Galleon Embedded Computing XSR
and G1 Software Encryption Layer
Security Target
Version 1.5
July 14, 2022
Prepared for:
Galleon Embedded Computing AS
Hovfaret 10
N-0275 OSLO, Norway
Prepared By:
www.gossamersec.com
Galleon Embedded Computing XSR and G1 SW Layer Security Target Version 1.5, July 14, 2022
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1. SECURITY TARGET INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................3
1.1 SECURITY TARGET REFERENCE......................................................................................................................3
1.2 TOE REFERENCE............................................................................................................................................3
1.3 TOE OVERVIEW .............................................................................................................................................3
1.4 TOE DESCRIPTION .........................................................................................................................................4
1.4.1 TOE Architecture...................................................................................................................................4
1.4.2 TOE Documentation ..............................................................................................................................5
2. CONFORMANCE CLAIMS..............................................................................................................................5
2.1 CONFORMANCE RATIONALE...........................................................................................................................6
3. SECURITY OBJECTIVES ................................................................................................................................7
3.1 SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT .....................................................................7
4. EXTENDED COMPONENTS DEFINITION ..................................................................................................8
5. SECURITY REQUIREMENTS.........................................................................................................................9
5.1 TOE SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS ...............................................................................................9
5.1.1 Cryptographic support (FCS)..............................................................................................................10
5.1.2 User data protection (FDP).................................................................................................................15
5.1.3 Security management (FMT) ...............................................................................................................15
5.1.4 Protection of the TSF (FPT) ................................................................................................................15
5.2 TOE SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS...............................................................................................17
5.2.1 Development (ADV).............................................................................................................................17
5.2.2 Guidance documents (AGD)................................................................................................................18
5.2.3 Life-cycle support (ALC) .....................................................................................................................19
5.2.4 Security Target (ASE) ..........................................................................................................................19
5.2.5 Tests (ATE) ..........................................................................................................................................19
5.2.6 Vulnerability assessment (AVA)...........................................................................................................19
6. TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION..............................................................................................................21
6.1 CRYPTOGRAPHIC SUPPORT ...........................................................................................................................21
6.2 USER DATA PROTECTION ..............................................................................................................................23
6.3 SECURITY MANAGEMENT .............................................................................................................................23
6.4 PROTECTION OF THE TSF .............................................................................................................................23
7. KEY MANAGEMENT DESCRIPTION..........................................ERROR! BOOKMARK NOT DEFINED.
LIST OF TABLES
Table 1 TOE Security Functional Components ......................................................................................................10
Table 2 Assurance Components ...............................................................................................................................17
Table 3 GEC SW Encryption Layer Cryptographic Algorithms..........................................................................22
Table 4 Key Identification......................................................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined.
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1. Security Target Introduction
This section identifies the Security Target (ST) and Target of Evaluation (TOE) identification, ST conventions, ST
conformance claims, and the ST organization. The TOE is Galleon Embedded Computing XSR and G1 Software
Encryption Layer provided by Galleon Embedded Computing. The TOE is being evaluated as a full drive encryption
solution.
The Security Target contains the following additional sections:
• Conformance Claims (Section 2)
• Security Objectives (Section 3)
• Extended Components Definition (Section 4)
• Security Requirements (Section 5)
• TOE Summary Specification (Section 6)
Conventions
The following conventions have been applied in this document:
• Security Functional Requirements – Part 2 of the CC defines the approved set of operations that may be
applied to functional requirements: iteration, assignment, selection, and refinement.
o Iteration: allows a component to be used more than once with varying operations. In the ST,
iteration is indicated by a parenthetical number placed at the end of the component. For example
FDP_ACC.1(1) and FDP_ACC.1(2) indicate that the ST includes two iterations of the FDP_ACC.1
requirement.
o Assignment: allows the specification of an identified parameter. Assignments are indicated using
bold and are surrounded by brackets (e.g., [assignment]). Note that an assignment within a selection
would be identified in italics and with embedded bold brackets (e.g., [[selected-assignment]]).
o Selection: allows the specification of one or more elements from a list. Selections are indicated
using bold italics and are surrounded by brackets (e.g., [selection]).
o Refinement: allows the addition of details. Refinements are indicated using bold, for additions, and
strike-through, for deletions (e.g., “… all objects …” or “… some big things …”).
• Other sections of the ST – Other sections of the ST use bolding to highlight text of special interest, such as
captions.
1.1 Security Target Reference
ST Title – Galleon Embedded Computing XSR and G1 Software Encryption Layer Security Target
ST Version – Version 1.5
ST Date – July 14, 2022
1.2 TOE Reference
TOE Identification – Galleon Embedded Computing XSR and G1 Software Encryption Layer
TOE Developer – Galleon Embedded Computing
Evaluation Sponsor – Galleon Embedded Computing
1.3 TOE Overview
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the Galleon Embedded Computing XSR and G1 Software Encryption Layer.
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The TOE’s evaluated configuration requires that administrators must only access the unit and perform management
activities locally and not remotely. For local management, the administrator may use either a directly attached
Keyboard, Video, and Mouse (KVM) or a cross-over cable (providing a direct, local connection between the TOE and
the administrator’s PC) to access the Red Hat operating system. This configuration (‘locally managed with remote
management disabled’) complies with NIAP Technical Decision 0606.
The TOE provides software Full Drive Encryption of removable drives and the software can be installed on
Galleon’s XSR or G1 models. All models use Intel 64-bit CPUs, and Galleon offers the G1 with a single CPU
model while offering the XSR with a range of CPUs to allow customers to tailor the system to their needs. The
following table summarizes the CPU options available (bold denotes the models used during evaluation testing,
while italics denotes equivalent models). Because the Red Hat operating system provides a hardware abstraction
layer, the TOE software executes identically irrespective of the underlying CPU.
Model Processor
XSR Intel Xeon E3-1505Lv6 (Kaby Lake)
XSR Intel Xeon E3-1505Mv6 (Kaby Lake)
XSR Intel Xeon E-2276ME (Coffee Lake)
XSR Intel Xeon E-2276ML (Coffee Lake)
G1 Intel Atom C2758 (Rangeley)
1.4 TOE Description
The TOE is a software application that provides Full Drive Encryption (FDE) of drives within the system in which
the software executes. The TOE has been evaluated on Galleon’s XSR and G1 products. These products can act in
multiple different capacities (Network Attached Storage [NAS], data recorder, general server, etc.) and allow for
encryption of the drives attached to the system (including a Removable Data Module [RDM]). The XSR model
supports encryption of one RDM (at a time), up to 4 internal SSDs, and its internal, non-removable mSATA SSD.
The G1 model also supports encryption of one RDM (at a time) and up to 2 internal SSDs. The TOE securely
encrypts all user data stored within either model.
The TOE software executes in a Red Hat Enterprise Linux (RHEL) Release 8.4 operating system running on the
hardware of the XSR and G1, and the TOE provides software-based Full Disk Encryption (FDE) of data drives (both
internal drives and the RDM).
