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THALES Communications & Security
F0057
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63 295 297 - 306 -A Lite A4 1/128
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83051027-DDQ-TCS-FR-003
This document and any data included are the property of THALES Communications & Security.
They cannot be reproduced, disclosed or used without the company's prior written approval.
SECURITY TARGET OF MISTRAL IP
ENCRYPTION DEVICE
Prepared by :
THALES Communications
4, rue des louvresses 92230 Gennevilliers - FRANCE
THALES Communications & Security 63 295 297 - 306 -A Lite A4 2/128
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Security. Ils ne peuvent être reproduits, communiqués ou utilisés sans son autorisation écrite
préalable.
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Security. They cannot be reproduced, disclosed or used without the company's prior written
approval.
83051027-DDQ-TCS-FR-003
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. INTRODUCTION.............................................................................................. 5
1.1. DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION AND SUMMARY......................................................5
1.2. TOE IDENTIFICATION...............................................................................................5
1.3. TOE OVERVIEW........................................................................................................5
1.3.1. MISTRAL IP DEVICE.................................................................................................................. 5
1.3.2. ARCHITECTURE OF THE MISTRAL IP SYSTEM .................................................................... 6
1.4. ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS........................................................................8
1.4.1. CC ACRONYMS......................................................................................................................... 8
1.4.2. TOE-SPECIFIC ACRONYM ....................................................................................................... 9
1.5. REFERENCES.........................................................................................................10
1.6. TOE DESCRIPTION.................................................................................................11
1.6.1. TOE BOUNDARY ..................................................................................................................... 11
1.6.2. MISTRAL IP PHYSICAL INTERFACES ................................................................................... 12
1.6.3. MISTRAL IP LIFECYCLE ......................................................................................................... 13
1.6.4. MISTRAL IP FUNCTIONAL STATE DIAGRAM ....................................................................... 14
1.6.5. OPERATIONAL CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEYS ............................................................................. 14
1.6.6. KEY INJECTION....................................................................................................................... 15
1.6.7. DATE AND TIME MANAGEMENT ........................................................................................... 15
1.6.8. LOCAL DATA PROTECTION................................................................................................... 15
1.6.9. TOE FUNCTIONALITIES.......................................................................................................... 15
2. CONFORMANCE CLAIM .............................................................................. 17
2.1. CC CONFORMANCE CLAIM...................................................................................17
2.2. PP CONFORMANCE CLAIM...................................................................................17
2.2.1. [ND_PP] CONFORMANCE ANALYSIS.................................................................................... 17
2.3. PACKAGE CONFORMANCE CLAIM ......................................................................21
3. SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION............................................................. 22
3.1. ASSETS...................................................................................................................22
3.1.1. ASSETS PROTECTED BY THE TOE (USER DATA).............................................................. 22
3.1.2. ASSETS BELONGING TO THE TOE (TSF DATA).................................................................. 22
3.2. USERS AND ENTITIES ...........................................................................................25
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This document and any data included are the property of THALES Communications &
Security. They cannot be reproduced, disclosed or used without the company's prior written
approval.
83051027-DDQ-TCS-FR-003
3.3. THREATS ................................................................................................................26
3.4. ORGANISATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES (OSP)..................................................29
3.4.1. REGULATORY POLICIES ....................................................................................................... 29
3.4.2. SERVICES................................................................................................................................ 29
3.4.3. MISCELLANEOUS ................................................................................................................... 30
3.5. ASSUMPTIONS .......................................................................................................30
3.5.1. SECURING THE TOE .............................................................................................................. 30
3.5.2. ADMINISTRATION ................................................................................................................... 31
3.5.3. ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT MANAGEMENT DEVICES .............................................................. 31
3.5.4. ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT THE CEC ......................................................................................... 33
4. SECURITY OBJECTIVES ............................................................................. 34
4.1. SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE TOE ...............................................................34
4.1.1. COMMUNICATION PROTECTION.......................................................................................... 34
4.1.2. AUDIT ....................................................................................................................................... 35
4.1.3. TOE MANAGEMENT................................................................................................................ 36
4.1.4. DATA PROTECTION................................................................................................................ 37
4.1.5. SOFTWARE UPDATE.............................................................................................................. 38
4.1.6. CRYPTOGRAPHY.................................................................................................................... 38
4.1.7. SELF-TEST............................................................................................................................... 39
4.2. SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE TOE ENVIRONMENT ....................................39
4.2.1. THE ADMINISTRATOR............................................................................................................ 39
4.2.2. THE AUDITOR.......................................................................................................................... 40
4.2.3. THE TOE .................................................................................................................................. 40
4.2.4. THE CG .................................................................................................................................... 41
4.2.5. THE NTP SERVER................................................................................................................... 42
4.2.6. THE FPD................................................................................................................................... 42
4.2.7. THE SGL................................................................................................................................... 43
4.2.8. THE CEC .................................................................................................................................. 43
4.2.9. SOFTWARE UPDATES............................................................................................................ 44
4.3. RATIONALE FOR THE SECURITY OBJECTIVES..................................................45
4.3.1. THREATS ................................................................................................................................. 45
4.3.2. ORGANISATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES (OSP).................................................................. 47
4.3.3. ASSUMPTIONS........................................................................................................................ 48
4.3.4. TABLES .................................................................................................................................... 50
5. EXTENDED SECURITY REQUIREMENTS................................................... 53
5.1. ETENDED FAMILIES...............................................................................................53
5.1.1. FCS_RBG_EXT - RANDOM BIT GENERATION ..................................................................... 53
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Security. They cannot be reproduced, disclosed or used without the company's prior written
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83051027-DDQ-TCS-FR-003
5.1.2. FPT_SIE_EXT - SECURITY INFORMATION ERASURE........................................................ 54
5.1.3. FCS_IPS_EXT - IPSEC............................................................................................................ 55
5.1.4. FIA_UIA_EXT - IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION.................................................. 58
5.1.5. FIA_PMG_EXT - PASSWORD MANAGEMENT...................................................................... 59
5.1.6. FPT_SKP_EXT - PROTECTION OF TSF DATA (FOR READING OF ALL SENSITIVE KEYS)60
5.1.7. FPT_APW_EXT - PROTECTION OF PASSWORDS .............................................................. 61
5.1.8. FPT_TUD_EXT - TRUSTED UPDATE..................................................................................... 62
5.1.9. FPT_SDP_EXT - STORED TSF DATA PROTECTION ........................................................... 63
5.2. EXTENDED COMPONENTS....................................................................................65
5.2.1. FAU_GEN_EXT.3 - EXTERNAL MEANS................................................................................. 65
5.2.2. FTA_SSL_EXT.1 - TSF-INITIATED SESSION LOCKING ....................................................... 66
5.2.3. FAU_STG_EXT.1 - EXTERNAL AUDIT TRAIL STORAGE ..................................................... 67
5.2.4. FAU_STG_EXT.3 - ACTION IN CASE OF LOSS OF AUDIT SERVER CONNECTIVITY ...... 68
5.2.5. FIA_UAU_EXT.2 - PASSWORD-BASED AUTHENTICATION MECHANISM......................... 68
5.2.6. FCS_CKM_EXT.4 - CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY ZEROIZATION ................................................ 69
5.2.7. FCS_CKM_EXT.5 - CRYTOGRAPHIC KEY LIFETIME........................................................... 71
6. SECURITY REQUIREMENTS ....................................................................... 73
6.1. SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS..........................................................73
6.1.1. TERMS USED WITHIN SFRS.................................................................................................. 73
6.1.2. AUDIT ....................................................................................................................................... 74
6.1.3. CRYPTOGRAPHY.................................................................................................................... 83
6.1.4. COMMUNICATIONS PROTECTION AND FLOW CONTROLS .............................................. 89
6.1.5. USERS AND DEVICES ............................................................................................................ 98
6.1.6. TSF MANAGEMENT .............................................................................................................. 101
6.1.7. MISCELLANEOUS ................................................................................................................. 104
6.2. SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS.........................................................105
6.3. RATIONALE FOR THE SECURITY REQUIREMENTS..........................................106
6.3.1. RATIONALE FOR THE SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS................................. 106
6.3.2. TABLES .................................................................................................................................. 109
6.3.3. RATIONALE FOR THE SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS.................................. 112
6.3.4. AVA_VAN.3 FOCUSED VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS.......................................................... 112
6.3.5. ALC_FLR.3 SYSTEMATIC FLAW REMEDIATION................................................................ 112
6.3.6. DEPENDENCIES.................................................................................................................... 112
7. TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATIONS ........................................................... 120
7.1. SECURITY FUNCTIONS........................................................................................120
7.2. SFR AND SECURITY FUNCTIONS MAPPING......................................................126
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Ce document et les informations qu'il contient sont la propriété de THALES Communications &
Security. Ils ne peuvent être reproduits, communiqués ou utilisés sans son autorisation écrite
préalable.
This document and any data included are the property of THALES Communications &
Security. They cannot be reproduced, disclosed or used without the company's prior written
approval.
83051027-DDQ-TCS-FR-003
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1. DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION AND SUMMARY
Document reference: 63 295 297 - 306
Document version: -A
Evaluation Level: EAL3 augmented with ALC_FLR.3 and AVA_VAN.3
The security target is based on, but it is not conformant to, the Security Requirements for Network Devices
Protection Profile [ND_PP].
1.2. TOE IDENTIFICATION
TOE : Mistral IP software v2.1.2 for Mistral IP system version 8
Nota : The TOE is embedded in Mistral device v1.2.00 also known as V5M .
The group formed by the Mistral IP software embedded in Mistral device, is called Mistral IP device. The
relative commercial name is "Mistral Net".
TOE reference: TRC7546-I0 version 8.2.1.2
Mistral IP software version's format is as follow: x.y.z
– x is the system version
– y identifies major functional version
– z indicates minor functional evolution and flaws patchs
Mistral device release's format is as follow : x.y.z
– x identifies the equipment form factor
– y identifies the hardware architecture
– z indicates minor evolutions (e.g. a component change)
1.3. TOE OVERVIEW
1.3.1. MISTRAL IP DEVICE
Mistral IP is a network device providing IP datagram protection based on VPN (« Virtual Private Network »)
technology. It secures data communication links (MAN or WAN, Radio communication link, Satcom link).
Mistral IP provides following data protection:
– Data encryption
– Data Integrity and Authentication
– Anti-Replay (only for IPSec)
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préalable.
This document and any data included are the property of THALES Communications &
Security. They cannot be reproduced, disclosed or used without the company's prior written
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83051027-DDQ-TCS-FR-003
– Remote TOE authentication
Those protections are provided through different modes which are:
– ENHANCED SIMPLE encryption mode, which provides data encryption and integrity without encapsulation,
– IPSEC ESP Tunnel encapsulation mode, which provides data and topology information encryption, integrity
and anti-replay
Two cryptographic key management modes are available:
– Negotiated keys mode: in this case, VPN keys are negotiated (IKEv2 protocol) and the Mistral management
center distributes peer authentication keys
– Distributed keys mode: in this case, the Mistral management center distributes the VPN keys
The TOE can be integrated within networks using the brigde mode. In bridge mode, the TOE is routing-transparent
for the network. The TOE accepts any network datagram, even if the MAC (Ethernet) address is not its. The TOE
authorised routing procotols (list of authorised protocols is configurable) to bypass the TOE.
The TOE support IPv4 and IPv6 protocols; In IPSEC ESP Tunnel mode, it could manage the following
encapsulation modes IPv4 in IPv6, and IPv6 in IPv4.
1.3.2. ARCHITECTURE OF THE MISTRAL IP SYSTEM
Mistral IP system is composed of IP encryption devices (Mistral IP) and one or several CG (Mistral Management
Center).
Nota : When using terms “Mistral IP system” we refer to the system, that is a network architecture composed of
many encryption devices, Mistral management centers, …
When using term “Mistral IP” we refer to the IP encryption device only.
Mistral IP has an interface connected to the plaintext data network (i.e. the trusted network), another connected to
the ciphered data network (i.e. the untrusted network).
Mistral IP VS8.X system is composed of following entities:
– IP encryption devices
•
•
•
• Mistral One (20Mbps, 100 VPNs)
•
•
•
• Mistral Net (100Mbps, 1000 VPNs)
•
•
•
• Mistral Max (2Gbps, 10000 VPNs)
– A Mistral Management Center Software (LGC): application that allows to manage, configure and supervise
those encryption devices. It is installed on the Mistral Management Center Device (SGC). It’s main
functionalities are:
•
•
•
• Smartcard and initialisation-files configuration
•
•
•
• Security associations and security policies configuration
•
•
•
• Cryptographic key distribution (for “Distributed keys” mode)
•
•
•
• Audit records data retrieving
•
•
•
• Encryption device supervision
•
•
•
• Secured device’s software update
•
•
•
• Devices supervision
– Key Generation Center (CEC): a stand-alone workstation, connected to a cryptographic resource device, with a
specific software for Mistral system key generation.
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This document and any data included are the property of THALES Communications &
Security. They cannot be reproduced, disclosed or used without the company's prior written
approval.
83051027-DDQ-TCS-FR-003
The CEC generates keys using a HSM (Hardware Security Module). The CEC exports keys in plaintext mode or
wrapped into an encrypted file (AES 128 bits). The encryption key for the file is derived from a passphrase that
the administrator has to enter to unwrap keys at injection. This passphrase may either be randomly generated
by the CEC or be entered by the user on the CEC (on that latter case, it is 16-chars minimum).
The HSM used by the CEC is a Mistral IP encryption device with a specific software.
– NTP Server: application that allows providing and maintaining date and time reference through synchronization
process (NTPv4 protocol) to encryption devices.
Mistral IP VS8.X system can also be connected to external devices:
– External encryption device: any other Mistral-compatible encryption device or software.
– Supervision device (SE): any network supervision device
Any management data flow between a Mistral encryption device and the Mistral Management Center Device (SGC)
is protected using a VPN between the encryption device and another Mistral configured as a “front-end”. Therefore,
the Mistral IP device has two configurations:
– "classic", which is the common configuration
– "front-end", which is the configuration necessary for the Management Center Device
Mistral Management Center (CGM) is the group formed by a SGC and a front-end Mistral. Several CGM can be
integrated in a system for redundancy purposes.
Mistral IP is able to operate in two different modes:
- with one or more connected CGM : the connected operation mode
- without any connected CGM : the autonomous operation mode
SGC
Public WAN
Private
LAN A
Mistral IP
VS8
Mistral IP VS8
(front-end)
CEC
SGC
Mistral IP VS8
(front-end)
CGM master
CGM slave
TOE scope
Secured link within evaluation
perimeter
Mistral IP
VS8
Private
LAN B
Figure 1:Mistral IP VS8 System
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Security. Ils ne peuvent être reproduits, communiqués ou utilisés sans son autorisation écrite
préalable.
This document and any data included are the property of THALES Communications &
Security. They cannot be reproduced, disclosed or used without the company's prior written
approval.
83051027-DDQ-TCS-FR-003
1.4. ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
1.4.1. CC ACRONYMS
CC Common Criteria
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
IT Information Technology
PP Protection Profile
SF Security Function
SFP Security Function Policy
SOF Strength of Function
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSC TSF Scope of Control
TSF TOE Security Functions
TSFI TSF Interface
TSP TOE Security Policy
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Security. Ils ne peuvent être reproduits, communiqués ou utilisés sans son autorisation écrite
préalable.
This document and any data included are the property of THALES Communications &
Security. They cannot be reproduced, disclosed or used without the company's prior written
approval.
83051027-DDQ-TCS-FR-003
1.4.2. TOE-SPECIFIC ACRONYM
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
CEC Key Generation Centre (Centre d’Élaboration des Clés)
CG Management Centre (Centre de Gestion)
CH Cipher Interface (Port Chiffre)
CL Plain Interface (Port Clair)
CLI Command Line Interface
COTS Component Off The Shelves
FPD Firmware Packaging Device
GC Console Interface (Port Console)
GE Management Interface (Port de Gestion)
IGL Local Management Interface (Interface de Gestion Locale)
SGC Station de Gestion Centrale
SNMP Simple Network Management protocol
SSH Secure Shell
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Security. Ils ne peuvent être reproduits, communiqués ou utilisés sans son autorisation écrite
préalable.
This document and any data included are the property of THALES Communications &
Security. They cannot be reproduced, disclosed or used without the company's prior written
approval.
83051027-DDQ-TCS-FR-003
1.5. REFERENCES
Reference Title and version
[802.3-2000] Local and metropolitan area networks, 2000 Edition (inclus Ethernet 10Mbps, 100Mbps, Full Duplex et
autonégociation)
[CC] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation :
- Part 1: Introduction and general model, dated September 2012, version 3.1 R4
- Part 2: Security functional components, dated September 2012, version 3.1 R4
- Part 3: Security assurance components, dated September 2012, version 3.1 R4
[CEM] Common Evaluation Methodology for Information Technology Security – Evaluation Methodology,
dated September 2012, version 3.1 R4
[FIPS PUB 197] Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
[QS] Référentiel général de sécurité
Processus de qualification d’un produit de sécurité - niveau standard
Version 1.2
ANSSI
[RFC 1042] A Standard for the Transmission of IP Datagrams over IEEE 802 Networks
[RFC 1213] Management Information Base for Network Management of TCP/IP-based internets : MIB II
[RFC 2408] Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol (ISAKMP)
[RFC 2409] The Internet Key Exchange (IKE)
[RFC 5996] Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)
[RFC 3566] The AES-XCBC-MAC-96 Algorithm and Its Use With IPSec
[RFC 3602] The AES-CBC Cipher Algorithm and Its Use with IPSec
[RFC 894] A Standard for the Transmission of IP Datagrams over Ethernet Networks
[RGS_B] Référentiel Général de Sécurité version 2.0 du 13 juin 2014 – Annexes B1 et B2 :
- Annexe B1 : Mécanismes cryptographiques - Version 2.03 du 21 février 2014
- Annexe B2 : Gestion des clés cryptographiques - Version 2.0 du 8 juin 2012
[LINUX_DGA] Recommandations pour la sécurisation des distributions GNU/Linux Redhat et Mandrake
Référence 2005/102317/CELAR/SSI/SSY/EA/51703616/NC
Version 2
[LINUX_ANSSI] Recommandations de sécurité relatives à un systèmeGNU/Linux
Référence DAT-NT-002/ANSSI/SDE/NP
Version1.1
[ND_PP] Protection Profile for Network Devices
version 1.1
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Ce document et les informations qu'il contient sont la propriété de THALES Communications &
Security. Ils ne peuvent être reproduits, communiqués ou utilisés sans son autorisation écrite
préalable.
This document and any data included are the property of THALES Communications &
Security. They cannot be reproduced, disclosed or used without the company's prior written
approval.
83051027-DDQ-TCS-FR-003
1.6. TOE DESCRIPTION
1.6.1. TOE BOUNDARY
The TOE is the Mistral IP software (including its FPGA firmware) running on the Mistral device, in both
configurations ("classic" and "front-end"). It is composed of a Linux OS, the Mistral IP application and the FPGA
firmware (implementing cryptographic functions). The implementation of the TOE relies on COTS and open-source
software (SNMP, ICMP, ARP). The list is provided below.
The Linux OS is hardened and complies with DGA/MI guidance to secure Linux OS [LINUX_DGA] and
[LINUX_ANSSI].
Figure 2: Mistral IP block architecture
COTS and open-source softwares used by the TOE are:
– Kernel Linux version 2.6.38
– UBoot version 1.3.4
– DBus version 1.2.20
– DBus-glib version 0.84
– NetSNMP version 5.5.1
– Ntpclient version 2013_194
– Strongswan version 5.1.0
– Busybox version 1.20.1
All other devices of the Mistral IP system are considered as part of the operational environment. Thus, those
equipments are out of scope of the Target of Evaluation described in this Security Target. In particular, the Mistral
Management Center Device (SGC), the Key Generation Center (CEC), the Firmware Packaging Device (FPD) and
the NTP Server are outside the TOE.
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préalable.
This document and any data included are the property of THALES Communications &
Security. They cannot be reproduced, disclosed or used without the company's prior written
approval.
83051027-DDQ-TCS-FR-003
1.6.2. MISTRAL IP PHYSICAL INTERFACES
The Mistral IP device has the following external interfaces:
– RJ45 interfaces for TCP/IP over Ethernet protocol:
•
•
•
• 1 "Encrypted data" interface, connected to the untrusted network: CH
•
•
•
• 1 "Plaintext data" interface, connected to the trusted network (the LAN): CL
•
•
•
• The other Ethernet interfaces are not used
– RJ45 interface for RS232 protocol:
•
•
•
• 1 Console interface (GC) providing an access to the IGL (via the CLI)
– And:
•
•
•
• 1 secure erasure push-button
•
•
•
• 1 USB interface (not used)
•
•
•
• 1 Smartcard reader interface (for key and configuration files injection only)
•
•
•
• 2 LEDS : the first indicating the device is powered on, the second indicating its status
•
•
•
• 1 remote secure erasure interface. An erasure requested though this interface has the same effect as the
push-button. It simply offers the possibility to remotely activate the erasure
•
•
•
• 1 On / Off switch
•
•
•
• 1 power input interface
Figure 3:Mistral IP device
The IP encryption device owns one IP address and one MAC (Ethernet) address shared by network interfaces CH
and CL.
The device accepts to be managed through:
– Its CL network interface (in “front-end” mode)
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préalable.
This document and any data included are the property of THALES Communications &
Security. They cannot be reproduced, disclosed or used without the company's prior written
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83051027-DDQ-TCS-FR-003
– Its CH network interface (in “classic” mode)
– Its GC console interface
1.6.3. MISTRAL IP LIFECYCLE
The Mistral IP lifecycle is illustrated below:
So ftw a re spe cificatio n an d
d esig n
Ha rd w are s p ecif icat io n an d
d es ign
Ha rd w are imp lem en ta tio n
So ftw a re im p le me nt atio n
Te st s Te s ts
Int egr atio n
T ests
Ha rd w are p ro d u ct io n
So ftw a re
U plo ad in g
Te stin g an d T un in g
Pack aging a nd
D elive ry
Tr an sp o rt /
Sto r age
Insta llat io n
O p era tion
En d o f life
U
s
e
O n- site
M aint en an ce
D
e
v
e
l
o
p
m
e
n
t
M a nu fa ctu ring
D on e w it hin T ha le s pr em ises
Do ne o u ts id e Th ales p r emises
Of f-s it e
M aint en an ce
Figure 4: Mistral IP Lifecycle
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Security. Ils ne peuvent être reproduits, communiqués ou utilisés sans son autorisation écrite
préalable.
This document and any data included are the property of THALES Communications &
Security. They cannot be reproduced, disclosed or used without the company's prior written
approval.
83051027-DDQ-TCS-FR-003
Mistral IP is manufactured in two steps:
– The hardware is produced outside Thales premises,
– The software injection and the final configuration are performed inside Thales premises.
Note: Mistral software implementation binaries, generated by the development team are packaged into a “firmware”
before to be uploaded inside the Mistral Hardware; this operation is realized inside Thales premises by the
Firrmware Packaging Device (FPD). This resource allows dedicated development team members to protect and
digitally sign the software implementation.
1.6.4. MISTRAL IP FUNCTIONAL STATE DIAGRAM
Mistral IP can hold different functional states. Those states are:
– "Booting": it is the functional state Mistral IP holds just after it has been switched on. It does hardware tests (not
including FPGA self-tests) and launches softwares
– "Self-test": in this state, Mistral IP runs selftests : it checks software and data integrity, it checks FPGA security
functions
– "Updating": Mistral IP is in this state when a software update is performed
– "Failure": Mistral IP enters this state when a failure occurs and is detected
– "Running": this state is the general state in which Mistral IP provides all its network services
1.6.5. OPERATIONAL CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEYS
The TOE keeps within its internal memory operational cryptographic keys used by Security Associations (SA) in
order to protect network dataflow.
The TOE implements two kinds of key management scheme in the SAs:
– Distributed mode, in which keys are directly used by the TOE to protect network dataflow. Those keys are pre-
shared by the TOE and a remote TOE. They are call “distributed mode PSK” and are symmetric keys.
In distributed mode, when an IPSec is opened, the SA’s distributed mode PSK is derivate into 2 keys, one used to
cipher and decipher network datagrams, the other used to calculate and check integrity patterns of network
datagrams.
The "distributed mode PSK" are generated by the Key Generation Center (CEC)
– Negotiated mode, in which keys are used by the TOE to authenticate itself and the remote TOE during a key
exchange protocol. Those keys are called “IKE peer authentication keys” .
These IKE peer authentication Pre-shared keys are symmetric keys shared by the TOE and a remote TOE.
They are generated by the Key Generation Center (CEC).
In negotiated mode, 2 keys are exchanged, one used to cipher and decipher network datagrams, the other used to
calculate and check integrity patterns of network datagrams.
The used key exchange protocol is IKE version 2.
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83051027-DDQ-TCS-FR-003
1.6.6. KEY INJECTION
Operational cryptographic master keys are generated by the CEC; keys are stored in plaintext or secure file format.
Secure file format offer confidentiality and integrity protection by an AES-128 bits algorithms (confidentiality
protection: AES-CBC-128; integrity protection: AES XCBC-MAC96). The protection keys used by these algorithms
are derived from a passphrase determined at keys generation (at CEC).
The key files generated by the CEC can either be injected in MISTRAL IP through the following ways:
– Via a remote command from the Management Center: the key files are prior imported in the management center
(secure or plaintext file format is allowed) ; Then the management center may either generate smartcard content
(see below) or inject imported keys to the Mistral-IP devices via the management VPN (remote management
Security Association used by the Mistral-IP devices to communicate with the Management Center). Note : This
second capability is not available for the very first configuration or after a secured-erasure, as the Mistral IP
does not have the necessary configuration parameters to be connected to its Management Center.
– Via a Smartcard generated by the Management center: key files are prior injected in the management center;
then the management center is able to generate Smartcard content; thus, the operator insert the generated
smartcard in reader interface of the Mistral IP device; the content of the smartcard is in plaintext.
– Via the Command Line Interface (CLI) offered by the console physical interface (GC); (only Secure File Format
is allowed); the secured key file content (representing the keys) is manually copied on the CLI.
1.6.7. DATE AND TIME MANAGEMENT
The TOE does not hold date and time when it is turned off. It provides the time related to its last power on.
Therefore, the time is set at startup. Two methods are provided and can be used:
– A network synchronization through NTP v4 protocol
– A manual configuration of the TOE performed by the local administrator
1.6.8. LOCAL DATA PROTECTION
The TOE persistently stores sensitive data. Those data are securely stored by a cryptographic functionality
preventing their disclosure and allowing detection of their modification.
The cryptographic functionality (which implements AES256-GCM16 for confidentiality and integrity) uses a local
cryptographic key (called Local Protection Key, LPK).
1.6.9. TOE FUNCTIONALITIES
The TOE's main functionalities are :
– Dataflow control and filtering from all interfaces, with Security Policies configuration allowing:
•
•
•
• Data flow protection (against disclosure, modification, insertion and replay).
– IPSEC ESP Tunnel encapsulation mode, which provides datagram payload data and topology data
encryption, integrity and anti-replay
•
•
•
• Data flow forwarding (without protection).
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83051027-DDQ-TCS-FR-003
– TOE configuration management (including key management and negotiation)
– Secure sensitive data storage
– Secure erasure
– Secure software update
– Auto-test (at startup and on request)
– SNMP supervision
– Audit generation
For details on those functionalities, refer to section TOE Summary Specification.
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83051027-DDQ-TCS-FR-003
2. CONFORMANCE CLAIM
2.1. CC CONFORMANCE CLAIM
This security target is conformant to Common Criteria 3.1 revision 4 of September 2012 [CC]:
– CC Part 2 extended
– CC Part 3 conformant
2.2. PP CONFORMANCE CLAIM
This security target is based on (but not conformant to) Security Requirements for Network Devices Protection
Profile [ND_PP].
2.2.1. [ND_PP] CONFORMANCE ANALYSIS
Here is the conformance analysis for the Security Problem Definition part:
Object Name in [ND_PP] Object Name in this ST Rationale
T.ADMIN_ERROR T.ADMIN_ERROR The threat in this ST is drawn from the PP
T.TSF_FAILURE T.TSF_FAILURE The threat in this ST is drawn from the PP
T.UNDETECTED_ACTIONS T.UNDETECTED_ACTIONS The threat in this ST is drawn from the PP
T.UNAUTHORIZED_ACCESS T.UNAUTHORISED_ACCESS The threat in this ST is drawn from the PP
T.UNAUTHORIZED_UPDATE T.UNAUTHORISED_UPDATE The threat in this ST is drawn from the PP
T.USER_DATA_REUSE T.USER_DATA_REUSE The threat in this ST is drawn from the PP
P.ACCESS_BANNER P.BANNER The OSP in this ST is drawn from the PP
A.NO_GENERAL_PURPOSE A.NO_GENERAL_PURPOSE The assumption in this ST is drawn from the PP
A.PHYSICAL A.PHYSICAL_ENVIRONMENT_TOE The assumption in this ST is drawn from the PP
A.TRUSTED_ADMIN A.TRUSTED_ADMIN The assumption in this ST is drawn from the PP
A.TRUSTED_NETWORKS A.TRUSTED_NETWORKS The assumption in this ST is drawn from the PP
Here is the conformance analysis for the Security Objectives part:
Object Name in [ND_PP] Object Name in this ST Rationale
O.PROTECTED_COMMUNICATIONS O.PROTECTED_COMMUNICATIONS The security objective in this ST is equivalent to the one in
[ND_PP], taking into account the TOE operation.
