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Version
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Certification Report
NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P40C012/040/072 VD
Sponsor and developer: NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH,
Business Unit Identification
Stresemannallee 101
D-22529 Hamburg
Germany
Evaluation facility: Brightsight
Delftechpark 1
2628 XJ Delft
The Netherlands
Report number: NSCIB-CC-13-37658-CR
Report version: 1
Project number: NSCIB-CC-13-37658
Author(s): Wouter Slegers
Date: October 7
th
, 2014
Number of pages: 13
Number of appendices: 0
Reproduction of this report is authorized provided the report is reproduced in its entirety.
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CONTENTS:
Foreword 4
Recognition of the certificate 5
1 Executive Summary 6
2 Certification Results 7
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation 7
2.2 Security Policy 7
2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 8
2.4 Architectural Information 8
2.5 Documentation 8
2.6 IT Product Testing 9
2.7 Results of the change assessment 10
2.8 Evaluated Configuration 10
2.9 Results of the Evaluation 11
2.10 Comments/Recommendations 11
3 Security Target 12
4 Definitions 12
5 Bibliography 13
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Foreword
The Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security (NSCIB) provides a third-party
evaluation and certification service for determining the trustworthiness of Information Technology (IT)
security products. Under this NSCIB, TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. has the task of issuing
certificates for IT security products as well as for protection profiles and sites.
Part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product, protection profile or site
according to the Common Criteria assessment guidelines published by the NSCIB. Evaluations are
performed by an IT Security Evaluation Facility (ITSEF) under the oversight of the NSCIB Certification
Body, which is operated by TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. in cooperation with the Ministry of the
Interior and Kingdom Relations.
An ITSEF in the Netherlands is a commercial facility that has been licensed by TÜV Rheinland
Nederland B.V. to perform Common Criteria evaluations; a significant requirement for such a license is
accreditation to the requirements of ISO Standard 17025, General requirements for the accreditation
of calibration and testing laboratories.
By awarding a Common Criteria certificate, TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. asserts that the product or
site complies with the security requirements specified in the associated (site) security target, or that
the protection profile (PP) complies with the requirements for PP evaluation specified in the Common
Criteria for Information Security Evaluation. A (site) security target is a requirements specification
document that defines the scope of the evaluation activities.
The consumer should review the security target or protection profile, in addition to this certification
report, in order to gain an understanding of any assumptions made during the evaluation, the intended
environment, its security requirements, and the level of confidence (i.e., the evaluation assurance
level) that the product or site satisfies the security requirements stated in the (site) security target.
Reproduction of this report is authorized provided the report is reproduced in its entirety.
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Recognition of the certificate
Currently the Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement (CCRA) and SOGIS-Mutual Recognition
Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) do not cover the recognition of Site Certificates. However, the evaluation
process followed all the rules of these agreements and used the agreed supporting document for Site
certification [CCDB]. Therefore, the results of this evaluation and certification procedure can be re-
used by any scheme in a subsequent product evaluation and certification procedure that makes use of
certified site.
The presence of the Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement and SOG-IS logos on the certificate
would indicate that this certificate is issued in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA and the
SOG-IS agreement and will be recognised by the participating nations.
International recognition
The CCRA has been signed by the Netherlands in May 2000 and provides mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC evaluation assurance levels up to and including EAL4. The current list of
signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be found on:
http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
European recognition
The European SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) version 3 effective from April
2010 provides mutual recognition of Common Criteria and ITSEC certificates at a basic evaluation
level for all products. A higher recognition level for evaluation levels beyond EAL4 (resp. E3-basic) is
provided for products related to specific technical domains. This agreement was initially signed by
Finland, France, Germany, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Italy
joined the SOGIS-MRA in December 2010. The current list of signatory nations, approved certification
schemes and the list of technical domains for which the higher recognition applies can be found on:
http://www.sogisportal.eu.
