KECS-CR-24-15
Document SAFER Blue 3
Certification Report
Certification No.: KECS-CISS-1293-2024
2024. 2. 26.
IT Security Certification Center
Certification Report Page 2
History of Creation and Revision
No. Date
Revised
Pages
Description
00 2024.02.26. -
Certification report for Document SAFER Blue 3
- First documentation
Certification Report Page 3
This document is the certification report for Document SAFER Blue 3 of
MarkAny Inc.
The Certification Body
IT Security Certification Center
The Evaluation Facility
Korea System Assurance (KOSYAS)
Certification Report Page 4
Contents
Certification Report ....................................................................................................1
1. Executive Summary.............................................................................................5
2. Identification.........................................................................................................8
3. Security Policy .....................................................................................................9
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope..........................................................10
5. Architectural Information ..................................................................................10
6. Documentation................................................................................................... 11
7. TOE Testing........................................................................................................12
8. Evaluated Configuration....................................................................................12
9. Results of the Evaluation ..................................................................................13
9.1 Security Target Evaluation (ASE)............................................................13
9.2 Life Cycle Support Evaluation (ALC) ......................................................14
9.3 Guidance Documents Evaluation (AGD).................................................14
9.4 Test Evaluation (ATE)................ 오류! 책갈피가 정의되어 있지 않습니다.
9.5 Development Evaluation (ADV) ..............................................................15
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment (AVA)..............................................................15
9.7 Evaluation Result Summary ...................................................................15
10. Recommendations.............................................................................................16
11. Security Target ...................................................................................................17
12. Acronyms and Glossary....................................................................................17
13. Bibliography.......................................................................................................18
Certification Report Page 5
1. Executive Summary
This report describes the certification result drawn by the certification body on the results
of the EAL1+ evaluation of the Document SAFER Blue 3 (“TOE” hereinafter) with
reference to the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation (“CC”
hereinafter) [1]. It describes the evaluation result and its soundness and conformity.
The Target of Evaluation (hereinafter referred to as “TOE”) is Electronic Document
Encryption designed to protect important documents managed by the organization based
on the encryption/decryption. Also, the TOE provides a variety of security features:
security audit, the user identification and authentication including mutual authentication
between TOE components, security management, the TOE access session
management, and the TSF protection function, etc.
The evaluation of the TOE has been carried out by Korea System Assurance (KOSYAS)
and completed on February 20, 2024. This report grounds on the Evaluation Technical
Report[7] had submitted and the Security Target(ST)[4].
The ST claims conformance to the Korean National Protection Profile for Electronic
Document Encryption V1.1[3]. All Security Assurance Requirements (SARs) in the ST
are based only upon assurance component in CC Part 3, and the TOE satisfies the SARs
of Evaluation Assurance Level EAL1+. The ST and the resulting TOE is CC Part 3
conformant. The Security Functional Requirements (SFRs) are based upon both
functional components in CC Part 2 and a newly defined component in the Extended
Component Definition chapter of the PP, therefor the ST, and the TOE satisfies the SFRs
in the ST. Therefore, the ST and the resulting TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
[Figure 1] shows the operational environment of the TOE. The TOE is composed of the
Document SAFER Blue 3 Server(“Server(TOE)” hereinafter) which manages the security
policy and cryptographic key, the Document SAFER Blue 3 Agent(“Agent”(TOE)
hereinafter) that performs Electronic Document encryption/decryption installed in the
user PC, and the Document SAFER Blue 3 Core(“Core”(TOE) hereinafter) that performs
Electronic Document encryption installed in the information system in the form of API
module. A wrapper is used for compatibility between the Core and various information
systems, but it is outside of the TOE scope.
Certification Report Page 6
[Figure 1] Operational Environment of the TOE
The requirements for hardware, software and operating system to install the TOE are
shown in 오류! 참조 원본을 찾을 수 없습니다.].
