National Information Assurance Partnership
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
Validation Report
FortiGate/FortiOS 7.2
Report Number: CCEVS-VR-VID11562-2025
Dated: October 09, 2025
Version: 1.0
National Institute of Standards and Technology Department of Defense
Information Technology Laboratory ATTN: NIAP, SUITE: 6982
100 Bureau Drive 9800 Savage Road
Gaithersburg, MD 20899 Fort Meade, MD 20755-6982
®
TM
FortiGate/FortiOS 7.2 Validation Report Version 1.0 October 09, 2025
ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Validation Team
Linda Morrison
Lisa Mitchell
Jenn Dotson
Lori Sarem
Randy Heimann
The MITRE Corporation
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
Sean Bennett
Nil Folquer
Brandon Solberg
Nathan Bennett
Lightship Security USA, Inc.
FortiGate/FortiOS 7.2 Validation Report Version 1.0 October 09, 2025
iii
Table of Contents
1. Executive Summary.................................................................................................... 1
2. Identification............................................................................................................... 2
3. Architectural Information ........................................................................................... 4
3.1. TOE Evaluated Configuration ........................................................................ 4
3.2. Physical Boundary .......................................................................................... 4
3.3. Required Non-TOE Hardware, Software, and Firmware ............................. 16
4. Security Policy.......................................................................................................... 18
4.1. Security Audit............................................................................................... 18
4.2. Cryptographic Support.................................................................................. 18
4.3. User Data Protection..................................................................................... 18
4.4. Stateful Traffic & Packet Filtering ............................................................... 18
4.5. Identification and Authentication ................................................................. 18
4.6. Security Management ................................................................................... 18
4.7. Protection of the TSF.................................................................................... 18
4.8. TOE Access .................................................................................................. 19
4.9. Trusted Path/Channels .................................................................................. 19
5. Assumptions.............................................................................................................. 20
6. Clarification of Scope ............................................................................................... 22
7. Documentation.......................................................................................................... 23
8. IT Product Testing .................................................................................................... 24
8.1. Developer Testing......................................................................................... 24
8.2. Evaluation Team Independent Testing ......................................................... 24
8.3. Evaluated Configuration............................................................................... 24
8.4. Excluded Functionality................................................................................. 27
9. Results of the Evaluation .......................................................................................... 29
9.1. Evaluation of Security Target (ASE)............................................................ 29
9.2. Evaluation of Development Documentation (ADV) .................................... 29
9.3. Evaluation of Guidance Documents (AGD)................................................. 29
9.4. Evaluation of Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC)..................................... 30
9.5. Evaluation of Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE) ................. 30
9.6. Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN)................................................... 30
FortiGate/FortiOS 7.2 Validation Report Version 1.0 October 09, 2025
iv
9.7. Summary of Evaluation Results.................................................................... 31
10. Validator Comments................................................................................................. 32
11. Annexes..................................................................................................................... 33
12. Security Target.......................................................................................................... 34
13. Glossary .................................................................................................................... 35
14. Acronym List ............................................................................................................ 36
15. Bibliography ............................................................................................................. 37
List of Tables
Table 1: Evaluation Identifiers............................................................................................ 2
Table 2: Assumptions (CPP_ND)..................................................................................... 20
Table 3: Assumptions (MOD_VPNGW).......................................................................... 21
Table 4: Tools Used for Testing ....................................................................................... 25
FortiGate/FortiOS 7.2 Validation Report Version 1.0 October 09, 2025
1
1. Executive Summary
This report documents the assessment of the National Information Assurance Partnership
(NIAP) validation team of the evaluation of FortiGate/FortiOS 7.2 provided by Fortinet,
Inc. It presents the evaluation results, their justifications, and the conformance results. This
Validation Report (VR) is not an endorsement of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) by any
agency of the U.S. government, and no warranty is either expressed or implied.
The evaluation was performed by the Lightship Security USA Common Criteria
Laboratory (CCTL) in Baltimore, MD, United States of America, and was completed in
October 2025. The information in this report is largely derived from the Evaluation
Technical Report (ETR) and associated test reports, all written by Lightship Security (LS).
The evaluation determined that the product is both Common Criteria Part 2 Extended and
Part 3 Conformant and meets the assurance requirements of the PP-Configuration for
Network Devices, Stateful Traffic Filter Firewalls, and Virtual Private Network Gateways,
Version 2.0 and the Functional Package for Secure Shell (SSH), Version 1.0.
The TOE is FortiGate/FortiOS 7.2. The TOE identified in this VR has been evaluated at a
NIAP approved CCTL using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation
(Version 3.1, Rev 5) for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
(Version 3.1, Rev 5). This VR applies only to the specific version of the TOE as evaluated.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the NIAP
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme (CCEVS) and the conclusions of the
testing laboratory in the ETR are consistent with the evidence provided.
The validation team monitored the activities of the evaluation team, provided guidance on
technical issues and evaluation processes, and reviewed the individual work units and
successive versions of the ETR. The validation team found that the evaluation showed that
the product satisfies all of the functional requirements and assurance requirements stated
in the Security Target (ST). The validation team concludes that the testing laboratory’s
findings are accurate, the conclusions justified, and the conformance results are correct.
The conclusions of the testing laboratory in the ETR are consistent with the evidence
produced.
The technical information included in this report was obtained from the Security Target
and analysis performed by the validation team.
FortiGate/FortiOS 7.2 Validation Report Version 1.0 October 09, 2025
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2. Identification
The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST) effort to establish commercial facilities to perform trusted product
evaluations. Under this program, security evaluations are conducted by commercial testing
laboratories called Common Criteria Testing Laboratories (CCTLs) using the Common
Evaluation Methodology (CEM) in accordance with National Voluntary Laboratory
Assessment Program (NVLAP) accreditation.
The NIAP Validation Body assigns Validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality and
consistency across evaluations. Developers of information technology products desiring a
security evaluation contract with a CCTL and pay a fee for their product’s evaluation. Upon
successful completion of the evaluation, the product is added to NIAP’s Validated Products
List.
Table 1 provides information needed to completely identify the product, including:
• The TOE: the fully qualified identifier of the product as evaluated.
