.CONFIG**

Objective	Rationale
OT.CARD-CONFIGURATION	Counters the threat by ensuring that the customer can only read and write customer configuration items using the Customer Configuration Token and NXP can read and write configuration items using the NXP Configuration Token. If access is disabled configuration items can not be read or written.

5.3.2.1.11 OS Update

**T.UNAUTH-LOAD-UPDATE-IMAGE**

Objective	Rationale
OT.SECURE_LOAD_ACODE	Counters the threat directly by ensuring that only authorized (allowed version) images can be installed.
OT.AUTH-LOAD-UPDATE-IMAGE	Counters the threat directly by ensuring that only authorized (allowed version) images can be loaded.

**T.INTERRUPT-OSU**

Objective	Rationale
OT.SECURE_LOAD_ACODE	Counters the threat directly by ensuring that the TOE remains in a secure state after interruption of the OS Update procedure (Load Phase).
OT.TOE_IDENTIFICATION	Counters the threat directly by ensuring that D.TOE_IDENTIFICATION is only updated after successful OS Update procedure.
OT.SECURE_AC_ACTIVATION	Counters the threat directly by ensuring that the update OS is only activated after successful (atomic) OS Update procedure.

5.3.2.1.12 Restricted Mode

**T.RESTRICTED-MODE**

Objective	Rationale
OT.ATTACK-COUNTER	Counters the threat by ensuring that only the ISD can reset the Attack Counter.
OT.RESTRICTED-MODE	Counters the threat by ensuring that only the ISD can reset the Attack Counter.

5.3.2.1.13 Applet Migration

**T.AM\_DATASTORE\_ACCESS**



Objective	Rationale
OT.DATASTORE_ACCESS	Counters the threat by verifying that only an authorized applet instance is able to import data from the datastore. The verification is based on the AID of the applet. Data import from the datastore by an applet instance can be done only by a trusted entity authenticated either by sending the import command via a scp or via untrusted channel using signature and chained hashes.

5.3.2.1.14 Context Separation

**T.CONFID-CONT**

Objective	Rationale
OT.CONT_SEP	Counters the threat by preventing one context to disclose code or data belonging to another context.

**T.INTEG-CONT**

Objective	Rationale
OT.CONT_SEP	Counters the threat by preventing one context to alter code or data belonging to another context.

**T.CONT-SID**

Objective	Rationale
OT.CONT_SEP	Counters the threat by maintaining a context differentiation for each Guest OS.
OT.CONT_PRIV	Counters the threat by preventing execution of code belonging to a Guest OS with kernel privileges.

**T.EXE-CONT**

Objective	Rationale
OT.CONT_SEP	Counters the threat by preventing one context to execute code belonging to another context.
OT.CONT_PRIV	Counters the threat by preventing execution of code belonging to a Guest OS with kernel privileges.

**T.CONT-DOS**

Objective	Rationale
OT.CONT_PRIV	Counters the threat by ensuring that the kernel has always the highest privilege.
OT.CONT_DOS	Counters the threat by ensuring that all the contexts will always remain accesible according the configured context management strategy maintained by Main JCOP.
OT.CONT_SEP	Counters the threat by preventing a context accessing the hardware peripherals and resources of another context without authorization.

5.3.2.2 Rationale for OSPs

**OSP.VERIFICATION**

Objective	Rationale
OE.VERIFICATION	Enforces the OSP by guaranteeing that all the bytecodes shall be verified at least once, before the loading, before the installation or before the execution in order to ensure that each bytecode is valid at execution time.
OT.CARD-MANAGEMENT	Contributing to enforce the OSP by ensuring that the loading of a CAP file into the card is safe.
OT.APPLI-AUTH	Contributing to enforce the OSP by ensuring that the loading of a CAP file into the card is safe.
OE.CODE-EVIDENCE	This policy is enforced by the security objective of the environment OE.CODE-EVIDENCE which ensures that evidences exist that the application code has been verified and not changed after verification.

**OSP.PROCESS-TOE**

Objective	Rationale
OT.IDENTIFICATION	Enforces this organisational security policy by ensuring that the TOE can be uniquely identified.

**OSP.KEY-CHANGE**

Objective	Rationale
OE.KEY-CHANGE	Enforces the OSP by ensuring that the initial keys of the security domain are changed before any operation on them are performed.

**OSP.SECURITY-DOMAINS**

Objective	Rationale
OE.SECURITY-DOMAINS	Enforces the OSP by dynamically create, delete, and block the security domain during usage phase in post-issuance mode.

5.3.2.3 Rationale for Assumptions

**A.CAP\_FILE**

Objective	Rationale
OE.CAP_FILE	Upholds the assumption by ensuring that no CAP file loaded post-issuance shall contain native methods.

**A.VERIFICATION**

Objective	Rationale
OE.VERIFICATION	Upholds the assumption by guaranteeing that all the bytecodes shall be verified at least once, before the loading, before the installation or before the execution in order to ensure that each bytecode is valid at execution time.

Objective	Rationale
OE.CODE-EVIDENCE	This assumption is also upheld by the security objective of the environment OE.CODE-EVIDENCE which ensures that evidences exist that the application code has been verified and not changed after verification.

**A.USE\_DIAG**

Objective	Rationale
OE.USE_DIAG	Directly upholds this assumption.

**A.USE\_KEYS**

Objective	Rationale
OE.USE_KEYS	Directly upholds this assumption.

**A.PROCESS-SEC-IC**

Objective	Rationale
OE.PROCESS_SEC_IC	Directly upholds this assumption.

**A.APPS-PROVIDER**

Objective	Rationale
OE.APPS-PROVIDER	Directly upholds this assumption.

**A.TRUSTED-GUESTOS**

Objective	Rationale
OE.TRUSTED-GUESTOS	Directly upholds this assumption.

**A.VERIFICATION-AUTHORITY**

Objective	Rationale
OE.VERIFICATION-AUTHORITY	Directly upholds this assumption.

## 6 Extended Components Definition (ASE\_ECD)

### 6.1 Extended Components Definition related to the IC Protection Profile

The extended components defined in chapter 5 of the Protection Profile [10] are listed in Table 26. They entirely apply to this Security Target.

Table 26. Extended components defined in the Protection Profile

Name	Title
FCS_RNG	Generation of random numbers
FMT_LIM	Limited capabilities and availability
FAU_SAS	FAU_SAS Audit data storage
FDP_SDC	Stored data confidentiality

### 6.2 Extended Components Definition for Java Card System

All the extended components defined in the JavaCard Open Configuration PP [11] have been taken with no modification and are listed in Table 27.

Table 27. Extended components defined in the JavaCard Open Configuration PP

Name	Title
FCS_RNG.1	Generation of random numbers

Note: FCS\_RNG.1 defined in Table 27 is redundant with FCS\_RNG defined in Table 26. In the current Security Target they represent the same functionality and are both implemented into only one FCS\_RNG.1 occurrence.

#### 6.2.1 TOE Emanation (FPT\_EMSEC)

This section has been taken over from the certified (BSI-PP-0055) Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document with ICAO Application, Basic Access Control [12]. The additional family FPT\_EMSEC (TOE Emanation) of the Class FPT - 'Protection of the TSF' is defined here to describe the IT security functional requirements of the TOE. The TOE shall prevent attacks against the TOE and other secret data where the attack is based on external observable physical phenomena of the TOE. Examples of such attacks are evaluation of TOEs electromagnetic radiation, simple power analysis (SPA), differential power analysis (DPA), timing attacks, etc. This family describes the functional requirements for the limitation of intelligible emanations which are not directly addressed by any other component of Common Criteria part 2 [2].

##### 6.2.1.1 Family behaviour

This family defines requirements to mitigate intelligible emanations.

Component Leveling:




Figure 4. EMSEC Component

FPT\_EMSEC.1 TOE Emanation has two constituents:

- FPT\_EMSEC.1.1 Limit of Emissions requires to net emit intelligible emissions enabling access to TSF data or user data.
- FPT\_EMSEC.1.2 Interface Emanation requires to not emit interface emanation enabling access to TSF data or user data.

Management: FPT\_EMSEC.1

There are no management activities foreseen.

Audit: FPT\_EMSEC.1

There are no actions identified that shall be auditable if FAU\_GEN (Security audit data generation) is included in a PP or ST using FPT\_EMSEC.1

**FPT\_EMSEC.1 TOE Emanation**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: No dependencies.

FPT\_EMSEC.1.1 The TOE shall not emit [**assignment: types of emission**] in excess of [**assignment: specified limits**] enabling access to [**assignment: list of types of TSF data**] and [**assignment: list of types of user data**]

FPT\_EMSEC.1.2 The TOE shall ensure [**assignment: types of users**] are unable to use the following interface [**assignment: type of connection**] to gain access [**assignment: list of types of TSF data**] and [**assignment: list of types of user data**]

## 7 Security Functional Requirements (ASE\_REQ)

### 7.1 Security Functional Requirements related to the IC Protection Profile

#### 7.1.1 Security Functional Requirements

Security functional requirements from the Protection Profile [10] are applied to this Security Target as described in [Section 7.1.1.1](#).

In compliance with Application Note 12 in the Protection Profile [10] this Security Target adds security functional requirements as detailed in [Section 7.1.1.2](#).

##### 7.1.1.1 Security Functional Requirements from Protection Profile

[Table 28](#) lists the security functional requirements for the TOE, which are defined in section 6.1 of the Protection Profile [10]. They entirely apply to this Security Target.

**Table 28. Security Functional Requirements from the Protection Profile**

Name	Title
FRU_FLT.2	Limited fault tolerance
FMT_LIM.1	Limited capabilities
FMT_LIM.2	Limited availability
FPT_PHP.3	Resistance to physical attack
FDP_ITT.1	Basic internal transfer protection
FPT_ITT.1	Basic internal TSF data transfer protection
FDP_IFC.1	Subset information flow control

FPT\_PHP.3 requests the TSF to resist physical manipulation and physical probing by responding automatically such that the security functional requirements are always enforced. The TOE implements two types of such automatic responses. One type of response is permanent and implicitly hampers exploitability or already incidence of physical attacks. The other type of response is conditional upon a failed check and explicitly detects physical attacks. Such type of response stops operation of the TOE or the attacked parts of it. This addresses Application Note 19 in the Protection Profile [10].

On some further Security Functional Requirements from the Protection Profile [10] operations are made. [Table 29](#) gives an overview on the Security Functional Requirements that were subject to refinement, selection, assignment and/or iteration operations in this Security Target.

**Table 29. Security Functional Requirements from the Protection Profile with operations done in this Security Target**

Name	Title
FPT_FLS.1	Failure with preservation of secure state
FAU_SAS.1	Audit storage
FDP_SDC.1	Stored data confidentiality



**FDP\_SDI.2.2/FLT** Upon detection of a data integrity error, the TSF shall *correct the error or trigger a security reset or raise a non-maskable interrupt*<sup>5</sup>.

This Security Target performs a second iteration operation on FDP\_SDI.2, which complies with section 8.1 in CC Part 1 [1], and also performs two assignment operations on this iteration according to Application Note 18 in the Protection Profile [10].

**FDP\_SDI.2/AGE** **Stored data integrity monitoring and action - Ageing**  
**Hierarchical to:** FDP\_SDI.1 Stored data integrity monitoring  
**Dependencies:** No dependencies.  
**FDP\_SDI.2.1/AGE** The TSF shall monitor user data stored in containers controlled by the TSF for *integrity violations due to ageing*<sup>6</sup> on all objects, based on the following attributes: *ageing check information associated with the data including code stored to the Flash memory*<sup>7</sup>.

**FDP\_SDI.2.2/AGE** Upon detection of a data integrity error, the TSF shall *raise a wearout failure*<sup>8</sup>.

This Security Target performs an iteration operation on FCS\_RNG.1, which complies with section 8.1 in CC Part 1 [1]. It also performs two assignment operations according to Application Note 21 in the Protection Profile [10]. The operations follow the example and its Application Note 44 in section 7.5.1 of the Protection Profile [10] in consideration of the updated documents [6] and [5].

**FCS\_RNG.1/PTG.2** **Random number generation - PTG.2**  
**Hierarchical to:** No other components.  
**Dependencies:** No dependencies.  
**Note:** This security functional requirement complies with PTG.2 in [5]  
**FCS\_RNG.1.1/PTG.2** The TSF shall provide a *physical*<sup>9</sup> random number generator that implements:  
 {  
 (PTG.2.1) *A total failure test detects a total failure of entropy source immediately when the RNG has started. When a total failure is detected, no random numbers will be output.*  
 (PTG.2.2) *If a total failure of the entropy source occurs while the RNG is being operated, the RNG prevents the output of any internal random number that depends on some raw random numbers that have been generated after the total failure of the entropy source.*  
 (PTG.2.3) *The online test shall detect non-tolerable statistical defects of the raw random number sequence (i) immediately when the RNG has started, and (ii) while*

5 [assignment: *action to be taken*]

6 [assignment: *integrity errors*]

7 [assignment: *memory area*]

8 [assignment: *action to be taken*]

9 [selection: *physical, hybrid physical, hybrid deterministic*]



the RNG is being operated. The TSF must not output any random numbers before the power-up online test has finished successfully or when a defect has been detected.

(PTG.2.4) The online test procedure shall be effective to detect non-tolerable weaknesses of the random numbers soon.

(PTG.2.5) The online test procedure checks the quality of the raw random number sequence. It is triggered continuously. The online test is suitable for detecting non-tolerable statistical defects of the statistical properties of the raw random numbers within an acceptable period of time.

}<sup>10</sup>

**FCS\_RNG.1.2/PTG.2**

The TSF shall provide octets of bits or packages of 32 bits<sup>11</sup> that meet

{

(PTG.2.6) Test procedure A does not distinguish the internal random numbers from output sequences of an ideal RNG.

(PTG.2.7) The average Shannon entropy per internal random bit exceeds 0.997.

}<sup>12</sup>

**7.1.1.2 Security Functional Requirements added in this Security Target**

Table 30 lists the Security Functional Requirements for the TOE, which are added in this Security Target. These Security Functional Requirements are taken from CC Part 2 [2]. They are subject to refinement, selection, assignment and/or iteration operations in this Security Target.

**Table 30. Security functional requirements added in this Security Target**

Name	Title
FCS_COP.1: • FCS_COP.1.1[AES] • FCS_COP.1.1[TripleDES] • FCS_COP.1.1[GCM]	Cryptographic operation
FCS_CKM.4	Cryptographic Key Destruction
FDP_ACC.1: • FDP_ACC.1/MEM • FDP_ACC.1/SFR	Subset access control
FDP_ACF.1: • FDP_ACF.1/MEM • FDP_ACF.1/SFR	Security attribute based access control

10 [assignment: list of security capabilities]

11 [selection: bits, octets of bits, numbers [assignment: format of the numbers]]

12 [assignment: a defined quality metric]

**Table 30. Security functional requirements added in this Security Target ...continued**

Name	Title
FMT_MSA.1: • FMT_MSA.1/MEM • FMT_MSA.1/SFR	Management of security attributes
FMT_MSA.3: • FMT_MSA.3/MEM • FMT_MSA.3/SFR	Static attribute initialisation
FMT_SMF.1	Management of TSF data

The Security Functional Requirements FCS\_COP.1.1[AES], FCS\_COP.1.1[TripleDES], FCS\_COP.1.1[GCM] and FCS\_CKM.4 are defined in [Section 7.2.1.1.2](#).

The Security Functional Requirements FDP\_ACC.1 and FDP\_ACF.1 in [Table 30](#) address the Access Control Policy of the TOE. The following Security Function Policies (SFP) are applied to the memories and hardware components.

• **Memory Access Control Policy**

The TOE shall control any access to all memories. Access shall be controlled depending on which context the access request is performed. Context information shall be attached to all bus transactions throughout the whole system. For each master a context and privilege level is to be assigned, as well as dedicated code regions and data regions. Context specific encryption/decryption and associated bus errors shall be applied. The access rules are defined in [56](#).

• **Peripheral Access Control Policy**

The TOE shall control any access to hardware peripherals. Access shall be controlled depending on which context the access request is performed. Context information shall be attached to all bus transactions throughout the whole system. For each master a context and privilege level is to be assigned. Any slave needs to check if access is allowed for the actual context. Context specific encryption/decryption and associated bus errors shall be applied. The access rules are defined in [56](#).

This Security Target performs two iteration operations on FDP\_ACC.1 and also two assignment operations on each iteration, which comply with section 8.1 of CC Part 1 [\[1\]](#).

The Access Control Policy controls access to two groups of objects, which are *objects for access control to memories* (MEM) and *objects for access control to hardware peripherals* (SFR).

**FDP\_ACC.1/MEM**

**Subset access control - Memories**

**Hierarchical to:**

No other components.

**Dependencies:**

FDP\_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control

**FDP\_ACC.1.1/MEM**

The TSF shall enforce the *Memory Access Control Policy*<sup>13</sup> on all subjects, all objects for access control to memories and all operations on the objects for access control to memories<sup>14</sup>.

**FDP\_ACC.1/SFR**

**Subset access control - Peripherals**

**Hierarchical to:**

No other components.

<sup>13</sup> [assignment: *access control SFP*]

<sup>14</sup> [assignment: *list of subjects, objects, and operations among subjects and objects covered by the SFP*]

**Dependencies:** FDP\_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control  
**FDP\_ACC.1.1/SFR** The TSF shall enforce the *Peripheral Access Control Policy*<sup>15</sup> on all subjects, all objects for access control to Peripherals and all operations on the objects for access control to peripherals<sup>16</sup>.

This Security Target performs two iteration operations on FDP\_ACF.1 and also five assignment operations on each iteration, which comply with section 8.1 in CC Part 1 [1].

**FDP\_ACF.1/MEM** **Security attribute based access control - Memories**  
**Hierarchical to:** No other components  
**Dependencies:** FDP\_ACC.1 Subset access control

**FDP\_ACF.1.1/MEM** FMT\_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation  
 The TSF shall enforce the *Memory Access Control Policy*<sup>17</sup> to objects based on the following:

*Subjects for access control to memories:*

- software running on the privilege levels required to secure operation
- software running on privilege levels

*Objects for access control to memories:*

- data and code stored to memories

*Security attributes:*

- memory area and operation to be performed<sup>18</sup>.

**FDP\_ACF1.2/MEM** The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:

*Evaluate the context and privilege level of the requesting subject and the attributes of the requested code regions and data regions. Accesses that are denied cannot be utilised by the subject that attempted to perform the operation.*

**FDP\_ACF1.3/MEM** The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules:

*None.*

**FDP\_ACF1.4/MEM** The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules:

*None.*

<sup>15</sup> [assignment: access control SFP]

<sup>16</sup> [assignment: list of subjects, objects, and operations among subjects and objects covered by the SFP]

<sup>17</sup> [assignment: access control SFP]

<sup>18</sup> [assignment: list of subjects and objects controlled under the indicated SFP, and for each, the SFP-relevant security attributes, or named groups of SFP-relevant security attributes]

<p><b>FDP_ACF.1/SFR</b>  <b>Hierarchical to:</b>  <b>Dependencies:</b></p>	<p><b>Security attribute based access control - Peripherals</b>                  No other components.                  FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control                  FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation</p>
<p><b>FDP_ACF.1.1/SFR</b></p>	<p>The TSF shall enforce the <i>Peripheral Access Control Policy</i><sup>19</sup> to objects based on the following:</p> <p><i>Subjects for access control to peripherals:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>software running on the privilege levels required to secure operation</i></li> <li>• <i>software running on privilege levels</i></li> </ul> <p><i>Objects for access control to peripherals:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>all peripherals that require access control</i></li> </ul> <p><i>Security attributes:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>peripheral and operation to be performed</i><sup>20</sup>.</li> </ul>
<p><b>FDP_ACF1.2/SFR</b></p>	<p>The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:</p> <p><i>Evaluate the context and privilege level of the requesting subject and the attributes of the requested peripheral and operation. Accesses that are denied cannot be utilised by the subject that attempted to perform the operation.</i></p>
<p><b>FDP_ACF1.3/SFR</b></p>	<p>The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules:</p> <p><i>None.</i></p>
<p><b>FDP_ACF1.4/SFR</b></p>	<p>The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules:</p> <p><i>None.</i></p>

This Security Target performs two iteration operations on FMT\_MSA.1 and also one selection and four assignment operations on each iteration, which comply with section 8.1 of CC Part 1.

<p><b>FMT_MSA.1/MEM</b>  <b>Hierarchical to:</b>  <b>Dependencies:</b></p>	<p><b>Management of security attributes - Memories</b>                  No other components                  [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]                  FMT_SMR.1 Security roles                  FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions</p>
--	---

<sup>19</sup> [assignment: *access control SFP*]

<sup>20</sup> [assignment: *list of subjects and objects controlled under the indicated SFP, and for each, the SFP-relevant security attributes, or named groups of SFP-relevant security attributes*]

<b>FMT_MSA.1.1/MEM</b>	The TSF shall enforce the <i>Memory Access Control Policy</i> <sup>21</sup> to restrict the ability to <i>modify</i> <sup>22</sup> the security attributes <i>assigned access rights</i> <sup>23</sup> to the subjects. <sup>24</sup>
<b>FMT_MSA.1/SFR</b>	<b>Management of security attributes - Hardware components</b>
<b>Hierarchical to:</b>	No other components
<b>Dependencies:</b>	[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control] FMT_SMR.1 Security roles FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
<b>FMT_MSA.1.1/SFR</b>	The TSF shall enforce the <i>Peripheral Access Control Policy</i> <sup>25</sup> to restrict the ability to <i>modify</i> <sup>26</sup> the security attributes <i>assigned access rights</i> <sup>27</sup> to the subjects. <sup>28</sup>

This Security Target performs two iteration operations on FMT\_MSA.3 and also one selection and two assignment operations on each iteration, which comply with section 8.1 of CC Part 1.

<b>FMT_MSA.3/MEM</b>	<b>Static attribute initialisation - Memories</b>
<b>Hierarchical to:</b>	No other components
<b>Dependencies:</b>	FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
<b>FMT_MSA.3.1/MEM</b>	The TSF shall enforce the <i>Memory Access Control Policy</i> <sup>29</sup> to provide <i>restrictive</i> <sup>30</sup> default values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.
<b>FMT_MSA.3.2/MEM</b>	The TSF shall allow the <i>no role</i> <sup>31</sup> to specify alternative initial values to override the default values when an object or information is created.
<b>FMT_MSA.3/SFR</b>	<b>Static attribute initialisation - Hardware components</b>
<b>Hierarchical to:</b>	No other components
<b>Dependencies:</b>	FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
<b>FMT_MSA.3.1/SFR</b>	The TSF shall enforce the <i>Peripheral Access Control Policy</i> <sup>32</sup> to provide <i>restrictive</i>

21 [assignment: *access control SFP(s), information flow control SFP(s)*]  
 22 [selection: *change\_default, query, modify, delete* [assignment: *other operations*]]  
 23 [assignment: *list of security attributes*]  
 24 [assignment: *the authorised identified roles*]  
 25 [assignment: *access control SFP(s), information flow control SFP(s)*]  
 26 [selection: *change\_default, query, modify, delete* [assignment: *other operations*]]  
 27 [assignment: *list of security attributes*]  
 28 [assignment: *the authorised identified roles*]  
 29 [assignment: *access control SFP, information flow control SFP*]  
 30 [selection, choose one of: *restrictive, permissive, [assignment: other property]*]  
 31 [assignment: *the authorised identified roles*]  
 32 [assignment: *access control SFP, information flow control SFP*]

**FMT\_MSA.3.2/SFR** <sup>33</sup> default values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.  
The TSF shall allow the *no role*<sup>34</sup> to specify alternative initial values to override the default values when an object or information is created.

This Security Target performs the assignment operations on FMT\_SMF.1, which comply with section 8.1 of CC Part 1 [1].

**FMT\_SMF.1** **Specification of Management Functions**  
**Hierarchical to:** No other components.  
**Dependencies:** No dependencies.  
**FMT\_SMF.1.1** The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions:  
*Transformations in system operation modes for subjects*  
*Change in the CPU privilege level for subject(s)*

<sup>35</sup>

## 7.1.2 Security Requirements Rationale

### 7.1.2.1 Rationale for the Security Functional Requirements

The Security Objectives for the TOE are mapped to the Security Functional Requirements in [Table 31](#).

It indicates the sufficient necessity and rationality of security requirements, that is, each security objective has at least one security functional requirement corresponding to it, and each security functional requirement solves at least one security objective, which is sufficient and necessary for security objectives.

**Table 31. Mapping of the Security Objectives for the TOE to the Security Functional Requirements for the TOE**

Security Objective for the TOE	Security Functional Requirement of the TOE
O.Malfunction	FRU_FLT.2, FPT_FLS.1
O.Abuse-Func	FMT_LIM.1, FMT_LIM.2
	FRU_FLT.2, FTP_FLS.1
	FPT_PHP.3
	FDP_ITT.1, FPT_ITT.1, FDP_IFC.1
O.Phys-Probing	FPT_PHP.3
	FDP_SDC.1
O.Phys-Manipulation	FDP_SDI.2/FLT
	FPT_PHP.3

<sup>33</sup> [selection, choose one of: *restrictive, permissive, [assignment: other property]*]

<sup>34</sup> [assignment: *the authorised identified roles*]

<sup>35</sup> [assignment: *list of management functions to be provided by the TSF*]

**Table 31. Mapping of the Security Objectives for the TOE to the Security Functional Requirements for the TOE ...continued**

Security Objective for the TOE	Security Functional Requirement of the TOE
O.Leak-Inherent	FDP_ITT.1, FPT_ITT.1 , FDP_IFC.1
O.Leak-Forced	FRU_FLT.2, FPT_FLS.1
O.RND_HW	FPT_PHP.3
	FDP_ITT.1, FPT_ITT.1, FDP_IFC.1
	FCS_RNG.1/PTG.2
	FRU_FLT.2, FPT_FLS.1
	FPT_PHP.3
	FDP_ITT.1, FPT_ITT.1 , FDP_IFC.1
O.Identification	FAU_SAS.1[SCP]
O.TDES	FCS_COP.1.1[TripleDES], FCS_CKM.4
O.AES	FCS_COP.1.1[AES], FCS_CKM.4
O.GCM-SUPPORT	FCS_COP.1.1[GCM]
O.FLASH-INTEGRITY	FDP_SDI.2/AGE
O.MEM-ACCESS	FDP_ACC.1/MEM
	FDP_ACF.1/MEM
	FMT_MSA.1/MEM
	FMT_MSA.3/MEM
	FMT_SMF.1
O.SFR-ACCESS	FDP_ACC.1/SFR
	FDP_ACF.1/SFR
	FMT_MSA.1/SFR
	FMT_MSA.3/SFR
	FMT_SMF.1

The green colored cells in [Table 31](#) show how the Protection Profile [\[10\]](#) maps its security objectives for the TOE to the Security Functional Requirements for the TOE, see section 6.3.1 and section 7.4.2. of the Protection Profile [\[10\]](#). Green marks this for the mandatory security requirements of the protection profile. Section 6.3.1 of the Protection Profile [\[10\]](#) also gives the rationale for the mappings colored in green.

The justification related to security objective O.TDES is as follows:

O.TDES is met by FCS\_COP.1.1[TripleDES] and FCS\_CKM.4 since FCS\_COP.1.1[TripleDES] requests the TOE to implement the cryptographic service targeted in O.TDES according to approved public standards and FCS\_CKM.4 requests the TOE to implement a secure destruction method for its cryptographic key.

The justification related to security objective O.AES is as follows:

O.AES is met by FCS\_COP.1.1[AES] and FCS\_CKM.4 since FCS\_COP.1.1[AES] requests the TOE to implement the cryptographic service targeted in O.AES according

to approved public standards and FCS\_CKM.4 requests the TOE to implement a secure destruction method for its cryptographic key.

The justification related to security objective O.GCM-SUPPORT is as follows:

O.GCM-SUPPORT is met by FCS\_COP.1.1[GCM] since FCS\_COP.1.1[GCM] requests the TOE to implement the support for cryptographic services targeted in O.GCM-SUPPORT according to an approved public standard. No keys are used by the support for the cryptographic services.

The justification related to security objective O.MEM-ACCESS is as follows:

O.MEM-ACCESS is met by FDP\_ACC.1/MEM, FDP\_ACF.1/MEM, FMT\_MSA.1/MEM, FMT\_MSA.3/MEM and FMT\_SMF.1 together.

FDP\_ACC.1/MEM requests the TOE to enforce the Access Control Policy to its memories. FDP\_ACF.1/MEM gives the rules for all access ports of the TOE versus system operation modes and CPU privilege levels, which must be applied to the objects, and also the dependencies of these rules on security attributes. FMT\_MSA.1/MEM and FMT\_MSA.3/MEM give the restrictions required on these security attributes. FMT\_SMF.1 finally lists the rules for all access ports that make the TOE changing their system operation modes and CPU privilege levels.

The justification related to security objective O.SFR-ACCESS is as follows:

O.SFR-ACCESS is met by FDP\_ACC.1/SFR, FDP\_ACF.1/SFR, FMT\_MSA.1/SFR, FMT\_MSA.3/SFR and FMT\_SMF.1 together.

FDP\_ACC.1/SFR requests the TOE to enforce the Access Control Policy to its hardware components. FDP\_ACF.1/SFR gives the rules for all access ports of the TOE versus system operation modes and CPU privilege levels, which must be applied to the objects, and also the dependencies of these rules on security attributes. FMT\_MSA.1/MEM and FMT\_MSA.3/MEM give the restrictions required on these security attributes. FMT\_SMF.1 finally lists the rules for all access ports that make the TOE changing their system operation modes and CPU privilege levels.

The justification related to security objective O.FLASH-INTEGRITY is as follows:

O.FLASH-INTEGRITY is met by FDP\_SDI.2/AGE for the following reason. O.FLASH-INTEGRITY targets to preserve integrity over life-time and FDP\_SDI.2/AGE addresses this with a request to monitor integrity and either correct violations or indicate a wearout failure.