Component Requirement
Server
HW
CPU: Intel(R) 2.45 GHz or higher
RAM: 8 GB or higher
HDD: 1 TB or higher for the installation of TOE
NIC: 100/1000 Ethernet Card 1 Port or higher
OS
Windows Server 2022
Standard (64 bit)
Ubuntu 22.04 (5.15.0-53-
generic) 64 bit
SW
OpenJDK 1.8.0_392
Apache Tomcat 9.0.85
Oracle 19c (19.3.0.0.0)
OpenJDK 1.8.0_392
Apache Tomcat 9.0.85
Mariadb 11.0.4
Agent HW
CPU: Intel Core 2.50 GHz or higher
RAM: 4 GB or higher
HDD: 500 GB or higher for the installation of TOE
NIC: 100/1000 Ethernet Card 1 Port or higher
Certification Report Page 7
OS
Windows 10 pro (64 bit)
Windows 11 pro (64 bit)
Core
HW
CPU: Intel(R) 2 GHz or higher
RAM: 8 GB or higher
HDD: 500 GB or higher for the installation of TOE
NIC: 100/1000 Ethernet Card 1 Port or higher
OS Ubuntu 22.04 (5.15.0-53-generic) 64 bit
SW OpenJDK 1.8.0_392
[Table 1] TOE Hardware and Software specifications
Administrator uses the pc that can operate web browser to use the security management.
Administrator pc minimum requirements are shown in 오류! 참조 원본을 찾을 수 없습
니다.]
Component Requirement
S/W Chrome 120.0.6099.217
[Table 2] Administrator PC Requirements
Certification Validity: The certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the
government of Republic of Korea or by any other organization that recognizes or gives
effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by the government of
Republic of Korea or by any other organization recognizes or gives effect to the
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
Certification Report Page 8
2. Identification
The TOE is reference is identified as follows.
TOE Document SAFER Blue 3
Version 3.0.02
TOE
Components
Server - Document SAFER Blue 3 Server 3.0.02
(Document_SAFER_Blue_3_Server_3.0.02.sh)
(Document_SAFER_Blue_3_Server_3.0.02.exe)
Agent - Document SAFER Blue 3 Agent 3.0.02
(Document_SAFER_Blue_3_Agent_3.0.02.exe)
Core - Document SAFER Blue 3 Core 3.0.02
(Document_SAFER_Blue_3_Core_3.0.02.sh)
Guidance
Document
Document SAFER Blue 3 Operation Guide V1.02
(Document SAFER Blue 3 Operation Guide V1.02.pdf)
Document SAFER Blue 3 Preparative Procedure V1.02
(Document SAFER Blue 3 Preparative Procedure V1.02.pdf)
[Table 3] TOE identification
Note that the TOE is delivered contained in a CD-ROM.
[Table 4] summarizes additional information for scheme, developer, sponsor, evaluation
facility, certification body, etc..
Scheme Korea Evaluation and Certification Guidelines for IT Security
(October 31, 2022)
Korea Evaluation and Certification Regulation for IT Security (May
17, 2021)
TOE Document SAFER Blue 3
Common Criteria Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 3.1 Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-001 ~ CCMB-2017-04-
003, April 2017
EAL EAL1+ (ATE_FUN.1)
Protection Profile Korean National Protection Profile for Electronic Document
Encryption V1.1
Certification Report Page 9
Developer MarkAny Inc.
Sponsor MarkAny Inc.
Evaluation
Facility
Korea System Assurance (KOSYAS)
Completion Date
of Evaluation
February 20, 2024
Certification
Body
IT Security Certification Center
[Table 4] Additional identification information
3. Security Policy
The ST [4] for the TOE claims strict conformance to Korean National Protection Profile
for Database Encryption V1.1 [3], and complies security policies defined in the PP [3] by
security requirements. The TOE provides security features defined in the PP [3] as
follows:
⚫ Security audit: The TOE generates audit records of security relevant events such
as the start-up/shutdown of the audit functions, integrity violation, self-test
failures and stores them in the DBMS.
⚫ Cryptographic support: The TOE performs cryptographic operation such as
encryption/decryption and hash, and cryptographic key management such as
key generation/distribution/destruction using cryptographic module
(MACRYPTO V3.00) validated under the KCMVP.
⚫ User data protection: The TOE provides user’ documents by making them
Secured Documents by means of encrypting them and controlling access to
them in accordance to the access control policy per user set by the administrator.