• The ST, describing the security features, claims, and assurances of the product.
• The conformance result of the evaluation.
• The Protection Profile to which the product is conformant.
• The organizations and individuals participating in the evaluation.
Table 1: Evaluation Identifiers
Item Identifier
Evaluation Scheme
United States NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation
Scheme
Evaluated Product FortiGate/FortiOS 7.2
Sponsor and Developer
Fortinet, Inc.
899 Kifer Road
Sunnyvale, CA 94086
CCTL
Lightship Security USA, Inc.
3600 O’Donnell St., Suite 2
Baltimore, MD 21224
CC Version
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.
CEM
Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation: Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Revision 5,
April 2017.
FortiGate/FortiOS 7.2 Validation Report Version 1.0 October 09, 2025
3
Item Identifier
Protection Profile
PP-Configuration for Network Devices, Stateful Traffic Filter
Firewalls, and Virtual Private Network Gateways, Version 2.0
(CFG_NDcPP-FW-VPNGW_V2.0) This PP-Configuration
includes the following components:
i) Base-PP: collaborative Protection Profile for
Network Devices, Version 3.0e (CPP_ND_V3.0E)
ii) PP-Module: PP-Module for Stateful Traffic Filter
Firewalls, Version 1.4e (MOD_CPP_FW_V1.4E)
iii) PP-Module: PP-Module for VPN Gateways, Version
1.3 (MOD_VPNGW_V1.3)
Functional Package for Secure Shell (SSH), Version 1.0
(PKG_SSH_V1.0)
ST FortiGate/FortiOS 7.2 Security Target, v1.5, October 2025
Evaluation Technical
Report
FortiGate/FortiOS 7.2 Evaluation Technical Report, v1.3,
October 2025
Conformance Result CC Part 2 extended, CC Part 3 conformant
Evaluation Personnel Sean Bennett, Nil Folquer, Brandon Solberg, Nathan Bennett
CCEVS Validators The MITRE Corporation
FortiGate/FortiOS 7.2 Validation Report Version 1.0 October 09, 2025
4
3. Architectural Information
Note: The following architectural description is based on the description presented in the
Security Target.
FortiGate next-generation firewall (NGFW) appliances running FortiOS software are
designed to provide high performance, multilayered security functionality and allows for
granular visibility and protection of enterprise network traffic.
3.1. TOE Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is FortiGate/FortiOS 7.2 Version 7.2.8 (FIPS-CC-72-5) running on a physical
device. The physical devices are listed in Section 3.2.
The TOE contains the following logical interfaces:
• CLI. Administrative CLI via direct serial connection or SSH.
• GUI. Administrative web GUI via HTTPS.
• Remote Logging. Forwarding of TOE audit events to a remote audit server, which
is a Fortinet FortiAnalyzer, via TLS.
• CRL. Certificate revocation communication via HTTP.
• NTP Server. Time synchronization via NTP.
• VPN Gateway. VPN connections via IPsec.
• WAN/Internet. External IP interface.
• LAN/Internal. Internal IP interface.
3.2. Physical Boundary
The physical boundary of the TOE includes the FortiGate hardware models shown in Table
2 running FortiOS software identified in Table 1 of the ST.
Table 2: TOE Hardware Models
Mode
l
CPU Architect
ure
RAM Stora
ge
ASIC Entro
py
ES
V
ASI
C
CAV
P
Forti
OS
FIPS
CAVP
Forti
OS
SSL
CAVP
FG-
40F
Fortin
et
SoC4
ARMv8 2 GB N/A CP9XL
ite
JitterE
nt
E13
9
A22
42
A664
1
A664
3
FG-
40F-
3G4G
Fortin
et
SoC4
ARMv8 2 GB N/A CP9XL
ite
JitterE
nt
E13
9
A22
42
A664
1
A664
3
FortiGate/FortiOS 7.2 Validation Report Version 1.0 October 09, 2025
5
Mode
l
CPU Architect
ure
RAM Stora
ge
ASIC Entro
py
ES
V
ASI
C
CAV
P
Forti
OS
FIPS
CAVP
Forti
OS
SSL
CAVP
FWF-
40F
Fortin
et
SoC4
ARMv8 2 GB N/A CP9XL
ite
JitterE
nt
E13
