© 2025 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. This document may be reproduced in full without any modification.
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Cisco Catalyst 9200/9200L Series Switches
17.15
Security Target
Version: 1.0
Date: July 22, 2025
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Document Introduction
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Table of Contents
Document Introduction ...................................................................................................................................................................................... 7
1. Security Target Introduction..................................................................................................................................................................... 9
1.1. ST and TOE Reference...................................................................................................................................................................... 9
1.2. TOE Overview................................................................................................................................................................................... 9
1.3. TOE Product Type ....................................................................................................................................................................... 9
1.4. Required non-TOE Hardware/Software/Firmware................................................................................................................. 10
1.5. TOE Description ........................................................................................................................................................................ 10
1.6. TOE Evaluated Configuration ........................................................................................................................................................ 10
1.7. Physical Scope of the TOE.............................................................................................................................................................. 11
1.8. Logical Scope of the TOE................................................................................................................................................................ 12
Security Audit .......................................................................................................................................................................................... 13
Cryptographic Support............................................................................................................................................................................ 13
Identification and Authentication ........................................................................................................................................................... 13
Security Management.............................................................................................................................................................................. 13
Protection of the TSF............................................................................................................................................................................... 13
TOE Access............................................................................................................................................................................................... 14
Trusted Path/Channels ........................................................................................................................................................................... 14
1.9. Excluded Functionality .................................................................................................................................................................. 14
2. Conformance Claims................................................................................................................................................................................ 14
2.1. Common Criteria Conformance Claim........................................................................................................................................... 14
2.2. PP Configuration Conformance Claim ........................................................................................................................................... 15
2.3. Protection Profile Conformance Claim Rationale.......................................................................................................................... 16
2.3.1. TOE Appropriateness ................................................................................................................................................................ 16
2.3.2. TOE Security Problem Definition Consistency ......................................................................................................................... 16
2.3.3. Statement of Security Requirements Consistency.................................................................................................................... 17
3. Security Problem Definition.................................................................................................................................................................... 18
3.1. Assumptions................................................................................................................................................................................... 18
3.2. Threats ........................................................................................................................................................................................... 20
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3.3. Organizational Security Policies .................................................................................................................................................... 22
4. Security Objectives .................................................................................................................................................................................. 23
4.1. Security Objectives for the TOE ..................................................................................................................................................... 23
4.2. Security Objectives for the Environment ...................................................................................................................................... 24
5. Security Requirements............................................................................................................................................................................ 26
5.1. Conventions.................................................................................................................................................................................... 26
5.2. Class: Security Audit (FAU)........................................................................................................................................................... 28
5.2.1. FAU_GEN.1 – Audit Data Generation......................................................................................................................................... 28
5.2.2. FAU_GEN.1/MACSEC – Audit Data Generation (MACsec) ........................................................................................................ 31
5.2.3. FAU_GEN.2 – User Identity Association .................................................................................................................................... 31
5.2.4. FAU_STG_EXT.1 – Protected Audit Event Storage .................................................................................................................... 32
5.3. Class: Cryptographic Support (FCS) ............................................................................................................................................. 32
5.3.1. FCS_CKM.1 – Cryptographic Key Generation (Refinement)..................................................................................................... 32
5.3.2. FCS_CKM.2 – Cryptographic Key Establishment (Refinement)................................................................................................ 32
5.3.3. FCS_CKM.4 – Cryptographic Key Destruction........................................................................................................................... 32
5.3.4. FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption – Cryptographic Operation (AES Data Encryption/Decryption)................................................ 33
5.3.5. FCS_COP.1/MACSEC – Cryptographic Operation (MACsec AES Data Encryption/Decryption).............................................. 33
5.3.6. FCS_COP.1/SigGen – Cryptographic Operation (Signature Generation and Verification)....................................................... 33
5.3.7. FCS_COP.1/Hash – Cryptographic Operation (Hash Algorithm).............................................................................................. 33
5.3.8. FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash – Cryptographic Operation (Keyed Hash Algorithm) ........................................................................ 33
5.3.9. FCS_COP.1/CMAC – Cryptographic Operation (AES-CMAC Keyed Hash Algorithm)............................................................... 34
5.3.10. FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1 IPsec Protocol............................................................................................................................................... 34
5.3.11. FCS_RBG_EXT.1 – Random Bit Generation................................................................................................................................ 35
5.3.12. FCS_MACSEC_EXT.1 – MACsec .................................................................................................................................................. 35
5.3.13. FCS_MACSEC_EXT.2 – MACsec Integrity and Confidentiality................................................................................................... 35
5.3.14. FCS_MACSEC_EXT.3 – MACsec Randomness ............................................................................................................................ 36
5.3.15. FCS_MACSEC_EXT.4 – MACsec Key Usage................................................................................................................................. 36
5.3.16. FCS_MKA_EXT.1 – MACsec Key Agreement .............................................................................................................................. 36
5.3.17. FCS_SSH_EXT.1 – SSH Protocol.................................................................................................................................................. 37
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5.3.18. FCS_SSHS_EXT.1 – SSH Server Protocol.................................................................................................................................... 38
5.4. Class: Identification and Authentication (FIA) ............................................................................................................................. 38
5.4.1. FIA_AFL.1 – Authentication Failure Handling (Refinement).................................................................................................... 38
5.4.2. FIA_PMG_EXT.1 – Password Management................................................................................................................................ 38
5.4.3. FIA_PSK_EXT.1 – Pre-Shared Key Composition........................................................................................................................ 39
5.4.4. FIA_UIA_EXT.1 – User Identification and Authentication......................................................................................................... 39
5.4.5. FIA_UAU.7 – Protected Authentication Feedback..................................................................................................................... 40
5.4.6. FIA_X509_EXT.1/Rev – X.509 Certificate Validation................................................................................................................ 40
5.4.7. FIA_X509_EXT.2 – X.509 Certificate Authentication................................................................................................................. 40
5.4.8. FIA_X509_EXT.3 – X.509 Certificate Requests .......................................................................................................................... 40
5.5. Class: Security Management (FMT) .............................................................................................................................................. 41
5.5.1. FMT_MOF.1/ManualUpdate – Management of Security Functions Behavior.......................................................................... 41
5.5.2. FMT_MTD.1/CoreData – Management of TSF Data.................................................................................................................. 41
5.5.3. FMT_MTD.1/CryptoKeys – Management of TSF Data .............................................................................................................. 41
5.5.4. FMT_SMF.1 – Specification of Management Functions............................................................................................................. 41
5.5.5. FMT_SMF.1/MACSEC – Specification of Management Functions (MACsec)............................................................................ 42
5.5.6. FMT_SMR.2 – Restrictions on Security Roles............................................................................................................................ 42
5.6. Class: Protection of the TSF (FPT) ................................................................................................................................................ 42
5.6.1. FPT_CAK_EXT.1 Protection of CAK Data ................................................................................................................................... 42
5.6.2. FPT_FLS.1 Failure with Preservation of Secure State............................................................................................................... 42
5.6.3. FPT_RPL.1 Replay Detection ..................................................................................................................................................... 42
5.6.4. FPT_APW_EXT.1 – Protection of Administrator Passwords..................................................................................................... 42
5.6.5. FPT_SKP_EXT.1 – Protection of TSF Data (for reading of all pre-shared, symmetric and private keys)................................. 43
5.6.6. FPT_STM_EXT.1 – Reliable Time Stamps.................................................................................................................................. 43
5.6.7. FPT_TST_EXT.1 – TSF Testing................................................................................................................................................... 43
5.6.8. FPT_TUD_EXT.1 – Trusted Update............................................................................................................................................ 43
5.7. Class: TOE Access (FTA)................................................................................................................................................................ 43
5.7.1. FTA_SSL_EXT.1 – TSF-initiated Session Locking ...................................................................................................................... 43
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5.7.2. FTA_SSL.3 – TSF-initiated Termination.................................................................................................................................... 43
5.7.3. FTA_SSL.4 – User-initiated Termination................................................................................................................................... 43
5.7.4. FTA_TAB.1 – Default TOE Access Banners................................................................................................................................ 43
5.8. Class: Trusted Path/Channels (FTP)............................................................................................................................................. 44
5.8.1. FTP_ITC.1 – Inter-TSF Trusted Channel.................................................................................................................................... 44
5.8.2. FTP_ITC.1/MACSEC – Inter-TSF Trusted Channel (MACsec Communications) ...................................................................... 44
5.8.3. FTP_TRP.1/Admin – Trusted Path............................................................................................................................................ 44
5.9. TOE SFR Dependencies Rationale.................................................................................................................................................. 44
5.10. TOE SFR Dependencies Rationale.................................................................................................................................................. 44
5.11. TOE SFR Dependencies Rationale.................................................................................................................................................. 45
5.12. Security Assurance Requirements Rationale ................................................................................................................................ 45
5.13. Assurance Measures....................................................................................................................................................................... 45
6. TOE Summary Specification.................................................................................................................................................................... 47
6.1. Key Zeroization .............................................................................................................................................................................. 60
6.2. CAVP Certificates............................................................................................................................................................................ 61
7. References ............................................................................................................................................................................................... 62
7.1. Acronyms and Terms..................................................................................................................................................................... 63
7.2. Obtaining Documentation and Submitting a Service Request ...................................................................................................... 65
7.3. Contacting Cisco............................................................................................................................................................................. 65
Table of Tables
Table 1. ST and TOE Identification................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 9
Table 2. Required IT Environment Components...................................................................................................................................................................................10
Table 3. Hardware Models and Specifications........................................................................................................................................................................................12
Table 4. Excluded Functionality and Rationale......................................................................................................................................................................................14
Table 5. PP Configuration Conformance ...................................................................................................................................................................................................15
Table 6. NIAP Technical Decisions...............................................................................................................................................................................................................15
Table 7. TOE Assumptions ..............................................................................................................................................................................................................................18
Table 8. Threats...................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................20
Table 9. Organizational Security Policies..................................................................................................................................................................................................22
Table 10. Security Objectives for the TOE................................................................................................................................................................................................23
Table 11. Security Objectives for the Environment..............................................................................................................................................................................24
Table 12. Security Requirement Conventions ........................................................................................................................................................................................26
Table 13. Security Functional Requirements..........................................................................................................................................................................................26
Table 14. Auditable Events .............................................................................................................................................................................................................................29
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Table 15. MACsec Auditable Events............................................................................................................................................................................................................31
Table 16. Additional Password Special Characters ..............................................................................................................................................................................39
Table 17. Assurance Requirements.............................................................................................................................................................................................................44
Table 18. Assurance Measures......................................................................................................................................................................................................................45
Table 19. TSS Rationale....................................................................................................................................................................................................................................47
Table 20. Key Zeroization................................................................................................................................................................................................................................60
Table 21. CAVP Certificates ............................................................................................................................................................................................................................61
Table 22. References..........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................62
Table 23. Acronyms and Terms....................................................................................................................................................................................................................63
Table of Figures
Figure 1. TOE and Environment ...................................................................................................................................................................................................................11
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Document Introduction
Prepared By:
Cisco Systems, Inc.
170 West Tasman Dr.
San Jose, CA 95134
This document provides the basis for an evaluation of a specific Target of Evaluation (TOE), Cisco Catalyst 9200/9200L Series Switches
17.15. This Security Target (ST) defines a set of assumptions about the aspects of the environment, a list of threats that the product
intends to counter, a set of security objectives, a set of security requirements, and the IT security functions provided by the TOE which
meet the set of requirements. Administrators of the TOE will be referred to as administrators, Authorized Administrators, TOE
administrators, semi-privileged, privileged administrators, and security administrators in this document.
Revision History
Version Date Change
0.1 October 2, 2024 Initial Version
0.2 February 4, 2025 Updates to address check-in comments
0.3 June 10, 2025 Updates from testing
1.0 July 22, 2025 Final Updates
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Cisco and the Cisco logo are trademarks or registered trademarks of Cisco and/or its affiliates in the U.S. and other countries. To view a list
of Cisco trademarks, go to this URL: www.cisco.com/go/trademarks. Third-party trademarks mentioned are the property of their
respective owners. The use of the word partner does not imply a partnership relationship between Cisco and any other company. (1110R)
© 2025 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.
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1. Security Target Introduction
This Security Target contains the following sections:
■ Security Target Introduction
■ Conformance Claims
■ Security Problem Definition
■ Security Objectives
■ Security Requirements
■ TOE Summary Specification
■ References
The structure and content of this ST comply with the requirements specified in the Common Criteria (CC), Part 1, Annex A, and Part 2.
1.1. ST and TOE Reference
This section provides information needed to identify and control this ST and its TOE.
Table 1. ST and TOE Identification
Name Description
ST Title Cisco Catalyst 9200/9200L Series Switches 17.15 Security Target
ST Version 1.0
Publication Date July 22, 2025
Vendor and ST Author Cisco Systems, Inc.
TOE Reference Cisco Catalyst 9200/9200L Series Switches 17.15
TOE Hardware Models Catalyst 9200 and Catalyst 9200L Series Switches
TOE Software Version IOS-XE 17.15.01
Keywords Audit, Authentication, Encryption, MACsec, Network Device,
Secure Administration
1.2. TOE Overview
The Cisco Catalyst 9200/9200L Series Switches 17.15 TOE is an enterprise access-layer switch for branch office deployments. Switches are
used to connect multiple devices, such as computers, wireless access points, printers, and servers; on the same network within a building
or campus. A switch enables connected devices to share information and talk to each other and are key building blocks for any network.
1.3.TOE Product Type
The Cisco Catalyst 9200/9200L Series Switches 17.15 TOE is a layer 2 and 3 network device comprised of both hardware and software. The
hardware is the Catalyst 9200 and Catalyst 9200L switches as described below in Table 3 of section 1.7.
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1.4.Required non-TOE Hardware/Software/Firmware
The TOE requires the following hardware/software/firmware in the IT environment when the TOE is configured in its evaluated
configuration.
Table 2. Required IT Environment Components
Component Usage/Purpose/Description
MACsec Peer This includes any MACsec peer with which the TOE participates
in MACsec communications. MACsec Peer may be any device
that supports MACsec communications.
Syslog Server This includes any syslog server to which the TOE would transmit
syslog messages over IPsec.
Certificate Authority The Certification Authority is used to provide the TOE with valid
certificates. The CA also provides the TOE with a method to
check the peer certificate revocation status of devices the TOE
communicates with.
Management Workstation This includes any IT Environment Management workstation with
a SSH client installed that is used by the Security Administrator
for remote administration over SSH trusted paths.
Local Console This includes any IT Environment Console that is directly
connected to the TOE component via the console port and is
used by the Security Administrator for local TOE administration.
1.5.TOE Description
The Cisco Catalyst 9200/9200L Series Switches 17.15 Target of Evaluation (TOE) is a purpose-built, switching and routing platform enabling
connected devices to communicate over a network at layer 2 or 3. The TOE provides Administrative control and management of the
network. For communicating with other network devices, the TOE provides AES-128 MACsec encryption. The TOE also provides Layer 3
capabilities, including OSPF, EIGRP, ISIS, RIP, and routed access.
1.6. TOE Evaluated Configuration
Deployment of the TOE in its evaluated configuration consists of at least one TOE switch model following the CC installation and
configuration guidance document (AGD). The TOE has two or more network interfaces and is connected to at least one internal and one
external network. The Cisco IOS-XE configuration determines how packets are handled to and from the TOE’s network interfaces. The
switch configuration will determine how traffic flows received on an interface will be handled. Typically, packet flows are passed through
the internet working device and forwarded to their configured destination.
A typical deployment with a single instance of the TOE is depicted in in figure 1 below.
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Figure 1. TOE and Environment
The TOE can be administered interactively using a CLI over a local console connection or remotely over SSH.
The operational environment of the TOE will include at least one MACsec peer. The environment will also include an audit (syslog) server
and a Management Workstation. The syslog server is used to store audit records, where the TOE uses IPsec to secure the transmission of
the records.