⚫ Identification and authentication: The TOE identifies and authenticates the
administrators and document users based on ID/PW.
⚫ Security management: The TOE provides functions such as TOE security
function management, security attribute management and TSF data
management to the authorized administrator.
⚫ Protection of the TSF: The TOE provides secure communications between TOE
components to protect the transmitted data. The TOE encrypts the stored TSF
data to protect them from unauthorized exposure and modification. The TOE
performs self-tests on the TOE components, which includes the self-test on the
Certification Report Page 10
validated cryptographic module.
⚫ TOE access: The TOE manages authorized administrators’ access to itself by
termination interactive sessions after defined time interval of inactivity.
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
There are no explicit Assumptions in the Security Problem Definition in the Low
Assurance ST. The followings are procedural method supported from operational
environment in order to provide the TOE security functionality accurately.
⚫ The place where the TOE components are installed and operated shall be
equipped with access control and protection facilities so that only authorized
administrator can access.
⚫ The authorized administrator of the TOE shall be non-malicious users, have
appropriately trained for the TOE management functions and accurately fulfill
the duties in accordance with administrator guidance.
⚫ The developer who uses the TOE to interoperate with the user identification and
authentication function in the operational environment of the business system
shall ensure that the security functions of the TOE are securely applied in
accordance with the requirements of the manual provided with the TOE.
⚫ The authorized administrator of the TOE shall periodically check a spare space
of audit data storage in case of the audit data loss, and carries out the audit data
backup (external log server or separate storage device, etc.) to prevent audit
data loss.
⚫ The authorized administrator of the TOE shall ensure the reliability and security
of the operating system by performing the reinforcement on the latest
vulnerabilities of the operating system in which the TOE is installed and operated.
⚫ The TOE shall accurately record security-related events using the reliable
timestamp provided by the TOE operating environment.
5. Architectural Information
The physical scope of the TOE consists of the Server(TOE), Agent(TOE), Core(TOE),
and guidance documents. The following security functions are provided by the TOE
logical scope and boundary of TOE is shown in [Figure 2].
Certification Report Page 11
[Figure 3] TOE Logical Scope
The TOE is composed of the Server(TOE), Agent(TOE), Core(TOE and should be
installed and operated inside the internal network of the protected organization.
The Server(TOE) manages policy and security data for document encryption/decryption
and provides the function to apply to the Agent(TOE). The Agent(TOE) controls the
permissions of secured documents according to the policy and performs document
encryption/decryption. The Core(TOE) interacts with information system and
encryption/decryption document according to the policy. The TOE also includes the
MACRYPTO V3.00 validated by KCMVP(Korea Cryptographic Module Validation
Program) to perform Electronic Document encryption/decryption.
6. Documentation
The following documentation is evaluated and provided with the TOE by the developer
to the customer.
Identification Date
Document SAFER Blue 3 Operation Guide V1.02 January 15, 2024
Certification Report Page 12
(Document SAFER Blue 3 Operation Guide V1.02.pdf)
Document SAFER Blue 3 Preparative Procedure V1.02
(Document SAFER Blue 3 Preparative Procedure V1.02.pdf)
January 15, 2024
[Table 5] Documentation
7. TOE Testing
The developer took a testing approach based on the security services provided by each
TOE component based on the operational environment of the TOE. Each test case
includes the following information:
⚫ Test no.: Identifier of each test case
⚫ Test Purpose: Includes the security functions to be tested
⚫ Test Configuration: Details about the test configuration
⚫ Test Procedure detail: Detailed procedures for testing each security function
⚫ Expected result: Result expected from testing
⚫ Actual result: Result obtained by performing testing
⚫ Test result compared to the expected result: Comparison between the expected
and actual result
The developer correctly performed and documented the tests according to the assurance
component ATE_FUN.1.
The evaluator has installed the product using the same evaluation configuration and tools
as the developer’s test and performed all tests provided by the developer. The evaluator
has confirmed that, for all tests, the expected results had been consistent with the actual
results. In addition, the evaluator conducted penetration testing based upon test cases
devised by the evaluator resulting from the independent search for potential
vulnerabilities. The evaluator testing effort, the testing approach, configuration, depth,
and results are summarized in the ETR [7].
8. Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is software consisting of the following components:
TOE: Document SAFER Blue 3 (3.0.02)
Certification Report Page 13
- Document SAFER Blue 3 Server 3.0.02
- Document SAFER Blue 3 Agent 3.0.02
- Document SAFER Blue 3 Core 3.0.02
The Administrator can identify the complete TOE reference after installation using the
product’s Info check menu. And the guidance documents listed in this report chapter 6,
[Table 5] were evaluated with the TOE
9. Results of the Evaluation
The evaluation facility provided the evaluation result in the ETR [7] which references
Single Evaluation Reports for each assurance requirement and Observation Reports.
The evaluation result was based on the CC [1] and CEM [2].
The TOE was evaluated based on Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation. (EAL1+).
As a result of the evaluation, the verdict PASS is assigned to all assurance components.
9.1 Security Target Evaluation (ASE)
The ST Introduction correctly identifies the ST and the TOE, and describes the TOE in a
narrative way at three levels of abstraction (TOE reference, TOE overview and TOE
description), and these three descriptions are consistent with each other. Therefore, the
verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_INT.1.
The Conformance Claim properly describes how the ST and the TOE conform to the CC
and how the ST conforms to PPs and packages. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned
to ASE_CCL.1.
The Security Objectives for the operational environment are clearly defined. Therefore,
the verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_OBJ.1.
The Extended Components Definition has been clearly and unambiguously defined, and
it is necessary. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_ECD.1.
The Security Requirements is defined clearly and unambiguously, and they are internally
consistent. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_REQ.1.
The TOE Summary Specification addresses all SFRs, and it is consistent with other
narrative descriptions of the TOE. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_TSS.1.
Certification Report Page 14
Thus, the ST is sound and internally consistent, and suitable to be used as the basis for
the TOE evaluation.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ASE.
9.2 Life Cycle Support Evaluation (ALC)
The developer has uniquely identified the TOE. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned
to ALC_CMC.1.
The configuration management document verifies that the configuration list includes the
TOE and the evaluation evidence. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to
ALC_CMS.1.
Also the evaluator confirmed that the correct version of the software is installed in device.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ALC.
9.3 Guidance Documents Evaluation (AGD)
The procedures and steps for the secure preparation of the TOE have been documented
and result in a secure configuration. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to
AGD_PRE.1.
The operational user guidance describes for each user role the security functionality and
interfaces provided by the TSF, provides instructions and guidelines for the secure use
of the TOE, addresses secure procedures for all modes of operation, facilitates
prevention and detection of insecure TOE states, or it is misleading or unreasonable.
Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to AGD_OPE.1.
Thus, the guidance documents are adequately describing the user can handle the TOE
in a secure manner. The guidance documents take into account the various types of
users (e.g. those who accept, install, administrate or operate the TOE) whose incorrect
actions could adversely affect the security of the TOE or of their own data.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class AGD.
9.4 Test Evaluation (ATE)
The developer correctly performed and documented the tests in the test documentation.
Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to ATE_FUN.1.
By independently testing a subset of the TSFI, the evaluator confirmed that the TOE
Certification Report Page 15
behaves as specified in the functional specification and guidance documentation.
Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to ATE_IND.1.
Thus, the TOE behaves as described in the ST and as specified in the evaluation
evidence (described in the ADV class).
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ATE.
9.5 Development Evaluation (ADV)
The functional specifications specify a high-level description of the SFR-enforcing and
SFR-supporting TSFIs, in terms of descriptions of their parameters. Therefore, the
verdict PASS is assigned to ADV_FSP.1.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ADV.
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment (AVA)
By penetrating testing, the evaluator confirmed that there are no exploitable
vulnerabilities by attackers possessing basic attack potential in the operational
environment of the TOE. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to AVA_VAN.1.
Thus, potential vulnerabilities identified, during the evaluation of the development and
anticipated operation of the TOE or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses), don’t
allow attackers possessing basic attack potential to violate the SFRs.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class AVA.