9
A22
42
A664
1
A664
3
FWF-
40F-
3G4G
Fortin
et
SoC4
ARMv8 2 GB N/A CP9XL
ite
JitterE
nt
E13
9
A22
42
A664
1
A664
3
FG-
60E
Fortin
et
SoC3
ARMv7-A 2 GB N/A CP9Lit
e
JitterE
nt
E13
9
A22
41
A664
1
A664
3
FG-
60E-
PoE
Fortin
et
SoC3
ARMv7-A 2 GB N/A CP9Lit
e
JitterE
nt
E13
9
A22
41
A664
1
A664
3
FG-
60E-
DSL
Fortin
et
SoC3
ARMv7-A 2 GB N/A CP9Lit
e
JitterE
nt
E13
9
A22
41
A664
1
A664
3
FWF-
60E
Fortin
et
SoC3
ARMv7-A 2 GB N/A CP9Lit
e
JitterE
nt
E13
9
A22
41
A664
1
A664
3
FWF-
60E-
DSL
Fortin
et
SoC3
ARMv7-A 2 GB N/A CP9Lit
e
JitterE
nt
E13
9
A22
41
A664
1
A664
3
FWF-
60E-
DSLJ
Fortin
et
SoC3
ARMv7-A 2 GB N/A CP9Lit
e
JitterE
nt
E13
9
A22
41
A664
1
A664
3
FG-
60F
Fortin
et
SoC4
ARMv8 2 GB N/A CP9XL
ite
JitterE
nt
E13
9
A22
42
A664
1
A664
3
FGR-
60F-
3G4G
Fortin
et
SoC4
ARMv8 2 GB N/A CP9XL
ite
JitterE
nt
E13
9
A22
42
A664
1
A664
3
FGR-
60F
Fortin
et
SoC4
ARMv8 2 GB N/A CP9XL
ite
JitterE
nt
E13
9
A22
42
A664
1
A664
3
FWF-
60F
Fortin
et
SoC4
ARMv8 2 GB N/A CP9XL
ite
JitterE
nt
E13
9
A22
42
A664
1
A664
3
FortiGate/FortiOS 7.2 Validation Report Version 1.0 October 09, 2025
6
Mode
l
CPU Architect
ure
RAM Stora
ge
ASIC Entro
py
ES
V
ASI
C
CAV
P
Forti
OS
FIPS
CAVP
Forti
OS
SSL
CAVP
FG-
61E
Fortin
et
SoC3
ARMv7-A 2 GB 128G
B
CP9Lit
e
JitterE
nt
E13
9
A22
41
A664
1
A664
3
FWF-
61E
Fortin
et
SoC3
ARMv7-A 2 GB 128G
B
CP9Lit
e
JitterE
nt
E13
9
A22
41
A664
1
A664
3
FG-
61F
Fortin
et
SoC4
ARMv8 2 GB 128G
B
CP9XL
ite
JitterE
nt
E13
9
A22
42
A664
1
A664
3
FGR-
70F
Fortin
et
SoC4
ARMv8 4 GB N/A CP9XL
ite
JitterE
nt
E13
9
A22
42
A664
1
A664
3
FGR-
70F-
3G4G
Fortin
et
SoC4
ARMv8 4 GB N/A CP9XL
ite
JitterE
nt
E13
9
A22
42
A664
1
A664
3
FG-
70F
Fortin
et
SoC4
ARMv8 4 GB N/A CP9XL
ite
JitterE
nt
E13
9
A22
42
A664
1
A664
3
FG-
71F
Fortin
et
SoC4
ARMv8 4 GB 128G
B
CP9XL
ite
JitterE
nt
E13
9
A22
42
A664
1
A664
3
FG-
80E
Fortin
et
SoC3
ARMv7-A 2 GB N/A CP9Lit
e
JitterE
nt
E13
9
A22
41
A664
1
A664
3
FG-
80E-
PoE
Fortin
et
SoC3
ARMv7-A 2 GB N/A CP9Lit
e
JitterE
nt
E13
9
A22
41
A664
1
A664
3
FG-
80F
Fortin
et
SoC4
ARMv8 4 GB N/A CP9XL
ite
JitterE
nt
E13
9
A22
42
A664
1
A664
3
FG-
80F-
PoE
Fortin
et
SoC4
ARMv8 4 GB N/A CP9XL
ite
JitterE
nt
E13
9
A22
42
A664
1
A664
3
FWF-
80F-
2R
Fortin
et
SoC4
ARMv8 4 GB N/A CP9XL
ite
JitterE
nt
E13
9
A22
42
A664
1
A664
3
FortiGate/FortiOS 7.2 Validation Report Version 1.0 October 09, 2025
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Mode
l
CPU Architect
ure
RAM Stora
ge
ASIC Entro
py
ES
V
ASI
C
CAV
P
Forti
OS
FIPS
CAVP
Forti
OS
SSL
CAVP
FG-
81E
Fortin
et
SoC3
ARMv7-A 2 GB 128G
B
CP9Lit
e
JitterE
nt
E13
9
A22
41
A664
1
A664
3
FG-
81E-
PoE
Fortin
et
SoC3
ARMv7-A 2 GB 128G
B
CP9Lit
e
JitterE
nt
E13
9
A22
41
A664
1
A664
3
FG-
81F
Fortin
et
SoC4
ARMv8 4 GB 128G
B
CP9XL
ite
JitterE
nt
E13
9
A22
42
A664
1
A664
3
FG-
81F-
PoE
Fortin
et
SoC4
ARMv8 4 GB 128G
B
CP9XL
ite
JitterE
nt
E13
9
A22
42
A664
1
A664
3
FWF-
81F-
2R
Fortin
et
SoC4
ARMv8 4 GB 128G
B
CP9Lit
e
JitterE
nt
E13
9
A22
41
A664
1
A664
3
FWF-
81F-
2R-
3G4G
-PoE
Fortin
et
SoC4
ARMv8 4 GB 128G
B
CP9Lit
e
JitterE
nt
E13
9
A22
41
A664
1
A664
3
FWF-
81F-
2R-
PoE
Fortin
et
SoC4
ARMv8 4 GB 128G
B
CP9Lit
e
JitterE
nt
E13
9
A22
41
A664
1
A664
3
FG-
90E
Fortin
et
SoC3
ARMv7-A 2 GB N/A CP9Lit
e
JitterE
nt
E13
9
A22
41
A664
1
A664
3
FG-
91E
Fortin
et
SoC3
ARMv7-A 2 GB 128G
B
CP9Lit
e
JitterE
nt
E13
9
A22
41
A664
1
A664
3
FG-
100E
Fortin
et
SoC3
ARMv7-A 4 GB N/A CP9Lit
e
JitterE
nt
E13
9
A22
41
A664
1
A664
3
FG-
100E
F
Fortin
et
SoC3
ARMv7-A 4 GB N/A CP9Lit
e
JitterE
nt
E13
9
A22
41
A664
1
A664
3
FortiGate/FortiOS 7.2 Validation Report Version 1.0 October 09, 2025
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Mode