O.VERIFIABLE_UPDATES O.SOFTWARE_UPDATES The security objective in this ST is equivalent to the one in
[ND_PP], taking into account the TOE operation.
O.SYSTEM_MONITORING O.AUDIT The security objective in this ST is equivalent to the one in
[ND_PP], taking into account the TOE operation.
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83051027-DDQ-TCS-FR-003
Object Name in [ND_PP] Object Name in this ST Rationale
O.DISPLAY_BANNER O.DISPLAY_BANNER The security objective in this ST is equivalent to the one in
[ND_PP], taking into account the TOE operation.
O.TOE_ADMINISTRATION O.I&A
O.MANAGEMENT
The [ND_PP] security objective is splitted into 2 security
objectives within this ST in order to be more explicit and to
take into account TOE operation.
O.RESIDUAL_INFORMATION_CLEAR O.RESIDUAL_INFORMATION_CLEAR The security objective in this ST is drawn from the PP.
O.SESSION_LOCK O.SESSION_LOCK The security objective in this ST is equivalent to the one in
[ND_PP], taking into account the TOE operation.
O.TSF_SELF_TEST O.SELF_TEST The security objective in this ST is equivalent to the one in
[ND_PP], taking into account the TOE operation.
OE.NO_GENERAL_PURPOSE OE.LINUX_GUIDANCE The security objective in this ST is an intanciation (being
more restrictive) of the one in [ND_PP].
OE.PHYSICAL OE.PHYSICAL_ENVIRONMENT_TOE The security objective in this ST is drawn from the PP.
OE.TRUSTED_ADMIN OE.TRUSTED_ADMIN The security objective in this ST is drawn from the PP.
OE.TRUSTED_NETWORKS OE.TRUSTED_NETWORKS The security objective in this ST is drawn from the PP.
Here is the conformance analysis for the Security Functional Requirement part:
Object Name in
[ND_PP]
Object Name in this ST Rationale
FAU_GEN.1.1 FAU_GEN.1.1 The SFR in this ST is drawn from [ND_PP] taking into account the TOE
operation. At least any audit events required in [ND_PP] are generated.
FAU_GEN.1.2 FAU_GEN.1.2 The SFR in this ST is drawn from [ND_PP] taking into account the TOE
operation. At least the required information in [ND_PP] are recorded.
(with a refinement on subject identity)
FAU_GEN.2.1 FAU_GEN.2.1 The SFR in this ST is drawn from [ND_PP] taking into account the TOE
operation.
FAU_STG_EXT.1.1 FAU_STG_EXT.1.1 The SFR in this ST is drawn from [ND_PP] taking into account the TOE
operation.
FCS_CKM.1.1 (for
asymmetric keys)
The TOE does not generated asymmetric keys.
(but it generates symmetric session keys using IKE protocol)
FCS_CKM_EXT.4.1 FCS_CKM_EXT.4.1/anyPlainTextData The SFR in this ST is drawn from [ND_PP]. However it instantiates the
SFR to be more precise.
FCS_COP.1.1(1) (data
encryption / decryption)
FCS_COP.1.1/aes-cbc
FCS_COP.1.1/aes-gcm
The SFRs in this ST are instantiations of FCS_COP.1(1)
FCS_COP.1.1(2) (crypto
signature)
FCS_COP.1.1/ecdsaSw The ECDSA instantiation regarding the software signature does not need
all "NIST curves" but only one, that why only one curve is specified.
The ECDSA and DSA instantiations are not claimed in this ST : the TOE
does not perform IKE authentication through certificates but only through
PSK.
FCS_COP.1.1(3) (crypto
hashing)
FCS_COP.1.1/sha The SFR in this ST instantiates the one in the PP.
FCS_COP.1.1(4) (keyed-
hash message auth.)
FCS_COP.1.1/hmac The requirement in this ST instantiates the one in the PP.
FCS_RBG_EXT.1.1 FCS_RBG_EXT.1.1 The requirement in this ST instantiates the one in the PP.
FCS_RBG_EXT.1.2 FCS_RBG_EXT.1.2 The requirement in this ST instantiates the one in the PP.
FDP_RIP.2.1 FDP_RIP.2.1 The requirement in this ST instantiates the one in the PP.
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83051027-DDQ-TCS-FR-003
Object Name in
[ND_PP]
Object Name in this ST Rationale
FIA_PMG_EXT.1.1 FIA_PMG_EXT.1.1/localMngt The SFR as been instantiated for the human user.
Refinements have been performed to take into account the TOE
operation : minimum password length is not settable and set to 8
characters.
FIA_UIA_EXT.1.1 FIA_UIA_EXT.1.1/localMngt The requirement is drawn from the PP.
A refinement has been performed as the TOE does not identify users: it
recognizes 2 roles without user identification.
FIA_UIA_EXT.1.2 FIA_UIA_EXT.1.2/localMngt The requirement is drawn from the PP.
A refinement has been performed to precise human user roles.
FIA_UAU_EXT.2.1 FIA_UAU_EXT.2.1/localMngt The requirement is drawn from the PP.
A refinement has been performed to precise human user roles.
FIA_UAU.7.1 FIA_UAU.7.1/localMngt The requirement is drawn from the PP.
A refinement has been performed to precise human user roles.
FMT_MTD.1.1 FMT_MTD.1.1/configuration
FMT_MTD.1.1/keys
FMT_MTD.1.1/dateTime
The requirement into [ND_PP] is divided into two parts in the ST.
The first part concerns general TSF data that can be manage from the
local management (administrator role only) and from the management
center.
The second part concerns crypto keys which can only be managed by the
local management (administrator role only)
FMT_SMF.1.1 FMT_SMF.1.1 The requirement is drawn from the PP.
A capability has been added regarding TOE supervision (SNMP).
FMT_SMR.2.1 FMT_SMR.1.1/user The requirement is drawn from the PP.
An "operator" role has been added regarding the [ND_PP] in order to
provide a minimal on-site configuration supervision capabilities.
FMT_SMR.2.2 FMT_SMR.1.2/user The requirement is drawn from the PP.
FMT_SMR.2.3 This requirement is not taken into this security target as per the TOE
operation. Indeed, the TOE can be locally and remotely administered,
however the authentication mechanism is different. Local management is
performed by a human user who has to authenticate himself onto the
TOE.
Remote management is performed by a human user who has to
authenticate himself on the management center device (but not on the
TOE). From the TOE point of view, it is the trusted path between the
management center and the TOE (done through a TOE in "front-end"
configuration) which authenticates the management center.
FPT_SKP_EXT.1.1 FPT_SKP_EXT.1.1 The requirement is drawn from the PP.
A refinement has been performed to be more precise.
FPT_APW_EXT.1.1 FPT_APW_EXT.1.1 The requirement is drawn from the PP.
FPT_APW_EXT.1.2 FPT_APW_EXT.1.2 The requirement is drawn from the PP.
FPT_STM.1.1 FPT_STM.1.1 The requirement is drawn from the PP.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.1 FPT_TUD_EXT.1.1/software The requirement is drawn from the PP.
A refinement has been performed to be more precise about the
"administrators".
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.2 FPT_TUD_EXT.1.2/software The requirement is drawn from the PP.
A refinement has been performed to be more precise about the
"administrators".
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83051027-DDQ-TCS-FR-003
Object Name in
[ND_PP]
Object Name in this ST Rationale
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.3 FPT_TUD_EXT.1.3/software The requirement is drawn from the PP.
FPT_TST_EXT.1.1 FPT_TST.1.1 The security target uses FPT_TST.1 drawn from [CC] part 2 to specify the
self tests that have to be performed and start-up AND on user request.
FPT_TST.1.1 refines the [ND_PP] requirement in order to be slightly
more precise about tested components.
FTA_SSL_EXT.1.1 FTA_SSL_EXT.1.1/localMngt The requirement is drawn from the PP.
A refinement has been done because the period of inactivity is not
configurable.
FTA_SSL.3.1 The security target does not include this requirement because of the TOE
operation. The remote management operations are performed through a
trusted path between two TOEs (one in "classic" mode, one in "front-end"
mode). the trusted path being a VPN, it is setted up and it never ends.
FTA_SSL.4.1 FTA_SSL.4.1/localMngt The requirement is drawn from the PP.
A refinement has been performed to be more precise about the
"administrators".
FTA_TAB.1.1 FTA_TAB.1.1/localMngt The requirement is drawn from the PP.
A refinement has been performed to be more precise about the
"administrators".
FTP_ITC.1.1 FTP_ITC.1.1/TOE The requirement is drawn from the PP.
FTP_ITC.1.2 FTP_ITC.1.2/TOE The requirement is drawn from the PP.
FTP_ITC.1.3 FTP_ITC.1.3/TOE The requirement is drawn from the PP.
FTP_TRP.1.1 FTP_ITC.1.1/TOE The remote management is performed through a trusted channel
between two TOEs (one in "classic" mode, the second in "front-end"
mode). Therefore the [ND_PP] trusted path FTP_TRP.1.1 requirement
becomes a trusted channel FTP_ITC.1.1 requirement in this security
target.
FTP_TRP.1.2 FTP_ITC.1.2/TOE The remote management is performed through a trusted channel
between two TOEs (one in "classic" mode, the second in "front-end"
mode). Therefore the [ND_PP] trusted path FTP_TRP.1.2 requirement
becomes a trusted channel FTP_ITC.1.2 requirement in this security
target.
FTP_TRP.1.3 FIA_UID.2.1/sgc
FTP_ITC.1.1/TOE
The remote management is performed through a truted channel between
two TOEs (one in "classic" mode, the second in "front-end" mode).
Therefore the [ND_PP] trusted path FTP_TRP.1.3 requirement does not
have an equivalent in FTP_ITC.1. However it is fully covered by the
existence of the trusted channel (FTP_ITC.1.1) and by the mandatory
identification of the management center device (FIA_UID.2/sgc).
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.1 FCS_IPS_EXT.1.1 The requirement is drawn from the PP.
IKEv1 is not selected, therefore following requirements regarding IPSec
are refined for IKEv2.
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.2 FCS_IPS_EXT.1.2 The requirement is not applicable as IKEv1 is not selected in
FCS_IPS_EXT.1.1
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.3 FCS_IPS_EXT.1.3 The requirement is drawn from the PP.
The requirement is refined for IKEv2.
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.4 FCS_IPS_EXT.1.4 The requirement is drawn from the PP.
The requirement is refined for IKEv2.
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.5 FCS_IPS_EXT.1.5 The requirement is drawn from the PP.
The requirement is refined because DH Group 14 is not claimed. Only DH
Group 20 is required.
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Object Name in
[ND_PP]
Object Name in this ST Rationale
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.6 FCS_IPS_EXT.1.6 The requirement is not applicable as the TOE does not perform IKE peer
authentication via certificates and private keys, but only via pre-shared
keys.
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.7 FCS_IPS_EXT.1.7 The requirement is drawn from the PP.
The requirement is refined : the requirement is applicable to IKE peer
authentication.
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.8 FCS_IPS_EXT.1.8 The requirement is not claimed because this peer authentication
mechanism is considered too weak.
2.3. PACKAGE CONFORMANCE CLAIM
This security target is conformant to EAL3 package augmented with ALC_FLR.3 and AVA_VAN.3.
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83051027-DDQ-TCS-FR-003
3. SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION
3.1. ASSETS
This section lists sensitive assets. For each of them, it associates a "security needs" attribute indicating what
protection the asset needs.
A security need specified as optional means that the risk analysis of the system using the TOE shall determine if
this security need is required or not for the purposes of the system. If it is, the user will have to configure the TOE
such as it provides the appropriate security protection.
Default values of parameters are specified within the requirement FMT_MSA.3.
3.1.1. ASSETS PROTECTED BY THE TOE (USER DATA)
D.APPLICATIVE_DATA
Applicative data are data which flow through a private network to another through IP encryptors. They are
contained in the IP datagrams payload routed up to the cipher units and received and sent by these cipher units.
These data can be temporarily stored in IP encryptors to be able to process them (i.e., enforce security services)
before sending them on the private or public network.
Applicative data corresponds both to user dataflow and to management dataflow (as the remote management
service’s architecture uses a remote IP encryptor).
Security needs: Confidentiality, Integrity, Authentication, No replay
D.TOPOLOGIC_INFO
Information pertaining to private networks topology is contained within IP datagrams headers.
Security needs: Confidentiality, Integrity, Authentication
3.1.2. ASSETS BELONGING TO THE TOE (TSF DATA)
D.SECURITY_POLICIES
This asset groups all Security Associations (SAs) and Security Policies (SPs) configured within the TOE.
Security Associations are caracterised at least by following parameters:
– SPI : unique identifier of the SA
– SA Type : User, Remote management
– Protection mode : IPSec_Tunnel, Enhanced_Simple
– Key management mode : distributed or negociated mode (that is use of IKE protocol)
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83051027-DDQ-TCS-FR-003
– Cryptographic secret or private key identifier
– Peer IP address : IP address of a remote instance of the TOE
– Lifetime of IKE SAs keys
Note : Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS) mode (for IKE protocol) : is always performed.
Security Policies are characterised at least by following parameters:
– Action : Encryption, Bypass, Reject
– Source IP address
– Destination IP address
– SA Identifier (link between SP and SA)
– Authorized protocol and port (for TCP and UDP)
Security needs: Confidentiality, Integrity
D.CONFIG_PARAM
This asset groups all TOE configuration parameters that are not confidential (TOE IP address, MTU, ...).
It contains at least:
– TOE IP address
– List of authorised routing protocols (in bridge mode)
– List of authorised TOE Management Centre Devices (E.SGC) IP address and related TOE interface
Security needs: Integrity
D.SUPERVISION_DATA
This asset groups all TOE supervision data that can be queried through SNMP requests.
Security needs: Integrity
D.CRYPTO_KEYS
This asset groups all (symmetric or asymmetric) cryptographic keys secret values used by VPN Policies (i.e. SAs).
It can either be PSK peer authentication keys when using IKE protocol (negotiated mode), or PSK communication
channels protection keys when not using IKE protocol (distributed mode).
Secret or private keys are characterised at least by following parameters:
– Key identifier
– Key type : secret keys
– Key length
– Associated cryptographic algorithm
– Key lifetime
– Key value
Security needs: Confidentiality, Integrity
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D.IKE_SAs_CRYPTO_KEYS
This asset groups all temporary (i.e. in volatile memory only) cryptographic keys secret values created through IKE
protocol. For IKEv2 protocol it is:
– SKEYSEED: IKEv2 protocol key seed (refer to [RFC 5996])
– IKEv2 SA Keys: Key materials issued from the IKEv2 first exchanges
– IKEv2 Child SAs Keys: Key materials issued from the IKEv2 second exchanges
Security needs: Confidentiality
D.DISTRIB_SAs_CRYPTO_KEYS
This asset groups all temporary (i.e. in volatile memory only) cryptographic keys secret values created by derivation
process of distributed PSK for distributed mode operation.
Security needs: Confidentiality
D.CRYPTO_KEYS_PROTECTION_PWD
This asset is a temporary data. It is the passphrase entered in order to unprotect the cryptographic private/secret
key during their injection in the TOE via the GC interface.
Security needs: Confidentiality
D.AUDIT
This asset represents audit record generated by the TOE.
Security needs: Integrity, Authentication
D.AUTHENTICATION_DATA
This asset groups authentication data that is:
– Local administrator's (U.LOCAL_ADMINISTRATOR) password
– Local operator's (U.LOCAL_ADMINISTRATOR) password
It also contains their lifetime. This lifetime is by default infinite.
Security needs: Confidentiality, Integrity
D.SOFTWARE
This asset represents the TOE (as the TOE is software).
Security needs: Integrity, Authentication
D.SWUPDATE_PUBLICKEYS
This asset is the cryptographic public key used by the TOE to authenticate its software updates.
Security needs: Integrity
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83051027-DDQ-TCS-FR-003
D.TIME_BASE
This asset represents the reliable time base kept within the TOE and used by the TOE.
Security needs: Integrity
3.2. USERS AND ENTITIES
U.LOCAL_ADMINISTRATOR
TOE local administrator. He interacts with the TOE through the E.SGL. He can uses any commands.
U.LOCAL_OPERATOR
TOE local operator. He interacts with the TOE through the E.SGL. He has only access to device initialisation and to
a complete view of the device configuration.
U.CENTRAL_ADMINISTRATOR
TOE administrator interacting with the TOE through the E.SGC.
E.SGC
TOE management centre device. It interacts remotely with the TOE.
It is the network device hosting E.LGC
E.LGC
TOE management centre software
This software is a dedicated one, developed for the TOE central administration and delivered with the TOE.
E.SGL
TOE local management device. It interacts with the TOE through the GC interface.
It is the network device hosting E.LGL
E.LGL
TOE local management software.
This software can either be a dedicated one (developed for the needs of the local administration of the TOE), or
hyperterminal, or telnet...
E.SF
File server
This device is a TFTP server where TOE can download software updates.
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Security. They cannot be reproduced, disclosed or used without the company's prior written
approval.
83051027-DDQ-TCS-FR-003
E.CEC
Key generation centre device
E.FPD
Firmware Packaging Device
3.3. THREATS
T.ADMIN_ERROR
An administrator may unintentionally install or configure the TOE incorrectly, resulting in ineffective security
mechanisms.
Impacted data:
- D.SECURITY_POLICIES
- D.CONFIG_PARAM
Impacted security need: Integrity
T.TSF_FAILURE
Security mechanisms of the TOE may fail, leading to a compromise of TSF Data or User Data.
Impacted data:
- D.SECURITY_POLICIES
- D.APPLICATIVE_DATA
- D.TOPOLOGIC_INFO
- D.CRYPTO_KEYS
- D.IKE_SAs_CRYPTO_KEYS
- D.DISTRIB_SAs_CRYPTO_KEYS
Impacted security need: Confidentiality
T.UNDETECTED_ACTIONS
Malicious remote users or external IT entities may take actions that adversely affect the security of the TOE. These
actions may remain undetected and thus their effects cannot be effectively mitigated.
Application note:
those actions are not logged.
Impacted data:
- D.SECURITY_POLICIES
- D.APPLICATIVE_DATA
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Security. They cannot be reproduced, disclosed or used without the company's prior written
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83051027-DDQ-TCS-FR-003
- D.CRYPTO_KEYS
- D.CONFIG_PARAM
- D.AUTHENTICATION_DATA
- D.IKE_SAs_CRYPTO_KEYS
- D.DISTRIB_SAs_CRYPTO_KEYS
Impacted security need: Confidentiality, Integrity
T.UNAUTHORISED_ACCESS
A user may gain unauthorized access to the TOE data and TOE executable code.
A malicious user, process, or external IT entity may masquerade as an authorized entity in order to gain
unauthorized access to data or TOE resources.
A malicious user, process, or external IT entity may misrepresent itself as the TOE to obtain identification and
authentication data.
Those actions could lead either to :
– Modification or retrieval of TOE data (that is TSF Data and User Data persistently stored within the TOE)
– Usurpation of the operator or the administrator identity in order to perform administration operations on the TOE
– Modification, insertion or deletion of audit data records while they are transmitted by the TOE to the TOE
management centre device (E.SGC).
Application note:
The TOE does not provide persistent storage of audit records. Those are systematically forwarded by the TOE to the management centre
device (E.SGC).
Impacted data:
- D.SECURITY_POLICIES
- D.APPLICATIVE_DATA
- D.TOPOLOGIC_INFO
- D.AUDIT
- D.CRYPTO_KEYS
- D.CONFIG_PARAM
- D.TIME_BASE
- D.SOFTWARE
- D.AUTHENTICATION_DATA
- D.IKE_SAs_CRYPTO_KEYS
- D.DISTRIB_SAs_CRYPTO_KEYS
- D.SWUPDATE_PUBLICKEYS
- D.SUPERVISION_DATA
- D.CRYPTO_KEYS_PROTECTION_PWD
Impacted security need: Confidentiality, Integrity
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Security. They cannot be reproduced, disclosed or used without the company's prior written
approval.
83051027-DDQ-TCS-FR-003
T.UNAUTHORISED_UPDATE
A malicious party attempts to supply the end user with an update of the product that may compromise the security
features of the TOE.
Impacted data:
- D.SOFTWARE
- D.SWUPDATE_PUBLICKEYS
Impacted security need: Integrity, Authentication
T.USER_DATA_REUSE
User data may be inadvertently sent to a destination not intended by the original sender.
Impacted data:
- D.APPLICATIVE_DATA
- D.TOPOLOGIC_INFO
Impacted security need: Confidentiality, No replay
T.TIME_BASE
An malicious party disturbs or tampers with the TOE time base with the aim of falsifying audit data.
Impacted data:
- D.TIME_BASE
Impacted security need: Integrity
T.RESIDUAL_DATA
An malicious party acquires knowledge, by direct access to the TOE, of old value of TOE data (keys, VPN security
policies…) during a change of operational context (assignment of the TOE in a new premise, maintenance…).
Impacted data:
- D.SECURITY_POLICIES
- D.APPLICATIVE_DATA
- D.CRYPTO_KEYS
- D.AUTHENTICATION_DATA
- D.IKE_SAs_CRYPTO_KEYS
- D.DISTRIB_SAs_CRYPTO_KEYS
- D.CRYPTO_KEYS_PROTECTION_PWD
Impacted security need: Confidentiality
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83051027-DDQ-TCS-FR-003
3.4. ORGANISATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES (OSP)
3.4.1. REGULATORY POLICIES
P.CRYPTO_RGS
The TOE shall implement cryptographic mechanisms compliant with ANSSI guidance [RGS_B].
3.4.2. SERVICES
P.PROVIDED_SERVICES
The TOE shall enforce VPN security policies defined by the TOE administrator (U.LOCAL_ADMINISTRATOR and
U.CENTRAL_ADMINISTRATOR).
It shall provide all related security services necessary to perform protections specified in these policies:
– datagram filtering,
– confidentiality protection of applicative data,
– integrity and authenticity protection of applicative data,
– protection against replay of applicative data (in ESP Tunnel mode only),
– confidentiality protection of topologic data (in ESP Tunnel mode only) and
– integrity and authenticity protection of topologic data (in ESP Tunnel mode only) .
Furthermore, the TOE shall provide the capability to separate IP datagrams flows to make communicate
subnetworks (of private networks) and enforce a security policy to every communication link between IP
subnetworks.
P.POL_VIEW
The TOE shall enable the TOE administrators (U.LOCAL_ADMINISTRATOR and U.CENTRAL_ADMINITRATOR)
and TOE operators (U.LOCAL_OPERATOR) to view all individual VPN security policies and their security contexts
upon each IP encryption device.
P.SUPERVISION
The TOE shall enable the system and network administrator to review the operational status of the TOE.
P.VISUAL_ALARMS
When a critical event occurs, the TOE shall notify a user through a visual mean (e.g. LED).
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Security. They cannot be reproduced, disclosed or used without the company's prior written
approval.
83051027-DDQ-TCS-FR-003
3.4.3. MISCELLANEOUS
P.BANNER
The TOE shall display an initial banner describing restrictions of use, legal agreements, or any other appropriate
information to which users consent by accessing the TOE.
P.SA_SP_PROTECTION
The TOE shall protect the integrity of the SPD (Security Policies Database) and the SAD (Security Associations
Database) while persistently stored and used.
The TOE shall periodically check the integrity of the SPD and the SAD.
P.KEYS_INJECTION
Injected keys shall be protected in confidentiality and integrity during their transfert from the Management Center to
the TOE whatever is the transportation method (external support, file, through network).
3.5. ASSUMPTIONS
3.5.1. SECURING THE TOE
A.NO_GENERAL_PURPOSE
It is assumed that there are no general-purpose computing capabilities (e.g., compilers or user applications)
available on the TOE, other than those services necessary for the operation, administration and support of the
TOE.
In particular, the TOE is configured accordingly to the guidance [LINUX_DGA] and [LINUX_ANSSI].
A.PHYSICAL_ENVIRONMENT_TOE
It is assumed that physical security of the TOE, commensurate with the value of the TOE and the data it contains,
is provided by the environment.
A.SW_PROTECTION
It is assumed that protection of TOE software updates is performed in a trusted environment, on a trusted device.
Only authorised persons have access to this device.
It is assumed that protection of TOE software updates provides confidentiality and authentication.
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83051027-DDQ-TCS-FR-003
A.TRUSTED_NETWORKS
Private Local Area Networks (LAN), i.e. plaintext networks, including the TOE Management centre network, are
assumed to be trusted networks.
3.5.2. ADMINISTRATION
A.TRUSTED_ADMIN
It is assumed that the TOE administrators (U.LOCAL_ADMINISTRATOR and U.CENTRAL_ADMINISTRATOR) are
trustworthy and apply the procedure described in the administration guide.
A.CONFIGURATION_CONTROL
It is assumed that the TOE administrators (U.LOCAL_ADMINISTRATOR and U.CENTRAL_ADMINISTRATOR)
have got means to control the hardware and software configuration of the TOE (including services and assets) with
respect to baseline state, or to restore it in a secure state.
Application note:
This assumption especially concerns the software assets.
A.ALARM
It is assumed that the TOE Management Centre (E.SGC) analyses and processes critical security audit data
generated and forwarded by the TOE, immediately after reception.
It is assumed that the TOE local administrator (U.LOCAL_ADMINISTRATOR) or the TOE local operator
(U.LOCAL_OPERATOR) analyses and processes alarms immediately after their generation.
A.POLICIES_CONTINUITY
When a plaintext communication channel is configured, the system shall make sure that the information security
policies of the two networks interconnected through the TOE are consistent between each other.
3.5.3. ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT MANAGEMENT DEVICES
A.SECURED_MANAGEMENT_DEVICES
It is assumed that following devices are properly and securely configured, according the sensitivity of assets they
handle:
– The TOE management centre device (E.SGC)
– The TOE local management device (E.SGL)
– The key generation center (E.CEC)
– The firmware packaging device (E.FPD)
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83051027-DDQ-TCS-FR-003
It is assumed that their operating system is configured accordingly to the appropriate governmental guidance and
that there are no general-purpose computing capabilities (e.g., compilers or user applications) available on those
devices, other than services necessary for the operation and support of their functionalities.
In case sensitive data are governmental data at Restricted level of classification (DR, NR, EUR), it is assumed that
devices are configured in regards to appropriate rules and regulations.
A.ACCESS_CONTROL_MANAGEMENT_DEVICES
It is assumed that the access to following devices is controlled:
– The TOE management centre device (E.SGC)
– The file server (E.SF)
– The TOE local management device (E.SGL)
– The key generation center (E.CEC)
– The firmware packaging device (E.FPD)
The overall solution shall allow individual accounting. It can be physical (e.g. physical access restriction to the
device hosting the software) and/or logical (e.g. user authentication by the operating system).
A.PHYSICAL_ENVIRONMENT_MANAGEMENT_DEVICES
It is assumed that physical security of following devices, commensurate with the value of the data concerning the
TOE they contain, is provided by the environment:
– The TOE management centre device (E.SGC)
– The file server (E.SF)
– The TOE local management device (E.SGL)
– The key generation center (E.CEC)
– The firmware packaging device (E.FPD)
– Any other devices connected to one of the devices listed above
In case sensitive data handled by those devices are governmental data at Restricted level of classification (DR,
NR, EUR), it is assumed that the physical environment meets appropriate rules and regulations.
A.AUDIT
It is assumed that the TOE management centre software (E.LGC) persistently stores any audit data received from
the TOE.
It is assumed that the auditor regularly review audit events generated by the TOE. It is also assumed that the
memory units storing audit events are managed so that the auditor does not lose events.
A.SGC_TO_FRONT-END
It is assumed that the TOE management centre device (E.SGC) is directly connected to the front-end Mistral. The
integrity of the link between the two equipments shall be easily checkable by a human.
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83051027-DDQ-TCS-FR-003
3.5.4. ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT THE CEC
A.STAND_ALONE_CEC
It is assumed that the key generation center (E.CEC) is offline and dedicated.
A.KEY_TRANSPORTATION
It is assumed that physical devices used to transport cryptographic keys generated by E.CEC are manipulated and
traced as sensitive items.
A.CEC_CRYPTO_REGULATION
The key generation center (E.CEC) meets ANSSI guidance [RGS_B] when implementing cryptographic
mechanisms, generating keys and managing keys.