1.7. Physical Scope of the TOE
The Cisco Catalyst 9200/9200L Series Switches 17.15 TOE is composed of hardware and software with the following specifications:
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Table 3. Hardware Models and Specifications
Hardware Model Picture Specifications
9200 models:
C9200-24T
C9200-48T
C9200-24P
C9200-48P
C9200-48PL
C9200-24PB
C9200-48P
C9200-24PXG
C9200-48PXG
With the following
network modules:
C9200-NM-4G
C9200-NM-4X
C9200-NM-2Y
C9200-NM-2Q
ASIC: Cisco UADP 2.0
Processor: Xilinx ZU3EG (ARM Cortex-A53)
Modular Uplinks
Ports: 24 or 48
Management Ports:
■ Ethernet management port: RJ-45 connectors, 4-pair Cat 5 UTP
cabling
■ Management console port: RJ45 or mini USB connectors.-RJ-45-
to-DB9 cable for PC connections, USB-C adaptor, USB adaptor
9200L models:
C9200L-24P-4G
C9200L-24P-4X
C9200L-24T-4G
C9200L-24T-4X
C9200L-48P-4G
C9200L-48P-4X
C9200L-48T-4G
C9200L-48T-4X
C9200L-48PL-4G
C9200L-48PL-4X
C9200L-24PXG-2Y
C9200L-48PXG-2Y
C9200L-24PXG-4X
C9200L-48PXG-4X
ASIC: Cisco UADP 2.0
Processor: Xilinx ZU3EG (ARM Cortex-A53)
Fixed Uplinks
Ports: 24 or 48
Management Ports:
■ Ethernet management port: RJ-45 connectors, 4-pair Cat 5 UTP
cabling
■ Management console port: RJ45 or mini USB connectors.-RJ-45-
to-DB9 cable for PC connections, USB-C adaptor, USB adaptor
The TOE includes the cat9k_lite_iosxe.V1715_3_CSCWO73590_3.SPA.bin software image available by contacting the Technical Assistance
Center (TAC) at www.cisco.com/go/offices or by navigating to Cisco Software Central at https://software.cisco.com/. Customers can use
their Cisco Care Online (CCO) or SMART account to download the software in a binary image format.
1.8. Logical Scope of the TOE
The TOE is comprised of several security features including:
■ Security Audit
■ Cryptographic Support
■ Identification and Authentication
■ Security Management
■ Protection of the TSF
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■ TOE Access
■ Trusted Path/Channels
These features are described in more detail in the following subsections.
Security Audit
Auditing allows Security Administrators to discover intentional and unintentional issues with the TOE’s configuration and/or
operation. Auditing of administrative activities provides information that may be used to hasten corrective action should the system
be configured incorrectly. Security audit data can also provide an indication of failure of critical portions of the TOE (e.g. a
communication channel failure or anomalous activity (e.g. establishment of an administrative session at a suspicious time, repeated
failures to establish sessions or authenticate to the TOE) of a suspicious nature.
The TOE provides extensive capabilities to generate audit data targeted at detecting such activity. The TOE generates an audit record
for each auditable event. Each security relevant audit event has the date, timestamp, event description, and subject identity. The
TOE stores audit messages in a circular audit trail configurable by the Security Administrator. All audit logs are transmitted to an
external audit server over a trusted channel protected with IPsec. The TOE allows authorized administrators the ability to view locally
stored audit records.
Cryptographic Support
The TOE provides cryptographic functions to implement SSH, IPsec, and MACsec protocols. The cryptographic algorithm
implementation has been validated for CAVP conformance. This includes key generation and random bit generation, key
establishment methods, key destruction, and the various types of cryptographic operations to provide AES encryption/decryption,
signature verification, hash generation, and keyed hash generation.
The TOE supports MACsec using the proprietary Unified Access Data Plane (UADP) 2.0 Application-Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC).
The MACsec Controller (MSC) v1.0 is embedded within the ASICs that are utilized within Cisco hardware platforms.
SSH and IPsec protocols are implemented using the IOS Common Cryptographic Module (IC2M) version Rel5a. Refer to Table 21 for
identification of the relevant CAVP certificates.
Identification and Authentication
The TOE implements four types of authentication to provide a trusted means for Security Administrators and remote
servers/endpoints to securely communicate: X.509v3 certificate-based authentication for remote syslog audit servers, pre-shared
keys for MACsec endpoints, and local and remote authentication for Security Administrators using local password, SSH password, and
SSH public key.
Security Administrators have the ability to compose strong passwords which are stored using a SHA-2 hash. Additionally, the TOE
detects and tracks successive unsuccessful remote authentication attempts and will prevent the offending account from making
further attempts until a Security Administrator time period has elapsed or until the Administrator manually unblocks the account.
Security Management
The TOE provides secure remote administrative interface and local interface to perform security management functions. This
includes ability to configure cryptographic functionality; an access banner containing an advisory notice and consent warning
message; a session inactivity timer before session termination as well as an ability to update TOE software.
The TOE provides a Security Administrator role and only the Security Administrator can perform the above security management
functions.
Protection of the TSF
The TOE protects critical security data including keys and passwords against tampering by untrusted subjects. The TOE provides
reliable timestamps to support monitoring local and remote interactive administrative sessions for inactivity, validating X.509
certificates (to determine if a certificate has expired), and to support accurate audit records.
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The TOE detects replay of MACsec traffic. If replay is detected, the MACsec packets are discarded.
The TOE provides self-tests to ensure it is operating correctly, including the ability to detect software integrity failures. Additionally,
the TOE provides an ability to perform software updates and to verify those software updates are from Cisco Systems, Inc.
TOE Access
The TOE monitors both local and remote admin sessions for inactivity and terminates when a threshold time period is reached. Once
a session has been terminated the TOE requires the user to re-authenticate.
The TOE also displays a Security Administrator specified advisory notice and consent warning message prior to initiating identification
and authentication for each administrative user.
Trusted Path/Channels
The TOE provides encryption (protection from disclosure and detection of modification) for communication paths and channels
between itself and remote endpoints.
In addition, the TOE provides two-way authentication of each endpoint in a cryptographically secure manner, meaning that even if
there was a malicious attacker between the two endpoints, any attempt to represent themselves to either endpoint of the
communications path as the other communicating party would be detected.
1.9. Excluded Functionality
The functionality listed below is not included in the evaluated configuration.
Table 4. Excluded Functionality and Rationale
Function Excluded Rationale
Non-FIPS 140-2 mode of operation The TOE includes FIPS mode of operation. The FIPS modes
allows the TOE to use only approved cryptography. FIPS mode
of operation must be enabled in order for the TOE to be
operating in its evaluated configuration.
HTTP/HTTPS Remote Management is performed using SSH
SNMP Remote Management is performed using SSH
These services can be disabled by using the configuration settings as described in section 4.2.18 of the Administrative Guidance
Documents (AGD).
Additionally, the TOE includes a number of functions where there are no Security Functional Requirements that apply from the
collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices v3.0e or the PP-Module for MACsec Ethernet Encryption v1.0. The excluded
functionality does not affect the TOE’s conformance to the claimed Protection Profiles.
2. Conformance Claims
2.1.Common Criteria Conformance Claim
The TOE and ST are compliant with the Common Criteria (CC) Version 3.1, Revision 5, dated: April 2017. The TOE and ST are CC Part 2
extended and CC Part 3 conformant.
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2.2.PP Configuration Conformance Claim
The TOE and ST are conformant with the PP Configuration identified in the PP-Configuration column of Table 5.
Table 5. PP Configuration Conformance
PP-Configuration Component Version Date
PP-Configuration for Network Devices and
MACsec Ethernet Encryption, 2024-04-25,
Version 2.0, (CFG_NDcPP-MACsec_V2.0),
which includes the components in the next
column
Base-PP: collaborative Protection Profile for
Network Devices [CPP_ND_V3.0E]
3.0e December 6, 2023
PP-Module: PP-Module for MACsec
Ethernet Encryption [MOD_MACsec_V1.0]
1.0 March 2, 2023
The TOE and ST are also conformant with the Functional Package for Secure Shell (SSH), Version 1.0, May 13, 2021 [PKG_SSH_v1.0].
This ST applies the following NIAP Technical Decisions:
Table 6. NIAP Technical Decisions
Number Title PP Applicable Exclusion Rational
TD0918 NIT Technical Decision: Addition of FIPS PUB
186-5
[CPP_ND_V3.0E] Yes
TD0900 Clarification to Local Administrator Access in
FIA_UIA_EXT.1.3
[CPP_ND_V3.0E] Yes
TD0899 NIT Technical Decision: Correction of
Renegotiation Test for TLS 1.2
[CPP_ND_V3.0E] No TLS 1.2 not claimed
TD0886 Clarification to FAU_STG_EXT.1 Test 6 [CPP_ND_V3.0E] Yes
TD0880 NIT Decision: Removal of Duplicate Selection
in FMT_SMF.1.1
[CPP_ND_V3.0E] Yes
TD0879 NIT Decision: Correction of Chapter Headings
in CPP_ND_V3.0E
[CPP_ND_V3.0E] Yes
TD0868 NIT Technical Decision: Clarification of time
frames in FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.7 and
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.8
[CPP_ND_V3.0E] Yes
TD0836 NIT Technical Decision: Redundant
Requirements in FPT_TST_EXT.1
[CPP_ND_V3.0E] Yes
TD0891 Correlation of Implicitly Satisfied
Requirements when CPP_ND_V3.0E is the
Base-PP
[MOD_MACSEC] Yes
TD0889 Correction For Tests Incorrectly Requiring
Group MACsec
[MOD_MACSEC] Yes
TD0884 Expansion of Permitted EtherTypes in
FCS_MACSEC_EXT.1.4
[MOD_MACSEC] Yes
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Number Title PP Applicable Exclusion Rational
TD0882 MACsec Data Delay Protection, Key
Agreement, and Conditional Support for
Group CAK
[MOD_MACSEC] Yes
TD0881 Correction to MN Usage for FPT_RPL.1 Test [MOD_MACSEC] Yes
TD0870 Security Objectives Rationale for
MOD_MACSEC_V1.0
[MOD_MACSEC] Yes
TD0840 Alignment of Test 22.1 to
FMT_SMF.1/MACSEC
[MOD_MACSEC] Yes
TD0826 Aligning MOD_MACSEC_V1.0 with
CPP_ND_V3.0E
[MOD_MACSEC] Yes
TD0816 Clarity for MACsec Self Test Failure Response [MOD_MACSEC] Yes
TD0803 Clarification for Configurable MACsec CKN
Length
[MOD_MACSEC] Yes
TD0746 Correction to FPT_RPL.1 Test 25 [MOD_MACSEC] Yes
TD0728 Corrections to MACSec PP-Module SD [MOD_MACSEC] Yes
TD0909 Updates to FCS_SSH_EXT.1.1 App Note in SSH
FP 1.0
[PKG_SSH_v1.0] Yes
TD0777 Clarification to Selections for Auditable Events
for FCS_SSH_EXT.1
[PKG_SSH_v1.0] Yes
TD0732 FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.3 Test 2 Update [PKG_SSH_v1.0] Yes
TD0695 Choice of 128 or 256 bit size in AES-CTR in SSH
Functional Package.
[PKG_SSH_v1.0] Yes
TD0682 Addressing Ambiguity in FCS_SSHS_EXT.1
Tests
[PKG_SSH_v1.0] Yes
2.3. Protection Profile Conformance Claim Rationale
2.3.1. TOE Appropriateness
The TOE provides all of the functionality at a level of security commensurate with that identified in the U.S. Government
Protection Profiles.
2.3.2. TOE Security Problem Definition Consistency
The Assumptions, Threats, and Organization Security Policies included in the Security Target represent the Assumptions, Threats,
and Organization Security Policies specified in [NDcPP], [MOD_MACSEC], and [PKG_SSH_v1.0] for which conformance is claimed
verbatim. All concepts covered in the Protection Profile Security Problem Definition are included in the Security Target
Statement of Security Objectives Consistency.
The Security Objectives included in the Security Target represent the Security Objectives specified in [NDcPP], [MOD_MACSEC],
and [PKG_SSH_v1.0] for which conformance is claimed verbatim. All concepts covered in the Protection Profile’s Statement of
Security Objectives are included in the Security Target.
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2.3.3. Statement of Security Requirements Consistency
The Security Functional Requirements included in the Security Target represent the Security Functional Requirements specified
in [NDcPP], [MOD_MACSEC], [PKG_SSH_v1.0] for which conformance is claimed verbatim. All concepts covered the Protection
Profile’s Statement of Security Requirements are included in the Security Target. Additionally, the Security Assurance
Requirements included in the Security Target are identical to the Security Assurance Requirements included in the claimed
Protection Profiles.
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3. Security Problem Definition
This section identifies the following:
■ Assumptions about the TOE’s operational environment. These assumptions include both practical realities in the development
of the TOE security requirements and the essential environmental conditions on the use of the TOE.
■ Threats addressed by the TOE and the IT Environment.
■ Organizational Security Policies imposed by an organization on the TOE to address its security needs.
The security problem definition below has been drawn verbatim from [NDcPP], [MOD_MACSEC], and [PKG_SSH_v1.0].
3.1. Assumptions
Table 7. TOE Assumptions
Assumption Assumption Definition
A.PHYSICAL_PROTECTION The Network Device is assumed to be physically protected in its
operational environment and not subject to physical attacks
that compromise the security or interfere with the device’s
physical interconnections and correct operation. This
protection is assumed to be sufficient to protect the device and
the data it contains. As a result, the cPP does not include any
requirements on physical tamper protection or other physical
attack mitigations. The cPP does not expect the product to
defend against physical access to the device that allows
unauthorized entities to extract data, bypass other controls, or
otherwise manipulate the device. For vNDs, this assumption
applies to the physical platform on which the VM runs.
A.LIMITED_FUNCTIONALITY The device is assumed to provide networking functionality as its
core function and not provide functionality/ services that could
be deemed as general purpose computing. For example the
device should not provide computing platform for general
purpose applications (unrelated to networking functionality).
If a virtual TOE evaluated as a pND, following Case 2 vNDs as
specified in Section 1.2, the VS is considered part of the TOE
with only one vND instance for each physical hardware
platform. The exception being where components of a
distributed TOE run inside more than one virtual machine (VM)
on a single VS. In Case 2 vND, no non-TOE guest VMs are
allowed on the platform.
A.NO_THRU_TRAFFIC_PROTECTION A standard/generic Network Device does not provide any
assurance regarding the protection of traffic that traverses it.
The intent is for the Network Device to protect data that
originates on or is destined to the device itself, to include
administrative data and audit data. Traffic that is traversing the
Network Device, destined for another network entity, is not
covered by the ND cPP. It is assumed that this protection will be
covered by cPPs for particular types of Network Devices (e.g.,
firewall).
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A.TRUSTED_ADMINISTRATOR The Security Administrator(s) for the Network Device are
assumed to be trusted and to act in the best interest of security
for the organization. This includes appropriately trained,
following policy, and adhering to guidance documentation.
Administrators are trusted to ensure passwords/credentials
have sufficient strength and entropy and to lack malicious intent
when administering the device. The Network Device is not
expected to be capable of defending against a malicious
Administrator that actively works to bypass or compromise the
security of the device.
For TOEs supporting X.509v3 certificate-based authentication,
the Security Administrator(s) are expected to fully validate (e.g.
offline verification) any CA certificate (root CA certificate or
intermediate CA certificate) loaded into the TOE’s trust store
(aka 'root store', ' trusted CA Key Store', or similar) as a trust
anchor prior to use (e.g. offline verification).
A.REGULAR_UPDATES The Network Device firmware and software is assumed to be
updated by an Administrator on a regular basis in response to
the release of product updates due to known vulnerabilities.
A.ADMIN_CREDENTIALS_SECURE The Administrator’s credentials (private key) used to access the
Network Device are protected by the platform on which they
reside.
A.COMPONENTS_RUNNING (applies to distributed TOEs only) For distributed TOEs it is assumed that the availability of all TOE
components is checked as appropriate to reduce the risk of an
undetected attack on (or failure of) one or more TOE
components. It is also assumed that in addition to the
availability of all components it is also checked as appropriate
that the audit functionality is running properly on all TOE
components.
A.RESIDUAL_INFORMATION The Administrator must ensure that there is no unauthorized
access possible for sensitive residual information (e.g.
cryptographic keys, keying material, PINs, passwords etc.) on
networking equipment when the equipment is discarded or
removed from its operational environment.
A.VS_TRUSTED_ADMINISTRATOR (applies to vNDs only) The Security Administrators for the VS are assumed to be
trusted and to act in the best interest of security for the
organization. This includes not interfering with the correct
operation of the device. The Network Device is not expected to
be capable of defending against a malicious VS Administrator
that actively works to bypass or compromise the security of the
device.
A.VS_REGULAR_UPDATES (applies to vNDs only) The VS software is assumed to be updated by the VS
Administrator on a regular basis in response to the release of
product updates due to known vulnerabilities.
A.VS_ISOLATON (applies to vNDs only) For vNDs, it is assumed that the VS provides, and is configured
to provide sufficient isolation between software running in VMs
on the same physical platform. Furthermore, it is assumed that
the VS adequately protects itself from software running inside
VMs on the same physical platform.
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A.VS_CORRECT_CONFIGURATION (applies to vNDs only) For vNDs, it is assumed that the VS and VMs are correctly
configured to support ND functionality implemented in VMs.