l
CPU Architect
ure
RAM Stora
ge
ASIC Entro
py
ES
V
ASI
C
CAV
P
Forti
OS
FIPS
CAVP
Forti
OS
SSL
CAVP
FG-
100F
Fortin
et
SoC4
ARMv8 4 GB N/A CP9XL
ite
JitterE
nt
E13
9
A22
42
A664
1
A664
3
FG-
101E
Fortin
et
SoC3
ARMv7-A 4 GB 480G
B
CP9Lit
e
JitterE
nt
E13
9
A22
41
A664
1
A664
3
FG-
101F
Fortin
et
SoC4
ARMv8 4 GB 480G
B
CP9XL
ite
JitterE
nt
E13
9
A22
42
A664
1
A664
3
FG-
140E
Fortin
et
SoC3
ARMv7-A 4 GB N/A CP9Lit
e
JitterE
nt
E13
9
A22
41
A664
1
A664
3
FG-
140E-
PoE
Fortin
et
SoC3
ARMv7-A 4 GB N/A CP9Lit
e
JitterE
nt
E13
9
A22
41
A664
1
A664
3
FG-
200E
Intel
Celer
on
G182
0
Haswell 4GB N/A CP9 JitterE
nt
E13
9
A22
40
A664
1
A664
3
FG-
200F
Intel
Xeon
D-
1627
Hewitt
Lake
8GB N/A CP9 JitterE
nt
E13
9
A22
40
A664
1
A664
3
FG-
201E
Intel
Celer
on
G182
0
Haswell 4GB 480G
B
CP9 JitterE
nt
E13
9
A22
40
A664
1
A664
3
FG-
201F
Intel
Xeon
D-
1627
Hewitt
Lake
8GB 480G
B
CP9 JitterE
nt
E13
9
A22
40
A664
1
A664
3
FG-
300E
Intel
Core
i5-
6500
SkyLake 8GB N/A CP9 JitterE
nt
E13
9
A22
40
A664
1
A664
3
FortiGate/FortiOS 7.2 Validation Report Version 1.0 October 09, 2025
9
Mode
l
CPU Architect
ure
RAM Stora
ge
ASIC Entro
py
ES
V
ASI
C
CAV
P
Forti
OS
FIPS
CAVP
Forti
OS
SSL
CAVP
FG-
301E
Intel
Core
i5-
6500
SkyLake 8GB 480G
B
CP9 JitterE
nt
E13
9
A22
40
A664
1
A664
3
FG-
400E
Intel
Core
i5-
8500
Coffee
Lake
8GB N/A CP9 JitterE
nt
E13
9
A22
40
A664
1
A664
3
FG-
400F
Intel
Xeon
E-
2336
Cypress
Cove
(Rocket
Lake)
16G
B
N/A CP9 JitterE
nt
E13
9
A22
40
A664
1
A664
3
FG-
401E
Intel
Core
i5-
8500
Coffee
Lake
8GB 480G
B
CP9 JitterE
nt
E13
9
A22
40
A664
1
A664
3
FG-
401E-
DC
Intel
Core
i5-
8500
Coffee
Lake
8GB 480G
B
CP9 JitterE
nt
E13
9
A22
40
A664
1
A664
3
FG-
401F
Intel
Xeon
E-
2336
Cypress
Cove
(Rocket
Lake)
16G
B
960G
B
CP9 JitterE
nt
E13
9
A22
40
A664
1
A664
3
FG-
500E
Intel
Core
i7-
6700
SkyLake 16G
B
N/A CP9 JitterE
nt
E13
9
A22
40
A664
1
A664
3
FG-
501E
Intel
Core
i7-
6700
SkyLake 16G
B
480G
B
CP9 JitterE
nt
E13
9
A22
40
A664
1
A664
3
FG-
600E
Intel
Core
i7-
8700
Coffee
Lake
16
GB
N/A CP9 JitterE
nt
E13
9
A22
40
A664
1
A664
3
FG-
600F
Intel
Xeon
E-
Cypress
Cove
16
GB
N/A CP9 JitterE
nt
E13
9
A22
40
A664
1
A664
3
FortiGate/FortiOS 7.2 Validation Report Version 1.0 October 09, 2025
10
Mode
l
CPU Architect
ure
RAM Stora
ge
ASIC Entro
py
ES
V
ASI
C
CAV
P
Forti
OS
FIPS
CAVP
Forti
OS
SSL
CAVP
2386
G
(Rocket
Lake)
FG-
601E
Intel
Core
i7-
8700
Coffee
Lake
16
GB
480G
B
CP9 JitterE
nt
E13
9
A22
40
A664
1
A664
3
FG-
601F
Intel
Xeon
E-
2386
G
Cypress
Cove
(Rocket
Lake)
16
GB
480G
B
CP9 JitterE
nt
E13
9
A22
40
A664
1
A664
3
FG-
900G
AMD
RYZE
N
5950
E
Zen 3
(Vermeer)
32
GB
N/A CP9 JitterE
nt
E13
9
A22
40
A664
1
A664
3
FG-
901G
AMD
RYZE
N
5950
E
Zen 3
(Vermeer)
32
GB
960G
B
CP9 JitterE
nt
E13
9
A22
40
A664
1
A664
3
FG-
1000
F
Intel
Xeon
E-
2388
G
Cypress
Cove
(Rocket
Lake)
16G
B
N/A CP9 JitterE
nt
E13
9
A22
40
A664
1
A664
3
FG-
1001
F
Intel
Xeon
E-
2388
G
Cypress
Cove
(Rocket
Lake)
16G
B
960G
B
CP9 JitterE
nt
E13
9
A22
40
A664
1
A664
3
FG-
1100
E
Intel
Xeon
E-
2186
G
Coffee
Lake
16
GB
N/A CP9 JitterE
nt
E13
9
A22
40
A664
1
A664
3
FG-
1100
E-DC
Intel
Xeon
E-
2186
G
Coffee
Lake
16
GB
N/A CP9 JitterE
nt
E13
9
A22
40
A664
1
A664
3
FortiGate/FortiOS 7.2 Validation Report Version 1.0 October 09, 2025
11
Mode
l
CPU Architect
ure
RAM Stora
ge
ASIC Entro
py
ES
V
ASI
C
CAV
P
Forti
OS
FIPS
CAVP
Forti
OS
SSL
CAVP
FG-
1101
E
Intel
Xeon
E-
2186
G
Coffee
Lake
16
GB
960G
B
CP9 JitterE
nt
E13
9
A22
40
A664
1
A664
3
FG-
1101
E-DC
Intel
Xeon
E-
2186
G
Coffee
Lake
16
GB
960G
B
CP9 JitterE
nt
E13
9
A22
40
A664
1
A664
3
FG-
1800
F
Intel
Xeon
W-
3223
Cascade
Lake
24G
B
N/A CP9 JitterE
nt
E13
9
A22
40
A664
1
A664
3
FG-
1800
F-DC
