National Information Assurance Partnership
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
Validation Report
Galleon Embedded Computing AS
Embedded Computing XSR and G1 Software
Encryption Layer
Report Number: CCEVS-VR-11273-2022
Dated: July 28, 2022
Version: 1.0
National Institute of Standards and Technology Department of Defense
Information Technology Laboratory ATTN: NIAP, Suite 6982
100 Bureau Drive 9800 Savage Road
Gaithersburg, MD 20899 Fort Meade, MD 20755-6982
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Validation Team
Jenn Dotson
Sheldon Durrant
Lisa Mitchell
Clare Parran
Chris Thorpe
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
Kevin Cummins
Douglas Kalmus
Allison Keenan
John Messiha
Gossamer Security Solutions, Inc.
Columbia, MD
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Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary.................................................................................................... 1
2 Identification............................................................................................................... 2
3 Assumptions & Clarification of Scope ....................................................................... 4
4 Architectural Information ........................................................................................... 5
4.1 TOE Evaluated Platforms ................................................................................... 5
4.2 TOE Architecture................................................................................................ 5
4.3 Physical Boundaries............................................................................................ 6
5 Security Policy............................................................................................................ 7
5.1 Cryptographic support ........................................................................................ 7
5.2 User data protection ............................................................................................ 7
5.3 Security management.......................................................................................... 7
5.4 Protection of the TSF.......................................................................................... 7
6 Documentation............................................................................................................ 8
7 IT Product Testing ...................................................................................................... 9
7.1 Developer Testing............................................................................................... 9
7.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing ............................................................... 9
8 Results of the Evaluation .......................................................................................... 10
8.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ASE).......................................................... 10
8.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV)............................................................ 10
8.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD) ............................................... 10
8.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC)................................... 11
8.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE) ............... 11
8.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN)....................................................... 11
8.7 Summary of Evaluation Results........................................................................ 12
9 Validator Comments/Recommendations .................................................................. 13
10 Annexes..................................................................................................................... 14
11 Security Target.......................................................................................................... 15
12 Glossary .................................................................................................................... 16
13 Bibliography ............................................................................................................. 17
List of Tables
Table 1: Evaluation Identifiers............................................................................................ 3
Table 2: Glossary.............................................................................................................. 16
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1 Executive Summary
This report documents the assessment of the National Information Assurance Partnership
(NIAP) evaluation of Galleon Embedded Computing XSR and G1 Software Encryption
Layer solution provided by Galleon Embedded Computing AS. It presents the evaluation
results, their justifications, and the conformance results. This Validation Report (VR) is not
an endorsement of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) by any agency of the U.S. government,
and no warranty is either expressed or implied.
The evaluation was performed by the Gossamer Security Solutions (Gossamer) Common
Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL) in Columbia, MD, United States of America, and was
completed in July 2022. The information in this report is largely derived from the Evaluation
Technical Report (ETR) and associated test reports, all written by Gossamer Security
Solutions. The evaluation determined that the product is both Common Criteria Part 2
Extended and Part 3 Conformant, and meets the assurance requirements of the collaborative
Protection Profile for Full Drive Encryption - Authorization Acquisition, Version 2.0 +
Errata 20190201, 01 February 2019 and the collaborative Protection Profile for Full Drive
Encryption - Encryption Engine, Version 2.0 + Errata 20190201, 01 February 2019.
The TOE is the Galleon Embedded Computing XSR and G1 Software Encryption Layer.
The TOE identified in this VR has been evaluated at a NIAP approved CCTL using the
Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev 5) for conformance to
the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev 5). This VR applies only
to the specific version of the TOE as evaluated. The evaluation has been conducted in
accordance with the provisions of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation
Scheme (CCEVS) and the conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation technical
report are consistent with the evidence provided.
The validation team monitored the activities of the evaluation team, provided guidance on
technical issues and evaluation processes, and reviewed the individual work units and
successive versions of the ETR. The validation team found that the evaluation showed that
the product satisfies all of the functional requirements and assurance requirements stated in
the Security Target (ST). Therefore, the validation team concludes that the testing
laboratory’s findings are accurate, the conclusions justified, and the conformance results are
correct. The conclusions of the testing laboratory in the ETR are consistent with the evidence
produced.