3.2. Threats
Table 8. Threats
Threat Threat Definition
T.UNAUTHORIZED_ADMINISTRATOR_ACCESS Threat agents may attempt to gain Administrator access to the
Network Device by nefarious means such as masquerading as an
Administrator to the device, masquerading as the device to an
Administrator, replaying an administrative session (in its
entirety, or selected portions), or performing man-in-the-middle
attacks, which would provide access to the administrative
session, or sessions between Network Devices. Successfully
gaining administrator access allows malicious actions that
compromise the security functionality of the device and the
network on which it resides.
T.WEAK_CRYPTOGRAPHY Threat agents may exploit weak cryptographic algorithms or
perform a cryptographic exhaust against the key space. Poorly
chosen encryption algorithms, modes, and key sizes will allow
attackers to compromise the algorithms, or brute force exhaust
the key space and give them unauthorized access allowing them
to read, manipulate and/or control the traffic with minimal
effort.
T.UNTRUSTED_COMMUNICATION_CHANNELS Threat agents may attempt to target Network Devices that do
not use standardized secure tunneling protocols to protect the
critical network traffic. Attackers may take advantage of poorly
designed protocols or poor key management to successfully
perform man-in-the middle attacks, replay attacks, etc.
Successful attacks will result in loss of confidentiality and
integrity of the critical network traffic, and potentially could
lead to a compromise of the Network Device itself.
T.WEAK_AUTHENTICATION_ENDPOINTS Threat agents may take advantage of secure protocols that use
weak methods to authenticate the endpoints – e.g., shared
password that is guessable or transported as plaintext. The
consequences are the same as a poorly designed protocol, the
attacker could masquerade as the Administrator or another
device, and the attacker could insert themselves into the
network stream and perform a man-in-the-middle attack. The
result is the critical network traffic is exposed and there could
be a loss of confidentiality and integrity, and potentially the
Network Device itself could be compromised.
T.UPDATE_COMPROMISE Threat agents may attempt to provide a compromised update of
the software or firmware which undermines the security
functionality of the device. Non-validated updates or updates
validated using non-secure or weak cryptography leave the
update firmware vulnerable to surreptitious alteration.
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T.UNDETECTED_ACTIVITY Threat agents may attempt to access, change, and/or modify
the security functionality of the Network Device without
Administrator awareness. This could result in the attacker
finding an avenue (e.g., misconfiguration, flaw in the product) to
compromise the device and the
Administrator would have no knowledge that the device has
been compromised.
T.SECURITY_FUNCTIONALITY_COMPROMISE Threat agents may compromise credentials and device data
enabling continued access to the Network Device and its critical
data. The compromise of credentials include replacing existing
credentials with an attacker’s credentials, modifying existing
credentials, or obtaining the Administrator or device credentials
for use by the attacker. Threat agents may also be able to take
advantage of weak administrative passwords to gain privileged
access to the device
T.SECURITY_FUNCTIONALITY_FAILURE An external, unauthorized entity could make use of failed or
compromised security functionality and might therefore
subsequently use or abuse security functions without prior
authentication to access, change or modify device data, critical
network traffic or security functionality of the device.
T.DATA_INTEGRITY An attacker may modify data transmitted over the layer 2 link in
a way that is not detected by the recipient.
Devices on a network may be exposed to attacks that attempt
to corrupt or modify data in transit without authorization. If
malicious devices are able to modify and replay data that is
transmitted over a layer 2 link, then the data contained within
the communications may be susceptible to a loss of integrity.
T.NETWORK_ACCESS An attacker may send traffic through the TOE that enables them
to access devices in the TOE’s operational environment without
authorization.
A MACsec device may sit on the periphery of a network, which
means that it may have an externally-facing interface to a public
network. Devices located in the public network may attempt to
exercise services located on the internal network that are
intended to be accessed only from within the internal network
or externally accessible only from specifically authorized
devices. If the MACsec device allows unauthorized external
devices access to the internal network, these devices on the
internal network may be subject to compromise. Similarly, if
two MACsec devices are deployed to facilitate end-to-end
encryption of traffic that is contained within a single network,
an attacker could use an insecure MACsec device as a method
to access devices on a specific segment of that network such as
an individual LAN.
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T.UNTRUSTED_MACSEC_COMMUNICATION_CHANNELS An attacker may acquire sensitive TOE or user data that is
transmitted to or from the TOE because an untrusted
communication channel causes a disclosure of data in transit.
A generic network device may be threatened by the use of
insecure communications channels to transmit sensitive data.
The attack surface of a MACsec device also includes the MACsec
trusted channels. Inability to secure communications channels,
or failure to do so correctly, would expose user data that is
assumed to be secure to the threat of unauthorized disclosure.
3.3. Organizational Security Policies
Table 9. Organizational Security Policies
Policy Name Policy Definition
P.ACCESS_BANNER The TOE shall display an initial banner describing restrictions of
use, legal agreements, or any other appropriate information to
which users consent by accessing the TOE.
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4. Security Objectives
This section identifies the security objectives of the TOE and the IT Environment. The security objectives identify the responsibilities of the
TOE and the TOE’s IT environment in meeting the security needs.
4.1. Security Objectives for the TOE
The following table identifies the Security Objectives for the TOE. These security objectives reflect the stated intent to counter identified
threats and/or comply with any security policies. The security objectives below have been drawn verbatim from [NDcPP] and
[MOD_MACSEC].
Table 10. Security Objectives for the TOE
Environment Security Objective TOE Security Objective Definition
O.AUTHENTICATION_MACSEC To further address the issues associated with unauthorized
disclosure of information, a compliant TOE’s authentication
ability (MKA) will allow a MACsec peer to establish connectivity
associations (CAs) with another MACsec peer. MACsec
endpoints authenticate each other to ensure they are
communicating with an authorized MAC Security Entity (SecY)
entity. Addressed by: FCS_MACSEC_EXT.4, FCS_MKA_EXT.1,
FIA_PSK_EXT.1, FCS_DEVID_EXT.1 (selection-based), FCS_EAP-
TLS_EXT.1 (selection-based)
O.AUTHORIZED_ADMINISTRATION All network devices are expected to provide services that allow
the security functionality of the device to be managed. The
MACsec device, as a specific type of network device, has a
refined set of management functions to address its specialized
behavior. In order to further mitigate the threat of a
compromise of its security functionality, the MACsec device
prescribes the ability to limit brute-force authentication
attempts by enforcing lockout of accounts that experience
excessive failures and by limiting access to security-relevant
data that administrators do not need to view. Addressed by:
FMT_SMF.1/MACSEC, FPT_CAK_EXT.1, FIA_AFL_EXT.1
(optional), FTP_TRP.1/MACSEC (optional), FMT_SNMP_EXT.1
(selection-based)
O.CRYPTOGRAPHIC_FUNCTIONS_MACSEC To address the issues associated with unauthorized modification
and disclosure of information, compliant TOEs will implement
cryptographic capabilities. These capabilities are intended to
maintain confidentiality and allow for detection and
modification of data that is transmitted outside of the TOE.
Addressed by: FCS_COP.1/CMAC, FCS_COP.1/MACSEC,
FCS_MACSEC_EXT.2, FCS_MACSEC_EXT.3, FTP_ITC.1/MACSEC,
FTP_TRP.1/MACSEC (optional), FCS_SNMP_EXT.1 (selection-
based)
O.PORT_FILTERING_MACSEC To further address the issues associated with unauthorized
network access, a compliant TOE’s port filtering capability will
restrict the flow of network traffic through the TOE based on
layer 2 frame characteristics and whether or not the traffic
represents valid MACsec frames and MACsec Key Agreement
Protocol Data Units (MKPDUs). Addressed by:
FCS_MACSEC_EXT.1, FIA_PSK_EXT.1, FPT_DDP_EXT.1
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O.REPLAY_DETECTION A MACsec device is expected to help mitigate the threat of
MACsec data integrity violations by providing a mechanism to
detect and discard replayed traffic for MPDUs. Addressed by:
FPT_RPL.1, FPT_RPL_EXT.1 (optional)
O.SYSTEM_MONITORING_MACSEC To address the issues of administrators being able to monitor
the operations of the MACsec device, compliant TOEs will
implement the ability to log the flow of Ethernet traffic.
Specifically, the TOE will provide the means for administrators
to configure rules to ‘log’ when Ethernet traffic grants or
restricts access. As a result, the ‘log’ will result in informative
event logs whenever a match occurs. In addition, the
establishment of security CAs is auditable, not only between
MACsec devices, but also with MAC Security Key Agreement
Entities (KaYs). Addressed by: FAU_GEN.1/MACSEC
O.TSF_INTEGRITY To mitigate the security risk that the MACsec device may fail
during startup, it is required to fail-secure if any self-test failures
occur during startup. This ensures that the device will only
operate when it is in a known state. Addressed by: FPT_FLS.1
4.2. Security Objectives for the Environment
The following table identifies the Security Objectives for the Environment. These security objectives reflect the stated intent to counter
identified threats and/or comply with any security policies. The security objectives below have been drawn verbatim from [NDcPP] and
[MOD_MACSEC].
Table 11. Security Objectives for the Environment
Environment Security Objective IT Environment Security Objective Definition
OE.PHYSICAL Physical security, commensurate with the value of the TOE and
the data it contains, is provided by the environment.
OE.NO_GENERAL_PURPOSE There are no general-purpose computing capabilities (e.g.,
compilers or user applications) available on the TOE, other than
those services necessary for the operation, administration and
support of the TOE. Note: For vNDs the TOE includes only the
contents of the its own VM, and does not include other VMs or
the VS.
OE.NO_THRU_TRAFFIC_PROTECTION The TOE does not provide any protection of traffic that
traverses it. It is assumed that protection of this traffic will be
covered by other security and assurance measures in the
operational environment.
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OE.TRUSTED_ADMIN Security Administrators are trusted to follow and apply all
guidance in a trusted manner. For vNDs, this includes the VS
Administrator responsible for configuring the VMs that
implement ND functionality.
For TOEs supporting X.509v3 certificate-based authentication,
the Security Administrator(s) are assumed to monitor the
revocation status of all certificates in the TOE's trust store and
to remove any certificate from the TOE’s trust store in case such
certificate can no longer be trusted.
OE.UPDATES The TOE firmware and software is updated by an Administrator
on a regular basis in response to the release of product updates
due to known vulnerabilities.
OE.ADMIN_CREDENTIALS_SECURE The Administrator’s credentials (private key) used to access the
TOE must be protected on any other platform on which they
reside.
OE.COMPONENTS_RUNNING (applies to distributed TOEs only) For distributed TOEs the Security Administrator ensures that the
availability of every TOE component is checked as appropriate
to reduce the risk of an undetected attack on (or failure of) one
or more TOE components. The Security Administrator also
ensures that it is checked as appropriate for every TOE
component that the audit functionality is running properly.
OE.RESIDUAL_INFORMATION The Security Administrator ensures that there is no
unauthorized access possible for sensitive residual information
(e.g. cryptographic keys, keying material, PINs, passwords etc.)
on networking equipment when the equipment is discarded or
removed from its operational environment. For vNDs, this
applies when the physical platform on which the VM runs is
removed from its operational environment.
OE.VM_CONFIG`URATION (applies to vNDs only) For vNDs, the Security Administrator ensures that the VS and
VMs are configured to
■ reduce the attack surface of VMs as much as possible
while supporting ND functionality (e.g., remove
unnecessary virtual hardware, turn off unused inter-
VM communications mechanisms), and
■ correctly implement ND functionality (e.g., ensure
virtual networking is properly configured to support
network traffic, management channels, and audit
reporting).
The VS should be operated in a manner that reduces the
likelihood that vND operations are adversely affected by
virtualisation features such as cloning, save/restore,
suspend/resume, and live migration.
If possible, the VS should be configured to make use of features
that leverage the VS’s privileged position to provide additional
security functionality. Such features could include malware
detection through VM introspection, measured VM boot, or VM
snapshot for forensic analysis.
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5. Security Requirements
This section identifies the Security Functional Requirements for the TOE. The Security Functional Requirements in this section are drawn
from [CC_PART2], [NDcPP], [MOD_MACSEC], [PKG_SSH_v1.0], and NIAP Technical Decisions.
5.1. Conventions
[CC_PART1] defines operations on Security Functional Requirements. This document uses the following conventions to identify the
operations permitted by [NDcPP], [MOD_MACSEC], [PKG_SSH_v1.0], and NIAP Technical Decisions.
Table 12. Security Requirement Conventions
Convention Indication
Assignment Indicated with italicized text
Refinement Indicated with bold text and strikethroughs
Selection Indicated with underlined text
Assignment within a Selection Indicated with italicized and underlined text
Iteration indicated by adding a string starting with ‘/’ (e.g.
‘FCS_COP.1/Hash’)
Where operations were completed in the [NDcPP] itself, the formatting used in the [NDcPP] has been retained. Formatting used in
[NDcPP], [MOD_MACSEC], and [PKG_SSH_v1.0] that is inconsistent with the listed conventions has not been retained in the ST.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are identified in the following table and are described in more detail in the following
subsections.
Table 13. Security Functional Requirements
Class Name Component Identification Component Name Drawn From
FAU: Security Audit FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation [NDcPP]
FAU_GEN.1/MACSEC Audit Data Generation (MACsec) [MOD_MACSEC]
FAU_GEN.2 User Identity Association [NDcPP]
FAU_STG_EXT.1 Protected Audit Event Storage [NDcPP]
FCS: Cryptographic
Support
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic Key Generation
(Refinement)
[NDcPP]
FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic Key Establishment [NDcPP]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic Key Destruction [NDcPP]
FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption Cryptographic Operation (AES
Data Encryption/Decryption)
[NDcPP]
FCS_COP.1/MACSEC Cryptographic Operation (MACsec
AES Data Encryption/Decryption)
[MOD_MACSEC]
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FCS_COP.1/SigGen Cryptographic Operation
(Signature Generation and
Verification)
[NDcPP]
FCS_COP.1/Hash Cryptographic Operation (Hash
Algorithm)
[NDcPP]
FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash Cryptographic Operation (Keyed
Hash Algorithm)
[NDcPP]
FCS_COP.1/CMAC Cryptographic Operation (AES-
CMAC Keyed Hash Algorithm)
[MOD_MACSEC]
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1 IPsec Protocol [NDcPP]
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Random Bit Generation [NDcPP]
FCS_MACSEC_EXT.1 MACsec [MOD_MACSEC]
FCS_MACSEC_EXT.2 MACsec Integrity and
Confidentiality
[MOD_MACSEC]
FCS_MACSEC_EXT.3 MACsec Randomness [MOD_MACSEC]
FCS_MACSEC_EXT.4 MACsec Key Usage [MOD_MACSEC]
FCS_MKA_EXT.1 MACsec Key Agreement [MOD_MACSEC]
FCS_SSH_EXT.1 SSH Protocol [PKG_SSH_v1.0]
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1 SSH Server Protocol [PKG_SSH_v1.0]
FIA: Identification and
authentication
FIA_AFL.1 Authentication Failure Handling [NDcPP]
FIA_PMG_EXT.1 Password Management [NDcPP]
FIA_PSK_EXT.1 Extended: Pre-Shared Key
Composition
[MOD_MACSEC]
FIA_UIA_EXT.1 User Identification and
Authentication
[NDcPP]
FIA_UAU.7 Protected Authentication
Feedback
[NDcPP]
FIA_X509_EXT.1/Rev X.509 Certificate Validation [NDcPP]
FIA_X509_EXT.2 X.509 Certificate Authentication [NDcPP]
FIA_X509_EXT.3 X.509 Certificate Requests [NDcPP]
FMT: Security
Management
FMT_MOF.1/ManualUpdate Management of security functions
behaviour
[NDcPP]
FMT_MTD.1/CoreData Management of TSF Data [NDcPP]
FMT_MTD.1/CryptoKeys Management of TSF Data [NDcPP]
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5.2. Class: Security Audit (FAU)
5.2.1. FAU_GEN.1 – Audit Data Generation
FAU_GEN.1.1 The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the following auditable events:
a) Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions;
b) All auditable events for the not specified level of audit; and
c) All administrator actions comprising:
• Administrative login and logout (name of Administrator account shall be logged if individual accounts are required for
Administrators).