In addition to the software-based FDE layer, the XSR and G1 products include a separate, hardware-based Full
Drive Encryption (FDE) layer to further encrypt the drives; however, this hardware-based FDE layer is addressed in
a separate evaluation.
The XSR and G1 products, whether operating as a NAS or a more general server, supports encrypting the data of
additional software running on the TOE’s operating system. The XSR and G1 systems might include software to
support protocols including CIFS and NFS or might include the vendor’s data recording software or even include
customer provided software applications. The RHEL administrator can enable, disable, or install additional
(accessing the system directly) desired protocols and software applications to support their use-case and application.
1.4.1 TOE Architecture
The TOE provides a software Full Drive Encryption solution that can encrypt a Removable Data Module (RDM)
which contain a data drive within as well as additional internal SSDs.
1.4.1.1 Physical Boundaries
The TOE’s physical boundary is the physical perimeter of its enclosure. The TOE provides a ruggedized solution to
secure Data at Rest (DAR).
1.4.1.2 Logical Boundaries
This section summarizes the security functions provided by the TOE:
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- Cryptographic support
- User data protection
- Security management
- Protection of the TSF
1.4.1.2.1 Cryptographic support
The TOE includes cryptographic functionality for key management, user authentication, and block-based encryption
including: symmetric key generation, encryption/decryption, cryptographic hashing, keyed-hash message
authentication, and password-based key derivation. These functions are supported with suitable random bit generation,
key derivation, salt generation, initialization vector generation, secure key storage, and key destruction. These
primitive cryptographic functions are used to encrypt Data-At-Rest (including the generation and protection of keys
and key encryption keys) used by the TOE.
1.4.1.2.2 User data protection
The TOE performs Full Drive Encryption on all partitions on the drive (so that no plaintext exists) and does so without
user intervention.
1.4.1.2.3 Security management
The TOE provides each of the required management services to manage the full drive encryption using a command
line interface.
1.4.1.2.4 Protection of the TSF
The TOE implements a number of features to protect itself to ensure the reliability and integrity of its security features.
It protects key and key material, and includes functions to perform self-tests and software/firmware integrity checking
so that it might detect when it is failing or may be corrupt. If any of the self-tests fail, the TOE will not go into an
operational mode.
1.4.2 TOE Documentation
Galleon SW Encryption Layer Certifiable Encryption, Version 1.0.7, July 14, 2022 [Admin Guide]
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2. Conformance Claims
This TOE is conformant to the following CC specifications:
• Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2: Security Functional Components,
CCMB-2017-04-002, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.
• Part 2 Extended
• Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3: Security Assurance Components,
CCMB-2017-04-003, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.
• Part 3 Conformant
• Package Claims:
• collaborative Protection Profile for Full Drive Encryption - Encryption Engine, Version 2.0 + Errata
20190201, February 1, 2019 and collaborative Protection Profile for Full Drive Encryption
Authorization Acquisition, Version 2.0 + Errata 20190201, February 1, 2019
(FDEEEcPP20E/FDEAAcPP20E)
• Technical Decisions:
TD No. Applied? Rationale
FDEEEcPP20E:TD0606 Yes The TOE is a NAS
FDEAAcPP20E:TD0606 Yes The TOE is a NAS
FDEEEcPP20E:TD0464 Yes FPT_PWR_EXT.1 claimed, SFR updated
FDEEEcPP20E:TD0460 Yes FPT_PWR_EXT.1 claimed, AGD affected
FDEEEcPP20E:TD0458 Yes FPT_KYP_EXT.1 claimed, TSS includes required info
FDEAAcPP20E:TD0458 Yes FPT_KYP_EXT.1 claimed, TSS includes required info
2.1 Conformance Rationale
The ST conforms to the FDEEEcPP20E/FDEAAcPP20E. As explained previously, the security problem definition,
security objectives, and security requirements have been drawn from the PP.
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3. Security Objectives
The Security Problem Definition may be found in the FDEEEcPP20E/FDEAAcPP20E and this section reproduces
only the corresponding Security Objectives for the operational environment for reader convenience. The
FDEEEcPP20E/FDEAAcPP20E offers additional information about the identified security objectives, but that has not
been reproduced here and the FDEEEcPP20E/FDEAAcPP20E should be consulted if there is interest in that material.
In general, the FDEEEcPP20E/FDEAAcPP20E has defined Security Objectives appropriate for Full Drive Encryption
and as such are applicable to the Galleon Embedded Computing XSR and G1 Software Encryption Layer TOE.
3.1 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment
OE.INITIAL_DRIVE_STATE The OE provides a newly provisioned or initialized storage device free of
protected data in areas not targeted for encryption.
OE.PASSPHRASE_STRENGTH An authorized administrator will be responsible for ensuring that the
passphrase authorization factor conforms to guidance from the Enterprise using the TOE.
OE.PHYSICAL The Operational Environment will provide a secure physical computing space such than
an adversary is not able to make modifications to the environment or to the TOE itself.
OE.PLATFORM_I&A The Operational Environment will provide individual user identification and
authentication mechanisms that operate independently of the authorization factors used by the TOE.
OE.PLATFORM_STATE The platform in which the storage device resides (or an external storage device
is connected) is free of malware that could interfere with the correct operation of the product.
OE.POWER_DOWN Volatile memory is cleared after power-off so memory remnant attacks are
infeasible.
OE.SINGLE_USE_ET External tokens that contain authorization factors will be used for no other purpose
than to store the external token authorization factor.
OE.STRONG_ENVIRONMENT_CRYPTO The Operating Environment will provide a cryptographic
function capability that is commensurate with the requirements and capabilities of the TOE and Appendix
A.
OE.TRAINED_USERS Authorized users will be properly trained and follow all guidance for securing the
TOE and authorization factors.
OE.TRUSTED_CHANNEL Communication among and between product components (i.e., AA and EE) is
sufficiently protected to prevent information disclosure.
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4. Extended Components Definition
All of the extended requirements in this ST have been drawn from the FDEEEcPP20E/FDEAAcPP20E. The
FDEEEcPP20E/FDEAAcPP20E defines the following extended requirements and since they are not redefined in this
ST the FDEEEcPP20E/FDEAAcPP20E should be consulted for more information in regard to those CC extensions.