9.7 Evaluation Result Summary
Assurance
Class
Assurance
Component
Evaluator
Action
Elements
Verdict
Evaluator Action
Elements
Assurance
Component
Assurance
Class
ASE
ASE_INT.1 ASE_INT.1.1E PASS
PASS
PASS
ASE_INT.1.2E PASS
ASE_CCL.1 ASE_CCL.1.1E PASS PASS
ASE_OBJ.1 ASE_OBJ.1.1E PASS PASS
ASE_ECD.1 ASE_ECD.1.1E PASS
PASS
ASE_ECD.1.2E PASS
ASE_REQ.1 ASE_REQ.1.1E PASS PASS
Certification Report Page 16
Assurance
Class
Assurance
Component
Evaluator
Action
Elements
Verdict
Evaluator Action
Elements
Assurance
Component
Assurance
Class
ASE_TSS.1 ASE_TSS.1.1E PASS
PASS
ASE_TSS.1.2E PASS
ALC
ALC_CMC.1 ALC_CMC.1.1E PASS PASS PASS
ALC_CMS.1 ALC_CMS.1.1E PASS PASS
AGD AGD_PRE.1
AGD_PRE.1.1E PASS
PASS
PASS
AGD_PRE.1.2E PASS
AGD_OPE.1 AGD_OPE.1.1E PASS PASS
ADV
ADV_FSP.1 ADV_FSP.1.1E PASS
PASS
PASS
ADV_FSP.1.2E PASS
ATE
ATE_FUN.1 ATE_FUN.1.1E PASS PASS PASS
ATE_IND.1 ATE_IND.1.1E PASS PASS
ATE_IND.1.2E PASS
AVA
AVA_VAN.1 AVA_VAN.1.1E PASS PASS PASS
AVA_VAN.1.2E PASS
AVA_VAN.1.3E PASS
[Table 5] Evaluation Result Summary
10. Recommendations
The TOE security functionality can be ensured only in the evaluated TOE operational
environment with the evaluated TOE configuration, thus the TOE shall be operated by
complying with the followings:
⚫ The administrator should periodically check the free space of the audit data
storage in preparation for the loss of the audit records, and perform backups of
the audit records so that the audit records are not exhausted.
⚫ The Server(TOE) must be installed and operated in a physically secure
environment that is accessible only to authorized administrators and should not
allow remote administration from outside.
⚫ If a cryptographic key is lost due to administrator's wrong cryptographic key
Certification Report Page 17
management, document users may not be able to decrypt the encrypted file
stored on the user's PC, so administrator has to be careful with cryptographic
key management.
⚫ If the TOE is operated in a ‘Information system encryption’ type defined in the
PP [3], it is recommended that those who are good at using the API.
11. Security Target
Document SAFER Blue 3 Security Target V1.02 [4] is included in this report for reference.
12. Acronyms and Glossary
CC Common Criteria
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
PP Protection Profile
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFR Security Functional Requirement
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
TSFI TSF Interface
Decryption The act that restoring the ciphertext into the plaintext
using the decryption key
Encryption The act that converting the plaintext into the
ciphertext using the cryptographic key
Authorized Document User The TOE user who may, in accordance with the
SFRs, perform an operation.
Authorized Administrator Authorized user to securely operate and manage the
TOE
Data Encryption Key (DEK) Key that encrypts the data
External Entity An entity (person or IT object) that interact (or can
interact) with the TOE from outside the TOE.
Certification Report Page 18
Key Encryption Key (KEK) Key that encrypts another cryptographic key.
Validated Cryptographic Module A cryptographic module that is validated and given
a validation number by validation authority
Wrapper Interface to connect the TOE with various types of
information system
13. Bibliography
The certification body has used following documents to produce this report.
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1
Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-001 ~ CCMB-2017-04-003, April, 2017
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version
3.1 Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-004, April, 2017
[3] Korean National Protection Profile for Electronic Document Encryption V1.1,
December 11, 2019
[4] Document SAFER Blue 3 Security Target V1.02, January 15, 2024
[5] Document SAFER Blue 3 Independent Testing Report(ATE_IND.1) V1.00,
February 20, 2024
[6] Document SAFER Blue 3 Penetration Testing Report (AVA_VAN.1) V1.00,
February 19, 2024
[7] Document SAFER Blue 3 Evaluation Technical Report Lite V1.00, February
20,2024