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management
Functions
[NDcPP]
FMT_SMF.1/MACSEC Specification of Management
Functions (MACsec)
[MOD_MACSEC]
FMT_SMR.2 Restrictions on Security Roles [NDcPP]
FPT: Protection of the
TSF
FPT_CAK_EXT.1 Protection of CAK Data [MOD_MACSEC]
FPT_FLS.1 Failure with Preservation of
Secure State
[MOD_MACSEC]
FPT_RPL.1 Replay Detection [MOD_MACSEC]
FPT_APW_EXT.1 Extended: Protection of
Administrator Passwords
[NDcPP]
FPT_SKP_EXT.1 Extended: Protection of TSF Data
(for reading of all pre-shared,
symmetric and private keys)
[NDcPP]
FPT_STM_EXT.1 Reliable Time Stamps [NDcPP]
FPT_TST_EXT.1 TSF Testing (Extended) [NDcPP]
FPT_TUD_EXT.1 Trusted update [NDcPP]
FTA: TOE Access FTA_SSL_EXT.1 TSF-initiated Session Locking [NDcPP]
FTA_SSL.3 TSF-initiated Termination [NDcPP]
FTA_SSL.4 User-initiated Termination [NDcPP]
FTA_TAB.1 Default TOE Access Banners [NDcPP]
FTP: Trusted
path/channels
FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel [NDcPP]
FTP_ITC.1/MACSEC Inter-TSF Trusted Channel
(MACsec Communications)
[MOD_MACSEC]
FTP_TRP.1/Admin Trusted Path [NDcPP]
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• Changes to TSF data related to configuration changes (in addition to the information that a change occurred it shall be
logged what has been changed).
• Generating/import of, changing, or deleting of cryptographic keys (in addition to the action itself a unique key name or
key reference shall be logged).
• [Resetting passwords (name of related Administrator account shall be logged];
d) Specifically defined auditable events listed in Table 14.
FAU_GEN.1.2 The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the following information:
a) Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity, and the outcome (success or failure) of the event; and
b) For each audit event type, based on the auditable event definitions of the functional components included in the cPP/ST,
information specified in column three of Table 14.
Table 14. Auditable Events
SFR Auditable Event Additional Audit Record Contents
FAU_GEN.1 None. None.
FAU_GEN.2 None. None.
FAU_STG_EXT.1 Configuration of local audit settings. Identity of account making changes to the
audit configuration.
FCS_CKM.1 None. None.
FCS_CKM.2 None. None.
FCS_CKM.4 None. None.
FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption None. None.
FCS_COP.1/SigGen None. None.
FCS_COP.1/Hash None. None.
FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash None. None.
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1 Failure to establish an IPsec SA. Reason for failure.
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 None. None.
FCS_SSH_EXT.1 [Failure to establish SSH connection] [Reason for failure and Non-TOE endpoint
of connection (IP Address)]
FCS_SSH_EXT.1 [Establishment of SSH connection] [Non-TOE endpoint of connection (IP
Address)]
FCS_SSH_EXT.1 [Termination of SSH connection session] [Non-TOE endpoint of connection (IP
Address)]
FCS_SSH_EXT.1 [None] [None]
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1 No events specified
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SFR Auditable Event Additional Audit Record Contents
FIA_AFL.1 Unsuccessful login attempts limit is met
or exceeded.
Origin of the attempt (e.g., IP address).
FIA_PMG_EXT.1 None. None.
FIA_UIA_EXT.1 All use of the identification and
authentication mechanism.
Origin of the attempt (e.g., IP address).
FIA_UAU.7 None. None.
FIA_X509_EXT.1/Rev Unsuccessful attempt to validate a
certificate
Any addition, replacement or removal of
trust anchors in the TOE's trust store.
Reason for failure of certificate validation
Identification of certificates added,
replaced or removed as trust anchor in
the TOE's trust store.
FIA_X509_EXT.2 None. None.
FIA_X509_EXT.3 None. None.
FMT_MOF.1/ManualUpdate Any attempt to initiate a manual update None.
FMT_MTD.1/CoreData None. None.
FMT_MTD.1/CryptoKeys None. None.
FMT_SMF.1 All management activities of TSF data. None.
FMT_SMR.2 None. None.
FPT_APW_EXT.1 None. None.
FPT_SKP_EXT.1 None. None.
FPT_STM_EXT.1 Discontinuous changes to time - either
Administrator actuated or changed via an
automated process.
For discontinuous changes to time: The
old and new values for the time. Origin of
the attempt to change time for success
and failure (e.g., IP address).
FPT_TST_EXT.1 None. None.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1 Initiation of update. result of the update
attempt (success or failure)
None.
FTA_SSL_EXT.1 The termination of a local session by the
session locking mechanism.
None.
FTA_SSL.3 The termination of a remote session by
the session locking mechanism.
None.
FTA_SSL.4 The termination of an interactive session. None.
FTA_TAB.1 None. None.
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SFR Auditable Event Additional Audit Record Contents
FTP_ITC.1 • Initiation of the trusted channel.
• Termination of the trusted channel.
• Failure of the trusted channel
functions.
• None
• None
• Reason for failure
FTP_TRP.1/Admin • Initiation of the trusted path.
• Termination of the trusted path.
• Failures of the trusted path
functions.
• None
• None
• Reason for failure
5.2.2. FAU_GEN.1/MACSEC – Audit Data Generation (MACsec)
FAU_GEN.1.1/MACSEC The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the following auditable events:
a) Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions;
b) All auditable events for the [not specified] level of audit;
c) All administrative actions;
d) [Specifically defined auditable events listed in the Auditable Events table (Table 15)]
Table 15. MACsec Auditable Events
SFR Auditable Event Additional Audit Record Contents
FCS_MACSEC_EXT.1 Session establishment Secure Channel Identifier (SCI)
FCS_MACSEC_EXT.3 Creation and update of SAK Creation and update times
FCS_MACSEC_EXT.4 Creation of CA Connectivity Association Key Names
(CKNs)
FPT_RPL.1 Detected replay attempt None.
FAU_GEN.1.2/MACSEC The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the following information:
a. Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity (if applicable), and the outcome (success or failure) of the event;
and
b. For each audit event type, based on the auditable event definitions of the functional components included in the PP-
Module/ST, [information specified in column three of the Auditable Events table (Table 15)].
5.2.3. FAU_GEN.2 – User Identity Association
FAU_GEN.2.1 For audit events resulting from actions of identified users, the TSF shall be able to associate each auditable event with
the identity of the user that caused the event.
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5.2.4. FAU_STG_EXT.1 – Protected Audit Event Storage
FAU_STG_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall be able to transmit the generated audit data to an external IT entity using a trusted channel
according to FTP_ITC.1.
FAU_STG_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall be able to store generated audit data on the TOE itself. In addition [
• The TOE shall consist of a single standalone component that stores audit data locally].
FAU_STG_EXT.1.3 The TSF shall maintain a [buffer] of audit records in the event that an interruption of communication with the
remote audit server occurs.
FAU_STG_EXT.1.4 The TSF shall be able to store [nonpersistent] audit records locally with a minimum storage size of [150000000
bytes].
FAU_STG_EXT.1.5 The TSF shall [overwrite previous audit records according to the following rule: [oldest audit records are
overwritten]] when the local storage space for audit data is full.
FAU_STG_EXT.1.6 The TSF shall provide the following mechanisms for administrative access to locally stored audit records [ability to
view locally].
5.3.Class: Cryptographic Support (FCS)
5.3.1. FCS_CKM.1 – Cryptographic Key Generation (Refinement)
FCS_CKM.1.1 The TSF shall generate asymmetric cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation
algorithm: [
• RSA schemes using cryptographic key sizes of 2048-bit or greater that meet the following: FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature
Standard (DSS)”, Appendix B.3;
• ECC schemes using ‘NIST curves’ [P-256, P-384] that meet the following: FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”,
Appendix B.4.
] and specified cryptographic key sizes [assignment: cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following: [assignment: list of standards].
5.3.2. FCS_CKM.2 – Cryptographic Key Establishment (Refinement)
FCS_CKM.2.1 The TSF shall perform cryptographic key establishment in accordance with a specified cryptographic key establishment
method: [
• Elliptic curve-based key establishment schemes that meet the following: NIST Special Publication 800-56A Revision 3,
“Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography”.
] that meets the following: [assignment: list of standards].
5.3.3. FCS_CKM.4 – Cryptographic Key Destruction
FCS_CKM.4.1 The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key destruction method
• For plaintext keys in volatile storage, the destruction shall be executed by a [single overwrite consisting of [zeroes, a new
value of the key]];
• For plaintext keys in non-volatile storage, the destruction shall be executed by the invocation of an interface provided by a
part of the TSF that [
o logically addresses the storage location of the key and performs a [single-pass]overwrite consisting of [zeroes, a
new value of the key]];
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that meets the following: No Standard.
5.3.4. FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption – Cryptographic Operation (AES Data
Encryption/Decryption)
FCS_COP.1.1/DataEncryption The TSF shall perform encryption/decryption in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm
AES used in [CBC, GCM] mode and cryptographic key sizes [128 bits, 256 bits] that meet the following: AES as specified in ISO 18033-3,
[CBC as specified in ISO 10116, GCM as specified in ISO 19772].
5.3.5. FCS_COP.1/MACSEC – Cryptographic Operation (MACsec AES Data
Encryption/Decryption)
FCS_COP.1.1/MACSEC The TSF shall perform [encryption and decryption] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [AES
used in AES Key Wrap, GCM] and cryptographic key sizes [128] bits that meets the following: [AES as specified in ISO 18033-3, AES Key
Wrap as specified in NIST SP 800-38F, GCM as specified in ISO 19772].
5.3.6. FCS_COP.1/SigGen – Cryptographic Operation (Signature Generation and Verification)
FCS_COP.1.1/SigGen The TSF shall perform cryptographic signature services (generation and verification) in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm
[
• RSA Digital Signature Algorithm,
]
and cryptographic key sizes [
• For RSA: modulus 2048 bits or greater,
]
that meet the following:
[
• For RSA schemes: FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”, Section 5.5, using PKCS #1 v2.1 Signature Schemes
RSASSA-PSS and/or RSASSA-PKCS1v1_5; ISO/IEC 9796-2, Digital signature scheme 2 or Digital Signature scheme 3,
].
5.3.7. FCS_COP.1/Hash – Cryptographic Operation (Hash Algorithm)
FCS_COP.1.1/Hash The TSF shall perform cryptographic hashing services in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [SHA-
256, SHA-512] and cryptographic key sizes [assignment: cryptographic key sizes] and message digest sizes [256, 512] bits that meet
the following: ISO/IEC 10118-3:2004.
5.3.8. FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash – Cryptographic Operation (Keyed Hash Algorithm)
FCS_COP.1.1/KeyedHash The TSF shall perform keyed-hash message authentication in accordance with a specified cryptographic
algorithm [HMAC-SHA-256, implicit] and cryptographic key sizes [256] and message digest sizes [256] bits that meet the following:
ISO/IEC 9797-2:2011, Section 7 “MAC Algorithm 2”.
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5.3.9. FCS_COP.1/CMAC – Cryptographic Operation (AES-CMAC Keyed Hash Algorithm)
FCS_COP.1.1/CMAC The TSF shall perform [keyed-hash message authentication] in accordance with a specified cryptographic
algorithm [AES-CMAC] and cryptographic key sizes [128] bits and message digest size of 128 bits that meets the following: [NIST SP
800-38B].
5.3.10. FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1 IPsec Protocol
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall implement the IPsec architecture as specified in RFC 4301.
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall have a nominal, final entry in the SPD that matches anything that is otherwise unmatched and dis-
cards it.
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.3 The TSF shall implement [tunnel mode, transport mode].
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.4 The TSF shall implement the IPsec protocol ESP1
as defined by RFC 4303 using the cryptographic algorithms [AES-
CBC-128 (RFC3602), AES-CBC-256 (RFC3602), AES-GCM-128 (RFC 4106), AES-GCM-256 (RFC 4106)] together with a Secure Hash Algo-
rithm (SHA)-based HMAC [HMAC-SHA-256, no HMAC algorithm].
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.5 The TSF shall implement the protocol: [
• IKEv2 as defined in RFC 7296 and [with no support for NAT traversal], and [RFC 4868 for hash functions]
].
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.6 The TSF shall ensure the encrypted payload in the [IKEv2] protocol uses the cryptographic algorithms [AES-CBC-
128, AES-CBC-256 (specified in RFC 3602), AES-GCM-128, AES-GCM-256 (specified in RFC 5282)].
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.7 The TSF shall ensure that [
• IKEv2 SA lifetimes can be configured by a Security Administrator based on
[
o length of time, where the time values can be configured between [2 minutes] and [24 hours];
]
].
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.8 The TSF shall ensure that [
• IKEv2 Child SA lifetimes can be configured by a Security Administrator based on
[
o number of bytes
o length of time, where the time values can be configured between [2 minutes] and [720 hours];
]
].
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.9 The TSF shall generate the secret value x used in the IKE Diffie-Hellman key exchange (“x” in gx
mod p) using the
random bit generator specified in FCS_RBG_EXT.1 and having a length of at least [128 (for DH Group 19), 192 (for DH Group 20)] bits.
1
ESP – Encapsulating Security Protocol
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FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.10 The TSF shall generate nonces used in [IKEv2] exchanges of length [
• at least 128 bits in size and at least half the output size of the negotiated pseudorandom function (PRF) hash
].
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.11 The TSF shall ensure that IKE protocols implement DH Group(s) [[19 (256-bit Random ECP), 20 (384-bit Random
ECP)] according to RFC 5114.
].
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.12 The TSF shall be able to ensure that the strength of the symmetric algorithm (in terms of the number of bits in
the key) negotiated to protect the [IKEv2 IKE_SA] connection is greater than or equal to the strength of the symmetric algorithm (in
terms of the number of bits in the key) negotiated to protect the [IKEv2 CHILD_SA] connection.
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.13 The TSF shall ensure that all IKE protocols perform peer authentication using [RSA] that use X.509v3 certificates
that conform to RFC 4945 and [no other method].
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.14 The TSF shall only establish a trusted channel if the presented identifier in the received certificate matches the
configured reference identifier, where the presented and reference identifiers are of the following fields and types: [SAN: IP address,
SAN: Fully Qualified Domain Name (FQDN)] and [no other reference identifier types].
Application Note: Per the [NDcPP] a SHA-based HMAC is not required in FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.4 for AES-GCM since AES-GCM satisfies
both confidentiality and integrity functions. The selection of "no HMAC algorithm" applies to AES-GCM-128 and AES-GCM-256.
5.3.11. FCS_RBG_EXT.1 – Random Bit Generation
FCS_RBG_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall perform all deterministic random bit generation services in accordance with ISO/IEC 18031:2011
using [CTR_DRBG (AES)].
FCS_RBG_EXT.1.2 The deterministic RBG shall be seeded by at least one entropy source that accumulates entropy from [[1] software-
based noise source] with a minimum of [256 bits] of entropy at least equal to the greatest security strength, according to ISO/IEC
18031:2011 Table C.1 “Security Strength Table for Hash Functions”, of the keys and hashes that it will generate.
5.3.12. FCS_MACSEC_EXT.1 – MACsec
FCS_MACSEC_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall implement MACsec in accordance with IEEE Standard 802.1AE-2018.
FCS_MACSEC_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall derive a Secure Channel Identifier (SCI) from a peer’s MAC address and port to uniquely identify
the originator of an MPDU.
FCS_MACSEC_EXT.1.3 The TSF shall reject any MPDUs during a given session that contain an SCI other than the one used to establish
that session.
FCS_MACSEC_EXT.1.4 The TSF shall permit only EAPOL (Port Access Entity (PAE) EtherType 88-8E), MACsec frames (EtherType 88-
E5), and [no other frame types] and shall discard others.
5.3.13. FCS_MACSEC_EXT.2 – MACsec Integrity and Confidentiality
FCS_MACSEC_EXT.2.1 The TOE shall implement MACsec with support for integrity protection with a confidentiality offset of [0, 30,
50].
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FCS_MACSEC_EXT.2.2 The TSF shall provide assurance of the integrity of protocol data units (MPDUs) using an Integrity Check Value
(ICV) derived with the SAK.
FCS_MACSEC_EXT.2.3 The TSF shall provide the ability to derive an Integrity Check Value Key (ICK) from a Connectivity Association
Key (CAK) using a KDF.
5.3.14. FCS_MACSEC_EXT.3 – MACsec Randomness
FCS_MACSEC_EXT.3.1 The TSF shall generate unique Secure Association Keys (SAKs) using [key derivation from Connectivity Associa-
tion Key (CAK) per section 9.8.1 of IEEE 802.1X-2010] such that the likelihood of a repeating SAK is no less than 1 in 2 to the power of
the size of the generated key.
FCS_MACSEC_EXT.3.2 The TSF shall generate unique nonces for the derivation of SAKs using the TOE’s random bit generator as spec-
ified by FCS_RBG_EXT.1.