Extended SFRs:
- FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_AFA_EXT.1: Authorization Factor Acquisition
- FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_AFA_EXT.2: Timing of Authorization Factor Acquisition
- FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_CKM_EXT.4(a): Cryptographic Key and Key Material Destruction (Destruction Timing)
- FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_CKM_EXT.4(a): Cryptographic Key and Key Material Destruction (Destruction Timing)
- FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_CKM_EXT.4(b): Cryptographic Key and Key Material Destruction (Power Management)
- FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_CKM_EXT.4(b): Cryptographic Key and Key Material Destruction (Power Management)
- FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_CKM_EXT.6: Cryptographic Key Destruction Types
- FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_KDF_EXT.1: Cryptographic Key Derivation
- FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_KDF_EXT.1: Cryptographic Key Derivation
- FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_KYC_EXT.1: Key Chaining (Initiator)
- FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_KYC_EXT.2: Key Chaining (Recipient)
- FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_PCC_EXT.1: Cryptographic Password Construct and Conditioning
- FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_RBG_EXT.1: Extended: Cryptographic Operation (Random Bit Generation)
- FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_RBG_EXT.1: Random Bit Generation
- FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_SNI_EXT.1: Cryptographic Operation (Salt, Nonce, and Initialization Vector Generation)
- FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_SNI_EXT.1: Cryptographic Operation (Salt, Nonce, and Initialization Vector Generation)
- FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_VAL_EXT.1: Validation
- FDEEEcPP20E:FDP_DSK_EXT.1: Protection of Data on Disk
- FDEAAcPP20E:FPT_KYP_EXT.1: Protection of Key and Key Material
- FDEEEcPP20E:FPT_KYP_EXT.1: Protection of Key and Key Material
- FDEAAcPP20E:FPT_PWR_EXT.1: Power Saving States
- FDEEEcPP20E:FPT_PWR_EXT.1: Power Saving States
- FDEAAcPP20E:FPT_PWR_EXT.2: Timing of Power Saving States
- FDEEEcPP20E:FPT_PWR_EXT.2: Timing of Power Saving States
- FDEAAcPP20E:FPT_TST_EXT.1: TSF Testing
- FDEEEcPP20E:FPT_TST_EXT.1: TSF Testing
- FDEAAcPP20E:FPT_TUD_EXT.1: Trusted Update
- FDEEEcPP20E:FPT_TUD_EXT.1: Trusted Update
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5. Security Requirements
This section defines the Security Functional Requirements (SFRs) and Security Assurance Requirements (SARs) that
serve to represent the security functional claims for the Target of Evaluation (TOE) and to scope the evaluation effort.
The SFRs have all been drawn from the FDEEEcPP20E/FDEAAcPP20E. The refinements and operations already
performed in the FDEEEcPP20E/FDEAAcPP20E are not identified (e.g., highlighted) here, rather the requirements
have been copied from the FDEEEcPP20E/FDEAAcPP20E and any residual operations have been completed herein.
Of particular note, the FDEEEcPP20E/FDEAAcPP20E made a number of refinements and completed some of the
SFR operations defined in the Common Criteria (CC) and that PP should be consulted to identify those changes if
necessary.
The SARs are also drawn from the FDEEEcPP20E/FDEAAcPP20E.The FDEEEcPP20E/FDEAAcPP20E should be
consulted for the assurance activity definitions.
5.1 TOE Security Functional Requirements
The following table identifies the SFRs that are satisfied by Galleon Embedded Computing XSR and G1 Software
Encryption Layer TOE.
Requirement Class Requirement Component
FCS:
Cryptographic
support
FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_AFA_EXT.1: Authorization Factor Acquisition
FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_AFA_EXT.2: Timing of Authorization Factor Acquisition
FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_CKM.1(c): Cryptographic Key Generation (Data Encryption Key)
FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_CKM.4(a): Cryptographic Key Destruction (Power Management)
FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_CKM.4(a): Cryptographic Key Destruction (Power Management)
FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_CKM.4(d): Cryptographic Key Destruction (Software TOE, 3rd
Party Storage)
FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_CKM.4(d): Cryptographic Key Destruction (Software TOE, 3rd
Party Storage)
FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_CKM_EXT.4(a): Cryptographic Key and Key Material
Destruction (Destruction Timing)
FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_CKM_EXT.4(a): Cryptographic Key and Key Material
Destruction (Destruction Timing)
FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_CKM_EXT.4(b): Cryptographic Key and Key Material
Destruction (Power Management)
FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_CKM_EXT.4(b): Cryptographic Key and Key Material
Destruction (Power Management)
FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_CKM_EXT.6: Cryptographic Key Destruction Types
FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_COP.1(a): Cryptographic Operation (Signature Verification)
FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_COP.1(a): Cryptographic Operation (Signature Verification)
FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_COP.1(b): Cryptographic operation (Hash Algorithm)
FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_COP.1(b): Cryptographic Operation (Hash Algorithm)
FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_COP.1(c): Cryptographic operation (Keyed Hash Algorithm)
FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_COP.1(c): Cryptographic Operation (Message Authentication)
FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_COP.1(f): Cryptographic Operation (AES Data
Encryption/Decryption)
FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_COP.1(g): Cryptographic operation (Key Encryption)
FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_COP.1(g): Cryptographic Operation (Key Encryption)
FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_KDF_EXT.1: Cryptographic Key Derivation
FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_KDF_EXT.1: Cryptographic Key Derivation
FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_KYC_EXT.1: Key Chaining (Initiator)
FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_KYC_EXT.2: Key Chaining (Recipient)
FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_PCC_EXT.1: Cryptographic Password Construct and
Conditioning
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FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_RBG_EXT.1: Extended: Cryptographic Operation (Random Bit
Generation)
FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_RBG_EXT.1: Random Bit Generation
FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_SNI_EXT.1: Cryptographic Operation (Salt, Nonce, and
Initialization Vector Generation)
FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_SNI_EXT.1: Cryptographic Operation (Salt, Nonce, and
Initialization Vector Generation)
FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_VAL_EXT.1: Validation
FDP: User data
protection
FDEEEcPP20E:FDP_DSK_EXT.1: Protection of Data on Disk
FMT: Security FDEAAcPP20E:FMT_MOF.1: Management of Functions Behavior
management FDEAAcPP20E:FMT_SMF.1: Specification of Management Functions
FDEEEcPP20E:FMT_SMF.1: Specification of Management Functions
FDEAAcPP20E:FMT_SMR.1: Security Roles
FPT: Protection FDEAAcPP20E:FPT_KYP_EXT.1: Protection of Key and Key Material
of the TSF FDEEEcPP20E:FPT_KYP_EXT.1: Protection of Key and Key Material
FDEAAcPP20E:FPT_PWR_EXT.1: Power Saving States
FDEEEcPP20E:FPT_PWR_EXT.1: Power Saving States
FDEAAcPP20E:FPT_PWR_EXT.2: Timing of Power Saving States
FDEEEcPP20E:FPT_PWR_EXT.2: Timing of Power Saving States
FDEAAcPP20E:FPT_TST_EXT.1: TSF Testing
FDEEEcPP20E:FPT_TST_EXT.1: TSF Testing
FDEAAcPP20E:FPT_TUD_EXT.1: Trusted Update
FDEEEcPP20E:FPT_TUD_EXT.1: Trusted Update
Table 1 TOE Security Functional Components
5.1.1 Cryptographic support (FCS)
5.1.1.1 Authorization Factor Acquisition (FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_AFA_EXT.1)
FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_AFA_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall accept the following authorization factors: [- a submask derived from a password
authorization factor conditioned as defined in FCS_PCC_EXT.1].