### 7.1.3 Security Requirements Dependencies

#### 7.1.3.1 Dependencies of Security Functional Requirements

The dependencies of the Security Functional Requirements for the TOE are given in [Table 32](#).

**Table 32. Dependencies of the Security Functional Requirements for the TOE**

SFR of the TOE	Dependencies	Fulfilled by SFRs
FRU_FLT.2	FPT_FLS.1	FPT_FLS.1
FPT_FLS.1	none	N/A
FMT_LIM.1	FMT_LIM.2	FMT_LIM.2
FMT_LIM.2	FMT_LIM.1	FMT_LIM.1



Table 32. Dependencies of the Security Functional Requirements for the TOE ...continued

SFR of the TOE	Dependencies	Fulfilled by SFRs
FPT_PHP.3	none	N/A
FDP_ITT.1	FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1	FDP_IFC.1
FPT_ITT.1	none	N/A
FDP_IFC.1	FDP_IFF.1	N/A, see sec. 6.3.2 in PP [10]
FAU_SAS.1[SCP]	none	N/A
FDP_SDC.1	none	N/A
FDP_SDI.2/FLT	none	N/A
FDP_SDI.2/AGE	none	N/A
FCS_RNG.1/PTG.2	none	N/A
FCS_COP.1.1[TripleDES]	FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or FCS_CKM.1	see item 1 below
	FCS_CKM.4	FCS_CKM.4/TDES
FCS_COP.1.1[AES]	FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or FCS_CKM.1	see item 1 below
	FCS_CKM.4	FCS_CKM.4/AES
FCS_COP.1.1[GCM]	FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or FCS_CKM.1	see item 1 below
	FCS_CKM.4	N/R, see item 2 below
FCS_CKM.4	FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or FCS_CKM.1	see item 1 below
FDP_ACC.1/MEM	FDP_ACF.1	FDP_ACF.1/MEM
FDP_ACC.1/SFR	FDP_ACF.1	FDP_ACF.1/SFR
FDP_ACF.1/MEM	FDP_ACC.1	FDP_ACC.1/MEM
	FMT_MSA.3	FMT_MSA.3/MEM
FDP_ACF.1/SFR	FDP_ACC.1	FDP_ACC.1/SFR
	FMT_MSA.3	FMT_MSA.3/SFR
FMT_MSA.1/MEM	FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1	FDP_ACC.1/MEM
	FMT_SMR.1	see item 3 below
	FMT_SMF.1	FMT_SMF.1
FMT_MSA.1/SFR	FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1	FDP_ACC.1/SFR
	FMT_SMR.1	see item 3 below
	FMT_SMF.1	FMT_SMF.1
FMT_MSA.3/MEM	FMT_MSA.1	FMT_MSA.1/MEM
	FMT_SMR.1	see item 3 below
FMT_MSA.3/SFR	FMT_MSA.1	FMT_MSA.1/SFR
	FMT_SMR.1	see item 3 below
FMT_SMF.1	none	N/A

1. The dependencies of Security Functional Requirements FCS\_CKM.4, FCS\_COP.1.1[TripleDES], FCS\_COP.1.1[AES], FCS\_COP.1.1[GCM] on the Security Functional Requirements FDP\_ITC.1 or FDP\_ITC.2 or FCS\_CKM.1 are not considered in this Security Target if these SFRs are not fulfilled. This is because the decision on how to import user data and how to generate the keys shall be left to the Security IC Embedded Software.

2. The dependencies of Security Functional Requirements FCS\_COP.1.1[GCM] on Security Functional Requirements FCS\_CKM.4 don't have to be considered in this Security Target since their operations do not need any cryptographic keys.
3. The dependencies of Security Functional Requirements FMT\_MSA.1/MEM, FMT\_MSA.3/MEM, FMT\_MSA.1/SFR and FMT\_MSA.3/SFR on FMT\_SMR.1 are not considered in this Security Target. This is because the security attributes shall be managed by Security IC Embedded Software based on which the Security IC Embedded Software shall be capable to maintain roles and assign users to roles appropriate to its needs.

### 7.1.3.2 Security Requirements are Internally Consistent

The statement on internal consistency of security requirements in section 6.3.4 of the Protection Profile [\[10\]](#) entirely applies to this Security Target.

Security functional requirements FRU\_FLT.2, FPT\_FLS.1, FPT\_PHP.3, FDP\_SDC.1, FDP\_SDI.2/FLT, FDP\_ITT.1, FPT\_ITT.1, FDP\_IFC.1, which meet security objectives O.Malfunction, O.Phys-Probing, O.Phys-Manipulation, O.Leak-Inherent and O.Leak-Forced, protect the whole security functionality of the TOE and with this also the cryptographic operations requested in all iterations on FCS\_COP.1, related operations on keys as requested in the iterations on FCS\_CKM.4 as well as the access control policy according to FMT\_SMF.1 and both iterations on each of FDP\_ACC.1, FDP\_ACF.1, FMT\_MAS.1 and FMT\_MSA.3.

The iterations FDP\_SDI.2/FLT and FDP\_SDI.2/AGE on FCS\_SDI.2 complement each other in protecting integrity since they both request security functionality that detects integrity violations. Therefore FDP\_SDI.2/AGE also adds to O.Phys-Manipulation.

The iterations on FCS\_COP and FCS\_CKM do not conflict since they address different operations with different keys.

The two iterations on each FDP\_ACC.1, FDP\_ACF.1, FMT\_MSA.1 and FMT\_MSA.3 do not contradict as they are related to different objects and their requests on shared security attributes fit together.

## 7.2 Security Functional Requirements for Java Card System

### 7.2.1 Security Functional Requirements

This section states the security functional requirements for the JCOP component of the TOE. For readability requirements are arranged into groups taken from [\[11\]](#). Further groups are added to cover additional security functional requirements.

In this chapter, the assignment and selection operations of the SFRs are marked within [ ] with the keywords "assignment" or "selection" printed in bold. There is no distinction between the operations performed in the PP and the operations performed in the ST. The iterations are marked by an identifier within [ ] appended to the name of the SFR. The refinements coming from the PP are reproduced as they are in the PP. Some additional refinements are introduced and are explicitly identified in a dedicated "Refinement" paragraph just after the SFR statement. Finally, a refinement for a group of SFRs is provided and justified in [Section 2.3.3.3](#) around [Table 14](#). Note that this convention only applies to the current chapter.

**Table 33. Requirement Groups**

Group	Description
Core with Logical Channels (CoreG_LC)	The CoreG_LC contains the requirements concerning the runtime environment of the Java Card System implementing logical channels. This includes the firewall policy and the requirements related to the Java Card API.
Installation (InstG)	The InstG contains the security requirements concerning the installation of post-issuance applications. It does not address card management issues in the broad sense, but only those security aspects of the installation procedure that are related to applet execution.
Applet deletion (ADELG)	The ADELG contains the security requirements for erasing installed applets from the card.
Remote Method Invocation (RMIG)	The RMIG contains the security requirements for the remote method invocation feature, which provides a new protocol of communication between the terminal and the applets. This feature is not supported by the TOE.
Object deletion (ODELG)	The ODELG contains the security requirements for the object deletion capability. This provides a safe memory recovering mechanism.
Secure carrier (CarG)	The CarG group contains minimal requirements for secure downloading of applications on the card. This group contains the security requirements for preventing, in those configurations that do not support on-card static or dynamic bytecode verification, the installation of a CAP file that has not been bytecode verified, or that has been modified after bytecode verification.
External Memory (EMG)	The EMG contains the security requirements for the external memory feature. This feature is not supported by the TOE.
Further Security Functional Requirements	This group contains further security requirements not covered by the PP <a href="#">[11]</a> .
Configuration (ConfG)	This group contains security requirements related to NXP Proprietary product configuration feature.
OS Update	This group contains security requirements related to NXP Proprietary product OS Update feature.
Restricted Mode	This group contains security requirements related to NXP Proprietary Restricted Mode feature.
Applet Migration	This group contains security requirements related to NXP Proprietary Restricted Applet Migration feature.
Context Separation (CONTSEP)	The CONTSEP group contains the requirements for context separation between Main JCOP (kernel) and hosted Guest OSs, and between each hosted Guest OSs themselves.

Subjects are active components of the TOE that (essentially) act on the behalf of users. The users of the TOE include people or institutions (like the applet developer, the card issuer, the verification authority), hardware (like the CAD where the card is inserted or the PCD) and software components (like the application packages installed on the card). Some of the users may just be aliases for other users. For instance, the verification authority in charge of the bytecode verification of the applications may be just an alias for the card issuer. Subjects (prefixed with an "S") are described in the following table:

Table 34. Java Card Subject Descriptions

Subjects	Descriptions
S.ADEL	The applet deletion manager which also acts on behalf of the card issuer. It may be an applet ([15], §11), but its role asks anyway for a specific treatment from the security viewpoint.
S.CAD	The CAD represents the actor that requests services by issuing commands to the card. It also plays the role of the off-card entity that communicates with the S.INSTALLER.
S.INSTALLER	The installer is the on-card entity which acts on behalf of the card issuer. This subject is involved in the loading of CAP files and installation of applets.
S.JCRE	The runtime environment under which Java programs in a smart card are executed.
S.JCVM	The bytecode interpreter that enforces the firewall at runtime.
S.LOCAL	Operand stack of a JCVM frame, or local variable of a JCVM frame containing an object or an array of references.
S.SD	A GlobalPlatform Security Domain representing on the card a off-card entity. This entity can be the Issuer, an Application Provider, the Controlling Authority or the Verification Authority.
S.MEMBER	Any object's field, static field or array position.
S.PACKAGE	A package is a namespace within the Java programming language that may contain classes and interfaces, and in the context of Java Card technology, it defines either a user library, or one or several applets.
S.CAP_FILE	A CAP file may contain multiple Java language packages. A package is a namespace within the Java programming language that may contain classes and interfaces. A CAP file may contain packages that define either user library, or one or several applets. A CAP file compliant with Java Card Specifications version 3.1 may contain multiple Java language packages. An EXTENDED CAP file as specified in Java Card Specifications version 3.1 may contain only applet packages, only library packages or a combination of library packages. A COMPACT CAP file as specified in Java Card Specifications version 3.1 or CAP files compliant to previous versions of Java Card Specification, MUST contain only a single package representing a library or one or more applets.
S.OSU	OSU provides secure functionality to update the TOE operating system with an image created by a trusted off-card entity (S.UpdateImageCreator)
S.UpdateImageCreator	The off-card Update Image Creator ensures that the image is signed and transferred encrypted to the device and is not disclosed during the creation and transfer. The keys used for signing and encrypting the image are kept confidential.
S.Archive_Manager	Handles incoming Applet Migration APDU Commands and access to the O.APPLLET_MIGRATION_DATASTORE.
S.Customer	The subject that has the Customer Configuration Token generation key.
S.NXP	The subject that has the NXP Configuration Token generation key.
S.ACAdmin	The subject that has the Attack Counter Token Key.
S.ConfigurationMechanism	On card entity which can read and write configuration items.

**Table 34. Java Card Subject Descriptions...continued**

Subjects	Descriptions
S.MainJCOP	Main JCOP operating system (secured privileged state) that is in the boundaries of the TOE.
S.GuestOS	One or several Guest Operating System (non-secured state) inside or outside the boundaries of the TOE. S.GuestOS includes the specific code of the Guest OS but also the Shared Code that is executed by the GuestOS and executed with the inherited access rights of this GuestOS.

Objects (prefixed with an "O") are described in the following table:

**Table 35. Object Groups**

Objects	Descriptions
O.APPLLET	Any installed applet, its code and data.
O.CODE_CAP_FILE	The code of a CAP file, including all linking information. On the Java Card platform, a CAP file is the installation unit.
O.JAVAOBJECT	Java class instance or array. It should be noticed that KEYS, PIN, arrays and applet instances are specific objects in the Java programming language.

Objects specific to APPLLET MIGRATION (prefixed with an "O") are described in the following table:

**Table 36. Applet Migration Object Groups**

Objects	Descriptions
O.APPLLET_MIGRATION_DATASTORE	Saves User Data: byte arrays, Key Data and PIN Data in the datastore.
O.APPLLET_CURRENT	The Applet instance on the TOE that is to be updated.
O.APPLLET_LOADED	The new Applet that is loaded and installed onto to TOE and updates O.APPLLET_CURRENT.
O.APPLLET_MIGRATION_PLAN	The migration plan which maps the AID of the exporting applet instance to the AID of the importing applet instance.

Objects specific to DOMAIN SEPARATION (prefixed with an "O") are described in the following table:

**Table 37. Domain Separation Object Groups**

Objects	Descriptions
O.GuestOS_Memory_Region	Memory region (addressable memory cells or registers) that is allocated to S.GuestOS (i.e. a context) though the Access Control Table. Some memory regions are in the boundaries of the TOE and some other not.
O.MainJCOP_Memory_Region	Memory region (addressable memory cells or registers) that is allocated to S.MainJCOP and that is in the boundaries of the TOE.

Information (prefixed with an "I") is described in the following table:

Table 38. Information Groups

Information	Description
I.DATA	JCVM Reference Data: objectref addresses of APDU buffer, JCRE-owned instances of APDU class and byte array for install method.

Security attributes linked to these subjects, objects and information are described in the following table:

Table 39. Security attribute description

Security attributes	Description
Active Applets	The set of the active applets' AIDs. An active applet is an applet that is selected on at least one of the logical channels.
Applet Selection Status	"Selected" or "Deselected".
Applet's Version Number	The version number of an applet indicated in the export file.
Attack Counter	Attack Counter
CAP File AID	The AID of a CAP file.
Context	CAP file AID or "Java Card RE".
Currently Active Context	CAP file AID or "Java Card RE".
Current Sequence Number	The current number of a valid OS installed on the TOE or current number of a OS update step during update process.
Dependent Package AID	Allows the retrieval of the Package AID and applet's version number.
Final Sequence Number	The sequence number which is reached after completing the update process. This is uniquely linked to the JCOP version of the final TOE.
Image Type	Type of D.UPDATE_IMAGE. Can be either Upgrade, Self Update or Downgrade.
LC Selection Status	Multiselectable, Non-multiselectable or "None".
LifeTime	CLEAR_ON_DESELECT or PERSISTENT. <i>Note: Transient objects of type CLEAR_ON_RESET behave like persistent objects in that they can be accessed only when the Currently Active Context is the object's context.</i>
Owner	The Owner of an object is either the applet instance that created the object or the CAP file (library) where it has been defined (these latter objects can only be arrays that initialize static fields of the CAP file). The owner of a remote object is the applet instance that created the object.
Package AID	The AID of each package indicated in the export file.
Reference Sequence Number	Is the sequence number which the TOE has before the update process is started. This is uniquely linked to the JCOP version of the initial TOE.
Registered Applets	The set of AID of the applet instances registered on the card.
Remote	An object is Remote if it is an instance of a class that directly or indirectly implements the interface java.rmi.Remote. It applies only if the TOE provides JCRMI functionality.
Resident CAP files	The set of AIDs of the CAP files already loaded on the card.
Resident Packages	The set of AIDs of the packages already loaded on the card.

Table 39. Security attribute description...continued

Security attributes	Description
Selected Applet Context	CAP file AID or "None".
Sharing	Standards, SIO, Array View, Java Card RE Entry Point or global array.
Static References	Static fields of a CAP file may contain references to objects. The Static References attribute records those references.
Address Space	Accessible memory portion.
Verification Key	Key to verify integrity of D.UPDATE_IMAGE.
Decryption Key	Key for decrypting D.UPDATE_IMAGE.
Customer Configuration Token generation key	The customer key to generate tokens for product configuration.
NXP Configuration Token generation key	The NXP key to generate tokens for product configuration.
Attack Counter Token Key	The key to generate tokens for Attack Counter Reset.
NXP Configuration Access	The NXP Configuration Access can either be enabled or disabled.
Customer Configuration Access	The Customer Configuration Access can either be enabled or disabled.
Access privilege	For each configuration item the access privilege attribute defines who (Customer and/or NXP) is allowed to read/write the item.
Key Set	Key Set for Secure Channel.
Received Sequence Number	Sequence number of the uploaded D.UPDATE_IMAGE.
Security Level	Secure Communication Security Level defined in Section 10.6 of [18].
Secure Channel Protocol	Secure Channel Protocol version used.
Session Key	Secure Channel's session key.
Sequence Counter	Secure Channel Session's Sequence Counter.
ICV	Secure Channel Session's ICV.
Card Life Cycle	Defined in Section 5.1.1 of [18].
Privileges	Defined in Section 6.6.1 of [18].
Loaded Applet AID	AID of O.APPLET_LOADED.
Current Instance AID	The AID of O.APPLET_CURRENT that is to be updated.
New Instance AID	The AID of O.APPLET_LOADED that is loaded onto the TOE and replaces O.APPLET_CURRENT.
Life-cycle Status	Defined in Section 5.3.2 of [18]
Access Control Table	Security attributes used to define the access control of S.GuestOS and S.MainJCOP to objects O.GuestOS_Memory_Region and O.MainJCOP_Memory_Region.

Operations (prefixed with "OP") are described in the following table. Each operation has parameters given between brackets, among which there is the "accessed object", the first one, when applicable. Parameters may be seen as security attributes that are under the control of the subject performing the operation.

**Table 40. Operation Description**

Operations	Description
OP.ARRAY_ACCESS (O.JAVAOBJECT, field)	Read/Write an array component.
OP.ARRAY_LENGTH (O.JAVAOBJECT, field)	Get length of an array component.
OP.ARRAY_T_ALOAD (O.JAVAOBJECT, field)	Read from an Array component
OP.ARRAY_T_ASTORE (O.JAVAOBJECT, field)	Write to an Array component
OP.ARRAY_ASTORE (O.JAVAOBJECT, field)	Store into reference array component.
OP.CREATE (Sharing, LifeTime)(*) <sup>[1]</sup>	Creation of an object (new, makeTransient or createArrayView call).
OP.DELETE_APPLET (O.APPLET,...)	Delete an installed applet and its objects, either logically or physically.
OP.DELETE_CAP_FILE (O.CODE_CAP_FILE,...)	Delete a CAP file, either logically or physically.
OP.DELETE_CAP_FILE_APPLET (O.CODE_CAP_FILE,...)	Delete a CAP file and its installed applets, either logically or physically.
OP.INSTANCE_FIELD (O.JAVAOBJECT, field)	Read/Write a field of an instance of a class in the Java programming language.
OP.INVK_VIRTUAL (O.JAVAOBJECT, method, arg1,...)	Invoke a virtual method (either on a class instance or an array object).
OP.INVK_INTERFACE (O.JAVAOBJECT, method, arg1,...)	Invoke an interface method.
OP.JAVA (...)	Any access in the sense of [15], §6.2.8. It stands for one of the operations OP.ARRAY_ACCESS, OP.INSTANCE_FIELD, OP.INVK_VIRTUAL, OP.INVK_INTERFACE, OP.THROW, OP.TYPE_ACCESS.
OP.PUT (S1,S2,I)	Transfer a piece of information I from S1 to S2.
OP.THROW (O.JAVAOBJECT)	Throwing of an object (athrow, see [15], §6.2.8.7).
OP.TYPE_ACCESS (O.JAVAOBJECT, class)	Invoke checkcast or instanceof on an object in order to access to classes (standard or shareable interfaces objects).
OP.READ_CONFIG_ITEM	Reading a Config Item from the configuration area.



Table 40. Operation Description...continued

Operations	Description
OP.MODIFY_CONFIG_ITEM	Writing of a Config Item.
OP.USE_CONFIG_ITEM	Operational usage of Config Items by subjects inside the TOE.
OP.TRIGGER_UPDATE	APDU Command that initializes the OS Update procedure.
OP.EXPORT_APPLET_DATA	Access O.APPLET_MIGRATION_DATASTORE to write User Data: byte array, PIN and Key Data and the corresponding Current Instance AID. Also Loaded Applet AID is saved to identify the Applet instance that can import the data.
OP.IMPORT_APPLET_DATA	Access O.APPLET_MIGRATION_DATASTORE to retrieve previously exported applet data: byte array, PIN and Key Data.
OP.CONT_ACCESS	Any Read/Write/Execute CPU or DMA (not Execute for DMA) operation performed by S.GuestOS, S.MainJCOP
OP.Modification_Of_Access_Control_Table	Modification of the Access Control Table

[1] For this operation, there is no accessed object. This rule enforces that shareable transient objects are not allowed. For instance, during the creation of an object, the JavaCardClass attribute's value is chosen by the creator.

7.2.1.1 COREG\_LC Security Functional Requirements

The list of SFRs of this category are taken from [11].

7.2.1.1.1 Firewall policy

**FDP\_ACC.2 [FIREWALL]**

**Complete access control (FIREWALL)**

Hierarchical to: FDP\_ACC.1 Subset access control.

Dependencies: FDP\_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control.

**FDP\_ACC.2.1 [FIREWALL]**

The TSF shall enforce the **[assignment: FIREWALL access control SFP]** on **[assignment: S.CAP\_FILE, S.JCRE, S.JCVM, O.JAVAOBJECT]** and all operations among subjects and objects covered by the SFP.

Refinement

The operations involved in the policy are:

- OP.CREATE(Sharing, LifeTime)(\*),
- OP.INVK\_INTERFACE(O.JAVAOBJECT, method, arg1, ...),
- OP.INVK\_VIRTUAL(O.JAVAOBJECT, method, arg1, ...),
- OP.JAVA(...),
- OP.THROW(O.JAVAOBJECT),
- OP.TYPE\_ACCESS(O.JAVAOBJECT, class),
- OP.ARRAY\_LENGTH(O.JAVAOBJECT, field),
- OP.ARRAY\_T\_ALOAD(O.JAVAOBJECT, field),
- OP.ARRAY\_T\_ASTORE(O.JAVAOBJECT, field),

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• OP.ARRAY_AASTORE(O.JAVAOBJECT, field).</li> </ul>
FDP_ACC.2.2 [FIREWALL]	The TSF shall ensure that all operations between any subject controlled by the TSF and any object controlled by the TSF are covered by an access control SFP.
Application Note	It should be noticed that accessing array's components of a static array, and more generally fields and methods of static objects, is an access to the corresponding O.JAVAOBJECT.
<b>FDP_ACF.1 [FIREWALL]</b>	<b>Security attribute based access control (FIREWALL)</b>
Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation.
FDP_ACF.1.1 [FIREWALL]	<p>The TSF shall enforce the <b>[assignment: FIREWALL access control SFP]</b> to objects based on the following <b>[assignment:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• S.CAP_FILE: security attributes LC Selection Status</li> <li>• S.JCVM: security attributes Active Applets, Currently Active Context</li> <li>• S.JCRE: security attributes Selected Applet Context</li> <li>• O.JAVAOBJECT: security attributes Sharing, Context, LifeTime</li> </ul> <p><b>].</b></p>
FDP_ACF.1.2 [FIREWALL]	<p>The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed: <b>[assignment:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• R.JAVA.1 ([15], §6.2.8): S.CAP_FILE may freely perform <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– OP.INVK_VIRTUAL(O.JAVAOBJECT, method, arg1, ...)</li> <li>– OP.INVK_INTERFACE(O.JAVAOBJECT, method, arg1, ...)</li> <li>– OP.THROW(O.JAVAOBJECT)</li> <li>– OP.TYPE_ACCESS(O.JAVAOBJECT, class)</li> </ul> upon any O.JAVAOBJECT whose Sharing attribute has value "JCRE entry point" or "global array".</li> <li>• R.JAVA.2 ([15], §6.2.8): S.CAP_FILE may freely perform <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– OP.ARRAY_ACCESS</li> <li>– OP.INSTANCE_FIELD</li> <li>– OP.INVK_VIRTUAL(O.JAVAOBJECT, method, arg1, ...)</li> <li>– OP.INVK_INTERFACE(O.JAVAOBJECT, method, arg1, ...)</li> <li>– OP.THROW(O.JAVAOBJECT)</li> </ul> upon any O.JAVAOBJECT whose Sharing attribute has value "Standard" and whose LifeTime attribute has value</li> </ul>

- "PERSISTENT" only if O.JAVAOBJECT's Context attribute has the same value as the active context.
- R.JAVA.3 ([15], §6.2.8.10): S.CAP\_FILE may perform
    - OP.TYPE\_ACCESS(O.JAVAOBJECT, class)
 upon an O.JAVAOBJECT with Context attribute different from the current active context, whose Sharing attribute has value "SIO" only if O.JAVAOBJECT is being cast into (checkcast) or is being verified as being an instance of (instanceof) an interface that extends the Shareable interface.
  - R.JAVA.4 ([15], §6.2.8.6): S.CAP\_FILE may perform
    - OP.INVK\_INTERFACE(O.JAVAOBJECT, method, arg1, ...)
 upon an O.JAVAOBJECT with Context attribute different from the currently active context, whose Sharing attribute has the value "SIO", and whose Context attribute has the value "CAP File AID", only if the invoked interface method extends the Shareable interface and one of the following conditions applies:
    - The value of the attribute LC Selection Status of the CAP file whose AID is "CAP File AID" is "Multiselectable",
    - The value of the attribute LC Selection Status of the CAP file whose AID is "CAP File AID" is "Non-multiselectable", and either "Package AID" is the value of the currently selected applet or otherwise "CAP File AID" does not occur in the attribute Active Applets.
  - R.JAVA.5: S.CAP\_FILE may perform
    - OP.CREATE(Sharing, LifeTime)(\*)
 upon O.JAVAOBJECT only if the value of the Sharing parameter is "Standard" or "SIO".
  - R.JAVA.6 ([15], §6.2.8.10): S.CAP\_FILE may freely perform
    - OP.ARRAY\_ACCESS(O.JAVAOBJECT, field)
    - OP.ARRAY\_LENGTH(O.JAVAOBJECT, field)
 upon any O.JAVAOBJECT whose Sharing attribute has value "global array".

].

FDP\_ACF.1.3  
[FIREWALL]

The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: **[assignment:**

- The subject S.JCRE can freely perform OP.JAVA(...) and OP.CREATE(Sharing, LifeTime)(\*), with the exception given in FDP\_ACF.1.4 [FIREWALL], provided it is the Currently Active Context.
- The only means that the subject S.JCVM shall provide for an application to execute native code is the invocation of a Java Card API method (through
  - OP.INVK\_INTERFACE(O.JAVAOBJECT, method, arg1, ...)
  - OP.INVK\_VIRTUAL(O.JAVAOBJECT, method, arg1, ...)

].

FDP\_ACF.1.4  
[FIREWALL]

The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules:**[assignment:**

- Any subject with OP.JAVA(...) upon an O.JAVAOBJECT whose LifeTime attribute has value "CLEAR\_ON\_DESELECT" if O.JAVAOBJECT's Context attribute is not the same as the Selected Applet Context.
- Any subject attempting to create an object by the means of OP.CREATE(Sharing, LifeTime)(\*) and a "CLEAR\_ON\_DESELECT" LifeTime parameter if the active context is not the same as the Selected Applet Context.
- S.CAP\_FILE performing OP.ARRAY\_AASTORE(O.JAVAOBJECT, field) of the reference of an O.JAVAOBJECT whose Sharing attribute has value "global array" or "Temporary".
- S.CAP\_FILE performing OP.PUTFIELD or OP.PUTSTATIC of the reference of an O.JAVAOBJECT whose Sharing attribute has value "global array" or "Temporary".
- R.JAVA.7 ([15], §6.2.8.2): S.CAP\_FILE performing OP.ARRAY\_T\_ASTORE into an array view without ATTR\_WRITABLE\_VIEW access attribute.
- R.JAVA.8 ([15], §6.2.8.2): S.CAP\_FILE performing OP.ARRAY\_T\_ALOAD into an array view without ATTR\_READABLE\_VIEW access attribute.

].

Application Note

FDP\_ACF.1.4 [FIREWALL]:

- The deletion of applets may render some O.JAVAOBJECT inaccessible, and the Java Card RE may be in charge of this aspect. This can be done, for instance, by ensuring that references to objects belonging to a deleted application are considered as a null reference.

In the case of an array type, fields are components of the array ([17], §2.14, §2.7.7), as well as the length; the only methods of an array object are those inherited from the Object class.

The Sharing attribute defines five categories of objects:

- Standard ones, whose both fields and methods are under the firewall policy,
- Shareable interface Objects (SIO), which provide a secure mechanism for inter-applet communication,
- JCRE entry points (Temporary or Permanent), who have freely accessible methods but protected fields,
- Global arrays, having both unprotected fields (including components; refer to JavaCardClass discussion above) and methods.
- Array Views, having fields/elements access controlled by access control attributes, ATTR\_READABLE\_VIEW and ATTR\_WRITABLE\_VIEW and methods.

When a new object is created, it is associated with the Currently Active Context. But the object is owned by the applet instance within the Currently Active Context when the object is instantiated ([15], §6.1.3). An object is owned by an applet instance, by the JCRE or by the library where it has been defined (these latter objects can only be arrays that initialize static fields of CAP files).

([15], Glossary) Selected Applet Context. The Java Card RE keeps track of the currently selected Java Card applet. Upon receiving a SELECT command with this applet's AID, the Java Card RE makes this applet the Selected Applet Context. The Java Card RE sends all APDU commands to the Selected Applet Context.

While the expression "Selected Applet Context" refers to a specific installed applet, the relevant aspect to the policy is the context (CAP file AID) of the selected applet. In this policy, the "Selected Applet Context" is the AID of the selected CAP file.

([15], §6.1.2.1) At any point in time, there is only one active context within the Java Card VM (this is called the Currently Active Context).

It should be noticed that the invocation of static methods (or access to a static field) is not considered by this policy, as there are no firewall rules. They have no effect on the active context as well and the "acting CAP File" is not the one to which the static method belongs to in this case.