5.3.15. FCS_MACSEC_EXT.4 – MACsec Key Usage
FCS_MACSEC_EXT.4.1 The TSF shall support peer authentication using pre-shared keys (PSKs) [no other method].
FCS_MACSEC_EXT.4.2 The TSF shall distribute SAKs between MACsec peers using AES key wrap as specified in FCS_COP.1/MACSEC.
FCS_MACSEC_EXT.4.3 The TSF shall support specifying a lifetime for CAKs.
FCS_MACSEC_EXT.4.4 The TSF shall associate Connectivity Association Key Names (CKNs) with SAKs that are defined by the KDF us-
ing the CAK as input data (per IEEE 802.1X-2010, Section 9.8.1).
FCS_MACSEC_EXT.4.5 The TSF shall associate CKNs with CAKs. The length of the CKN shall be an integer number of octets, between 1
and 32 (inclusive).
5.3.16. FCS_MKA_EXT.1 – MACsec Key Agreement
FCS_MKA_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall implement Key Agreement Protocol (MKA) in accordance with IEEE 802.1X-2010 and 802.1Xbx-2014.
FCS_MKA_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall provide assurance of the integrity of MKA protocol data units (MKPDUs) using an Integrity Check
Value (ICV) derived from an Integrity Check Value Key (ICK).
FCS_MKA_EXT.1.3 The TSF shall provide the ability to derive an Integrity Check Value Key (ICK) from a CAK using a KDF.
FCS_MKA_EXT.1.4 The TSF shall enforce an MKA Lifetime Timeout limit of 6.0 seconds and [MKA Bounded Hello Timeout limit of 0.5
seconds].
FCS_MKA_EXT.1.5 The key server shall refresh a SAK when it expires. The key server shall distribute a SAK by [
• pairwise CAKS that are PSKs
].
FCS_MKA_EXT.1.6 The key server shall distribute a fresh SAK whenever a member is added to or removed from the live membership
of the CA.
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FCS_MKA_EXT.1.7 The TSF shall validate MKPDUs according to IEEE 802.1X-2010 Section 11.11.2. In particular, the TSF shall discard
without further processing any MKPDUs to which any of the following conditions apply:
a. The destination address of the MKPDU was an individual address
b. The MKPDU is less than 32 octets long
c. The MKPDU comprises fewer octets than indicated by the Basic Parameter Set body length, as encoded in bits 4 through 1
of octet 3 and bits 8 through 1 of octet 4, plus 16 octets of ICV
d. The CAK Name is not recognized
If an MKPDU passes these tests, then the TSF will begin processing it as follows:
a. If the Algorithm Agility parameter identifies an algorithm that has been implemented by the receiver, the ICV shall be veri-
fied as specified in IEEE 802.1X-2010 Section 9.4.1.
b. If the Algorithm Agility parameter is unrecognized or not implemented by the receiver, its value can be recorded for diagno-
sis but the received MKPDU shall be discarded without further processing.
Each received MKPDU that is validated as specified in this clause and verified as specified in IEEE 802.1X-2010 Section 9.4.1 shall be
decoded as specified in IEEE 802.1X-2010 Section 11.11.4.
5.3.17. FCS_SSH_EXT.1 – SSH Protocol
FCS_SSH_EXT.1.1 The TOE shall implement SSH acting as a [server] in accordance with that complies with RFCs 4251, 4252, 4253,
4254, [5656, 6668, 8308, 8332] and [no other standard].
FCS_SSH_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall ensure that the SSH protocol implementation supports the following authentication methods: [
• “password” (RFC 4252),
• “publickey” (RFC 4252): [
o rsa-sha2-256 (RFC 8332),
o rsa-sha2-512 (RFC 8332),
]
] and no other methods.
FCS_SSH_EXT.1.3 The TSF shall ensure that, as described in RFC 4253, packets greater than [65,806 bytes] in an SSH transport
connection are dropped.
FCS_SSH_EXT.1.4 The TSF shall protect data in transit from unauthorised disclosure using the following mechanisms: [
• aes128-cbc (RFC 4253),
• aes256-cbc (RFC 4253),
• aes128-gcm@openssh.com (RFC 5647),
• aes256-gcm@openssh.com (RFC 5647)
] and no other mechanisms.
FCS_SSH_EXT.1.5 The TSF shall protect data in transit from modification, deletion, and insertion using: [
• hmac-sha2-256 (RFC 6668),
• implicit
] and no other mechanisms.
FCS_SSH_EXT.1.6 The TSF shall establish a shared secret with its peer using: [
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• ecdh-sha2-nistp256 (RFC 5656),
• ecdh-sha2-nistp384 (RFC 5656),
] and no other mechanisms.
FCS_SSH_EXT.1.7 The TSF shall use SSH KDF as defined in [
• RFC 5656 (Section 4)
] to derive the following cryptographic keys from a shared secret: session keys.
FCS_SSH_EXT.1.8 The TSF shall ensure that [
• a rekey of the session keys,
] occurs when any of the following thresholds are met:
• one hour connection time
• no more than one gigabyte of transmitted data, or
• no more than one gigabyte of received data.
5.3.18. FCS_SSHS_EXT.1 – SSH Server Protocol
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall authenticate itself to its peer (SSH Client) using: [
• ssh-rsa (RFC 4253),
• rsa-sha2-256 (RFC 8332),
• rsa-sha2-512 (RFC 8332),
].
5.4.Class: Identification and Authentication (FIA)
5.4.1. FIA_AFL.1 – Authentication Failure Handling (Refinement)
FIA_AFL.1.1 The TSF shall detect when an Administrator configurable positive integer within [1-25] unsuccessful authentication
attempts occur related to Administrators attempting to authenticate remotely using a password.
FIA_AFL.1.2 When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been met, the TSF shall [prevent the offending
Administrator from successfully establishing remote session using any authentication method that involves a password until
[unblocking action] is taken by an Administrator; prevent the offending Administrator from successfully establishing remote session
using any authentication method that involves a password until an Administrator defined time period has elapsed].
5.4.2. FIA_PMG_EXT.1 – Password Management
FIA_PMG_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall provide the following password management capabilities for administrative passwords:
1. Passwords shall be able to be composed of any combination of upper and lower case letters, numbers, and the following
special characters: [“!”, “@”, “#”, “$”, “%”, “^”, “&”, “*”, “(“, “)” [Additional Special Characters listed in Table 16]];
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Table 16. Additional Password Special Characters
Special Character Name
Space
; Semicolon
: Colon
" Double Quote
‘ Single Quote
| Vertical Bar
+ Plus
- Minus
= Equal Sign
. Period
, Comma
/ Slash
\ Backslash
< Less Than
> Greater Than
_ Underscore
` Grave accent (backtick)
~ Tilde
{ Left Brace
} Right Brace
2. Minimum password length shall be configurable to between [1] and [127] characters.
5.4.3. FIA_PSK_EXT.1 – Pre-Shared Key Composition
FIA_PSK_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall use PSKs for MKA as defined by IEEE 802.1X-2010, [no other protocols].
FIA_PSK_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall be able to [accept] bit-based pre-shared keys.
5.4.4. FIA_UIA_EXT.1 – User Identification and Authentication
FIA_UIA_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall allow the following actions prior to requiring the non-TOE entity to initiate the identification and
authentication process:
• Display the warning banner in accordance with FTA_TAB.1;
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• [no other actions]
FIA_UIA_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall require each administrative user to be successfully identified and authenticated before allowing any
other TSF-mediated action on behalf of that administrative user.
FIA_UIA_EXT.1.3 The TSF shall provide the following remote authentication mechanisms [SSH password, SSH public key] and [no
other mechanism]. The TSF shall provide the following local authentication mechanisms [password-based].
FIA_UIA_EXT.1.4 The TSF shall authenticate any administrative user’s claimed identity according to each authentication mechanism
specified in FIA_UIA_EXT.1.3.
5.4.5. FIA_UAU.7 – Protected Authentication Feedback
FIA_UAU.7.1 The TSF shall provide only obscured feedback to the administrative user while the authentication is in progress at the
local console.
5.4.6. FIA_X509_EXT.1/Rev – X.509 Certificate Validation
FIA_X509_EXT.1.1/Rev The TSF shall validate certificates in accordance with the following rules:
• RFC 5280 certificate validation and certificate path validation supporting a minimum path length of three certificates.
• The certificate path must terminate with a trusted CA certificate designated as a trust anchor.
• The TSF shall validate a certification path by ensuring that all CA certificates in the certification path contain the
basicConstraints extension with the CA flag set to TRUE.
• The TSF shall validate the revocation status of the certificate using [a Certificate Revocation List (CRL) as specified in RFC
5759 Section 5].
• The TSF shall validate the extendedKeyUsage field according to the following rules:
o Certificates used for trusted updates and executable code integrity verification shall have the Code Signing
purpose (id-kp 3 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.3) in the extendedKeyUsage field.
o Server certificates presented for TLS shall have the Server Authentication purpose (id-kp 1 with OID
1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1) in the extendedKeyUsage field.
o Client certificates presented for TLS shall have the Client Authentication purpose (id-kp 2 with OID
1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2) in the extendedKeyUsage field.
o OCSP certificates presented for OCSP responses shall have the OCSP Signing purpose (id-kp 9 with OID
1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.9) in the extendedKeyUsage field.
FIA_X509_EXT.1.2/Rev The TSF shall only treat a certificate as a CA certificate if the basicConstraints extension is present and the CA
flag is set to TRUE.
5.4.7. FIA_X509_EXT.2 – X.509 Certificate Authentication
FIA_X509_EXT.2.1 The TSF shall use X.509v3 certificates as defined by RFC 5280 to support authentication for [IPsec], and [no
additional uses].
FIA_X509_EXT.2.2 When the TSF cannot establish a connection to determine the validity of a certificate, the TSF shall [not accept the
certificate].
5.4.8. FIA_X509_EXT.3 – X.509 Certificate Requests
FIA_X509_EXT.3.1 The TSF shall generate a Certificate Request as specified by RFC 2986 and be able to provide the following
information in the request: public key and [Common Name, Organization, Organizational Unit, Country].
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FIA_X509_EXT.3.2 The TSF shall validate the chain of certificates from the Root CA upon receiving the CA Certificate Response.
5.5.Class: Security Management (FMT)
5.5.1. FMT_MOF.1/ManualUpdate – Management of Security Functions Behavior
FMT_MOF.1.1/ManualUpdate The TSF shall restrict the ability to enable the functions to perform manual update to Security
Administrators.
5.5.2. FMT_MTD.1/CoreData – Management of TSF Data
FMT_MTD.1.1/CoreData The TSF shall restrict the ability to manage the TSF data to Security Administrators.
5.5.3. FMT_MTD.1/CryptoKeys – Management of TSF Data
FMT_MTD.1.1/CryptoKeys The TSF shall restrict the ability to manage the cryptographic keys to Security Administrators.
5.5.4. FMT_SMF.1 – Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions:
• Ability to administer the TOE remotely;
• Ability to configure the access banner;
• Ability to configure the remote session inactivity time before session termination;
• Ability to update the TOE, and to verify the updates using [digital signature] capability prior to installing those updates;
[
o Ability to configure local audit behaviour (e.g. changes to storage locations for audit; changes to behaviour when
local audit storage space is full, changes to local audit storage size);
o Ability to manage the cryptographic keys;
o Ability to configure the cryptographic functionality;
o Ability to configure thresholds for SSH rekeying;
o Ability to configure the lifetime for IPsec SAs;
o Ability to re-enable an Administrator account;
o Ability to set the time which is used for time-stamps;
o Ability to configure the reference identifier for the peer;
o Ability to manage the TOE's trust store and designate X509.v3 certificates as trust anchors;
o Ability to import X.509v3 certificates to the TOE's trust store;
o Ability to generate Certificate Signing Request (CSR) and process CA certificate response;
o Ability to administer the TOE locally;
o Ability to configure the authentication failure parameters for FIA_AFL.1;
o Ability to manage the trusted public keys database
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]
5.5.5. FMT_SMF.1/MACSEC – Specification of Management Functions (MACsec)
FMT_SMF.1.1/MACSEC The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions related to MACsec
functionality: [Ability of a Security Administrator to:
• Manage a PSK-based CAK and install it in the device
• Manage the key server to create, delete, and activate MKA participants [as specified in IEEE 802.1X-2020, Sections 9.13 and
9.16 (cf. MIB object ieee8021XKayMkaParticipant Entry) and section 12.2 (cf. function createMKA() ]
• Specify the lifetime of a CAK
• Enable, disable, or delete a PSK-based CAK using [CLI management commands]
[
• No other MACsec management functions
] ].
5.5.6. FMT_SMR.2 – Restrictions on Security Roles
FMT_SMR.2.1 The TSF shall maintain the roles:
• Security Administrator.
FMT_SMR.2.2 The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
FMT_SMR.2.3 The TSF shall ensure that the conditions
• The Security Administrator role shall be able to administer the TOE remotely
are satisfied.
5.6.Class: Protection of the TSF (FPT)
5.6.1. FPT_CAK_EXT.1 Protection of CAK Data
FPT_CAK_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall prevent reading of CAK values by administrators.
5.6.2. FPT_FLS.1 Failure with Preservation of Secure State
FPT_FLS.1.1 The TSF shall fail-secure when any of the following types of failures occur: [failure of the power-on self-tests, failure of
integrity check of the TSF executable image, failure of noise source health tests].
5.6.3. FPT_RPL.1 Replay Detection
FPT_RPL.1.1 The TSF shall detect replay for the following entities: [MPDUs, MKA frames].
FPT_RPL.1.2 The TSF shall perform [discarding of the replayed data, logging of the detected replay attempt] when replay is detected.
5.6.4. FPT_APW_EXT.1 – Protection of Administrator Passwords
FPT_APW_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall store administrative passwords in non-plaintext form.
FPT_APW_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall prevent the reading of plaintext administrative passwords.
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5.6.5. FPT_SKP_EXT.1 – Protection of TSF Data (for reading of all pre-shared, symmetric and
private keys)
FPT_SKP_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall prevent reading of all pre-shared keys, symmetric keys, and private keys.
5.6.6. FPT_STM_EXT.1 – Reliable Time Stamps
FPT_STM_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall be able to provide reliable time stamps for its own use.
FPT_STM_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall [allow the Security Administrator to set the time].
5.6.7. FPT_TST_EXT.1 – TSF Testing
FPT_TST_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall run a suite of the following self-tests:
• During initial start-up (on power on) to verify the integrity of the TOE firmware and software;
• Prior to providing any cryptographic services and [on-demand] to verify correct operation of cryptographic implementation
necessary to fulfil the TSF;
• [no other] self tests [none]
to demonstrate the correct operation of the TSF.
FPT_TST_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall respond to [all failures] by [rebooting].
5.6.8. FPT_TUD_EXT.1 – Trusted Update
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall provide Security Administrators the ability to query the currently executing version of the TOE
firmware/software and [the most recently installed version of the TOE firmware/software].
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall provide Security Administrators the ability to manually initiate updates to TOE firmware/software and
[no other update mechanism].
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.3 The TSF shall provide means to authenticate firmware/software updates to the TOE using a [digital signature] prior
to installing those updates.
5.7.Class: TOE Access (FTA)
5.7.1. FTA_SSL_EXT.1 – TSF-initiated Session Locking
FTA_SSL_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall, for local interactive sessions, [terminate the session] after a Security Administrator-specified time
period of inactivity.
5.7.2. FTA_SSL.3 – TSF-initiated Termination
FTA_SSL.3.1 The TSF shall terminate a remote interactive session after a Security Administrator-configurable time interval of session
inactivity.
5.7.3. FTA_SSL.4 – User-initiated Termination
FTA_SSL.4.1 The TSF shall allow user Administrator-initiated termination of the user’s Administrator’s own interactive session.
5.7.4. FTA_TAB.1 – Default TOE Access Banners
FTA_TAB.1.1 Before establishing a an administrative user session the TSF shall display a Security Administrator-specified advisory
notice and consent warning message regarding unauthorised use of the TOE.
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5.8.Class: Trusted Path/Channels (FTP)
5.8.1. FTP_ITC.1 – Inter-TSF Trusted Channel
FTP_ITC.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of using [IPsec] to provide a trusted communication channel between itself and another trusted
IT product authorized IT entities supporting the following capabilities: audit server, [no other capabilities] that is logically distinct
from other communication channels and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel data from
modification or disclosure and detection of modification of the channel data.
FTP_ITC.1.2 The TSF shall permit [the TSF] to initiate communication via the trusted channel.
FTP_ITC.1.3 The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for [
■ Syslog server over IPsec
]
5.8.2. FTP_ITC.1/MACSEC – Inter-TSF Trusted Channel (MACsec Communications)
FTP_ITC.1.1/MACSEC The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself and a MACsec peer that is logically distinct from
other communication channels and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel data from
modification or disclosure.