5.1.1.2 Timing of Authorization Factor Acquisition (FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_AFA_EXT.2)
FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_AFA_EXT.2.1
The TSF shall reacquire the authorization factor(s) specified in FCS_AFA_EXT.1 upon transition
from any Compliant power saving state specified in FPT_PWR_EXT.1 prior to permitting access
to plaintext data.
5.1.1.3 Cryptographic Key Generation (Data Encryption Key) (FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_CKM.1(c))
FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_CKM.1.1(c)
Refinement: The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key generation method [- generate a DEK using the RBG as specified in
FCS_RBG_EXT.1] and specified cryptographic key sizes [256 bits].
5.1.1.4 Cryptographic Key Destruction (Power Management) (FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_CKM.4(a))
FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_CKM.4.1(a)
Refinement: The TSF shall [erase] cryptographic keys and key material from volatile memory
when transitioning to a Compliant power saving state as defined by FPT_PWR_EXT.1 that meets
the following: a key destruction method specified in FCS_CKM.4(d).
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5.1.1.5 Cryptographic Key Destruction (Power Management) (FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_CKM.4(a))
FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_CKM.4.1(a)
The TSF shall [erase] cryptographic keys and key material from volatile memory when
transitioning to a Compliant power saving state as defined by FPT_PWR_EXT.1 that meets the
following: a key destruction method specified in FCS_CKM_EXT.6.
5.1.1.6 Cryptographic Key Destruction (Software TOE, 3rd Party Storage)
(FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_CKM.4(d))
FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_CKM.4.1(d)
Refinement: The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key destruction method [- For volatile memory, the destruction shall be executed
by a [o removal of power to the memory],
- For non-volatile storage that consists of the invocation of an interface provided by the
underlying platform that [o logically addresses the storage location of the key and performs a
[single] overwrite consisting of [- zeroes]]] that meets the following: no standard.
5.1.1.7 Cryptographic Key Destruction (Software TOE, 3rd Party Storage) (FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_CKM.4(d))
FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_CKM.4.1(d)
Refinement: The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key destruction method [- For volatile memory, the destruction shall be executed
by a [removal of power to the memory],
- For non-volatile storage that consists of the invocation of an interface provided by the
underlying platform that [o logically addresses the storage location of the key and performs a
[single] overwrite consisting of [- zeros]]] that meets the following: no standard.
5.1.1.8 Cryptographic Key and Key Material Destruction (Destruction Timing)
(FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_CKM_EXT.4(a))
FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_CKM_EXT.4.1(a)
The TSF shall destroy all keys and key material when no longer needed.
5.1.1.9 Cryptographic Key and Key Material Destruction (Destruction Timing)
(FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_CKM_EXT.4(a))
FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_CKM_EXT.4.1(a)
The TSF shall destroy all keys and keying material when no longer needed.
5.1.1.10 Cryptographic Key and Key Material Destruction (Power Management)
(FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_CKM_EXT.4(b))
FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_CKM_EXT.4.1(b)
Refinement: The TSF shall destroy all key material, BEV, and authentication factors stored in
plaintext when transitioning to a Compliant power saving state as defined by FPT_PWR_EXT.1.
5.1.1.11 Cryptographic Key and Key Material Destruction (Power Management)
(FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_CKM_EXT.4(b))
FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_CKM_EXT.4.1(b)
The TSF shall destroy all key material, BEV, and authentication factors stored in plaintext when
transitioning to a Compliant power saving state as defined by FPT_PWR_EXT.1.
5.1.1.12 Cryptographic Key Destruction Types (FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_CKM_EXT.6)
FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_CKM_EXT.6.1
The TSF shall use [FCS_CKM.4(d)] key destruction methods.
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5.1.1.13 Cryptographic Operation (Signature Verification) (FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_COP.1(a))
FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_COP.1.1(a)
Refinement: The TSF shall perform cryptographic signature services (verification) in accordance
with a [Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm with a key size of 256 bits or greater] that
meet the following:[FIPS PUB 186-4, 'Digital Signature Standard (DSS)', Section 6 and
Appendix D, Implementing 'NIST curves' [P-384]; ISO/IEC 14888-3, Section 6.4, for ECDSA
schemes].
5.1.1.14 Cryptographic Operation (Signature Verification) (FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_COP.1(a))
FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_COP.1.1(a)
Refinement: The TSF shall perform cryptographic signature services (verification) in accordance
with a [Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm with a key size of 256 bits or greater] that
meet the following:[FIPS PUB 186-4, 'Digital Signature Standard (DSS)', Section 6 and
Appendix D, Implementing 'NIST curves' [P-384]; ISO/IEC 14888-3, Section 6.4, for ECDSA
schemes].
5.1.1.15 Cryptographic operation (Hash Algorithm) (FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_COP.1(b))
FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_COP.1.1(b)
Refinement: The TSF shall perform cryptographic hashing services in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm [SHA-256, SHA-384] that meet the following: ISO/IEC 10118-3:2004.
5.1.1.16 Cryptographic Operation (Hash Algorithm) (FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_COP.1(b))
FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_COP.1.1(b)
Refinement: The TSF shall perform cryptographic hashing services in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm [SHA-256, SHA-384] that meet the following: ISO/IEC 10118-3:2004.
5.1.1.17 Cryptographic operation (Keyed Hash Algorithm) (FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_COP.1(c))
FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_COP.1.1(c)
Refinement: The TSF shall perform cryptographic [keyed-hash message authentication] in
accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384] and
cryptographic key sizes [256] that meet the following: [ISO/IEC 9797-2:2011, Section 7 'MAC
Algorithm 2'].
5.1.1.18 Cryptographic Operation (Message Authentication) (FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_COP.1(c))
FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_COP.1.1(c)
Refinement: The TSF shall perform cryptographic [message authentication] in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm [HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384] and cryptographic key
sizes [256-bit keys used in [HMAC]] that meet the following: ISO/IEC 9797-2:2011, Section 7
'MAC Algorithm 2'.
5.1.1.19 Cryptographic Operation (AES Data Encryption/Decryption) (FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_COP.1(f))
FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_COP.1.1(f)
Refinement: The TSF shall perform data encryption and decryption in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm AES used in [XTS] mode and cryptographic key sizes [256 bits] that
meet the following: AES as specified in ISO /IEC 18033-3, [XTS as specified in IEEE 1619].
5.1.1.20 Cryptographic operation (Key Encryption) (FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_COP.1(g))
FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_COP.1.1(g)
Refinement: The TSF shall perform key encryption and decryption in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm AES used in [CBC] mode and cryptographic key sizes [256 bits] that
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meet the following: AES as specified in ISO /IEC 18033-3, [CBC as specified in ISO/IEC
10116].
5.1.1.21 Cryptographic Operation (Key Encryption) (FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_COP.1(g))
FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_COP.1.1(g)
Refinement: The TSF shall perform key encryption and decryption in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm AES used in [CBC] mode and cryptographic key sizes [256 bits] that
meet the following: AES as specified in ISO /IEC 18033-3, [CBC as specified in ISO/IEC
10116].