It should be noticed that the Java Card platform, version 2.2.x and version 3.x.x Classic Edition, introduces the possibility for an applet instance to be selected on multiple logical channels at the same time, or accepting other applets belonging to the same CAP file being selected simultaneously. These applets are referred to as multiselectable applets. Applets that belong to a same CAP file are either all multiselectable or not ([14], §2.2.5). Therefore, the selection mode can be regarded as an attribute of CAP file. No selection mode is defined for a library CAP file.

An applet instance will be considered an active applet instance if it is currently selected in at least one logical channel. An applet instance is the currently selected applet instance only if it is processing the current command. There can only be one currently selected applet instance at a given time. ([15], §4).

**FDP\_IFC.1 [JCVM] Subset information flow control (JCVM)**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FDP\_IFF.1 Simple security attributes

FDP\_IFC.1.1 [JCVM] The TSF shall enforce the **[assignment: JCVM information flow control SFPs]** on **[assignment: S.JCVM, S.LOCAL, S.MEMBER, I.DATA and OP.PUT(S1,S2,I)]**.

Application note It should be noticed that references of temporary Java Card RE entry points, which cannot be stored in class variables, instance variables or array components, are transferred from the internal memory of the Java Card RE (TSF data) to some stack through specific APIs (Java Card RE owned exceptions) or Java Card RE invoked methods (such as the process(APDU apdu)); these are causes of OP.PUT(S1,S2,I) operations as well.

**FDP\_IFF.1 [JCVM] Simple security attributes (JCVM)**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FDP\_IFC.1 Subset information flow control FMT\_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation.

FDP\_IFF.1.1 [JCVM] The TSF shall enforce the **[assignment: JCVM information flow control SFP]** based on the following types of subject and information security attributes **[assignment:**

- S.JCVM: security attributes Currently Active Context ]

FDP\_IFF.1.2 [JCVM] The TSF shall permit an information flow between a controlled subject and controlled information via a controlled operation if the following rules hold: **[assignment:**

- An operation OP.PUT(S1, S.MEMBER, I.DATA) is allowed if and only if the Currently Active Context is "Java Card RE".
- other OP.PUT operations are allowed regardless of the Currently Active Context's value.

].

FDP\_IFF.1.3 [JCVM] The TSF shall enforce**[assignment:no additional information flow control SFP rules]**.

FDP\_IFF.1.4 [JCVM] The TSF shall explicitly authorise an information flow based on the following rules: **[assignment:none]**.

FDP\_IFF.1.5 [JCVM] The TSF shall explicitly deny an information flow based on the following rules: **[assignment: none]**.

Application note The storage of temporary Java Card RE-owned objects references is runtime-enforced ([15], §6.2.8.1-3).  
  
It should be noticed that this policy essentially applies to the execution of bytecode. Native methods, the Java Card RE itself and possibly some API methods can be granted specific rights or limitations through the FDP\_IFF.1.3 [JCVM] to FDP\_IFF.1.5 [JCVM] elements. The way the Java Card virtual machine manages the transfer of values on the stack and local variables (returned values, uncaught exceptions) from and to internal

registers is implementation dependent. For instance, a returned reference, depending on the implementation of the stack frame, may transit through an internal register prior to being pushed on the stack of the invoker. The returned bytecode would cause more than one OP.PUT operation under this scheme.

### FDP\_RIP.1 [OBJECT]

#### Subset residual information protection

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: No dependencies.

FDP\_RIP.1.1  
[OBJECT] The TSF shall ensure that any previous information content of a resource is made unavailable upon the **[selection: allocation of the resource to]** the following objects: **[assignment: class instances and arrays]**.

Application note The semantics of the Java programming language requires for any object field and array position to be initialized with default values when the resource is allocated [\[17\]](#), §2.5.1.

### FMT\_MSA.1 [JCRE] Management of security attributes (JCRE)

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: [FDP\_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP\_IFC.1 Subset information flow control], FMT\_SMR.1 Security roles, FMT\_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions.

FMT\_MSA.1.1  
[JCRE] The TSF shall enforce the **[assignment: FIREWALL access control SFP]** to restrict the ability to **[selection: modify]** the security attributes **[assignment: Selected Applet Context]** to **[assignment: S.JCRE]**.

Application note The modification of the Selected Applet Context should be performed in accordance with the rules given in [\[15\]](#), §4 and [\[14\]](#), §3.4.

### FMT\_MSA.1 [JCVM]

#### Management of security attributes (JCVM)

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: [FDP\_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP\_IFC.1 Subset information flow control], FMT\_SMR.1 Security roles, FMT\_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions.

FMT\_MSA.1.1  
[JCVM] The TSF shall enforce the **[assignment: FIREWALL access control SFP and the JCVM information flow control SFP]** to restrict the ability to **[selection:modify]** the security attributes **[assignment: Currently Active Context and Active Applets]** to **[assignment:S.JCVM]**.

Application note The modification of the Selected Applet Context should be performed in accordance with the rules given in [\[15\]](#), §4 and [\[14\]](#), §3.4.

### FMT\_MSA.2 [FIREWALL-JCVM] **Secure security attributes (FIREWALL-JCVM)**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: [FDP\_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP\_IFC.1 Subset information flow control], FMT\_MSA.1 Management of security attributes, FMT\_SMR.1 Security roles.

FMT\_MSA.2.1  
[FIREWALL-JCVM] The TSF shall ensure that only secure values are accepted for **[assignment: all the security attributes of subjects and objects defined in the FIREWALL access control SFP and the JCVM information flow control SFP]**.

Application note The following rules are given as examples only. For instance, the last two rules are motivated by the fact that the Java Card API defines only transient arrays factory methods. Future versions may allow the creation of transient objects belonging to arbitrary classes; such evolution will naturally change the range of "secure values" for this component.

- The Context attribute of an O.JAVAOBJECT must correspond to that of an installed applet or be "Java Card RE".
- An O.JAVAOBJECT whose Sharing attribute is a Java Card RE entry point or a global array necessarily has "Java Card RE" as the value for its Context security attribute.
- An O.JAVAOBJECT whose Sharing attribute value is a global array necessarily has "array of primitive type" as a JavaCardClass security attribute's value.
- Any O.JAVAOBJECT whose Sharing attribute value is not "Standard" has a PERSISTENT-LifeTime attribute's value.
- Any O.JAVAOBJECT whose LifeTime attribute value is not PERSISTENT has an array type as JavaCardClass attribute's value.

### FMT\_MSA.3 [FIREWALL] **Static attribute initialisation (FIREWALL)**

Hierarchical to: No other components.



Dependencies:	FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes FMT_SMR.1 Security roles.
FMT_MSA.3.1 [FIREWALL]	The TSF shall enforce the <b>[assignment: FIREWALL access control SFP]</b> to provide <b>[selection: restrictive]</b> default values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.
FMT_MSA.3.2 [FIREWALL-EditoriallyRefined]	The TSF shall not allow <b>[assignment: any role]</b> to specify alternative initial values to override the default values when an object or information is created.
Application note	<p>FMT_MSA.3.1 [FIREWALL]</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Objects' security attributes of the access control policy are created and initialized at the creation of the object or the subject. Afterwards, these attributes are no longer mutable (FMT_MSA.1 [JCRE]). At the creation of an object (OP.CREATE), the newly created object, assuming that the FIREWALL access control SFP permits the operation, gets its Lifetime and Sharing attributes from the parameters of the operation; on the contrary, its Context attribute has a default value, which is its creator's Context attribute and AID respectively ([15], §6.1.3). There is one default value for the Selected Applet Context that is the default applet identifier's Context, and one default value for the Currently Active Context that is "Java Card RE".</li> <li>• The knowledge of which reference corresponds to a temporary entry point object or a global array and which does not is solely available to the Java Card RE (and the Java Card virtual machine).</li> </ul> <p>FMT_MSA.3.2 [FIREWALL]</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The intent is that none of the identified roles has privileges with regard to the default values of the security attributes. It should be noticed that creation of objects is an operation controlled by the FIREWALL access control SFP. The operation shall fail anyway if the created object would have had security attributes whose value violates FMT_MSA.2.1 [FIREWALL-JCVM].</li> </ul>
<b>FMT_MSA.3 [JCVM]</b>	<b>Static attribute initialisation (JCVM)</b>
Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes FMT_SMR.1 Security roles.
FMT_MSA.3.1 [JCVM]	The TSF shall enforce the <b>[assignment: JCVM information flow control SFP]</b> to provide <b>[selection: restrictive]</b> default values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.

FMT\_MSA.3.2 [JCVM-EditoriallyRefined] The TSF shall not allow **[assignment: any role]** to specify alternative initial values to override the default values when an object or information is created.

### **FMT\_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: No dependencies.

FMT\_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions:**[assignment:**

1. modify the Currently Active Context, the Selected Applet Context and the Active Applets

**].**

### **FMT\_SMR.1 Security roles**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FIA\_UID.1 Timing of identification.

FMT\_SMR.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the roles **[assignment:**

- Java Card RE (JCRE),
- Java Card VM (JCVM).

**].**

FMT\_SMR.1.2 The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.

#### 7.2.1.1.2 Application Programming Interface

The following SFRs are related to the Java Card API. The whole set of cryptographic algorithms is generally not implemented because of limited memory resources and/or limitations due to exportation. Therefore, the following requirements only apply to the implemented subset. It should be noticed that the execution of the additional native code is not within the TSF. Nevertheless, access to API native methods from the Java Card System is controlled by TSF because there is no difference between native and interpreted methods in their interface or invocation mechanism.

### **FCS\_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: [FCS\_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or FCS\_COP.1 Cryptographic operation] FCS\_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction.

FCS_CKM.1.1	The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm <b>[assignment: JCOP RNG]</b> and specified cryptographic key sizes <b>[assignment: DES: Key lengths - LENGTH_DES3_2KEY, LENGTH_DES3_3KEY bit, AES: Key lengths - LENGTH_AES_128, LENGTH_AES_192, LENGTH_AES_256 bit]</b> that meet the following: <b>[assignment: FCS_RNG.1 or FCS_RNG.1[HDT]]</b> .
FCS_CKM.1.1[RSA]	The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm <b>[assignment: RSA and RSA-CRT key generation algorithm]</b> and specified cryptographic key sizes <b>[assignment: from 512 to 4096 bits by steps of 256 bits]</b> that meet the following: <b>[assignment: [32] and [38]]</b> .
FCS_CKM.1.1[ECC]	The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm <b>[assignment: ECC key generation algorithm]</b> and specified cryptographic key sizes <b>[assignment: any length from 128 to 528 bits]</b> that meet the following: <b>[assignment: [33] and [38]]</b> .
FCS_CKM.1.1[EdDSA]	The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm <b>[assignment: EdDSA key generation algorithm]</b> and specified cryptographic key sizes <b>[assignment: any length from 128 to 528 bits]</b> that meet the following: <b>[assignment: [30]]</b> .
FCS_CKM.1.1[Mont]	The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm <b>[assignment: MontDH Key generation algorithm]</b> and specified cryptographic key sizes <b>[assignment: any length from 128 to 528 bits]</b> that meet the following: <b>[assignment: [31]]</b> .
Application Note	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The keys can be generated and diversified in accordance with <a href="#">[13]</a> specification in class KeyBuilder.</li> <li>• This component shall be instantiated according to the version of the Java Card API applying to the security target and the implemented algorithms (<a href="#">[13]</a>).</li> </ul>
Application Note	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The keys can be generated and diversified in accordance with <a href="#">[49]</a> specification in class KeyBuilderX.</li> <li>• This component shall be instantiated according to the version of the Java Card API applying to the security target and the implemented algorithms (<a href="#">[49]</a>).</li> </ul>
<b>FCS_CKM.4</b>	<b>Cryptographic key destruction</b>
Hierarchical to:	No other components.

Dependencies:	[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation].
FCS_CKM.4.1	The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key destruction method <b>[assignment: physically overwriting the keys in a randomized manner]</b> that meets the following: <b>[assignment: none]</b> .
Application Note	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The keys are reset as specified in <a href="#">[13]</a> Key class, with the method clearKey(). Any access to a cleared key for ciphering or signing shall throw an exception.</li> <li>• This component shall be instantiated according to the version of the Java Card API applicable to the security target and the implemented algorithms (<a href="#">[13]</a>).</li> </ul>

**FCS\_COP.1 Cryptographic Operation**

Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation], FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction.
FCS_COP.1.1 [GCM]	The TSF shall perform <b>[assignment: encryption and decryption]</b> in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm <b>[assignment: AES in GCM mode]</b> and cryptographic key sizes <b>[assignment: 128 bits, 192 and 256 bits]</b> that meet the following: <b>[assignment: FIPS 197 <a href="#">[39]</a>, NIST Special Publication 800-38D Recommendation for BlockCipher <a href="#">[37]</a>]</b> .
FCS_COP.1.1 [CCM]	The TSF shall perform <b>[assignment: encryption and decryption]</b> in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm <b>[assignment: AES in CCM mode]</b> and cryptographic key sizes <b>[assignment: 128 bits, 192 and 256 bits]</b> that meet the following: <b>[assignment: FIPS 197 <a href="#">[39]</a>, NIST Special Publication 800-38C Recommendation for BlockCipher <a href="#">[36]</a>]</b> .
FCS_COP.1.1 [TripleDES]	<p>The TSF shall perform <b>[assignment: encryption and decryption]</b> in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm in <b>[assignment:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• ALG_DES_CBC_ISO9797_M1</li> <li>• ALG_DES_CBC_ISO9797_M2</li> <li>• ALG_DES_CBC_NOPAD</li> <li>• ALG_DES_ECB_ISO9797_M1</li> <li>• ALG_DES_ECB_ISO9797_M2</li> <li>• ALG_DES_ECB_NOPAD</li> <li>• ALG_DES_CBC_PKCS5</li> </ul>

- ALG\_DES\_ECB\_PKCS5
- ALG\_DES\_CBC\_PKCS7
- ALG\_DES\_ECB\_PKCS7

] and cryptographic key sizes [assignment: **LENGTH\_DES3\_2KEY, LENGTH\_DES3\_3KEY**] that meet the following: [assignment: for **ALG\_DES\_ECB\_ISO9797\_M2** see **Java Card API Spec [13]**, for the rest see both **[13]** and **JCOPX API [49]**].

FCS\_COP.1.1 [AES] The TSF shall perform [assignment: **encryption and decryption**] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [assignment:

- ALG\_AES\_BLOCK\_128\_CBC\_NOPAD
- ALG\_AES\_BLOCK\_128\_CBC\_NOPAD\_STANDARD
- ALG\_AES\_BLOCK\_128\_ECB\_NOPAD
- ALG\_AES\_CBC\_ISO9797\_M1
- ALG\_AES\_CBC\_ISO9797\_M2
- ALG\_AES\_CBC\_ISO9797\_M2\_STANDARD
- ALG\_AES\_ECB\_ISO9797\_M1
- ALG\_AES\_ECB\_ISO9797\_M2
- ALG\_AES\_CBC\_PKCS5
- ALG\_AES\_ECB\_PKCS5
- ALG\_AES\_CBC\_PKCS7
- ALG\_AES\_ECB\_PKCS7
- AES\_CTR
- AES\_CFB

] and cryptographic key sizes [assignment: **LENGTH\_AES\_128, LENGTH\_AES\_192 and LENGTH\_AES\_256 bit**] that meet the following: [assignment: for **ALG\_AES\_BLOCK\_128\_CBC\_NOPAD\_STANDARD, ALG\_AES\_CBC\_ISO9797\_STANDARD, ALG\_AES\_CBC\_PKCS7, ALG\_AES\_ECB\_PKCS7, ALG\_AES\_CFB** see API specified in **JCOPX [49]**, for the rest see **Java Card API Spec [13]**].

FCS\_COP.1.1 [RSACipher] The TSF shall perform [assignment: **encryption and decryption**] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [assignment: **ALG\_RSA\_NOPAD, ALG\_RSA\_PKCS1, ALG\_RSA\_PKCS1\_OAEP**] and cryptographic key sizes [assignment: **any key length that is amultiple of 32 between 512 and 4096 bits**] that meet the following: [assignment: **Java Card API Spec [13]** and for the **32 bit step range** see API specified in **JCOPX [49]**].

FCS\_COP.1.1 [ECDH\_P1363] The TSF shall perform [assignment: **Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement**] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [assignment:

- ALG\_EC\_SVDP\_DH
- ALG\_EC\_SVDP\_DH\_KDF

- ALG\_EC\_SVDP\_DH\_PLAIN
- ALG\_EC\_SVDP\_DHC
- ALG\_EC\_SVDP\_DHC\_KDF
- ALG\_EC\_SVDP\_DHC\_PLAIN
- ALG\_EC\_SVDP\_DH\_PLAIN\_XY

] and cryptographic key sizes [assignment: **LENGTH\_EC\_FP\_128, LENGTH\_EC\_FP\_160, LENGTH\_EC\_FP\_192, LENGTH\_EC\_FP\_224, LENGTH\_EC\_FP\_256, LENGTH\_EC\_FP\_384, LENGTH\_EC\_FP\_528** and from 128 bit to 528 bit in 1 bit steps] that meet the following: [assignment: **Java Card API Spec [13]** and for **ALG\_EC\_SVDP\_DH\_PLAIN\_XY** 1 bit step range key size see API specified in JCOPX [49]].

FCS\_COP.1.1  
[ECDH\_25519]

The TSF shall perform [assignment: **Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement**] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [assignment: **ALG\_MONT\_DH\_25519**] and cryptographic key sizes [assignment: **256 bits**] that meet the following: [assignment: **see API specified in JCOPX [49]**].

FCS\_COP.1.1  
[DESMAC]

The TSF shall perform [assignment: **MAC generation and verification**] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [assignment: **Triple-DES in outer CBC for Mode:**

- ALG\_DES\_MAC4\_ISO9797\_1\_M1\_ALG3
- ALG\_DES\_MAC4\_ISO9797\_1\_M2\_ALG3
- ALG\_DES\_MAC4\_ISO9797\_M1
- ALG\_DES\_MAC4\_ISO9797\_M2
- ALG\_DES\_MAC8\_ISO9797\_1\_M1\_ALG3
- ALG\_DES\_MAC8\_ISO9797\_1\_M2\_ALG3
- ALG\_DES\_MAC8\_ISO9797\_M1
- ALG\_DES\_MAC8\_ISO9797\_M2
- ALG\_DES\_MAC8\_NOPAD
- ALG\_DES\_MAC4\_PKCS5
- ALG\_DES\_MAC8\_PKCS5

] and cryptographic key sizes [assignment: **LENGTH\_DES3\_2KEY, LENGTH\_DES3\_3KEY**] that meet the following: [assignment: **Java Card API Spec [13]** and JCOPX API [49] ].

FCS\_COP.1.1  
[AESMAC]

The TSF shall perform [assignment: **16 byte MAC generation and verification**] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [assignment: **AES in CBC Mode ALG\_AES\_MAC\_128\_NOPAD**] and cryptographic key sizes [assignment: **LENGTH\_AES\_128, LENGTH\_AES\_192 and LENGTH\_AES\_256 bit**] that meet the following: [assignment: **Java Card API Spec [13]**].

<p>FCS_COP.1.1 [RSA Signature PKCS1]</p>	<p>The TSF shall perform <b>[assignment: digital signature generation and verification]</b> in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm <b>[assignment:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• ALG_RSA_SHA_224_PKCS1</li> <li>• ALG_RSA_SHA_224_PKCS1_PSS</li> <li>• ALG_RSA_SHA_256_PKCS1</li> <li>• ALG_RSA_SHA_256_PKCS1_PSS</li> <li>• ALG_RSA_SHA_384_PKCS1</li> <li>• ALG_RSA_SHA_384_PKCS1_PSS</li> <li>• ALG_RSA_SHA_512_PKCS1</li> <li>• ALG_RSA_SHA_512_PKCS1_PSS</li> <li>• SIG_CIPHER_RSA in combination with MessageDigest.ALG_SHA_256 or MessageDigest.ALG_SHA_384 or MessageDigest.ALG_SHA_512 and in combination with Cipher.PAD_PKCS1_OAEP</li> </ul> <p><b>]</b> and cryptographic key sizes <b>[assignment: any key length that is a multiple of 32 between 512 and 4096 bits]</b> that meet the following: <b>[assignment: Java Card API Spec [13] and for the 32 bit step range see API specified in JCOPX [49]].</b></p>
<p>FCS_COP.1.1 [EC Signature]</p>	<p>The TSF shall perform <b>[assignment: digital signature generation and verification]</b> in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm <b>[assignment:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• ALG_ECDSA_SHA_224</li> <li>• ALG_ECDSA_SHA_256</li> <li>• ALG_ECDSA_SHA_384</li> <li>• ALG_ECDSA_SHA_512</li> <li>• SIG_CIPHER_ECDSA in combination with MessageDigest.ALG_SHA_256 or MessageDigest.ALG_SHA_384 or MessageDigest.ALG_SHA_512]</li> </ul> <p><b>]</b> and cryptographic key sizes <b>[assignment: LENGTH_EC_FP_128,LENGTH_EC_FP_160, LENGTH_EC_FP_192, LENGTH_EC_FP_224, LENGTH_EC_FP_256, LENGTH_EC_FP_384, LENGTH_EC_FP_528 and from 128 bit to 528 bit in 1 bit steps]</b> that meet the following: <b>[assignment: Java Card API Spec [13] and for 1 bit step range key size see API specified in JCOPX [49]].</b></p>
<p>FCS_COP.1.1 [EdDSA]</p>	<p>The TSF shall perform <b>[assignment: digital signature generation and verification]</b> in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm <b>[assignment: ALG_ED25519PH_SHA_512 ]</b> and cryptographic key sizes <b>[assignment: 256 bit for private key, 256 bit for public key]</b> that meet the following: <b>[assignment: API specified in JCOPX [49]].</b></p>

- FCS\_COP.1.1 [SHA] The TSF shall perform **[assignment: secure hash computation]** in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm **[assignment:**
- ALG\_SHA<sup>36</sup>
  - ALG\_SHA\_224
  - ALG\_SHA\_256
  - ALG\_SHA\_384
  - ALG\_SHA\_512
- ]** and cryptographic key sizes **[assignment: LENGTH\_SHA, LENGTH\_SHA\_224, LENGTH\_SHA\_256, LENGTH\_SHA\_384, LENGTH\_SHA\_512]** that meet the following: **[assignment: Java Card API Spec [13] and JCOPX API specified in [49]].**
- FCS\_COP.1.1 [AES\_CMAC] The TSF shall perform **[assignment: CMAC generation and verification]** in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm **[assignment:**
- ALG\_AES\_CMAC8
  - ALG\_AES\_CMAC16
  - SIG\_CIPHER\_AES\_CMAC8
  - SIG\_CIPHER\_AES\_CMAC16
  - ALG\_AES\_CMAC16\_STANDARD
  - ALG\_AES\_CMAC128
- ]** and cryptographic key sizes **[assignment: LENGTH\_AES\_128, LENGTH\_AES\_192 and LENGTH\_AES\_256 bit]** that meet the following: **[assignment: see Java Card API Spec [13] and the JCOPX API specified in [49]].**
- FCS\_COP.1.1 [HMAC] The TSF shall perform **[assignment: HMAC generation and verification]** in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm **[assignment:**
- ALG\_HMAC\_SHA\_256
  - ALG\_HMAC\_SHA\_384
  - ALG\_HMAC\_SHA\_512
- ]** and cryptographic key sizes **[assignment: LENGTH\_SHA\_256, LENGTH\_SHA\_384 and LENGTH\_SHA\_512 bit]** that meet the following: **[assignment: Java Card specification [13] and JCOPX API [49]].**
- FCS\_COP.1.1 [TDES\_CMAC] The TSF shall perform **[assignment: message authentication and verification]** in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm **[assignment:**
- ALG\_DES\_CMAC8
  - SIG\_CIPHER\_DES\_CMAC8

<sup>36</sup> Due to mathematical weakness only resistant against AVA\_VAN.5 for temporary data (e.g. as used for generating session keys), but not if repeatedly applied to the same input data.



] and cryptographic key sizes [assignment: **LENGTH\_DES3\_2KEY and LENGTH\_DES3\_3KEY bit**] that meet the following: [assignment: see API specified in JCOPX [\[49\]](#)].

FCS\_COP.1.1 [DAP] The TSF shall perform [assignment: **verification of the DAP signature attached to Executable Load Applications**] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [assignment:

- ALG\_RSA\_SHA\_PKCS1
- ALG\_ECDSA\_SHA\_256

] and cryptographic key sizes [assignment: **LENGTH\_RSA\_1024, LENGTH\_EC\_FP\_256**] that meet the following: [assignment: GP Spec [\[22\]](#) and JCOPX API [\[49\]](#)].

**FCS\_RNG.1 Random Number Generation.**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: No dependencies.

FCS\_RNG.1.1 The TSF shall provide a [selection: **deterministic**] random number generator [selection: **DRG.3**][**AIS20**]that implements: [assignment:

- (DRG.3.1) If initialized with a random seed using a PTRNG of class PTG.2 (as defined in [\[7\]](#)) as random source, the internal state of the RNG shall have at least 256 bit of entropy.
- (DRG.3.2) The RNG provides forward secrecy (as defined in [\[7\]](#)).
- (DRG.3.3) The RNG provides enhanced backward secrecy even if the current internal state is known (as defined in [\[7\]](#))

].

FCS\_RNG.1.2 The TSF shall provide [selection: **octets of bits**] that meet [assignment:

- (DRG.3.4) The RNG, initialized with a random seed using a PTRNG of class PTG.2 (as defined in [\[7\]](#)) as random source, generates output for which for AES-mode  $2^{48}$  and for TDEA-mode  $2^{35}$  strings of bit length 128 are mutually different with probability at least  $1-2^{-24}$
- (DRG.3.5) Statistical test suites cannot practically distinguish the random numbers from output sequences of an ideal RNG. The random numbers must pass test procedure A (as defined in [\[7\]](#)).

].

Application Note • This functionality is provided by the Crypto Library.

- FCS\_RNG.1 and FCS\_RNG.1[HDT] both apply to the same Random Number Generator.

### FCS\_RNG.1 [HDT] Random Number Generation.

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: No dependencies.

FCS\_RNG.1.1 [HDT] The TSF shall provide a **[selection: hybrid deterministic]** random number generator that implements: **[assignment:**

- (DRG.4.1) The internal state of the RNG shall use PTRNG of class PTG.2 (as defined in [7]) as random source
- (DRG.4.2) The RNG provides forward secrecy (as defined in [7]).
- (DRG.4.3) The RNG provides backward secrecy even if the current internal state is known (as defined in [7])
- (DRG.4.4) The RNG provides enhanced forward secrecy on demand (as defined in [7])
- (DRG.4.5) The internal state of the RNG is seeded by an PTRNG of class PTG.2 (as defined in [7])

].

FCS\_RNG.1.2 [HDT] The TSF shall provide **[selection: random numbers]** that meet **[assignment:**

- (DRG.4.6) The RNG generates output for which for AES-mode  $2^{48}$  and for TDEA-mode  $2^{35}$  strings of bit length 128 are mutually different with probability at least  $1-2^{-24}$
- (DRG.4.7) Statistical test suites cannot practically distinguish the random numbers from output sequences of an ideal RNG. The random numbers must pass test procedure A (as defined in [7]).

].

Application Note

- This functionality is provided by the Crypto Library.
- FCS\_RNG.1 and FCS\_RNG.1[HDT] both apply to the same Random Number Generator. The 'enhanced forward secrecy' giving access to DRG.4 is an option that can only be activated by NXP on specific customer request.
- For DRG.4.5: The Hardware PTRNG of class PTG.2 generates random data used as an input for the derivation function. The result of the derivation function is used as the seed.

### FDP\_RIP.1 [ABORT] Subset residual information protection (ABORT)

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies:	No dependencies.
FDP_RIP.1.1 [ABORT]	The TSF shall ensure that any previous information content of a resource is made unavailable upon the <b>[selection: de-allocation of the resource from]</b> the following objects: <b>[assignment: any reference to an object instance created during an aborted transaction]</b> .
Application Note	The events that provoke the de-allocation of a transient object are described in <a href="#">[15]</a> , §5.1.
<b>FDP_RIP.1 [APDU] Subset residual information protection (APDU)</b>	
Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	No dependencies.
FDP_RIP.1.1 [APDU]	The TSF shall ensure that any previous information content of a resource is made unavailable upon the <b>[selection: allocation of the resource to]</b> the following objects: <b>[assignment: the APDU buffer]</b> .
Application Note	The allocation of a resource to the APDU buffer is typically performed as the result of a call to the process() method of an applet.
<b>FDP_RIP.1 [GlobalArray] Subset residual information protection (GlobalArray)</b>	
Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	No dependencies.
FDP_RIP.1.1 [GlobalArray-Refined]	The TSF shall ensure that any previous information content of a resource is made unavailable upon the <b>[selection: deallocation of the resource from]</b> <i>the applet as a result of returning from the process method</i> the following objects: <b>[assignment: a user Global Array]</b>
Application Note	An array resource is allocated when a call to the API method JCSYSTEM.makeGlobalArray is performed. The Global Array is created as a transient JCRE Entry Point Object ensuring that reference to it cannot be retained by any application. On return from the method which called JCSYSTEM.makeGlobalArray, the array is no longer available to any applet and is deleted and the memory in use by the array is cleared and reclaimed in the next object deletion cycle.

**FDP\_RIP.1 [bArray] Subset residual information protection (bArray)**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: No dependencies.

FDP\_RIP.1.1 [bArray] The TSF shall ensure that any previous information content of a resource is made unavailable upon the **[selection: deallocation of the resource from]** the following objects: **[assignment: the bArray object]**.

Application Note A resource is allocated to the bArray object when a call to an applet’s install() method is performed. There is no conflict with FDP\_ROL.1 here because of the bounds on the rollback mechanism (FDP\_ROL.1.2[FIREWALL]): the scope of the rollback does not extend outside the execution of the install() method, and the de-allocation occurs precisely right after the return of it.