FTP_ITC.1.2/MACSEC The TSF shall permit [the TSF, another trusted IT product] to initiate communication via the trusted channel.
FTP_ITC.1.3/MACSEC The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for communications with MACsec peers that
require the use of MACsec.
5.8.3. FTP_TRP.1/Admin – Trusted Path
FTP_TRP.1.1/Admin The TSF shall be capable of using [SSH] to provide a communication path between itself and authorized remote
Administrators users that is logically distinct from other communication paths and provides assured identification of its end points
and protection of the communicated data from disclosure and provides detection of modification of the channel data.
FTP_TRP.1.2/Admin The TSF shall permit remote Administrators users to initiate communication via the trusted path.
FTP_TRP.1.3/Admin The TSF shall require the use of the trusted path for initial Administrator authentication and all remote
administration actions.
5.9. TOE SFR Dependencies Rationale
The Security Functional Requirements included in the ST represent all mandatory, optional, and selection-based SFRs specified in [NDcPP],
[MOD_MACSEC], and [PKG_SSH_v1.0] against which exact compliance is claimed.
All dependency rationale in the ST are considered to be identical to those that are defined in the claimed PP.
5.10. TOE SFR Dependencies Rationale
The TOE assurance requirements for this ST are taken directly from the NDcPP which are derived from [CC_PART3]. The assurance
requirements are summarized in the table below.
Table 17. Assurance Requirements
Assurance Class Components Description
Security Target (ASE) ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
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ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
ASE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
ASE_SPD.1 Security Problem Definition
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
Development (ADV) ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification
Guidance Documents (AGD) AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
Life Cycle Support (ALC) ALC_CMC.1 Labeling of the TOE
ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage
ALC_FLR.2 Flaw Reporting Procedures
Tests (ATE) ATE_IND.1 Independent testing – conformance
Vulnerability Assessment (AVA) AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability survey
5.11. TOE SFR Dependencies Rationale
[NDcPP] and [MOD_MACSEC] contain all the requirements claimed in this Security Target. As such the dependencies are not applicable
since the PPs themselves have been approved.
5.12. Security Assurance Requirements Rationale
The Security Assurance Requirements (SARs) in this Security Target represent the SARs identified in the [NDcPP], [MOD_MACSEC], and
[PKG_SSH_v1.0]. As such, the [NDcPP], [MOD_MACSEC], and [PKG_SSH_v1.0] SAR rationale is deemed acceptable since the PPs
themselves have been approved.
5.13. Assurance Measures
The TOE satisfies the identified assurance requirements. The table below identifies the Assurance Measures applied by Cisco to satisfy the
assurance requirements.
Table 18. Assurance Measures
Assurance Component Rationale
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ASE_INT.1
ASE_CCL.1
ASE_OBJ.1
ASE_ECD.1
ASE_REQ.1
ASE_SPD.1
ASE_TSS.1
Cisco provided this Security Target document.
ADV_FSP.1 No additional “functional specification” documentation was
provided by Cisco to satisfy the Evaluation Activities.
AGD_OPE.1
AGD_PRE.1
Cisco will provide the guidance documents with the ST.
ALC_CMC.1
ALC_CMS.1
Cisco will identify the TOE such that it can be distinguished from
other products or versions from the Cisco and can be easily
specified when being procured by an end user.
ALC_FLR.2 Cisco will provide the flaw remediation and reporting
procedures to document how TOE users can submit security
flaw reports to the developer and how the security flaw reports
will be appropriately acted upon.
ATE_IND.1 Cisco will provide the TOE for testing.
AVA_VAN.1 Cisco will provide the TOE for Vulnerability Analysis.
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6. TOE Summary Specification
The table below identifies and describes how the Security Functional Requirements identified above are met by the TOE.
Table 19. TSS Rationale
TOE SFRs How the SFR is Met
FAU_GEN.1
FAU_GEN.1/MACSEC
The TOE generates an audit record whenever an audited event occurs. The types of events that
cause audit records to be generated include start-up and shut-down of the audit mechanism
cryptography related events, identification and authentication related events, and administra-
tive events (the specific events and the contents of each audit record are listed in Table 14 and
Table 15.
Each of the events is specified in the audit record is in enough detail to identify the user for
which the event is associated, when the event occurred, where the event occurred, the out-
come of the event, and the type of event that occurred such as generating keys, including the
key identifier. Additionally, the start-up and shut-down of the audit functionality is audited.
The audit trail consists of the individual audit records; one audit record for each event that oc-
curred. The audit record can contain up to 80 characters and a percent sign (%), which follows
the time-stamp information. As noted above, the information includes at least all the required
information. Additional information can be configured.
FAU_GEN.2 The TOE shall ensure that each auditable event is associated with the user that triggered the
event and as a result, they are traceable to a specific user. For example, a human user, user
identity or related session ID would be included in the audit record. For an IT entity or device,
the IP address, MAC address, host name, or other configured identification is presented.
FAU_STG_EXT.1 The TOE is a standalone device configured to export syslog records to a specified, external syslog
server in real-time. The TOE protects communications with an external syslog server using IPsec.
If the IPsec connection fails, the TOE will store audit records on the TOE when it discovers it can
no longer communicate with its configured syslog server. When the connection is restored, the
TOE will transmit the buffer contents to the syslog server.
For audit records stored internally to the TOE the audit records are stored in a non-persistent
circular log file where the TOE overwrites the oldest audit records when the audit trail becomes
full. The size of the logging files on the TOE is configurable by the Administrator with the mini-
mum value being 4096 (default) to 2,147,483,647 bytes of available disk space. Refer to the
Common Criteria Operational User Guidance and Preparative Procedures for command descrip-
tion and usage information.
Only Authorized Administrators can clear the local logs, and local audit records are stored in a
directory that does not allow Administrators to modify the contents.
FCS_CKM.1 The following table describes the key generation algorithms the TOE implements to generate
asymmetric keys used for device authentication:
Scheme Standard Key Size/
NIST Curve
SFR Service
RSA FIPS PUB 186-4 2048
3072
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1 SSH Remote
Administration
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1 Transmit
generated
audit data to
an external IT
entity
FCS_CKM.2
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TOE SFRs How the SFR is Met
With the exception to SSH, the keys are used to generate certificate signing requests (CSRs) in
which the public key is associated with an X.509 certificate.
The following table shows the key generation algorithms the TOE implements to generate
asymmetric keys used for key establishment:
Scheme Standard Key Size/
NIST
Curve
SFR Service
ECC FIPS PUB 186-4 DH Group
19 (P-256)
DH Group
20 (P-384)
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1 Transmit
generated
audit data to
an external IT
entity
P-256
P-384
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1 SSH Remote
Administration
The following table shows the methods the TOE implements for key establishment:
Scheme Standard SFR Service
EC-DH NIST SP
800-56A
Revision 3
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1 Transmit
generated audit
data to an
external IT entity
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1 SSH Remote
Administration
FCS_CKM.4 The TOE meets all requirements specified in FIPS 140-2 for destruction of keys and Critical Se-
curity Parameters (CSPs) when no longer required for use. See section 6.1 for additional details
on key zeroization.
FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption The TOE provides symmetric encryption and decryption capabilities using AES in CBC mode and
GCM mode (128 and 256 bits) as described in ISO/IEC 18033-3, ISO/IEC 10116, and ISO/IEC
19772. AES is implemented in the SSH and IPsec protocols. Refer to Table 21 for the FIPS vali-
dated algorithm certificate numbers.
FCS_COP.1/SigGen The TOE provides cryptographic signature services using a RSA Digital Signature Algorithm with
key size of 2048 or 3072 as specified in FIPS PUB 186-4. Refer to Table 21 for the FIPS validated
algorithm certificate numbers.
FCS_COP.1/Hash The TOE provides cryptographic hashing services using SHA-256 and SHA-512 as specified in
ISO/IEC 10118-3:2004 (with key sizes and message digest sizes of 256 and 512 bits respectively).
The TOE provides keyed-hashing message authentication services using HMAC-SHA-256 that
operates on 512-bit blocks of data, with key size and message digest size of 256 bits as specified
in ISO/IEC 9797-2:2011, Section 7 “MAC Algorithm 2”.
SHA-512 hashing is used for verification of software image integrity.
FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash
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TOE SFRs How the SFR is Met
Refer to Table 21 for the FIPS validated algorithm certificate numbers.
FCS_COP.1/CMAC The TSF implements keyed-hash message authentication in accordance with AES-CMAC and
cryptographic key size of 128 bits with message digest size of 128 bits, block size of 128 bits, and
MAC length of 128 bits which meets NIST SP 800-38B.
The TSF implements symmetric encryption and decryption capabilities using AES in AES Key
Wrap and GCM mode (128 bits) as described in AES as specified in ISO/IEC 18033-3, AES Key
Wrap as specified in NIST SP800-38F, GCM as specified in ISO/IEC 19772.
AES is implemented in the MACsec protocol.
Refer to Table 21 for the FIPS validated algorithm certificate numbers.
FCS_COP.1/MACSEC
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1 The TSF implements IPsec to provide authentication and encryption services to prevent unau-
thorized viewing or modification of syslog authentication data as it travels over the external
network. The TSF’s implementation of the IPsec standard (in accordance with the RFCs noted
in the SFR) uses the Internet Key Exchange version 2 (IKEv2) protocol and the Encapsulating
Security Payload (ESP) protocol to provide authentication and encryption supporting the fol-
lowing algorithms:
■ AES-CBC-128 and AES-CBC-256 with HMAC-SHA-256
■ AES-GCM-128 and AES-GCM-256.
The TOE supports both transport and tunnel mode for IPsec communications between the
TOE and an external audit server.
The administrator defines the traffic that needs to be protected between two IPsec peers by
configuring access lists and applying these access lists to interfaces using crypto map sets. A
crypto map set can contain multiple entries, each with a different access list. The crypto map
entries are searched in a sequence--the router attempts to match the packet to the access list
specified in that entry.
When a packet matches a permit entry in a particular access list, and the corresponding crypto
map entry is tagged connections are established, if necessary. If the crypto map entry is
tagged as ipsec-isakmp, IPsec is triggered. If there is no SA that the IPsec can use to protect
this traffic to the peer, IPsec uses IKE to negotiate with the remote peer to set up the neces-
sary IPsec SAs on behalf of the data flow. The negotiation uses information specified in the
crypto map entry as well as the data flow information from the specific access list entry.
Once established, the set of SAs (outbound to the peer) is then applied to the triggering
packet and to subsequent applicable packets as those packets exit the Switch. "Applicable"
packets are packets that match the same access list criteria that the original packet matched.
For example, all applicable packets could be encrypted be-fore being forwarded to the remote
peer. The corresponding inbound SAs are used when processing the incoming traffic from that
peer.
Access lists associated with IPsec crypto map entries also represent the traffic that the Switch
needs protected by IPsec. Inbound traffic is processed against crypto map entries. if an unpro-
tected packet matches a permit entry in a particular access list associated with an IPsec crypto
map entry, that packet is dropped because it was not sent as an IPsec-protected packet. The
traffic matching the permit ACLs would then flow through the IPsec tunnel and be classified as
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“PROTECTED”. Traffic that does not match a permit ACL in the crypto map, but that is not dis-
allowed by other ACLs on the interface is allowed to BYPASS the tunnel. Traffic that does not
match a permit ACL and is also blocked by other non-crypto ACLs on the interface would be
DISCARDED. Rules applied to an access control list can be applied to either inbound or out-
bound traffic.
IPsec Internet Key Exchange, also called ISAKMP, is the negotiation protocol that lets two
peers agree on how to build an IPsec Security Association (SA). The strength of the symmetric
algorithm negotiated to protect the IKEv2 IKE_SA connection is greater than or equal to the
strength of the symmetric algorithm negotiated to protect the IKEv2 CHILD_SA connection.
The IKE protocols implement Peer Authentication using RSA X.509v3 certificates or pre-shared
keys. IKE separates negotiation into two phases: IKEv2 SA and IKEv2 Child SA. The IKEv2 SA
creates the first tunnel, which protects later ISAKMP negotiation messages. The key negoti-
ated during the IKEv2 SA enables IKE peers to negotiate IKE v2 Child SA and establishes the IP-
sec SA to communicate securely. IKE maintains a trusted channel, referred to as a Security As-
sociation (SA), between IPsec peers that is also used to manage IPsec connections, including:
■ The negotiation of mutually acceptable IPsec options between peers (including peer
authentication parameters, either signature based or pre-shared key based),
■ The establishment of additional Security Associations to protect packets flows using
Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP), and
■ The agreement of secure bulk data encryption AES keys for use with ESP.
The resulting potential strength of the symmetric key will be 128 or 256 bits of security de-
pending on the algorithms negotiated between the two IPsec peers. As part of this negotia-
tion, the TOE verifies that the negotiated IKE Child SA symmetric algorithm key strength is at
most as large as the negotiated IKE SA key strength as configured on the TOE and peer via an
explicit check.
Each IKE negotiation begins by agreement of both peers on a common (shared) IKE policy. This
policy states which security parameters will be used to protect subsequent IKE negotiations
and mandates how the peers are authenticated.
The Security Administrator can configure multiple, prioritized policies on each peer, each with
a different combination of parameter values. However, at least one of these policies must con-
tain exactly the same encryption, hash, authentication, and Diffie-Hellman parameter values
as one of the policies on the remote peer. For each policy created, the Security Administrator
assign's a unique priority (1 through 10,000, with 1 being the highest priority).
When the IKE negotiation begins, IKE searches for an IKE policy that is the same on both peers.
The peer that initiates the negotiation will send all its policies to the remote peer, and the re-
mote peer will try to find a match. The remote peer looks for a match by comparing its own
highest priority policy against the policies received from the other peer. The remote peer
checks each of its policies in order of its priority (highest priority first) until a match is found.
After the two peers agree upon a policy, the security parameters of the policy are identified by
an SA established at each peer, and these IKE SAs apply to all subsequent IKE traffic during the
negotiation. When a packet is processed by the TOE and it determines it requires IPsec, it
uses active SA settings or creates new SAs for initial connections with the IPsec peer.
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TOE SFRs How the SFR is Met
The TOE supports IKEv2 session establishment. The TOE supports configuration of session life-
times for both IKEv2 SAs and IKEv2 Child SAs using the command “lifetime.” The time values
for IKEv2 SAs can be configured between 2 minutes and 24 hours. The time values for IKEv2
Child SAs can be configured between 2 minutes and 720 hours. The IKEv2 Child SA lifetimes
can also be configured by an Administrator based on number of bytes. The TOE supports Dif-
fie-Hellman Group 19 and 20.
The TSF generates the secret value 'x' used in the IKEv2 Diffie-Hellman key exchange ('x' in gx
mod p) using the NIST approved DRBG specified in FCS_RBG_EXT.1 and having possible lengths
of 256 or 384 bits. The TOE generates nonces used in IKEv2 exchanges, of at least 128 bits in
size and at least half the output size of the negotiated pseudorandom function (PRF) hash.
When a random number is needed for a nonce, the probability that a specific nonce value will
be repeated during the life a specific IPsec SA is less than 1 in 2128
. The nonce is likewise gen-
erated using the CTR-DRBG.
The TOE supports authentication of IPsec peers using pre-shared keys and RSA X.509 certifi-
cates. The TOE validates the presented identifier provided supporting the following fields and
types: SAN: IP address, SAN: Fully Qualified Domain Name (FQDN).
Certificate maps provide the ability for a certificate to be matched with a given set of criteria.
The Administrator is instructed in the CC Configuration Guide to specify one or more certifi-
cate fields together with their matching criteria and the value to match. In the evaluated con-
figuration, the field name must specify the SAN (alt-subject-name) field. Match criteria should
be “eq” for equal.
SAN example: alt-subject-name eq <peer.cisco.com>
The TOE will reject the IKE connection in any of these situations: 1) If the data ID Payload for
any of those ID Types does not match the peer’s certificate exactly; 2) If an ID Payload is not
provided by the peer; 3) If multiple ID Types are provided in the ID Payload.
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 The TOE implements a NIST-approved CTR-DRBG, as specified in ISO/IEC 18031:2011 seeded by
an entropy source that accumulates entropy from a software-based noise source.
The DRBG is seeded with a minimum of 256 bits of entropy, which is at least equal to the great-
est security strength of the keys and hashes that it will generate.
FCS_MACSEC_EXT.1 The TOE implements MACsec in compliance with Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
(IEEE) Standard 802.1AE-2018. The MACsec connections maintain confidentiality of transmitted
data and takes measures against frames transmitted or modified by unauthorized devices.