The technical information included in this report was obtained from the Galleon Embedded
Computing XSR and G1 Software Encryption Layer Security Target, version 1.5, July 14,
2022 and analysis performed by the validation team.
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2 Identification
The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST) effort to establish commercial facilities to perform trusted product
evaluations. Under this program, security evaluations are conducted by commercial testing
laboratories called Common Criteria Testing Laboratories (CCTLs) using the Common
Evaluation Methodology (CEM) in accordance with National Voluntary Laboratory
Assessment Program (NVLAP) accreditation.
The NIAP Validation Body assigns Validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality and
consistency across evaluations. Developers of information technology products desiring a
security evaluation contract with a CCTL and pay a fee for their product’s evaluation. Upon
successful completion of the evaluation, the product is added to NIAP’s Validated Products
List.
Table 1 provides information needed to completely identify the product, including:
• The TOE: the fully qualified identifier of the product as evaluated.
• The ST, describing the security features, claims, and assurances of the product.
• The conformance result of the evaluation.
• The Protection Profile to which the product is conformant.
• The organizations and individuals participating in the evaluation.
Item Identifier
Evaluation Scheme United States NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
TOE Galleon Embedded Computing XSR and G1 Software Encryption Layer
(Specific models identified in Section 4.1)
Protection Profile collaborative Protection Profile for Full Drive Encryption - Authorization
Acquisition, Version 2.0 + Errata 20190201, 01 February 2019 and collaborative
Protection Profile for Full Drive Encryption - Encryption Engine, Version 2.0 +
Errata 20190201, 01 February 2019
ST Galleon Embedded Computing XSR and G1 Software Encryption Layer Security
Target, version 1.5, July 14, 2022
Evaluation Technical
Report
Evaluation Technical Report for Galleon Embedded Computing XSR and G1
Software Encryption Layer, Version 0.4, July 14, 2022
CC Version Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
rev 5
Conformance Result CC Part 2 extended, CC Part 3 conformant
Sponsor Galleon Embedded Computing AS
Developer Galleon Embedded Computing AS
Common Criteria
Testing Lab (CCTL)
Gossamer Security Solutions, Inc.
Columbia, MD
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Item Identifier
CCEVS Validators Jenn Dotson, Sheldon Durrant, Lisa Mitchell, Clare Parran, Chris Thorpe
Table 1: Evaluation Identifiers
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3 Assumptions & Clarification of Scope
Assumptions
The Security Problem Definition, including the assumptions, may be found in the following
documents:
• collaborative Protection Profile for Full Drive Encryption - Authorization
Acquisition, Version 2.0 + Errata 20190201, 01 February 2019
• collaborative Protection Profile for Full Drive Encryption - Encryption Engine,
Version 2.0 + Errata 20190201, 01 February 2019
That information has not been reproduced here and the
CPP_FDE_AA_V2.0E/CPP_FDE_EE_V2.0E should be consulted if there is interest in that
material.
Clarification of scope
The scope of this evaluation was limited to the functionality and assurances covered in the
CPP_FDE_AA_V2.0E/CPP_FDE_EE_V2.0E and applicable Technical Decisions as
described for this TOE in the ST. Other functionality included in the product was not assessed
as part of this evaluation. All other functionality provided by the devices needs to be assessed
separately, and no further conclusions can be drawn about their effectiveness.
All evaluations (and all products) have limitations, as well as potential misconceptions that
need clarification. This text covers some of the more important limitations and clarifications
of this evaluation. Note that:
• As with any evaluation, this evaluation only shows that the evaluated configuration
meets the security claims made with a certain level of assurance (the assurance
activities specified in the Full Drive Encryption Protection Profiles and performed by
the evaluation team).
• This evaluation covers only the specific device models and software as identified in
this document, and not any earlier or later versions released or in process.
• Apart from the Admin Guide, additional customer documentation for the specific Full
Drive Encryption models was not included in the scope of the evaluation and
therefore should not to be relied upon when configuring or operating the device as
evaluated.