**FDP\_RIP.1 [KEYS] Subset residual information protection (KEYS)**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: No dependencies.

FDP\_RIP.1.1 [KEYS] The TSF shall ensure that any previous information content of a resource is made unavailable upon the **[selection: deallocation of the resource from]** the following objects: **[assignment: the cryptographic buffer (D.CRYPTO)]**.

Application Note • The javacard.security and javacardx.crypto packages do provide secure interfaces to the cryptographic buffer in a transparent way. See javacard.security.KeyBuilder and Key interface of [\[13\]](#).

**FDP\_RIP.1 [TRANSIENT] Subset residual information protection (TRANSIENT)**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: No dependencies.

FDP\_RIP.1.1 [TRANSIENT] The TSF shall ensure that any previous information content of a resource is made unavailable upon the **[selection: deallocation of the resource from]** the following objects: **[assignment: any transient object]**.

Application Note • The events that provoke the de-allocation of any transient object are described in [\[15\]](#), §5.1.

- The clearing of CLEAR\_ON\_DESELECT objects is not necessarily performed when the owner of the objects is deselected. In the presence of multiselectable applet instances, CLEAR\_ON\_DESELECT memory segments may be attached to applets that are active in different logical channels. Multiselectable applet instances within a same CAP file must share the transient memory segment if they are concurrently active ([15], §4.2.).

**FDP\_ROL.1  
[FIREWALL]**

**Basic rollback (FIREWALL)**

Hierarchical to:

No other components.

Dependencies:

[FDP\_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP\_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]

**FDP\_ROL.1.1  
[FIREWALL]**

The TSF shall enforce **[assignment: the FIREWALL access control SFP and the JCVM information flow control SFP]** to permit the rollback of the **[assignment: operations OP.JAVA(...) and OP.CREATE(Sharing, LifeTime)(\*)]** on the **[assignment: object O.JAVAOBJECT.]**.

**FDP\_ROL.1.2  
[FIREWALL]**

The TSF shall permit operations to be rolled back within the **[assignment: scope of a select(), deselect(), process(), install() or uninstall() call, notwithstanding the restrictions given in [15], §7.7, within the bounds of the Commit Capacity ([15], §7.8), and those described in [13].**

Application Note

Transactions are a service offered by the APIs to applets. It is also used by some APIs to guarantee the atomicity of some operation. This mechanism is either implemented in Java Card platform or relies on the transaction mechanism offered by the underlying platform. Some operations of the API are not conditionally updated, as documented in [13] (see for instance, PIN-blocking, PIN-checking, update of Transient objects).

7.2.1.1.3 Card Security Management

**FAU\_ARP.1**

**Security alarms**

Hierarchical to:

No other components.

Dependencies:

FAU\_SAA.1 Potential violation analysis.

**FAU\_ARP.1.1**

The TSF shall take **[assignment: one of the following actions:**

- throw an exception,
- lock the card session (after a predefined number of resetted sessions the card might switch to Restricted Mode),

- reinitialize the Java Card System and its data,
- response with error code to S.CAD

] upon detection of a potential security violation.

Refinement

The "potential security violation" stands for one of the following events:

- CAP: CAP file inconsistency (response with error code to S.CAD),
- LFC: applet life cycle inconsistency (throw an exception),
- CHP: card tearing (unexpected removal of the Card out of the CAD) and power failure (reset the card session),
- ABT: abort of a transaction in an unexpected context (throw an exception),
- FWL: violation of the Firewall or JCVM SFPs (throw an exception),
- RSC: unavailability of memory (throw an exception),
- OFL: array overflow (throw an exception),
- EDC: checksum mismatch of EDC arrays (throw an exception),
- assignment:
  - CHP: Exposure to operating conditions which may not be tolerated according to the requirement Limited fault tolerance (FRU\_FLT.2) and where therefore a malfunction could occur (reset the card session),
  - Physical Tampering
    - CLC: Card Manager Life Cycle inconsistency (reset the card session),
    - CHP: General Fault Injection Detection (reset the card session)
  - CHP: Memory defects (reset the card session),
  - CHP: Integrity protected persistent data inconsistency (reset the card session),
  - CHP: Integrity protected transient data inconsistency (reset the card session),
  - Memory Access Violation
    - CHP: Others (reset the card session)

**FDP\_SDI.2 [DATA] Stored data integrity monitoring and action (Data)**

Hierarchical to: FDP\_SDI.1 Stored data integrity monitoring.

Dependencies: No dependencies.

FDP\_SDI.2.1 [DATA] The TSF shall monitor user data stored in containers controlled by the TSF for **[assignment: integrity errors]** on all objects, based on the following attributes: **[assignment: integrity protected data]**.

FDP_SDI.2.2 [DATA]	Upon detection of a data integrity error, the TSF shall <b>[assignment: reset the card session for integrity errors]</b> .
Refinement	<p>The following data elements have the user data attribute "integrity protected data":</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• D.APP_KEYS</li> <li>• D.PIN</li> <li>• D.TOE_IDENTIFIER</li> </ul>
Application Note	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Although no such requirement is mandatory in the Java Card specification, at least an exception shall be raised upon integrity errors detection on cryptographic keys, PIN values and their associated security attributes. Even if all the objects cannot be monitored, cryptographic keys and PIN objects shall be considered with particular attention by ST authors as they play a key role in the overall security.</li> <li>• It is also recommended to monitor integrity errors in the code of the native applications and Java Card applets.</li> <li>• For integrity sensitive application, their data shall be monitored (D.APP_I_DATA): applications may need to protect information against unexpected modifications, and explicitly control whether a piece of information has been changed between two accesses. For example, maintaining the integrity of an electronic purse's balance is extremely important because this value represents real money. Its modification must be controlled, for illegal ones would denote an important failure of the payment system.</li> <li>• A dedicated library could be implemented and made available to developers to achieve better security for specific objects, following the same pattern that already exists in cryptographic APIs, for instance.</li> </ul>

**FPR\_UNO.1 Unobservability**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: No dependencies.

FPR\_UNO.1.1 The TSF shall ensure that **[assignment: all users]** are unable to observe the operation **[assignment: all operations]** on **[assignment: D.APP\_KEYS, D.PIN]** by **[assignment: another user]**.

**FPT\_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: No dependencies.

FPT_FLS.1.1	The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of failures occur: <b>[assignment: those associated to the potential security violations described in FAU_ARP.1]</b> .
Application Note	The Java Card RE Context is the Current context when the Java Card VM begins running after a card reset ([15], §6.2.3) or after a proximity card (PICC) activation sequence ([15]). Behavior of the TOE on power loss and reset is described in [15], §3.6 and §7.1. Behavior of the TOE on RF signal loss is described in [15], §3.6.1.
Refinement:	The term “failure” above also covers “circumstances” for assignments taken from [10]. The TOE prevents failures for the “circumstances” defined above.
<b>FPT_TDC.1</b>	<b>Inter-TSF basic TSF data consistency</b>
Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	No dependencies.
FPT_TDC.1.1	The TSF shall provide the capability to consistently interpret <b>[assignment: the CAP files, the bytecode and its data arguments]</b> when shared between the TSF and another trusted IT product.
FPT_TDC.1.2	The TSF shall use <b>[assignment:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• the rules defined in [14] specification</li> <li>• the API tokens defined in the export files of reference implementation</li> </ul> <b>]</b> when interpreting the TSF data from another trusted IT product.
Application Note	Concerning the interpretation of data between the TOE and the underlying Java Card platform, it is assumed that the TOE is developed consistently with the SCP functions, including memory management, I/O functions and cryptographic functions.

## 7.2.1.1.4 AID Management

<b>FIA_ATD.1 [AID]</b>	<b>User attribute definition (AID)</b>
Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	No dependencies.
FIA_ATD.1.1 [AID]	The TSF shall maintain the following list of security attributes belonging to individual users: <b>[assignment:</b>



	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• CAP File AID,</li> <li>• Applet's Version Number,</li> <li>• Registered Applets,</li> <li>• Applet Selection Status ([15], §4.6)</li> </ul> <p>].</p>
Refinement	"Individual users" stands for applets.
<b>FIA_UID.2 [AID]</b>	<b>User identification before any action (AID)</b>
Hierarchical to:	FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification.
Dependencies:	No dependencies.
FIA_UID.2.1 [AID]	The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
Application Note	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• By users here it must be understood the ones associated to the CAP files (or applets) that act as subjects of policies. In the Java Card System, every action is always performed by an identified user interpreted here as the currently selected applet or the CAP file that is the subject's owner. Means of identification are provided during the loading procedure of the CAP file and the registration of applet instances.</li> <li>• The role Java Card RE defined in FMT_SMR.1 is attached to an IT security function rather than to a "use" of the CC terminology. The Java Card RE does not "identify" itself to the TOE, but it is part of it.</li> </ul>
<b>FIA_USB.1 [AID]</b>	<b>User-subject binding (AID)</b>
Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition.
FIA_USB.1.1 [AID]	The TSF shall associate the following user security attributes with subjects acting on the behalf of that user: <b>[assignment: CAP file AID]</b> .
FIA_USB.1.2 [AID]	The TSF shall enforce the following rules on the initial association of user security attributes with subjects acting on the behalf of users: <b>[assignment: Each uploaded package is associated with an unique Package AID]</b> .
FIA_USB.1.3 [AID]	The TSF shall enforce the following rules governing changes to the user security attributes associated with subjects acting on the

behalf of users: **[assignment: The initially assigned Package AID is unchangeable]**.

Application Note The user is the applet and the subject is the S.CAP\_FILE. The subject security attribute Context shall hold the user security attribute "CAP file AID".

**FMT\_MTD.1 [JCRE] Management of TSF data (JCRE)**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FMT\_SMR.1 Security roles, FMT\_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions.

FMT\_MTD.1.1 [JCRE] The TSF shall restrict the ability to **[selection: modify]** the **[assignment: list of registered applets' AIDs]** to **[assignment: S.JCRE]**.

Application Note

- The installer and the Java Card RE manage other TSF data such as the applet life cycle or CAP files, but this management is implementation specific. Objects in the Java programming language may also try to query AIDs of installed applets through the lookupAID(...) API method.
- The installer, applet deletion manager or even the card manager may be granted the right to modify the list of registered applets' AIDs in specific implementations (possibly needed for installation and deletion; see #.DELETION and #.INSTALL).

**FMT\_MTD.3 [JCRE] Secure TSF data (JCRE)**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FMT\_MTD.1 Management of TSF data.

FMT\_MTD.3.1 [JCRE] The TSF shall ensure that only secure values are accepted for **[assignment: the registered applet AIDs]**.

**7.2.1.2 INSTG Security Functional Requirements**

The list of SFRs of this category are taken from [11]. The SFR FDP\_ITC.2[INSTALLER] has been refined and is now part of the card management SFRs (FDP\_ITC.2[CCM]) in [Section 7.2.1.6](#).

**FMT\_SMR.1 [INSTALLER] Security roles (INSTALLER)**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies:	FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification.
FMT_SMR.1.1 [INSTALLER]	The TSF shall maintain the roles <b>[assignment: Installer]</b> .
FMT_SMR.1.2 [INSTALLER]	The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
<b>FPT_FLS.1</b> <b>[INSTALLER]</b>	<b>Failure with preservation of secure state (INSTALLER)</b>
Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	No dependencies.
FPT_FLS.1.1 [INSTALLER]	The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of failures occur: <b>[assignment: the installer fails to load/install a CAP file/applet as described in [15], §11.1.5]</b> .
Application Note	The TOE may provide additional feedback information to the card manager in case of potential security violations (see FAU_ARP.1).
<b>FPT_RCV.3</b> <b>[INSTALLER]</b>	<b>Automated recovery without undue loss (INSTALLER)</b>
Hierarchical to:	FPT_RCV.2 Automated recovery.
Dependencies:	AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance.
FPT_RCV.3.1 [INSTALLER]	When automated recovery from <b>[assignment: none]</b> is not possible, the TSF shall enter a maintenance mode where the ability to return to a secure state is provided.
FPT_RCV.3.2 [INSTALLER]	For <b>[assignment: a failure during load/installation of a package/applet and deletion of a package/applet/object]</b> , the TSF shall ensure the return of the TOE to a secure state using automated procedures.
FPT_RCV.3.3 [INSTALLER]	The functions provided by the TSF to recover from failure or service discontinuity shall ensure that the secure initial state is restored without exceeding <b>[assignment: 0%]</b> for loss of TSF data or objects under the control of the TSF.
FPT_RCV.3.4 [INSTALLER]	The TSF shall provide the capability to determine the objects that were or were not capable of being recovered.
Application Note	FPT_RCV.3.1[Installer]:

- This element is not within the scope of the Java Card specification, which only mandates the behavior of the Java Card System in good working order. Further details on the "maintenance mode" shall be provided in specific implementations. The following is an excerpt from [2], p298: In this maintenance mode normal operation might be impossible or severely restricted, as otherwise insecure situations might occur. Typically, only authorised users should be allowed access to this mode but the real details of who can access this mode is a function of FMT: Security management. If FMT: Security management does not put any controls on who can access this mode, then it may be acceptable to allow any user to restore the system if the TOE enters such a state. However, in practice, this is probably not desirable as the user restoring the system has an opportunity to configure the TOE in such a way as to violate the SFRs.

FPT\_RCV.3.2[Installer]:

- Should the installer fail during loading/installation of a CAP file/applet, it has to revert to a "consistent and secure state". The Java Card RE has some clean up duties as well; see [15], §11.1.5 for possible scenarios. Precise behavior is left to implementers. This component shall include among the listed failures the deletion of a CAP file/applet. See ([15], §11.3.4) for possible scenarios. Precise behavior is left to implementers.
- Other events such as the unexpected tearing of the card, power loss, and so on, are partially handled by the underlying hardware platform (see [10]) and, from the TOE's side, by events "that clear transient objects" and transactional features. See FPT\_FLS.1.1, FDP\_RIP.1[TRANSIENT], FDP\_RIP.1[ABORT] and FDP\_ROL.1[FIREWALL].

FPT\_RCV.3.3[Installer]:

- The quantification is implementation dependent, but some facts can be recalled here. First, the SCP ensures the atomicity of updates for fields and objects, and a power-failure during a transaction or the normal runtime does not create the loss of otherwise permanent data, in the sense that memory on a smart card is essentially persistent with this respect (EEPROM). Data stored on the RAM and subject to such failure is intended to have a limited lifetime anyway (runtime data on the stack, transient objects' contents). According to this, the loss of data within the TSF scope should be limited to the same restrictions of the transaction mechanism.

### 7.2.1.3 ADELG Security Functional Requirements

The list of SFRs of this category are taken from [11].

#### **FDP\_ACC.2 [ADEL] Complete access control (ADEL)**

Hierarchical to: FDP\_ACC.1 Subset access control.

Dependencies:	FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control.
FDP_ACC.2.1 [ADEL]	The TSF shall enforce the <b>[assignment: ADEL access control SFP]</b> on <b>[assignment: S.ADEL, S.JCRE, S.JCVM, O.JAVAOBJECT, O.APPLET and O.CODE_CAP_FILE]</b> and all operations among subjects and objects covered by the SFP.
FDP_ACC.2.2 [ADEL]	The TSF shall ensure that all operations between any subject controlled by the TSF and any object controlled by the TSF are covered by an access control SFP.
Refinement	The operations involved in the policy are: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• OP.DELETE_APPLET,</li> <li>• OP.DELETE_CAP_FILE,</li> <li>• OP.DELETE_CAP_FILE_APPLET.</li> </ul>

**FDP\_ACF.1 [ADEL] Security attribute based access control (ADEL)**

Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation.
FDP_ACF.1.1 [ADEL]	The TSF shall enforce the <b>[assignment: ADEL access control SFP]</b> to objects based on the following <b>[assignment:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• S.JCVM: security attributes Active Applets</li> <li>• S.JCRE: security attributes Selected Applet Context, Registered Applets, Resident CAP files</li> <li>• O.CODE_CAP_FILE: security attributes CAP file AID, AIDs of packages within a CAP file, Dependent Package AID, Static References</li> <li>• O.APPLET: security attributes Applet Selection Status</li> <li>• O.JAVAOBJECT: security attributes Owner, Remote</li> </ul> <b>]</b> .
FDP_ACF.1.2 [ADEL]	The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed: <b>[assignment:</b> <p>In the context of this policy, an object O is reachable if and only if one of the following conditions hold:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. the owner of O is a registered applet instance A (O is reachable from A),</li> <li>2. a static field of a resident package P contains a reference to O (O is reachable from P),</li> <li>3. there exists a valid remote reference to O (O is remote reachable),</li> </ol> <b>]</b> .

4. there exists an object O' that is reachable according to either (1) or (2) or (3) above and O' contains a reference to O (the reachability status of O is that of O').

The following access control rules determine when an operation among controlled subjects and objects is allowed by the policy:

- R.JAVA.14 ([15], §11.3.4.2, Applet Instance Deletion): S.ADEL may perform OP.DELETE\_APPLET upon an O.APPLET only if,
  - S.ADEL is currently selected,
  - there is no instance in the context of O.APPLET that is active in any logical channel and
  - there is no O.JAVAOBJECT owned by O.APPLET such that either O.JAVAOBJECT is reachable from an applet instance distinct from O.APPLET, or O.JAVAOBJECT is reachable from a package P, or ([15], §8.5) O.JAVAOBJECT is remote reachable.
- R.JAVA.15 ([15], §11.3.4.2.1, Multiple Applet Instance Deletion): S.ADEL may perform OP.DELETE\_APPLET upon several O.APPLET only if,
  - S.ADEL is currently selected,
  - there is no instance of any of the O.APPLET being deleted that is active in any logical channel and
  - there is no O.JAVAOBJECT owned by any of the O.APPLET being deleted such that either O.JAVAOBJECT is reachable from an applet instance distinct from any of those O.APPLET, or O.JAVAOBJECT is reachable from a CAP file P, or ([15], §8.5) O.JAVAOBJECT is remote reachable.
- R.JAVA.16 ([15], §11.3.4.3, Applet/Library CAP file Deletion): S.ADEL may perform OP.DELETE\_CAP\_FILE upon an O.CODE\_CAP\_FILE only if,
  - S.ADEL is currently selected,
  - no reachable O.JAVAOBJECT, from a CAP file distinct from O.CODE\_CAP\_FILE that is an instance of a class that belongs to O.CODE\_CAP\_FILE, exists on the card and
  - there is no resident package on the card that depends on O.CODE\_CAP\_FILE.
- R.JAVA.17 ([15], §11.3.4.4, Applet CAP file and Contained Instances Deletion): S.ADEL may perform OP.DELETE\_CAP\_FILE\_APPLET upon an O.CODE\_CAP\_FILE only if,
  - S.ADEL is currently selected,
  - no reachable O.JAVAOBJECT, from a CAP file distinct from O.CODE\_CAP\_FILE, which is an instance of a class that belongs to O.CODE\_CAP\_FILE exists on the card,
  - there is no package loaded on the card that depends on O.CODE\_CAP\_FILE, and
  - for every O.APPLET of those being deleted it holds that: (i) there is no instance in the context of O.APPLET that is active in any logical channel and (ii) there is no O.JAVAOBJECT owned by O.APPLET such that either O.JAVAOBJECT is reachable from an applet instance not being deleted, or

O.JAVAOBJECT is reachable from a CAP file not being deleted, or ([15], §8.5) O.JAVAOBJECT is remote reachable.

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FDP_ACF.1.3 [ADEL]	The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: <b>[assignment: none]</b> .
FDP_ACF.1.4 [ADEL]	The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: <b>[assignment: any subject but S.ADEL to O.CODE_CAP_FILE or O.APPLET for the purpose of deleting them from the card]</b> .
Application Note	<p>FDP_ACF.1.2[ADEL]:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• This policy introduces the notion of reachability, which provides a general means to describe objects that are referenced from a certain applet instance or CAP file.</li> <li>• S.ADEL calls the "uninstall" method of the applet instance to be deleted, if implemented by the applet, to inform it of the deletion request. The order in which these calls and the dependencies checks are performed are out of the scope of this protection profile.</li> </ul>

#### **FDP\_RIP.1 [ADEL] Subset residual information protection (ADEL)**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: No dependencies.

FDP\_RIP.1.1 [ADEL] The TSF shall ensure that any previous information content of a resource is made unavailable upon the **[selection: de-allocation of the resource from]** the following objects: **[assignment: applet instances and/or CAP files when one of the deletion operations in FDP\_ACC.2.1[ADEL] is performed on them]**.

Application Note Deleted freed resources (both code and data) may be reused, depending on the way they were deleted (logically or physically). Requirements on de-allocation during applet/CAP file deletion are described in [15], §11.3.4.1, §11.3.4.2 and §11.3.4.3.

#### **FMT\_MSA.1 [ADEL] Management of security attributes (ADEL)**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: [FDP\_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP\_IFC.1 Subset information flow control], FMT\_SMR.1 Security roles, FMT\_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions.

FMT\_MSA.1.1 [ADEL] The TSF shall enforce the **[assignment: ADEL access control SFP]** to restrict the ability to **[selection: modify]** the security attributes **[assignment: Registered Applets and Resident CAP files]** to **[assignment: S.JCRE]**.

### FMT\_MSA.3 [ADEL] Static attribute initialisation (ADEL)

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FMT\_MSA.1 Management of security attributes FMT\_SMR.1 Security roles.

FMT\_MSA.3.1 [ADEL] The TSF shall enforce the **[assignment: ADEL access control SFP]** to provide **[restrictive]** default values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.

FMT\_MSA.3.2 [ADEL] The TSF shall allow the **[assignment: none]** to specify alternative initial values to override the default values when an object or information is created.

### FMT\_SMF.1 [ADEL] Specification of Management Functions (ADEL)

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: No dependencies.

FMT\_SMF.1.1 [ADEL] The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions: **[assignment: modify the list of registered applets' AIDs and the Resident CAP files]**.

### FMT\_SMR.1 [ADEL] Security roles (ADEL)

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FIA\_UID.1 Timing of identification.

FMT\_SMR.1.1 [ADEL] The TSF shall maintain the roles **[assignment: applet deletion manager]**.

FMT\_SMR.1.2 [ADEL] The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.

### FPT\_FLS.1 [ADEL] Failure with preservation of secure state (ADEL)

Hierarchical to: No other components.



Dependencies: No dependencies.

FPT\_FLS.1.1 [ADEL] The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of failures occur: **[assignment: the applet deletion manager fails to delete a CAP file/applet as described in [15], §11.3.4].**

Application Note

- The TOE may provide additional feedback information to the card manager in case of potential security violation (see FAU\_ARP.1).
- The CAP file/applet instance deletion must be atomic. The "secure state" referred to in the requirement must comply with Java Card specification ([15], §11.3.4.).

#### 7.2.1.4 RMIG Security Functional Requirements

Not used in this ST because RMI is optional in PP [11] and the TOE does not support RMI.

#### 7.2.1.5 ODELG Security Functional Requirements

The list of SFRs of this category are taken from [11].

##### FDP\_RIP.1 [ODEL] Subset residual information protection (ODEL)

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: No dependencies.

FDP\_RIP.1.1 [ODEL] The TSF shall ensure that any previous information content of a resource is made unavailable upon the **[selection: de-allocation of the resource from]** the following objects: **[assignment: the objects owned by the context of an applet instance which triggered the execution of the method javacard.framework.JCSystem.requestObjectDeletion()].**

Application Note

- Freed data resources resulting from the invocation of the method `javacard.framework.JCSystem.requestObjectDeletion()` may be reused. Requirements on de-allocation after the invocation of the method are described in [13].
- There is no conflict with FDP\_ROL.1 here because of the bounds on the rollback mechanism: the execution of `requestObjectDeletion()` is not in the scope of the rollback because it must be performed in between APDU command processing, and therefore no transaction can be in progress.

##### FPT\_FLS.1 [ODEL] Failure with preservation of secure state (ODEL)

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies:	No dependencies.
FPT_FLS.1.1 [ODEL]	The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of failures occur: <b>[assignment: the object deletion functions fail to delete all the unreferenced objects owned by the applet that requested the execution of the method]</b> .
Application Note	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The TOE may provide additional feedback information to the card manager in case of a potential security violation (see FAU_ARP.1).</li> <li>The Package/applet instance deletion must be atomic. The "secure state" referred to in the requirement must comply with Java Card specification ([15], §11.3.4.).</li> </ul>

### 7.2.1.6 CarG Security Functional Requirements

The card management SFRs from the PP [11] are refined and replaced by the following SFRs.

<b>FDP_UIT.1 [CCM]</b>	<b>Data exchange integrity (CCM)</b>
Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control] [FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel, or FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path].
FDP_UIT.1.1 [CCM]	The TSF shall enforce the <b>[assignment: Secure Channel Protocol information flow control policy and the Security Domain access control policy]</b> to <b>[selection:receive]</b> user data in a manner protected from <b>[selection:modification, deletion, insertion and replay]</b> errors.
FDP_UIT.1.2 [CCM]	The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of user data, whether <b>[selection: modification, deletion, insertion, replay]</b> has occurred.
<b>FDP_ROL.1 [CCM]</b>	<b>Basic rollback (CCM)</b>
Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control].
FDP_ROL.1.1 [CCM]	The TSF shall enforce <b>[assignment: Security Domain access control policy]</b> to permit the rollback of the <b>[assignment: installation operation]</b> on the <b>[assignment: executable files and application instances]</b> .

FDP_ROL.1.2 [CCM]	The TSF shall permit operations to be rolled back within the <b>[assignment: boundaries of available memory before the card content management function started]</b> .
<b>FDP_ITC.2 [CCM]</b>	<b>Import of user data with security attributes (CCM)</b>
Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control] [FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel, or FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path] FPT_TDC.1 Inter-TSF basic TSF data consistency.
FDP_ITC.2.1 [CCM]	The TSF shall enforce the <b>[assignment: Security Domain access control policy and the Secure Channel Protocol information flow policy]</b> when importing user data, controlled under the SFP, from outside of the TOE.
FDP_ITC.2.2 [CCM]	The TSF shall use the security attributes associated with the imported user data.
FDP_ITC.2.3 [CCM]	The TSF shall ensure that the protocol used provides for the unambiguous association between the security attributes and the user data received.
FDP_ITC.2.4 [CCM]	The TSF shall ensure that interpretation of the security attributes of the imported user data is as intended by the source of the user data.
FDP_ITC.2.5 [CCM]	The TSF shall enforce the following rules when importing user data controlled under the SFP from outside the TOE: <b>[assignment: CAP file loading is allowed only if, for each dependent package, its AID attribute is equal to a resident package AID attribute, the major version attribute associated to the dependent package file is equal to the major version attribute of the resident package and the minor version attribute is equal to or less than the minor version attribute associated to the resident package ([14], §4.5.2).]</b>
Application Note	This SFR also covers security functionality required by Amendment A of the GP specification [19], i.e. personalizing SDs and loading ciphered load files.
<b>FPT_FLS.1 [CCM]</b>	<b>Failure with preservation of secure state (CCM)</b>
Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	No dependencies.

FPT\_FLS.1.1 [CCM] The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of failures occur: **[assignment: the Security Domain fails to load/install an Executable File/application instance as described in [15], Section 11.1.5].**

**FDP\_ACC.1 [SD] Subset access control (SD)**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FDP\_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control.

FDP\_ACC.1.1 [SD] The TSF shall enforce the **[assignment: Security Domain access control policy]** on **[assignment:**

- Subjects: S.INSTALLER, S.ADEL, S.CAD (from [11]) and S.SD
- Objects: Delegation Token, DAP Block and Load File
- Operations: GlobalPlatform's card content management APDU commands and API methods

**].**

**FDP\_ACF.1 [SD] Security attribute based access control (SD)**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FDP\_ACC.1 Subset access control FMT\_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation

FDP\_ACF.1.1 [SD] The TSF shall enforce the **[assignment: Security Domain access control policy]** to objects based on the following **[assignment:**

- Subjects:
  - S.INSTALLER, defined in [11] and represented by the GlobalPlatform Environment (OPEN) on the card, the Card Life Cycle attributes (defined in Section 5.1.1 of [18])
  - S.ADEL, also defined in [11] and represented by the GlobalPlatform Environment (OPEN) on the card
  - S.SD receiving the Card Content Management commands (through APDUs or APIs) with a set of Privileges (defined in Section 6.6.1 of [18]), a Life-cycle Status (defined in Section 5.3.2 of [18]) and a Secure Communication Security Level (defined in Section 10.6 of [18])
  - S.CAD, defined in [11], the off-card entity that communicates with the S.INSTALLER and S.ADEL through S.SD
- Objects:
  - The Delegation Token, in case of Delegated Management operations, with the attributes Present or Not Present
  - The DAP Block, in case of application loading, with the attributes Present or Not Present

- The Load File or Executable File, in case of application loading, installation, extradition or registry update, with a set of intended privileges and its targeted associated SD AID.
  - Mapping subjects/objects to security attributes:
    - S.INSTALLER: Security Level, Card Life Cycle, Life-cycle Status, Privileges, Resident Packages, Registered Applets
    - S.ADEL: Active Applets, Static References, Card Life Cycle, Life-cycle Status, Privileges, Applet Selection Status, Security Level
    - S.SD: Privileges, Life-cycle Status, Security Level
    - S.CAD: Security Level
- ].

FDP\_ACF.1.2 [SD] The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed: **[assignment: Runtime behavior rules defined by GlobalPlatform for:**

- loading (Section 9.3.5 of [18])
- installation (Section 9.3.6 of [18])
- extradition (Section 9.4.1 of [18])
- registry update (Section 9.4.2 of [18])
- content removal (Section 9.5 of [18])

].

FDP\_ACF.1.3 [SD] The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: **[assignment: none]**.