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1 Executive Summary
This Certification Report states the outcome of the Common Criteria security evaluation of the NXP
Secure Smart Card Controller P40C012/040/072 VD. The developer is NXP Semiconductors Germany
GmbH, Business Unit Identification located in Hamburg, Germany and they also act as the sponsor of
the evaluation and certification. A Certification Report is intended to assist prospective consumers
when judging the suitability of the IT security properties of the product for their particular requirements.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is a hardware secure smart card controller IC with IC Dedicated
software. A Smartcard Embedded Software developer may create Security IC Embedded Software to
execute on the NXP P40C012/040/072 VD hardware. This software is stored in arbitrary memory of
the NXP P40C012/040/072 VD hardware and is not part of the TOE.
The TOE provides a hardware co-processor for Triple-DES (3DES) and AES, an [AIS31]-compliant
True Random Number Generator (TRNG), a memory management unit (MMU) for access control
management and ISO/IEC 7816 contact interface with UART.
The TOE also contains IC Dedicated software which provides support functionalities such as basic
NVM access, Post-Delivery Configuration feature, self-testing, error counter handling and TOE reset.
The TOE has been evaluated by Brightsight B.V. located in Delft, The Netherlands and was completed
on October 1
st
, 2014 with the acceptance of the ETR. The certification procedure has been conducted
in accordance with the provisions of the Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT
Security [NSCIB].
The scope of the evaluation is defined by the Security Target [ST], which identifies assumptions made
during the evaluation, the intended environment for the TOE, the security requirements, and the level
of confidence (evaluation assurance level) at which the product is intended to satisfy the security
requirements. Consumers of the TOE are advised to verify that their own environment is consistent
with the Security Target, and to give due consideration to the comments, observations and
recommendations in this certification report.
The results documented in the evaluation technical report [ETR]
1
for this product provide sufficient
evidence that it meets the EAL5 augmented (EAL5+) assurance requirements for the evaluated
security functionality. This assurance level is augmented with ALC_DVS.2 (Sufficiency of security
measures), AVA_VAN.5 (Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis), and ASE_TSS.2 (TOE
summary specification with architectural design summary).
The evaluation was conducted using the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 4 [CEM], for conformance to the Common Criteria for Information
Technology Security Evaluation, version 3.1 Revision 4 [CC].
TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V., as the NSCIB Certification Body, declares that the NXP Secure Smart
Card Controller P40C012/040/072 VD evaluation meets all the conditions for international recognition
of Common Criteria Certificates and that the product will be listed on the NSCIB Certified Products list.
It should be noted that the certification results only apply to the specific version of the product as
evaluated.
1
The Evaluation Technical Report contains information proprietary to the developer and/or the
evaluator, and is not releasable for public review.
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2 Certification Results
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) for this evaluation is the NXP Secure Smart Card Controller
P40C012/040/072 VD from NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH, Business Unit Identification
located in Hamburg, Germany.
This report pertains to the TOE which is comprised of the following main components:
Type Name Release Date Form of delivery
IC Hardware P40C012/040/072 VD VD 2014-02-06 wafer, module (dice have
nameplate 9511D)
IC Dedicated
Test Software
Test Software 00h 2014-02-06 Stored in ROM
Boot Software 00h 2014-02-06 Stored in ROM
IC Dedicated
Support Software HAL Software 00h 2014-02-06 Stored in ROM
To ensure secure usage a set of guidance documents is provided together with the TOE. Details can
be found in section 2.5 of this report.
The TOE is delivered following the procedures of the hardware part of the TOE, i.e. as a wafer in
phase 3 or in packaged form in phase 4 of the smart card life cycle as defined in the Smart Card IC
Protection Profile [BSI-PP-0035]. Security IC Embedded Software (not part of the TOE) can be loaded
in ROM in Phase 3.
2.2 Security Policy
A Security IC must provide high security in particular when being used in the banking and finance
market, in electronic commerce or in governmental applications.
Hence the TOE shall maintain:
Ø the integrity and the confidentiality of code and data stored in its memories,
Ø the different CPU modes with the related capabilities for configuration and memory access,
Ø the integrity, the correct operation and the confidentiality of security functionality provided by
the TOE.
This is ensured by the construction of the TOE and its security functionality.
NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P40C012/040/072 VD basically provides a hardware platform for
an implementation of a smart card application with
Ø functionality to calculate Data Encryption Standard (Triple-DES) with up to three keys,
Ø hardware to calculate Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) with different key lengths,
Ø a True Random Number Generator,
Ø memory management control, and
Ø an ISO/IEC 7816 contact interface with UART.
In addition, several security mechanisms are implemented to ensure proper operation as well as
integrity and confidentiality of stored data. For example, this includes security mechanisms for memory
protection and security exceptions as well as sensors, which allow operation under specified
conditions only. Memory encryption is used for memory protection and chip shielding is added to the
chip.
Hardware support for large integer arithmetic operations like multiplication, addition and logical
operations, which are suitable for public key cryptography and elliptic curve cryptography, as well as
support for cyclic redundancy check (CRC) calculation, is functionally in the TOE, however not part of
the claimed security functionality.
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2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
2.3.1 Assumptions
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead
to specific Security Objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following objectives for the
environment are of relevance:
Ø OE.Plat-Appl: Usage of Hardware Platform
Ø OE.Resp-Appl: Treatment of User Data
Ø OE.Process-Sec-IC: Protection during Packaging, Finishing and Personalisation
Ø OE.Check-Init: Check of initialization data by the Security IC Embedded Software
Details can be found in the Security Target [ST] sections 4.2 and 4.3.
2.3.2 Clarification of scope
The evaluation did not reveal any threats to the TOE that are not countered by the evaluated security
functions of the product.
Please note that although the TOE contains accelerators for CRC and large number arithmetic, the
functionality and security of these features has not been topic of this evaluation. Composite product
developers should do their own security analysis and/or testing.
2.4 Architectural Information
This chapter provides a high-level description of the IT product and its major components based on
the evaluation evidence described in the Common Criteria assurance family entitled “TOE design
(ADV_TDS)”. The intent of this chapter is to characterise the degree of architectural separation of the
major components and to show dependencies between the TOE and products using the TOE in a
composition (e.g. dependencies between HW and SW).
The target of evaluation (TOE) is a Security IC with Dedicated Test Software and Dedicated Support
Software.
The TOE does not include any Security IC Embedded Software. See [ST] section 1.4 for details.
2.5 Documentation
The following documentation is provided with the product by the developer to the customer:
Type Name Release Date Form of
delivery
Document Product data sheet SmartMX2 P40 family
P40C012/040/072, Secure high performance
smart card controller, NXP Semiconductors
262923 2014-06-27 Electronic
document
Document Product data sheet addendum SmartMX2 P40
family P40Cxxx, Firmware interface
specification, NXP Semiconductors
275823 2014-06-27 Electronic
document
Document Product data sheet addendum SmartMX2 P40
family P40Cxxx, User Mode, NXP
Semiconductors
275722 2014-06-27 Electronic
document
Document Product data sheet addendum SmartMX2 P40
family P40Cxxx, System Mode, NXP
Semiconductors
267522 2014-06-27 Electronic
document
Document Product data sheet addendum SmartMX2 P40
family P40Cxxx, Chip Health Mode, NXP
Semiconductors
269720 2014-05-21 Electronic
document
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Type Name Release Date Form of
delivery
Document Product data sheet addendum SmartMX2 P40
family P40Cxxx, Post Delivery Configuration,
NXP Semiconductors
269620 2014-05-21 Electronic
document
Document Product data sheet addendum SmartMX2 P40
family P40Cxxx, Instruction Set Manual, NXP
Semiconductors
258121 2014-06-27 Electronic
document
Document Product data sheet addendum SmartMX2 P40
family P40Cxxx VA and VD, Wafer
specification, NXP Semiconductors
269822 2014-06-03 Electronic
document
Document Guidance and Operation Manual
NXP Secure Smart Card Controller
P40C012/040/072, Information on Guidance
and Operation, NXP Semiconductors
269422 2014-06-27 Electronic
document
2.6 IT Product Testing
Testing (depth, coverage, functional tests, independent testing): The evaluators examined the
developer’s testing activities documentation and verified that the developer has met their testing
responsibilities.