The Secure Channel Identifier (SCI) is composed of a globally unique 48-bit Message Authenti-
cation Code (MAC) Address and the Secure System Address (port). The SCI is part of the SecTAG
if the Secure Channel (SC) bit is set and will be at the end of the tag. Any MAC Protocol Data
Units (MPDUs) during a given session that contain an SCI other than the one used to establish
that session is rejected.
Only Extensible Authentication Protocol over LAN (EAPOL) (Physical Address Extension (PAE)
EtherType 88-8E) and MACsec frames (EtherType 88-E5) are permitted. All others are rejected.
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FCS_MACSEC_EXT.2 The TOE implements the MACsec requirement for integrity protection with the confidentiality
offsets of 0, 30 and 50 using the ‘mka-policy confidentiality-offset’ command.
An offset value of 0 does not offset the encryption and offset values of 30 and 50 offset the
encryption by 30 and 50 characters respectively.
An Integrity Check Value (ICV) of 16-bytes derived with the SAK is used to provide assurance of
the integrity of MPDUs.
The TOE derives the ICK from a CAK using KDF, using the SCI as the most significant bits of the
Initialization Vector (IV) and the 32 least significant bits of the PN as the IV.
FCS_MACSEC_EXT.3 Each SAK is generated using the KDF specified in IEEE 802.1X-2010 section 6.2.1 using the fol-
lowing transform - KS-nonce = a nonce of the same size as the required SAK, obtained from a
Random Number Generator (RNG) each time an SAK is generated.
Each of the keys used by MKA is derived from the CAK.
The key string is the CAK that is used for ICV validation by the MKA protocol. The CAK is not used
directly but derives two further keys from the CAK using the AES cipher in CMAC mode.
The derived keys are tied to the identity of the CAK, and thus restricted to use with that partic-
ular CAK. These are the ICV Key (ICK) used to verify the integrity of MPDUs and to prove that
the transmitter of the MKPDU possesses the CAK, and the Key Encrypting Key (KEK) used by the
Key Server, elected by MKA, to transport a succession of SAKs, for use by MACsec, to the other
member(s) of a CA.
The key size is 32-bit hexadecimal in length for AES 128-bit CMAC mode encryption.
FCS_MACSEC_EXT.4 MACsec peer authentication is achieved by only using pre-shared keys.
The SAKs are distributed between these peers using AES Key Wrap. Prior to distribution of the
SAKs between these peers, the TOE uses AES Key Wrap in accordance with AES as specified in
ISO/IEC 18033-3, AES in CMAC mode as specified in NIST SP800-38B, and GCM as specified in
ISO/IEC 19772.
FCS_MKA_EXT.1 The TOE implements the MKA Protocol in accordance with IEEE 802.1X-2010 and 802.1Xbx-
2014.
The data delay protection is enabled for MKA as a protection guard against an attack on the
configuration protocols that MACsec is designed to protect by alternately delaying and deliver-
ing their MPDUs. The “Delay Protection” does not operate if MKA operation is suspended. An
MKA Lifetime Timeout limit of 6.0 seconds and Hello Timeout limit of 2.0 seconds is enforced
by the TOE.
The TOE discards MACsec Key Agreement Protocol Data Units (MKPDUs) that do not satisfy the
requirements listed under FCS_MKA_EXT.1.7. All valid MKPDUs that meet the requirements as
defined under FCS_MKA_EXT.1.7 are decoded in a manner conformant to IEEE 802.1x-2010 Sec-
tion 11.11.4.
On successful peer authentication, a unique connectivity association is formed between the
peers and a secure Connectivity Association Key Name (CKN) is exchanged. After the exchange,
the MKA ICV is validated with a Connectivity Association Key (CAK), which is effectively a secret
key. The TOE does not support group CAKs.
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For the Data Integrity Check, MACsec uses MKA to generate an ICV for the frame arriving on the
port. If the generated ICV is the same as the ICV in the frame, then the frame is accepted; oth-
erwise, it is dropped. The key string is the CAK that is used for ICV validation by the MKA proto-
col.
FCS_SSH_EXT.1
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1
The TSF implements SSHv2 conformant to RFCs 4251, 4252, 4253, 4254, 5656, 6668, 8308
section 3, and 8332 to provide a secure command line interface for remote administration.
The TOE uses rsa-sha2-512 and rsa-sha2-256 for host key authentication and uses ssh-rsa for
client or user password-based authentication.
SSHv2 connections will be dropped if the TOE receives a packet larger than 65,806 bytes.
Large packets are detected by the SSHv2 implementation and dropped internal to the SSH
process.
The TSF’s SSH transport implementation supports the following encryption algorithms when
aes128-cbc or aes-256-cbc is used:
■ aes128-cbc
■ aes256-cbc
■ aes128-gcm@openssh.com
■ aes256-gcm@openssh.com
When aes128-gcm@openssh.com or aes256-gcm@openssh.com is used as the encryption
algorithm the MAC algorithm is implicit.
All connection attempts from remote SSH clients requesting any other encryption algorithm is
denied.
The TSF’s SSH transport implementation supports the following MAC algorithms:
■ hmac-sha2-256
All connection attempts from remote SSH clients requesting any other MAC algorithm is
denied.
The TSF’s SSH transport implementation supports the following public-key algorithms for
Hostkey authentication:
■ rsa-sha2-256
■ rsa-sha2-512
The TSF’s SSH transport implementation supports the following public-key algorithms for
Client Authentication:
■ ssh-rsa
The public-key algorithm is consistent with the RSA digital signature algorithm in
FCS_COP.1/SigGen.
When the SSH client presents a public key, the TSF verifies it matches the one configured for
the Administrator account. If the presented public key does not match the one configured for
the Administrator account, access is denied.
The TSF’s SSH key exchange implementation supports the following key exchange algorithm:
■ ecdh-sha2-nistp256
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■ ecdh-sha2-nistp384
The TOE derives cryptographic session keys via shared secret using SSH KDF as defined in RFC
5656 (Section 4).
The TSF's SSH implementation will perform a rekey after no longer than one hour or more
than one gigabyte of data has been transmitted with the same session key. Both thresholds
are checked. Rekeying is performed upon reaching whichever threshold is met first. The
Administrator can configure lower rekey values if desired. The minimum time value is 10
minutes. The minimum volume value is 100 kilobytes.
FIA_AFL.1 To block password-based brute force attacks, the TOE uses an internal AAA function to detect
and track failed login attempts. When an account attempting to log into an administrative
interface reaches the set maximum number of failed authentication attempts, the account will
not be granted access until the time period has elapsed or until the Administrator manually
unblocks the account.
The TOE provides the Administrator the ability to specify the maximum number of unsuccessful
authentication attempts before an offending account will be blocked. The TOE also provides
the ability to specify the time period to block offending accounts.
To avoid a potential situation where password failures made by Administrators leads to no Ad-
ministrator access until the defined blocking time period has elapsed, the CC Configuration
Guide instructs the Administrator to configure the TOE for SSH public key authentication which
is not subjected to password-based brute force attacks. During the block out period, the TOE
provides the ability for the Administrator account to login remotely using SSH public key au-
thentication.
FIA_PMG_EXT.1 The TOE supports the local definition of users with corresponding passwords. The passwords
can be composed of any combination of upper and lower case letters, numbers, and special
characters that include: “!”, “@”, “#”, “$”, “%”, “^”, “&”, “*”, “(“, “)” and other special charac-
ters listed in Table 16. Minimum password length is settable by the Authorized Administrator,
and can be configured for minimum password lengths of 1 and maximum of 127 characters. A
minimum password length of 8 is recommended.
FIA_PSK_EXT.1 The TOE supports use of pre-shared keys for MACsec key agreement protocols as defined by
IEEE 802.1X. The pre-shared keys are not generated by the TOE, but the TOE accepts the keys
in the form of HEX strings. This is done via the CLI configuration command ‘key chain test_key
macsec’. The TOE accepts pre-shared keys that are 32 characters in length.
FIA_UIA_EXT.1 The TOE requires all users to be successfully identified and authenticated before allowing any
TSF mediated actions to be performed. Prior to being granted access, a login warning banner is
displayed.
Administrative access to the TOE is facilitated through a local password-based authentication
mechanism and remote SSH password and public key authentication mechanisms on the TOE
through which all Administrator actions are mediated. Once a potential (unauthenticated) ad-
ministrative user attempts to access the TOE through an interactive administrative interface,
the TOE prompts the user for a user name and password or SSH public key authentication. The
TOE then either grants administrative access (if credentials are valid, and the account has not
been locked) or indicates the login attempt was unsuccessful. The TOE does not provide a rea-
son for failure in the cases of a login failure. A successful login is indicated by a hash sign (“#”)
next to the device hostname. No access is allowed to the administrative functionality of the
TOE until the administrator is successfully identified and authenticated.
FIA_UAU.7 When a user enters their password at the local console, the TOE does not echo any characters
as the password is entered. For remote session authentication, the TOE does not echo any char-
acters as they are entered.
FIA_X509_EXT.1/Rev The TOE uses X.509v3 certificates to support authentication for IPsec connections. The TSF de-
termines the validity of certificates at the time of authentication by ensuring that the certificate
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and the certificate path are valid in accordance with RFC 5280. The certificate path is validated
by ensuring that all the CA certificates have the basicConstraints extension and the CA flag is set
to TRUE and the certificate path must terminate with a trusted CA certificate.
CRL revocation checking is supported by the TOE. Revocation checking is performed on the leaf
and intermediate certificate(s) when authenticating a certificate chain provided by the remote
peer. There are no functional differences if a full certificate chain or only a leaf certificate is
presented.
FIA_X509_EXT.2 The TOE determines which certificate to use based upon the trustpoint configured. The in-
structions for configuring trustpoints is provided in CC Configuration Guide. In the event that a
network connection cannot be established to verify the revocation status of certificate for an
external peer, the certificate will be rejected and the connection will not be established.
FIA_X509_EXT.3 A Certificate Request Message can be generated as specified by RFC 2986 and provide the fol-
lowing information in the request – Common Name(CN), Organization(O), Organizational
Unit(OU), and Country(C). The TOE will validate the chain of certificates from the Root CA when
the CA Certificate Response is received.
FMT_MOF.1/ManualUpdate
FMT_MTD.1/CoreData
FMT_MTD.1/CryptoKeys
The TOE provides the ability for Security Administrators to access TOE data, such as audit data,
configuration data, security attributes, routing tables, and session thresholds and to perform
manual updates to the TOE. Only Security Administrators can access the TOE’s trust store. Each
of the predefined and administratively configured roles has create (set), query, modify, or de-
lete access to the TOE data, though with some privilege levels, the access is limited.
The TOE performs role-based authorization, using TOE platform authorization mechanisms, to
grant access to the privileged and semi-privileged roles. For the purposes of this evaluation, the
privileged level is equivalent to full administrative access to the CLI, which is the default access
for IOS-XE privilege level 15; and the semi-privileged level equates to any privilege level that has
a subset of the privileges assigned to level 15. Privilege levels 0 and 1 are defined by default and
are customizable, while levels 2-14 are undefined by default and customizable.
The term “Authorized Administrator” is used in this ST to refer to any user that has been as-
signed to a privilege level that is permitted to perform the relevant action; therefore, has the
appropriate privileges to perform the requested functions. The semi-privileged Administrators
with only a subset of privileges may also manage and modify TOE data based on the privileges
assigned.
The TOE provides the ability for Authorized Administrators to access TOE data, such as audit
data, configuration data, security attributes, session thresholds, cryptographic keys, and up-
dates. Each of the predefined and administratively configured privilege levels has a set of per-
missions that will grant access to the TOE data, though with some privilege levels, the access is
limited.
The TOE does not provide automatic updates to the software version running on the TOE.
The Authorized Administrator can query the software version running on the TOE and can initi-
ate updates to (replacements of) software images. When software updates are made available
by Cisco, the Authorized Administrators can obtain, verify the integrity of, and install those up-
dates.
The Authorized Administrator generates RSA key pairs to be used in the IPsec and SSH protocols.
Zeroization of these keys is provided in Table 20.
Prior to authentication the TOE may be configured by the Administrator to display a customized
login banner, which describes restrictions of use, legal agreements, or any other appropriate
information to which users consent by accessing the TOE. No administrative functionality is
available prior to administrative login. TOE Administrators can control (generate/delete) the
following keys, RSA Key Pairs and SSH RSA Key Pairs by following the instruction in the AGD.
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FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMF.1/MACSEC
The TOE provides all capabilities necessary to securely manage the TOE and the services pro-
vided by the TOE. The management functionality of the TOE is provided through the TOE CLI.
The Authorized Administrator can perform all management functions by accessing the TOE di-
rectly via connected console cable or remote administration via SSHv2 secure connection.
The specific management capabilities available from the TOE include:
• Ability to administer the TOE remotely;
• Ability to configure the access banner;
• Ability to configure the remote session inactivity time before session termination;
• Ability to update the TOE, and to verify the updates using a digital signature capability
prior to installing those updates;
• Ability to configure local audit behaviour (e.g. changes to storage locations for audit;
changes to behaviour when local audit storage space is full, changes to local audit
storage size);
• Ability to manage the cryptographic keys;
• Ability to configure the cryptographic functionality;
• Ability to configure thresholds for SSH rekeying;
• Ability to configure the lifetime for IPsec SAs;
• Ability to re-enable an Administrator account;
• Ability to set the time which is used for time-stamps;
• Ability to configure the reference identifier for the peer;
• Ability to manage the TOE's trust store and designate X509.v3 certificates as trust an-
chors;
• Ability to import X.509v3 certificates to the TOE's trust store;
• Ability to generate Certificate Signing Request (CSR) and process CA certificate re-
sponse;
• Ability to administer the TOE locally;
• Ability to configure the authentication failure parameters for FIA_AFL.1;
• Ability to manage the trusted public keys database;
• The ability to configure the reference identifiers for peers, which can be IP address,
FQDN identifier or can be the same as the peer’s name;
• Manage a PSK-based CAK and install it in the device;
• Manage the key server to create, delete, and activate MKA participants as specified
in IEEE 802.1X-2020, Sections 9.13 and 9.16 (cf. MIB object ieee8021XKayMkaPartici-
pant Entry) and section 12.2 (cf. function createMKA();
• Specify the lifetime of a CAK;
• Enable, disable, or delete a PSK-based CAK using CLI management commands;
FMT_SMR.2 The TOE maintains privileged and semi-privileged Administrator roles.
The TOE performs role-based authorization, using TOE platform authorization mechanisms, to
grant access to TOE functions. For the purposes of this evaluation, the privileged role is equiva-
lent to full administrative access to the CLI, which is the default access for IOS-XE privilege level
(PL) 15. Semi-privileged roles are assigned a PL of 0 – 14. PL 0 and 1 are defined by default and
are customizable, while PL 2-14 are undefined by default and are also customizable. Note: Lev-
els 0 – 14 are a subset of PL 15 and the levels are not hierarchical.
The term “Authorized Administrator” is used in this ST to refer to any user which has been as-
signed to a privilege level that is permitted to perform the relevant action; therefore, has the
appropriate privileges to perform the requested functions.
The privilege level determines the functions the user can perform, hence the Authorized Ad-
ministrator with the appropriate privileges.
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The TOE can and shall be configured to authenticate all access to the command line interface
using a username and password.
The TOE supports both local administration via a directly connected console cable and remote
administration via SSHv2 secure connection.
FPT_CAK_EXT.1 A CAK value is specified in the configuration file by the Administrator using a bit-based (hex)
format. The interface specifically implemented in the TSF for viewing the configuration file is
the “show running-config” or “show startup-config “CLI commands. When the TOE is operating
in the evaluated configuration, and the Administrator executes the “show running-config” or
“show startup-config” CLI commands, the CAK data will not be displayed. This protects the CAK
data from unauthorized disclosure.
FPT_FLS.1. Whenever a failure occurs (power-on self-tests, integrity check of the TSF executable image
and/or the noise source health-tests) within the TOE, the TOE will attain a secure/safe state by
disabling its interfaces to prevent the unintentional flow of any information to or from the TOE
and reloads.
If the failures persist, the TOE will continue to reload in an attempt to correct the failure. This
functionally prevents any failure from causing an unauthorized information flow. There are no
failures that circumvent this protection. If the rebooting continues, the Authorized Administra-
tor must contact Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC).
FPT_RPL.1 Replayed data is discarded by the TOE and the attempt to replay data is logged.
The TOE protects against replayed MKPDUs by ensuring if a MKPDU contains a duplicate Mem-
ber Number (MN) and not the most current MN in the Basic Parameter set, then the MKPDU
will be dropped and not processed further.