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Security. They cannot be reproduced, disclosed or used without the company's prior written
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83051027-DDQ-TCS-FR-003
4. SECURITY OBJECTIVES
4.1. SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE TOE
4.1.1. COMMUNICATION PROTECTION
O.PROTECTED_COMMUNICATIONS
The TOE shall provide protected communication channels between itself and a remote instance of the TOE.
This protection shall prevent disclosure, modification, insertion and replay of IP datagrams (payload and/or
datagram header).
Application note:
Protected channels between the TOE and a remote instance of the TOE are used to transmit:
- User data:
- D.APPLICATIVE_DATA
- D.TOPOLOGIC_INFO (in ESP Tunnel mode only)
- TSF data (for remote management purpose):
- D.SECURITY_POLICIES
- D.CONFIG_PARAM
- D.CRYPTO_KEYS
- D.AUDIT
- D.SOFTWARE
- D.SWUPDATE_PUBLICKEYS
O.POL_ENFORCEMENT
The TOE shall enforce information flow control policies coming in and out its external interfaces, in particular VPN
security policies specified through D.SECURITY_POLICIES.
The TOE shall authorise the administrator (R.ADMINISTRATOR) and the TOE management center (R.SGC) only
to modify the filtering configuration of the flow control policies.
O.FLOW_PARTITIONING
The TOE shall provide the capability to partition IP networks that are interconnected together thanks to TOEs, by
permiting creation of a new extended IP network, stacked up to the IP network make up of IP subnetworks.
The TOE shall also provide the capability to enforce a security policy upon every communication link between IP
subnetworks.
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83051027-DDQ-TCS-FR-003
4.1.2. AUDIT
O.AUDIT
The TOE shall generate audit data:
– For all security-relevant operations performed by the TOE or concerning protected communication channels
– For all security-relevant operations (including viewing operations on TOE sensitive assets) performed by the
administrator (R.ADMINISTRATOR), by the operator (R.OPERATOR) or by the TOE management center
device (R.SGC)
The TOE shall associate to generated audit data:
– A number (an incremental counter), offering a mean to detect audit data loss.
– A severity, offering a mean to discriminate informational, warning and critical audit data.
– If it is an alarm or not.
The TOE shall send stored audit data to the GC interface, at the request of the local administrator
(R.ADMINISTRATOR).
After generation, the TOE shall send any ALARM-type audit data to the TOE management center device (E.SGC).
Application note:
Refer to FAU_GEN.1 for the list of audited security events.
O.TIME_BASE
The TOE provides a time base upon which the audit records are based and ensures its reliability.
O.AUDIT_PROTECTION
The TOE shall ensure the integrity of recorded audit data while being forwarded to the TOE management center
device (E.SGC).
The TOE shall ensure the authentication of recorded audit data forwarded to the TOE management center device
(E.SGC).
O.SUPERVISION
The TOE shall authorise the local administrator (R.ADMINISTRATOR) and the TOE management center device
(E.SGC) to supervise its operational status.
O.SUPERVISION_IMPACT
The TOE shall ensure that the supervision service does not put in danger its sensitive assets.
O.VISUAL_ALARMS
When an alarm-type event has occurred, the TOE shall notify local users through a visual or sounding mean (e.g.
LED).
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83051027-DDQ-TCS-FR-003
4.1.3. TOE MANAGEMENT
O.ROLES
The TOE shall implement access control and security policy enforcement for the following roles:
– Administrator (R.ADMINISTRATOR), which is the role corresponding to U.LOCAL_ADMINISTRATOR
– Operator (R.OPERATOR), which is the role corresponding to U.LOCAL_OPERATOR
– TOE management center device (R.SGC), which is the role corresponding to E.SGC
Application note:
The TOE does not know the "central administrator" (U.CENTRAL_ADMINISTRATOR) but it knows the TOE management center device
(E.SGC) with which the central administrator interacts.
O.I&A
The TOE shall require the identification of the TOE management center device (R.SGC) before granting it with the
TOE management center device access rights.
The TOE shall require the authentication of the user before granting him with the administrator
(R.ADMINISTRATOR) access rights.
The TOE shall require the authentication of the user before granting him with the operator (R.OPERATOR) access
rights.
The authentication mechanism shall be compliant with ANSSI guidance [RGS_B].
O.AUTHENTICATION_FAILURE
The TOE shall temporarily lock the authentication mechanism after too many unsuccessful authentication attempts.
O.DISPLAY_BANNER
After a successful local management device (R.SGL) identification, the TOE shall send to the network device
(E.SGL) from which the user is connected to the TOE an advisory warning regarding use of the TOE.
O.SESSION_LOCK
The TOE shall lock any local user (R.ADMINISTRATOR and R.OPERATOR) session after a defined period of
inactivity of 3 minutes.
The TOE shall provide the local user (R.ADMINISTRATOR and R.OPERATOR) a mean to terminate his session.
O.MANAGEMENT
The TOE shall authorise modification of following data to the administrator (R.ADMINISTRATOR) and to TOE
management center device (R.SGC) only:
– D.TIME_BASE
– D.CRYPTO_KEYS
The TOE shall authorise modification of following data to the TOE management center device (R.SGC) only:
– D.SECURITY_POLICIES
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83051027-DDQ-TCS-FR-003
– D.CONFIG_PARAM
The TOE shall authorise software (D.SOFTWARES) update to the administrator (R.ADMINISTRATOR) only.
O.VIEW
The TOE shall authorise viewing of following data to the administrator (R.ADMINISTRATOR), the operator
(R.OPERATOR) and to the TOE management center device (R.SGC) only:
– D.SECURITY_POLICIES
– D.CONFIG_PARAM
– D.TIME_BASE
The TOE shall authorise viewing of following data to no one:
– D.CRYPTO_KEYS
– D.IKE_SAs_CRYPTO_KEYS
– D.DISTRIB_SAs_CRYPTO_KEYS
– D.AUTHENTICATION_DATA
O.POL_VIEW
The TOE shall enable to individually view VPN security policies (i.e. security associations) and their security
contexts (IKE security associations) upon each IP encryptor.
4.1.4. DATA PROTECTION
O.RESIDUAL_INFORMATION_CLEAR
The TOE shall ensure that any data contained in a protected resource is not available when the resource is
deallocated or reallocated.
O.DATA_ERASURE
The TOE shall provide a secure data erasure mechanism which cause sensitive data (both persistently stored and
in volatile memory) to be made unavailable in case of emergency.
O.LOCAL_DATA_PROTECTION
The TOE shall protect at least TSF Data and User Data from disclosure (in regards to their security needs) that are
persistently stored.
The TOE shall allow detecting modification of at least TSF Data and User Data (in regards to their security needs)
that are persistently stored.
Application note:
As a reminder, impacted TSF and User Data by this security objective are:
- D.SECURITY_POLICIES
- D.CONFIG_PARAM
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83051027-DDQ-TCS-FR-003
- D.CRYPTO_KEYS
- D.AUTHENTICATION_DATA
- D.SWUPDATE_PUBLICKEYS
4.1.5. SOFTWARE UPDATE
O.SOFTWARE_UPDATES
When a software update is requested, the TOE shall:
– control the integrity and authenticity (done through a digital signature) of the software
– decipher the software
before accepting and installing it.
4.1.6. CRYPTOGRAPHY
O.KEYS_INJECTION
When a secret key is injected via the Command Line Interface, the TOE shall:
– control the integrity and authenticity of the key
– decipher the key
before accepting and persistently storing it.
O.CRYPTOPERIOD
The TOE shall manage a cryptoperiod for any cryptographic key (D.CRYPTO_KEYS) used to protect
communication channels (refer to O.PROTECTED_COMMUNICATIONS). For secret keys (i.e. keys for symmetric
cryptographic algorithm), this cryptoperiod is part of each key's security attributes.
For IKEv2 protocols SA keys, at the end of a key lifetime, the TOE shall renew the key through SA renewal
mechanism.
For IKEv2 protocols peer authentication keys, at the end of a key lifetime, the TOE shall either (depending on the
key's security attribute):
– close any communication channels and periodically generate a critical severity audit data requiring the peer
authentication key to be renewed (in this case no more new communication channels for SAs using this key can
be initiated until the key is renewed)
– or periodically generate a critical severity audit data while it continues to proceed the network trafic (in this case
new communication channels for SAs using this key can be initiated even if the key is out-of-date)
The period of the generation of audit data is by default 30 minutes.
The TOE shall authorise the administrator (R.ADMINISTRATOR) and the TOE management center device
(R.SGC) only to modify this cryptoperiod.
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O.CRYPTO_REGULATION
The TOE shall implement cryptographic mechanisms compliant with ANSSI guidance [RGS_B]
4.1.7. SELF-TEST
O.SELF_TEST
The TOE shall run a suite of tests at startup concerning the following security functionalities and data to ensure it is
operating properly:
– Cryptographic primitives correct operation
– Cryptographic operations (refer to FCS_COP requirements) correct operation
– TOE software integrity (D.SOFTWARES)
– Persistently stored TSF Data integrity that is:
•
•
•
• D.SECURITY_POLICIES
•
•
•
• D.CONFIG_PARAM
•
•
•
• D.CRYPTO_KEYS
•
•
•
• D.AUTHENTICATION_DATA
The TOE shall also provide the capability to the administrator (R.ADMINISTRATOR) to request such tests during
TOE running.
The result of a self-test can be OK or NOK. If all self-tests results are OK, then the TOE can go in “Running”
functional state. Otherwise, at the first self-test failure (that is a result is NOK), the TOE shall go in “Failure”
functional state.
4.2. SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE TOE ENVIRONMENT
4.2.1. THE ADMINISTRATOR
OE.TRUSTED_ADMIN
The TOE administrators (U.LOCAL_ADMINISTRATOR, U.CENTRAL_ADMINISTRTOR) shall be trusted to follow
and apply all administrator guidance in a trusted manner.
OE.ALARM
The TOE central administrator (U.CENTRAL_ADMINISTRATOR) shall analyse and process critical security audit
data generated and forwarded by the TOE, immediately after reception.
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83051027-DDQ-TCS-FR-003
OE.POLICIES_CONTINUITY
When a plaintext communication channel is configured, the system shall make sure that the information security
policies of the two networks interconnected through the TOE are consistent between each other.
4.2.2. THE AUDITOR
OE.AUDIT_ANALYSIS
The TOE central administrator (U.CENTRAL_ADMINISTRATOR) shall regulary analyse audit events generated by
the TOE and react accordingly.
OE.AUDIT_MNGT
The memory units storing audit events shall be managed so that the TOE central administrator
(U.CENTRAL_ADMINISTRATOR) does not lose events.
4.2.3. THE TOE
OE.PHYSICAL_ENVIRONMENT_TOE
The environment provides physical security to the TOE, commensurate with the value of the TOE and the data it
contains.
OE.LINUX_GUIDANCE
The operating system used by the TOE shall be configured accordingly to the appropriate governmental guidance
[LINUX_DGA] and [LINUX_ANSSI]. In particular, this guidance requires not to install services other than those
necessary for the TOE's operation, administration and maintenance.
OE.TOE_INTEGRITY
The TOE environment shall provide the capability to check the integrity of the TOE hardware and software
configuration.
OE.TOE_TRANSPORTATION
The TOE shall be securely erased (using the mechanism describe within O.DATA_ERASURE) before being
brought from a site to another.
OE.TRUSTED_NETWORKS
Private Local Area Networks (LAN), i.e. plaintext networks, including the TOE Management centre network, shall
be trusted networks.
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4.2.4. THE CG
OE.SECURED_SGC
The TOE management centre device (E.SGC) shall be securely configured and used, in particular, its operating
system shall be configured accordingly to the appropriate governmental guidance and no general-purpose
computing capabilities (e.g., compilers or user applications) shall be available on this network device, nor any
services other than those necessary for the operation and support of the TOE management center software
(E.LGC).
In case the device handles governmental data at Restricted level of classification (DR, NR, EUR), it shall be
configured in regards to appropriate rules and regulations.
OE.ACCESS_CONTROL_SGC
The access to the TOE management center software (E.LGC) is controlled. The overall solution shall allow
individual accounting. It can be physical (e.g. physical access restriction to the device E.SGC hosting the software
E.LGC) and/or logical (e.g. user authentication by the operating system or by E.LGC itself).
OE.ACCESS_CONTROL_SF
The access to the file server (E.SF) is controlled. The overall solution shall allow individual accounting. It can be
physical (e.g. physical access restriction to the device hosting the server E.SF) and/or logical (e.g. user
authentication by the operating system).
OE.PHYSICAL_ENVIRONMENT_SGC
The environment provides physical security to the TOE management centre device (E.SGC), commensurate with
the value of the data concerning the TOE it contains.
The environment provides also physical security to all network devices connected to the E.SGC and
communicating with it, commensurate with the value of the data concerning the TOE they contain.
In case sensitive data handled by those devices are governmental data at Restricted level of classification (DR,
NR, EUR), their physical environment shall meet appropriate rules and regulations.
OE.PHYSICAL_ENVIRONMENT_SF
The environment provides physical security to the file server (E.SF), commensurate with the value of the data
concerning the TOE it contains.
In case sensitive data handled by those devices are governmental data at Restricted level of classification (DR,
NR, EUR), their physical environment shall meet appropriate rules and regulations.
OE.SGC_TO_FRONT-END
The TOE management centre device (E.SGC) shall be directly connected to the front-end Mistral. The integrity of
the link between the two equipments shall be easily checkable by a human.
OE.AUDIT_RECORD_SGC
The TOE management center software (E.LGC) shall persistently store any audit data received from the TOE.
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83051027-DDQ-TCS-FR-003
OE.DISPLAY_BANNER_SGC
Before user identification and authentication, the TOE management center device (E.SGC) shall display an
advisory warning describing restrictions of use, legal agreements, or any other appropriate information to which
users consent by accessing the TOE and its management center.
4.2.5. THE NTP SERVER
OE.SECURED_NTP_SERVER
The network device hosting the NTP server shall be securely configured and used, in particular, its operating
system shall be configured accordingly to the appropriate governmental guidance and no general-purpose
computing capabilities (e.g., compilers or user applications) shall be available on this network device, nor any
services other than those necessary for the operation and support of the NTP service.
OE.ACCESS_CONTROL_NTP_SERVER
The access to the NTP server is controlled. The overall solution shall allow individual accounting. It can be physical
(e.g. physical access restriction to the device hosting the NTP server) and/or logical (e.g. user authentication by the
operating system).
OE.NTP_SERVER_LOCATION
The device hosting the NTP server shall be located within the Mistral Management Center (CGM) when Mistral IP
is operated in connected mode. In autonomous mode, NTP server is located in the trusted network (private LAN).
OE.PHYSICAL_ENVIRONMENT_NTP_SERVER
The environment provides physical security to the NTP server.
4.2.6. THE FPD
OE.SECURED_FPD
The firmware packaging device (E.FPD) shall be securely configured and used, in particular, its operating system
shall be configured accordingly to the appropriate governmental guidance and no general-purpose computing
capabilities (e.g., compilers or user applications) shall be available on this device, nor any services other than those
necessary for the operation and support of the E.FPD.
In case the device handles governmental data at Restricted level of classification (DR, NR, EUR), it shall be
configured in regards to appropriate rules and regulations.
OE.ACCESS_CONTROL_FPD
The access to the firmware packaging device (E.FPD) is controlled. The overall solution shall allow individual
accounting. It can be physical (e.g. physical access restriction to the device) and/or logical (e.g. user authentication
by the operating system).
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83051027-DDQ-TCS-FR-003
OE.PHYSICAL_ENVIRONMENT_FPD
The environment provides physical security to the firmware packaging device (E.FPD) commensurate with the
value of the data concerning the TOE it contains.
In case sensitive data handled by this device are governmental data at Restricted level of classification (DR, NR,
EUR), its physical environment shall meet appropriate rules and regulations.
4.2.7. THE SGL
OE.SECURED_SGL
The TOE local management device (E.SGL) shall be securely configured and used, in particular, its operating
system shall be configured accordingly to the appropriate governmental guidance and no general-purpose
computing capabilities (e.g., compilers or user applications) shall be available on this network device, nor any
services other than those necessary for the operation and support of the E.LGL.
In case the device handles governmental data at Restricted level of classification (DR, NR, EUR), it shall be
configured in regards to appropriate rules and regulations.
OE.ACCESS_CONTROL_SGL
The access to the TOE local management device (E.SGL) is controlled. The overall solution shall allow individual
accounting. It can be physical (e.g. physical access restriction to the device E.SGL) and/or logical (e.g. user
authentication by the operating system or by E.LGL itself).
OE.SGL_CONNECTION
The network link between the TOE and the TOE local management device (E.SGL) shall be a trustworthy link.
OE.PHYSICAL_ENVIRONMENT_SGL
The environment provides physical security to the TOE local management device (E.SGL), commensurate with the
value of the data concerning the TOE it contains.
In case sensitive data handled by this device are governmental data at Restricted level of classification (DR, NR,
EUR), its physical environment shall meet appropriate rules and regulations.
4.2.8. THE CEC
OE.SECURED_CEC
The key generation center (E.CEC) shall be securely configured and used, in particular, its operating system shall
be configured accordingly to the appropriate governmental guidance and no general-purpose computing
capabilities (e.g., compilers or user applications) shall be available on this device, nor any services other than those
necessary for the operation and support of the E.CEC.
In case the device handles governmental data at Restricted level of classification (DR, NR, EUR), it shall be
configured in regards to appropriate rules and regulations.
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83051027-DDQ-TCS-FR-003
OE.STAND_ALONE_CEC
The key generation center (E.CEC) shall be offline and dedicated.
OE.ACCESS_CONTROL_CEC
The access to the key generation center (E.CEC) is controlled. The overall solution shall allow individual
accounting. It can be physical (e.g. physical access restriction to the device) and/or logical (e.g. user authentication
by the operating system).
OE.PHYSICAL_ENVIRONMENT_CEC
The environment provides physical security to the key generation center (E.CEC), commensurate with the value of
the data concerning the TOE it contains.
In case sensitive data handled by this device are governmental data at Restricted level of classification (DR, NR,
EUR), its physical environment shall meet appropriate rules and regulations.
OE.KEY_TRANSPORTATION
Physical devices used to transport cryptographic keys generated by E.CEC shall be manipulated and traced as
sensitive items. The environment provides security of key transportation, commensurate with their confidentiality
and integrity level.
OE.CEC_CRYPTO_REGULATION
The key generation center (E.CEC) meet ANSSI guidance [RGS_B] when implementing cryptographic
mechanisms, generating keys and managing keys.
4.2.9. SOFTWARE UPDATES
OE.SW_PROTECTION
TOE software updates shall be ciphered, authenticated and digitally signed.
The protection shall be performed within a trusted environment, on a trusted device.
Only authorised persons shall have access to this device.
OE.SW_UPDATE_KEY
Cryptographic keys used to protect TOE software updates shall be distinct by 'circle of trust'.
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4.3. RATIONALE FOR THE SECURITY OBJECTIVES
4.3.1. THREATS
T.ADMIN_ERROR
This threat is countered by OE.TRUSTED_ADMIN which ensures that administrators
(U.LOCAL_ADMINISTRATOR and U.CENTRAL_ADMINISTRATOR) apply all guidance in a trusted manner.
O.AUDIT contributes to the threat coverage by providing audit data generation for all operations (including viewing
operations on TOE sensitive assets) performed by the administrators.
T.TSF_FAILURE
This threat is countered by O.SELF_TEST and OE.TOE_INTEGRITY, because they ensure that the integrity of the
software which enforces VPN security policies can be checked.
T.UNDETECTED_ACTIONS
This threat is covered by O.AUDIT, which requires the TOE to generate audit for security-relevant operations
performed by the TOE or concerning protected communication channels, and for actions performed by users.
OE_TRUSTED_NETWORKS contributes to the threat coverage by minimizing the attack surface to the black
network.
T.UNAUTHORISED_ACCESS
Regarding the threat concerning modification, it is countered:
- for D.SECURITY_POLICIES and D.CONFIG_PARAM:
- at configuration, by O.MANAGEMENT which requires that D.SECURITY_POLICIES and D.CONFIG_PARAM
can be modified by authorised entities only, that is E.SGC.
- when persistently stored, by O.LOCAL_DATA_PROTECTION which requires that D.SECURITY_POLICIES
and D.CONFIG_PARAM is protected against disclosure when it is persistently stored.
- for D.CRYPTO_KEY:
- at injection, by O.MANAGEMENT which requires that D.CRYPTO_KEY can be modified by authorised entities
only, that is E.SGC.
- when persistently stored, by O.LOCAL_DATA_PROTECTION which requires that unauthorised modification of
D.CRYPTO_KEY to be detected.
- for D.AUDIT:
- by O.AUDIT and O.AUDIT_PROTECTION which ensure that audit data modification (enforced by
O.AUDIT_PROTECTION) and audit data loss (enforced by O.AUDIT) can be detected by the receiver, associated
to OE.SGL_CONNECTION (for communications to E.SGL) and O.PROTECTED_COMMUNICATIONS (for
communications to E.SGC).
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Regarding the threat concerning disclosure, it is countered:
- for D.SECURITY_POLICIES, by O.VIEW which requires that VPN security policies and their contexts can be
viewed by authorised entities only, that is the administrator and E.SGC. O.POL_VIEW contributes to this security
objective by requiring the TOE to be able to display individually VPN security policies and their security contexts
upon each IP encryptor.
- for D.CONFIG_PARAM and D.AUTHENTICATION_DATA, by:
- O.LOCAL_DATA_PROTECTION which requires that unauthorised modification of D.CONFIG_PARAM and
D.AUTHENTICATION_DATA to be detected.
- and O.VIEW which requires that D.CONFIG_PARAM can be viewed by authorised entities only, that is the
administrator, the E.SGL and E.SGC.
- for D.CRYPTO_KEY when persistently stored, by O.LOCAL_DATA_PROTECTION which requires that
D.CRYPTO_KEY is protected against disclosure when it is persistently stored.
All those countermeasures rely upon the Identification & Authentication security objectives which are:
- O.I&A which requires the administrator to be authenticated before performing any management functions.
Protection of TOE local management communication is ensured through OE.SGL_CONNECTION.
O.AUTHENTICATION_FAILURE prevents brute force attacks on the authentication mechanism and
O.SESSION_LOCK prevents theft of an administrator session.
- O.I&A and O.PROTECTED_COMMUNICATIONS which require the E.SGC to be identified before performing
any management functions and the communication between E.SGC and the TOE to be a protected communication
channel (ensuring authentication and encryption) implemented between the TOE and another instance of the TOE.
- and O.ROLES which requires the TOE to distinguish three roles to implement the Identification & Authentication
security objective (O.I&A) : the administrator, the TOE local management device, the TOE management center
device.
Note: there is no authentication of the E.SGC. The E.SGC is part of the management center network which is
authenticated to the TOE through a protected communication channel (i.e. a VPN as for user traffic).
The following objectives also contribute to the threat coverage:
- O.SUPERVISION_IMPACT ensures that the TOE supervision service does not question sensitive assets
security.
- O.AUDIT ensures that operations (viewing, modification) performed on TOE sensitive assets as well as TOE
services uses are logged and that critical security events are generated to indicate TOE operational failures.
Therefore, they provide the capability to detect and process errors or attacks after an analysis of audit events and
security alarms.
- OE.TOE_INTEGRITY ensures the integrity check of the TOE hardware and software configuration.
- O.CRYPTO_REGULATION ensures that the TOE implements robust cryptographic mechanisms.
- OE.CEC_CRYPTO_REGULATION requires the CEC to meet ANSSI cryptographic guidance.
- O.POL_ENFORCEMENT requires filtering of data flow coming into the TOE network interfaces. It hardens
attacks exploiting protocol vulnerabilities.
T.UNAUTHORISED_UPDATE
O.SOFTWARE_UPDATES counters this threat by providing a cryptographic authentication mechanism.
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83051027-DDQ-TCS-FR-003
OE.SW_UPDATE_KEY contributes to the threat's coverage by requiring distinct software keys for distinct systems
T.USER_DATA_REUSE
This threat is countered by O.RESIDUAL_INFORMATION_CLEAR to ensure that no unused user data remains in
TOE's volatile memory.
It is also countered by O.POL_ENFORCEMENT which requires the TOE to systematically apply the VPN policies
when treating user data flow.
T.TIME_BASE
This threat is covered by the security objective O.TIME_BASE which ensures the time base reliability.
T.RESIDUAL_DATA
This threat is countered by :
- O.DATA_ERASURE which requires the TOE to provide a mechanism to securely erase stored data.
- O.LOCAL_DATA_PROTECTION which requires the TOE to protect persistently stored sensitive data.
4.3.2. ORGANISATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES (OSP)
P.CRYPTO_RGS
The OSP is entirely covered through the implementation of the security objective O.CRYPTO_REGULATION,
which uses the same words as the OSP.
O.CRYPTOPERIOD contributes to the coverage of the OSP by requiring the TOE to manage key lifetimes.
OE.CEC_CRYPTO_REGULATION contributes also by requiring the CEC to meet ANSSI cryptographic guidance.
P.PROVIDED_SERVICES
This OSP is covered by O.PROTECTED_COMMUNICATIONS which requires that the TOE provides security
services.
It is also covered by O.POL_ENFORCEMENT and O.FLOW_PARTITIONING which require that these security
services are enforced and provide the capability to partition IP flows.
O.AUDIT and OE.AUDIT_RECORD_SGC cover this OSP, because they ensure that operations concerning VPN
links are logged and that security critical events are generated to indicate operational failures. They so provide the
capability to detect and process errors or attacks after an analysis of audit events and security alarms.
This OSP is covered by O.SELF_TEST and OE.TOE_INTEGRITY, because they ensure that the integrity of the
software which enforces VPN security policies can be checked.
P.POL_VIEW
This OSP is covered by O.POL_VIEW, because it provides the viewing of VPN security policies on an individual
basis, which permits a security administrator to visually check that he defined correctly every VPN security policy.
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P.SUPERVISION
The OSP is entirely covered through the implementation of the security objective O.SUPERVISION, which uses the
same words as the OSP.
P.VISUAL_ALARMS
The OSP is entirely covered through the implementation of the security objective O.VISUAL_ALARMS, which uses
the same words as the OSP.
P.BANNER
The OSP is covered through the implementation of :
- the sending to the E.SGL of a banner just after its connection establishment (O.DISPLAY_BANNER), that the
E.LGL will display to the user,
- and the display of a banner by the E.SGC to the user (OE.DISPLAY_BANNER_SGC).
P.SA_SP_PROTECTION
The OSP is covered by O.LOCAL_DATA_PROTECTION which requires the TOE to be able to detect modification
of TSF Data, in particular of SAD and SPD.
P.KEYS_INJECTION
The OSP is covered by the security objective O.KEYS_INJECTION which requires the TOE :
- to check the integrity and authenticity of a key injected via the Command Line Interface before accepting it
- to decipher a key injected via the Command Line Interface before persistently storing it.
4.3.3. ASSUMPTIONS
A.NO_GENERAL_PURPOSE
The assumption is entirely covered through the implementation of the security objective for the environment
OE.LINUX_GUIDANCE.
A.PHYSICAL_ENVIRONMENT_TOE
The assumption is entirely covered through the implementation of the security objective for the environment
OE.PHYSICAL_ENVIRONMENT_TOE, which uses the same words as the assumption.
A.SW_PROTECTION
The assumption is entirely covered through the implementation of the security objective for the environment
OE.SW_PROTECTION, which uses the same words as the assumption.
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A.TRUSTED_ADMIN
The assumption is entirely covered through the implementation of the security objective for the environment
OE.TRUSTED_ADMIN, which uses the same words as the assumption.
A.TRUSTED_NETWORKS
The assumption is entirely covered through the implementation of the security objective for the environment
OE.TRUSTED_NETWORKS, which uses the same words as the assumption.
A.CONFIGURATION_CONTROL
The assumption is upheld by OE.TOE_INTEGRITY.
A.ALARM
The assumption is entirely covered through the implementation of the security objective for the environment
OE.ALARM, which uses the same words as the assumption.
A.POLICIES_CONTINUITY
The assumption is entirely covered through the implementation of the security objective for the environment
OE.POLICIES_CONTINUITY, which uses the same words as the assumption.
A.SECURED_MANAGEMENT_DEVICES
The assumption is entirely covered through the implementation of the security objectives for the environment
OE.SECURED_SGC, OE.SECURED_SGL, OE.SECURED_FPD, OE.SECURED_CEC and
OE.SECURED_NTP_SERVER.
A.ACCESS_CONTROL_MANAGEMENT_DEVICES
The assumption is entirely covered through the implementation of the security objectives for the environment
OE.ACCESS_CONTROL_SGC, OE.ACCESS_CONTROL_SF, OE.ACCESS_CONTROL_SGL,
OE.ACCESS_CONTROL_FPD, OE.ACCESS_CONTROL_NTP_SERVER and OE.ACCESS_CONTROL_CEC.