Intel
Xeon
W-
3223
Cascade
Lake
24G
B
N/A CP9 JitterE
nt
E13
9
A22
40
A664
1
A664
3
FG-
1801
F
Intel
Xeon
W-
3223
Cascade
Lake
24G
B
2TB CP9 JitterE
nt
E13
9
A22
40
A664
1
A664
3
FG-
1801
F-DC
Intel
Xeon
W-
3223
Cascade
Lake
24G
B
2TB CP9 JitterE
nt
E13
9
A22
40
A664
1
A664
3
FG-
2000
E
Intel
Xeon
E5-
1660
v4
Broadwell 32
GB
480G
B
CP9 JitterE
nt
E13
9
A22
40
A664
1
A664
3
FG-
2200
E
Intel
Xeon
Gold
6126
SkyLake 24
GB
N/A CP9 JitterE
nt
E13
9
A22
40
A664
1
A664
3
FG-
2201
E
Intel
Xeon
Gold
6126
SkyLake 24
GB
2TB CP9 JitterE
nt
E13
9
A22
40
A664
1
A664
3
FortiGate/FortiOS 7.2 Validation Report Version 1.0 October 09, 2025
12
Mode
l
CPU Architect
ure
RAM Stora
ge
ASIC Entro
py
ES
V
ASI
C
CAV
P
Forti
OS
FIPS
CAVP
Forti
OS
SSL
CAVP
FG-
2500
E
Intel
Xeon
E5-
1650
v3
Haswell 32
GB
480G
B
CP9 JitterE
nt
E13
9
A22
40
A664
1
A664
3
FG-
2600
F
Intel
Xeon
Gold
6208
U
Cascade
Lake
48
GB
N/A CP9 JitterE
nt
E13
9
A22
40
A664
1
A664
3
FG-
2601
F
Intel
Xeon
Gold
6208
U
Cascade
Lake
48
GB
2 TB CP9 JitterE
nt
E13
9
A22
40
A664
1
A664
3
FG-
2601
F-DC
Intel
Xeon
Gold
6208
U
Cascade
Lake
48
GB
2 TB CP9 JitterE
nt
E13
9
A22
40
A664
1
A664
3
FG-
3000
F
AMD
EPY
C
7502
P
Zen 2
(Rome)
128
GB
N/A CP9 JitterE
nt
E13
9
A22
40
A664
1
A664
3
FG-
3000
F-DC
AMD
EPY
C
7502
P
Zen 2
(Rome)
128
GB
N/A CP9 JitterE
nt
E13
9
A22
40
A664
1
A664
3
FG-
3001
F
AMD
EPY
C
7502
P
Zen 2
(Rome)
128
GB
2TB CP9 JitterE
nt
E13
9
A22
40
A664
1
A664
3
FG-
3001
F-DC
AMD
EPY
C
7502
P
Zen 2
(Rome)
128
GB
2TB CP9 JitterE
nt
E13
9
A22
40
A664
1
A664
3
FortiGate/FortiOS 7.2 Validation Report Version 1.0 October 09, 2025
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Mode
l
CPU Architect
ure
RAM Stora
ge
ASIC Entro
py
ES
V
ASI
C
CAV
P
Forti
OS
FIPS
CAVP
Forti
OS
SSL
CAVP
FG-
3200
F
Intel
Xeon
Gold
6348
Ice Lake 128
GB
N/A CP9 JitterE
nt
E13
9
A22
40
A664
1
A664
3
FG-
3201
F
Intel
Xeon
Gold
6348
Ice Lake 128
GB
2 TB CP9 JitterE
nt
E13
9
A22
40
A664
1
A664
3
FG-
3300
E
Intel
Xeon
Gold
5118
SkyLake 96
GB
N/A CP9 JitterE
nt
E13
9
A22
40
A664
1
A664
3
FG-
3301
E
Intel
Xeon
Gold
5118
SkyLake 96
GB
2TB CP9 JitterE
nt
E13
9
A22
40
A664
1
A664
3
FG-
3400
E
Intel
Xeon
Gold
6130
SkyLake 96
GB
N/A CP9 JitterE
nt
E13
9
A22
40
A664
1
A664
3
FG-
3400
E-DC
Intel
Xeon
Gold
6130
SkyLake 96
GB
N/A CP9 JitterE
nt
E13
9
A22
40
A664
1
A664
3
FG-
3401
E
Intel
Xeon
Gold
6130
SkyLake 96
GB
2TB CP9 JitterE
nt
E13
9
A22
40
A664
1
A664
3
FG-
3401
E-DC
Intel
Xeon
Gold
6130
SkyLake 96
GB
2TB CP9 JitterE
nt
E13
9
A22
40
A664
1
A664
3
FG-
3500
F
AMD
EPY
C
7542
Zen 2
(Rome)
256
GB
N/A CP9 JitterE
nt
E13
9
A22
40
A664
1
A664
3
FG-
3501
F
AMD
EPY
Zen 2
(Rome)
256
GB
4TB CP9 JitterE
nt
E13
9
A22
40
A664
1
A664
3
FortiGate/FortiOS 7.2 Validation Report Version 1.0 October 09, 2025
14
Mode
l
CPU Architect
ure
RAM Stora
ge
ASIC Entro
py
ES
V
ASI
C
CAV
P
Forti
OS
FIPS
CAVP
Forti
OS
SSL
CAVP
C
7542
FG-
3600
E
Intel
Xeon
Gold
6152
SkyLake 96
GB
N/A CP9 JitterE
nt
E13
9
A22
40
A664
1
A664
3
FG-
3600
E-DC
Intel
Xeon
Gold
6152
SkyLake 96
GB
N/A CP9 JitterE
nt
E13
9
A22
40
A664
1
A664
3
FG-
3601
E
Intel
Xeon
Gold
6152
SkyLake 96
GB
2TB CP9 JitterE
nt
E13
9
A22
40
A664
1
A664
3
FG-
3700
F
Intel
Xeon
Gold
6348
Ice Lake 256
GB
4TB CP9 JitterE
nt
E13
9
A22
40
A664
1
A664
3
FG-
3701
F
Intel
Xeon
Gold
6348
Ice Lake 256
GB
4TB CP9 JitterE
nt
E13
9
A22
40
A664
1
A664
3
FG-
3960
E
Intel
Xeon
E5-
2650
V4
Broadwell 256
GB
N/A CP9 JitterE
nt
E13
9
A22
40
A664
1
A664
3
FG-
3960
E-DC
Intel
Xeon
E5-
2650
V4
Broadwell 256
GB
N/A CP9 JitterE
nt
E13
9
A22
40
A664
1
A664
3
FG-
3980
E
Intel
Xeon
E5-
2680
V4
Broadwell 256
GB
N/A CP9 JitterE
nt
E13
9
A22
40
A664
1
A664
3
FG-
3980
E-DC
Intel
Xeon