FDP\_ACF.1.4 [SD] The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules:**[assignment: when at least one of the rules defined by GlobalPlatform does not hold]**.

**FMT\_MSA.1 [SD] Management of security attributes (SD)**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: [FDP\_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP\_IFC.1 Subset information flow control], FMT\_SMR.1 Security roles, FMT\_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions.

FMT\_MSA.1.1 [SD] The TSF shall enforce the **[assignment: Security Domain access control policy]** to restrict the ability to **[selection: modify]** the security attributes **[assignment:**

- Card Life Cycle,
- Privileges,
- Life-cycle Status,
- Security Level.

] to [assignment: the Security Domain and the application instance itself].

**FMT\_MSA.3 [SD]      Static attribute initialisation (SD)**

Hierarchical to:      No other components.

Dependencies:      FMT\_MSA.1 Management of security attributes FMT\_SMR.1 Security roles.

FMT\_MSA.3.1 [SD]      The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: Security Domain access control policy] to provide [restrictive] default values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.

FMT\_MSA.3.2 [SD]      The TSF shall allow the [assignment: Card Issuer or the Application Provider] to specify alternative initial values to override the default values when an object or information is created.

Refinement      Alternative initial values shall be at least as restrictive as the default values defined in FMT\_MSA.3.1[SD].

**FMT\_SMF.1 [SD]      Specification of Management Functions (SD)**

Hierarchical to:      No other components.

Dependencies:      No dependencies.

FMT\_SMF.1.1 [SD]      The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions: [assignment:  

- Management functions specified in GlobalPlatform specifications [GP]:
  - card locking (Section 9.6.3 of [18])
  - application locking and unlocking (Section 9.6.2 of [18])
  - card termination (Section 9.6.4 of [18])
  - card status interrogation (Section 9.6.6 of [18])
  - application status interrogation (Section 9.6.5 of [18])

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**FMT\_SMR.1 [SD]      Security roles (SD)**

Hierarchical to:      No other components.

Dependencies:      FIA\_UID.1 Timing of identification.

FMT\_SMR.1.1 [SD]      The TSF shall maintain the roles [assignment: ISD, SSD].

FMT_SMR.1.2 [SD]	The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
<b>FCO_NRO.2 [SC]</b>	<b>Enforced proof of origin (SC)</b>
Hierarchical to:	FCO_NRO.1 Selective proof of origin.
Dependencies:	FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification.
FCO_NRO.2.1 [SC]	The TSF shall enforce the generation of evidence of origin for transmitted <b>[assignment: Executable load files]</b> at all times.
FCO_NRO.2.2 [SC]	The TSF shall be able to relate the <b>[assignment: DAP Block]</b> of the originator of the information, and the <b>[assignment: identity]</b> of the information to which the evidence applies.
FCO_NRO.2.3 [SC]	The TSF shall provide a capability to verify the evidence of origin of information to <b>[selection: originator]</b> given <b>[assignment: at the time the Executable load files are received as no evidence is kept on the card for future verification]</b> .
Application Note	<p>FCO_NRO.2.1[SC]:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Upon reception of a new application CAP file for installation, the card manager shall first check that it actually comes from the verification authority. The verification authority is the entity responsible for bytecode verification.</li> </ul> <p>FCO_NRO.2.3[SC]:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The exact limitations on the evidence of origin are implementation dependent. In most of the implementations, the card manager performs an immediate verification of the origin of the CAP file using an electronic signature mechanism, and no evidence is kept on the card for future verifications.</li> </ul>
<b>FDP_IFC.2 [SC]</b>	<b>Complete information flow control (SC)</b>
Hierarchical to:	FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control.
Dependencies:	FDP_IFF.1 Simple security attributes.
FDP_IFC.2.1 [SC]	<p>The TSF shall enforce the <b>[assignment: Secure Channel Protocol information flow control policy]</b> on <b>[assignment:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• the subjects S.CAD and S.SD, involved in the exchange of messages between the TOE and the CAD through a potentially unsafe communication channel,</li> <li>• the information controlled by this policy are the card content management commands, including personalization commands, in the APDUs sent to the card and their associated responses returned to the CAD</li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>[assignment: none]</b></li> </ul> <p>] and all operations that cause that information to flow to and from subjects covered by the SFP.</p>
FDP_IFC.2.2 [SC]	The TSF shall ensure that all operations that cause any information in the TOE to flow to and from any subject in the TOE are covered by an information flow control SFP.
<b>FDP_IFF.1 [SC]</b>	<b>Simple security attributes (SC)</b>
Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation.
FDP_IFF.1.1 [SC]	<p>The TSF shall enforce the <b>[assignment: Secure Channel Protocol information flow control policy]</b> based on the following types of subject and information security attributes <b>[assignment: :</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Subjects:             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– S.SD receiving the Card Content Management commands (through APDUs or APIs).</li> <li>– S.CAD the off-card entity that communicates with the S.SD.</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Information:             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– executable load file, in case of application loading;</li> <li>– applications or SD privileges, in case of application installation or registry update;</li> <li>– personalization keys and/or certificates, in case of application or SD personalization.</li> </ul> </li> <li>• <b>[assignment: none]</b></li> </ul> <p>].</p>
FDP_IFF.1.2 [SC]	<p>The TSF shall permit an information flow between a controlled subject and controlled information via a controlled operation if the following rules hold: <b>[assignment:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Runtime behavior rules defined by GlobalPlatform for:             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– loading (Section 9.3.5 of [18]);</li> <li>– installation (Section 9.3.6 of [18]);</li> <li>– extradition (Section 9.4.1 of [18]);</li> <li>– registry update (Section 9.4.2 of [18]);</li> <li>– content removal (Section 9.5 of [18])</li> </ul> </li> </ul> <p>].</p>
FDP_IFF.1.3 [SC]	The TSF shall enforce the <b>[assignment: none]</b> .



FDP_IFF.1.4 [SC]	The TSF shall explicitly authorise an information flow based on the following rules: <b>[assignment:none]</b> .
FDP_IFF.1.5 [SC]	<p>The TSF shall explicitly deny an information flow based on the following rules: <b>[assignment:]</b>.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• When none of the conditions listed in the element FDP_IFF.1.4 of this component hold and at least one of those listed in the element FDP_IFF.1.2 does not hold</li> </ul> <p><b>]</b>.</p>
Application note	The subject S.SD can be the ISD or APSD.
Application note	The on-card and the off-card subjects have security attributes such as MAC, Cryptogram, Challenge, Key Set, Static Keys, etc.
<b>FMT_MSA.1 [SC]</b>	<b>Management of security attributes (SC)</b>
Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control], FMT_SMR.1 Security roles, FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions.
FMT_MSA.1.1 [SC]	<p>The TSF shall enforce the <b>[assignment: Secure Channel Protocol information flow control policy]</b> to restrict the ability to <b>[selection: modify]</b> the security attributes <b>[assignment:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Key Set,</li> <li>• Security Level,</li> <li>• Secure Channel Protocol,</li> <li>• Session Keys,</li> <li>• Sequence Counter,</li> <li>• ICV.</li> </ul> <p><b>] to [assignment: the actor associated with the according security domain:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The Card Issuer for ISD,</li> <li>• The Application Provider for APSD</li> </ul> <p><b>]</b>.</p>
Application note	The key data used for setting up a secure channel is according to GP spec <a href="#">[18]</a> , Amendment D <a href="#">[21]</a> and Amendmend F <a href="#">[23]</a> .
<b>FMT_MSA.3 [SC]</b>	<b>Static attribute initialisation (SC)</b>
Hierarchical to:	No other components.

Dependencies:	FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes FMT_SMR.1 Security roles.
FMT_MSA.3.1 [SC]	The TSF shall enforce the <b>[assignment: Secure Channel Protocol information flow control policy]</b> to provide <b>[restrictive]</b> default values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.
FMT_MSA.3.2 [SC]	The TSF shall allow the <b>[assignment: Card Issuer, Application Provider]</b> to specify alternative initial values to override the default values when an object or information is created.
<b>FMT_SMF.1 [SC]</b>	<b>Specification of Management Functions (SC)</b>
Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	No dependencies.
FMT_SMF.1.1 [SC]	The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions: <b>[assignment:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Management functions specified in GlobalPlatform specifications [GP]:<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>– loading (Section 9.3.5 of [18])</li><li>– installation (Section 9.3.6 of [18])</li><li>– extradition (Section 9.4.1 of [18])</li><li>– registry update (Section 9.4.2 of [18])</li><li>– content removal (Section 9.5 of [18])</li></ul></li></ul> <b>].</b>
Application note	All management functions related to secure channel protocols shall be relevant.
<b>FIA_UID.1 [SC]</b>	<b>Timing of Identification (SC)</b>
Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	No dependencies.
FIA_UID.1.1 [SC]	The TSF shall allow <b>[assignment:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• application selection</li><li>• initializing a secure channel with the card</li><li>• requesting data that identifies the card or the Card Issuer</li></ul> <b>] on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified.</b>

FIA_UID.1.2 [SC]	The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
Application Note	The GlobalPlatform TSF mediated actions listed in [GP] such as selecting an application, requesting data, initializing, etc.
<b>FIA_UAU.1 [SC]</b>	<b>Timing of authentication (SC)</b>
Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification.
FIA_UAU.1.1 [SC]	The TSF shall allow <b>[assignment: the TSF mediated actions listed in FIA_UID.1[SC]]</b> on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated.
FIA_UAU.1.2 [SC]	The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
<b>FIA_UAU.4 [SC]</b>	<b>Single-use authentication mechanisms</b>
Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	No dependencies.
FIA_UAU.4.1 [SC]	The TSF shall prevent reuse of authentication data related to <b>[assignment: the authentication mechanism used to open a secure communication channel with the card]</b> .
<b>FTP_ITC.1 [SC]</b>	<b>Inter-TSF trusted channel(SC)</b>
Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	No dependencies.
FTP_ITC.1.1 [SC]	The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself and another trusted IT product that is logically distinct from other communication channels and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel data from modification or disclosure.
FTP_ITC.1.2 [SC]	The TSF shall permit <b>[selection: another trusted IT product]</b> to initiate communication via the trusted channel.

FTP\_ITC.1.3 [SC] The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for **[assignment: all card management functions including:**

- loading;
- installation;
- extradition;
- registry update;
- content removal;
- changing the Application Life Cycle or Card Life Cycle;

**].**

**7.2.1.7 EMG Security Functional Requirements**

Not used in this ST because EMG is optional in PP [11] and the TOE does not support EMG.

**7.2.1.8 Further Security Functional Requirements**

The SFRs in this section provide additional proprietary features.

**FAU\_SAS.1 [SCP] Audit Data Storage (SCP)**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: No other components.

FAU\_SAS.1.1 [SCP] The TSF shall provide **[assignment: the test process before TOE Delivery]** with the capability to store **[selection: the Initialisation Data, Prepersonalisation Data, [assignment: supplements of the Smartcard Embedded Software]]** in the **[assignment: audit records]**.

Application Note This SFR performs selection and assignment operations on FAU\_SAS.1 as defined in the Security IC Platform Protection Profile [10]. The test process is running under control of the test-personnel.

**FIA\_AFL.1 [PIN] Basic Authentication Failure Handling (PIN)**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FIA\_UID.1 Timing of identification.

FIA\_AFL.1.1 [PIN] The TSF shall detect when **[selection: an administrator configurable positive integer within [1 and 127]]** unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related to **[assignment: any user authentication using D.PIN]**.

FIA_AFL.1.2 [PIN]	When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been <b>[selection: surpassed]</b> , the TSF shall <b>[assignment: block the authentication with D.PIN]</b> .
Application Note	The dependency with FIA_UAU.1 is not applicable. The TOE implements the firewall access control SFP, based on which access to the object implementing FIA_AFL.1[PIN] is organized.
<b>FPT_EMSEC.1</b>	<b>TOE Emanation</b>
Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	No dependencies.
FPT_EMSEC.1.1	The TOE shall not emit <b>[assignment: variations in power consumption or timing during command execution]</b> in excess of <b>[assignment: non-useful information]</b> enabling access to <b>[assignment: TSF data: D.CRYPTO]</b> and <b>[assignment: User data: D.PIN, D.APP_KEYS]</b> .
FPT_EMSEC.1.2	The TOE shall ensure <b>[assignment: that unauthorized users]</b> are unable to use the following interface <b>[assignment: electrical contacts or RF field]</b> to gain access to <b>[assignment: TSF data D.CRYPTO]</b> and <b>[assignment: User data D.PIN, D.APP_KEYS]</b> .
<b>FPT_PHP.3</b>	<b>Resistance to physical attack</b>
Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	No dependencies.
FPT_PHP.3.1	The TSF shall resist <b>[assignment: physical manipulation and physical probing]</b> to the <b>[assignment: TSF]</b> by responding automatically such that the SFRs are always enforced.
Refinement	The TSF will implement appropriate mechanisms to continuously counter physical manipulation and physical probing. Due to the nature of these attacks (especially manipulation) the TSF can by no means detect attacks on all of its elements. Therefore, permanent protection against these attacks is required ensuring that security functional requirements are enforced. Hence, "automatic response" means here (i) assuming that there might be an attack at any time and (ii) countermeasures are provided at any time.
Application Note	This SFR is taken from the certified Security IC Platform Protection Profile <a href="#">[10]</a> .

<b>FCS_CKM.2</b>	<b>Cryptographic key distribution</b>
Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation] FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction.
FCS_CKM.2.1	The TSF shall distribute cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key distribution method <b>[assignment: methods: set keys and components of DES, AES, RSA, RSA-CRT, ECC, ECDH, HMAC, XEC, GenericSecret keys]</b> that meets the following: <b>[assignment: [13], [49]]</b> .
Application Note	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The keys can be accessed as specified in <a href="#">[13]</a> Key class and <a href="#">[49]</a> for proprietary classes.</li> <li>• This component shall be instantiated according to the version of the Java Card API applying to the security target and the implemented algorithms <a href="#">[13]</a> and <a href="#">[49]</a> for proprietary classes.</li> </ul>
<b>FCS_CKM.3</b>	<b>Cryptographic key access</b>
Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation] FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction.
FCS_CKM.3.1	The TSF shall perform <b>[assignment: management of DES, AES, RSA, RSA-CRT, ECC, ECDH, HMAC, XEC, and GenericSecret Keys]</b> in accordance with a specified cryptographic key access method <b>[assignment: methods/ commands defined in packages javacard.security of [13] and [49] for proprietary classes]</b> that meets the following: <b>[assignment: [13] and [49]]</b> .
Application Note	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The keys can be accessed as specified in <a href="#">[13]</a> and <a href="#">[49]</a> for proprietary classes.</li> <li>• This component shall be instantiated according to the version of the Java Card API applying to the security target and the implemented algorithms <a href="#">[13]</a> and <a href="#">[49]</a> for proprietary classes.</li> </ul>
<b>FDP_SDI.2 [SENSITIVE_ RESULT]</b>	<b>Stored data integrity monitoring and action (Sensitive Result)</b>

Hierarchical to:	FDP_SDI.1 Stored data integrity monitoring.
Dependencies:	No dependencies.
FDP_SDI.2.1 [SENSITIVE_RESULT]	The TSF shall monitor user data stored in containers controlled by the TSF for <b>[assignment: integrity errors]</b> on all objects, based on the following attributes: <b>[assignment: sensitive API result stored in the javacardx.security.SensitiveResult class]</b> .
FDP_SDI.2.2 [SENSITIVE_RESULT]	Upon detection of a data integrity error, the TSF shall <b>[assignment: throw an exception]</b> .

### 7.2.1.9 Configuration Security Functional Requirements

<b>FDP_IFC.2 [CFG]</b>	<b>Complete information flow control (CFG)</b>
Hierarchical to:	FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control.
Dependencies:	FDP_IFF.1 Simple security attributes.
FDP_IFC.2.1 [CFG]	The TSF shall enforce the <b>[assignment: CONFIGURATION information flow control SFP]</b> on <b>[assignment: S.Customer, S.NXP, S.ConfigurationMechanism, and D.CONFIG_ITEM]</b> and all operations that cause that information to flow to and from subjects covered by the SFP.
FDP_IFC.2.2 [CFG]	The TSF shall ensure that all operations that cause any information in the TOE to flow to and from any subject in the TOE are covered by an information flow control SFP.
<b>FDP_IFF.1 [CFG]</b>	<b>Simple security attributes</b>
Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation.
FDP_IFF.1.1 [CFG]	The TSF shall enforce the <b>[assignment: CONFIGURATION information flow control SFP]</b> based on the following types of subject and information security attributes <b>[assignment:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• S.Customer: security attributes Customer Configuration Token generation key</li> <li>• S.NXP: security attributes NXP Configuration Token generation key</li> <li>• S.ConfigurationMechanism: security attributes NXP Configuration Access, Customer Configuration Access</li> <li>• D.CONFIG_ITEM: security attributes access privilege</li> </ul>

].

- FDP\_IFF.1.2 [CFG] The TSF shall permit an information flow between a controlled subject and controlled information via a controlled operation if the following rules hold: **[assignment:**
- Read and write operations of D.CONFIG\_ITEM between S.ConfigurationMechanism and S.NXP shall only be possible when S.NXP is authenticated with its token using the NXP Configuration Token generation key.
  - Read and write operations of D.CONFIG\_ITEM between S.ConfigurationMechanism and S.Customer shall only be possible when S.Customer is authenticated with its token using the Customer Configuration Token generation key and if access privilege allows it.
  - Enabling or disabling of NXP Configuration Access between S.ConfigurationMechanism and S.NXP shall only be possible when S.NXP is authenticated with its token using the NXP Configuration Token generation key.

].

- FDP\_IFF.1.3 [CFG] The TSF shall enforce the additional information flow control SFP rules **[assignment: none]**.

- FDP\_IFF.1.4 [CFG] The TSF shall explicitly authorise an information flow based on the following rules: **[assignment: none]**.

- FDP\_IFF.1.5 [CFG] The TSF shall explicitly deny an information flow based on the following rules: **[assignment:**
- If the NXP Configuration Access is disabled then nobody can read or write D.CONFIG\_ITEM.
  - If the Customer Configuration Access is disabled then S.Customer can not read or write D.CONFIG\_ITEM.

].

- Application note GlobalPlatform Framework authentication mechanism is used to authenticate the tokens.

**FIA\_UID.1 [CFG] Timing of Identification (CFG)**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: No dependencies.

- FIA\_UID.1.1 [CFG] The TSF shall allow **[assignment: to select the Runtime Configuration Interface]** on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified.



FIA\_UID.1.2 [CFG] The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.

**FMT\_MSA.1 [CFG] Management of security attributes (CFG)**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: [FDP\_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP\_IFC.1 Subset information flow control], FMT\_SMR.1 Security roles, FMT\_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions.

FMT\_MSA.1.1 [CFG] The TSF shall enforce the **[assignment: CONFIGURATION information flow control SFP]** to restrict the ability to **[selection: modify]** the security attributes **[assignment: NXP Configuration Access and Customer Configuration Access]** to **[assignment: S.NXP and S.Customer]** respectively.

**FMT\_MSA.3 [CFG] Static attribute initialisation (CFG)**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FMT\_MSA.1 Management of security attributes FMT\_SMR.1 Security roles.

FMT\_MSA.3.1 [CFG] The TSF shall enforce the **[assignment: CONFIGURATION information flow control SFP]** to provide **[restrictive]** default values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.

FMT\_MSA.3.2 [CFG] The TSF shall allow the **[assignment: nobody]** to specify alternative initial values to override the default values when an object or information is created.

**FMT\_SMF.1 [CFG] Specification of Management Functions (CFG)**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: No dependencies.

FMT\_SMF.1.1 [CFG] The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions: **[assignment: disable the NXP Configuration Access, disable the Customer Configuration Access]**.

**FMT\_SMR.1 [CFG] Security roles (CFG)**

Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification.
FMT_SMR.1.1 [CFG]	The TSF shall maintain the roles <b>[assignment: S.NXP and S.Customer]</b> .
FMT_SMR.1.2 [CFG]	The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
Application note	The roles of the CONFIGURATION information flow control SFP are defined by the NXP Configuration Token generation key and the Customer Configuration Token generation key.

#### 7.2.1.10 OS Update Security Functional Requirements

The SFRs in this section provide JCOP proprietary features.

##### **FDP\_IFC.2 [OSU] Complete information flow control (OSU)**

Hierarchical to: FDP\_IFC.1 Subset information flow control.

Dependencies: FDP\_IFF.1 Simple security attributes.

FDP\_IFC.2.1 [OSU] The TSF shall enforce the **[assignment: OS Update information flow control SFP]** on **[assignment: S.OSU and D.UPDATE\_IMAGE]**.

FDP\_IFC.2.2 [OSU] The TSF shall ensure that all operations that cause any information in the TOE to flow to and from any subject in the TOE are covered by an information flow control SFP.

##### **FDP\_IFF.1 [OSU] Simple security attributes**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FDP\_IFC.1 Subset information flow control FMT\_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation.

FDP\_IFF.1.1 [OSU] The TSF shall enforce the **[assignment: OS Update information flow control SFP]** based on the following types of subject and information security attributes **[assignment:**

- S.OSU: security attributes Current Sequence Number, Verification Key, Package Decryption Key
- D.UPDATE\_IMAGE: security attributes Received Sequence Number, Image Type

**].**

FDP_IFF.1.2[OSU]	The TSF shall permit an information flow between a controlled subject and controlled information via a controlled operation if the following rules hold: <b>[assignment:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• S.OSU shall only accept D.UPDATE_IMAGE which signature can be verified with Verification Key.</li> <li>• S.OSU shall only accept D.UPDATE_IMAGE for the update process that can be decrypted with Package Decryption Key.</li> </ul> <b>].</b>
FDP_IFF.1.3 [OSU]	The TSF shall enforce the additional information flow control SFP rules <b>[assignment: S.OSU shall only authorize D.UPDATE_IMAGE for the update process if the following rules apply:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• If Image Type equals Reset then Received Sequence Number shall equal Current Sequence Number.</li> <li>• If Image Type equals Upgrade then Received Sequence Number shall be higher than Current Sequence Number.</li> <li>• If Image Type equals Downgrade then Received Sequence Number shall be lower than Current Sequence Number.</li> </ul> <b>].</b>
FDP_IFF.1.4 [OSU]	The TSF shall explicitly authorise an information flow based on the following rules: <b>[assignment: none].</b>
FDP_IFF.1.5[OSU]	The TSF shall explicitly deny an information flow based on the following rules: <b>[assignment: D.UPDATE_IMAGE which is not included in the pre-loaded OS Update plan].</b>
Application note	The on-card S.OSU role interacts with the off-card S.UpdateImageCreator via OSU commands. The D.UPDATE_IMAGE is split up into smaller chunks and transmitted as payload within the OSU Commands to the TOE.
Application note	Decrypting the D.UPDATE_IMAGE with the Package Decryption Key prevents the authorization of the D.UPDATE_IMAGE for the update process on a not certified system. The Package Decryption Key is only available on a certified TOE.
<b>FMT_MSA.3 [OSU]</b>	<b>Static attribute initialisation (OSU)</b>
Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes FMT_SMR.1 Security roles.

FMT_MSA.3.1 [OSU]	The TSF shall enforce the <b>[assignment: OS Update information flow control SFP]</b> to provide <b>[restrictive]</b> default values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.
FMT_MSA.3.2 [OSU]	The TSF shall allow the <b>[assignment: S.OSU]</b> to specify alternative initial values to override the default values when an object or information is created.
<b>FMT_MSA.1 [OSU] Management of security attributes (OSU)</b>	
Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control], FMT_SMR.1 Security roles, FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions.
FMT_MSA.1.1 [OSU]	The TSF shall enforce the <b>[assignment: OS Update information flow control SFP]</b> to restrict the ability to <b>[selection: modify]</b> the security attributes <b>[assignment: Current Sequence Number]</b> to <b>[assignment: S.OSU]</b> .
<b>FMT_SMR.1 [OSU] Security roles (OSU)</b>	
Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification.
FMT_SMR.1.1 [OSU]	The TSF shall maintain the roles <b>[assignment: S.OSU]</b> .
FMT_SMR.1.2 [OSU]	The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
Application note	The roles of the CONFIGURATION information flow control SFP are defined by the NXP Configuration Token generation key and the Customer Configuration Token generation key.
<b>FMT_SMF.1 [OSU] Specification of Management Functions (OSU)</b>	
Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	No dependencies.
FMT_SMF.1.1 [OSU]	The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions: <b>[assignment:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• query Current Sequence Number</li> <li>• query Reference Sequence Number</li> </ul>

].

Application note After the atomic activation of the additional code the Final Sequence Number is returned on querying the Current Sequence Number.

#### **FIA\_UID.1 [OSU] Timing of Identification (OSU)**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: No dependencies.

FIA\_UID.1.1 [OSU] The TSF shall allow **[assignment: OP.TRIGGER\_UPDATE]** on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified.

FIA\_UID.1.2 [OSU] The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.

#### **FIA\_UAU.1 [OSU] Timing of authentication (OSU)**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FIA\_UID.1 Timing of identification.

FIA\_UAU.1.1 [OSU] The TSF shall allow **[assignment: OP.TRIGGER\_UPDATE]** on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated.

FIA\_UAU.1.2 [OSU] The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.

#### **FIA\_UAU.4 [OSU] Single-use authentication mechanisms (OSU)**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: No dependencies.

FIA\_UAU.4.1[OSU] The TSF shall prevent reuse of authentication data related to **[assignment: the authentication mechanism used to load D.UPDATE\_IMAGE]**.

#### **FPT\_FLS.1 [OSU] Failure with preservation of secure state (OSU)**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: No dependencies.

FPT\_FLS.1.1 [OSU] The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of failures occur: **[assignment:**

- Corrupted D.UPDATE\_IMAGE is received.
- Unauthorized D.UPDATE\_IMAGE is received.
- The OS Update Process is interrupted.
- The activation of the additional code failed.

**].**

### 7.2.1.11 Restricted Mode Security Functional Requirements

The SFRs in this section provide JCOP proprietary features.

#### **FDP\_ACC.2 [RM] Complete access control (RM)**

Hierarchical to: FDP\_ACC.1 Subset access control.

Dependencies: FDP\_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control.

FDP\_ACC.2.1 [RM] The TSF shall enforce the **[assignment: Restricted Mode access control SFP]** on **[assignment: S.ACAdmin]** and all operations among subjects and objects covered by the SFP.

FDP\_ACC.2.2 [RM] The TSF shall ensure that all operations between any subject controlled by the TSF and any object controlled by the TSF are covered by an access control SFP.

#### **FDP\_ACF.1 [RM] Security attribute based access control (RM)**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FDP\_ACC.1 Subset access control FMT\_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation.

FDP\_ACF.1.1 [RM] The TSF shall enforce the **[assignment: Restricted Mode access control SFP]** to objects based on the following **[assignment:**

- S.ACAdmin: security attribute Attack Counter

**].**

FDP\_ACF.1.2 [RM] The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed: **[assignment: The Attack Counter can be reset by S.ACAdmin].**

FDP_ACF.1.3 [RM]	The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: <b>[assignment: none]</b> .
FDP_ACF.1.4 [RM]	The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: <b>[assignment: Deny all operations on all objects when the TOE is in restricted mode, except for operations listed in FMT_SMF.1[RM]]</b> .
<b>FMT_MSA.3 [RM]</b>	<b>Static attribute initialisation (RM)</b>
Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes FMT_SMR.1 Security roles.
FMT_MSA.3.1 [RM]	The TSF shall enforce the <b>[assignment: Restricted Mode access control SFP]</b> to provide <b>[restrictive]</b> default values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.
FMT_MSA.3.2 [RM]	The TSF shall allow the <b>[assignment: nobody]</b> to specify alternative initial values to override the default values when an object or information is created.
<b>FMT_MSA.1 [RM]</b>	<b>Management of security attributes (RM)</b>
Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control], FMT_SMR.1 Security roles, FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions.
FMT_MSA.1.1 [RM]	The TSF shall enforce the <b>[assignment: Restricted Mode access control]</b> to restrict the ability to <b>[selection: change_default, [assignment: reset]]</b> the security attributes <b>[assignment: Attack Counter]</b> to <b>[assignment: S.ACAAdmin]</b> .
<b>FMT_SMF.1 [RM]</b>	<b>Specification of Management Functions (RM)</b>
Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	No dependencies.
FMT_SMF.1.1 [RM]	The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions: <b>[assignment:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• reset Attack Counter.</li> <li>• select ISD.</li> <li>• authentication against the ISD.</li> </ul>

- initialize a Secure Channel with the card.
  - query the Serial Number (Unique ID for chip).
  - read Platform Identifier.
  - query the logging information.
  - read Secure Channel Sequence Counter.
  - read Current Sequence Number.
- ].

**FIA\_UID.1 [RM]****Timing of Identification (RM)**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: No dependencies.

**FIA\_UID.1.1 [RM]**

The TSF shall allow **[assignment:**

- select ISD
- identify the card
- query the debug logging information
- send Restricted Mode Unlock Request

**]** on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified.

**FIA\_UID.1.2 [RM]**

The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.

**FIA\_UAU.1 [RM]****Timing of authentication (RM)**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FIA\_UID.1 Timing of identification.

**FIA\_UAU.1.1 [RM]**

The TSF shall allow **[assignment:**

- OP.TRIGGER\_UPDATE
- identify the card
- query the debug logging information
- send Restricted Mode Unlock Request

**]** on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated.

**FIA\_UAU.1.2 [RM]**

The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.



### 7.2.1.12 Applet Migration Security Functional Requirements

The SFRs in this section cover both "Applet Migration" JCOP proprietary features and GP Amd-H with the same set of SFRs, as both functionalities are identical.

#### **FDP\_ACC.1 [AMD] Subset access control (AMD)**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FDP\_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control.