• This evaluation did not specifically search for, nor attempt to exploit, vulnerabilities
that were not “obvious” or vulnerabilities to objectives not claimed in the ST. The
CEM defines an “obvious” vulnerability as one that is easily exploited with a
minimum of understanding of the TOE, technical sophistication and resources.
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4 Architectural Information
Note: The following architectural description is based on the description presented in the ST.
The TOE is the Galleon Embedded Computing XSR and G1 Software Encryption Layer.
The TOE provides software Full Drive Encryption of removable drives and can be installed
on Galleon’s XSR or G1 models. All models use Intel 64-bit CPUs, and Galleon offers the
G1 with a single CPU model while offering the XSR with a range of CPUs to allow
customers to tailor the system to their needs.
The XSR and G1 (hereafter referred to as the Products) can act in multiple different
capacities (Network Attached Storage [NAS], data recorder, general server, etc.) and allow
for encryption of the Removable Data Module (RDM) attached to the system. The XSR
model supports encryption of one RDM (at a time), up to 4 internal SSDs, and its internal,
non-removable mSATA SSD. The G1 model also supports encryption of one RDM (at a
time) and up to 2 internal SSDs. Both securely encrypt all user data stored within either
model.
The Products run the Red Hat Enterprise Linux (RHEL) Release 8.4 operating system. The
Products provide a software-based Full Disk Encryption (FDE) of the removable drive
within each RDM. In addition to the software-based FDE layer, the TOE also provides a
hardware-based Full Drive Encryption (FDE) layer to encrypt the drive within each RDM.
The hardware-based FDE layer is addressed in a separate evaluation.
The TOE, whether operating as a NAS or a more general server, supports encrypting the
data of additional software running on the TOE’s operating system. The TOE might
include software to support protocols including CIFS and NFS or might include the
vendor’s data recording software or even include customer provided software applications.
The RHEL administrator can enable, disable, or install additional (accessing the system
directly) desired protocols and software applications to support their use-case and
application.
4.1 TOE Evaluated Platforms
The following table summarizes the CPU options available (bold denotes the models used
during evaluation testing, while italics denotes equivalent models).
Model Processor
XSR Intel Xeon E3-1505Lv6 (Kaby Lake)
XSR Intel Xeon E3-1505Mv6 (Kaby Lake)
XSR Intel Xeon E-2276ME (Coffee Lake)
XSR Intel Xeon E-2276ML (Coffee Lake)
G1 Intel Atom C2758 (Rangeley)
4.2 TOE Architecture
The TOE provides a software Full Drive Encryption solution that can encrypt a Removable
Data Module (RDM) which contain a data drive within as well as additional internal SSDs.
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4.3 Physical Boundaries
The TOE’s physical boundary is the physical perimeter of its enclosure. The TOE provides
a ruggedized solution to secure Data at Rest (DAR).
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5 Security Policy
This section summaries the security functionality of the TOE:
1. Cryptographic support
2. User data protection
3. Security management
4. Protection of the TSF
5.1 Cryptographic support
The TOE includes cryptographic functionality for key management, user authentication, and
block-based encryption including: symmetric key generation, encryption/decryption,
cryptographic hashing, keyed-hash message authentication, and password-based key
derivation. These functions are supported with suitable random bit generation, key
derivation, salt generation, initialization vector generation, secure key storage, and key
destruction. These primitive cryptographic functions are used to encrypt Data-At-Rest
(including the generation and protection of keys and key encryption keys) used by the TOE.
5.2 User data protection
The TOE performs Full Drive Encryption on all partitions on the drive (so that no plaintext
exists) and does so without user intervention.
5.3 Security management
The TOE provides each of the required management services to manage the full drive
encryption using a command line interface.
5.4 Protection of the TSF
The TOE implements a number of features to protect itself to ensure the reliability and
integrity of its security features. It protects key and key material and includes functions to
perform self-tests and software/firmware integrity checking so that it might detect when it is
failing or may be corrupt. If any of the self-tests fail, the TOE will not go into an operational
mode.
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6 Documentation
The following documents were available with the TOE for evaluation:
• SW Encryption Layer Certifiable Encryption, Version 1.0.7, July 14, 2022
Any additional customer documentation provided with the product, or that is available
online was not included in the scope of the evaluation and therefore should not to be relied
upon when configuring or operating the device as evaluated.