A.PHYSICAL_ENVIRONMENT_MANAGEMENT_DEVICES
The assumption is covered through the implementation of the security objectives for the environment
OE.PHYSICAL_ENVIRONMENT_SGC, OE.PHYSICAL_ENVIRONMENT_SF,
OE.PHYSICAL_ENVIRONMENT_SGL, OE.PHYSICAL_ENVIRONMENT_NTP_SERVER,
OE.NTP_SERVER_LOCATION, OE.PHYSICAL_ENVIRONMENT_FPD and
OE.PHYSICAL_ENVIRONMENT_CEC.
The security objective OE.TOE_TRANSPORTATION comes in order to add security in depth because TOE
physical security during TOE carriage from a site to another may not be as high as when the TOE is in used and
installed in a site.
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A.AUDIT
The assumption is entirely covered through the implementation of the three security objectives for the environment
OE.AUDIT_RECORD_SGC, OE.AUDIT_ANALYSIS and OE.AUDIT_MNGT, which use the same words as the
assumption.
A.SGC_TO_FRONT-END
The assumption is entirely covered through the implementation of the security objective for the environment
OE.SGC_TO_FRONT-END, which uses the same words as the assumption.
A.STAND_ALONE_CEC
The assumption is entirely covered through the implementation of the security objective for the environment
OE.STAND_ALONE_CEC, which uses the same words as the assumption.
A.KEY_TRANSPORTATION
The assumption is entirely covered through the implementation of the security objective for the environment
OE.KEYS_TRANSPORTATION, which uses the same words as the assumption.
A.CEC_CRYPTO_REGULATION
The assumption is entirely covered through the implementation of the security objective for the environment
OE.CEC_CRYPTO_REGULATION, which uses the same words as the assumption.
4.3.4. TABLES
Threats Security objectives
T.ADMIN_ERROR O.AUDIT
OE.TRUSTED_ADMIN
T.TSF_FAILURE O.SELF_TEST
OE.TOE_INTEGRITY
T.UNDETECTED_ACTIONS O.AUDIT
OE.TRUSTED_NETWORKS
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Threats Security objectives
T.UNAUTHORISED_ACCESS O.PROTECTED_COMMUNICATIONS
O.ROLES
O.AUDIT
O.I&A
O.SESSION_LOCK
O.POL_ENFORCEMENT
O.MANAGEMENT
O.VIEW
O.CRYPTO_REGULATION
O.SUPERVISION_IMPACT
O.AUDIT_PROTECTION
O.AUTHENTICATION_FAILURE
O.LOCAL_DATA_PROTECTION
OE.TOE_INTEGRITY
O.POL_VIEW
OE.SGL_CONNECTION
OE.CEC_CRYPTO_REGULATION
T.UNAUTHORISED_UPDATE O.SOFTWARE_UPDATES
OE.SW_UPDATE_KEY
T.USER_DATA_REUSE O.RESIDUAL_INFORMATION_CLEAR
O.POL_ENFORCEMENT
T.TIME_BASE O.TIME_BASE
T.RESIDUAL_DATA O.DATA_ERASURE
O.LOCAL_DATA_PROTECTION
OSP Security objectives
P.CRYPTO_RGS O.CRYPTO_REGULATION
O.CRYPTOPERIOD
OE.CEC_CRYPTO_REGULATION
P.PROVIDED_SERVICES O.PROTECTED_COMMUNICATIONS
O.AUDIT
O.SELF_TEST
O.POL_ENFORCEMENT
O.FLOW_PARTITIONING
OE.AUDIT_RECORD_SGC
OE.TOE_INTEGRITY
P.POL_VIEW O.POL_VIEW
P.SUPERVISION O.SUPERVISION
P.VISUAL_ALARMS O.VISUAL_ALARMS
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83051027-DDQ-TCS-FR-003
OSP Security objectives
P.BANNER O.DISPLAY_BANNER
OE.DISPLAY_BANNER_SGC
P.SA_SP_PROTECTION O.LOCAL_DATA_PROTECTION
P.KEYS_INJECTION O.KEYS_INJECTION
Assumptions Security objectives
A.NO_GENERAL_PURPOSE OE.LINUX_GUIDANCE
A.PHYSICAL_ENVIRONMENT_TOE OE.PHYSICAL_ENVIRONMENT_TOE
A.SW_PROTECTION OE.SW_PROTECTION
A.TRUSTED_ADMIN OE.TRUSTED_ADMIN
A.TRUSTED_NETWORKS OE.TRUSTED_NETWORKS
A.CONFIGURATION_CONTROL OE.TOE_INTEGRITY
A.ALARM OE.ALARM
A.POLICIES_CONTINUITY OE.POLICIES_CONTINUITY
A.SECURED_MANAGEMENT_DEVICES OE.SECURED_SGC
OE.SECURED_SGL
OE.SECURED_CEC
OE.SECURED_FPD
OE.SECURED_NTP_SERVER
A.ACCESS_CONTROL_MANAGEMENT_DEVICES OE.ACCESS_CONTROL_SGC
OE.ACCESS_CONTROL_SGL
OE.ACCESS_CONTROL_CEC
OE.ACCESS_CONTROL_SF
OE.ACCESS_CONTROL_FPD
OE.ACCESS_CONTROL_NTP_SERVER
A.PHYSICAL_ENVIRONMENT_MANAGEMENT_DEVICES OE.PHYSICAL_ENVIRONMENT_SGC
OE.PHYSICAL_ENVIRONMENT_SGL
OE.PHYSICAL_ENVIRONMENT_CEC
OE.NTP_SERVER_LOCATION
OE.TOE_TRANSPORTATION
OE.PHYSICAL_ENVIRONMENT_SF
OE.PHYSICAL_ENVIRONMENT_FPD
OE.PHYSICAL_ENVIRONMENT_NTP_SERVER
A.AUDIT OE.AUDIT_RECORD_SGC
OE.AUDIT_ANALYSIS
OE.AUDIT_MNGT
A.SGC_TO_FRONT-END OE.SGC_TO_FRONT-END
A.STAND_ALONE_CEC OE.STAND_ALONE_CEC
A.KEY_TRANSPORTATION OE.KEY_TRANSPORTATION
A.CEC_CRYPTO_REGULATION OE.CEC_CRYPTO_REGULATION
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approval.
83051027-DDQ-TCS-FR-003
5. EXTENDED SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
5.1. ETENDED FAMILIES
5.1.1. FCS_RBG_EXT - RANDOM BIT GENERATION
5.1.1.1. Definition
The extended family FCS_RBG_EXT is drawn from [ND_PP].
Family Behaviour
This family FCS_RBG_EXT (Random Bit Generation) extends the functional class FCS with the capability to
generate random bits.
Component levelling
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Random Bit Generation, requires that the TSF has the capability to generate random bits in
conformance to a specified standard.
Management: FCS_RBG_EXT.1
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: FCS_RBG_EXT.1
The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security audit data generation is included in the PP/ST:
a) Minimal: Failure of the randomization process.
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Security. They cannot be reproduced, disclosed or used without the company's prior written
approval.
83051027-DDQ-TCS-FR-003
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 RANDOM BIT GENERATION
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FCS_RBG_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall perform all random bit generation (RBG) services in accordance with
[selection, choose one of: NIST Special Publication 800-90 using [selection: Hash_DRBG (any),
HMAC_DRBG (any), CTR_DRBG (AES), Dual_EC_DRBG (any)]; FIPS Pub 140-2 Annex C: X9.31 Appendix
2.4 using AES] seeded by an entropy source that accumulated entropy from [selection, one or both of: a
software-based noise source; a TSF-hardware-based noise source].
FCS_RBG_EXT.1.2 The deterministic RBG shall be seeded with a minimum of [selection, choose one of:
128 bits, 256 bits] of entropy at least equal to the greatest bit length of the keys and authorization factors
that it will generate.
5.1.1.2. Rationale
The extended family FCS_RBG_EXT is drawn from [ND_PP].
This family was defined because part 2 of [CC] does not contain any SFR which allow to generate random bits.
5.1.2. FPT_SIE_EXT - SECURITY INFORMATION ERASURE
5.1.2.1. Definition
Family Behaviour
This family FPT_SIE_EXT (Security Information Erasure) extends the functional class FPT with the capability to
erase and make unavailable TSF data stored within the TOE.
Component levelling
FPT_SIE_EXT.1 Subset information erasure, requires that the TSF ensure that a defined subset of TSF data is
made unavailable after a list of actions occurs.
FPT_SIE_EXT.2 Complete information erasure, requires that the TSF ensure that all TSF data is made unavailable
after a list of actions occurs.
Management: FPT_SIE_EXT.1, FPT_SIE_EXT.2
There are no management activities foreseen.
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préalable.
This document and any data included are the property of THALES Communications &
Security. They cannot be reproduced, disclosed or used without the company's prior written
approval.
83051027-DDQ-TCS-FR-003
Audit: FPT_SIE_EXT.1, FPT_SIE_EXT.2
The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security audit data generation is included in the PP/ST:
a) Minimal: Success or failure of the activity.
FPT_SIE_EXT.1 SUBSET INFORMATION ERASURE
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT_SIE_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall ensure that [assignment: parts of TSF data] are made unavailable after
[assignment: list of actions].
FPT_SIE_EXT.2 COMPLETE INFORMATION ERASURE
Hierarchical to: FPT_SIE_EXT.1 Subset information erasure.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT_SIE_EXT.2.1 The TSF shall ensure that TSF data is made unavailable after [assignment: list of
actions].
5.1.2.2. Rationale
This family was defined because part 2 of [CC] does not contain any SFR which makes unavailable after an
erasure TSF data stored within the TOE.
5.1.3. FCS_IPS_EXT - IPSEC
The extended family FCS_IPS_EXT is drawn from [ND_PP].
5.1.3.1. Definition
Family Behaviour
This family FCS_IPS_EXT (IPSec) extends the functional class FCS with the capability to specify the cryptographic
algorithms used within IPSec and IKE protocols.
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Security. They cannot be reproduced, disclosed or used without the company's prior written
approval.
83051027-DDQ-TCS-FR-003
Component levelling
FCS_IPS_EXT.1 IPSec, requires the TSF to meet specifed cryptographic algorithms when implementing IPSec and
IKE protocols.
Management: FCS_IPS_EXT.1
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: FCS_IPS_EXT.1
There are no auditable events foreseen.
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Security. They cannot be reproduced, disclosed or used without the company's prior written
approval.
83051027-DDQ-TCS-FR-003
FCS_IPS_EXT.1 IPSEC
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic
operation
FCS_IPS_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall implement the IPsec protocol ESP as defined by RFC 4303 using the
cryptographic algorithms AES-CBC-128, AES-CBC-256 (both specified by RFC 3602), [selection: no other
algorithms, AES-GCM-128, AES-GCM-256 as specified in RFC 4106], and using [selection, choose at least
one of: IKEv1 as defined in RFCs 2407, 2408, 2409, RFC 4109, and [selection: no other RFCs for hash
functions, RFC 4868 for hash functions]; IKEv2 as defined in RFCs 5996 (with mandatory support for NAT
traversal as specified in section 2.23), 4307, and [selection: no other RFCs for hash functions, RFC 4868 for
hash functions]].
FCS_IPS_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall ensure that IKEv1 Phase 1 exchanges use only main mode.
FCS_IPS_EXT.1.3 The TSF shall ensure that IKEv1 SA lifetimes are able to be limited to 24 hours for Phase
1 SAs and 8 hours for Phase 2 SAs.
FCS_IPS_EXT.1.4 The TSF shall ensure that IKEv1 SA lifetimes are able to be limited to [assignment:
number between 100 - 200] MB of traffic for Phase 2 SAs.
FCS_IPS_EXT.1.5 The TSF shall ensure that all IKE protocols implement DH Groups 14 (2048-bit MODP),
and [selection: 24 (2048-bit MODP with 256-bit POS), 19 (256-bit Random ECP), 20 (384-bit Random ECP),
[assignment: other DH groups that are implemented by the TOE], no other DH groups].
FCS_IPS_EXT.1.6 The TSF shall ensure that all IKE protocols implement Peer Authentication using the
[selection: DSA, rDSA, ECDSA] algorithm.
FCS_IPS_EXT.1.7 The TSF shall support the use of pre-shared keys (as referenced in the RFCs) for use in
authenticating its IPsec connections.
FCS_IPS_EXT.1.8 The TSF shall support the following:
– Pre-shared keys shall be able to be composed of any combination of upper and lower case letters,
numbers, and special characters [selection: “!”, “@”, “#”, “$”, “%”, “^”, “&”, “*”, “(“, “)” [assignment:
other characters]];
– Pre-shared keys of 22 characters and [selection: [assignment: other supported lengths], no other
lengths].
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Security. They cannot be reproduced, disclosed or used without the company's prior written
approval.
83051027-DDQ-TCS-FR-003
5.1.3.2. Rationale
This family was defined because part 2 of [CC] does not contain any SFR which allows to specify cryptographic
algorithms used by IPSec and IKE protocols.
5.1.4. FIA_UIA_EXT - IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION
The extended component FIA_UIA_EXT.1 is drawn from [ND_PP].
5.1.4.1. Definition
Family Behaviour
The family FIA_UIA_EXT (Identification and Authentication) extends the functional class FIA with the capability to
identify and authenticate a user.
Component levelling
FIA_UIA_EXT.1 User Identification and Authentication, requires to allow some actions before requiring user
identification and authentication.
Management: FIA_UIA_EXT.1
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:
a) All use of the authentication mechanism.
Audit: FIA_UIA_EXT.1
The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security audit data generation is included in the PP/ST:
a) Minimal: All use of the authentication mechanism.
FIA_UIA_EXT.1 USER IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FTA_TAB.1 Default TOE Access Banners
FIA_UIA_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall allow the following actions prior to requiring the non-TOE entity to initiate
the identification and authentication process:
– Display the warning banner in accordance with FTA_TAB.1;
– [selection: no other actions, [assignment: list of services, actions performed by the TSF in response to
non-TOE requests.]]
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83051027-DDQ-TCS-FR-003
FIA_UIA_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall require each administrative user to be successfully identified and
authenticated before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that administrative user.
5.1.4.2. Rationale
This family was defined because part 2 of [CC] does not contain any SFR which allows to specify identification and
authentication of a user in the same SFR.
5.1.5. FIA_PMG_EXT - PASSWORD MANAGEMENT
The extended family FIA_PMG_EXT is drawn from [ND_PP].
5.1.5.1. Definition
Family Behaviour
The family FIA_PMG_EXT (Password Management) extends the functional class FIA with the capability to
management password-based authentication mechanism.
Component levelling
FIA_PMG_EXT.1 Pass management, provides the TSF with password management capabilities.
Management: FIA_PMG_EXT.1
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: FIA_PMG_EXT.1
There are no auditable events foreseen.
FIA_PMG_EXT.1 PASSWORD MANAGEMENT
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FIA_PMG_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall provide the following password management capabilities for
administrative passwords:
– Passwords shall be able to be composed of any combination of upper and lower case letters, numbers,
and the following special characters: [selection: “!”, “@”, “#”, “$”, “%”, “^”, “&”, “*”, “(“, “)”,
[assignment: other characters]]
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83051027-DDQ-TCS-FR-003
– Minimum password length shall settable by the Security Administrator, and support passwords of 15
characters or greater;
5.1.5.2. Rationale
This component was defined because part 2 of [CC] does not contain any SFR which allows managing password-
based authentication mechanisms.
5.1.6. FPT_SKP_EXT - PROTECTION OF TSF DATA (FOR READING OF ALL SENSITIVE
KEYS)
The extended family FPT_SKP_EXT is drawn from [ND_PP].
5.1.6.1. Definition
Family Behaviour
The family FPT_SKP_EXT (Protection of TSF Data) extends the functional class FPT with the capability to prevent
reading secret and private keys.
Component levelling
FPT_SKP_EXT.1 Protection of TSF Data, requires the TSF to prevent reading secret and private keys.
Management: FPT_SKP_EXT.1
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: FPT_SKP_EXT.1
There are no auditable events foreseen.
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approval.
83051027-DDQ-TCS-FR-003
FPT_SKP_EXT.1 PROTECTION OF TSF DATA (FOR READING OF ALL SENSTIVE KEYS)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT_SKP_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall prevent reading of all pre-shared keys, symmetric keys, and private keys.
5.1.6.2. Rationale
This family was defined because part 2 of [CC] does not contain any SFR which specifically allows preventing
reading secret and private keys.
5.1.7. FPT_APW_EXT - PROTECTION OF PASSWORDS
The extended family FPT_APW_EXT is drawn from [ND_PP].
5.1.7.1. Definition
Family Behaviour
This family FPT_APW_EXT (Protection of passwords) extends the functional class FPT with the capability to
protect authentication data during their storage.
Component levelling
FPT_APW_EXT.1 Protection of password, requires the TSF to protect authentication data during their storage.
Management: FPT_APW_EXT.1
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: FPT_APW_EXT.1
There are no auditable events foreseen.
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83051027-DDQ-TCS-FR-003
FPT_APW_EXT.1 PROTECTION OF PASSWORDS
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT_APW_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall store passwords in non-plaintext form.
FPT_APW_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall prevent the reading of plaintext passwords.
5.1.7.2. Rationale
This family was defined because part 2 of [CC] does not contain any SFR which specifically allows protecting
authentication data during their storage.
5.1.8. FPT_TUD_EXT - TRUSTED UPDATE
The extended family FPT_TUD_EXT is drawn from [ND_PP].
5.1.8.1. Definition
Family Behaviour
This family FPT_TUD_EXT (Trusted Update) extends the functional class FPT with the capability to update TSF
firmware/software parts.
Component levelling
FPT_TUD_EXT.1 Trusted Update, requires the TSF to provide a trusted firmware/software update mechanism.
Management: FPT_TUD_EXT.1
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: FPT_TUD_EXT.1
The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security audit data generation is included in the PP/ST:
a) Minimal: Initiation of update.
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83051027-DDQ-TCS-FR-003
FPT_TUD_EXT.1 TRUSTED UPDATE
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall provide security administrators the ability to query the current version of
the TOE firmware/software.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall provide security administrators the ability to initiate updates to TOE
firmware/software.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.3 The TSF shall provide a means to verify firmware/software updates to the TOE using a
[selection: digital signature mechanism, published hash] prior to installing those updates.
5.1.8.2. Rationale
This family was defined because part 2 of [CC] does not contain any SFR which allows specifying requirements
about trusted firmware/software update.
5.1.9. FPT_SDP_EXT - STORED TSF DATA PROTECTION
5.1.9.1. Definition
Family Behaviour
This family FPT_SDP_EXT (Stored TSF Data Protection) extends the functional class FPT with the capability to
protect TSF data in confidentiality and/or integrity while it is stored within containers controlled by the TSF.
Component levelling
FPT_SDP_EXT.1 Stored TSF Data protection capability, requires that the TSF protect TSF data from disclosure
and/or alteration while it is stored within containers controlled by the TSF.
FPT_SDP_EXT.2 Stored TSF Data protection capability and action, adds the additional capability to the fist
component by allowing for actions to be taken as a result of an error detection..
Management: FPT_SDP_EXT.1, FPT_SDP_EXT.2
There are no management activities foreseen.
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83051027-DDQ-TCS-FR-003
Audit: FPT_SDP_EXT.1, FPT_SDP_EXT.2
The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security audit data generation is included in the PP/ST:
a) Minimal: Success or failure of integrity check of TSF data.
FPT_SDP_EXT.1 STORED TSF DATA PROTECTION CAPABILITY
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT_SDP_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall protect [assignment: list of TSF data] stored in containers controlled by
the TSF from [selection: disclosure, none] and shall detect [selection: integrity errors, none] on those data.
FPT_SDP_EXT.2 STORED TSF DATA PROTECTION CAPABILITY AND ACTION
Hierarchical to: FPT_SDP_EXT.1 Stored TSF data protection capability.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT_SDP_EXT.2.1 The TSF shall protect [assignment: list of TSF data] stored in containers controlled by
the TSF from [selection: disclosure, none] and shall detect [selection: integrity errors, none] on those data.
FPT_SDP_EXT.2.2 Upon detection of a data integrity error, the TSF shall [assignment: action to be taken].
5.1.9.2. Rationale
This family was defined because part 2 of [CC] does not contain any SFR which requires protection of TSF data
stored within the TOE.
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83051027-DDQ-TCS-FR-003
5.2. EXTENDED COMPONENTS
5.2.1. FAU_GEN_EXT.3 - EXTERNAL MEANS
5.2.1.1. Definition
Family Behaviour
Cf. part 2 [CC].
The family FAU_GEN is extended with the new component FAU_GEN_EXT.3 which provides the capability to the
TSF to indicate to a user through a visual or sounding mean that an (or a list of) event(s) has occurred.
Component levelling
FAU_GEN_EXT.3 External means, requires to indicate to users through a visual mean that a specified list of
events have occurred.
Management: FAU_GEN_EXT.3
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: FAU_GEN_EXT.3
There are no auditable events foreseen.
FAU_GEN_EXT.3 EXTERNAL MEANS
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FAU_GEN.1 Audit Data Generation
FAU_GEN_EXT.3.1 The TSF shall indicate to the user through a visual or a sounding mean when
[assignment : list of events] occur(s).
5.2.1.2. Rationale
This component was defined because part 2 of [CC] does not contain any SFR which allows indicating through a
visual mean that specific events occurred. For the TOE described in this ST it was necessary to provide such
capability.
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83051027-DDQ-TCS-FR-003
5.2.2. FTA_SSL_EXT.1 - TSF-INITIATED SESSION LOCKING
The extended component FTA_SSL_EXT.1 is drawn from [ND_PP].
5.2.2.1. Definition
Family Behaviour
Cf. part 2 [CC].
The component FTA_SSL.1 is extended with the capability to the TSF to configure the time period of inactivity.
Component levelling
FTA_SSL_EXT.1 TSF-initiated Session Locking, requires TSF-initiated of a user session locking after a configured
time period of user inactivity.
Management: FTA_SSL_EXT.1
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:
a) Time period of user inactivity.
Audit: FTA_SSL_EXT.1
The following actions should be auditable if FTA_SSL_EXT.1 TSF-initiated Session Locking is included in the
PP/ST:
a) Minimal: Locking of an interactive session by the session locking mechanism.
FTA_SSL_EXT.1 TSF-INITIATED SESSION LOCKING
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FTA_SSL_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall, for local interactive sessions, [selection:
– lock the session - disable any activity of the user’s data access/display devices other than unlocking
the session, and requiring that the administrator re-authenticate to the TSF prior to unlocking the
session;
– terminate the session]
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83051027-DDQ-TCS-FR-003
after a Security Administrator-specified time period of inactivity.
5.2.2.2. Rationale
This component was defined to detail usage of the FTA_SSL.1 component of part 2 of [CC] within the [ND_PP].
5.2.3. FAU_STG_EXT.1 - EXTERNAL AUDIT TRAIL STORAGE
The extended component FAU_STG_EXT.1 is drawn from [ND_PP].
5.2.3.1. Definition
Family Behaviour
Cf. part 2 [CC].
The component FAU_STG.1 is extended with the capability to the TSF to send audit trail to an external storage.
Management: FAU_STG_EXT.1
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:
a) Managing key lifetime value.
Audit: FAU_STG_EXT.1
There are no auditable events foreseen.
FAU_STG_EXT.1 EXTERNAL AUDIT TRAIL STORAGE
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation, FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel
FAU_STG_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall be able to [selection: transmit the generated audit data to an external IT
entity, receive and store audit data from an external IT entity] using a trusted channel implementing the
[selection: IPsec, SSH, TLS, TLS/HTTPS] protocol.
5.2.3.2. Rationale
This component was defined because part 2 of [CC] does not contain any SFR which allows transmitting audit trail
to an external storage capability. For the TOE described in this ST it was necessary to provide such capability.
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Security. They cannot be reproduced, disclosed or used without the company's prior written
approval.
83051027-DDQ-TCS-FR-003
5.2.4. FAU_STG_EXT.3 - ACTION IN CASE OF LOSS OF AUDIT SERVER CONNECTIVITY
5.2.4.1. Definition
Family Behaviour
Cf. part 2 [CC].
The component FAU_STG.3 is extended with the capability to the TSF to take actions when audit trail are lost that
is in case of loss of external link connectivity.
Management: FAU_STG_EXT.3
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: FAU_STG_EXT.3
The following actions should be auditable if FAU_STG_EXT.3 Action in Case of Loss of Audit Server Connectivity
is included in the PP/ST:
a) Minimal: Loss of connectivity.
FAU_STG_EXT.3 ACTION IN CASE OF LOSS OF AUDIT SERVER CONNECTIVITY
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FAU_STG_EXT.1 External audit trail storage
FAU_STG_EXT.3.1 The TSF shall [assignment: action] if the link to the external IT entity collecting the audit
data generated by the TOE is not available.
5.2.4.2. Rationale
FAU_STG_EXT.3 was extended in order to be consistent with FAU_STG_EXT.1.
5.2.5. FIA_UAU_EXT.2 - PASSWORD-BASED AUTHENTICATION MECHANISM
The extended component FIA_UAU_EXT.2 is drawn from [ND_PP].
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Security. They cannot be reproduced, disclosed or used without the company's prior written
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83051027-DDQ-TCS-FR-003
5.2.5.1. Definition
Family Behaviour
The family FIA_UAU is extended with the new component FIA_UAU_EXT.2 to explicitly specify a password-based
authentication mechanism and its constraint on password change.
Component levelling
FIA_UAU_EXT.2 Password-based Authentication Mechanism, requires to use a password-based authentication
mechanism and explicitly specify its constraint on password change.
Management: FIA_UAU_EXT.2
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: FIA_UAU_EXT.2
The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security audit data generation is included in the PP/ST:
a) Minimal: All use of the authentication mechanism.
FIA_UAU_EXT.2 PASSWORD-BASED AUTHENTICATION MECHANISM
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FIA_UAU_EXT.2.1 The TSF shall provide a local password-based authentication mechanism, [selection:
[assignment: other authentication mechanism(s)], none] to perform administrative user authentication.
5.2.5.2. Rationale
This component was defined because part 2 of [CC] does not contain any SFR explicitly concerning password-
based authentication mechanism.
5.2.6. FCS_CKM_EXT.4 - CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY ZEROIZATION
The extended component FCS_CKM_EXT.4 is drawn from [ND_PP].
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83051027-DDQ-TCS-FR-003
5.2.6.1. Definition
Family Behaviour
Cf. part 2 [CC].
The family FCS_CKM is extended with the new component FCS_CKM_EXT.4 which provides the capability to
zeroise cryptographic keys.
Component levelling
FCS_CKM_EXT.4 Cryptographic Key Zeroization, requires to zeroise cryptographic keys when no longer required
Management: FCS_CKM_EXT.4
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: FCS_CKM_EXT.4
The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security audit data generation is included in the PP/ST:
a) Minimal: Success and failure of the activity, the object attribute(s), and object value(s) excluding any
sensitive information (e.g. secret or private keys).
FCS_CKM_EXT.4 CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY ZEROIZATION
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of
user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM_EXT.4.1 The TSF shall zeroize all plaintext secret and private cryptographic keys and CSPs
when no longer required.
5.2.6.2. Rationale
This component was defined to require any cryptographic keys to be zeroised.
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Security. They cannot be reproduced, disclosed or used without the company's prior written
approval.
83051027-DDQ-TCS-FR-003
5.2.7. FCS_CKM_EXT.5 - CRYTOGRAPHIC KEY LIFETIME
5.2.7.1. Definition
Family Behaviour
Cf. part 2 [CC].
The family FCS_CKM is extended with the new component FCS_CKM_EXT.5 which provide the capability to the
TSF to manage and monitor key lifetime.
Component levelling
FCS_CKM_EXT.5 Cryptographic key lifetime, requires to specify and monitor cryptographic key lifetime.
Management: FCS_CKM_EXT.5
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:
a) Managing key lifetime value.
Audit: FCS_CKM_EXT.5
The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security audit data generation is included in the PP/ST:
a) Minimal: expiration of a cryptographic key.
b) Basic: The object attribute(s), and object value(s) excluding any sensitive information (e.g. secret or private
keys).
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83051027-DDQ-TCS-FR-003
FCS_CKM_EXT.5 KEY CRYPTOPERIOD
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation or FDP_ITC.1 Import of User Data
Without Security Attributes or FDP_ITC.2 Import of User Data With Security Attributes], FCS_CKM.4
Cryptographic key destruction, FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps
FCS_CKM_EXT.5.1 The TSF shall manage [selection : an expiration date and time, a cryptoperiod, other]
for [assignment : list of cryptographic keys].
FCS_CKM_EXT.5.2 The TSF shall calculate the key(s) lifetime from [selection: key generation, key first use,
other].
FCS_CKM_EXT.5.3 The TSF shall [assignment : list of actions] after the key(s) has(have) expired.
5.2.7.2. Rationale
This component was defined because part 2 of [CC] does not contain any SFR which allows specifying a lifetime
for cryptographic keys. For the TOE described in this ST it was necessary to provide such capability.