FDP\_ACC.1.1[AMD] The TSF shall enforce the **[assignment: Applet Migration Data access control SFP]** on **[assignment: subject S.ArchiveManager object O.APPLET\_MIGRATION\_DATASTORE, O.APPLET\_CURRENT, O.APPLET\_LOADED and operations OP.EXPORT\_APPLET\_DATA, OP.IMPORT\_APPLET\_DATA ]**.

#### **FDP\_ACF.1 [AMD] Security attribute based access control (AMD)**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FDP\_ACC.1 Subset access control FMT\_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation.

FDP\_ACF.1.1 [AMD] The TSF shall enforce the **[assignment: Applet Migration Data access control SFP]** to objects based on the following **[assignment:**

- O.APPLET\_MIGRATION\_DATASTORE: security attributes Current Instance AID, New Instance AID
- O.APPLET\_CURRENT: Security attributes Current Instance AID
- O.APPLET\_LOADED: Security attributes Loaded Applet AID

**]**.

FDP\_ACF.1.2 [AMD] The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed: **[assignment:**

- S.ArchiveManager shall only perform OP.EXPORT\_APPLET\_DATA if an applet with Current Instance AID is installed.
- S.ArchiveManager shall delete O.APPLET\_CURRENT after OP.EXPORT\_APPLET\_DATA has finished.
- S.ArchiveManager shall perform OP.IMPORT\_APPLET\_DATA if Loaded Applet AID of O.APPLET\_LOADED is equal to New Instance AID in O.APPLET\_MIGRATION\_DATASTORE.
- S.ArchiveManager shall delete O.APPLET\_MIGRATION\_DATASTORE Upon completion of OP.IMPORT\_APPLET\_DATA.

].

FDP\_ACF.1.3 [AMD] The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: **[assignment: none]**.

FDP\_ACF.1.4 [RM] The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules:**[assignment: none]**.

### **FMT\_MSA.3 [AMD] Static attribute initialisation (AMD)**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FMT\_MSA.1 Management of security attributes FMT\_SMR.1 Security roles.

FMT\_MSA.3.1 [AMD] The TSF shall enforce the **[assignment: Applet Migration access control SFP]** to provide **[assignment: restrictive]** default values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.

FMT\_MSA.3.2 [AMD] The TSF shall allow the **[assignment: S.ArchiveManager]** to specify alternative initial values to override the default values when an object or information is created.

### **FMT\_MSA.1 [AMD] Management of security attributes (AMD)**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: [FDP\_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP\_IFC.1 Subset information flow control], FMT\_SMR.1 Security roles, FMT\_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions.

FMT\_MSA.1.1 [AMD] The TSF shall enforce the **[assignment: Applet Migration access control]** to restrict the ability to **[selection: set]** the security attributes **[assignment: Current Instance AID and New Instance AID]** to **[assignment: the S.ArchiveManager]**.

### **FMT\_SMF.1 [AMD] Specification of Management Functions (AMD)**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: No dependencies.

FMT\_SMF.1.1 [AMD] The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions:  
**[assignment: OP.EXPORT\_APPLET\_DATA, OP.IMPORT\_APPLET\_DATA]**.

**FMT\_SMR.1 [AMD] Security roles (AMD)**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FIA\_UID.1 Timing of identification.

FMT\_SMR.1.1 [AMD] The TSF shall maintain the roles **[assignment: S.ArchiveManager]**.

FMT\_SMR.1.2 [AMD] The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.

**FIA\_UID.1 [AMD] Timing of Identification (AMD)**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: No dependencies.

FIA\_UID.1.1 [AMD] The TSF shall allow **[assignment: OP.TRIGGER\_UPDATE or Select ISD and Initiate Secure Channel]** on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified.

FIA\_UID.1.2 [AMD] The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.

**FDP\_IFC.2 [AMD] Complete Information flow control (AMD)**

Hierarchical to: FDP\_IFC.1 Subset information flow control.

Dependencies: FDP\_IFF.1 Simple security attributes.

FDP\_IFC.2.1 [AMD] The TSF shall enforce the **[assignment: Applet Migration information flow control SFP]** on **[assignment: S.ArchiveManager and O.APPLET\_MIGRATION\_PLAN]** and all operations that cause that information to flow to and from subjects covered by the SFP.

FDP\_IFC.2.2 [AMD] The TSF shall ensure that all operations that cause any information in the TOE to flow to and from any subject in the TOE are covered by an information flow control SFP.

**FDP\_IFF.1 [AMD] Simple security attributes (AMD)**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies:	FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation.
FDP_IFF.1.1 [AMD]	The TSF shall enforce the <b>[assignment: Applet Migration information flow control SFP]</b> based on the following types of subject and information security attributes: <b>[assignment:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• S.ArchiveManager: Security attribute Verification key</li> <li>• O.APPLLET_MIGRATION_PLAN: Security attribute Applet Migration Plan Signature</li> </ul> <b>].</b>
FDP_IFF.1.2 [AMD]	The TSF shall permit an information flow between a controlled subject and controlled information via a controlled operation if the following rules hold: <b>[assignment:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• S.ArchiveManager shall only accept O.APPLLET_MIGRATION_PLAN transmitted either via a secure channel or via unsecured channel where in the latter case the APDUs commands are protected for integrity and authenticity by an electronic signature verified by the Verification Key.</li> </ul>
FDP_IFF.1.3 [AMD]	The TSF shall enforce the additional information flow control SFP rules <b>[assignment: none].</b>
FDP_IFF.1.4 [AMD]	The TSF shall explicitly authorise an information flow based on the following rules <b>[assignment: none].</b>
FDP_IFF.1.5 [AMD]	The TSF shall explicitly deny an information flow based on the following rules <b>[assignment: none].</b>
Application Note	The operations OP.EXPORT_APPLET_DATA and OP.IMPORT_APPLET_DATA are triggered by proprietary Applet Migration APDU Commands that are transmitted via a Secure Channel with authentication against the ISD or a proprietary protocol which uses a signature based authentication.
<b>FIA_UAU.5 [AMD]</b>	<b>Timing of authentication (AMD)</b>
Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	No dependencies.
FIA_UAU.5.1 [AMD]	The TSF shall provide <b>[assignment: secure channel protocol or a proprietary communication protocol using a cryptographic signature]</b> to support user authentication.
FIA_UAU.5.2 [AMD]	The TSF shall authenticate any user's claimed identity according to the <b>[assignment: secure channel protocol mutual authentication phase, or proprietary communication protocol</b>

where in the latter case the APDUs commands are protected for integrity and authenticity by an electronic signature verified by the Verification Key].

Application Note The operations OP.EXPORT\_APPLET\_DATA and OP.IMPORT\_APPLET\_DATA are triggered by proprietary Applet Migration APDU Commands that are transmitted via a Secure Channel with authentication against the ISD or a proprietary protocol which uses a signature based authentication.

**FPT\_FLS.1 [AMD] Failure with preservation of secure state (AMD)**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: No dependencies.

FPT\_FLS.1 [AMD] The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of failures occur: **[assignment:**

- the applet data export phase or the applet data import phase are interrupted or fail.

].

**7.2.1.13 Context Separation Security Functional Requirements**

The SFRs in this section provide JCOP proprietary features.

**FDP\_ACC.2 Complete access control (CONTSEP)  
[CONTSEP]**

Hierarchical to: FDP\_ACC.1 Subset access control.

Dependencies: FDP\_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control.

FDP\_ACC.2.1 The TSF shall enforce the **[assignment: Context Separation SFP]** on **[assignment: subject S.MainJCOP, S.GuestOS and object O.MainJCOP\_Memory\_region, O.GuestOS\_Memory\_Region]** and all operations among subjects and objects covered by the SFP.

FDP\_ACC.2.2 The TSF shall ensure that all operations between any subject controlled by the TSF and any object controlled by the TSF are covered by an access control SFP.

**FDP\_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control (CONTSEP)  
[CONTSEP]**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies:	FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation.
FDP_ACF.1.1 [CONTSEP]	<p>The TSF shall enforce the <b>[assignment: Context Separation SFP]</b> to objects based on the following <b>[assignment:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Subjects: S.MainJCOP, S.GuestOS</li> <li>• Objects: O.MainJCOP_Memory_Region, O.GuestOS_Memory_Region</li> <li>• Security Attributes: Access Control Table</li> </ul> <p><b>].</b></p>
FDP_ACF.1.2 [CONTSEP]	<p>The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed: <b>[assignment:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• One S.GuestOS can perform operation OP.CONT_ACCESS over its own O.GuestOS_Memory_Region.</li> <li>• One S.GuestOS can perform operation OP.CONT_ACCESS over O.GuestOS_Memory_Region of another S.GuestOS only if so authorized by S.MainJCOP according to the Access Control Table.</li> <li>• S.GuestOS cannot perform operation OP.CONT_ACCESS over O.MainJCOP_Memory_Region.</li> <li>• S.MainJCOP can perform operation OP.CONT_ACCESS over its own O.MainJCOP_Memory_Region.</li> <li>• S.MainJCOP can perform operation OP.CONT_ACCESS over O.GuestOS_Memory_Region only if so authorized in Access Control Table.</li> </ul> <p><b>].</b></p>
FDP_ACF.1.3 [CONTSEP]	<p>The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: <b>[assignment:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• S.GuestOS can perform operation OP.CONT_ACCESS over O.MainJCOP_Memory_Region only through dedicated call gates mechanism.</li> </ul> <p><b>].</b></p>
FDP_ACF.1.4 [CONTSEP]	<p>The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules:<b>[assignment: None].</b></p>
<b>FMT_MSA.3</b> <b>[CONTSEP]</b>	<b>Static attribute initialisation (CONTSEP)</b>
Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes FMT_SMR.1 Security roles.

FMT_MSA.3.1 [CONTSEP]	The TSF shall enforce the <b>[assignment: Context Separation SFP]</b> to provide <b>[assignment: restrictive]</b> default values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.
FMT_MSA.3.2 [CONTSEP]	The TSF shall allow the <b>[assignment: S.MainJCOP]</b> to specify alternative initial values to override the default values when an object or information is created.
<b>FMT_MSA.1</b> <b>[CONTSEP]</b>	<b>Management of security attributes (CONTSEP)</b>
Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control], FMT_SMR.1 Security roles, FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions.
FMT_MSA.1.1 [CONTSEP]	The TSF shall enforce the <b>[assignment: Context Separation SFP]</b> to restrict the ability to <b>[selection: modify]</b> the security attributes <b>[assignment: Access Control Table]</b> to <b>[assignment: S.MainJCOP]</b> .
<b>FMT_SMF.1</b> <b>[CONTSEP]</b>	<b>Specification of Management Functions (CONTSEP)</b>
Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	No dependencies.
FMT_SMF.1.1 [CONTSEP]	The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions: <b>[assignment: OP.Modification_Of_Access_Control_Table]</b> .
<b>FMT_SMR.1</b> <b>[CONTSEP]</b>	<b>Security roles (CONTSEP)</b>
Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification.
FMT_SMR.1.1 [CONTSEP]	The TSF shall maintain the roles <b>[assignment:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li data-bbox="671 1809 1406 1843">• One S.MainJCOP running in O.MainJCOP_Memory_Region</li> <li data-bbox="671 1845 1406 1906">• Several S.GuestOS running in there own O.GuestOS_Memory_Region</li> </ul> <b>]</b> .

FMT_SMR.1.2 [CONTSEP]	The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
<b>FIA_UID.1</b> [CONTSEP]	<b>Timing of Identification (CONTSEP)</b>
Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	No dependencies.
FIA_UID.1.1 [CONTSEP]	The TSF shall allow <b>[assignment: no action]</b> on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified.
FIA_UID.1.2 [CONTSEP]	The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.

**7.2.2 Security Requirements Rationale**

**7.2.2.1 Identification**

**OT.SID**

SFR	Rationale
FIA_UID.2[AID]	Subjects' identity is AID-based (applets, packages and CAP files) and is met by the SFR. Installation procedures ensure protection against forgery (the AID of an applet is under the control of the TSFs) or re-use of identities and is met by the SFR.
FIA_USB.1[AID]	Subjects' identity is AID-based (applets, packages) and is met by the SFR. Installation procedures ensure protection against forgery (the AID of an applet is under the control of the TSFs) or re-use of identities and is met by the SFR.
FMT_MSA.1[JCRE]	Subjects' identity is AID-based (applets, packages) and is met by the SFR.
FMT_MSA.1[JCVVM]	Subjects' identity is AID-based (applets, packages) and is met by the SFR.
FMT_MSA.1[ADEL]	Subjects' identity is AID-based (applets, packages) and is met by the SFR.
FMT_MSA.3[FIREWALL]	Subjects' identity is AID-based (applets, packages) and is met by the SFR.
FMT_MSA.3[JCVVM]	Subjects' identity is AID-based (applets, packages) and is met by the SFR.
FMT_MSA.3[ADEL]	Subjects' identity is AID-based (applets, packages) and is met by the SFR.
FMT_MTD.1[JCRE]	Subjects' identity is AID-based (applets, packages) and is met by the SFR.



SFR	Rationale
FMT_MTD.3[JCRE]	Subjects' identity is AID-based (applets, packages) and is met by the SFR.
FMT_SMF.1[ADEL]	Subjects' identity is AID-based (applets, packages) and is met by the SFR.
FIA_ATD.1[AID]	Subjects' identity is AID-based (applets, packages) and is met by the SFR.
FDP_ITC.2[CCM]	Subjects' identity is AID-based (applets, packages) and is met by the SFR.
FMT_MSA.1[SC]	Subjects' identity is AID-based (applets, packages) and is met by the SFR.
FMT_MSA.3[SC]	Subjects' identity is AID-based (applets, packages) and is met by the SFR.
FMT_SMF.1[SC]	Subjects' identity is AID-based (applets, packages) and is met by the SFR.
FMT_MSA.1[AMD]	Subjects' identity is AID-based (applets, packages) and is met by the SFR.
FMT_MSA.3[AMD]	Subjects' identity is AID-based (applets, packages) and is met by the SFR.
FMT_SMF.1[AMD]	Subjects' identity is AID-based (applets, packages) and is met by the SFR.

7.2.2.2 Execution

**OT.FIREWALL**

SFR	Rationale
FDP_ACC.2[FIREWALL]	The FIREWALL access control policy contributes to meet this objective.
FDP_ACF.1[FIREWALL]	The FIREWALL access control policy contributes to meet this objective.
FDP_IFC.1[JCVM]	The JCVM information flow control policy contributes to meet this objective.
FDP_IFF.1[JCVM]	The JCVM information flow control policy contributes to meet this objective.
FMT_MSA.1[JCRE]	Contributes indirectly to meet this objective.
FMT_MSA.1[JCVM]	Contributes indirectly to meet this objective.
FMT_MSA.1[ADEL]	Contributes indirectly to meet this objective.
FMT_MSA.2[FIREWALL-JCVM]	Contributes indirectly to meet this objective.
FMT_MSA.3[FIREWALL]	Contributes indirectly to meet this objective.
FMT_MSA.3[JCVM]	Contributes indirectly to meet this objective.
FMT_MSA.3[ADEL]	Contributes indirectly to meet this objective.
FMT_MTD.1[JCRE]	Contributes indirectly to meet this objective.

SFR	Rationale
FMT_MTD.3[JCRE]	Contributes indirectly to meet this objective.
FMT_SMF.1	Contributes indirectly to meet this objective.
FMT_SMF.1[ADEL]	Contributes indirectly to meet this objective.
FMT_SMR.1	Contributes indirectly to meet this objective.
FMT_SMR.1[INSTALLER]	Contributes indirectly to meet this objective.
FMT_SMR.1[ADEL]	Contributes indirectly to meet this objective.
FDP_ITC.2[CCM]	Contributes indirectly to meet this objective.
FMT_SMR.1[SD]	Contributes indirectly to meet this objective.
FMT_MSA.1[SC]	Contributes indirectly to meet this objective.
FMT_MSA.3[SC]	Contributes indirectly to meet this objective.
FMT_SMF.1[SC]	Contributes indirectly to meet this objective.
FMT_MSA.1[AMD]	Contributes indirectly to meet this objective.
FMT_MSA.3[AMD]	Contributes indirectly to meet this objective.
FMT_SMF.1[AMD]	Contributes indirectly to meet this objective.

**OT.GLOBAL\_ARRAYS\_CONFID**

SFR	Rationale
FDP_IFC.1[JCVN]	The JCVN information flow control policy meets the objective by preventing an application from keeping a pointer to a shared buffer, which could be used to read its contents when the buffer is being used by another application.
FDP_IFF.1[JCVN]	The JCVN information flow control policy meets this objective by preventing an application from keeping a pointer to a shared buffer, which could be used to read its contents when the buffer is being used by another application.
FDP_RIP.1[OBJECTS]	Contributes to meet the objective by protecting the array parameters of remotely invoked methods, which are global as well, through the general initialization of method parameters.
FDP_RIP.1[ABORT]	Contributes to meet the objective by protecting the array parameters of remotely invoked methods, which are global as well, through the general initialization of method parameters.
FDP_RIP.1[APDU]	Contributes to meet this objective by fulfilling the clearing requirement of these arrays.
FDP_RIP.1[GlobalArray]	Contributes to meet this objective by fulfilling the clearing requirement of these arrays.
FDP_RIP.1[bArray]	Contributes to meet this objective by fulfilling the clearing requirement of these arrays.
FDP_RIP.1[KEYS]	Contributes to meet the objective by protecting the array parameters of invoked methods, which are global as well, through the general initialization of method parameters.

SFR	Rationale
FDP_RIP.1[TRANSIENT]	Contributes to meet the objective by protecting the array parameters of invoked methods, which are global as well, through the general initialization of method parameters.
FDP_RIP.1[ADEL]	Contributes to meet the objective by protecting the array parameters of invoked methods, which are global as well, through the general initialization of method parameters.
FDP_RIP.1[ODEL]	Contributes to meet the objective by protecting the array parameters of invoked methods, which are global as well, through the general initialization of method parameters.

**OT.GLOBAL\_ARRAYS\_INTEG**

SFR	Rationale
FDP_IFC.1[JCVM]	Contributes to meet the objective by preventing an application from keeping a pointer to the APDU buffer of the card or to the global byte array of the applet's install method. Such a pointer could be used to access and modify it when the buffer is being used by another application.
FDP_IFF.1[JCVM]	Contributes to meet the objective by preventing an application from keeping a pointer to the APDU buffer of the card or to the global byte array of the applet's install method. Such a pointer could be used to access and modify it when the buffer is being used by another application.

**OT.ARRAY\_VIEWS\_CONFID**

SFR	Rationale
FDP_IFC.1[JCVM]	The JCVM information flow control policy meets the objective by preventing an application from storing a reference to the array view or reading the content of an array view that don't have ATTR_READABLE_VIEW security attribute.
FDP_IFF.1[JCVM]	The JCVM information flow control policy meets the objective by preventing an application from storing a reference to the array view or reading the content of an array view that don't have ATTR_READABLE_VIEW security attribute.
FDP_ACC.2[FIREWALL]	The FIREWALL access control SFP meets the objective by enforcing access control to array views without ATTR_READABLE_VIEW access attributes.
FDP_ACF.1[FIREWALL]	The FIREWALL access control SFP meets the objective by enforcing access control to array views without ATTR_READABLE_VIEW access attributes.

**OT.ARRAY\_VIEWS\_INTEG**

SFR	Rationale
FDP_IFC.1[JCVM]	The JCVM information flow control policy meets the objective by preventing an application from storing a reference to the array view or altering the content of an array view that don't have ATTR_WRITABLE_VIEW security attribute.

SFR	Rationale
FDP_IFF.1[JCVN]	The JCVM information flow control policy meets the objective by preventing an application from storing a reference to the array view or altering the content of an array view that don't have ATTR_WRITABLE_VIEW security attribute.
FDP_ACC.2[FIREWALL]	The FIREWALL access control SFP meets the objective by enforcing access control to array views without ATTR_WRITABLE_VIEW access attributes.
FDP_ACF.1[FIREWALL]	The FIREWALL access control SFP meets the objective by enforcing access control to array views without ATTR_WRITABLE_VIEW access attributes.

**OT.NATIVE**

SFR	Rationale
FDP_ACF.1[FIREWALL]	Covers this objective by ensuring that the only means to execute native code is the invocation of a Java Card API method. This objective mainly relies on the environmental objective OE.CAP_FILE, which uphold the assumption A.CAP_FILE.

**OT.OPERATE**

SFR	Rationale
FAU_ARP.1	Contributes to meet this objective by detecting and blocking various failures or security violations during usual working.
FDP_ACC.2[FIREWALL]	Contributes to meet this objective by protecting the TOE through the FIREWALL access control policy.
FDP_ACF.1[FIREWALL]	Contributes to meet this objective by protecting the TOE through the FIREWALL access control policy.
FDP_ROL.1[FIREWALL]	Contributes to meet this objective by providing support for cleanly abort applets' installation, which belongs to the category security-critical parts and procedures protection.
FIA_AFL.1[PIN]	Contributes to meet the objective by protecting the authentication.
FIA_USB.1[AID]	Contributes to meet this objective by controlling the communication with external users and their internal subjects to prevent alteration of TSF data.
FPT_TDC.1	Contributes to meet this objective by protection in various ways against applets' actions.
FPT_RCV.3[INSTALLER]	Contributes to meet this objective by providing safe recovery from failure, which belongs to the category of security-critical parts and procedures protection.
FIA_ATD.1[AID]	Contributes to meet this objective by controlling the communication with external users and their internal subjects to prevent alteration of TSF data.
FPT_FLS.1	Contributes to meet this objective by detecting and blocking various failures or security violations during usual working.
FPT_FLS.1[INSTALLER]	Contributes to meet this objective by detecting and blocking various failures or security violations during usual working.

SFR	Rationale
FPT_FLS.1[ADEL]	Contributes to meet this objective by detecting and blocking various failures or security violations during usual working.
FPT_FLS.1[ODEL]	Contributes to meet this objective by detecting and blocking various failures or security violations during usual working.
FDP_ITC.2[CCM]	Contributes to meet this objective by detecting and blocking various failures or security violations during usual working.

**OT.REALLOCATION**

SFR	Rationale
FDP_RIP.1[OBJECTS]	Contributes to meet the objective by imposing that the contents of the re-allocated block shall always be cleared before delivering the block.
FDP_RIP.1[ABORT]	Contributes to meet the objective by imposing that the contents of the re-allocated block shall always be cleared before delivering the block.
FDP_RIP.1[APDU]	Only arrays can be designated as global, and the only global arrays required in the Java Card API are the APDU buffer and the global byte array input parameter (bArray) to an applet's install method. Contributes to meet the objective by imposing that the contents of the re-allocated block shall always be cleared before delivering the block.
FDP_RIP.1[GlobalArray]	Contributes to meet the objective by imposing that the contents of the re-allocated block shall always be cleared before delivering the block.
FDP_RIP.1[bArray]	Only arrays can be designated as global, and the only global arrays required in the Java Card API are the APDU buffer and the global byte array input parameter (bArray) to an applet's install method. Contributes to meet the objective by imposing that the contents of the re-allocated block shall always be cleared before delivering the block.
FDP_RIP.1[KEYS]	Contributes to meet the objective by imposing that the contents of the re-allocated block shall always be cleared before delivering the block.
FDP_RIP.1[TRANSIENT]	Contributes to meet the objective by imposing that the contents of the re-allocated block shall always be cleared before delivering the block.
FDP_RIP.1[ADEL]	Contributes to meet the objective by imposing that the contents of the re-allocated block shall always be cleared before delivering the block.
FDP_RIP.1[ODEL]	Contributes to meet the objective by imposing that the contents of the re-allocated block shall always be cleared before delivering the block.

**OT.RESOURCES**

SFR	Rationale
FAU_ARP.1	Contributes to meet this objective by detecting stack/memory overflows during execution of applications.
FDP_ROL.1[FIREWALL]	Contributes to meet this objective by preventing that failed installations create memory leaks.
FMT_MTD.1[JCRE]	Contributes to meet this objective since the TSF controls the memory management.
FMT_MTD.3[JCRE]	Contributes to meet this objective since the TSF controls the memory management.

SFR	Rationale
FMT_SMF.1	Contributes to meet this objective since the TSF controls the memory management.
FMT_SMF.1[ADEL]	Contributes to meet this objective since the TSF controls the memory management.
FMT_SMR.1	Contributes to meet this objective since the TSF controls the memory management.
FMT_SMR.1[INSTALLER]	Contributes to meet this objective since the TSF controls the memory management.
FMT_SMR.1[ADEL]	Contributes to meet this objective since the TSF controls the memory management.
FPT_RCV.3[INSTALLER]	Contributes to meet this objective by preventing that failed installations create memory leaks.
FPT_FLS.1	Contributes to meet this objective by detecting stack/memory overflows during execution of applications.
FPT_FLS.1[INSTALLER]	Contributes to meet this objective by detecting stack/memory overflows during execution of applications.
FPT_FLS.1[ADEL]	Contributes to meet this objective by detecting stack/memory overflows during execution of applications.
FPT_FLS.1[ODEL]	Contributes to meet this objective by detecting stack/memory overflows during execution of applications.
FMT_SMR.1[SD]	Contributes to meet this objective since the TSF controls the memory management.
FMT_SMF.1[SC]	Contributes to meet this objective since the TSF controls the memory management.

### 7.2.2.3 Services

#### OT.ALARM

SFR	Rationale
FAU_ARP.1	Contributes to meet this objective by defining TSF reaction upon detection of a potential security violation.
FPT_FLS.1	Contributes to meet the objective by providing the guarantee that a secure state is preserved by the TSF when failures occur.
FPT_FLS.1[INSTALLER]	Contributes to meet the objective by providing the guarantee that a secure state is preserved by the TSF when failures occur.
FPT_FLS.1[ADEL]	Contributes to meet the objective by providing the guarantee that a secure state is preserved by the TSF when failures occur.
FPT_FLS.1[ODEL]	Contributes to meet the objective by providing the guarantee that a secure state is preserved by the TSF when failures occur.

#### OT.CIPHER

SFR	Rationale
FCS_CKM.1	Covers the objective directly.
FCS_CKM.2	Covers the objective directly.

SFR	Rationale
FCS_CKM.3	Covers the objective directly.
FCS_CKM.4	Covers the objective directly.
FCS_COP.1	Covers the objective directly.
FPR_UNO.1	Contributes to meet the objective by controlling the observation of the cryptographic operations which may be used to disclose the keys.

**OT.KEY-MNGT**

SFR	Rationale
FCS_CKM.1	Covers the objective directly.
FCS_CKM.2	Covers the objective directly.
FCS_CKM.3	Covers the objective directly.
FCS_CKM.4	Covers the objective directly.
FCS_COP.1	Covers the objective directly.
FDP_RIP.1[OBJECTS]	Covers the objective directly.
FDP_RIP.1[ABORT]	Covers the objective directly.
FDP_RIP.1[APDU]	Covers the objective directly.
FDP_RIP.1[GlobalArray]	Covers the objective directly.
FDP_RIP.1[bArray]	Covers the objective directly.
FDP_RIP.1[KEYS]	Covers the objective directly.
FDP_RIP.1[TRANSIENT]	Covers the objective directly.
FDP_RIP.1[ADEL]	Covers the objective directly.
FDP_RIP.1[ODEL]	Covers the objective directly.
FDP_SDI.2[DATA]	Covers the objective directly.
FPR_UNO.1	Contributes to meet objective by controlling the observation of the cryptographic operations which may be used to disclose the keys.

**OT.PIN-MNGT**

SFR	Rationale
FDP_ACC.2[FIREWALL]	Contributes to meet the objective by protecting the access to private and internal data of the objects.
FDP_ACF.1[FIREWALL]	Contributes to meet the objective by protecting the access to private and internal data of the objects.
FDP_RIP.1[OBJECTS]	Contributes to meet the objective.
FDP_RIP.1[ABORT]	Contributes to meet the objective.
FDP_RIP.1[APDU]	Contributes to meet the objective.
FDP_RIP.1[GlobalArray]	Contributes to meet the objective.
FDP_RIP.1[bArray]	Contributes to meet the objective.

SFR	Rationale
FDP_RIP.1[KEYS]	Contributes to meet the objective.
FDP_RIP.1[TRANSIENT]	Contributes to meet the objective.
FDP_RIP.1[ADEL]	Contributes to meet the objective.
FDP_RIP.1[ODEL]	Contributes to meet the objective.
FDP_ROL.1[FIREWALL]	Contributes to meet the objective.
FDP_SDI.2[DATA]	Contributes to meet the objective.
FPR_UNO.1	Contributes to meet the objective.
FIA_AFL.1[PIN]	Directly contributes to meet the objective.

**OT.TRANSACTION**

SFR	Rationale
FDP_RIP.1[OBJECTS]	Covers the objective directly.
FDP_RIP.1[ABORT]	Covers the objective directly.
FDP_RIP.1[APDU]	Covers the objective directly.
FDP_RIP.1[GlobalArray]	Covers the objective directly.
FDP_RIP.1[bArray]	Covers the objective directly.
FDP_RIP.1[KEYS]	Covers the objective directly.
FDP_RIP.1[TRANSIENT]	Covers the objective directly.
FDP_RIP.1[ADEL]	Covers the objective directly.
FDP_RIP.1[ODEL]	Covers the objective directly.
FDP_ROL.1[FIREWALL]	Covers the objective directly.

**7.2.2.4 Object Deletion****OT.OBJ-DELETION**

SFR	Rationale
FDP_RIP.1[ODEL]	Contributes to meet the objective.
FPT_FLS.1[ODEL]	Contributes to meet the objective.

**7.2.2.5 Applet Management****OT.APPLI-AUTH**



SFR	Rationale
FCS_COP.1	Refinement: applies to FCS_COP.1[DAP]. Contributes to meet the security objective by ensuring that the loaded Executable Application is legitimate by specifying the algorithm to be used in order to verify the DAP signature of the Verification Authority.
FDP_ROL.1[CCM]	Contributes to meet this security objective by ensures that card management operations may be cleanly aborted.
FPT_FLS.1[CCM]	Contributes to meet the security objective by preserving a secure state when failures occur.