5.1.1.22 Cryptographic Key Derivation (FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_KDF_EXT.1)
FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_KDF_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall accept [a conditioned password submask] to derive an intermediate key, as defined
in [NIST SP 800-132] , using the keyed-hash functions specified in FCS_COP.1(c), such that the
output is at least of equivalent security strength (in number of bits) to the BEV.
5.1.1.23 Cryptographic Key Derivation (FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_KDF_EXT.1)
FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_KDF_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall accept [a conditioned password submask] to derive an intermediate key, as defined
in [NIST SP 800-132] , using the keyed-hash functions specified in FCS_COP.1(c), such that the
output is at least of equivalent security strength (in number of bits) to the BEV.
5.1.1.24 Key Chaining (Initiator) (FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_KYC_EXT.1)
FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_KYC_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall maintain a key chain of: intermediate keys originating from one or more
submask(s) to the BEV using the following method(s): [key derivation as specified in
FCS_KDF_EXT.1] while maintaining an effective strength of [256 bits] for symmetric keys and
an effective strength of [not applicable] for asymmetric keys.
FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_KYC_EXT.1.2
The TSF shall provide at least a [256 bit] BEV to [the encryption engine] [- without validation
taking place].
5.1.1.25 Key Chaining (Recipient) (FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_KYC_EXT.2)
FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_KYC_EXT.2.1
The TSF shall accept a BEV of at least [256 bits] from the AA.
FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_KYC_EXT.2.2
The TSF shall maintain a chain of intermediary keys originating from the BEV to the DEK using
the following method(s): [- key encryption as specified in FCS_COP.1(g)] while maintaining an
effective strength of [256 bits] for symmetric keys and an effective strength of [not applicable] for
asymmetric keys.
5.1.1.26 Cryptographic Password Construct and Conditioning (FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_PCC_EXT.1)
FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_PCC_EXT.1.1
A password used by the TSF to generate a password authorization factor shall enable up to [511]
characters in the set of upper case characters, lower case characters, numbers, and [all ASCII
printable characters] and shall perform Password-based Key Derivation Functions in accordance
with a specified cryptographic algorithm HMAC-[SHA-384], with [between 1,150,000 and
3,400,000] iterations, and output cryptographic key sizes [256 bits] that meet the following: NIST
SP 800-132.
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5.1.1.27 Extended: Cryptographic Operation (Random Bit Generation) (FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_RBG_EXT.1)
FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_RBG_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall perform all deterministic random bit generation services in accordance with
[ISO/IEC 18031:2011] using [HMAC_DRBG (any)]].
FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_RBG_EXT.1.2
The deterministic RBG shall be seeded by at least one entropy source that accumulates entropy
from [[two] software-based noise source(s)] with a minimum of [256 bits] of entropy at least
equal to the greatest security strength, according to ISO/IEC 18031:2011 Table C.1 'Security
Strength Table for Hash Functions', of the keys and hashes that it will generate.
5.1.1.28 Random Bit Generation (FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_RBG_EXT.1)
FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_RBG_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall perform all deterministic random bit generation services in accordance with
[ISO/IEC 18031:2011] using [HMAC_DRBG (any)]].
FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_RBG_EXT.1.2
The deterministic RBG shall be seeded by at least one entropy source that accumulates entropy
from [[two] software-based noise source(s)] with a minimum of [256 bits] of entropy at least
equal to the greatest security strength, according to ISO/IEC 18031:2011 Table C.1 'Security
Strength Table for Hash Functions', of the keys and hashes that it will generate.
5.1.1.29 Cryptographic Operation (Salt, Nonce, and Initialization Vector Generation)
(FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_SNI_EXT.1)
FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_SNI_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall [use salts that are generated by a [DRBG as specified in FCS_RBG_EXT.1]].
FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_SNI_EXT.1.2
The TSF shall use [unique nonces with a minimum size of 64 bits].
FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_SNI_EXT.1.3
The TSF shall create IVs in the following manner [
- CBC: IVs shall be non-repeating and unpredictable
- XTS: No IV. Tweak values shall be non-negative integers, assigned consecutively,
and starting at an arbitrary non-negative integer].
5.1.1.30 Cryptographic Operation (Salt, Nonce, and Initialization Vector Generation)
(FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_SNI_EXT.1)
FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_SNI_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall [use salts that are generated by a [DRBG as specified in FCS_RBG_EXT.1]].
FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_SNI_EXT.1.2
The TSF shall use [unique nonces with a minimum size of 64 bits].
FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_SNI_EXT.1.3
The TSF shall create IVs in the following manner [
- CBC: IVs shall be non-repeating and unpredictable
- XTS: No IV. Tweak values shall be non-negative integers, assigned consecutively,
and starting at an arbitrary non-negative integer].
5.1.1.31 Validation (FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_VAL_EXT.1)
FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_VAL_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall perform validation of the BEV using the following method(s): [- hash the BEV as
specified in [FCS_COP.1(c)] and compare it to a stored hashed value].
FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_VAL_EXT.1.2
The TSF shall require the validation of the BEV prior to allowing access to TSF data after exiting
a Compliant power saving state.
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FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_VAL_EXT.1.3
The TSF shall [
- institute a delay such that only [4320] can be made within a 24 hour period].
5.1.2 User data protection (FDP)
5.1.2.1 Protection of Data on Disk (FDEEEcPP20E:FDP_DSK_EXT.1)
FDEEEcPP20E:FDP_DSK_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall perform Full Drive Encryption in accordance with FCS_COP.1(f), such that the
drive contains no plaintext protected data.
FDEEEcPP20E:FDP_DSK_EXT.1.2
The TSF shall encrypt all protected data without user intervention.
5.1.3 Security management (FMT)
5.1.3.1 Management of Functions Behavior (FDEAAcPP20E:FMT_MOF.1)
FDEAAcPP20E:FMT_MOF.1.1
The TSF shall restrict the ability to [modify the behaviour of] the functions [use of Compliant
power saving state] to [authorized users].
5.1.3.2 Specification of Management Functions (FDEAAcPP20E:FMT_SMF.1)
FDEAAcPP20E:FMT_SMF.1.1
The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions: [
a) forwarding requests to change the DEK to the EE,
b) forwarding requests to cryptographically erase the DEK to the EE,
c) allowing authorized users to change authorization factors or set of authorization factors used,
d) initiate TOE firmware/software updates,
e) [no other functions]
5.1.3.3 Specification of Management Functions (FDEEEcPP20E:FMT_SMF.1)
FDEEEcPP20E:FMT_SMF.1.1
The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions:
a) change the DEK, as specified in FCS_CKM.1, when reprovisioning or when commanded,
b) erase the DEK, as specified in FCS_CKM.4(a),
c) initiate TOE firmware/software updates,
d) [no other functions].
5.1.3.4 Security Roles (FDEAAcPP20E:FMT_SMR.1)
FDEAAcPP20E:FMT_SMR.1.1
The TSF shall maintain the roles [authorized user].