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83051027-DDQ-TCS-FR-003
6. SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
6.1. SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS
6.1.1. TERMS USED WITHIN SFRS
6.1.1.1. External Entities
Quite all subjects used within SFRs are defined previously in section "Security Problem Definition".
Subjects that are not defined in that section are:
– Remote (instance of the) TOE: it is a remote TOE with which the TOE described through the SFRs
communicates.
– Network Device on the WAN: it is any network device connected to the network which is not the TOE nor a
Remote TOE.
6.1.1.2. Objects et Informations
Objects and Information used within the SFRs are defined previously in section "Security Problem Definition"
(section 3.1 Assets).
6.1.1.3. Security Attributes
Security attributes used within the SFRs are:
For IP datagrams :
datagram protocol type
datagram protocol version
datagram topologic data (i.e. source and destination IP addresses)
datagram IPSec protection mode
For NTP datagrams :
datagram protocol type
datagram protocol version
datagram topologic data (i.e. source and destination IP addresses)
For the TOE plaintext and cipher interfaces :
TOE main IP address
For cryptographic keys :
key identifier,
key type,
key lifetime (for symmetric keys only),
key value
6.1.1.4. Operations
Operations used or described within the SFRs are:
– equipment (TOE) Start-up
– Full erasure
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83051027-DDQ-TCS-FR-003
– CH interface parameters erasure
– equipment (TOE) Shutdown
– Emission of security events (FAU_SEG.1)
– Parameter query (i.e. read access)
– Password modification
– TSF Data configuration
– TSF Software upgrade
– Ciphering / Deciphering of
•
•
•
• IP datagram
•
•
•
• Sensitive TSF Data
•
•
•
• Sensitive User Data
– Computing and verification of authentication pattern of
•
•
•
• IP Datagram
•
•
•
• Sensitive TSF Data
•
•
•
• Sensitive User Data
– Deciphering of
•
•
•
• TOE software
•
•
•
• Injected IKE Peer Authentication PSK
– Verification of authentication pattern of
•
•
•
• TOE software
•
•
•
• Injected IKE Peer Authentication PSK
– Processing (i.e. filtering and cryptographic operations) of information coming in CH and CL interfaces
6.1.2. AUDIT
FAU_GEN.1 - AUDIT DATA GENERATION
FAU_GEN.1.1
The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the following auditable events:
a) Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions;
b) All auditable events for the basic level of audit;
c) All administrative actions;
d) and all auditable events listed in the table below (by default event is NORMAL-severity, otherwise its
severity is mentionned)
SFR Auditable events (drawn from CC Part
2)
Interpretation regarding the TOE
FAU_GEN.1 There are no auditable events foreseen. NO GENERATED AUDIT DATA
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83051027-DDQ-TCS-FR-003
SFR Auditable events (drawn from CC Part
2)
Interpretation regarding the TOE
FAU_GEN.2 There are no auditable events foreseen. NO GENERATED AUDIT DATA
FAU_GEN_EXT.3 There are no auditable events foreseen. NO GENERATED AUDIT DATA
FAU_STG_EXT.1 There are no auditable events foreseen. NO GENERATED AUDIT DATA
FAU_STG_EXT.3 Loss of connectivity. Loss of connectivity to the remote instance of the TOE in
front of the E.SGC. (ALARM)
FPT_STM.1 Changes to the time Change to the time due to NTP synchronisation
Change to the time due to configuration command
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Failure of the randomization process Failure of the randomization process (ALARM)
FCS_CKM.3/keyRenewal Success and failure of the activity
The object attribute(s), and object
value(s) excluding any sensitive
information (e.g. secret or private keys).
Success and failure of a key renewal
The event log shall include the key type (IKEv1 Phase 1
key, …), the SPI of the associated SA
FCS_CKM_EXT.4/anyPlainTextData Success and failure of the activity
The object attribute(s), and object
value(s) excluding any sensitive
information (e.g. secret or private keys).
Success and failure of key erasure.
The event log shall include the key identifier, the key type
(IKEv1 Phase 1 key, …), the SPI of the associated SA
FCS_CKM_EXT.5/pskDistribMode Expiration of a cryptographic key
The object attribute(s), and object
value(s) excluding any sensitive
information (e.g. secret or private keys).
Almost expiration of PSK (of distributed mode)
Expiration of PSK (of distributed mode) (ALARM)
The event log shall include the key identifier, the SPI of all
impacted SAs
FCS_CKM_EXT.5/deriv-
pskDistribMode
Expiration of a cryptographic key
The object attribute(s), and object
value(s) excluding any sensitive
information (e.g. secret or private keys).
Almost expiration of PSK derivated key (of distributed
mode)
Expiration of PSK derivated key (of distributed mode)
(ALARM)
The event log shall include the key identifier, the SPI of all
impacted SAs
FCS_CKM_EXT.5/pskIKE Expiration of a cryptographic key
The object attribute(s), and object
value(s) excluding any sensitive
information (e.g. secret or private keys).
Almost expiration of PSK (of negociated mode)
Expiration of PSK (of negociated mode) (ALARM)
The event log shall include the key identifier, the SPI of all
impacted SAs
FCS_CKM_EXT.5/ikeV2SA Expiration of a cryptographic key
The object attribute(s), and object
value(s) excluding any sensitive
information (e.g. secret or private keys).
NO GENERATED AUDIT DATA
Rationale : expiration of a negociated IKE key is not
required to be logged as it could saturate the audit data
and the network link between the TOE and the TOE
management centre.
FCS_CKM_EXT.5/ikeV2childSA Expiration of a cryptographic key
The object attribute(s), and object
value(s) excluding any sensitive
information (e.g. secret or private keys).
NO GENERATED AUDIT DATA
Rationale : expiration of a negociated IKE key is not
required to be logged as it could saturate the audit data
and the network link between the TOE and the TOE
management centre.
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83051027-DDQ-TCS-FR-003
SFR Auditable events (drawn from CC Part
2)
Interpretation regarding the TOE
FPT_SIE_EXT.1/allPlainTextData Success or failure of the activity Success of keys erasure operation
Failure of keys erasure operation (ALARM)
An event log per key shall be generated.
FCS_COP.1/aes-cbc Success and failure, and the type of
cryptographic operation
Any applicable cryptographic mode(s) of
operation, subject attributes and object
attributes.
Failure of the cryptographic operation (ALARM)
Rationale: this cryptographic operation is used to protect
and unprotect IP datagram. Successful of the operation is
not required to be logged as it would saturate the audit
data and the network link between the TOE and the TOE
management centre.
FCS_COP.1/aes-gcm Success and failure, and the type of
cryptographic operation
Any applicable cryptographic mode(s) of
operation, subject attributes and object
attributes.
Failure of the cryptographic operation (ALARM)
Rationale: this cryptographic operation is used to protect
and unprotect IP datagram. Successful of the operation is
not required to be logged as it would saturate the audit
data and the network link between the TOE and the TOE
management centre.
FCS_COP.1/aes-xcbc Success and failure, and the type of
cryptographic operation
Any applicable cryptographic mode(s) of
operation, subject attributes and object
attributes.
Failure of the cryptographic operation (ALARM)
Rationale: this cryptographic operation is used to protect
and unprotect IP datagram. Successful of the operation is
not required to be logged as it would saturate the audit
data and the network link between the TOE and the TOE
management centre.
FCS_COP.1/aes-cbcSw Success and failure, and the type of
cryptographic operation
Any applicable cryptographic mode(s) of
operation, subject attributes and object
attributes.
Failure of the cryptographic operation (ALARM)
FCS_COP.1/aes-xcbcSw Success and failure, and the type of
cryptographic operation
Any applicable cryptographic mode(s) of
operation, subject attributes and object
attributes.
Failure of the cryptographic operation (ALARM)
FCS_COP.1/ecdsaSw Success and failure, and the type of
cryptographic operation
Any applicable cryptographic mode(s) of
operation, subject attributes and object
attributes.
Success of the cryptographic operation
Failure of the cryptographic operation (ALARM)
FCS_COP.1/aes-gcmLocalData Success and failure, and the type of
cryptographic operation
Any applicable cryptographic mode(s) of
operation, subject attributes and object
attributes.
Failure of the cryptographic operation (ALARM)
Rationale : Successful of the operation is not required to be
logged because it is implicit : in case of successful
operation, parameters can be retrieved and the TOE is
operational.
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83051027-DDQ-TCS-FR-003
SFR Auditable events (drawn from CC Part
2)
Interpretation regarding the TOE
FCS_COP.1/sha Success and failure, and the type of
cryptographic operation
Any applicable cryptographic mode(s) of
operation, subject attributes and object
attributes.
NO GENERATED AUDIT DATA
Rationale: There is no need to generate audit data for this
type of cryptographic operation.
FCS_COP.1/hmac Success and failure, and the type of
cryptographic operation
Any applicable cryptographic mode(s) of
operation, subject attributes and object
attributes.
NO GENERATED AUDIT DATA
Rationale: There is no need to generate audit data for this
type of cryptographic operation.
FCS_COP.1/hmacTrunc Success and failure, and the type of
cryptographic operation
Any applicable cryptographic mode(s) of
operation, subject attributes and object
attributes.
NO GENERATED AUDIT DATA
Rationale: There is no need to generate audit data for this
type of cryptographic operation.
FCS_COP.1/prf-sha Success and failure, and the type of
cryptographic operation
Any applicable cryptographic mode(s) of
operation, subject attributes and object
attributes.
Failure of the cryptographic operation (ALARM)
Rationale: this cryptographic operation is used by the key
negociation protocol (IKE). Successful of the operation is
not required to be logged as it could saturate the audit data
and the network link between the TOE and the TOE
management centre.
FTP_ITC.1/TOE All attempted uses of the trusted channel
functions.
Identification of the initiator and target of
all trusted channel functions.
Success and failure of initiation of a protected
communication channel.
The event log shall include the identifier of the security
policy.
FDP_UCT.1/TOE The identity of any unauthorised user or
subject attempting to use the data
exchange mechanisms.
NO GENERATED AUDIT DATA
Rationale: There is no need to generate audit data for this
type of cryptographic operation is done through
FDP_IFF.1/VPN.
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83051027-DDQ-TCS-FR-003
SFR Auditable events (drawn from CC Part
2)
Interpretation regarding the TOE
FDP_UIT.1/TOE The identity of any user or subject using
the data exchange mechanisms.
The identity of any user or subject
attempting to use the user data
exchange mechanisms, but who is
unauthorised to do so.
A reference to the names or other
indexing information useful in identifying
the user data that was transmitted or
received. This could include security
attributes associated with the user data.
Any identified attempts to block
transmission of user data.
NO GENERATED AUDIT DATA
Rationale:
this mechanism is used to exchange IP datagram. The
identifty of any subject using the mechanism is not required
to be logged as it would saturate the audit data and the
network link between the TOE and the TOE management
centre.
Logging unauthorised use of the mechanism is done
through FDP_IFF.1/VPN.
FCS_IPS_EXT.1 There are no auditable events foreseen. NO GENERATED AUDIT DATA
FDP_ITC.2/VPN All attempts (successful or not) to import
user data, including any security
attributes.
NO GENERATED AUDIT DATA
Rationale: this function is used to import IP datagram. No
logging of the operation is not required as it would saturate
the audit data and the network link between the TOE and
the TOE management centre.
FDP_ETC.2/VPN All attempts (successful or not) to export
user data, including any security
attributes.
NO GENERATED AUDIT DATA
Rationale: this function is used to export IP datagram. No
logging of the operation is not required as it would saturate
the audit data and the network link between the TOE and
the TOE management centre.
FDP_IFC.1/VPN There are no auditable events foreseen. NO GENERATED AUDIT DATA
FDP_IFF.1/VPN All decisions on requests for information
flow.
Unfound SP/SA
Detection of IPSec datagram modification.
Detection of IPSec datagram replay. (ALARM)
Rationale: this function is used to control vpn IP datagram
flow. All successful decisions is not required to be logged
as it would saturate the audit data and the network link
between the TOE and the TOE management centre.
FDP_ITC.2/pskDistribmode All attempts (successful or not) to import
user data, including any security
attributes.
Key (PSK for distributed mode) injection operation.
The event log shall include the key identifier, the user
identitiy (user role or management device’s IP adress).
FDP_ITC.2/pskIKE All attempts (successful or not) to import
user data, including any security
attributes.
Key (PSK for negociated mode) injection operation.
The event log shall include the key identifier, the user
identitiy.
FDP_UCT.1/keysInjection The identity of any unauthorised user or
subject attempting to use the data
exchange mechanisms.
NO GENERATED AUDIT DATA
Rationale: logging of use of this mechanism is done
through FDP_ITC.2/pskDistribmode and
FDP_ITC.2/pskIKE.
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SFR Auditable events (drawn from CC Part
2)
Interpretation regarding the TOE
FDP_UIT.1/keysInjection The identity of any user or subject using
the data exchange mechanisms.
The identity of any user or subject
attempting to use the user data
exchange mechanisms, but who is
unauthorised to do so.
A reference to the names or other
indexing information useful in identifying
the user data that was transmitted or
received. This could include security
attributes associated with the user data.
Any identified attempts to block
transmission of user data.
Detection of key modification.
Rationale:
this mechanism is used to inject cryptographic key. The
use of the mechanism is not required to be logged as it is
done through FDP_ITC.2/***.
Logging unauthorised use of the mechanism is done
through FDP_IFF.1/keyInjection.
FDP_IFC.1/keysInjection There are no auditable events foreseen. NO GENERATED AUDIT DATA
FDP_IFF.1/keysInjection All decisions on requests for information
flow.
Detection of key modification.
FPT_TDC.1/keysInjection Use of the TSF data consistency
mechanisms
Identification of which TSF data have
been interpreted
Detection of modified TSF data
NO GENERATED AUDIT DATA
Rationale : no audit data is generated by this SFR as they
are already generated by FDP_UIT.1/keysInjection (for
data modification) and FMT_MTD.1/configuration (for data
import).
Use of the consistency mechanism is implicit when the
data is accepted by the TOE.
FDP_IFC.1/ntp There are no auditable events foreseen. NO GENERATED AUDIT DATA
FDP_IFF.1/ntp All decisions on requests for information
flow.
Detection of key modification.
(the event log shall include the entire content of the
protected key (not the deciphered content))
Success of key integrity checking.
FMT_MSA.3 Modifications of the default setting of
permissive or restrictive rules.
All modifications of the initial values of
security attributes.
Any modification a parameter value.
Rationale: modification of default value is not logged as it is
not possible to modifiy default settings.
FMT_SMR.1/user Modifications to the group of users that
are part of a role
NO GENERATED AUDIT DATA
Rationale: the TOE implements roles only.
FMT_SMR.1/devices Modifications to the group of users that
are part of a role
NO GENERATED AUDIT DATA
Rationale: the TOE implements roles only.
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83051027-DDQ-TCS-FR-003
SFR Auditable events (drawn from CC Part
2)
Interpretation regarding the TOE
FIA_UID.2/sgc All use of the user identification
mechanism, including the
user identity provided
NO GENERATED AUDIT DATA
Rationale: the audit data are generated through
FDP_IFF.1/VPN since the identity of the SGC is checked
through the SP/SA filtering and verification process. If an
error occurs, the corresponding audit data is logged by the
SP/SA filtering and verification mechanism.
FIA_UIA_EXT.1/localMngt All use of the authentication mechanism. Successful and failure (for all attempts) of the
authentication of a user.
The event log shall include the user’s role.
FIA_UAU_EXT.2/localMngt All use of the authentication mechanism Successful and failure (for all attempts) of the
authentication of a user.
The event log shall include the user’s role.
FIA_UAU.6/localMngt All reauthentication attempts. Successful and failure (for all attempts) of the re-
authentication of a user.
The event log shall include the user’s role.
FIA_UAU.7/localMngt There are no auditable events foreseen. NO GENERATED AUDIT DATA
FIA_AFL.1/localMngt The reaching of the threshold for the
unsuccessful authentication attempts
and the actions (e.g. disabling of a
terminal) taken and the subsequent, if
appropriate, restoration to the normal
state (e.g. re-enabling of a terminal)
Failure of an authentication attempt
FIA_PMG_EXT.1/localMngt There are no auditable events foreseen. NO GENERATED AUDIT DATA
FTA_SSL_EXT.1/localMngt Locking of an interactive session by the
session locking mechanism
Termination of an interactive session by the session
locking mechanism
FTA_SSL.4/localMngt Termination of an interactive session by
the user
Termination of an interactive session by the user
FTA_TAB.1/localMngt There are no auditable events foreseen. NO GENERATED AUDIT DATA
FMT_SMF.1 Use of the management functions Use of the management functions
The event log shall include the origin of the management
order : TOE local management or TOE management
centre.
FMT_MOF.1/localMngt All modifications in the behaviour of the
functions in the TSF.
Enabling of the TOE local management functionality
Disabling of the TOE local management functionality
FMT_MTD.1/query All modifications to the values of TSF
data.
NO GENERATED AUDIT DATA
FMT_MTD.1/supervision All modifications to the values of TSF
data.
NO GENERATED AUDIT DATA
FPT_SKP_EXT.1 All modifications to the values of TSF
data.
NO GENERATED AUDIT DATA
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83051027-DDQ-TCS-FR-003
SFR Auditable events (drawn from CC Part
2)
Interpretation regarding the TOE
FMT_MTD.1/configuration All modifications to the values of TSF
data.
All modifications to the values of parameters of
D.SECURITY_POLICIES and D.CONFIG_PARAM.
The event log shall include the name of the paramter and
the involved interface.
FMT_MTD.1/dateTime All modifications to the values of TSF
data.
All modifications to the values of parameters of
D.TIME_BASE.
The event log shall include the name of the paramter and
the involved interface.
FMT_MTD.1/keys All modifications to the values of TSF
data.
Modification (injection) of a PSK
FMT_MTD.1/keyLifetime All modifications to the values of TSF
data.
Modification of a key lifetime.
The event log shall include the name of the key and the
previous and the new lifetime values.
FMT_MTD.1/adminPwd All modifications to the values of TSF
data.
Modification of the administrator password.
FMT_MTD.1/opePwd All modifications to the values of TSF
data.
Modification of the operator password.
FMT_MTD.1/software All modifications to the values of TSF
data.
NO GENERATED AUDIT DATA
Rationale : generated events are given by
FPT_TUD_EXT.1/software.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1/software Initiation of update. Taking into account an uploading command request
(the event log shall include the IP address of the TFTP
server)
Success and failure (integrity error, ...) of the software
signature.
FPT_APW_EXT.1 There are no auditable events foreseen. NO GENERATED AUDIT DATA
FPT_FLS.1 Failure of the TSF Failure of the software (ALARM)
Failure of a parameter loading (ALARM)
(the event log shall include the failed parameter name and
the type of failure)
Failure of a self-test (ALARM)
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83051027-DDQ-TCS-FR-003
SFR Auditable events (drawn from CC Part
2)
Interpretation regarding the TOE
FPT_TST.1 Execution of the TSF self tests and the
results of the tests
Start of the execution of the self-test process
Success each self-test.
Failure of a self-test (ALARM)
At least :
· cryptographic auto-tests
· software auto-tests
· data integrity, this includes:
· D.SECURITY_POLICIES
· D.CONFIG_PARAM
· D.CRYPTO_KEYS
End of the execution of the self-test process.
The event log shall include any additional information
generated by the tests (beyond “success” or “failure”).
FPT_SDP_EXT.2 Success or failure of integrity check of
TSF data
Failure of integrity check of
· D.SECURITY_POLICIES
· D.CONFIG_PARAM
· D.CRYPTO_KEYS
FDP_RIP.2 There are no auditable events foreseen. NO GENERATED AUDIT DATA
FAU_GEN.1.2
The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the following information:
– a) Date and time of the event,
– b) Type of event,
– c) (refinement) User identity or the origin network interface (in case a network device caused the event)
(if applicable),
– d) Outcome (success or failure) of the event.
– e) For each audit event type, based on the auditable event definitions of the functional components included in
the PP/ST,
•
•
•
• Severity of the event, at least:
– NORMAL
– ALARM
•
•
•
• Information specified in column three of the table above.
FAU_GEN.2 - USER IDENTITY ASSOCIATION
FAU_GEN.2.1
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83051027-DDQ-TCS-FR-003
For audit events resulting from actions of (refinement) users and network devices, the TSF shall be able to
associate each auditable event with the identity of the (refinement) user or the network device that caused the
event.
FAU_GEN_EXT.3 - EXTERNAL MEANS
FAU_GEN_EXT.3.1
The TSF shall indicate to the user through a visual or a sounding mean when an ALARM-type event occurs.
FAU_STG_EXT.1 - EXTENDED : EXTERNAL AUDIT TRAIL STORAGE
FAU_STG_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall be able to transmit the generated audit data to an external IT entity when required, and
transmit all generated ALARM-type event data to an external IT entity using a trusted channel implementing
the IPSec protocol (refinement) (trusted channel defined in FTP_ITC.1/TOE).
FAU_STG_EXT.3 - EXTENDED : ACTION IN CASE OF LOSS OF AUDIT SERVER CONNECTIVITY
FAU_STG_EXT.3.1
The TSF shall generate an ALARM-type event and continue its operation if the link to the external IT entity
collecting the audit data generated by the TOE is not available.
FPT_STM.1 - RELIABLE TIME STAMPS
FPT_STM.1.1
The TSF shall be able to provide reliable time stamps for its own use.
Application note:
TOE reference of time is its start-up.
6.1.3. CRYPTOGRAPHY
6.1.3.1. Key Management
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 - EXTENDED : RANDOM BIT GENERATION
FCS_RBG_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall perform all random bit generation (RBG) services in accordance with NIST Special Publication
800-90 using CTR_DRBG (AES) seeded by an entropy source that accumulated entropy from TSF-hardware-
based noise source.
FCS_RBG_EXT.1.2
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83051027-DDQ-TCS-FR-003
The deterministic RBG shall be seeded with a minimum of 256 bits of entropy at least equal to the greatest bit
length of the keys and authorization factors that it will generate.
FCS_CKM.3/KEYRENEWAL - CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY (REFINEMENT) RENEWAL
FCS_CKM.3.1/keyRenewal
The TSF shall perform (refinement) key renewal in accordance with a specified cryptographic (refinement) key
renewal method (refinement) peer authentication key injection (negociated mode) and session distributed
key injection (distributed mode) (for D.CRYPTO_KEYS) and IKE SAs keys renewal (for
D.IKE_SAs_CRYPTO_KEYS) and derived distributed PSK renewal (for D.DISTRIB_SAs_CRYPTO_KEYS)
that meets the following: ANSSI cryptographic referential [RGS_B].
FCS_CKM_EXT.4/ANYPLAINTEXTDATA - CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY DESTRUCTION
FCS_CKM_EXT.4.1/anyPlainTextData
The TSF shall zeroize (refinement) all plaintext secret cryptographic keys and CSPs (Cryptographic Critical
Security Parameters) when no longer required, that is :
– Any plaintext cryptographic key symbolised through D.CRYPTO_KEYS:
•
•
•
• any plaintext Distributed mode PSK (during injection, or during TOE operation, ...)
•
•
•
• any plaintext IKE peer authentication PSK (during injection, or during TOE operation, ...)
– Any plaintext cryptographic key symbolised through D.IKE_SAs_CRYPTO_KEYS:
•
•
•
• any plaintext IKEv2 SAs keys
•
•
•
• any plaintext IKEv2 Child SAs keys
– any plaintext CSPs (i.e. SKEYSEED for IKEv2 protocol, the seed for the PRNG (refer to
FCS_RBG_EXT.1), ...)
– Any plaintext cryptographic key symbolised through D.DISTRIB_SAs_CRYPTO_KEYS:
•
•
•
• any plaintext derivated keys of Distributed mode PSK
– the Local Protection Key
(refinement) in accordance with a specified cryptographic key destruction method called zeroisation that
overwrites keys and data value through one pass of bits '0' and one pass of bits '1'.
FCS_CKM_EXT.5/PSKDISTRIBMODE - DISTRIBUTED MODE PSK KEY CRYPTOPERIOD
FCS_CKM_EXT.5.1/pskDistribMode
The TSF shall manage a cryptoperiod for the Distributed mode PSK.
FCS_CKM_EXT.5.2/pskDistribMode
The TSF shall calculate the key lifetime from key first use.
FCS_CKM_EXT.5.3/pskDistribMode
The TSF shall either (depending on the key security attribute values)
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83051027-DDQ-TCS-FR-003
– close any communication channels using this key and periodically generate a critical severity audit
data requiring the peer authentication key to be renewed (in this case no more new communication
channels for SAs using this key can be initiated until the key is renewed)
– or periodically generate a critical severity audit data while it continues to proceed the network trafic (in
this case new communication channels for SAs using this key can be initiated even if the key is out-of-
date)
after the key has expired.
FCS_CKM_EXT.5/DERIV-PSKDISTRIBMODE - DISTRIBUTED MODE PSK DERIVATED KEY CRYPTOPERIOD
FCS_CKM_EXT.5.1/deriv-pskDistribMode
The TSF shall manage a cryptoperiod for the Distributed mode PSK derivated key.
FCS_CKM_EXT.5.2/deriv-pskDistribMode
The TSF shall calculate the key lifetime from key first use.
FCS_CKM_EXT.5.3/deriv-pskDistribMode
The TSF shall either (depending on the key security attribute values)
– close any communication channels using this key and periodically generate a critical severity audit
data requiring the peer authentication key to be renewed (in this case no more new communication
channels for SAs using this key can be initiated until the key is renewed)
– or periodically generate a critical severity audit data while it continues to proceed the network trafic (in
this case new communication channels for SAs using this key can be initiated even if the key is out-of-
date)
after the key has expired.
FCS_CKM_EXT.5/PSKIKE - IKE PEER AUTHENTICATION PSK KEY CRYPTOPERIOD
FCS_CKM_EXT.5.1/pskIKE
The TSF shall manage a cryptoperiod for the IKE peer authentication PSK.
FCS_CKM_EXT.5.2/pskIKE
The TSF shall calculate the key lifetime from key first use.
FCS_CKM_EXT.5.3/pskIKE
The TSF shall either (depending on the key security attribute values)
– close any communication channels using this key and periodically generate a critical severity audit
data requiring the peer authentication key to be renewed (in this case no more new communication
channels for SAs using this key can be initiated until the key is renewed)
– or periodically generate a warning severity audit data while it continues to proceed the network trafic
(in this case new communication channels for SAs using this key can be initiated even if the key is out-
of-date)
after the key has expired.
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83051027-DDQ-TCS-FR-003
FCS_CKM_EXT.5/IKEV2SA - IKEV2 IKE SA KEY CRYPTOPERIOD
FCS_CKM_EXT.5.1/ikeV2SA
The TSF shall manage a cryptoperiod for IKEv2 SAs keys.
FCS_CKM_EXT.5.2/ikeV2SA
The TSF shall calculate the key lifetime from keys generation.
FCS_CKM_EXT.5.3/ikeV2SA
The TSF shall renew the keys by establishing a new IKEv2 SA (i.e. rekeying) after a key has expired.
Application note:
IKE v2 ([RFC 5996) introduces the notion of Initial Exchange. It is quite similar to the IKE v1 phase 1.
In IKE v2 protocol, during the initial exchange, the two end-points exchange their Diffie-Hellman key public-parts in order to generate and derive
key material. This key material will then be used by the IKE SA corresponding to the channel between those two end-points in order to protect
next IKE v2 exchange (known as Child SA Exchange) and to generate new key material during this latter exchange.
FCS_CKM_EXT.5/IKEV2CHILDSA - IKEV2 CHILD SAS KEY CRYPTOPERIOD
FCS_CKM_EXT.5.1/ikeV2childSA
The TSF shall manage a cryptoperiod for IKEv2 Child SAs keys.
FCS_CKM_EXT.5.2/ikeV2childSA
The TSF shall calculate the key lifetime from keys generation.
FCS_CKM_EXT.5.3/ikeV2childSA
The TSF shall renew the keys by establishing a new IKEv2 Child SA (i.e. rekeying) after a key has expired.
Application note:
IKE v2 ([RFC 5996]) introduces the notion of Child SA Exchange. It is quite similar to the IKE v1 phase 2.
In IKE v2 protocol, during the child SA exchange, the two end-points negociate the algorithm to be used to protect User Dataflows. During this
exchange, they also derive their key material that will then be used by the Child SA in order to protect the User Data flows.
FPT_SIE_EXT.1/ALLPLAINTEXTDATA - EXTENDED : SUBSET INFORMATION ERASURE
FPT_SIE_EXT.1.1/allPlainTextData
The TSF shall ensure that plaintext secret cryptographic keys and CSPs (Cryptographic Critical Security
Parameters) as required by FCS_CKM_EXT.4 are made unavailable after:
– A full erasure (which can be activated by a command on the CLI, the erasure push-button on the front
panel, or the remote erasure interface on the rear panel).