**OT.DOMAIN-RIGHTS**

SFR	Rationale
FDP_ACC.1[SD]	Contributes to cover this security objective by enforcing a Security Domain access control policy (rules and restrictions) that ensures a secure card content management.
FDP_ACF.1[SD]	Contributes to cover this security objective by enforcing a Security Domain access control policy (rules and restrictions) that ensures a secure card content management.
FMT_MSA.1[SD]	Contributes to cover this security objective by enforcing a Security Domain access control policy (rules and restrictions) that ensures a secure card content management.
FMT_MSA.3[SD]	Contributes to cover this security objective by enforcing a Security Domain access control policy (rules and restrictions) that ensures a secure card content management.
FMT_SMF.1[SD]	Contributes to cover this security objective by enforcing a Security Domain access control policy (rules and restrictions) that ensures a secure card content management.
FMT_SMR.1[SD]	Contributes to cover this security objective by enforcing a Security Domain access control policy (rules and restrictions) that ensures a secure card content management.
FTP_ITC.1[SC]	Contributes to cover this security objective by enforcing Secure Channel Protocol information flow control policy that ensures the integrity and the authenticity of card management operations.
FCO_NRO.2[SC]	Contributes to cover this security objective by enforcing Secure Channel Protocol information flow control policy that ensures the integrity and the authenticity of card management operations.
FDP_IFC.2[SC]	Contributes to cover this security objective by enforcing Secure Channel Protocol information flow control policy that ensures the integrity and the authenticity of card management operations.
FDP_IFF.1[SC]	Contributes to cover this security objective by enforcing Secure Channel Protocol information flow control policy that ensures the integrity and the authenticity of card management operations.
FMT_MSA.1[SC]	Contributes to cover this security objective by enforcing Secure Channel Protocol information flow control policy that ensures the integrity and the authenticity of card management operations.
FMT_MSA.3[SC]	Contributes to cover this security objective by enforcing Secure Channel Protocol information flow control policy that ensures the integrity and the authenticity of card management operations.

SFR	Rationale
FMT_SMF.1[SC]	Contributes to cover this security objective by enforcing Secure Channel Protocol information flow control policy that ensures the integrity and the authenticity of card management operations.
FIA_UID.1[SC]	Contributes to cover this security objective by enforcing Secure Channel Protocol information flow control policy that ensures the integrity and the authenticity of card management operations.
FIA_UAU.1[SC]	Contributes to cover this security objective by enforcing Secure Channel Protocol information flow control policy that ensures the integrity and the authenticity of card management operations.
FIA_UAU.4[SC]	Contributes to cover this security objective by enforcing Secure Channel Protocol information flow control policy that ensures the integrity and the authenticity of card management operations.

**OT.COMM\_AUTH**

SFR	Rationale
FCS_COP.1	Contributes to meet the security objective by specifying secure cryptographic algorithm that shall be used to determine the origin of the card management commands.
FMT_SMR.1[SD]	Contributes to meet the security objective by specifying the authorized identified roles enabling to send and authenticate card management commands.
FTP_ITC.1[SC]	Contributes to meet the security objective by ensuring the origin of card administration commands.
FDP_IFC.2[SC]	Contributes to meet the security objective by specifying the authorized identified roles enabling to send and authenticate card management commands.
FDP_IFF.1[SC]	Contributes to meet the security objective by specifying the authorized identified roles enabling to send and authenticate card management commands.
FMT_MSA.1[SC]	Contributes to meet the security objective by specifying security attributes enabling to authenticate card management requests.
FMT_MSA.3[SC]	Contributes to meet the security objective by specifying security attributes enabling to authenticate card management requests.
FIA_UID.1[SC]	Contributes to meet the security objective by specifying the actions that can be performed before authenticating the origin of the APDU commands that the TOE receives.
FIA_UAU.1[SC]	Contributes to meet the security objective by specifying the actions that can be performed before authenticating the origin of the APDU commands that the TOE receives.

**OT.COMM\_INTEGRITY**

SFR	Rationale
FCS_COP.1	Contributes to meet the security objective by by specifying secure cryptographic algorithm that shall be used to ensure the integrity of the card management commands.

SFR	Rationale
FMT_SMR.1[SD]	Contributes to cover this security objective by defining the roles enabling to send and authenticate the card management requests for which the integrity has to be ensured.
FTP_ITC.1[SC]	Contributes to meet the security objective by ensuring the integrity of card management commands.
FDP_IFC.2[SC]	Contributes to cover the security objective by enforcing the Secure Channel Protocol information flow control policy to guarantee the integrity of administration requests.
FDP_IFF.1[SC]	Contributes to cover the security objective by enforcing the Secure Channel Protocol information flow control policy to guarantee the integrity of administration requests.
FMT_MSA.1[SC]	Contributes to cover the security objective by specifying security attributes enabling to guarantee the integrity of card management requests.
FMT_MSA.3[SC]	Contributes to cover the security objective by specifying security attributes enabling to guarantee the integrity of card management requests.
FMT_SMF.1[SC]	Contributes to meet the security objective by specifying the actions activating the integrity check on the card management commands.

**OT.COMM\_CONFIDENTIALITY**

SFR	Rationale
FCS_COP.1	Contributes to meet this objective by specifying secure cryptographic algorithm that shall be used to ensure the confidentiality of the card management commands.
FMT_SMR.1[SD]	Contributes to cover the security objective by defining the roles enabling to send and authenticate the card management requests for which the confidentiality has to be ensured.
FTP_ITC.1[SC]	Contributes to cover the security objective by ensuring the confidentiality of card management commands.
FDP_IFC.2[SC]	Contributes to cover the security objective by enforcing the Secure Channel Protocol information flow control policy to guarantee the confidentiality of administration requests.
FDP_IFF.1[SC]	Contributes to cover the security objective by enforcing the Secure Channel Protocol information flow control policy to guarantee the confidentiality of administration requests.
FMT_MSA.1[SC]	Contributes to cover the security objective by specifying security attributes enabling to guarantee the confidentiality of card management requests by decrypting those requests and imposing management conditions on that attributes.
FMT_MSA.3[SC]	Contributes to cover the security objective by specifying security attributes enabling to guarantee the confidentiality of card management requests by decrypting those requests and imposing management conditions on that attributes.
FMT_SMF.1[SC]	Contributes to cover the security objective by specifying the actions ensuring the confidentiality of the card management commands.

## 7.2.2.6 Card Management

## OT.CARD-MANAGEMENT

SFR	Rationale
FDP_ACC.2[ADEL]	Contributes to meet the objective by the ADEL access control policy which ensures the non-introduction of security holes. The integrity and confidentiality of data that does not belong to the deleted applet or package is a by-product of this policy as well.
FDP_ACF.1[ADEL]	Contributes to meet the objective by the ADEL access control policy which ensures the non-introduction of security holes. The integrity and confidentiality of data that does not belong to the deleted applet or package is a by-product of this policy as well.
FDP_RIP.1[ADEL]	Contributes to meet the objective by ensuring the non-accessibility of deleted data.
FMT_MSA.1[ADEL]	Contributes to meet the objective by enforcing the ADEL access control SFP.
FMT_MSA.3[ADEL]	Contributes to meet the objective by enforcing the ADEL access control SFP.
FMT_SMR.1[ADEL]	Contributes to meet the objective by maintaining the role applet deletion manager.
FPT_RCV.3[INSTALLER]	Contributes to meet the objective by protecting the TSFs against possible failures of the deletion procedures.
FPT_FLS.1[INSTALLER]	Contributes to meet the objective by protecting the TSFs against possible failures of the installer.
FPT_FLS.1[ADEL]	Contributes to meet the objective by protecting the TSFs against possible failures of the deletion procedures.
FDP_UIT.1[CCM]	Contributes to meet the objective by enforcing the Secure Channel Protocol information flow control policy and the Security Domain access control policy which controls the integrity of the corresponding data.
FDP_ROL.1[CCM]	Contributes to meet this security objective by ensures that card management operations may be cleanly aborted.
FDP_ITC.2[CCM]	Contributes to meet the security objective by enforcing the Firewall access control policy and the Secure Channel Protocol information flow policy when importing card management data.
FPT_FLS.1[CCM]	Contributes to meet the security objective by preserving a secure state when failures occur.
FDP_ACC.1[SD]	Contributes to cover this security objective by enforcing a Security Domain access control policy (rules and restrictions) that ensures a secure card content management.
FDP_ACF.1[SD]	Contributes to cover this security objective by enforcing a Security Domain access control policy (rules and restrictions) that ensures a secure card content management.
FMT_MSA.1[SD]	Contributes to cover this security objective by enforcing a Security Domain access control policy (rules and restrictions) that ensures a secure card content management.
FMT_MSA.3[SD]	Contributes to cover this security objective by enforcing a Security Domain access control policy (rules and restrictions) that ensures a secure card content management.

SFR	Rationale
FMT_SMF.1[SD]	Contributes to cover this security objective by enforcing a Security Domain access control policy (rules and restrictions) that ensures a secure card content management.
FMT_SMR.1[SD]	Contributes to cover this security objective by enforcing a Security Domain access control policy (rules and restrictions) that ensures a secure card content management.
FTP_ITC.1[SC]	Contributes to meet this security objective by enforcing Secure Channel Protocol information flow control policy that ensures the integrity and the authenticity of card management operations.
FCO_NRO.2[SC]	Contributes to meet this security objective by enforcing Secure Channel Protocol information flow control policy that ensures the integrity and the authenticity of card management operations.
FDP_IFC.2[SC]	Contributes to meet this security objective by enforcing Secure Channel Protocol information flow control policy that ensures the integrity and the authenticity of card management operations.
FDP_IFF.1[SC]	Contributes to meet this security objective by enforcing Secure Channel Protocol information flow control policy that ensures the integrity and the authenticity of card management operations.
FMT_MSA.1[SC]	Contributes to meet this security objective by enforcing Secure Channel Protocol information flow control policy that ensures the integrity and the authenticity of card management operations.
FMT_MSA.3[SC]	Contributes to meet this security objective by enforcing Secure Channel Protocol information flow control policy that ensures the integrity and the authenticity of card management operations.
FMT_SMF.1[SC]	Contributes to meet this security objective by enforcing Secure Channel Protocol information flow control policy that ensures the integrity and the authenticity of card management operations.
FIA_UID.1[SC]	Contributes to meet this security objective by enforcing Secure Channel Protocol information flow control policy that ensures the integrity and the authenticity of card management operations.
FIA_UAU.1[SC]	Contributes to meet this security objective by enforcing Secure Channel Protocol information flow control policy that ensures the integrity and the authenticity of card management operations.
FIA_UAU.4[SC]	Contributes to meet this security objective by enforcing Secure Channel Protocol information flow control policy that ensures the integrity and the authenticity of card management operations.

7.2.2.7 Smart Card Platform

OT.SCP.IC

SFR	Rationale
FAU_ARP.1	Contributes to the coverage of the objective by resetting the card session or terminating the card in case of physical tampering.
FPR_UNO.1	Contributes to the coverage of the objective by ensuring leakage resistant implementations of the unobservable operations.
FPT_EMSEC.1	Contributes to meet the objective.

SFR	Rationale
FPT_PHP.3	Contributes to the coverage of the objective by preventing bypassing, deactivation or changing of other security features.

**OT.SCP.RECOVERY**

SFR	Rationale
FAU_ARP.1	Contributes to the coverage of the objective by ensuring reinitialization of the Java Card System and its data after card tearing and power failure.
FPT_FLS.1	Contributes to the coverage of the objective by preserving a secure state after failure.

**OT.SCP.SUPPORT**

SFR	Rationale
FCS_CKM.1	Contributes to meet the objective.
FCS_CKM.4	Contributes to meet the objective.
FCS_COP.1	Contributes to meet the objective.
FDP_ROL.1[FIREWALL]	Contributes to meet the objective.

**OT.IDENTIFICATION**

SFR	Rationale
FAU_SAS.1[SCP]	Covers the objective. The Initialisation Data (or parts of them) are used for TOE identification

**7.2.2.8 Random Numbers****OT.RND**

SFR	Rationale
FCS_RNG.1	Covers the objective by providing random numbers of good quality by specifying class DRG.3 of AIS 20. It was chosen to define FCS_RNG.1 explicitly, because Part 2 of the Common Criteria does not contain generic security functional requirements for Random Number generation. (Note that there are security functional requirements in Part 2 of the Common Criteria, which refer to random numbers. However, they define requirements only for the authentication context, which is only one of the possible applications of random numbers).
FCS_RNG.1[HDT]	Covers the objective by providing random numbers of good quality by specifying class DRG.4 of AIS 20

**7.2.2.9 Config Applet****OT.CARD-CONFIGURATION**

SFR	Rationale
FDP_IFC.2[CFG]	Contributes to meet the objective by controlling the ability to modify configuration items.

SFR	Rationale
FDP_IFF.1[CFG]	Contributes to meet the objective by controlling the ability to modify configuration items.
FMT_MSA.3[CFG]	Contributes to meet the objective by controlling the ability to modify configuration items.
FMT_MSA.1[CFG]	Contributes to meet the objective by controlling the ability to modify configuration items.
FMT_SMR.1[CFG]	Contributes to meet the objective by controlling the ability to modify configuration items.
FMT_SMF.1[CFG]	Contributes to meet the objective by controlling the ability to modify configuration items.
FIA_UID.1[CFG]	Contributes to meet the objective by requiring identification before modifying configuration items.

#### 7.2.2.10 OS Update Mechanism

##### OT.CONFID-UPDATE-IMAGE.LOAD

SFR	Rationale
FPR_UNO.1	Contributes to the coverage of the objective by ensuring the unobservability of the S.OSU decryption key.
FIA_UID.1[OSU]	Contributes to the coverage of the objective by requiring identification.
FIA_UAU.1[OSU]	Contributes to the coverage of the objective by requiring authentication.

##### OT.AUTH-LOAD-UPDATE-IMAGE

SFR	Rationale
FDP_IFC.2[OSU]	Contributes to the coverage of the objective by applying the rules of the Information Flow Control policy.
FDP_IFF.1[OSU]	Contributes to the coverage of the objective by applying the rules of the Information Flow Control policy.
FMT_MSA.3[OSU]	Contributes to the coverage of the objective by enforcing restrictive default values for the attributes of the OS Update information flow control SFP.
FMT_SMR.1[OSU]	Contributes to the coverage of the objective by letting S.OSU handle the OS Update procedure.
FIA_UID.1[OSU]	Contributes to the objective by requiring identification of the authorized images.
FIA_UAU.1[OSU]	Contributes to the objective by requiring authentication of the authorized images.

##### OT.SECURE\_LOAD\_ACODE

SFR	Rationale
FDP_IFC.2[OSU]	Contributes to the coverage of the objective by ensuring that only allowed versions of the D.UPDATE_IMAGE are accepted and by checking the evidence data of authenticity and integrity.

SFR	Rationale
FMT_SMR.1[OSU]	Contributes to the coverage of the objective by letting S.OSU handle the OS Update procedure.
FPT_FLS.1[OSU]	Contributes to the coverage of the objective by ensuring a secure state after interruption of the OS Update procedure (Load Phase).
FIA_UAU.4[OSU]	Contributes to meet the objective by enforcing authenticity and integrity of D.UPDATE_IMAGE (i.e. Additional Code).

**OT.SECURE\_AC\_ACTIVATION**

SFR	Rationale
FMT_MSA.1[OSU]	Contributes to the coverage of the objective by allowing to modify the Current Sequence Number only after successful OS Update procedure.
FMT_SMR.1[OSU]	Contributes to the coverage of the objective by letting S.OSU handle the OS Update procedure.
FMT_SMF.1[OSU]	Contributes to the objective by providing information on the currently activated software (Current Sequence Number).
FPT_FLS.1[OSU]	Contributes to the coverage of the objective by ensuring atomicity of the OS Update procedure (Load Phase).

**OT.TOE\_IDENTIFICATION**

SFR	Rationale
FDP_SDI.2	Contributes to cover the objective by storing the identification data (D.TOE_IDENTIFICATION) in an integrity protected store.
FMT_SMF.1[OSU]	Contributes to cover the objective by providing the ability to query the identification data (Current Sequence Number, Reference Sequence Number, Final Sequence Number) of the TOE.

**7.2.2.11 Applet Migration Mechanism****OT.DATASTORE\_ACCESS**

SFR	Rationale
FDP_ACC.1[AMD]	Contributes to meet the objective by applying access control rules to the datastore.
FDP_ACF.1[AMD]	Contributes to meet the objective by applying access control rules to the datastore.
FMT_MSA.1[AMD]	Contributes to meet the objective by ensuring that only the ArchiveManager sets the respective AID couples of the exporting and importing applets.
FMT_MSA.3[AMD]	Contributes to meet the objective by providing access only to ArchiveManager to read/write the datastore and the respective exporting and importing applet AID.
FMT_SMF.1[AMD]	Contributes to meet the objective by providing import and export functions from/to the datastore.
FDP_IFC.2[AMD]	This SFR contributes to the objective by accepting migration plans only from an authenticated off card entity



SFR	Rationale
FDP_IFF.1[AMD]	This SFR contributes to the objective by accepting migration plans only from an authenticated off card entity.
FMT_SMR.1[AMD]	Contributes to cover the objective by letting S.ArchiveManager handle the Applet Migration process
FPT_FLS.1[AMD]	Enforces the security objective by preserving a secure state in case the applet migration is not performed successfully.
FIA_UAU.5[AMD]	This SFR contributes to the objective by accepting migration plans only from an authenticated off card entity
FIA_UID.1[AMD]	Contributes to the coverage of the objective by requiring identification.

7.2.2.12 Restricted Mode

**OT.ATTACK-COUNTER**

SFR	Rationale
FMT_MSA.3[RM]	Contributes to cover the objective by restricting the initial value of the Attack Counter and allowing nobody to change the initial value.
FMT_MSA.1[RM]	Contributes to cover the objective by only allowing the S.ACAdmin to modify the Attack Counter.
FIA_UAU.1[RM]	Contributes to cover the objective by requiring authentication before resetting the Attack Counter.
FIA_UID.1[RM]	Contributes to cover the objective by requiring identification before resetting the Attack Counter.

**OT.RESTRICTED-MODE**

SFR	Rationale
FDP_ACC.2[RM]	Contributes to the coverage of the objective by defining the subject of the Restricted Mode access control SFP.
FDP_ACF.1[RM]	Contributes to cover the objective by controlling access to objects for all operations.
FMT_SMF.1[RM]	Contributes to cover the objective by defining the management functions of the restricted mode.
FIA_UAU.1[RM]	Contributes to cover the objective by requiring authentication before resetting the Attack Counter.
FIA_UID.1[RM]	Contributes to cover the objective by requiring identification before resetting the Attack Counter.

7.2.2.13 Package Sensitive Result

**OT.SENSITIVE\_RESULTS\_INTEG**

SFR	Rationale
FDP_SDI.2[SENSITIVE_RESULT]	The security objective is covered directly by the SFR FDP_SDI.2[SENSITIVE_RESULT] which ensures that integrity errors related to the sensitive API result are detected by the TOE.

7.2.2.14 Context Separation

**OT.CONT-SEP**

SFR	Rationale
FDP_ACC.2[CONTSEP]	Contributes to cover the objective by defining the context separation SFP.
FDP_ACF.1[CONTSEP]	Contributes to cover the objective by defining the rules of the context separation SFP.
FMT_MSA.3[CONTSEP]	Contributes to cover the objective by providing restrictive default values for the Access Control Table and by allowing only the Main JCOP to create new entries.
FMT_MSA.1[CONTSEP]	Contributes to cover the objective by allowing only Main JCOP to modify the Memory Region Access Control Table.
FMT_SMR.1[CONTSEP]	Contributes to cover the objective by maintaining the roles S.Main JCOP, S.GuestOS.
FMT_SMF.1[CONTSEP]	Contributes to cover the objective by defining a management function for the Memory Region Access Control Table.
FIA_UID.1[CONTSEP]	Contributes to cover the objective by ensuring that no user can access the TOE before the context separation SFP has been set up

**OT.CONT-PRIV**

SFR	Rationale
FDP_ACC.2[CONTSEP]	Contributes to cover the objective by defining the context separation SFP.
FDP_ACF.1[CONTSEP]	Contributes to cover the objective by defining the rules that makes Main JCOP the most privileged.
FMT_MSA.3[CONTSEP]	Contributes to cover the objective by providing restrictive default values for the Access Control Table and by allowing only the Main JCOP to create new entries.
FMT_MSA.1[CONTSEP]	Contributes to cover the objective by allowing only Main JCOP to modify the Memory Region Access Control Table.
FMT_SMR.1[CONTSEP]	Contributes to cover the objective by maintaining the roles S.MainJCOP, S.GuestOS.
FMT_SMF.1[CONTSEP]	Contributes to cover the objective by defining a management function for the Memory Region Access Control Table.
FIA_UID.1[CONTSEP]	Contributes to cover the objective by ensuring that no user can access the TOE before the context separation SFP has been set up

**OT.CONT-DOS**

SFR	Rationale
FDP_ACC.2[CONTSEP]	Contributes to cover the objective by defining the context separation SFP.
FDP_ACF.1[CONTSEP]	Contributes to cover the objective by defining the rules that ensure that Main JCOP stays the leader and manages context switching.

SFR	Rationale
FMT_MSA.3[CONTSEP]	Contributes to cover the objective by providing restrictive default values for the Access Control Table and by allowing only the Main JCOP to create new entries.
FMT_MSA.1[CONTSEP]	Contributes to cover the objective by allowing only Main JCOP to modify the Memory Region Access Control Table.
FMT_SMR.1[CONTSEP]	Contributes to cover the objective by maintaining the roles S.MainJCOP, S.GuestOS.
FMT_SMF.1[CONTSEP]	Contributes to cover the objective by defining a management function for the Memory Region Access Control Table.
FIA_UID.1[CONTSEP]	Contributes to cover the objective by ensuring that no user can access the TOE before the context separation SFP has been set up

### 7.2.3 Security Requirements Dependencies

Table 41. SFRs Dependencies.

Requirements	CC Dependencies	Satisfied dependencies
FAU_ARP.1	FAU_SAA.1 Potential violation analysis	see §7.4.3.1 of [11]
FAU_SAS.1[SCP]	No other components.	
FCO_NRO.2[SC]	FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification	FIA_UID.1[SC]
FCS_CKM.1	[FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation] FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction	see §7.4.3.1 of [11]
FCS_CKM.2	[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation] FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction	FCS_CKM.1 FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.3	[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation] FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction	FCS_CKM.1 FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.4	[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]	see §7.4.3.1 of [11]

Table 41. SFRs Dependencies....continued

Requirements	CC Dependencies	Satisfied dependencies
FCS_COP.1	[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation] FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction.	see §7.4.3.1 of [11]
FCS_RNG.1	No dependencies	
FCS_RNG.2[HDT]	No dependencies	
FDP_ACC.1[AMD]	FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control	FDP_ACF.1[AMD]
FDP_ACC.1[SD]	FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control	FDP_ACF.1[SD]
FDP_ACC.2[FIREWALL]	FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control	see §7.4.3.1 of [11]
FDP_ACC.2[ADEL]	FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control	see §7.4.3.1 of [11]
FDP_ACC.2[RM]	FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control	FDP_ACF.1[RM]
FDP_ACC.2[CONTSEP]	FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control	FDP_ACF.1[CONTSEP]
FDP_ACF.1[FIREWALL]	FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation	see §7.4.3.1 of [11]
FDP_ACF.1[ADEL]	FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation	see §7.4.3.1 of [11]
FDP_ACF.1[AMD]	FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation	FDP_ACC.1[AMD] FMT_MSA.3[AMD]
FDP_ACF.1[SD]	FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation	FDP_ACC.1[SD] FMT_MSA.3[SD]
FDP_ACF.1[RM]	FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation	FDP_ACC.2[RM] FMT_MSA.3[RM]
FDP_ACF.1[CONTSEP]	FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation	FDP_ACC.2[CONTSEP] FMT_MSA.3[CONTSEP]
FDP_IFC.1[JCVI]	FDP_IFF.1 Simple security attributes	see §7.4.3.1 of [11]
FDP_IFC.2[SC]	FDP_IFF.1 Simple security attributes	FDP_IFF.1[SC]
FDP_IFC.2[OSU]	FDP_IFF.1 Simple security attributes	FDP_IFF.1[OSU]

Table 41. SFRs Dependencies....continued

Requirements	CC Dependencies	Satisfied dependencies
FDP_IFC.2[CFG]	FDP_IFF.1 Simple security attributes	FDP_IFF.1[CFG]
FDP_IFC.2[CFG]	FDP_IFF.1 Simple security attributes	FDP_IFF.1[CFG]
FDP_IFC.2[AMD]	FDP_IFF.1 Simple security attributes	FDP_IFF.1[AMD]
FDP_IFF.1[JCVI]	FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation	see §7.4.3.1 of [11]
FDP_IFF.1[SC]	FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation	FDP_IFC.2[SC] FMT_MSA.3[SC]
FDP_IFF.1[OSU]	FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation	FDP_IFC.2[OSU] FMT_MSA.3[OSU]
FDP_IFF.1[CFG]	FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation	FDP_IFC.2[CFG] FMT_MSA.3[CFG]
FDP_IFF.1[AMD]	FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation	FDP_IFC.2[AMD] FMT_MSA.3[AMD]
FDP_ITC.2[CCM]	[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control] [FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel, or FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path] FPT_TDC.1 Inter-TSF basic TSF data consistency	FDP_ACC.1[SD] FTP_ITC.1[SC]
FDP_RIP.1[OBJECTS]	No dependencies	
FDP_RIP.1[ABORT]	No dependencies	
FDP_RIP.1[APDU]	No dependencies	
FDP_RIP.1[bArray]	No dependencies	
FDP_RIP.1[KEYS]	No dependencies	
FDP_RIP.1[TRANSIENT]	No dependencies	
FDP_RIP.1[ADEL]	No dependencies	
FDP_RIP.1[ODEL]	No dependencies	
FDP_ROL.1[FIREWALL]	[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]	see §7.4.3.1 of [11]
FDP_ROL.1[CCM]	[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]	FDP_ACC.1[SD]
FDP_SDI.2[DATA]	No dependencies	

Table 41. SFRs Dependencies....continued

Requirements	CC Dependencies	Satisfied dependencies
FDP_UIT.1[CCM]	[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control] [FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel, or FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path]	FDP_ACC.1[SD] FTP_ITC.1[SC]
FIA_AFL.1[PIN]	FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication	see AppNote in FIA_AFL.1[PIN]
FIA_ATD.1[AID]	No dependencies	
FIA_UID.1[SC]	No dependencies	
FIA_UID.1[OSU]	No dependencies	
FIA_UID.1[AMD]	No dependencies	
FIA_UID.1[CFG]	No dependencies	
FIA_UID.1[RM]	No dependencies	
FIA_UID.1[CONTSEP]	No dependencies	
FIA_UID.2[AID]	No dependencies	
FIA_USB.1[AID]	FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition	see §7.4.3.1 of [11]
FIA_UAU.1[SC]	A_UID.1 Timing of identification	FIA_UID.1[SC]
FIA_UAU.5[AMD]	No dependencies	
FIA_UAU.1[RM]	FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification	FIA_UID.1[RM]
FIA_UAU.1[OSU]	FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification	FIA_UID.1[OSU]
FIA_UAU.4[SC]	No dependencies	
FIA_UAU.4[OSU]	No dependencies	
FMT_MSA.1[JCRE]	[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control] FMT_SMR.1 Security roles FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions	see §7.4.3.1 of [11]
FMT_MSA.1[JCVVM]	[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control] FMT_SMR.1 Security roles FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions	see §7.4.3.1 of [11]
FMT_MSA.1[ADEL]	[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control] FMT_SMR.1 Security roles FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions	see §7.4.3.1 of [11]

Table 41. SFRs Dependencies....continued

Requirements	CC Dependencies	Satisfied dependencies
FMT_MSA.1[SC]	[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control] FMT_SMR.1 Security roles FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions	FDP_ACC.1[SD] FMT_SMR.1[SD] FMT_SMF.1[SC]
FMT_MSA.1[OSU]	[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control] FMT_SMR.1 Security roles FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions	FDP_IFC.2[OSU] FMT_SMR.1[OSU] FMT_SMF.1[OSU]
FMT_MSA.1[CFG]	[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control] FMT_SMR.1 Security roles FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions	FDP_IFC.2[CFG] FMT_SMR.1[CFG] FMT_SMF.1[CFG]
FMT_MSA.1[SD]	[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control] FMT_SMR.1 Security roles FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions	FDP_ACC.1[SD] FMT_SMR.1[SD] FMT_SMF.1[SD]
FMT_MSA.1[RM]	[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control] FMT_SMR.1 Security roles FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions	FDP_ACC.2[RM] FMT_SMR.1[SD] FMT_SMF.1[RM]
FMT_MSA.1[AMD]	[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control] FMT_SMR.1 Security roles FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions	FDP_ACC.1[AMD] & FDP_IFC.2[AMD] FMT_SMR.1[AMD] FMT_SMF.1[AMD]
FMT_MSA.1[CONTSEP]	[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control] FMT_SMR.1 Security roles FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions	FDP_ACC.2[CONTSEP] FMT_SMR.1[CONTSEP] FMT_SMF.1[CONTSEP]
FMT_MSA.2[FIREWALL-JCVM]	FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control] FMT_SMR.1 Security roles FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions	see §7.4.3.1 of <a href="#">[11]</a>
FMT_MSA.3[FIREWALL]	FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes FMT_SMR.1 Security roles	see §7.4.3.1 of <a href="#">[11]</a>

Table 41. SFRs Dependencies....continued

Requirements	CC Dependencies	Satisfied dependencies
FMT_MSA.3[JCVN]	FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes FMT_SMR.1 Security roles	see §7.4.3.1 of [11]
FMT_MSA.3[ADEL]	FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes FMT_SMR.1 Security roles	see §7.4.3.1 of [11]
FMT_MSA.3[AMD]	FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes FMT_SMR.1 Security roles	FMT_MSA.1[AMD] FMT_SMR.1[AMD]
FMT_MSA.3[OSU]	FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes FMT_SMR.1 Security roles	FMT_MSA.1[OSU] FMT_SMR.1[OSU]
FMT_MSA.3[CFG]	FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes FMT_SMR.1 Security roles	FMT_MSA.1[CFG] FMT_SMR.1[CFG]
FMT_MSA.3[SD]	FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes FMT_SMR.1 Security roles	FMT_MSA.1[SD] FMT_SMR.1[SD]
FMT_MSA.3[SC]	FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes FMT_SMR.1 Security roles	FMT_MSA.1[SC] FMT_SMR.1[SD]
FMT_MSA.3[RM]	FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes FMT_SMR.1 Security roles	FMT_MSA.1[RM] FMT_SMR.1[SD]
FMT_MSA.3[CONTSEP]	FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes FMT_SMR.1 Security roles	FMT_MSA.1[CONTSEP] FMT_SMR.1[CONTSEP]
FMT_MTD.1[JCRE]	FMT_SMR.1 Security roles FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions	see §7.4.3.1 of [11]
FMT_MTD.3[JCRE]	FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF data	see §7.4.3.1 of [11]
FMT_SMF.1	No dependencies	
FMT_SMF.1[ADEL]	No dependencies	
FMT_SMF.1[AMD]	No dependencies	
FMT_SMF.1[OSU]	No dependencies	
FMT_SMF.1[CFG]	No dependencies	
FMT_SMF.1[SD]	No dependencies	
FMT_SMF.1[SC]	No dependencies	
FMT_SMF.1[RM]	No dependencies	
FMT_SMF.1[CONTSEP]	No dependencies	
FMT_SMR.1	FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification	see §7.4.3.1 of [11]



Table 41. SFRs Dependencies....continued

Requirements	CC Dependencies	Satisfied dependencies
FMT_SMR.1[INSTALLER]	FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification	see §7.4.3.1 of [11]
FMT_SMR.1[ADEL]	FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification	see §7.4.3.1 of [11]
FMT_SMR.1[OSU]	FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification	FIA_UID.1[OSU]
FMT_SMR.1[AMD]	FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification	FIA_UID.1[AMD]
FMT_SMR.1[CFG]	FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification	FIA_UID.1[CFG]
FMT_SMR.1[SD]	FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification	FIA_UID.1[SC]
FMT_SMR.1[CONTSEP]	FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification	FIA_UID.1[CONTSEP]
FPR_UNO.1	No dependencies	
FPT_EMSEC.1	No dependencies	
FPT_FLS.1	No dependencies	
FPT_FLS.1[INSTALLER]	No dependencies	
FPT_FLS.1[ADEL]	No dependencies	
FPT_FLS.1[ODEL]	No dependencies	
FPT_FLS.1[OSU]	No dependencies	
FPT_FLS.1[AMD]	No dependencies	
FPT_FLS.1[CCM]	No dependencies	
FPT_TDC.1	No dependencies	
FPT_RCV.3[INSTALLER]	AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance	see §7.4.3.1 of [11]
FPT_PHP.3	No dependencies	
FTP_ITC.1[SC]	No dependencies	

### 7.2.4 Rationale for Exclusion of Dependencies

**The dependency FIA\_UID.1 of FMT\_SMR.1[INSTALLER] is unsupported.** This ST does not require the identification of the "installer" since it can be considered as part of the TSF.