To use the product in the evaluated configuration, the product must be configured as
specified in the Guidance Documentation listed above. Consumers are encouraged to
download the configuration guides from the NIAP website to ensure the device is
configured as evaluated.
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7 IT Product Testing
This section describes the testing efforts of the developer and the evaluation team. It is
derived from information contained in the proprietary Detailed Test Report for Galleon
Embedded Computing XSR and G1 Software Encryption Layer, Version 0.4, July 14, 2022
(DTR), as summarized in the evaluation Assurance Activity Report (AAR).
7.1 Developer Testing
No evidence of developer testing is required in the assurance activities for this product.
7.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing
The evaluation team verified the product according to a Common Criteria Certification
document and ran the tests specified in the CPP_FDE_AA_V2.0E/CPP_FDE_EE_V2.0E
including the tests associated with optional requirements. The DTR, in Section 2, lists the
tested devices, provides a list of test tools, and has diagrams of the test environment.
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8 Results of the Evaluation
The results of the assurance requirements are generally described in this section and are
presented in detail in the proprietary ETR. The reader of this document can assume that all
assurance activities and work units received a passing verdict.
A verdict for an assurance component is determined by the resulting verdicts assigned to the
corresponding evaluator action elements. The evaluation was conducted based upon CC
version 3.1 rev 5 and CEM version 3.1 rev 5. The evaluation determined the Embedded
Computing XSR and G1 Software Encryption Layer TOE to be Part 2 extended, and to meet
the SARs contained in the CPP_FDE_AA_V2.0E/CPP_FDE_EE_V2.0E.
8.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ASE)
The evaluation team applied each ASE CEM work unit. The ST evaluation ensured the ST
contains a description of the environment in terms of policies and assumptions, a statement
of security requirements claimed to be met by the Galleon Embedded Computing XSR and
G1 Software Encryption Layer products that are consistent with the Common Criteria, and
product security function descriptions that support the requirements.
The validation team reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient
evidence and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation
was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion
reached by the evaluation team was justified.
8.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV)
The evaluation team applied each ADV CEM work unit. The evaluation team assessed the
design documentation and found it adequate to aid in understanding how the TSF provides
the security functions. The design documentation consists of a functional specification
contained in the ST and Guidance document. Additionally, the evaluator performed the
assurance activities specified in the CPP_FDE_AA_V2.0E/ CPP_FDE_EE_V2.0E related to
the examination of the information contained in the TSS.
The validation team reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient
evidence and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation
was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion
reached by the evaluation team was justified.
8.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD)
The evaluation team applied each AGD CEM work unit. The evaluation team ensured the
adequacy of the user guidance in describing how to use the operational TOE. Additionally,
the evaluation team ensured the adequacy of the administrator guidance in describing how
to securely administer the TOE. All of the guides were assessed during the design and testing
phases of the evaluation to ensure they were complete.
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The validation team reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient
evidence and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation
was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion
reached by the evaluation team was justified.
8.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC)
The evaluation team applied each ALC CEM work unit. The evaluation team found that the
TOE was identified.
The validation team reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient
evidence and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation
was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion
reached by the evaluation team was justified.
8.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE)
The evaluation team applied each ATE CEM work unit. The evaluation team ran the set of
tests specified by the assurance activities in the CPP_FDE_AA_V2.0E/
CPP_FDE_EE_V2.0E and recorded the results in the DTR, summarized in the AAR.
The validation team reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient
evidence and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation
was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion
reached by the evaluation team was justified.
8.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN)
The evaluation team applied each AVA CEM work unit. The vulnerability analysis is in the
DTR prepared by the evaluation team. The vulnerability analysis includes a public search
for vulnerabilities. The public search for vulnerabilities did not uncover any residual
vulnerability.
The evaluation team searched the following databases:
• National Vulnerability Database (https://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/search)
• Vulnerability Notes Database (http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/)
The search was performed on 7/12/2022. The search was conducted with the following
search terms: "disk encryption", "drive encryption", "key destruction", "key sanitization",
"Password caching", "Key caching", "Galleon", "G1", "XSR", "Intel Atom CPU C2758",
"Intel Xeon CPU E3-1505L v6", "Opal management software", "SED management
software", "LUKS", "Linux Unified Key Setup", "kernel cryptography", "openssl",
"libcrypt", "RHEL 8.4", "Intel Xeon E3-1505Mv6", "Intel Xeon E-2276ME", "Intel Xeon
E-2276ML".