2.6.1 Testing approach and depth
The developer has performed extensive testing on functional specification, subsystem and module
level. All parameter choices have been addressed at least once. All boundary cases identified have
been tested explicitly, and additionally the near-boundary conditions have been covered
probabilistically. The testing was largely automated using industry standard and proprietary test suites.
Test scripts were extensively used to verify that the functions return the expected values.
The hardware test results are extendable to composite evaluations on this hardware TOE, as the
hardware is operated according to its guidance and the composite evaluation requirements are met.
For the testing performed by the evaluators, the developer has provided a testing environment. The
evaluators have reproduced a selection of the developer tests, as well as a small number of test cases
designed by the evaluator.
2.6.2 Independent Penetration Testing
The evaluator independent penetration tests were devised after performing an Evaluator Vulnerability
Analysis. This was done in the following steps: The reference for attack techniques against which
smart card-related devices controllers such as the TOE must be protected against is the document
"Attack methods for smart cards" [JIL-AM]. The vulnerability of the TOE for these attacks has been
analysed in a white box investigation conforming to AVA_VAN.5.
1. Inventory of required resistance
This step uses the JIL attack list [JIL-AM] as a reference for completeness and studies the ST
claims to decide which attacks in the JIL attack list apply for the TOE.
2. Validation of security functionalities
This step identifies the implemented security functionalities and performs tests to verify
implementation and to validate proper functioning. This step has been performed as part of
ATE evaluation.
3. Vulnerability analysis
This step first gives an overview against which attacks the implemented security functionalities
are meant to provide protection. Secondly in this step the design of the implemented security
functionalities is studied. Thirdly, an analysis is performed to determine whether the design
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contains vulnerabilities against the respective attacks of step 1. This step has been performed
as part of AVA evaluation.
4. Analysis of input from other evaluation activities
This step first analyses the input from other CC-evaluation classes expressed as possible
vulnerabilities. Secondly, the evaluators made an analysis of the TOE in its intended
environment to check whether the developer vulnerability analysis provides sufficient
assurance or whether penetration testing is needed to provide sufficient assurance. This step
has been performed as part of AVA evaluation.
5. Design assurance evaluation
This step analyses the results from an attack perspective as defined in step 1. Based on this
design analysis the evaluators determine whether the design provides sufficient assurance or
whether penetration testing is needed to provide sufficient assurance. This step has been
performed as part of AVA evaluation.
6. Penetration testing
This step performs the penetration tests identified in step 4 and step 5. This step has been
performed as part of AVA evaluation.
7. Conclusions on resistance
This step performs a [JIL-AM] compliant rating on the results of the penetration tests in relation
with the assurance already gained by the design analysis. Based on the ratings the evaluators
draw conclusions on the resistance of the TOE against attackers possessing a high attack
potential. This step has been performed as part of AVA evaluation.
In total 40 weeks of testing effort was spent on 6 light manipulation, 2 voltage manipulation and 11
side channel analysis attack scenarios.
2.6.3 Test Configuration
The developer provided the evaluator with the TOE including a proprietary test operating system
called IC Dedicated Test Software. See the [ETR] for details.
2.6.4 Testing Results
The testing activities, including configurations, procedures, test cases, expected results and observed
results are summarised in the [ETR], with references to the documents containing the full details.
The developer’s tests and the independent functional tests produced the expected results, giving
assurance that the TOE behaves as specified in its ST and functional specification.
No exploitable vulnerabilities were found with the independent penetration tests.
2.7 Re-used evaluation results
This security evaluation is a new, full evaluation under NSCIB. No evaluation results on the TOE have
been re-used.
There has been extensive re-use of the ALC aspects for the sites, by use of two site certificates and
eight times re-use following the [AIS38] methodology. No sites have been visited as part of this
evaluation.
2.8 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE was tested in the major configuration with an EEPROM of 72 kBytes (P40C072 VD).
All major configurations as well as all minor configuration options that can be selected are described in
chapter 1.4.2.2 of the [ST]. All major and minor configurations are available to the evaluator. Besides
the size of the available EEPROM memory, there are no differences between the major
configurations. The major configurations do not have dependencies to security features. All minor
configuration options that are part of the evaluation were tested and behave as specified.