6.1.3.2. Cryptographic Operations
FCS_COP.1/AES-CBC - AES-CBC CRYPTOGRAPHIC OPERATION
FCS_COP.1.1/aes-cbc
The TSF shall perform ip datagram encryption and decryption in accordance with (refinement) AES operating
in CBC mode and cryptographic key sizes (refinement) 256 bits that meet the following:
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83051027-DDQ-TCS-FR-003
– FIPS 197 (Advanced Encryption Standard (AES))
– NIST SP 800-38A
FCS_COP.1/AES-GCM - AES-GCM CRYPTOGRAPHIC OPERATION
FCS_COP.1.1/aes-gcm
The TSF shall perform ip datagram encryption with authentication and decryption with authentication
verification in accordance with (refinement) AES operating in GCM mode and cryptographic key sizes
(refinement) 256 bits that meet the following:
– FIPS 197 (Advanced Encryption Standard (AES))
– NIST SP 800-38D
FCS_COP.1/AES-XCBC - AES-XCBC CRYPTOGRAPHIC OPERATION
FCS_COP.1.1/aes-xcbc
The TSF shall perform ip datagram authentication and authentication verification in accordance with
(refinement) AES operating in XCBC-MAC-96 mode and cryptographic key size 128 bits that meet the following:
– RFC 3566
FCS_COP.1/AES-CBCSW - AES-CBC FOR SOFTWARE UPDATE CRYPTOGRAPHIC OPERATION
FCS_COP.1.1/aes-cbcSw
The TSF shall perform software update decryption in accordance with (refinement) AES operating in CBC
mode and cryptographic key sizes 256 bits that meet the following:
– FIPS 197 (Advanced Encryption Standard (AES))
– NIST SP 800-38A
FCS_COP.1/AES-XCBCSW - AES-XCBC FOR SOFTWARE UPDATE CRYPTOGRAPHIC OPERATION
FCS_COP.1.1/aes-xcbcSw
The TSF shall perform software update authentication verification in accordance with (refinement) AES
operating in XCBC-MAC-96 mode and cryptographic key size 128 bits that meet the following:
– RFC 3566
FCS_COP.1/ECDSASW - ECDSA FOR SOFTWARE UPDATE CRYPTOGRAPHIC OPERATION
FCS_COP.1.1/ecdsaSw
The TSF shall perform software update cryptographic signature verification in accordance with (refinement)
SHA512 and Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) and cryptographic key size 521 bits that meet
the following:
– FIPS 186-4 (Digital Signature Standard)
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83051027-DDQ-TCS-FR-003
– (refinement) and RFC 5639 (Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Brainpool Standard Curves and Curve
Generation)
FCS_COP.1/AES-GCMLOCALDATA - AES-GCM LOCAL DATA CRYPTOGRAPHIC OPERATION
FCS_COP.1.1/aes-gcmLocalData
The TSF shall perform local data containers encryption with authentication and decryption with
authentication verification in accordance with (refinement) AES operating in GCM mode and cryptographic key
sizes 256 bits that meet the following:
– FIPS 197 (Advanced Encryption Standard (AES))
– NIST SP 800-38D
FCS_COP.1/SHA - SHA CRYPTOGRAPHIC OPERATION
FCS_COP.1.1/sha
The TSF shall perform cryptographic hashing in accordance with (refinement) SHA-256, SHA-384 and SHA-
512 and message digest sizes 160, 384 and 512 bits that meet the following:
– FIPS 180-3 (Secure Hash Standard)
FCS_COP.1/HMAC - HMAC CRYPTOGRAPHIC OPERATION
FCS_COP.1.1/hmac
The TSF shall perform keyed-hash message authentication and authentication verification in accordance with
(refinement) HMAC-SHA-256 and HMAC-SHA-384 and cryptographic key sizes respectively 256 and 384,
(refinement) and message digest sizes 256 and 384 bits that meet the following:
– FIPS 198-1 (The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code)
– FIPS 180-3 (Secure Hash Standard)
FCS_COP.1/HMACTRUNC - TRUNCATED HMAC CRYPTOGRAPHIC OPERATION
FCS_COP.1.1/hmacTrunc
The TSF shall perform truncated keyed-hash message authentication and authentication verification in
accordance with (refinement) HMAC-SHA-256-128 and cryptographic key sizes respectively 256 bits,
(refinement) and truncated message digest size 128 bits that meet the following:
– FIPS 198-1 (The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code)
– FIPS 180-3 (Secure Hash Standard)
– SP 800-107 (Recommendations for Applications Using Approved Hash Algorithms)
– RFC 4868 (Using HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384, and HMAC-SHA-512 with IPsec)
FCS_COP.1/PRF-SHA - PRF-SHA CRYPTOGRAPHIC OPERATION
FCS_COP.1.1/prf-sha
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83051027-DDQ-TCS-FR-003
The TSF shall perform pseudo random function in accordance with (refinement) SHA-384 that meet the
following:
– FIPS 180-3 (Secure Hash Standard)
6.1.4. COMMUNICATIONS PROTECTION AND FLOW CONTROLS
6.1.4.1. Communications Protection
6.1.4.1.1. Inter-TOE Communications Protection
FTP_ITC.1/TOE - INTER-TSF TRUSTED CHANNEL
FTP_ITC.1.1/TOE
The TSF shall (refinement) use IPSec to provide a (refinement) trusted communication channel between itself
and (refinement) authorized IT entities supporting the following capabilities: audit server, NTP server, TOE
Management center device, a remote instance of the TOE that is logically distinct from other communication
channels and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel data from (refinement)
disclosure and modification of the channel data.
FTP_ITC.1.2/TOE
The TSF shall permit the TSF or the authorized IT entities to initiate communication via the trusted channel.
FTP_ITC.1.3/TOE
The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for communication with a remote instance of the
TOE.
FDP_UCT.1/TOE - INTER-TSF BASIC DATA EXCHANGE CONFIDENTIALITY
FDP_UCT.1.1/TOE
The TSF shall enforce the VPN SFP to be able to transmit and receive user data in a manner protected from
unauthorised disclosure (refinement) between itself and a remote instance of the TOE.
FDP_UIT.1/TOE - INTER-TSF DATA EXCHANGE INTEGRITY
FDP_UIT.1.1/TOE
The TSF shall enforce the VPN SFP to be able to transmit and receive user data in a manner protected from
modification, insertion and replay errors (refinement) between itself and a remote instance of the TOE.
FDP_UIT.1.2/TOE
The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of user data, whether modification, insertion and replay has
occurred.
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83051027-DDQ-TCS-FR-003
FCS_IPS_EXT.1 - EXTENDED : IPSEC
FCS_IPS_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall implement the IPsec protocol ESP as defined by RFC 4303 using: (refinement)
– for IPSEC Mistral mode, the cryptographic algorithms AES-CBC-256 (specified by RFC 3602) for
confidentiality and XCBC-MAC96 (specified by RFC 3566) for Integrity
and using:
– IKEv2 as defined in RFCs 5996, 4307
– PSK derivation algorithm for distributed mode
FCS_IPS_EXT.1.2
(refinement) not applicable.
FCS_IPS_EXT.1.3
The TSF shall ensure that (refinement) IKEv2 SA lifetimes are able to be limited to 24 hours for IKE SAs and
8 hours for IKE Child SAs.
FCS_IPS_EXT.1.4
The TSF shall ensure that (refinement) IKEv2 SA lifetimes are able to be limited to 200 MB of traffic for IKE
Child SAs.
FCS_IPS_EXT.1.5
The TSF shall ensure that (refinement) IKEv2 protocols implement:
– DH Group 20 (384-bit Random ECP) (RFC 5903)
FCS_IPS_EXT.1.6
(refinement) not applicable.
FCS_IPS_EXT.1.7
The TSF shall support the use of pre-shared keys (as referenced in the RFCs) for use in authenticating its
(refinement) IKEv2 connections.
FCS_IPS_EXT.1.8
(refinement) requirement removed.
Application note :
FCS_IPS_EXT.1.8 has been removed in regards to [ND_PP] because it is considered too weak. The TOE authorises only PSK peer
authentication for the IKE protocols using either symmetric cryptographic keys.
6.1.4.1.2. Central Management Communications Protection
The central management of the TOE is performed through a secured communication link provided by the TOE and
a remote instance of the TOE. Therefore, no added security TOE requirements about securing the central
management link are necessary in regards to those specified for the "Inter-TOE Communications Protection".
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Security. They cannot be reproduced, disclosed or used without the company's prior written
approval.
83051027-DDQ-TCS-FR-003
6.1.4.2. Flow Controls
6.1.4.2.1. VPN Policy flow control
FDP_ITC.2/VPN - VPN IMPORT OF USER DATA WITH SECURITY ATTRIBUTES
FDP_ITC.2.1/VPN
The TSF shall enforce the VPN SFP when importing (refinement) IP datagrams to send to a remote private
network or IPSec datagrams, controlled under the SFP, from outside of the TOE.
FDP_ITC.2.2/VPN
The TSF shall use the (refinement) IP datagrams protocol and topologic data associated with the imported
(refinement) IP datagrams payload.
FDP_ITC.2.3/VPN
The TSF shall ensure that the protocol used provides for the unambiguous association between the (refinement)
IP datagrams protocol and topologic data and the (refinement) IP datagrams payload received.
FDP_ITC.2.4/VPN
The TSF shall ensure that interpretation of the (refinement) IP datagrams protocol and topologic data of the
imported (refinement) datagrams payload is as intended by the source of the (refinement) IP datagrams.
FDP_ITC.2.5/VPN
The TSF shall enforce the following rules when importing (refinement) IP datagrams controlled under the SFP
from outside the TOE: no additional importation control rules.
FDP_ETC.2/VPN - VPN EXPORT OF USER DATA WITH SECURITY ATTRIBUTES
FDP_ETC.2.1/VPN
The TSF shall enforce the VPN SFP when exporting (refinement) IP datagrams, controlled under the SFP,
outside of the TOE.
FDP_ETC.2.2/VPN
The TSF shall export the (refinement) IP datagrams payload with the (refinement) IP datagrams protocol and
topologic data associated security attributes.
FDP_ETC.2.3/VPN
The TSF shall ensure that the (refinement) IP datagrams protocol and topologic data, when exported outside
the TOE, are unambiguously associated with the exported (refinement) IP datagrams payload.
FDP_ETC.2.4/VPN
The TSF shall enforce the following rules when (refinement) IP datagrams are from the TOE: no additional
exportation control rules.
FDP_IFC.1/VPN - VPN SUBSET INFORMATION FLOW CONTROL
FDP_IFC.1.1/VPN
The TSF shall enforce the VPN SFP on :
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Security. They cannot be reproduced, disclosed or used without the company's prior written
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83051027-DDQ-TCS-FR-003
– Subjects :
•
•
•
• Encrypted Data Interface
•
•
•
• Plain Text Data Interface
– Information :
•
•
•
• IP datagrams
– Operations :
•
•
•
• OP.Receiving : Processing of information coming from the Subject
•
•
•
• OP.Sending : Emission of information to the Subject
FDP_IFF.1/VPN - VPN SIMPLE SECURITY ATTRIBUTES
FDP_IFF.1.1/VPN
The TSF shall enforce the VPN SFP based on the following types of subject and information security attributes:
– Subjects and their security attributes :
•
•
•
• Encrypted Data Interface : the TOE main IP address
•
•
•
• Plain Text Data Interface : the TOE main IP address
– Information and their security attributes :
•
•
•
• Protocol datagrams : protocol type, protocol version, source IP address, destination IP address, (if
available:) IPSec protection mode
FDP_IFF.1.2/VPN
The TSF shall permit an information flow between a controlled subject and controlled information via a controlled
operation if the following rules hold:
– For the operation OP.Receving (from Encrypted Data Interface):
•
•
•
• If the IP datagram contains a SPI
– The TSF can find an associated SA using the SPI within the IP datagram
– If SA’s protection mode is IPSec ESP Tunnel:
•
•
•
• The IPSec protection mode contain within the IP datagram is the same as the one specified
within the SA
•
•
•
• The IP datagram has not been inserted (refer to FDP_UIT.1/TOE)
•
•
•
• The IP datagram has not been modified (refer to FDP_UIT.1/TOE)
•
•
•
• The IP datagram has not been replayed (refer to FDP_UIT.1/TOE)
•
•
•
• The TSF can find an associated SP using the source and destination IP addresses of the
deciphered IP datagram
•
•
•
• The deciphered IP datagram contains an authorised specified port
•
•
•
• The deciphered IP datagram contains an authorised protocol
•
•
•
• If the IP datagram does not contain a SPI
– If bridge mode is activated:
•
•
•
• If the IP datagram specifies a routing protocol, the routing protocol shall be explicitly
authorised through the configuration of the TSF (D.CONFIG_PARAM)
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Security. They cannot be reproduced, disclosed or used without the company's prior written
approval.
83051027-DDQ-TCS-FR-003
•
•
•
• Otherwise the TSF applies the rules below
•
•
•
• The TSF can find an associated SP using the source and destination IP addresses of the IP
datagram
•
•
•
• The SP specifies “bypass” action (that is authorises a plaintext IP datagram)
•
•
•
• The IP datagram contains an authorised specified port
•
•
•
• The IP datagram contains an authorised protocol
– OP.Receiving (from Plaintext Data Interface):
•
•
•
• The IP datagram contains an authorised specified port
•
•
•
• The IP datagram contains an authorised protocol
•
•
•
• The TSF can find an associated SP using the source and destination IP addresses of the IP
datagram
– OP.Sending (to Encrypted Data Interface):
•
•
•
• The datagram has been properly protected according to the SA referred by the associated SA and
SP
– OP.Sending (to Plaintext Data Interface):
•
•
•
• The datagram has been properly checked and deprotected according to the associated SA and SP
FDP_IFF.1.3/VPN
The TSF shall (refinement) not enforce additional rules.
FDP_IFF.1.4/VPN
The TSF shall explicitly authorise an information flow based on the following rules: none.
FDP_IFF.1.5/VPN
The TSF shall explicitly deny an information flow based on the following rules:
– In bridge mode, when the IP datagram does not specifies an authorised routing protocol and when no
VPN SP has been explicitly defined for the given IP datagram (no match with the given source IP
address and destination IP address) the default screening rule applies. This latter rule shall reject the IP
datagram, without sending it to any interface (either external intefaces such as Plaintext Data Interface,
Enciphered Data Interface, …, nor internal interfaces (such a TOE management)).
– When the given VPN SP specifies that sending IP packets to the destination address (specific to a
subnetwork) is forbidden, no sending is performed.
– When an error occurs during the application or verification of security protections, no sending of IP
packets is authorized.
6.1.4.2.2. Import of Cryptographic Keys
FDP_ITC.2/PSKDISTRIBMODE - DISTRIBUTED PSK IMPORT OF USER DATA WITH SECURITY ATTRIBUTES
FDP_ITC.2.1/pskDistribmode
The TSF shall enforce the Keys Injection SFP when importing (refinement) the distributed mode's PSK,
controlled under the SFP, from outside of the TOE.
FDP_ITC.2.2/pskDistribmode
The TSF shall use the security attributes associated with the imported (refinement) the distributed mode's PSK.
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préalable.
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Security. They cannot be reproduced, disclosed or used without the company's prior written
approval.
83051027-DDQ-TCS-FR-003
FDP_ITC.2.3/pskDistribmode
The TSF shall ensure that the protocol used provides for the unambiguous association between the security
attributes and the user data received.
FDP_ITC.2.4/pskDistribmode
The TSF shall ensure that interpretation of the security attributes of the imported user data is as intended by the
source of the user data.
FDP_ITC.2.5/pskDistribmode
The TSF shall enforce the following rules when importing (refinement) the distributed mode's PSK controlled
under the SFP from outside the TOE: no additional control rules.
FDP_ITC.2/PSKIKE - IKE PSK IMPORT OF USER DATA WITH SECURITY ATTRIBUTES
FDP_ITC.2.1/pskIKE
The TSF shall enforce the Keys Injection SFP when importing (refinement) the IKE peer authentication PSK,
controlled under the SFP, from outside of the TOE.
FDP_ITC.2.2/pskIKE
The TSF shall use the security attributes associated with the imported (refinement) the IKE peer authentication
PSK.
FDP_ITC.2.3/pskIKE
The TSF shall ensure that the protocol used provides for the unambiguous association between the security
attributes and the user data received.
FDP_ITC.2.4/pskIKE
The TSF shall ensure that interpretation of the security attributes of the imported user data is as intended by the
source of the user data.
FDP_ITC.2.5/pskIKE
The TSF shall enforce the following rules when importing (refinement) the IKE peer authentication PSK
controlled under the SFP from outside the TOE: no additional control rules.
FDP_UCT.1/KEYSINJECTION - KEYS BASIC DATA EXCHANGE CONFIDENTIALITY
FDP_UCT.1.1/keysInjection
The TSF shall enforce the Keys Injection SFP to be able to receive (refinement) cryptographic secret keys in a
manner protected from unauthorised disclosure.
FDP_UIT.1/KEYSINJECTION - KEYS DATA EXCHANGE INTEGRITY
FDP_UIT.1.1/keysInjection
The TSF shall enforce the Keys Injection SFP to be able to receive (refinement) cryptographic keys in a
manner protected from modification, insertion and replay errors.
FDP_UIT.1.2/keysInjection
The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of user data, whether modification, insertion and replay has
occurred.
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préalable.
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Security. They cannot be reproduced, disclosed or used without the company's prior written
approval.
83051027-DDQ-TCS-FR-003
FDP_IFC.1/KEYSINJECTION - KEYS INJECTION SUBSET INFORMATION FLOW CONTROL
FDP_IFC.1.1/keysInjection
The TSF shall enforce the Keys Injection SFP on :
– Subjects :
•
•
•
• Encrypted Data Interface
•
•
•
• Plaintext Data Interface
•
•
•
• Command Line Interface
•
•
•
• Smartcard Interface
– Information :
•
•
•
• Keys
– Operations :
•
•
•
• OP.Injection : Processing of information coming from the Subject
FDP_IFF.1/KEYSINJECTION - KEYS INJECTION SIMPLE SECURITY ATTRIBUTES
FDP_IFF.1.1/keysInjection
The TSF shall enforce the Keys Injection SFP based on the following types of subject and information security
attributes:
– Subjects and their security attributes :
•
•
•
• Encrypted Data Interface
•
•
•
• Plaintext Data Interface
•
•
•
• Command Line Interface
•
•
•
• Smartcard Interface
– Information and their security attributes :
•
•
•
• Key : key identifier, key type, key lifetime (for symetric keys only), key value
FDP_IFF.1.2/keysInjection
The TSF shall permit an information flow between a controlled subject and controlled information via a controlled
operation if the following rules hold:
– For the operation OP.Injection (from Encrypted Data Interface):
•
•
•
• The key and its security attributes are consistent
– For the operation OP.Injection (from Plaintext Data Interface):
•
•
•
• The key and its security attributes are consistent
– For the operation OP.Injection (from Command Line Interface):
•
•
•
• The key and its security attributes have not been modified
•
•
•
• The Local Administrator is successfully authentified
•
•
•
• The key and its security attributes are consistent
– For the operation OP.Injection (from Smartcard Interface):
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Security. They cannot be reproduced, disclosed or used without the company's prior written
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83051027-DDQ-TCS-FR-003
•
•
•
• The key and its security attributes are consistent
FDP_IFF.1.3/keysInjection
The TSF shall (refinement) not enforce additional rules.
FDP_IFF.1.4/keysInjection
The TSF shall explicitly authorise an information flow based on the following rules: none.
FDP_IFF.1.5/keysInjection
The TSF shall explicitly deny an information flow based on the following rules: none.
FPT_TDC.1/KEYSINJECTION - INTER-TSF BASIC TSF DATA CONSISTENCY
FPT_TDC.1.1/keysInjection
The TSF shall provide the capability to consistently interpret
– the IKE peer authentication PSK
– the communication channels protection keys PSK (for distributed mode)
when shared between the TSF and another trusted IT product.
FPT_TDC.1.2/keysInjection
The TSF shall use key format when interpreting the TSF data from another trusted IT product.
6.1.4.2.3. NTP Synchronisation
FDP_IFC.1/NTP - NTP SYNCHRONISATION SUBSET INFORMATION FLOW CONTROL
FDP_IFC.1.1/ntp
The TSF shall enforce the NTP SFP on :
– Subjects :
•
•
•
• Encrypted Data Interface
•
•
•
• Plaintext Data Interface
– Information :
•
•
•
• NTP datagram
– Operations :
•
•
•
• OP.Receving : Processing of information coming from the Subject
FDP_IFF.1/NTP - NTP SYNCHRONISATION SIMPLE SECURITY ATTRIBUTES
FDP_IFF.1.1/ntp
The TSF shall enforce the NTP SFP based on the following types of subject and information security attributes:
– Subjects and their security attributes :
•
•
•
• Encrypted Data Interface
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Security. They cannot be reproduced, disclosed or used without the company's prior written
approval.
83051027-DDQ-TCS-FR-003
•
•
•
• Plaintext Data Interface
– Information and their security attributes :
•
•
•
• NTP datagram: protocol type, protocol version, source IP address, destination IP address
FDP_IFF.1.2/ntp
The TSF shall permit an information flow between a controlled subject and controlled information via a controlled
operation if the following rules hold:
– For the operation OP.Receiving (from Encrypted Data Interface):
•
•
•
• The Interface is authorised to receive NTP synchronisation datagram
•
•
•
• The source IP address is an authorised NTP server IP address
•
•
•
• The NTP datagram is received into an IP datagram corresponding to a SP (Security Policy). That is :
the NTP datagram shall come from a remote LAN protected by a remote TOE. The SP can either
define a VPN protection or a "bypass" protection.
– For the operation OP.Receiving (from Plaintext Data Interface):
•
•
•
• The Interface is authorised to receive NTP synchronisation datagram
•
•
•
• The source IP address is an authorised NTP server IP address
FDP_IFF.1.3/ntp
The TSF shall (refinement) not enforce additional rules.
FDP_IFF.1.4/ntp
The TSF shall explicitly authorise an information flow based on the following rules: none.
FDP_IFF.1.5/ntp
The TSF shall explicitly deny an information flow based on the following rules: none.
6.1.4.2.4. TSF Data Default Values
FMT_MSA.3 - STATIC ATTRIBUTE INITIALISATION
FMT_MSA.3.1
The TSF shall enforce the VPN SFP and Keys Injection SFP to provide restrictive default values for security
attributes that are used to enforce the SFP (refinement) that is:
– Protection mode : IPSec_Tunnel
– Key management mode : IPSec_Tunnel
– Lifetime of IKE SAs keys : 28800 seconds
– Lifetime of IKE Child SAs keys : 3600 seconds
– Perfect Secrecy (PFS) mode (for IKE protocol) : activated
– List of authorised TOE Management Centre Devices (E.SGC) IP address : 0.0.0.0 / none
FMT_MSA.3.2
The TSF shall allow Local Administrator and TOE Management Centre Device to specify alternative initial
values to override the default values when an object or information is created.
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Security. They cannot be reproduced, disclosed or used without the company's prior written
approval.
83051027-DDQ-TCS-FR-003
6.1.5. USERS AND DEVICES
6.1.5.1. Roles
FMT_SMR.1/USER - SECURITY ROLES
FMT_SMR.1.1/user
The TSF shall maintain the roles
– Local Administrator (corresponding to a human user U.LOCAL_ADMINISTRATOR).
– Local Operator (corresponding to a human user U.LOCAL_OPERATOR).
FMT_SMR.1.2/user
The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
FMT_SMR.1/DEVICES - SECURITY ROLES
FMT_SMR.1.1/devices
The TSF shall maintain the roles
– TOE Management Centre Device (corresponding to a network device E.SGC)
FMT_SMR.1.2/devices
The TSF shall be able to associate (refinement) devices with roles.
6.1.5.2. Identification and Authentication
6.1.5.2.1. TOE Management Centre Device
FIA_UID.2/SGC - E.SGC IDENTIFICATION BEFORE ANY ACTION
FIA_UID.2.1/sgc
The TSF shall require each (refinement) TOE Management Centre Device to be successfully identified before
allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that (refinement) TOE Management Centre Device.
Application note :
In CC Part 2, FIA_UID targets users. Taking into account TOE operation, the security target refines this component : in this case the user is
indeed a network device. The identification of the device is performed through its network address (IP address).
Note that no authentication of E.SGC is required nor necessary. Indeed, the E.SGC can access the TOE only through a protected
communication channel between the TOE and a remote instance of the TOE (the channel is IPSec, as for user data flow).
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Security. They cannot be reproduced, disclosed or used without the company's prior written
approval.
83051027-DDQ-TCS-FR-003
6.1.5.2.2. Users
FIA_UIA_EXT.1/LOCALMNGT - LOCAL HUMAN USERS TIMING OF AUTHENTICATION
FIA_UIA_EXT.1.1/localMngt
The TSF shall allow the following actions prior to requiring the non-TOE entity to initiate the (refinement)
authentication process:
– Display the warning banner in accordance with FTA_TAB.1
– equipment (TOE) Start-up
– equipment (TOE) Shutdown
– Full erasure
– Equipment and network interfaces status query
– Events viewing
– TOE self-test request
FIA_UIA_EXT.1.2/localMngt
The TSF shall require (refinement) the Local Administrator and Local Operator to be successfully identified and
authenticated before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that (refinement) Local Administrator
and Local Operator.
Application note :
This requirement only targets the administrator and the operator performing TOE local management actions. Remote administration actions are
performed through the management center which shall require user authentication at its level.
FIA_UAU_EXT.2/LOCALMNGT - EXTENDED : PASSWORD-BASED AUTHENTICATION MECHANISM
FIA_UAU_EXT.2.1/localMngt
The TSF shall provide a local password-based authentication mechanism, (refinement) to perform (refinement)
Local Administrator and Local Operator authentication.
FIA_UAU.6/LOCALMNGT - RE-AUTHENTICATING
FIA_UAU.6.1/localMngt
The TSF shall re-authenticate the (refinement) Local Administrator or Local Operator when he changes his
password.
FIA_UAU.7/LOCALMNGT - PROTECTED AUTHENTICATION FEEDBACK
FIA_UAU.7.1/localMngt
The TSF shall provide only obscured feedback to the (refinement) Local Administrator and Local Operator
while the authentication is in progress at the local console.
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Security. They cannot be reproduced, disclosed or used without the company's prior written
approval.
83051027-DDQ-TCS-FR-003
FIA_AFL.1/LOCALMNGT - AUTHENTICATION FAILURE HANDLING
FIA_AFL.1.1/localMngt
The TSF shall detect when three (3) unsuccessful successive authentication attempts occur related to the user
authentication functionality.
FIA_AFL.1.2/localMngt
When the defined number of unsuccessful successive authentication attempts has been met, the TSF shall :
– Send an alert message (FAU_SEG.1)
– Lock the authentication functionality for 3 minutes
– After the locking time, authentication functionality the TSF shall unlock the authentication functionality :
the user can try again to log on (FIA_AFL.1.1).
FIA_PMG_EXT.1/LOCALMNGT - PASSWORD MANAGEMENT
FIA_PMG_EXT.1.1/localMngt
The TSF shall provide the following password management capabilities for (refinement) Local Administrator and
Local Operator passwords:
– Passwords shall be able to be composed of any combination of upper and lower case letters, numbers, and the
following special characters: "!", "@", "#", "$", "%", "^", "&", "*", "(", ")", "+", ",", "-", ".", "/", ":", ";", "<", "=",
">", "?", "[", "\", "]", "_", "{", "|", and "}";
– (refinement) Password length shall be of (refinement) 8 characters or greater;
– (refinement) Password is composed with at least 1 upper case letter, 1 lower case letter, 1 number and
1 special character;
6.1.5.3. Local Management Sessions
FTA_SSL_EXT.1/LOCALMNGT - TSF-INITIATED SESSION LOCKING
FTA_SSL_EXT.1.1/localMngt
The TSF shall, for local interactive session terminate the session after (refinement) three (3) minutes of user
inactivity.
FTA_SSL.4/LOCALMNGT - USER-INITIATED TERMINATION
FTA_SSL.4.1/localMngt
The TSF shall allow (refinement) Local Administrator and Local Operator-initiated termination of the
(refinement) (respectively) Local Administrator's and Local Operator's own interactive session.
FTA_TAB.1/LOCALMNGT - DEFAULT TOE ACCESS BANNERS
FTA_TAB.1.1/localMngt
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83051027-DDQ-TCS-FR-003
Before establishing a (refinement) Local Administrator and Local Operator user session, the TSF shall display
(refinement) a security specified advisory (refinement) notice and consent warning message regarding
unauthorised use of the TOE.
6.1.6. TSF MANAGEMENT
FMT_SMF.1 - SPECIFICATION OF MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS
FMT_SMF.1.1
The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions:
– Ability to administer the TOE locally and remotely
– Ability to update the TOE, and to verify the updates using digital signature capability prior to installing
those updates (TSF Software upgrade)
– Ability to configure the cryptographic functionality
– TOE Supervision
FMT_MOF.1/LOCALMNGT - MANAGEMENT OF SECURITY FUNCTIONS BEHAVIOUR
FMT_MOF.1.1/localMngt
The TSF shall restrict the ability to disable and enable the functions Local Operator role to TOE Management
Centre Device.