FDEAAcPP20E:FMT_SMR.1.2
The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
5.1.4 Protection of the TSF (FPT)
5.1.4.1 Protection of Key and Key Material (FDEAAcPP20E:FPT_KYP_EXT.1)
FDEAAcPP20E:FPT_KYP_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall [only store keys in non-volatile memory when wrapped, as specified in
FCS_COP.1(d), or encrypted, as specified in FCS_COP.1(g) or FCS_COP.1(e)].
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5.1.4.2 Protection of Key and Key Material (FDEEEcPP20E:FPT_KYP_EXT.1)
FDEEEcPP20E:FPT_KYP_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall [only store keys in non-volatile memory when wrapped, as specified in
FCS_COP.1(d), or encrypted, as specified in FCS_COP.1(g) or FCS_COP.1(e)].
5.1.4.3 Power Saving States (FDEAAcPP20E:FPT_PWR_EXT.1)
FDEAAcPP20E:FPT_PWR_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall define the following Compliant power saving states: [G3].
5.1.4.4 Power Saving States (FDEEEcPP20E:FPT_PWR_EXT.1)
FDEEEcPP20E:FPT_PWR_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall define the following Compliant power saving states: [G3].
(TD0464 applied)
5.1.4.5 Timing of Power Saving States (FDEAAcPP20E:FPT_PWR_EXT.2)
FDEAAcPP20E:FPT_PWR_EXT.2.1
For each Compliant power saving state defined in FPT_PWR_EXT.1.1, the TSF shall enter the
Compliant power saving state when the following conditions occur:
user-initiated request,
[shutdown].
5.1.4.6 Timing of Power Saving States (FDEEEcPP20E:FPT_PWR_EXT.2)
FDEEEcPP20E:FPT_PWR_EXT.2.1
For each Compliant power saving state defined in FPT_PWR_EXT.1.1, the TSF shall enter the
Compliant power saving state when the following conditions occur:
user-initiated request,
[shutdown].
5.1.4.7 TSF Testing (FDEAAcPP20E:FPT_TST_EXT.1)
FDEAAcPP20E:FPT_TST_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall run a suite of the following self- tests [during initial start-up (on power on)] to
demonstrate the correct operation of the TSF: [Cryptographic Algorithm Self-tests].
5.1.4.8 TSF Testing (FDEEEcPP20E:FPT_TST_EXT.1)
FDEEEcPP20E:FPT_TST_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall run a suite of the following self- tests [during initial start-up (on power on)] to
demonstrate the correct operation of the TSF: [Cryptographic Algorithm Self-tests].
5.1.4.9 Trusted Update (FDEAAcPP20E:FPT_TUD_EXT.1)
FDEAAcPP20E:FPT_TUD_EXT.1.1
Refinement: The TSF shall provide authorized users the ability to query the current version of the
TOE [software].
FDEAAcPP20E:FPT_TUD_EXT.1.2
Refinement: The TSF shall provide authorized users the ability to initiate updates to TOE
[software].
FDEAAcPP20E:FPT_TUD_EXT.1.3
Refinement: The TSF shall verify updates to the TOE software using a [digital signature as
specified in FCS_COP.1(a)] by the manufacturer prior to installing those updates.
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5.1.4.10 Trusted Update (FDEEEcPP20E:FPT_TUD_EXT.1)
FDEEEcPP20E:FPT_TUD_EXT.1.1
Refinement: The TSF shall provide authorized users the ability to query the current version of the
TOE [software].
FDEEEcPP20E:FPT_TUD_EXT.1.2
Refinement: The TSF shall provide authorized users the ability to initiate updates to TOE
[software].
FDEEEcPP20E:FPT_TUD_EXT.1.3
Refinement: The TSF shall verify updates to the TOE [software] using a [digital signature as
specified in FCS_COP.1(a)] by the manufacturer prior to installing those updates.
5.2 TOE Security Assurance Requirements
The SARs for the TOE are the components as specified in Part 3 of the Common Criteria. Note that the SARs have
effectively been refined with the assurance activities explicitly defined in association with both the SFRs and SARs.
Requirement Class Requirement Component
ADV: Development ADV_FSP.1: Basic functional specification
AGD: Guidance documents AGD_OPE.1: Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1: Preparative procedures
ALC: Life-cycle support ALC_CMC.1: Labelling of the TOE
ALC_CMS.1: TOE CM coverage
ATE: Tests ATE_IND.1: Independent testing - conformance
AVA: Vulnerability assessment AVA_VAN.1: Vulnerability survey
Table 2 Assurance Components
5.2.1 Development (ADV)
5.2.1.1 Basic functional specification (ADV_FSP.1)
ADV_FSP.1.1d
The developer shall provide a functional specification.
ADV_FSP.1.2d
The developer shall provide a tracing from the functional specification to the SFRs.
ADV_FSP.1.1c
The functional specification shall describe the purpose and method of use for each SFR-enforcing
and SFR-supporting TSFI.
ADV_FSP.1.2c
The functional specification shall identify all parameters associated with each SFR-enforcing and
SFR-supporting TSFI.
ADV_FSP.1.3c
The functional specification shall provide rationale for the implicit categorisation of interfaces as
SFR-non-interfering.
ADV_FSP.1.4c
The tracing shall demonstrate that the SFRs trace to TSFIs in the functional specification.
ADV_FSP.1.1e
The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and
presentation of evidence.
ADV_FSP.1.2e
The evaluator shall determine that the functional specification is an accurate and complete
instantiation of the SFRs.
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5.2.2 Guidance documents (AGD)
5.2.2.1 Operational user guidance (AGD_OPE.1)
AGD_OPE.1.1d
The developer shall provide operational user guidance.
AGD_OPE.1.1c
The operational user guidance shall describe, for each user role, the user-accessible functions and
privileges that should be controlled in a secure processing environment, including appropriate
warnings.
AGD_OPE.1.2c
The operational user guidance shall describe, for each user role, how to use the available interfaces
provided by the TOE in a secure manner.
AGD_OPE.1.3c
The operational user guidance shall describe, for each user role, the available functions and
interfaces, in particular all security parameters under the control of the user, indicating secure
values as appropriate.
AGD_OPE.1.4c
The operational user guidance shall, for each user role, clearly present each type of security-
relevant event relative to the user-accessible functions that need to be performed, including
changing the security characteristics of entities under the control of the TSF.
AGD_OPE.1.5c
The operational user guidance shall identify all possible modes of operation of the TOE (including
operation following failure or operational error), their consequences and implications for
maintaining secure operation.
AGD_OPE.1.6c
The operational user guidance shall, for each user role, describe the security measures to be
followed in order to fulfil the security objectives for the operational environment as described in
the ST.
AGD_OPE.1.7c
The operational user guidance shall be clear and reasonable.
AGD_OPE.1.1e
The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and
presentation of evidence.