E5-
Broadwell 256
GB
N/A CP9 JitterE
nt
E13
9
A22
40
A664
1
A664
3
FortiGate/FortiOS 7.2 Validation Report Version 1.0 October 09, 2025
15
Mode
l
CPU Architect
ure
RAM Stora
ge
ASIC Entro
py
ES
V
ASI
C
CAV
P
Forti
OS
FIPS
CAVP
Forti
OS
SSL
CAVP
2680
V4
FG-
4200
F
Intel
Xeon
Gold
6248
Cascade
Lake
384
GB
N/A CP9 JitterE
nt
E13
9
A22
40
A664
1
A664
3
FG-
4200
F-DC
Intel
Xeon
Gold
6248
Cascade
Lake
384
GB
N/A CP9 JitterE
nt
E13
9
A22
40
A664
1
A664
3
FG-
4201
F
Intel
Xeon
Gold
6248
Cascade
Lake
384
GB
4 TB CP9 JitterE
nt
E13
9
A22
40
A664
1
A664
3
FG-
4201
F-DC
Intel
Xeon
Gold
6248
Cascade
Lake
384
GB
4 TB CP9 JitterE
nt
E13
9
A22
40
A664
1
A664
3
FG-
4400
F
Intel
Xeon
Gold
6248
Cascade
Lake
384
GB
N/A CP9 JitterE
nt
E13
9
A22
40
A664
1
A664
3
FG-
4400
F-DC
Intel
Xeon
Gold
6248
Cascade
Lake
384
GB
N/A CP9 JitterE
nt
E13
9
A22
40
A664
1
A664
3
FG-
4401
F
Intel
Xeon
Gold
6248
Cascade
Lake
384
GB
4 TB CP9 JitterE
nt
E13
9
A22
40
A664
1
A664
3
FG-
4401
F-DC
Intel
Xeon
Gold
6248
Cascade
Lake
384
GB
4 TB CP9 JitterE
nt
E13
9
A22
40
A664
1
A664
3
FG-
4800
F
Intel
Xeon
Gold
6348
Ice Lake 512
GB
N/A CP9 JitterE
nt
E13
9
A22
40
A664
1
A664
3
FortiGate/FortiOS 7.2 Validation Report Version 1.0 October 09, 2025
16
Mode
l
CPU Architect
ure
RAM Stora
ge
ASIC Entro
py
ES
V
ASI
C
CAV
P
Forti
OS
FIPS
CAVP
Forti
OS
SSL
CAVP
FG-
4801
F
Intel
Xeon
Gold
6348
Ice Lake 512
GB
4 TB CP9 JitterE
nt
E13
9
A22
40
A664
1
A664
3
FG-
5001
E1
Intel
Xeon
E5-
2690
v4
Broadwell 64G
B
480
GB
CP9 JitterE
nt
E13
9
A22
40
A664
1
A664
3
FG-
6001
F
Intel
Xeon
D-
1567
Broadwell 64G
B
2 TB CP9 JitterE
nt
E13
9
A22
40
A664
1
A664
3
FG-
6300
F
Intel
Xeon
D-
1567
Broadwell 192
GB
2 TB CP9 JitterE
nt
E13
9
A22
40
A664
1
A664
3
FG-
6301
F
Intel
Xeon
D-
1567
Broadwell 192
GB
2 TB CP9 JitterE
nt
E13
9
A22
40
A664
1
A664
3
FG-
6500
F
Intel
Xeon
D-
1567
Broadwell 320
GB
2 TB CP9 JitterE
nt
E13
9
A22
40
A664
1
A664
3
FG-
6501
F
Intel
Xeon
D-
1567
Broadwell 320
GB
2 TB CP9 JitterE
nt
E13
9
A22
40
A664
1
A664
3
3.3. Required Non-TOE Hardware, Software, and Firmware
The TOE operates with the following components in the environment:
• Admin’s Workstation. The TOE makes use of a separate workstation for
administrative purposes.
• Audit Server. The TOE makes use of a FortiAnalyzer for remote logging.
• VPN Endpoints. The TOE supports FortiGate VPN endpoints.
FortiGate/FortiOS 7.2 Validation Report Version 1.0 October 09, 2025
17
• CRL Web Server. Web server capable of serving up CRLs over HTTP.
• NTP Server. The TOE makes use of an NTP server to provide reliable and
synchronized time information.
FortiGate/FortiOS 7.2 Validation Report Version 1.0 October 09, 2025
18
4. Security Policy
This section summarizes the security functionality of the TOE:
4.1. Security Audit
The TOE generates logs for auditable events. These logs can be stored locally in protected
storage and/or exported to an external audit server via a secure channel.
4.2. Cryptographic Support
The TOE implements a variety of key generation and cryptographic methods to provide
protection of data both in transit and at rest within the TOE. In the evaluated configuration,
the TOE is in FIPS mode to support the cryptographic functionality. The TOE implements
cryptographic protocols such as SSH, TLS, HTTPS, and IPsec.
4.3. User Data Protection
The TOE ensures that residual information and other data cannot be recovered once the
associated resource has been deallocated. Data is removed through zeroization.
4.4. Stateful Traffic & Packet Filtering
The TOE allows for the configuration and enforcement of stateful packet filtering/firewall
rules on all traffic traversing the TOE.