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Therefore the results described in this document are applicable for the major configurations P40C012
VD, P40C040 VD, and P40C072 VD as well as for all minor configurations described in the [ST].
2.9 Results of the Evaluation
The evaluation lab documented their evaluation results in the [ETR]
2
which references several
Intermediate Reports and other evaluator documents. To support composite evaluations according to
[CCDB-2007-09-01] a derived document [ETRfC] was provided and approved. This document
provides details of the TOE evaluation that have to be considered when this TOE is used as platform
in a composite evaluation.
The verdict of all claimed assurance requirements is: Pass.
Based on the above evaluation results the evaluation lab concluded the NXP Secure Smart Card
Controller P40C012/040/072 VD to be CC Part 2 extended, CC Part 3 conformant, and to meet the
requirements of EAL5 augmented with ALC_DVS.2, AVA_VAN.5, and ASE_TSS.2. This implies that
the product satisfies the security technical requirements specified in the Security Target [ST].
The Security Target claims strict conformance to the Protection Profile [BSI-PP-0035].
2.10 Comments/Recommendations
The user guidance (as outlined in section 2.5 of this report) contains necessary information about the
usage of the TOE. Certain aspects of the TOE’s security functionality, in particular the
countermeasures against attacks, depend on accurate conformance to the user guidance.
Please note that although the TOE contains accelerators for CRC and large number arithmetic, the
functionality and security of these features has not been topic of this evaluation. Composite product
developers should do their own security analysis and/or testing.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his system risk
management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and techniques to be covered, he
should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the TOE is required and thus requested from
the sponsor of the certificate.
The strength of the implemented cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this
evaluation. To fend off attackers with high attack potential appropriate cryptographic algorithms with
adequate key lengths must be used (references can be found in national and international documents
and standards).
2
The Evaluation Technical Report contains information proprietary to the developer and/or the
evaluator, and is not releasable for public review.
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3 Security Target
The Security Target [ST] is included here by reference. A sanitized public version [ST-lite] is available.
4 Definitions
This list of Acronyms and the glossary of terms contains elements that are not already defined by the
CC or CEM:
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
CRC Cyclic Redundancy Check
DES Data Encryption Standard
IC Integrated Circuit
IT Information Technology
ITSEF IT Security Evaluation Facility
NSCIB Nederlands Schema voor Certificatie op het gebied van IT-Beveiliging
PP Protection Profile
TRNG True Random Number Generator
TOE Target of Evaluation
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5 Bibliography
This section lists all referenced documentation used as source material in the compilation of this
report:
[AIS31] AIS 31: Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für physikalische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik.
Version 2.0, September 18, 2011.
[AIS38] AIS 38: Reuse of evaluation results, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik. Version 2.9, June 8th 2011.
[BSI-PP-0035] "Security IC Platform Protection Profile", Version 1.0, June 2007.
[CC] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Parts I version
3.1 revision 1, and Part II and III, version 3.1 revision 4.
[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, version 3.1,
Revision 4.
[ETR] Brightsight, Evaluation Technical Report NXP Secure Smart Card Controller
P40C012/040/072 VD EAL5+, 14-RPT-252, version 2.0, dated 1 October 2014.
[ETRfC] Brightsight, Evaluation Technical Report for Composition NXP Secure Smart Card
Controller P40C012/040/072 VD EAL5+, 14-RPT-253, version 2.0 dated 1 October
2014.
[JIL-AM] Attack methods for Smart cards and similar devices, JIL, version 2.2, January
2013.
[NSCIB] Nederlands Schema for Certification in the Area of IT Security, Version 2.1, August
1
st
, 2011.
[ST] NXP Secure Smart Card Controllers P40C012/040/072 VD Security Target, Rev.
1.4, 2014-09-25.
[ST-lite] NXP Secure Smart Card Controllers P40C012/040/072 VD Security Target Lite,
Rev. 1.1, 2014-09-25.
(This is the end of this report).