The TOE protects against replayed MPDUs by ensuring the received 32-bit PN in the SecTAG of
the frame is not less than the lowest acceptable 32-bit PN for the SA. If the PN is less that the
lowest acceptable PN for the SA, the MPDU will be dropped and not processed further. The
Replay Protection Window Size determines the lowest acceptable PN for the SA and must be
enabled in the evaluated configuration. The Replay Protection Window Size may be set to zero
to enforce strict replay protection.
The TOE protects against replayed MKPDUs by ensuring if a MKPDU contains a duplicate Mem-
ber Number (MN) and not the most current MN in the Basic Parameter set, then the MKPDU
will be dropped and not processed further.
FPT_APW_EXT.1 The TOE is designed specifically to not disclose any passwords stored in the TOE. All
passwords are stored using a SHA-2 hash. ‘Show’ commands display only the hashed
password.
The CC Configuration Guide instructs the Administrator to use the algorithm-type scrypt sub-
command when passwords are created or updated. The scrypt is password type 9 and uses a
SHA-2 hash.
FPT_SKP_EXT.1 The TOE is designed specifically to not disclose any keys stored in the TOE. The TOE stores all
private keys in a secure directory that cannot be viewed or accessed, even by the Administrator.
The TOE stores symmetric keys only in volatile memory. Pre-shared keys (MACsec CAKs) may
be specified in the configuration file by the Administrator using a bit-based (hex) format. While
only the Administrator may view the configuration file, the Administrator may configure the
TOE such that the CAKs are excluded from display when viewing the configuration file via “show
running-config” or “show startup-config “CLI commands.
FPT_STM_EXT.1 The TSF implements a clock function to provide a source of date and time. The clock function
is reliant on the system clock provided by the underlying hardware. All Switch models have a
real-time clock (RTC) with battery to maintain time across reboots and power loss.
The TOE relies upon date and time information for the following security functions:
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■ To monitor local and remote interactive administrative sessions for inactivity
(FTA_SSL_EXT.1, FTA_SSL.3);
■ Validating X.509 certificates to determine if a certificate has expired
(FIA_X509_EXT.1/Rev);
■ To determine when IKEv2 SA lifetimes have expired and to initiate a rekey
(FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1);
■ To determine when IPsec Child SA lifetimes have expired and to initiate a rekey
(FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1);
■ To determine when SSH session keys have expired and to initiate a rekey
(FCS_SSHS_EXT.1);
■ To provide accurate timestamps in audit records (FAU_GEN.1.2).
FPT_TUD_EXT.1 An Authorized Administrator can query the software version running on the TOE and can initiate
updates to (replacements of) software images. The current active version can be verified by
executing the “show version” command from the TOE’s CLI. When software updates are made
available by Cisco, an Administrator can obtain, verify the integrity of, and install the updates.
The updates can be downloaded from https://software.cisco.com/. Trusted updates can be in-
stalled on the TOE in a single stage or as a multi-stage process with a delayed activation. The
inactive version will become active when the Administrator responds ‘y’ at the reboot prompt.
The updates can be downloaded from software.cisco.com.
The TOE will authenticate the image using a digital signature verification check to ensure it has
not been modified since distribution using the following process: Prior to being made publicly
available, the software image is hashed using a SHA512 algorithm and then digitally signed.
The digital signature is embedded to the image (hence the image is signed). The TOE uses a
Cisco public key to validate the digital signature to obtain the SHA512 hash. The TOE then
computes its own hash of the image using the same SHA512 algorithm and verifies the com-
puted hash against the embedded hash. If they match the image has not been modified or
tampered since distributed from Cisco meaning the software is authenticated and the image is
ready to be activated automatically in the one stage upgrade or by the administrator in the
multistage upgrade. If they do not match the image will not install.
FPT_TST_EXT.1 The TOE runs a suite of self-tests during initial start-up to verify correct operation of the cryp-
tographic module. All ports are blocked from moving to forwarding state during the POST. If
all components of all modules pass the POST, the system is placed in FIPS PASS state and ports
are allowed to forward data traffic. If any of the tests fail, the system halts and a message is
displayed to the local console. These tests include:
AES Known Answer Test:
For the encrypt test, a known key is used to encrypt a known plain text value resulting in an
encrypted value. This encrypted value is compared to a known encrypted value. If the encrypted
texts match, the test passes; otherwise, the test fails. The decrypt test is just the opposite. In
this test a known key is used to decrypt a known encrypted value. The resulting plaintext value
is compared to a known plaintext value. If the decrypted texts match, the test passes; otherwise,
the test fails.
RSA Signature Known Answer Test (both signature/verification):
This test takes a known plaintext value and Private/Public key pair and used the public key to
encrypt the data. This value is compared to a known encrypted value. If the encrypted values,
the test passes; otherwise, the test fails. The encrypted data is then decrypted using the private
key. This value is compared to the original plaintext value. If the decrypted values match, the
test passes; otherwise, the test fails.
RNG/DRBG Known Answer Test:
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For this test, known seed values are provided to the DRBG implementation. The DRBG uses
these values to generate random bits. These random bits are compared to known random bits.
If the random bits match, the test passes; otherwise, the test fails.
HMAC Known Answer Test:
For each of the hash values listed, the HMAC implementation is fed known plaintext data and a
known key. These values are used to generate a MAC. This MAC is compared to a known MAC.
If the MAC values match, the test passes; otherwise, the test fails.
Software Integrity Test:
The Software Integrity Test uses HMAC-SHA256 verification to confirm the cryptographic mod-
ule has maintained its integrity. The Software Integrity Test is run automatically when the mod-
ule is loaded.
SHA-256/384/512 Known Answer Test:
For each of the values listed, the SHA implementation is fed known data and a key. These values
are used to generate a hash. This hash is compared to a known value. If the hash values match,
the test passes; otherwise, the test fails.
If any component reports failure for the POST, the system crashes. Appropriate information is
displayed on the screen and saved in the crashinfo file.
All ports are blocked during the POST. If all components pass the POST, the system is placed in
FIPS PASS state and ports can forward data traffic.
If an error occurs during the self-test, a SELF_TEST_FAILURE system log is generated.
Example Error Message:
%CRYPTO-0-SELF_TEST_FAILURE: Crypto algorithms self-test failed (SHA hashing)
These tests are sufficient to verify that the correct version of the TOE software is running as well
as that the cryptographic operations are all performing as expected because any deviation in
the TSF behaviour will be identified by the failure of a self-test.
At the request of the authorized administrator, the self-tests can be executed on-demand. Refer
to the AGD for related instructions.
FTA_SSL_EXT.1
FTA_SSL.3
An Authorized Administrator can configure maximum inactivity times individually for both local
and remote administrative sessions using the “exec-timeout” command applied to the console
and virtual terminal (vty) lines. The allowable inactivity timeout range is from is <0-35791>
minutes. A value of 0 means there is no inactivity timeout enforced.
The configuration of the vty lines sets the configuration for the remote console access.
The line console settings are not immediately activated for the current session. The current line
console session must be exited. When the user logs back in, the inactivity timer will be activated
for the new session. The local interactive session terminates and does not lock. If a local user
session is inactive for a configured period, the session will be terminated and will require re-
identification and authentication to login. If a remote user session is inactive for a configured
period, the session will be terminated and will require re-identification and authentication to
establish a new session.
FTA_SSL.4 An Authorized Administrator can exit out of both local and remote administrative sessions by
issuing the ‘exit’ or ’logout’ command.
FTA_TAB.1 The Administrator can configure an access banner that describes restrictions of use, legal agree-
ments, or any other appropriate information to which users consent by accessing the TOE. The
banner will display on the local console port and SSH interfaces prior to allowing any adminis-
trative access.
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FTP_ITC.1
FTP_ITC.1/MACSEC
The TOE uses secure protocols to provide trusted communications between itself and author-
ized IT entities as specified in the table below:
IT Entity TOE Acting as
Client or Server
Secure
Communication
Mechanism/
Protocol
Non-TSF Endpoint
Identification
Syslog Server Client IPsec X.509 Certificate
MACsec Peer Client or
Server
MACsec Pre-Shared Key
FTP_TRP.1/Admin All remote administrative communications take place over a secure encrypted SSHv2 session.
The SSHv2 session is encrypted using AES encryption. The remote users (Authorized Adminis-
trators) can initiate SSHv2 communications with the TOE.
6.1. Key Zeroization
The table below describes the key zeroization referenced by FCS_CKM.4 provided by the TOE.
Table 20. Key Zeroization
Key Description Storage Location Zeroization Method
MACsec SAK The SAK is used to secure the
control plane traffic.
internal ASIC
register
Overwritten automatically with 0x00
when the MACsec session expires.
MACsec CAK The CAK secures the control plane
traffic.
NVRAM Overwritten with a new value of the
key.
(config-key-chain)# key-
string <32 hex-bit CAK>
MACsec Key Encryption Key
(KEK)
The Key Encrypting Key (KEK) is
used by Key Server, elected by
MKA, to transport a succession of
SAKs, for use by MACsec, to the
other member(s) of a Secure
Connectivity Association (SCA).
internal ASIC
register
Overwritten automatically with 0x00
when the MACsec session expires.
MACsec Integrity Check Key
(ICK)
The ICK is used to verify the
integrity of MPDUs and to prove
that the transmitter of the MKPDU
possesses the CAK.
internal ASIC
register
Overwritten automatically with 0x00
when the MACsec session expires.
SSH Session Key Used to encrypt SSH traffic SDRAM Overwritten automatically with 0x00
when the SSH trusted channel is no
longer in use.
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Key Description Storage Location Zeroization Method
SSH Private Key Used in establishing a secure SSH
session
NVRAM Overwritten with 0x00 by using the
following command:
#crypto key zeroize
<label>
Diffie-Hellman Shared
Secret
The shared secret used in Diffie-
Hellman (DH) exchange. Created
per the Diffie-Hellman Exchange.
SDRAM Overwritten automatically with 0x00
when the IPsec trusted channel is no
longer in use.
Diffie Hellman private key The private key used in Diffie-
Hellman (DH) Exchange
SDRAM Overwritten automatically with 0x00
when the IPsec trusted channel is no
longer in use.
Skey_id IKE SA key from which
Phase2/Child IPsec keys are
derived.
SDRAM Overwritten automatically with 0x00
when the IPsec trusted channel is no
longer in use.
IKE session encrypt key Used for IKE payload protection SDRAM Overwritten automatically with 0x00
when the IPsec trusted channel is no
longer in use.
IKE session authentication
key
Used for IKE payload integrity
verification
SDRAM Overwritten automatically with 0x00
when the IPsec trusted channel is no
longer in use.
IPsec encryption key Used to secure IPsec traffic SDRAM Overwritten automatically with 0x00
when the IPsec trusted channel is no
longer in use.
IPsec authentication key Used to authenticate the IPsec
peer
SDRAM Overwritten automatically with 0x00
when the IPsec trusted channel is no
longer in use.
6.2. CAVP Certificates
The table below lists the CAVP certificates for the TOE
Table 21. CAVP Certificates
SFR Selection Algorithm Implementation Standard Certificate
Number
FCS_CKM.1 – Cryptographic
Key Generation
2048
3072
RSA IC2M FIPS PUB 186-4 A1462
FCS_CKM.1 – Cryptographic
Key Generation
P-256
P-384
ECDSA IC2M FIPS PUB 186-4 A1462
FCS_CKM.2 – Cryptographic
Key Establishment
P-256
P-384
KAS-ECC IC2M NIST SP 800-56A Rev 3 A1462
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SFR Selection Algorithm Implementation Standard Certificate
Number
FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption –
AES Data
Encryption/Decryption
AES-CBC-128
AES-CBC-256
AES-GCM-128
AES-GCM-256
AES IC2M ISO/IEC 18033-3 (AES)
ISO/IEC 10116 (CBC)
ISO/IEC 19772 (GCM)
A1462
FCS_COP.1/MACSEC AES-GCM-128 AES UADP MSC ISO/IEC 18033-3 (AES)
ISO/IEC 19772 (GCM)
AES 4769 2
AES-KW
128 bits
AES IC2M NIST SP 800-38F (AES Key
Wrap)
A1462
FCS_COP.1/SigGen –
Cryptographic Operation
(Signature Generation and
Verification)
2048
3072
RSA IC2M FIPS PUB 186-4 A1462
FCS_COP.1/Hash –
Cryptographic Operation (Hash
Algorithm)
SHA-256
SHA-512
SHS IC2M ISO/IEC 10118-3:2004 A1462
FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash –
Cryptographic Operation
(Keyed Hash Algorithm)
HMAC-SHA-256 HMAC IC2M ISO/IEC 9797-2:2011 A1462
FCS_COP.1/CMAC AES-CMAC
128 bits
AES-CMAC IC2M NIST SP 800-38B A1462
FCS_RBG_EXT.1– Random Bit
Generation
CTR_DRBG (AES)
256 bits
DRBG IC2M ISO/IEC 18031:2011 A1462
7. References
The documentation listed below was used to prepare this ST.
Table 22. References
Identifier Description
[CC_PART1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation – Part 1: Introduction and general
model, dated September 2012, version 3.1, Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-001
[CC_PART2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation – Part 2: Security functional
components, dated September 2012, version 3.1, Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-002
2
The Tested Environment is Synopsys VCS v2011.12mx-SP1-3
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Identifier Description
[CC_PART3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation – Part 3: Security assurance
components, dated September 2012, version 3.1, Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-003
[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation – Evaluation Methodology,
dated September 2012, version 3.1, Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-004
[NDcPP] collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices Version 3.0e, December 14, 2023
[SD] Supporting Document – Evaluation Activities for Network Device cPP, version 3.0e, December 6,
2023
[MOD_MACSEC] PP-Module for MACsec Ethernet Encryption Version 1.0, 2023-03-02
IEEE 802.1X-2010 IEEE Standard for Local and metropolitan area networks—Port-Based Network Access Control
IEEE Standard 802.1AE-2018 IEEE Standard for Local and metropolitan area networks-Media Access Control (MAC) Security
ISO 18033-3 Information technology -- Security techniques -- Encryption algorithms -- Part 3: Block ciphers
ISO 10116 Information technology -- Security techniques -- Modes of operation for an n-bit block cipher
ISO 19772 Information technology -- Security techniques -- Authenticated encryption
ISO/IEC 10118-3:2004 Information technology -- Security techniques -- Hash-functions -- Part 3: Dedicated hash-functions
ISO/IEC 9797-2:2011 Information technology -- Security techniques -- Message Authentication Codes (MACs) -- Part 2:
Mechanisms using a dedicated hash-function
ISO/IEC 18031:2011 Information technology -- Security techniques -- Random bit generation
NIST SP800-38B Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The CMAC Mode for Authentication
NIST SP800-38F Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Methods for Key Wrapping
7.1.Acronyms and Terms
The following acronyms and terms are common and may be used in this Security Target.
Table 23. Acronyms and Terms
Acronym/Term Definition
AAA Administration, Authorization, and Accounting
ACL Access Control Lists
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
AES-CMAC Advanced Encryption Standard - Cipher-based Message Authentication Code
CAK Connectivity Association Key
CC Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation
CEM Common Evaluation Methodology for Information Technology Security
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CM Configuration Management
CMAC Cipher-based Message Authentication Code
DHCP Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
EAP Extensible Authentication Protocol
GE Gigabit Ethernet port
ICMP Internet Control Message Protocol
IT Information Technology
KCK Key Confirmation Key
KEK Key Encryption Key
MACsec Media Access Control Security
MKA MACsec Key Agreement
MKPDU MACsec Key Agreement Protocol Data Unit
MU-MIMO Multi-User Multiple-Input Multiple-Output
NDcPP collaborative Network Device Protection Profile
OFDMA Orthogonal Frequency-Division Multiple Access
OS Operating System
PoE Power over Ethernet
POST Power On Self Test
PRF Pseudo-random function
PP Protection Profile
RFC Request for Comment
SFP Small–form-factor pluggable port
SHS Secure Hash Standard
SSHv2 Secure Shell (version 2)
ST Security Target
TCP Transport Control Protocol
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSC TSF Scope of Control
TSF TOE Security Function
TSP TOE Security Policy
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TSS TOE Summary Specification
UDP User datagram protocol
WAN Wide Area Network
7.2.Obtaining Documentation and Submitting a Service Request
For information on obtaining documentation, using the Cisco Bug Search Tool (BST), submitting a service request, and gathering additional
information, see What’s New in Cisco Product Documentation.
To receive new and revised Cisco technical content directly to your desktop, you can subscribe to the What’s New in Cisco Product
Documentation RSS feed. The RSS feeds are a free service.
7.3.Contacting Cisco
Cisco has more than 200 offices worldwide. Addresses, phone numbers, and fax numbers are listed on the Cisco website at
www.cisco.com/go/offices.