4.5. Identification and Authentication
The TOE implements mechanisms to ensure that users are both identified and authenticated
before any access to TOE functionality or TSF data is granted. Remote login attempts are
limited to an administrator-configured threshold, after which the user must wait for a
defined period of time before login attempts can be made. It provides the ability to both
assign attributes (user names, passwords and roles) and to authenticate users against these
attributes. The TOE also provides X.509 certificate validation for its TLS and IPsec
connections.
4.6. Security Management
The TOE provides a suite of management functionality, allowing for full configuration of
the TOE by an authorized administrator.
4.7. Protection of the TSF
The TOE implements a number of protection mechanisms (including authentication
requirements, self-tests and trusted update) to ensure the protection of the TOE and all TSF
data. The TOE supports the use of NTP or its own manually configurable time source free
from outside interference for the purpose of generating logs and executing reliable time
sensitive operations.
FortiGate/FortiOS 7.2 Validation Report Version 1.0 October 09, 2025
19
4.8. TOE Access
The TOE provides session management functions for local and remote administrative
sessions. Administrative sessions have a defined lifetime for both local and remote
sessions, users connecting to the TOE will be presented with a warning and consent banner
prior to authentication.
4.9. Trusted Path/Channels
The TOE provides secure channels between itself and local/remote administrators and
other devices to ensure data security during transit.
FortiGate/FortiOS 7.2 Validation Report Version 1.0 October 09, 2025
20
5. Assumptions
The following assumptions are drawn from CPP_ND_V3.0E, PKG_SSH_V1.0,
MOD_CPP_FW_V1.4E and MOD_VPNGW_V1.3 as applicable listed here for reader
convenience.
Table 3: Assumptions (CPP_ND)
Identifier Description
A.PHYSICAL_
PROTECTION
The Network Device is assumed to be physically protected in its operational
environment and not subject to physical attacks that compromise the
security or interfere with the device’s physical interconnections and correct
operation. This protection is assumed to be sufficient to protect the device
and the data it contains. As a result, the cPP does not include any
requirements on physical tamper protection or other physical attack
mitigations. The cPP does not expect the product to defend against physical
access to the device that allows unauthorized entities to extract data,
bypass other controls, or otherwise manipulate the device. For vNDs, this
assumption applies to the physical platform on which the VM runs.
A.LIMITED_
FUNCTIONALITY
The device is assumed to provide networking functionality as its core
function and not provide functionality/services that could be deemed as
general purpose computing. For example, the device should not provide a
computing platform for general purpose applications (unrelated to
networking functionality).
If a virtual TOE evaluated as a pND, following Case 2 vNDs as specified in
Section 1.2, the VS is considered part of the TOE with only one vND
instance for each physical hardware platform. The exception being where
components of a distributed TOE run inside more than one virtual machine
(VM) on a single VS. In Case 2 vND, no non-TOE guest VMs are allowed on
the platform.
A.NO_THRU_
TRAFFIC_
PROTECTION
A standard/generic Network Device does not provide any assurance
regarding the protection of traffic that traverses it. The intent is for the
Network Device to protect data that originates on or is destined to the device
itself, to include administrative data and audit data. Traffic that is traversing
the Network Device, destined for another network entity, is not covered by
the NDcPP. It is assumed that this protection will be covered by cPPs and
PP-Modules for particular types of Network Devices (e.g., firewall).
FortiGate/FortiOS 7.2 Validation Report Version 1.0 October 09, 2025
21
Identifier Description
A.TRUSTED_
ADMINISTRATOR
The Security Administrator(s) for the Network Device are assumed to be
trusted and to act in the best interest of security for the organization. This
includes appropriately trained, following policy, and adhering to guidance
documentation. Administrators are trusted to ensure passwords/credentials
have sufficient strength and entropy and to lack malicious intent when
administering the device. The Network Device is not expected to be capable
of defending against a malicious Administrator that actively works to bypass
or compromise the security of the device.
For TOEs supporting X.509v3 certificate-based authentication, the Security
Administrator(s) are expected to fully validate (e.g. offline verification) any
CA certificate (root CA certificate or intermediate CA certificate) loaded into
the TOE’s trust store (aka ‘root store’, ‘ trusted CA Key Store’, or similar) as
a trust anchor prior to use (e.g. offline verification).
A.REGULAR_
UPDATES
The Network Device firmware and software is assumed to be updated by an
Administrator on a regular basis in response to the release of product
updates due to known vulnerabilities.
A.ADMIN_
CREDENTIALS_
SECURE
The Administrator’s credentials (private key) used to access the Network
Device are protected by the platform on which they reside.
A.RESIDUAL_
INFORMATION
The Administrator must ensure that there is no unauthorized access
possible for sensitive residual information (e.g. cryptographic keys, keying
material, PINs, passwords etc.) on networking equipment when the
equipment is discarded or removed from its operational environment.
Table 4: Assumptions (MOD_VPNGW)
Identifier Description
A.CONNECTIONS It is assumed that the TOE is connected to distinct networks in a
manner that ensures that the TOE security policies will be enforced
on all applicable network traffic flowing among the attached networks.
FortiGate/FortiOS 7.2 Validation Report Version 1.0 October 09, 2025
22
6. Clarification of Scope
The scope of this evaluation was limited to the functionality and assurances covered in
CPP_ND_V3.0E, PKG_SSH_V1.0, MOD_CPP_FW_V1.4E and MOD_VPNGW_V1.3 as
described for this TOE in the Security Target. Other functionality included in the product
was not assessed as part of this evaluation. All other functionality provided by the devices
needs to be assessed separately, and no further conclusions can be drawn about their
effectiveness.
All evaluations (and all products) have limitations, as well as potential misconceptions that
need clarifying. This text covers some of the more important limitations and clarifications
of this evaluation. Note that:
• As with any evaluation, this evaluation only shows that the evaluated configuration
meets the security claims made with a certain level of assurance (the assurance
activities specified in CPP_ND_V3.0E, PKG_SSH_V1.0, MOD_CPP_FW_V1.4E
and MOD_VPNGW_V1.3 and performed by the evaluation team).
• This evaluation covers only the specific device models and software as identified
in this document, and not any earlier or later versions released or in process.
• Apart from the Admin Guide, additional customer documentation for the specific
Firewall, VPN Gateway, Router models was not included in the scope of the
evaluation and should not to be relied upon when configuring or operating the
device as evaluated.