Application note :
Disabling Local Operator role means that no user can log on the TOE as an operator.
FMT_MTD.1/QUERY - MANAGEMENT OF TSF DATA (CONFIGURATION AND STATUS VIEWING)
FMT_MTD.1.1/query
The TSF shall restrict the ability to query the TSF configuration and the TOE status, that is the following data:
– D.SECURITY_POLICIES
– D.CONFIG_PARAM
– D.TIME_BASE
to Local Administrator, to Local Operator and to TOE Management Centre Device.
FMT_MTD.1/SUPERVISION - MANAGEMENT OF TSF DATA (SUPERVISION)
FMT_MTD.1.1/supervision
The TSF shall restrict the ability to query the TSF supervision data, that is the following data:
– D.SUPERVISION_DATA
to Local Administrator and TOE Management Centre Device.
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approval.
83051027-DDQ-TCS-FR-003
FPT_SKP_EXT.1 - PROTECTION OF TSF DATA (FOR READING OF SENSITIVE KEYS)
FPT_SKP_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall prevent reading all pre-shared keys, symmetric keys, private keys (refinement) that is:
– D.CRYPTO_KEYS
– D.IKE_SAs_CRYPTO_KEYS
– D.DISTRIB_SAs_CRYPTO_KEYS
FMT_MTD.1/CONFIGURATION - MANAGEMENT OF TSF DATA (CONFIGURATION MODIFICATION)
FMT_MTD.1.1/configuration
The TSF shall restrict the ability to modify the TSF configuration, that is the following data:
– D.SECURITY_POLICIES
– D.CONFIG_PARAM
to TOE Management Centre Device.
FMT_MTD.1/DATETIME - MANAGEMENT OF TSF DATA (DATE AND TIME MODIFICATION)
FMT_MTD.1.1/dateTime
The TSF shall restrict the ability to modify the TSF date and time, that is the following data:
– D.TIME_BASE
to Local Administrator and TOE Management Centre Device.
FMT_MTD.1/KEYS - MANAGEMENT OF TSF DATA (KEYS INJECTION)
FMT_MTD.1.1/keys
The TSF shall restrict the ability to modify the value of (i.e. to inject) the keys
– D.CRYPTO_KEYS
to Local Administrator and to TOE Management centre device
.
FMT_MTD.1/KEYLIFETIME - MANAGEMENT OF TSF DATA (KEY LIFETIME)
FMT_MTD.1.1/keyLifetime
The TSF shall restrict the ability to modify the following key lifetimes:
– IKE SA keys' lifetime
– IKE Child SAs keys' lifetime
– Distributed PSK and derivated keys’ lifetime for distributed mode
to Local Administrator.
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83051027-DDQ-TCS-FR-003
FMT_MTD.1/ADMINPWD - MANAGEMENT OF TSF DATA (LOCAL ADMINISTRATOR PASSWORD)
FMT_MTD.1.1/adminPwd
The TSF shall restrict the ability to modify the password of the Local Administrator to Local Administrator.
FMT_MTD.1/OPEPWD - MANAGEMENT OF TSF DATA (LOCAL OPERATOR PASSWORD)
FMT_MTD.1.1/opePwd
The TSF shall restrict the ability to modify the password of the Local Operator to Local Administrator and
Local Operator.
FMT_MTD.1/SOFTWARE - MANAGEMENT OF TSF DATA (SOFTWARE UPDATE)
FMT_MTD.1.1/software
The TSF shall restrict the ability to update the TOE software (D.SOFTWARES) to Local Administrator and
Management centre device.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1/SOFTWARE - EXTENDED : TRUSTED UPDATE
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.1/software
The TSF shall provide (refinement) Local Administrator, Local Operator and TOE Management Centre Device
the ability to query the current version of the TOE firmware/software.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.2/software
The TSF shall provide (refinement) Local Administrator and TOE Management Centre Device the ability to
initiate updates to TOE firmware/software.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.3/software
The TSF shall provide a means to verify firmware/software updates to the TOE using a digital signature
mechanism prior to installing those updates.
FPT_APW_EXT.1 - EXTENDED: PROTECTION OF PASSWORDS
FPT_APW_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall store passwords in non-plaintext form.
FPT_APW_EXT.1.2
The TSF shall prevent the reading of plaintext passwords.
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Security. They cannot be reproduced, disclosed or used without the company's prior written
approval.
83051027-DDQ-TCS-FR-003
6.1.7. MISCELLANEOUS
FPT_FLS.1 - FAIL WITH PRESERVATION OF SECURE STATE
FPT_FLS.1.1
The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of failures occur: self-test failure.
FPT_TST.1 - TSF TESTING
FPT_TST.1.1
The TSF shall run a suite of self tests during initial start-up and at the request of the authorised user to
demonstrate the correct operation of following parts of the TSF:
– All cryptographic operations (all FCS_COP.1 requirements)
– Hardware parts used by the TSF : RAM, network interfaces, …
FPT_TST.1.2
The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of
– D.SECURITY_POLICIES
– D.CONFIG_PARAM
– D.CRYPTO_KEYS
– D.AUTHENTICATION_DATA
FPT_TST.1.3
The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of stored TSF executable code.
Application note :
FPT_TST.1.2 shall be implemented using keyed-cryptographic mechanisms.
FPT_TST.1.3 shall be implemented using cryptographic mechanisms, not necessarely keyed-mechanisms (such as digest calculation).
FPT_SDP_EXT.2 - STORED TSF DATA PROTECTION CAPABILITY AND ACTION
FPT_SDP_EXT.2.1
The TSF shall protect
– D.SECURITY_POLICIES
– D.CONFIG_PARAM
– D.CRYPTO_KEYS
– D.AUTHENTICATION_DATA
stored in containers controlled by the TSF from disclosure and shall detect integrity errors on those data
(refinement) using FCS_COP.1/aes-gcmLocalData.
FPT_SDP_EXT.2.2
Upon detection of a data integrity error, the TSF shall
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83051027-DDQ-TCS-FR-003
– generate an event (FAU_GEN.1),
– and preserve a secure state (FPT_FLS.1).
FDP_RIP.2 - FULL RESIDUAL INFORMATION PROTECTION
FDP_RIP.2.1
The TSF shall ensure that any previous information content of a resource is made unavailable upon the
deallocation of the resource from all objects.
Application note :
"Resources" in the context of this requirement are network packets being sent through (as opposed to "to", as is the case when an administrator
connects to the TOE) the TOE. The concern is that once a network packet is sent, the buffer or memory area used by the packet still contains
data from that packet, and that if that buffer is re-used, those data might remain and make their way into a new packet.
6.2. SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS
The security target claims an EAL3 security assurance level augmented with AVA_VAN.3 and ALC_FLR.3.
Assurance requirements for this level are:
– ADV_ARC.1
– ADV_FSP.3
– ADV_TDS.2
– AGD_OPE.1
– AGD_PRE.1
– ALC_CMC.3
– ALC_CMS.3
– ALC_DEL.1
– ALC_DVS.1
– ALC_FLR.3
– ALC_LCD.1
– ASE_CCL.1
– ASE_ECD.1
– ASE_INT.1
– ASE_OBJ.2
– ASE_REQ.2
– ASE_SPD.1
– ASE_TSS.1
– ATE_COV.2
– ATE_DPT.1
– ATE_FUN.1
– ATE_IND.2
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83051027-DDQ-TCS-FR-003
– AVA_VAN.3
6.3. RATIONALE FOR THE SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
6.3.1. RATIONALE FOR THE SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS
6.3.1.1. Security Objectives for the TOE
O.PROTECTED_COMMUNICATIONS
This security objective is covered in one hand by the security requirements FTP_ITC.1/TOE, FDP_UCT.1/TOE and
FDP_UIT.1/TOE which require the TSF to provide a trusted communication channel between itself and a remote
instance of the TOE that protect data from disclosure, modification, insertion and replay.
In another hand, the security objective is covered by FCS_IPS_EXT.1 which requires the trusted channel to
implement IPSec and IKE.
Finally the security objective is covered by all cryptographic operations used by IPSec and IKE, that is :
FCS_COP.1/aes-cbc, FCS_COP.1/aes-gcm, FCS_COP.1/aes-xcbc, FCS_COP.1/hmac,
FCS_COP.1/hmacTrunc and FCS_COP.1/prf-sha.
O.POL_ENFORCEMENT
This security objective is covered by the VPN enforcement policy FDP_IFC.1/VPN, FDP_IFF.1/VPN,
FDP_ITC.2/VPN and FDP_ETC.2/VPN, because it controls IP datagrams flows by enforcing them security rules
and services.
FMT_MSA.3 supports FDP_IFF.1 by providing default values.
O.FLOW_PARTITIONING
This objective is covered by the VPN enforcement policy (FDP_IFC.1/VPN, FDP_IFF.1/VPN and
FDP_ETC.2/VPN), because it controls the sending of IP datagrams on the appropriate subnetworks of private
network.
FMT_MSA.3 supports FDP_IFF.1 by providing default values.
O.AUDIT
This security objective is covered by the capability of the TSF to generate audit records data (FAU_GEN.1).
FAU_GEN.2 requires the TSF to associate each audit data with the identity of the user or the network device that
caused the event.
FAU_STG_EXT.1 ensures the audit data to be recorded (by an external device), since the TSF does not locally
store generated audit records. If the link with this external device is not available, FAU_STG_EXT.3 requires the
TSF to generate a critical security event in order to inform a local user (refer to O.LED).
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83051027-DDQ-TCS-FR-003
O.TIME_BASE
This objective is covered by the requirement FPT_STM.1 on one hand, and by FDP_IFC.1/ntp and FDP_IFF.1/ntp
on the other hand..
O.AUDIT_PROTECTION
This security objective is covered by FAU_STG_EXT.1 which requires the TSF to send all audit records data to an
external device since the TSF does not locally stores audit data.
If the link with this external device is not available, FAU_STG_EXT.3 requires the TSF to generate a critical
security event in order to inform a local user (refer to O.VISUAL).
The external device is the management centre, the link between the TOE and the external device is therefore a
protected management communication channel (i.e. an IPSec VPN). FTP_ITC.1/TOE, FCS_IPS_EXT.1,
FDP_UCT.1/TOE, FDP_UIT.1/TOE provide the appropriate requirements (as for
O.PROTECTED_COMMUNICATIONS).
O.SUPERVISION
This objective is covered by FMT_SMF.1 and FMT_MTD.1/Supervision.
O.SUPERVISION_IMPACT
This objective is covered by all policies concerning TOE sensitive assets by restricting access to operations
handling these assets: FDP_IFC.1/VPN, FDP_IFF.1/VPN, FDP_IFC.1/keysInjection and
FDP_IFF.1/keysInjection.
FMT_MSA.3 supports FDP_IFF.1 by providing default values.
Furthermore, for the same reasons this objective is covered by all requirements concerning the TSF data
management: FMT_MTD.1/query, FMT_MTD.1/configuration, FMT_MTD.1/keys and FMT_MTD.1/keyLifetime.
O.VISUAL_ALARMS
This security objective is covered by FAU_GEN_EXT.3.
O.ROLES
This security objectives is covered by FMT_SMR.1/user and FMT_SMR.1/devices which respectively define roles
for users and roles for devices the TSF shall maintain.
O.I&A
This security objective is covered by FIA_UID.2/sgc and FIA_UIA_EXT.1/localMngt which require identification of
devices and authentication of users before granting access to security functions. FPT_APW_EXT.1 supports
FIA_UIA by requiring password protection.
Authentication of users is password based (FIA_UAU_EXT.2/localMngt).
Brute force attacks are countered by requiring specific rules for users' passwords (FIA_PMG_EXT.1/localMngt),
and eavedropping by requiring protected feedback (FIA_UAU.7/localMngt).
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Security. They cannot be reproduced, disclosed or used without the company's prior written
approval.
83051027-DDQ-TCS-FR-003
O.AUTHENTICATION_FAILURE
This security objective is covered by FIA_AFL.1/localMngt.
O.DISPLAY_BANNER
This security objective is covered by FTA_TAB.1/localMngt.
O.SESSION_LOCK
This security objective is covered by FTA_SSL_EXT.1/localMngt and FTA_SSL.4/localMngt.
O.MANAGEMENT
This security objective is covered by FMT_SMF.1. All instances of FMT_MTD.1 (except those about viewing
(query) and supervision), FPT_TUD_EXT.1/software, FIA_UAU.6/localMngt and FMT_MOF.1/localMngt provide
details on management functionalities.
O.VIEW
This security objective is covered by the protection policy of TSF configuration and cryptographic keys
(FMT_SMF.1, FMT_MDT.1/query, FMT_SKP_EXT.1, FPT_TUD_EXT.1/software) by controlling their access to
the action allowing review.
O.POL_VIEW
This security objective is covered by the protection policy of VPN security policies (FMT_MTD.1/query) by
controlling access to the action allowing review of VPN security policies and of their contexts.
O.RESIDUAL_INFORMATION_CLEAR
This security objective is covered by FDP_RIP.2.
O.DATA_ERASURE
This security objective is covered by FPT_SIE_EXT.1/allPlainTextData. FCS_CKM_EXT.4/anyPlainTextData
gives the method of erasure.
O.LOCAL_DATA_PROTECTION
This security objective is covered by FPT_SDP_EXT.2 and cryptography operation FCS_COP.1/aes-
gcmLocalData.
O.SOFTWARE_UPDATES
This security objective is covered by FPT_TUD_EXT.1/software and cryptography operation FCS_COP.1/aes-
cbcSw, FCS_COP.1/aes-xcbcSw and FCS_COP.1/ecdsaSw.
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Security. They cannot be reproduced, disclosed or used without the company's prior written
approval.
83051027-DDQ-TCS-FR-003
O.KEYS_INJECTION
This objective is covered by the keys injection policy (FDP_IFC.1/keysInjection, FDP_IFF.1/keysInjection,
FDP_ITC.2/pskIKE, and FDP_ITC.2/pskDistribMode) which controls keys flows of keys injection. In addition,
FDP_UCT.1/keysInjection and FDP_UIT.1/keysInjection ensure the integrity of all keys and the confidentiality of
secret keys during their transmission.
FMT_MSA.3 supports FDP_IFF.1/keysInjection, providing default values.
FPT_TDC.1/keysInjection supports FDP_ITC.2/pskIKE and FDP_ITC.2/pskDistribMode, providing data
consistency check.
O.CRYPTOPERIOD
This security objective is covered by all instances of FCS_CKM_EXT.5 security requirements.
O.CRYPTO_REGULATION
This objective is covered by requirements concerning cryptographic keys and cryptographic operations:
FCS_RBG_EXT.1, FCS_CKM.3/keyRenewal, FCS_CKM.4/anyPlainTextData, and all instances of FCS_COP.1.
O.SELF_TEST
This security objective is covered by FPT_TST.1. In case of self-test failure, the TSF shall preserve a secure state
(FPT_FLS.1).
6.3.2. TABLES
Security objectives SFR
O.PROTECTED_COMMUNICATIONS FCS_COP.1/aes-cbc
FDP_UCT.1/TOE
FDP_UIT.1/TOE
FTP_ITC.1/TOE
FCS_COP.1/aes-xcbc
FCS_COP.1/aes-gcm
FCS_COP.1/hmac
FCS_COP.1/hmacTrunc
FCS_IPS_EXT.1
FCS_COP.1/prf-sha
O.POL_ENFORCEMENT FDP_IFC.1/VPN
FDP_IFF.1/VPN
FMT_MSA.3
FDP_ITC.2/VPN
FDP_ETC.2/VPN
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83051027-DDQ-TCS-FR-003
Security objectives SFR
O.FLOW_PARTITIONING FDP_IFC.1/VPN
FDP_IFF.1/VPN
FMT_MSA.3
FDP_ETC.2/VPN
O.AUDIT FAU_GEN.1
FAU_GEN.2
FAU_STG_EXT.1
FAU_STG_EXT.3
O.TIME_BASE FPT_STM.1
FDP_IFC.1/ntp
FDP_IFF.1/ntp
O.AUDIT_PROTECTION FDP_UCT.1/TOE
FDP_UIT.1/TOE
FAU_STG_EXT.1
FAU_STG_EXT.3
FTP_ITC.1/TOE
FCS_IPS_EXT.1
O.SUPERVISION FMT_SMF.1
FMT_MTD.1/supervision
O.SUPERVISION_IMPACT FDP_IFC.1/VPN
FDP_IFF.1/VPN
FMT_MSA.3
FMT_MTD.1/query
FMT_MTD.1/configuration
FMT_MTD.1/keys
FMT_MTD.1/keyLifetime
FDP_IFC.1/keysInjection
FDP_IFF.1/keysInjection
O.VISUAL_ALARMS FAU_GEN_EXT.3
O.ROLES FMT_SMR.1/user
FMT_SMR.1/devices
O.I&A FIA_PMG_EXT.1/localMngt
FIA_UIA_EXT.1/localMngt
FIA_UID.2/sgc
FIA_UAU.7/localMngt
FIA_UAU_EXT.2/localMngt
FPT_APW_EXT.1
O.AUTHENTICATION_FAILURE FIA_AFL.1/localMngt
O.DISPLAY_BANNER FTA_TAB.1/localMngt
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83051027-DDQ-TCS-FR-003
Security objectives SFR
O.SESSION_LOCK FTA_SSL_EXT.1/localMngt
FTA_SSL.4/localMngt
O.MANAGEMENT FIA_UAU.6/localMngt
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_MOF.1/localMngt
FMT_MTD.1/configuration
FMT_MTD.1/keys
FMT_MTD.1/adminPwd
FMT_MTD.1/software
FPT_TUD_EXT.1/software
FMT_MTD.1/keyLifetime
FMT_MTD.1/opePwd
FMT_MTD.1/dateTime
O.VIEW FMT_SMF.1
FMT_MTD.1/query
FPT_SKP_EXT.1
FPT_TUD_EXT.1/software
O.POL_VIEW FMT_MTD.1/query
O.RESIDUAL_INFORMATION_CLEAR FDP_RIP.2
O.DATA_ERASURE FCS_CKM_EXT.4/anyPlainTextData
FPT_SIE_EXT.1/allPlainTextData
O.LOCAL_DATA_PROTECTION FPT_SDP_EXT.2
FCS_COP.1/aes-gcmLocalData
O.SOFTWARE_UPDATES FCS_COP.1/ecdsaSw
FPT_TUD_EXT.1/software
FCS_COP.1/aes-cbcSw
FCS_COP.1/aes-xcbcSw
O.KEYS_INJECTION FDP_ITC.2/pskDistribmode
FMT_MSA.3
FDP_ITC.2/pskIKE
FDP_UCT.1/keysInjection
FDP_UIT.1/keysInjection
FDP_IFC.1/keysInjection
FDP_IFF.1/keysInjection
FPT_TDC.1/keysInjection
O.CRYPTOPERIOD FCS_CKM_EXT.5/pskDistribMode
FCS_CKM_EXT.5/deriv-pskDistribMode
FCS_CKM_EXT.5/ikeV2childSA
FCS_CKM_EXT.5/ikeV2SA
FCS_CKM_EXT.5/pskIKE
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83051027-DDQ-TCS-FR-003
Security objectives SFR
O.CRYPTO_REGULATION FCS_CKM_EXT.4/anyPlainTextData
FCS_COP.1/aes-cbc
FCS_RBG_EXT.1
FCS_COP.1/ecdsaSw
FCS_CKM.3/keyRenewal
FCS_COP.1/aes-xcbc
FCS_COP.1/aes-gcm
FCS_COP.1/sha
FCS_COP.1/hmac
FCS_COP.1/hmacTrunc
FCS_COP.1/prf-sha
FCS_COP.1/aes-cbcSw
FCS_COP.1/aes-xcbcSw
FCS_COP.1/aes-gcmLocalData
O.SELF_TEST FPT_FLS.1
FPT_TST.1
6.3.3. RATIONALE FOR THE SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS
The TOE evaluation is performed through the ANSSI "Qualification" process, claiming a "Standard" assurance
level. This level requires a CC EAL3 security assurance level augmented with ALC_FLR.3 and AVA_VAN.3.
6.3.4. AVA_VAN.3 FOCUSED VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS
This augmentation is required by the ANSSI "Qualification" process at "Standard" level.
6.3.5. ALC_FLR.3 SYSTEMATIC FLAW REMEDIATION
This augmentation is required by the ANSSI "Qualification" process at "Standard" level.
6.3.6. DEPENDENCIES
6.3.6.1. Dependencies for the Security Functional Requirements
SFR CC dependencies Satisfied dependencies
FAU_GEN.1 (FPT_STM.1) FPT_STM.1
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SFR CC dependencies Satisfied dependencies
FAU_GEN.2 (FAU_GEN.1)
et (FIA_UID.1)
FAU_GEN.1
FIA_UIA_EXT.1/localMngt
FIA_UID.2/sgc
FAU_GEN_EXT.3 (FAU_GEN.1) FAU_GEN.1
FAU_STG_EXT.1 (FAU_GEN.1)
et (FTP_ITC.1)
FAU_GEN.1
FTP_ITC.1/TOE
FAU_STG_EXT.3 FAU_STG_EXT.1 FAU_STG_EXT.1
FPT_STM.1 No dependencies.
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 No dependencies.
FCS_CKM.3/keyRenewal (FCS_CKM.1 ou FDP_ITC.1 ou FDP_ITC.2)
et (FCS_CKM.4)
FCS_CKM_EXT.4/anyPlainTextData
FCS_RBG_EXT.1
FDP_ITC.2/pskDistribmode
FDP_ITC.2/pskIKE
FCS_CKM_EXT.4/anyPlainTextData (FCS_CKM.1 ou FDP_ITC.1 ou FDP_ITC.2) FDP_ITC.2/pskDistribmode
FCS_RBG_EXT.1
FDP_ITC.2/pskIKE
FCS_CKM_EXT.5/pskDistribMode (FCS_CKM.1 ou FDP_ITC.1 ou FDP_ITC.2)
et (FCS_CKM_EXT.4)
et (FPT_STM.1)
FPT_STM.1
FCS_CKM_EXT.4/anyPlainTextData
FDP_ITC.2/pskDistribmode
FCS_CKM_EXT.5/deriv-pskDistribMode (FCS_CKM.1 ou FDP_ITC.1 ou FDP_ITC.2)
et (FCS_CKM_EXT.4)
et (FPT_STM.1)
FPT_STM.1
FCS_CKM_EXT.4/anyPlainTextData
FCS_CKM_EXT.5/pskIKE (FCS_CKM.1 ou FDP_ITC.1 ou FDP_ITC.2)
et (FCS_CKM.4)
et (FPT_STM.1)
FPT_STM.1
FCS_CKM_EXT.4/anyPlainTextData
FDP_ITC.2/pskIKE
FCS_CKM_EXT.5/ikeV2SA (FCS_CKM.1 ou FDP_ITC.1 ou FDP_ITC.2)
et (FCS_CKM.4)
et (FPT_STM.1)
FPT_STM.1
FCS_CKM_EXT.4/anyPlainTextData
FCS_IPS_EXT.1
FCS_CKM_EXT.5/ikeV2childSA (FCS_CKM.1 ou FDP_ITC.1 ou FDP_ITC.2)
et (FCS_CKM.4)
et (FPT_STM.1)
FPT_STM.1
FCS_CKM_EXT.4/anyPlainTextData
FCS_IPS_EXT.1
FPT_SIE_EXT.1/allPlainTextData No dependencies.
FCS_COP.1/aes-cbc (FCS_CKM.1 ou FDP_ITC.1 ou FDP_ITC.2)
et (FCS_CKM.4)
FCS_CKM_EXT.4/anyPlainTextData
FCS_IPS_EXT.1
FCS_COP.1/aes-gcm (FCS_CKM.1 ou FDP_ITC.1 ou FDP_ITC.2)
et (FCS_CKM.4)
FCS_CKM_EXT.4/anyPlainTextData
FCS_IPS_EXT.1
FCS_COP.1/aes-xcbc (FCS_CKM.1 ou FDP_ITC.1 ou FDP_ITC.2)
et (FCS_CKM.4)
FCS_CKM_EXT.4/anyPlainTextData
FCS_IPS_EXT.1
FCS_COP.1/aes-cbcSw (FCS_CKM.1 ou FDP_ITC.1 ou FDP_ITC.2)
et (FCS_CKM.4)
FPT_TUD_EXT.1/software
THALES Communications & Security 63 295 297 - 306 -A Lite A4 114/128
Ce document et les informations qu'il contient sont la propriété de THALES Communications &
Security. Ils ne peuvent être reproduits, communiqués ou utilisés sans son autorisation écrite
préalable.
This document and any data included are the property of THALES Communications &
Security. They cannot be reproduced, disclosed or used without the company's prior written
approval.
83051027-DDQ-TCS-FR-003
SFR CC dependencies Satisfied dependencies
FCS_COP.1/aes-xcbcSw (FCS_CKM.1 ou FDP_ITC.1 ou FDP_ITC.2)
et (FCS_CKM.4)
FPT_TUD_EXT.1/software
FCS_COP.1/ecdsaSw (FCS_CKM.1 ou FDP_ITC.1 ou FDP_ITC.2)
et (FCS_CKM.4)
FPT_TUD_EXT.1/software
FCS_COP.1/aes-gcmLocalData (FCS_CKM.1 ou FDP_ITC.1 ou FDP_ITC.2)
et (FCS_CKM.4)
FCS_CKM_EXT.4/anyPlainTextData
FCS_RBG_EXT.1
FCS_COP.1/sha (FCS_CKM.1 ou FDP_ITC.1 ou FDP_ITC.2)
et (FCS_CKM.4)
FCS_COP.1/hmac (FCS_CKM.1 ou FDP_ITC.1 ou FDP_ITC.2)
et (FCS_CKM.4)
FCS_CKM_EXT.4/anyPlainTextData
FDP_ITC.2/pskDistribmode
FCS_RBG_EXT.1
FDP_ITC.2/pskIKE
FCS_COP.1/hmacTrunc (FCS_CKM.1 ou FDP_ITC.1 ou FDP_ITC.2)
et (FCS_CKM.4)
FCS_CKM_EXT.4/anyPlainTextData
FDP_ITC.2/pskDistribmode
FCS_RBG_EXT.1
FDP_ITC.2/pskIKE
FCS_COP.1/prf-sha (FCS_CKM.1 ou FDP_ITC.1 ou FDP_ITC.2)
et (FCS_CKM.4)
FCS_CKM_EXT.4/anyPlainTextData
FDP_ITC.2/pskDistribmode
FDP_ITC.2/pskIKE
FTP_ITC.1/TOE No dependencies.
FDP_UCT.1/TOE (FDP_ACC.1 ou FDP_IFC.1)
et (FTP_ITC.1 ou FTP_TRP.1)
FDP_IFC.1/VPN
FTP_ITC.1/TOE
FDP_UIT.1/TOE (FDP_ACC.1 ou FDP_IFC.1)
et (FTP_ITC.1 ou FTP_TRP.1)
FDP_IFC.1/VPN
FTP_ITC.1/TOE
FCS_IPS_EXT.1 (FDP_ITC.1)
et (FCS_COP.1)
FCS_COP.1/aes-cbc
FDP_ITC.2/pskDistribmode
FCS_COP.1/aes-xcbc
FCS_COP.1/aes-gcm
FCS_COP.1/sha
FCS_COP.1/hmac
FCS_COP.1/hmacTrunc
FCS_COP.1/prf-sha
FDP_ITC.2/pskIKE
FDP_ITC.2/VPN (FDP_ACC.1 or
FDP_IFC.1)
and (FTP_ITC.1 or
FTP_TRP.1)
and (FPT_TDC.1)
FDP_IFC.1/VPN
FDP_ETC.2/VPN (FDP_ACC.1 or
FDP_IFC.1)
FDP_IFC.1/VPN
THALES Communications & Security 63 295 297 - 306 -A Lite A4 115/128
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Security. Ils ne peuvent être reproduits, communiqués ou utilisés sans son autorisation écrite
préalable.
This document and any data included are the property of THALES Communications &
Security. They cannot be reproduced, disclosed or used without the company's prior written
approval.