The validation team reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient
evidence and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation
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was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion
reached by the evaluation team was justified.
8.7 Summary of Evaluation Results
The evaluation team’s assessment of the evaluation evidence demonstrates that the claims in
the ST are met. Additionally, the evaluation team’s testing also demonstrated the accuracy
of the claims in the ST.
The validation team’s assessment of the evidence provided by the evaluation team is that it
demonstrates that the evaluation team followed the procedures defined in the CEM, and
correctly verified that the product meets the claims in the ST.
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9 Validator Comments/Recommendations
The validation team notes that the evaluated configuration is dependent upon the TOE
being configured per the evaluated configuration instructions in the SW Encryption Layer
Certfiable Encryption, 1.0.7, July 14, 2022. No other versions of the TOE and software,
either earlier or later were evaluated.
Please note that the functionality evaluated is scoped exclusively to the security functional
requirements specified in the ST. Other functionality included in the product was not
assessed as part of this evaluation. All other functionality provided by devices in the
operational environment, would need to be assessed separately and no further conclusions
can be drawn about their effectiveness.
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10 Annexes
Not applicable
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11 Security Target
The ST is identified as: Galleon Embedded Computing XSR and G1 Software Encryption
Layer Security Target, Version 1.5, July 14, 2022.
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12 Glossary
The following definitions are used throughout this document:
Term Definition
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
(CCTL)
An IT security evaluation facility accredited by
the National Voluntary Laboratory
Accreditation Program (NVLAP) and approved
by the CCEVS Validation Body to conduct
Common Criteria-based evaluations.
Conformance The ability to demonstrate in an unambiguous
way that a given implementation is correct with
respect to the formal model.
Evaluation The assessment of an IT product against the
Common Criteria using the Common Criteria
Evaluation Methodology to determine whether
or not the claims made are justified; or the
assessment of a protection profile against the
Common Criteria using the Common
Evaluation Methodology to determine if the
Profile is complete, consistent, technically
sound and hence suitable for use as a statement
of requirements for one or more TOEs that may
be evaluated.
Evaluation Evidence Any tangible resource (information) required
from the sponsor or developer by the evaluator
to perform one or more evaluation activities.
Feature Part of a product that is either included with the
product or can be ordered separately.
Target of Evaluation (TOE) A group of IT products configured as an IT
system, or an IT product, and associated
documentation that is the subject of a security
evaluation under the CC.
Validation The process carried out by the CCEVS
Validation Body leading to the issue of a
Common Criteria certificate.
Validation Body A governmental organization responsible for
carrying out validation and for overseeing the
day-to-day operation of the NIAP Common
Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme.
Table 2: Glossary
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13 Bibliography
The Validation Team used the following documents to produce this Validation Report:
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation: Part 1:
Introduction and General Model, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.
[2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security
functional components, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.
[3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security
assurance components, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.
[4] collaborative Protection Profile for Full Drive Encryption - Authorization
Acquisition, Version 2.0 + Errata 20190201, 01 February 2019
[5] collaborative Protection Profile for Full Drive Encryption - Encryption Engine,
Version 2.0 + Errata 20190201, 01 February 2019.
[6] Galleon Embedded Computing XSR and G1 Software Encryption Layer Security
Target, Version 1.5, July 14, 2022 (ST).
[7] Assurance Activity Report for Galleon Embedded Computing XSR and G1 Software
Encryption Layer, Version 0.4, July 14, 2022 (AAR).
[8] Detailed Test Report for Galleon Embedded Computing XSR and G1 Software
Encryption Layer, Version 0.4, July 14, 2022 (DTR).
[9] Evaluation Technical Report for Galleon Embedded Computing XSR and G1
Software Encryption Layer, Version 0.4, July 14, 2022 (ETR)
[10] SW Encryption Layer Certfiable Encryption, 1.0.7, July 14, 2022 (AGD)