5.2.2.2 Preparative procedures (AGD_PRE.1)
AGD_PRE.1.1d
The developer shall provide the TOE including its preparative procedures.
AGD_PRE.1.1c
The preparative procedures shall describe all the steps necessary for secure acceptance of the
delivered TOE in accordance with the developer's delivery procedures.
AGD_PRE.1.2c
The preparative procedures shall describe all the steps necessary for secure installation of the TOE
and for the secure preparation of the operational environment in accordance with the security
objectives for the operational environment as described in the ST.
AGD_PRE.1.1e
The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and
presentation of evidence.
AGD_PRE.1.2e
The evaluator shall apply the preparative procedures to confirm that the TOE can be prepared
securely for operation.
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5.2.3 Life-cycle support (ALC)
5.2.3.1 Labelling of the TOE (ALC_CMC.1)
ALC_CMC.1.1d
The developer shall provide the TOE and a reference for the TOE.
ALC_CMC.1.1c
The TOE shall be labelled with its unique reference.
ALC_CMC.1.1e
The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and
presentation of evidence.
5.2.3.2 TOE CM coverage (ALC_CMS.1)
ALC_CMS.1.1d
The developer shall provide a configuration list for the TOE.
ALC_CMS.1.1c
The configuration list shall include the following: the TOE itself; and the evaluation evidence
required by the SARs.
ALC_CMS.1.2c
The configuration list shall uniquely identify the configuration items.
ALC_CMS.1.1e
The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and
presentation of evidence.
5.2.4 Security Target (ASE)
5.2.4.1 Security Target (ASE_TSS.1)
ASE_TSS.1.1c
Refinement: The TOE summary specification shall describe how the TOE meets each SFR,
including a proprietary Key Management Description (Appendix E), and [Entropy Essay].
5.2.5 Tests (ATE)
5.2.5.1 Independent testing - conformance (ATE_IND.1)
ATE_IND.1.1d
The developer shall provide the TOE for testing.
ATE_IND.1.1c
The TOE shall be suitable for testing.
ATE_IND.1.1e
The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and
presentation of evidence.
ATE_IND.1.2e
The evaluator shall test a subset of the TSF to confirm that the TSF operates as specified.
5.2.6 Vulnerability assessment (AVA)
5.2.6.1 Vulnerability survey (AVA_VAN.1)
AVA_VAN.1.1d
The developer shall provide the TOE for testing.
AVA_VAN.1.1c
The TOE shall be suitable for testing.
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AVA_VAN.1.1e
The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and
presentation of evidence.
AVA_VAN.1.2e
The evaluator shall perform a search of public domain sources to identify potential vulnerabilities
in the TOE.
AVA_VAN.1.3e
The evaluator shall conduct penetration testing, based on the identified potential vulnerabilities, to
determine that the TOE is resistant to attacks performed by an attacker possessing Basic attack
potential.
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6. TOE Summary Specification
This chapter describes the security functions:
- Cryptographic support
- User data protection
- Security management
- Protection of the TSF
6.1 Cryptographic support
The Cryptographic support function satisfies the following security functional requirements:
• FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_AFA_EXT.1: The TOE supports password authorization factor, and the password may
be between 15 and (up to) 511 characters in length and can be composed of all ASCII printable characters.
• FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_AFA_EXT.2: The TOE does not have any power-saving states beyond power-off.
After transitioning from the power-off state, the user must authenticate before the TOE will allow data to be
read from or written to the drive.
• FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_CKM.1(c): The TOE generates 256-bit DEKs (Master Keys) using its SHA-256
HMAC_DRBG. Because the DRBG has a security strength of 256 bits, the DEKs generated are sufficient
for the TOE’s 256-bit AES data encryption/decryption. The TOE stores these keys encrypted in dedicated
headers on the drives (in the first few megabytes of an unpartitioned, drives or at the start of each partition).
• FDEAAcPP20E/FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_CKM.4(a): When the TOE powers off (as the TOE has no other power
states other than off (G3)), all values in memory drain to a zero state.
• FDEAAcPP20E/FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_CKM.4(d): The XSR model of TOE has between 16GB and 128GB
of RAM, while the G1 model has 8GB of RAM, and this serves as the working memory in which the TOE
temporarily stores working copies of key material (for example, the Derived Key [DerKey], which is derived
from the user's password and salt using PBKDFv2 and the Master Keys (DEKs) currently in use (if any). The
TOE clears keys from memory by a removal of power.
Additionally, the TOE stores encrypted DEKs in a header for the encrypted drive partitions. The TOE’s
RHEL operating system supports SATA interface drives that support block addressing. The TOE clears these
keys through an internal call using the CRYPT_WIPE_RANDOM pattern, which draws random data from
the TOE's HMAC_DRBG.
• FDEAAcPP20E/FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_CKM_EXT.4(a): The TOE clears the DerKey and DEKs from
userspace memory immediately after the operation for which it is needed, while DEKs will be held in kernel
memory while the drive is accessible. If the user logs out, then the TOE will clear any in-use DEKs from
kernel memory.
• FDEAAcPP20E/FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_CKM_EXT.4(b): The TOE has no Compliant power saving states
other than power off (G3).
• FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_CKM_EXT.6: The TOE clears its keys in accordance with FCS_CKM.4(d).
• FCS_COP.1: The TOE performs cryptographic algorithms in accordance with the following NIST standards
and has received the following CAVP algorithm certificates.
The TOE uses its Galleon Embedded Computing Software Encryption Layer cryptographic implementation (version
1.0 for RHEL 8.4) to support all of its FDE functionality.
SFR Algorithm NIST Standard Cert#
FCS_COP.1(a) (Verify) ECDSA P-384 w/ SHA-384 Verify FIPS 186-4, ECDSA A2477
FCS_COP.1(b) (Hash) SHA-256/384 Hashing FIPS 180-4 A2477
FCS_COP.1(c) (Keyed Hash) HMAC-SHA-256/384 FIPS 198-1 & 180-4 A2477
FCS_COP.1(f)(g) (AES) AES-256 CBC/XTS Encrypt/Decrypt FIPS 197 A2477
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SFR Algorithm NIST Standard Cert#
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 (Random) SHA-256 HMAC_DRBG SP 800-90A A2477
Table 3 GEC SW Encryption Layer Cryptographic Algorithms
• FDEAAcPP20E/FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_COP.1(a): The TOE utilizes ECDSA P-384 w/ SHA-384 signatures
to verify the authenticity of firmware updates. Upon receiving a candidate update and the accompanying
signature file, the TOE uses the vendor’s public key (see FPT_TUD_EXT.1 below) to verify the ECDSA
signature against the received RPM. The verification uses SHA-384 and follows the FIPS 186-4 ECDSA
format.
• FDEAAcPP20E/FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_COP.1(b): The TOE's cryptographic library provides the SHA-256
and SHA-384 algorithms and uses those algorithms as for its RBG and for PBKDFv2 password-based key
derivation, respectively. The TOE’s cryptographic library (against which RPM links) also provides the SHA-
384 hashing algorithm used to verify signatures during trusted updates.