83051027-DDQ-TCS-FR-003
SFR CC dependencies Satisfied dependencies
FDP_IFC.1/VPN (FDP_IFF.1) FDP_IFF.1/VPN
FDP_IFF.1/VPN (FDP_IFC.1) et (FMT_MSA.3) FDP_IFC.1/VPN
FMT_MSA.3
FDP_ITC.2/pskDistribmode (FDP_ACC.1 or
FDP_IFC.1)
and (FTP_ITC.1 or
FTP_TRP.1)
and (FPT_TDC.1)
FTP_ITC.1/TOE
FDP_IFC.1/keysInjection
FPT_TDC.1/keysInjection
FDP_ITC.2/pskIKE (FDP_ACC.1 or
FDP_IFC.1)
and (FTP_ITC.1 or
FTP_TRP.1)
and (FPT_TDC.1)
FTP_ITC.1/TOE
FDP_IFC.1/keysInjection
FPT_TDC.1/keysInjection
FDP_UCT.1/keysInjection (FDP_ACC.1 ou FDP_IFC.1)
et (FTP_ITC.1 ou FTP_TRP.1)
FDP_ITC.2/pskDistribmode
FDP_ITC.2/pskIKE
FDP_IFC.1/keysInjection
FDP_UIT.1/keysInjection (FDP_ACC.1 ou FDP_IFC.1)
et (FTP_ITC.1 ou FTP_TRP.1)
FDP_ITC.2/pskDistribmode
FDP_ITC.2/pskIKE
FDP_IFC.1/keysInjection
FDP_IFC.1/keysInjection (FDP_IFF.1) FDP_IFF.1/keysInjection
FDP_IFF.1/keysInjection (FDP_IFC.1) et (FMT_MSA.3) FMT_MSA.3
FDP_IFC.1/keysInjection
FPT_TDC.1/keysInjection No dependencies.
FDP_IFC.1/ntp (FDP_IFF.1) FDP_IFF.1/ntp
FDP_IFF.1/ntp (FDP_IFC.1) et (FMT_MSA.3) FMT_MSA.3
FDP_IFC.1/ntp
FMT_MSA.3 (FMT_MSA.1)
et (FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMR.1/user (FIA_UID.1) FIA_UIA_EXT.1/localMngt
FMT_SMR.1/devices (FIA_UID.1) FIA_UID.2/sgc
FIA_UID.2/sgc No dependencies.
FIA_UIA_EXT.1/localMngt (FTA_TAB.1) FTA_TAB.1/localMngt
FIA_UAU_EXT.2/localMngt No dependencies.
FIA_UAU.6/localMngt No dependencies.
FIA_UAU.7/localMngt (FIA_UAU.1) FIA_UIA_EXT.1/localMngt
FIA_AFL.1/localMngt (FIA_UAU.1) FIA_UIA_EXT.1/localMngt
FIA_PMG_EXT.1/localMngt No dependencies.
FTA_SSL_EXT.1/localMngt No dependencies.
FTA_SSL.4/localMngt No dependencies.
FTA_TAB.1/localMngt No dependencies.
THALES Communications & Security 63 295 297 - 306 -A Lite A4 116/128
Ce document et les informations qu'il contient sont la propriété de THALES Communications &
Security. Ils ne peuvent être reproduits, communiqués ou utilisés sans son autorisation écrite
préalable.
This document and any data included are the property of THALES Communications &
Security. They cannot be reproduced, disclosed or used without the company's prior written
approval.
83051027-DDQ-TCS-FR-003
SFR CC dependencies Satisfied dependencies
FMT_SMF.1 No dependencies.
FMT_MOF.1/localMngt (FMT_SMF.1)
et (FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1/devices
FMT_MTD.1/query (FMT_SMF.1)
et (FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMR.1/user
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1/devices
FMT_MTD.1/supervision (FMT_SMF.1)
et (FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMR.1/user
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1/devices
FPT_SKP_EXT.1 No dependencies.
FMT_MTD.1/configuration (FMT_SMF.1)
et (FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMR.1/user
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1/devices
FMT_MTD.1/dateTime (FMT_SMF.1)
et (FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMR.1/user
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1/devices
FMT_MTD.1/keys (FMT_SMF.1)
et (FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMR.1/user
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1/devices
FMT_MTD.1/keyLifetime (FMT_SMF.1)
et (FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMR.1/user
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1/devices
FMT_MTD.1/adminPwd (FMT_SMF.1)
et (FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMR.1/user
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_MTD.1/opePwd (FMT_SMF.1)
et (FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMR.1/user
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_MTD.1/software (FMT_SMF.1)
et (FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMR.1/user
FMT_SMF.1
FPT_TUD_EXT.1/software (FCS_COP.1) FCS_COP.1/ecdsaSw
FPT_APW_EXT.1 No dependencies.
FPT_FLS.1 No dependencies.
FPT_TST.1 No dependencies.
FPT_SDP_EXT.2 No dependencies.
FDP_RIP.2 No dependencies.
6.3.6.1.1. Rationale for the Unsatisfied Dependencies
SFR SFR unsatisfied dependencies
FCS_CKM_EXT.5/ikeV2SA FCS_CKM.1 ou FDP_ITC.1 ou FDP_ITC.2 dependency of FCS_CKM_EXT.5/ikeV2SA is unsatisfied,
because it is replaced by FCS_IPS_EXT.1 because cryptographic key generation is done during the IKE
negociation key phase.
THALES Communications & Security 63 295 297 - 306 -A Lite A4 117/128
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Security. Ils ne peuvent être reproduits, communiqués ou utilisés sans son autorisation écrite
préalable.
This document and any data included are the property of THALES Communications &
Security. They cannot be reproduced, disclosed or used without the company's prior written
approval.
83051027-DDQ-TCS-FR-003
SFR SFR unsatisfied dependencies
FCS_CKM_EXT.5/ikeV2childSA FCS_CKM.1 or FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 dependency of FCS_CKM_EXT.5/ikeV2childSA is
unsatisfied, because it is replaced by FCS_IPS_EXT.1 because cryptographic key generation is done
during the IKE negociation key phase.
FCS_CKM_EXT.5/deriv-
pskDistribMode
FCS_CKM.1 or FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 dependency of FCS_CKM_EXT.5/deriv-pskDistribMode
unsatisfied, because cryptographic key generation is done by derivation of the distributed mode PSK .
FCS_COP.1/aes-cbc FCS_CKM.1 or FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 dependency of FCS_COP.1/aes-cbc is unsatisfied,
because it is replaced by FCS_IPS_EXT.1 because cryptographic keys are negotiated via IKE protocol.
FCS_COP.1/aes-xcbc FCS_CKM.1 or FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 dependency of FCS_COP.1/aes-xcbc is unsatisfied,
because it is replaced by FCS_IPS_EXT.1 because cryptographic keys are negotiated via IKE protocol.
FCS_COP.1/aes-cbcSw FCS_CKM.1 or FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 dependency of FCS_COP.1/aes-cbcSw is unsatisfied,
because it is replaced by the software update itself (FPT_TUD_EXT.1/software) : cryptographic keys are
renewed during this operation.
FCS_CKM_EXT.4 dependency of FCS_COP.1/aes-cbcSw is unsatisfied, because no emergency
erasing of software update keys is performed out of the software update itself.
FCS_COP.1/aes-xcbcSw FCS_CKM.1 or FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 dependency of FCS_COP.1/aes-xcbcSw is unsatisfied,
because it is replaced by the software update itself (FPT_TUD_EXT.1/software) : cryptographic keys are
renewed during this operation.
FCS_CKM_EXT.4 dependency of FCS_COP.1/aes-xcbcSw is unsatisfied, because no emergency
erasing of software update keys is performed out of the software update itself.
FCS_COP.1/ecdsaSw FCS_CKM.1 or FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 dependency of FCS_COP.1/ecdsaSw is unsatisfied,
because it is replaced by the software update itself (FPT_TUD_EXT.1/software) : cryptographic keys are
renwed during this operation.
FCS_CKM_EXT.4 dependency of FCS_COP.1/ecdsaSw is unsatisfied, because no emergency
erasing of software update keys is performed out of the software update itself.
FCS_COP.1/aes-gcmLocalData FCS_CKM.1 or FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 dependency of FCS_COP.1/aes-gcmLocalData is
unsatisfied, because it is replaced by FCS_RBG_EXT.1 which randomly generates the local data
protection key.
FCS_COP.1/sha FCS_COP.1/sha dependencies are unsatsified, because SHA cryptographic function does not require
use of cryptographic keys.
FCS_IPS_EXT.1 FDP_ITC.1 dependency of FCS_IPS_EXT.1 is unsatisfied, because it is replaced by
FDP_ITC.2/pskIKE and FDP_ITC.2/pskDistribmode which offers better protection during import of user
data.
FMT_MSA.3 FMT_MSA.1 and FMT_SMR.1 dependencies of FMT_MSA.3 are unsatisfied, because default settings
values cannot be modified.
FMT_SMR.1/user FIA_UID.1 dependency of FMT_SMR.1/user is unsatisfied, because it is replaced by
FIA_UIA_EXT.1/localMngt dependency.
FIA_UAU.7/localMngt FIA_UAU.1 dependency of FIA_UAU.7/localMngt is unsatisfied, because it is replaced by the
extended component FIA_UIA_EXT.1/localMngt.
FIA_AFL.1/localMngt FIA_UAU.1 dependency of FIA_AFL.1/localMngt is unsatisfied, because it is replaced by the
extended component FIA_UIA_EXT.1/localMngt.
6.3.6.2. Dependencies for the Security Assurance Requirements
SAR CC dependencies Satisfied dependencies
ADV_ARC.1 (ADV_FSP.1)
et (ADV_TDS.1)
ADV_FSP.3
ADV_TDS.2
ADV_FSP.3 (ADV_TDS.1) ADV_TDS.2
ADV_TDS.2 (ADV_FSP.3) ADV_FSP.3
AGD_OPE.1 (ADV_FSP.1) ADV_FSP.3
THALES Communications & Security 63 295 297 - 306 -A Lite A4 118/128
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Security. Ils ne peuvent être reproduits, communiqués ou utilisés sans son autorisation écrite
préalable.
This document and any data included are the property of THALES Communications &
Security. They cannot be reproduced, disclosed or used without the company's prior written
approval.
83051027-DDQ-TCS-FR-003
SAR CC dependencies Satisfied dependencies
AGD_PRE.1 No dependencies.
ALC_CMC.3 (ALC_CMS.1)
et (ALC_DVS.1)
et (ALC_LCD.1)
ALC_CMS.3
ALC_DVS.1
ALC_LCD.1
ALC_CMS.3 No dependencies.
ALC_DEL.1 No dependencies.
ALC_DVS.1 No dependencies.
ALC_FLR.3 No dependencies.
ALC_LCD.1 No dependencies.
ASE_CCL.1 (ASE_ECD.1)
et (ASE_INT.1)
et (ASE_REQ.1)
ASE_ECD.1
ASE_INT.1
ASE_REQ.2
ASE_ECD.1 No dependencies.
ASE_INT.1 No dependencies.
ASE_OBJ.2 (ASE_SPD.1) ASE_SPD.1
ASE_REQ.2 (ASE_ECD.1)
et (ASE_OBJ.2)
ASE_ECD.1
ASE_OBJ.2
ASE_SPD.1 No dependencies.
ASE_TSS.1 (ADV_FSP.1)
et (ASE_INT.1)
et (ASE_REQ.1)
ADV_FSP.3
ASE_INT.1
ASE_REQ.2
ATE_COV.2 (ADV_FSP.2)
et (ATE_FUN.1)
ADV_FSP.3
ATE_FUN.1
ATE_DPT.1 (ADV_ARC.1)
et (ADV_TDS.2)
et (ATE_FUN.1)
ADV_ARC.1
ADV_TDS.2
ATE_FUN.1
ATE_FUN.1 (ATE_COV.1) ATE_COV.2
ATE_IND.2 (ADV_FSP.2)
et (AGD_OPE.1)
et (AGD_PRE.1)
et (ATE_COV.1)
et (ATE_FUN.1)
ADV_FSP.3
AGD_OPE.1
AGD_PRE.1
ATE_COV.2
ATE_FUN.1
AVA_VAN.3 (ADV_ARC.1)
et (ADV_FSP.4)
et (ADV_IMP.1)
et (ADV_TDS.3)
et (AGD_OPE.1)
et (AGD_PRE.1)
et (ATE_DPT.1)
ADV_ARC.1
AGD_OPE.1
AGD_PRE.1
ATE_DPT.1
THALES Communications & Security 63 295 297 - 306 -A Lite A4 119/128
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Security. Ils ne peuvent être reproduits, communiqués ou utilisés sans son autorisation écrite
préalable.
This document and any data included are the property of THALES Communications &
Security. They cannot be reproduced, disclosed or used without the company's prior written
approval.
83051027-DDQ-TCS-FR-003
6.3.6.2.1. Rationale for the Unsatisfied Dependencies
The dependency ADV_IMP.1 of AVA_VAN.3 is not satisfied. The dependency ADV_IMP.1 is not satisfied as
required by the "Standard" assurance level of the ANSSI "Qualification" process.
The dependency ADV_TDS.3 of AVA_VAN.3 is not satisfied. The dependency ADV_TDS.3 is not satisfied as
required by the "Standard" assurance level of the ANSSI "Qualification" process.
The dependency ADV_FSP.4 of AVA_VAN.3 is not satisfied. The dependency ADV_FSP.4 is not satisfied as
required by the "Standard" assurance level of the ANSSI "Qualification" process.
THALES Communications & Security 63 295 297 - 306 -A Lite A4 120/128
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Security. Ils ne peuvent être reproduits, communiqués ou utilisés sans son autorisation écrite
préalable.
This document and any data included are the property of THALES Communications &
Security. They cannot be reproduced, disclosed or used without the company's prior written
approval.
83051027-DDQ-TCS-FR-003
7. TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATIONS
7.1. SECURITY FUNCTIONS
F.AUDIT AND EVENTS LOGGING
Definitions :
An event is the result of known/specified action in the Mistral system. An event has a unique type and a Syslog
kind severity level. The type is not a sequence number.
There is a special event kind named alarm. An alarm is an event with a severity level strictly superior to the 4th
syslog level: Warning.
Actions performed after each event analysis depend on the equipment state machine.
Same alarms can produce a LED blinking. This functionality is a user configurable global parameter.
Using :
Events are written in a local file based on Syslog format to allow the viewing of past actions history and detected
problems. This file can be distant in case of remote manageable equipment.
Alarms are logged in the event file and can be sent to the Command Line Interface and sent to Management
Centre Devices. Events log file is different from the Syslog files managed by the OS but the Syslog presentation
format is used to store events and alarms.
An alarm filter is provided to prevent flooding of a single alarm such as anti-replay or bad decryption alarms.
F. STORAGE AND PROTECTION OF LOCAL DATA
Definitions :
Data can be gathered in 2 groups:
Permanent data : saved in the non volatile memory of the encryptors between two starts.
Non permanent data : not saved after the shutdown or the retsart of the equipment.
Permanent data are divided in the following groups :
THALES Communications & Security 63 295 297 - 306 -A Lite A4 121/128
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préalable.
This document and any data included are the property of THALES Communications &
Security. They cannot be reproduced, disclosed or used without the company's prior written
approval.
83051027-DDQ-TCS-FR-003
Factory data : default command line interface user profiles. Not erasable, those data are written in concerned
data containers during full erasure.
Hardware data : serial numbers and Ethernet addresses. Set once during the equipment manifacturing and
not erasable after.
Network data : parameters of all network interfaces.
Security data for remote management : security rules (Security Association / Security Policies), keys, IKE
parameters and keys, management centers IP addresses, and other useful parameters for remote
management.
Security data for user data flows : security rules (Security Association / Security Policies) and password
(stored SHA-256 hashed).
Events log file : storage of events/alarms detected by the equipment.
Using :
Permanent data groups are stored in logical separated containers in order to modify and supress them
independently. During an emergency erasing, containers are erased depending on the erasing type (security user’s
rules or complete).
Containers are protected in confidentiality and integrity with AES256-GCM and a key of 256 bits length.
At the equipment start permanent parameters are loaded in the running configuration. Those parameters are used
and stored in RAM while equipment is running.
When the configuration is changed by a user command, the new parameters can be saved in permanent
containers with a special command. It means the saving operation is not mandatory and automatic if the
configuration is changed manually by a user on the command line interface.
If a new configuration is pushed by remote management, a secured configuration file or a smart card, the saving in
permanent containers is automatic.
Erasing of permanent data consists in a writing of 0 followed by a writing of 1 in the memory spaces concerned.
F. KEYS MANAGEMENT
Definitions :
Keys are used for network flows protection and authentication of counterpart equipments.
Keys using :
There are 3 key types in the Mistral system:
- Pre-Shared keys (PSK) : keys given by Mistral management centers and saved between 2 starts;
o peer authentication keys when using IKE protocol (negotiated mode),
THALES Communications & Security 63 295 297 - 306 -A Lite A4 122/128
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préalable.
This document and any data included are the property of THALES Communications &
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83051027-DDQ-TCS-FR-003
o communication channels protection keys when not using IKE protocol (distributed mode)
- Negociated keys : dynamic negociated keys by IKEv2. There are not saved between 2 starts.
- Derivated keys : temporary keys specified by cryptographic algorithms used to perform ciphering and/or
integrity cryptographic primitives for distributed mode.
PSK are stored in the following containers: security data for remote management and security data for user data
flows, depending of their final using (remote management or “user flow”).
Used keys are loaded in the FPGA when cryptographic operations are hardware ones, or in RAM when they are
software ones.
Each key have a lifetime in number of packets and a lifetime in number of days of using. Those parameters are
defined by the management center or manually on the software management interface if the equipment is not
manageable remotely.
F. USERS, CONFIGURATION AND MONITORING
Definitions :
Mistral encryptors are manageable with the command line interface or with management centers and allowed
stations through the network.
Command interface access is limited with the active user profile.
Equipment monitoring corresponds to configuration check and statistic viewing (network interfaces, operating
system, …).
User management :
Command line interface is accessible localy with a RS232 link. Users do not have their own account but use a user
profile to define the allowed commands.
"No_User" profile is a narrowed profile which does not require any authentication. It has only access to a few
commands essentially linked to information and statistics viewing : equipment reboot, equipment and network
interfaces status, locally-stored events viewing, software version query, self-test query.
Operator profile needs a password authentication and is allowed to load secured configuration files but without
being able to define parameters manually. He can use more monitoring commands in addition of the user profile
ones.
Administrator profile needs a password authentication too and gives the user access to all commands.
Administrator profile is allowed to configure manually the equipment.
THALES Communications & Security 63 295 297 - 306 -A Lite A4 123/128
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Security. They cannot be reproduced, disclosed or used without the company's prior written
approval.
83051027-DDQ-TCS-FR-003
User session termination : it is done by the user, or automatically after 3 minutes of inactivity.
Banner : at user session opening, a notice and consent warning message is displayed.
Configuration and monitoring :
Command line interface lets configuration and monitoring of the Mistral equipments. All parameters are
configurable with commands. Parameters can be set individually or imported from a secured file containing all or
part of the configuration.
Configuration and monitoring can also be performed by management centers.
SNMPv2c protocol is available to view network and system parameters for allowed stations.
Software upgrade :
In the Mistral system software, update can be performed by a user command on the command line interface or
through the remote management protocol. The upgrade consists in the download of a single file protected in
authentication (SHA512 + ECDSA-521), integrity (AES-XCBC-MAC96) and confidentiality (AES-CBC) called
firmware. The firmware contains all software components (bios, OS, FPGA software, main software, …).
After being checked by the current running software of the equipment, the new firmware is written in permanent
memory.
Key injection :
PSK are injected in the equipment manually with a secured configuration file (via Command Line Interface,
administrator rights needed) or directly by a Mistral Management Center.
Note : the secured configuration file is protected by cryptographic key derivated (through HMAC-SHA-256-128)
from a passphrase.
Negociated keys are injected by the IKE service and are directly and only stored in RAM/FPGA.
Time management :
Mistral encryptors have to manage time (event log, …) but don’t have a clock available between two starts. The
equipment can manage a default uptime from its starting but need in addition to be synchronized with a trustable
time.
There are 2 ways to configure time :
Manually with a user command
Automatically with a NTP synchronization
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préalable.
This document and any data included are the property of THALES Communications &
Security. They cannot be reproduced, disclosed or used without the company's prior written
approval.
83051027-DDQ-TCS-FR-003
F. FILTERING AND PROTECTION OF NETWORK DATA FLOWS
Definitions :
Network frame processing is performed in a component named Commutation. This component is in charge of
frame filtering and protection.
Mistral encryptors have one processing mode : bridge mode. In bridge mode, encryptors are transparent for IP
(IPv4/IPv6) sending and receiving stations. All network interfaces of the equipment share the same IP address.
All incoming and outgoing network flows are analyzed and have a predefined handling. Possible actions for frames
are:
Discard : the frame is destroyed.
Bypass : the frame is allowed to be forwarded without modification on the destination interface.
Protect : the frame must be encrypted/decrypted depending on the mode defined in the SA.
Transmit control : the frame is allowed to be forwarded to a local management service.
If no rule corresponds during the analysis a default discard action is applied on the frame.
Network flow filtering :
Each incomming and outgoing frame from cipher, plain or management zone is systematically analyzed and
filtered. Filtering is based on IPSec selectors and SA (Security Association) / SP (Security Policy).
A blocking/bypass filtering of non IP protocols is also available. For the bridge mode, some frames must be allowed
to be forwarded (for example: ARP) to ensure the transparency of encryptors on network segments.
Network flow protection :
When the filtering action is « protect » , frames are encrypted (or decrypted) depending on the protection mode and
keys specified in the SA. This contains at least :
Algorithm and key for confidentiality protection
Algorithm and key for integrity protection
Encapsulation mode : tunnel
When frame protection is finished, the Commutation software component established the interface/outgoing zone
to send the new packet.
If the encryptor receives an ESP frame on a plain or cipher interface, it will first of all try to decrypt the frame with
the SA identified by the SPI of the ESP header before filtering.
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préalable.
This document and any data included are the property of THALES Communications &
Security. They cannot be reproduced, disclosed or used without the company's prior written
approval.
83051027-DDQ-TCS-FR-003
IKE and IPSec modes :
Two modes are available :
Enhanced Simple (Simple renforcé), which is outside the scope of the evaluation
IPSec Mistral
Those modes define IKE et IPSec algorithms:
Enhanced Simple
IKE protocol (IKE SA) parameters
Key exchange : ECDH 384-bit random ECP-group
Authentication mode : Preshared key
Key derivation : PRF-SHA-384
IKE protocol confidentiality algorithm : AES-GCM16 with 256-bits long key
IKE protocol integrity algorithm : AES-GCM16 with 256-bits long key
IPSec (Child SA) parameters
IPSEC protocol confidentiality algorithm : AES-GCM8 with 256-bits long key
IPSEC protocol integrity algorithm : AES-GCM8 with 256-bits long key
IPSec Mistral
IKE protocol (IKE SA) parameters
Key exchange : ECDH 384-bit random ECP-group
Authentication mode : Preshared key
Key derivation : PRF-SHA-384
IKE protocol confidentiality algorithm : AES-GCM16 with 256-bits long key
IKE protocol integrity algorithm : AES-GCM16 with 256-bits long key
IPSec (Child SA) parameters
IPSEC protocol confidentiality algorithm : AES-CBC with 256-bits long key
IPSEC protocol integrity algorithm : AES-XCBC-MAC-96 with 128-bits long key
F. FAILURE STATE
When one of the following error occurs the equipment enters in a failure state :
FPGA access error
Autotest failure
Failure of a service start
Writing memory error
In a failure state all network services are blocked but data are kept in memory for analysis.
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préalable.
This document and any data included are the property of THALES Communications &
Security. They cannot be reproduced, disclosed or used without the company's prior written
approval.
83051027-DDQ-TCS-FR-003
F. AUTOTEST
At start an autotest is performed with the following tests:
Encryption/decryption of data by the FPGA
Encryption/decryption of data by the cryptographic library
Writing/reading in permanent memory
While the equipment is running and operational a cryptographic autotest is also available.
7.2. SFR AND SECURITY FUNCTIONS MAPPING
SFR Security functions
FAU_GEN.1 F.Audit and events logging
FAU_GEN.2 F.Audit and events logging
FAU_GEN_EXT.3 F.Audit and events logging
FAU_STG_EXT.1 F.Audit and events logging
FAU_STG_EXT.3 F.Audit and events logging
FPT_STM.1 F. Users, configuration and monitoring
FCS_RBG_EXT.1
F. Storage and protection of local data
F. Filtering and protection of network data flows
FCS_CKM.3/keyRenewal
F. Keys management
F. Filtering and protection of network data flows
FCS_CKM_EXT.4/anyPlainTextData F. Keys management
FCS_CKM_EXT.5/pskDistribMode F. Keys management
FCS_CKM_EXT.5/deriv-pskDistribMode F. Keys management
FCS_CKM_EXT.5/psk F. Keys management
FCS_CKM_EXT.5/ikeV2SA F. Keys management
FCS_CKM_EXT.5/ikeV2childSA F. Keys management
FPT_SIE_EXT.1/allPlainTextData F. Users, configuration and monitoring
FCS_COP.1/aes-cbc F. Filtering and protection of network data flows
FCS_COP.1/aes-gcm F. Filtering and protection of network data flows
FCS_COP.1/aes-xcbc F. Filtering and protection of network data flows
FCS_COP.1/aes-cbcSw F. Users, configuration and monitoring
FCS_COP.1/aes-xcbcSw F. Users, configuration and monitoring
FCS_COP.1/ecdsaSw F. Users, configuration and monitoring
FCS_COP.1/aes-gcmLocalData F. Filtering and protection of network data flows
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préalable.
This document and any data included are the property of THALES Communications &
Security. They cannot be reproduced, disclosed or used without the company's prior written
approval.
83051027-DDQ-TCS-FR-003
FCS_COP.1/sha
F. Storage and protection of local data
F. Users, configuration and monitoring
F. Filtering and protection of network data flows
FCS_COP.1/hmac
F. Keys management
F. Filtering and protection of network data flows
FCS_COP.1/hmacTrunc F. Users, configuration and monitoring
FCS_COP.1/prf-sha F. Keys management
FTP_ITC.1/TOE F. Filtering and protection of network data flows
FDP_UCT.1/TOE F. Filtering and protection of network data flows
FDP_UIT.1/TOE F. Filtering and protection of network data flows
FCS_IPS_EXT.1
F. Keys management
F. Filtering and protection of network data flows
FDP_ITC.2/VPN F. Filtering and protection of network data flows
FDP_ETC.2/VPN F. Filtering and protection of network data flows
FDP_IFC.1/VPN F. Filtering and protection of network data flows
FDP_IFF.1/VPN F. Filtering and protection of network data flows
FDP_ITC.2/pskDistribmode F. Users, configuration and monitoring
FDP_ITC.2/pskIKE F. Users, configuration and monitoring
FDP_UCT.1/keysInjection F. Users, configuration and monitoring
FDP_UIT.1/keysInjection F. Users, configuration and monitoring
FDP_IFC.1/keysInjection F. Users, configuration and monitoring
FDP_IFF.1/keysInjection F. Users, configuration and monitoring
FPT_TDC.1/keysInjection F. Users, configuration and monitoring
FDP_IFC.1/ntp F. Users, configuration and monitoring
FDP_IFF.1/ntp F. Users, configuration and monitoring
FMT_MSA.3 F. Users, configuration and monitoring
FMT_SMR.1/user F. Users, configuration and monitoring
FMT_SMR.1/devices F. Users, configuration and monitoring
FIA_UID.2/sgc F. Users, configuration and monitoring
FIA_UIA_EXT.1/localMngt F. Users, configuration and monitoring
FIA_UAU_EXT.2/localMngt F. Users, configuration and monitoring
FIA_UAU.6/localMngt F. Users, configuration and monitoring
FIA_UAU.7/localMngt F. Users, configuration and monitoring
FIA_AFL.1/localMngt F. Users, configuration and monitoring
FIA_PMG_EXT.1/localMngt F. Users, configuration and monitoring
FTA_SSL_EXT.1/localMngt F. Users, configuration and monitoring
FTA_SSL.4/localMngt F. Users, configuration and monitoring
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préalable.
This document and any data included are the property of THALES Communications &
Security. They cannot be reproduced, disclosed or used without the company's prior written
approval.
83051027-DDQ-TCS-FR-003
FTA_TAB.1/localMngt F. Users, configuration and monitoring
FMT_SMF.1 F. Users, configuration and monitoring
FMT_MOF.1/localMngt F. Users, configuration and monitoring
FMT_MTD.1/query F. Users, configuration and monitoring
FMT_MTD.1/supervision F. Users, configuration and monitoring
FPT_SKP_EXT.1 F. Users, configuration and monitoring
FMT_MTD.1/configuration F. Users, configuration and monitoring
FMT_MTD.1/dateTime F. Users, configuration and monitoring
FMT_MTD.1/keys F. Users, configuration and monitoring
FMT_MTD.1/keyLifetime F. Users, configuration and monitoring
FMT_MTD.1/adminPwd F. Users, configuration and monitoring
FMT_MTD.1/opePwd F. Users, configuration and monitoring
FMT_MTD.1/software F. Users, configuration and monitoring
FPT_TUD_EXT.1/software F. Users, configuration and monitoring
FPT_APW_EXT.1
F. Storage and protection of local data
F. Users, configuration and monitoring
FPT_FLS.1 F. Failure state
FPT_TST.1 F. Autotest
FPT_SDP_EXT.2 F. Storage and protection of local data
FDP_RIP.2 F. Storage and protection of local data