**The dependency FIA\_UID.1 of FMT\_SMR.1[ADEL] is unsupported.** This ST does not require the identification of the "deletion manager" since it can be considered as part of the TSF.

**The dependency FMT\_SMF.1 of FMT\_MSA.1[JCRE] is unsupported.** The dependency between FMT\_MSA.1[JCRE] and FMT\_SMF.1 is not satisfied because no management functions are required for the Java Card RE.

**The dependency FAU\_SAA.1 of FAU\_ARP.1 is unsupported.** The dependency of FAU\_ARP.1 on FAU\_SAA.1 assumes that a "potential security violation" generates

an audit event. On the contrary, the events listed in FAU\_ARP.1 are self-contained (arithmetic exception, ill-formed bytecodes, access failure) and ask for a straightforward reaction of the TSFs on their occurrence at runtime. The JCVM or other components of the TOE detect these events during their usual working order. Thus, there is no mandatory audit recording in this ST.

**The dependency FIA\_UAU.1 of FIA\_AFL.1[PIN] is unsupported.** The TOE implements the firewall access control SFP, based on which access to the object Implementing FIA\_AFL.1[PIN] is organized.

## 8 Security Assurance Requirements (ASE\_REQ)

### 8.1 Security Assurance Requirements

The assurance requirements of this evaluation are EAL5, augmented by AVA\_VAN.5, ALC\_DVS.2, ASE\_TSS.2, and ALC\_FLR.1. The assurance requirements ensure, among others, the security of the TOE during its development and production.

### 8.2 Rationale for the Security Assurance Requirements

All the Protection Profiles referenced in PP claim [Section 2.2](#) target EAL4 augmented with ALC\_DVS.2, and AVA\_VAN.5 and also give a rationale for this choice, which is entirely applicable to this Security Target.

This Security Target augments from EAL4 to EAL5 in order to meet increasing assurance expectations of digital signature applications and electronic payment systems on the resistance to attackers with high attack potential.

This Security Target augments EAL5 with ALC\_FLR.1 to cover policies and procedures that are applied to track and correct flaws and to support surveillance of the TOE. Furthermore, ASE\_TSS.2 is chosen to give architectural information on the security functionality of the TOE, which enhances comprehensibility.

The assurance level EAL5 is an elaborated pre-defined level of the CC, part 3 [\[3\]](#). The assurance components in an EAL level are chosen in a way that they build a mutually supportive and complete set of components. The additional requirements chosen for augmentation do not add any dependencies, which are not already fulfilled for the corresponding requirements contained in EAL5. Therefore, the components AVA\_VAN.5, ALC\_DVS.2, ASE\_TSS.2 and ALC\_FLR.1 and ALC\_FLR.1 serve additional assurance to EAL5, but the mutual support of the requirements is still guaranteed.

### 8.3 Dependencies of Security Assurance Requirements

The dependencies of the Security Assurance Requirements are given in [Table 42](#). They are derived from Appendix C of CC [\[3\]](#). The table indicates whether the SAR is directly or indirectly required. Only applicable dependencies from the highest level assurance components are considered.

**Table 42. Dependencies of the Security assurance requirements**

Name	Directly required	Indirectly required
ADV_ARC.1	ADV_FSP.1, ADV_TDS.1	ADV_FSP.2
ADV_FSP.5	ADV_IMP.1, ADV_TDS.1	ADV_TDS.3, ALC_TAT.1
ADV_IMP.1	ADV_TDS.3, ALC_CMC.4, ALC_TAT.1	ADV_FSP.4, ALC_CMS.1, ALC_DVS.1, ALC_LCD.1
ADV_INT.2	ADV_IMP.1, ADV_TDS.3, ALC_TAT.1	ADV_FSP.4,
ADV_TDS.4	ADV_FSP.5	ADV_IMP.1, ADV_TDS.3, ALC_TAT.1
AGD_OPE.1	ADV_FSP.1	none
AGD_PRE.1	none	none
ALC_CMC.4	ALC_CMS.1, ALC_DVS.1, ALC_LCD.1	none

Table 42. Dependencies of the Security assurance requirements ...continued

Name	Directly required	Indirectly required
ALC_CMS.5	none	none
ALC_DEL.1	none	none
ALC_DVS.2	none	none
ALC_FLR.1	none	none
ALC_LCD.1	none	none
ALC_TAT.2	ADV_IMP.1	ADV_FSP.4, ADV_TDS.3
ASE_CCL.1	ASE_ECD.1, ASE_INT.1, ASE_REQ.1	none
ASE_ECD.1	none	none
ASE_INT.1	none	none
ASE_OBJ.2	ASE_SPD.1	none
ASE_REQ.2	ASE_ECD.1, ASE_OBJ.2	ASE_SPD.1
ASE_SPD.1	none	none
ASE_TSS.2	ADV_ARC.1, ASE_INT.1, ASE_REQ.1	ADV_FSP.2, ADV_TDS.1, ASE_ECD.1
ATE_COV.2	ADV_FSP.2, ATE_FUN.1	ADV_TDS.1, ATE_COV.1
ATE_DPT.3	ADV_ARC.1, ADV_TDS.4, ATE_FUN.1	ADV_FSP.5, ADV_IMP.1, ALC_TAT.1, ARE_COV.1
ATE_FUN.1	ATE_COV.1	ADV_FSP.2, ADV_TDS.1, ATE_FUN.1
ATE_IND.2	ADV_FSP.2, AGD_OPE.1, AGD_PRE.1, ATE_COV.1, ATE_FUN.1	ADV_TDS.1
AVA_VAN.5	ADV_ARC.1, ADV_FSP.4, ADV_IMP.1, ADV_TDS.3, AGD_OPE.1, AGD_PRE.1, ATE_DPT.1	ALC_TAT.1, ATE_COV.1, ATE_FUN.1

## 9 TOE summary specification (ASE\_TSS)

### 9.1 Introduction

The Security Functions (SF) and Security Services (SS) introduced in this section realize the SFRs of the TOE. Each SF/SS consists of components spread over several TOE modules to provide a security functionality and fulfill SFRs.

### 9.2 Security Functionality of the SN300 Secure Element

The TOE Security Functionality (TSF) of the SN300 Secure Element is composed of Security Services (SS) and Security Features (SF). They together fulfill the Security Functional Requirements for the TOE, which are identified in [Section 7.1.1](#).

The Security Services of the TOE are summarized in [Table 43](#) and described in [Section 9.2.1](#). The Security Features of the TOE are summarized in [Table 44](#) and described in [Section 9.2.2](#).

The TOE also implements security functionality, which is not part of its Security Services and Security Features, like the PKC coprocessor. Such security functionality isn't required to meet the Security Functional Requirements for the TOE. Instead, it can be used by Security IC Embedded Software to implement further Security Services and Security Features.

**Table 43. Security Services of the SN300 Secure Element**

Security Services	Name
SS.RNG	Random Number Generator
SS.TDES	Triple-DES coprocessor
SS.AES	AES coprocessor
SS.GCM	GCM coprocessor
SS.SGI	Symmetric General Interface functions
SS.CRC	CRC coprocessor

**Table 44. Security Features of the SN300 Secure Element**

Security Features	Name
SF.OPC	Control of Operating Conditions
SF.PHY	Protection against Physical Manipulation
SF.LOG	Logical Protection
SF.FOS-USE	FactoryOS use restrictions
SF.MEM-ACC	Memory Access Control
SF.SFR-ACC	Special Function Register Access Control
SF.FLASH-SVC	Flash Services

#### 9.2.1 Security Services of the SN300 Secure Element

#### 9.2.1.1 SS.RNG : Random Number Generator

SS.RNG serves Security IC Embedded Software with random numbers.

For this purpose SS.RNG implements a physical Random Number Generator, which claims functionality class PTG2 of the pre-defined RNG classes in [5]. This Security Service is suited e.g. for generation of signature key pairs, generation of session keys for symmetric encryption mechanisms, random padding bits, zero-knowledge proofs or generation of seeds for Digital Random Number Generation (DRNG).

The Random Number Generator fulfills the online test requirements defined in [5] and embeds hardware test functionality to detect hardware defects and quality issues of the random numbers.

#### 9.2.1.2 SS.TDES : Triple-DES coprocessor

SS.TDES serves Security IC Embedded Software with calculation of the Triple Data Encryption Algorithm (TDEA) based on the Data Encryption Standard (DES) as defined in [43].

For this purpose SS.TDES implements a Triple-DES coprocessor in hardware, which can be configured by the Security IC Embedded Software to calculate the Triple DES algorithm or the Triple DES inverse algorithm on blocks of 64 bits with selectable keying option 1 of two 56-bit keys or keying option 2 of three 56-bit keys according to [43]. The keys shall be provided by the Security IC Embedded Software.

#### 9.2.1.3 SS.AES : AES coprocessor

SS.AES serves Security IC Embedded Software with calculation of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) algorithm as defined in [39].

For this purpose SS.AES implements an AES coprocessor in hardware, which can be configured by the Security IC Embedded Software to calculate the AES algorithm or the inverse AES algorithm on blocks of 128 bits with a selectable key length of 128, 192 or 256 bits. The keys shall be provided by the Security IC Embedded Software.

#### 9.2.1.4 SS.GCM : GCM coprocessor

SS.GCM serves Security IC Embedded Software with support of Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) of operation for symmetric-key cryptographic block ciphers and Galois Message Authentication Code (GMAC) as defined in [37].

For this purpose SS.GCM implements a GCM coprocessor in hardware, which can be configured by the Security IC Embedded Software to perform Galois field multiplication of two 128-bits input values according to section 6.3 of [37].

#### 9.2.1.5 SS.SGI : SGI functions

SS.SGI serves the Security IC Embedded Software with support of Cipher Block Chaining (CBC), Cipher Feedback (CFB), Output Feedback (OFB) and Counter (CTR) modes of operation for symmetric block ciphers as defined in "NIST SP 800-38A" [34], "Addendum to NIST SP 800-38A" [35] and with support of Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) of operation for symmetric block ciphers and Galois Message Authentication Code (GMAC) as defined in "NIST SP 800-38D" [37].

For this purpose SS.SGI implements XOR operations in hardware and also implements an increment function in hardware according to section 6.2 of “NIST SP 800-38D” [37] with  $s = 32$ . In addition, the TOE implements a register bank that handles input and output data of SS.TDES, SS.AES, SS.GCM as well as their pre- and post-processing with XOR operations and increment function.

#### 9.2.1.6 SS.CRC : CRC coprocessor

SS.CRC serves the Security IC Embedded Software with calculation of cyclic redundancy checks.

For this purpose SS.CRC implements two CRC coprocessors in hardware. Each CRC coprocessor can be configured by Security IC Embedded software to calculate a cyclic redundancy check over a data stream of selectable number of one, two, three or four input bytes. The Security IC embedded Software can choose the cyclic redundancy check out of a 16-bits value based on the polynomial in [40] and a 32-bits value based on the polynomial in [41].

### 9.2.2 Security Features of the SN300 Secure Element

#### 9.2.2.1 SF.OPC : Control of Operating Conditions

SF.OPC controls operating conditions of the TOE. These are explicitly controlled by security functionality that simply hampers feeding certain electrical stimulations into the device. Such security functionality is composed of frequency filters and voltage limiters. Operating conditions of the device are explicitly controlled also by security functionality that actively monitors certain electrical parameters. These parameters are voltage levels of external supply from pad and internal supplies, frequencies of internal clocks and on-chip temperature. Such security functionality raises an error message whenever a monitored parameter drops out of its valid range. In addition, exposure of the device to light is explicitly controlled by security functionality that senses abnormal light over its whole surface, raising an error message when detected.

SF.OPC also controls operating conditions implicitly. This is done by security functionality that detects faults in code and data stored to memories and while processed in the device. Such faults might be inserted by electrical stimulations or by exposure of the device to energy or particles. Error detection codes are used to protect the memories as well as the access channels over the bus system to memories and to hardware peripherals on the control bus, the direct access channel to PKC RAM and security-relevant storage and processing in CPU coprocessor and hardware peripherals on the control bus including SGI interface with Triple-DES, AES, GCM coprocessors and CRC coprocessor. Watchdogs on error detection codes run over code and data stored to RAM, and the Secure Fetch Plus on code and data read from Flash memory can be configured and enabled by Security IC Embedded Software.

Further on, Security IC Embedded Software can configure and enable a Secure Fetch on CPU code and/or data accesses over the bus system and also range checks on values in general purpose, stack pointers and link registers of the CPU as well as checks on predefined CPU instructions for zero values in their operands or in the addresses of their resulting data accesses to memory. In addition, Security IC Embedded Software may protect its program flow by use of a signature watchdog on CPU code accesses over the bus system, by use of a secure counter and by use of a watchdog timer.

SF.OPC also provides the Security IC Embedded Software with multiple calculation modes for the Triple-DES, AES and GCM coprocessors. Triple-DES and AES coprocessors each is equipped with a fault detection mechanism on its key schedule that must be enabled by Security IC Embedded Software.

In case an error message is raised the TOE either (i) aborts code execution and forces a reset or (ii) raises an exception, which interrupts code execution and jumps to an exception vector on which the Security IC Embedded Software can react with an appropriate exception handler. In case of reset the TOE returns to its initial state and provides information on the reset source to the Security IC Embedded Software. In case of an exception the TOE provides information on the exception source to the Security IC Embedded Software.

SF.OPC also implements security functionality that corrects errors in Flash memory.

#### 9.2.2.2 SF.PHY : Protection against Physical Manipulation

SF.PHY protects the TOE from physical probing and physical manipulation of its hardware, its IC Dedicated Software, its TSF data and Security IC Embedded Software stored to its Flash memory including user data of the Composite TOE. This is achieved by appropriate shielding techniques for all elements in the physical design of the TOE, by redundant CPU core, by redundant routing of sensitive signals, by layout constraints on particular placements and routings.

Selected security functionality in analog design parts of the TOE is additionally checked for its basic operability by a built-in selftests that run during startup of the device.

Memories and their interfaces are additionally protected against probing by appropriate encryption of stored content and address scrambling mechanisms.

#### 9.2.2.3 SF.LOG : Logical Protection

SF.LOG provides logical protection of the TOE that fights disclosure of confidential data stored to and processed in the TOE through tracing of power consumption or emanation and subsequent complex signal analysis.

Triple-DES, AES, GCM and CRC coprocessors each implements security functionality that eliminates exploitable side channel leakage. Such security functionality in Triple-DES and AES coprocessors uses masking techniques in data processing, inserts diverse dummy activity that can partly be configured by Security Embedded Software, and randomizations. GCM coprocessor and CRC coprocessor implement masking schemes on their data processing.

Input and output data of Triple-DES, AES and GCM coprocessors are handled via the register bank in the SGI interface that implements masking. XOR operations in the SGI interface are embedded in this masking.

The PKC coprocessor implements security functionality that effectively reduces side channel leakage by adding noise, inserting dummy activity and randomizations.

Secure data transfers from memory to memory or from memories to peripherals on the control bus like the SGI interface, are managed by the secure copy engine (SMA). All such transfers are fully masked from source to destination across the bus infrastructure.

SYM-Lite coprocessor provides secure general purpose operations over sensitive data outside the CPU.



SF.LOG also serves the Security IC Embedded Software with security functionality for additional protection for loading of data into the register bank of the SGI interface and into the input register of the CRC coprocessor.

#### 9.2.2.4 SF.FOS-USE : FactoryOS use restrictions

SF.FOS-USE restricts use of the FactoryOS among three levels of testing capabilities of the TOE. Access to the lower level of testing capabilities is not blocked. Instead, its testing capabilities are very limited so that they cannot be exploited. The medium level of testing capabilities is blocked by an authentication procedure. After successful authentication to this level the TOE serves with testing capabilities to the extent that confidentiality of content stored to its memories cannot be compromised.

The upper level of testing capabilities is blocked by two authentication checks, of which the latter one also forces an erase of Flash windows as well as System Pages before full testing capabilities are provided.

Commands of the FactoryOS are conditionally installed in stages and commands with test functionality are cut to tests of basic functionality only.

SF.FOS-USE also ensures that even the corresponding administrator cannot modify the identification data of chip after the IC card chip enters the use stage.

#### 9.2.2.5 SF.MEM-ACC : Memory Access Control

SF.MEM-ACC controls access to the memories of the TOE. This is done based on physical restrictions in the bus system that block certain access ports for particular memories.

In addition, security functionality is implemented that checks every single access over the bus system to the memories against predefined and/or configurable access rights for each context and privilege levels.

Every access over the bus system to a memory address is checked against access rights in read, write and execute. Access rights are set for predefined default address windows in ROM, Flash memory and RAM and also for configurable software-controlled address windows within these default address windows. Configurations are accessible to Security IC Embedded Software.

#### 9.2.2.6 SF.SFR-ACC : Special Function Register Access Control

SF.SFR-ACC controls access to the Special Function Registers of the TOE. This is done based on physical restrictions in the bus system that block DMA controller access to hardware components on the control bus and also PKC coprocessor access to hardware components on both, control bus and peripheral control bus.

In addition, security functionality is implemented that checks every single access over the bus system on the control bus and on the peripheral control bus to a Special Function Register against predefined and/or configurable access rights for the context and privilege levels.

#### 9.2.2.7 SF.FLASH-SVC : Flash Services

SF.FLASH-SVC provides a Flash Services Software application programming interface (API), which serves Security IC Embedded Software with operations that update content

in Flash memory (Flash erase and/or programming). These operations are tearing-save and verify the updated content in Flash memory.

SF.FLASH-SVC implements dynamic wear-leveling for Flash memory and serves a Flash Services Software application programming interface (API) that provides Security IC Embedded Software with functionality for static wear-leveling and Flash memory refreshing, and with wearout indication for Flash memory.

In addition, the Flash Services Software application programming interface (API) provides Security IC Embedded Software with write access control to certain System Pages depending on the System Operation Mode.

### 9.3 Security Functionality of Java Card System

The Security Functions (SF) introduced in this section realize the SFRs of the TOE. See [Table 45](#) for list of all Security Functions. Each SF consists of components spread over several TOE modules to provide a security functionality and fulfill SFRs.

**Table 45. Overview of Security Functionality**

Name	Title
SF.JCVM	Java Card Virtual Machine
SF.AM	Applet Migration
SF.CONFIG	Configuration Management
SF.OPEN	Card Content Management
SF.CRYPTO	Cryptographic Functionality
SF.RNG	Random Number Generator
SF.DATA_STORAGE	Secure Data Storage
SF.OSU	Operating System Update
SF.OM	Java Object Management
SF.MM	Memory Management
SF.PIN	PIN Management
SF.PERS_MEM	Persistent Memory Management
SF.EDC	Error Detection Code API
SF.HW_EXC	Hardware Exception Handling
SF.RM	Restricted Mode
SF.PID	Platform Identification
SF.SMG_NSC	No Side-Channel
SF.SENS_RES	Sensitive Result
SF.CONT_SEP	Context Separation

<b>SF.JCVM</b>	<b>Java Card Virtual Machine</b> SF.JCVM provides the Java Card Virtual Machine including byte code interpretation and the Java Card Firewall according to the specifications <a href="#">[15]</a> , <a href="#">[14]</a> .
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<b>SF.AM</b>	<p><b>Applet Migration</b></p> <p>The SF.AM enables applet update while applet personalization data is preserved. In particular, the implementation of the Applet Migration feature supports the functions for export and import of applet data.</p>
<b>SF.CONFIG</b>	<p><b>Configuration Management</b></p> <p>SF.CONFIG provides means to store Initialization Data and Pre-personalization Data before TOE delivery.</p> <p>SF.CONFIG provides means to change configurations of the card. Some configurations can be changed by the customer and some can only be changed by NXP.</p> <p>Additionally, SF.CONFIG provides proprietary commands to select the OS update mechanism SF.OSU and to reset the OS to an initial state.</p>
<b>SF.OPEN</b>	<p><b>Card Content Management</b></p> <p>SF.OPEN provides the card content management functionality according the GlobalPlatform Specification [18] and GlobalPlatform Amendments A [19], C [20], D [21], E [22] and H [24]. In addition to the GP specification, the Java Card Runtime Environment specification [15] is followed for application loading, installation, and deletion.</p> <p>AID management is provided by SF.OPEN according to the GlobalPlatform Specification [18], the Java Card Runtime Environment Specification [15], and the Java Card API Specification [13].</p> <p>SF.OPEN is part of the TOE runtime environment and thus separated from other applications.</p>
<b>SF.CRYPTO</b>	<p><b>Cryptographic Functionality</b></p> <p>SF.CRYPTO provides key creation, key management, key deletion and cryptographic functionality. It provides the API in accordance to the Java Card API Specification [13]. Proprietary solutions (e.g., key lengths not supported by the Java Card API) are supported following the Java Card API. SF.CRYPTO uses SF.DATA_STORAGE.</p> <p>This TSF enforces protection of Key material during cryptographic functions processing and Key Generation, against state-of-the-art attacks, including IC power consumption analysis.</p>
<b>SF.RNG</b>	<p><b>Random Number Generator</b></p> <p>SF.RNG provides secure random number generation. Random numbers are generated by the Security Software certified with the TOE hardware. SF.RNG provides an API according to the Java Card API Specification [13] to generate random numbers.</p>
<b>SF.DATA_STORAGE</b>	<p><b>Secure Data Storage</b></p> <p>SF.DATA_STORAGE provides a secure data storage for confidential data. It is used to store cryptographic keys and to store PINs. All data stored by SF.DATA_STORAGE is CRC32 integrity protected. The stored data is AES encrypted.</p>

<b>SF.OSU</b>	<p><b>Operating System Update</b></p> <p>SF.OSU provides secure functionality to update the JCOP 7.0 OS or Updater OS itself with an image created by a trusted off-card entity. SF.OSU allows an authenticated OSU command to upload an integrity and confidentiality protected update image to update to another operating system version. User authentication is based on the verification of signed OSU commands. Integrity protection of OSU commands uses ECDSA, SHA-256 and CRC verification. Confidentiality of the update image is ensured by ECDH and AES encryption. SF.OSU ensures that the system stays in a secure state in case of invalid or aborted update procedures and ensures that the information identifying the currently running OS is modified and the updated code is activated only after successful OS Update procedure.</p>
<b>SF.OM</b>	<p><b>Java Object Management</b></p> <p>SF.OM provides the object management for Java objects which are processed by SF.JCVM. It provides object creation and garbage collection according to the Java Card Runtime Environment Specification [15]. SF.OM throws a Java Exception in case an object cannot be created as requested due to too less available memory.</p>
<b>SF.MM</b>	<p><b>Memory Management</b></p> <p>SF.MM provides deletion of memory for transient arrays, global arrays, and logical channels according to the Java Card Runtime Environment Specification [15] by granting access to and erasing of CLEAR_ON_RESET and CLEAR_ON_DESELECT transient arrays, by clearing the APDU buffers for new incoming data, by clearing the bArray during application installation, or by any Global Array after uage.</p>
<b>SF.PIN</b>	<p><b>PIN Management</b></p> <p>SF.PIN provides secure PIN management by using SF.DATA_STORAGE for PIN objects specified in the Java Card API Specification [13] and the GlobalPlatform Specification [18].</p>
<b>SF.PERS_MEM</b>	<p><b>Persistent Memory Management</b></p> <p>SF.PERS_MEM provides atomic write operations and transaction management according to the Java Card Runtime Environment Specification [15].</p> <p>SF.PERS_MEM supports SF.JCVM by halting the system in case of object creation in aborted transactions.</p> <p>Low level write routines to persistent memory in SF.PERS_MEM perform checks for defect memory cells.</p>
<b>SF.EDC</b>	<p><b>Error Detection Code API</b></p> <p>SF.EDC provides an Java API for user applications to perform integrity checks based on a checksum on Java arrays [49]. The API throws a Java Exception in case the checksum in invalid.</p>
<b>SF.HW_EXC</b>	<p><b>Hardware Exception Handling</b></p> <p>SF.HW_EXC provides software exception handler to react on unforeseen events captured by the hardware (hardware exceptions). SF.HW_EXC catches the hardware exceptions, to ensure the system goes to a secure state, as well as to increase the attack counter in order to resist physical manipulation and probing.</p>

<b>SF.RM</b>	<p><b>Restricted Mode</b></p> <p>SF.RM provides a restricted mode that limits the functionality of the TOE. Only the S.ACAdmin is able to reset the Attack Counter to leave the restricted mode. SF.RM only allows a limited set of operations to not identified and not authenticated users when in restricted mode. All other operations require identification and authentication</p>
<b>SF.PID</b>	<p><b>Platform Identification</b></p> <p>SF.PID provides a platform identifier. For elements that can be identified see <a href="#">Section 1.6</a>.</p>
<b>SF.SMG_NSC</b>	<p><b>No Side-Channel</b></p> <p>The TSF ensures that during command execution there are no usable variations in power consumption (measurable at e.g. electrical contacts) or timing (measurable at e.g. electrical contacts) that might disclose cryptographic keys or PINs. All functions of SF.CRYPTO except for SHA are resistant to side-channel attacks (e.g. timing attack, SPA, DPA, DFA, EMA, DEMA).</p>
<b>SF.SENS_RES</b>	<p><b>Sensitive Result</b></p> <p>SF.SENS_RES ensures that sensitive methods of the Java Card API store their results so that callers of these methods can assert their return values. If such a method returns abnormally with an exception then the stored result is tagged as Unassigned and any subsequent assertion of the result will fail.</p>
<b>SF.CONT_SEP</b>	<p><b>Context Separation</b></p> <p>The product supports several contexts of operation that guaranty code execution, data storage, and hardware virtualization in a completely isolated way from other contexts. For that, the whole address space is organized in regions. Each region is assigned access rights based on Context and Access Type (read/write/execute) thus allowing a complete control of the MPU over the entire memory space . The default context separation will be applied at boot by Main JCOP and only Main JCOP can change the context separation setting after that. One specific Context is reserved for Main JCOP whereas other Contexts are reserved for Guest Operating Systems. The State information and the Context number are applied to all bus transactions for checking access control by the MPU. Any tentative to perform a forbidden access will be prevented and will trigger a security alarm.</p>

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Deleted here, only available in the full version of the Security Target.

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