• FDEAAcPP20E/FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_COP.1(c): The TOE implements HMAC-SHA-256 and HMAC-
SHA-384 using 256-bit keys, the SHA-256 or SHA-384 hash algorithm, a 512-bit or 1024-bit block size, and
an output MAC length of 256 and 384 bits. The TOE uses HMAC-SHA-256 in its DRBG, and it uses
HMAC-SHA-384 as part of all PBKDF (NIST SP 800-132) key management operations.
• FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_COP.1(f): The TOE uses an AES XTS cryptographic implementation dedicated to
drive encryption/decryption. This implementation uses AES- 256 bit keys.
• FDEAAcPP20E/FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_COP.1(g): The TOE has an AES CBC implementation used for key
managements operations (decryption of the encrypted DEKs). This implementation uses AES- 256 bit keys.
• FDEAAcPP20E/FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_KDF_EXT.1: The TOE uses 800-132 (PBKDFv2) with HMAC-
SHA-384 and a number of iterations and a 256 bit salt to transform the operator's password into a Derived
Key for decrypting the encrypted DEKs. The number of iterations is determined by the specified number of
milliseconds (2000 milliseconds) multiplied by the number of PBKDF operations per/second to achieve a
delay specified by the administrator. The TOE has an empirically determined benchmark for PBKDF2 of
573,619 and 1,696,724 iterations per second for a 256-bit key, and thus the TOE uses a count between ~1.1
million to ~3.4 million iterations to achieve a 2 second delay across different CPUs.
• FDEAAcPP20E/FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_KYC_EXT.1/2: The TOE uses PBKDFv2 to transform the operator's
password into a 256-bit BEV, and then uses that BEV to AES decrypt the DEKs stored in the header(s) stored
on the drive.
• FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_PCC_EXT.1: The TOE allows passwords up to 511 characters in length, and the TOE
allows uppercase/lowercase letters, numbers, and ASCII printable characters. The TOE will truncate any
password longer than 511 characters to the first 511 characters entered. The TOE will reject a password
containing other characters. The TOE conditions passwords by combining them with a 256-bit salt using
PBKDFv2.
• FDEAAcPP20E/FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_RBG_EXT.1: The TOE includes an SHA-256 HMAC_DRBG that it
seeds with at least 256-bits of entropy from two software-based noise sources.
• FDEAAcPP20E/FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_SNI_EXT.1: The TOE generates its salts and AES-CBC IVs using its
SHA-256 HMAC_DRBG. The TOE generates no nonces but generates it 256-bit AES XTS tweaks (used for
data partition encryption) also using its HMAC_DRBG.
• FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_VAL_EXT.1: The TOE validates the operator's password by first subjecting the
password and salt to PBKDFv2 to form the Derived Key (DerKey). The TOE uses the DerKey to decrypt the
masterKey stripes and reconstitutes the masterKey; however, before using the masterKey, the TOE first
performs iterative HMAC-SHA-256 using the operator's password, the masterKey salt, masterKey iterations,
and masterKey as inputs, and then compares the resulting value to the stored masterKey's digest stored in the
header to ensure the two match.
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The TOE uses a counter to track consecutive failed authentication attempts and if the TOE detects more than
three, consecutive, incorrect passwords, then the TOE will delay any further authentication attempts for a
period of one minute.
6.2 User data protection
The User data protection function satisfies the following security functional requirements:
• FDEEEcPP20E:FDP_DSK_EXT.1: The TOE provides FDE that encrypts the entirety of the drive or drive
partitions through AES-XTS block based encryption. The Admin Guide describes the TOE’s initialization
process and setup for the SW-layer. The TOE maintains a separate, unencrypted, system drive where the
RHEL-operating system resides. That system drive contains no user/NAS data, as the TOE stores all
user/NAS data on the RMC drives that the TOE encrypts. When the administrator configure an RMC drive
for use, the TOE encrypts the entire drive (with a small area reserved for the Linux Unified Key Setup
(LUKS) header).
6.3 Security management
The Security management function satisfies the following security functional requirements:
• FDEAAcPP20E:FMT_MOF.1: The TOE claims no Compliant power saving states beyond power off. Only
the authorized administrator can issue the shutdown command.
• FDEAAcPP20E/FDEEEcPP20E:FMT_SMF.1: The TOE provides each of the required management services
with no additional ones. Because the TOE fulfills the AA and EE requirements together, the TOE need not
“forward” requests to change the DEK or cryptographically erase the DEK. The TOE supports changing of
the authorization factors (the administrator can remove a partition and recreate it to change the associated
password). The Admin Guide describes updating the TOE’s software through loading and installation of an
RPM update (the TOE relies upon RHEL OS to verify the signature, and (if the signature verifies
successfully) install the RPM update). The TOE does not provide any manageable power-saving states.
• FDEAAcPP20E:FMT_SMR.1 – The TOE’s RHEL OS maintains an administer role that can administer the
TOE.
6.4 Protection of the TSF
The Protection of the TSF function satisfies the following security functional requirements:
• FDEAAcPP20E/FDEEEcPP20E:FPT_KYP_EXT.1: The TOE stores encrypted DEKs in the header of each
drive partition.
• FDEAAcPP20E/FDEEEcPP20E:FPT_PWR_EXT.1/2: The TOE provides the compliant power-saving state
power-off and G3, mechanical off. The TOE enters this state when the operator shuts off the device. The
TOE must be fully rebooted from this state.
• FDEAAcPP20E/FDEEEcPP20E:FPT_TST_EXT.1: The TOE includes the following power-up Known
Answer Tests (KATs) to ensure that each of its cryptographic algorithms operates correctly.
- ECDSA verify test
- SHA-256/384 hashing tests
- HMAC-SHA tests
- AES-256 CBC/XTS encrypt/decrypt test
- SHA-256 HMAC_DRBG test
There are no non-cryptographic functions that affect the correct operation of the TSF.
• FDEAAcPP20E/FDEEEcPP20E:FPT_TUD_EXT.1: The TOE can display its current software version
(queried using cat /etc/galleon/sw-version) and an administrator can update the TOE software using signed
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RPM update files. The TOE’s RHEL OS will verify the signature on the RPM software update files (using
its cryptographic library in conjunction with the Galleon’s public key, previously loaded by the RHEL
administrator and stored in the RPM database in /var/lib/rpm, to verify the ECDSA P-384 with SHA-384
signature) before installing it, and will reject any update with an invalid signature. The TOE relies upon the
RHEL operating system protections for RPM updates, namely that only root can read or write any files and
databases in the /var/lib/rpm directory, and thus, only the RHEL root administrator has the ability to access,
update, or remove the public keys used to verify RPMs during installation. Only Galleon can sign TOE RPM
updates (as Galleon is the only authorized source possessing the Galleon private signing key) and RHEL
automatically verifies RPM signature by using the pre-installed gec-install-signed-update utility and will not
install the update package if the embedded digital signature in the update cannot be verified.