• This evaluation did not specifically search for, nor attempt to exploit, vulnerabilities
that were not “obvious” or vulnerabilities to objectives not claimed in the ST. The
CEM defines an “obvious” vulnerability as one that is easily exploited with a
minimum of understanding of the TOE, technical sophistication and resources.
• The functionality evaluated is scoped exclusively to the security functional
requirements specified in the CPP_ND_V3.0E, PKG_SSH_V1.0,
MOD_CPP_FW_V1.4E and MOD_VPNGW_V1.3 and applicable Technical
Decisions. Any additional security related functional capabilities of the TOE were
not covered by this evaluation.
FortiGate/FortiOS 7.2 Validation Report Version 1.0 October 09, 2025
23
7. Documentation
The following guidance documents are provided with the TOE upon delivery in accordance
with the PP:
• FIPS 140-3 and NDcPP Common Criteria Technote for FortiOS 7.2 and FortiGate
NGFW Appliances, 01-728-1075780-20251006, October 6, 2025
• FortiOS 7.2.8 Administration Guide, 01-728-791905-20240807, August 7 2024
• FortiOS 7.2.8 CLI Reference, 01-728-791773-20240314, March 14 2024
• FortiOS 7.2.8 Log Reference, 01-728-791443-20240314, March 14 2024
• FortiOS 7.2.8 Hardware Acceleration Guide, 01-729-538746-20240314, March 14
2024
• NDcPP Logging Addendum for FortiOS 7.2 and FortiGate NGFW Appliances, 01-
728-1172697-20250620, June 20, 2025
• FortiOS 6.4.0 Parallel Path Processing, 01-640-619132-20210125, January 25,
2021
All documentation delivered with the product is relevant to and within the scope of the
TOE.
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8. IT Product Testing
This section describes the testing efforts of the evaluation team. It is derived from
information contained in FortiGate/FortiOS 7.2 Assurance Activity Report, version 1.3,
October 2025 provides an overview of testing and the prescribed evaluation activities.
8.1. Developer Testing
No evidence of developer testing is required in the SARs or Evaluation Activities.
8.2. Evaluation Team Independent Testing
The evaluation team conducted independent testing at Lightship Security USA in
Baltimore, MD from September 2024 until August 2025. The evaluation team configured
the TOE according to vendor installation instructions and as identified in the Security
Target.
The evaluation team confirmed the technical accuracy of the setup and installation guide
during installation of the TOE. The evaluation team confirmed that the TOE version
delivered for testing was identical to the version identified in the ST.
The evaluation team used the Protection Profile test procedures as a basis for creating each
of the independent tests as required by the Evaluation Activities.
Each Evaluation Activity was tested as required by the conformant Protection Profile and
the evaluation team verified that each test passed.
8.3. Evaluated Configuration
The TOE testing environment components are identified in Figure 1 and 5 below.
FortiGate/FortiOS 7.2 Validation Report Version 1.0 October 09, 2025
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Figure 1: Testing Environment Overview
The green line ( ) identifies the path traffic may be routed over. All other
connections are for the local subnet.
For IPsec testing, an IPsec tunnel is established between the FW-WAN VM and the TOE.
In summary the evaluator performed full end-to-end testing on the FortiGate 2000E and
the FortiGate 3001F models. IPsec was also tested on the FortiGate 81E and 81F.
Table 5: Tools Used for Testing
Tool name Version Description
Firefox 91.6.0esr Web Browser for GUI access
(evaluator dependent).
Chrome 124.0.6367.61
(Official Build) (64-
bit)
Web Browser for GUI access
(evaluator dependent).
OpenSSH 8.8p1 SSH server/client
OpenSSL 1.1.1m General purpose crypto tool
Netcat 1.10-47 TCP/UDP Server/Client
hping3 3.0.0-alpha-2 Arbitrary IPv4 packet creation
sendip 2.6-1 Arbitrary IPv4 & IPv6 packet creation
apache2 2.4.52 HTTP server
Nmap 7.92 Port/Protocol Scanner
Scapy 2.4.5 Send custom packets
Python 3.9.10 Supports Scapy
tcpdump 4.99.1 Packet capture
vsftp 3.0.3-13 FTP server.
Testssl.sh 3.0.8 SSL/TLS Server vulnerability
scanner.
Green Light 3.0.54 Custom Lightship Test Tool that
performs protocol manipulation and
corruption.
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Tool name Version Description
Includes:
• Scapy 2.4.5
• Python 3.9.10
• OpenSSH 8.8p1-Lightship-1.1.1
• OpenSSL 1.0.2g-LS 1 Mar 2016
Tool name Version Description
OpenSSH 7.9p1 SSH client for accessing the Remote
CLI
OpenSSL 1.1.1n General purpose crypto tool.
strongSwan Linux strongSwan
U5.7.2/K4.19.0-25-
amd64
IPsec peer for NAT testing
dnsmasq 2.80-1 DNS server
syslog-ng 3.19.1-5 Syslog Server
Python 2.7.16 HTTP server
tcpdump 4.9.3 Packet capture
Tool name Version Description
OpenSSH 9.2p1 SSH client for accessing the Remote
CLI
SSH server/client
OpenSSL 3.0.8 General purpose crypto tool.
Netcat 1.10-41.1 TCP/UDP Server/Client
tcpdump 4.9.3 Packet capture
Python/Python3 3.11.2 TCP/UDP Server
Green Light 3.0.41 Custom Lightship Test Tool that
performs protocol manipulation and
corruption.
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Tool name Version Description
Includes:
• Scapy 2.4.4
• Python 3.9.2
• OpenSSH 8.8p1-Lightship-1.0.1
• OpenSSL 1.0.2g-LS 1 Mar 2016
Tool name Version Description
tcpdump 4.9.3 Packet capture
Netcat 1.10-41.1 TCP/UDP Server/Client
OpenSSL 3.0.8 General purpose crypto tool
OpenSSH SSH client for accessing the Remote
CLI
SSH server/client
strongSwan U5.9.8 VPN Peer for FPF testing
Python/Python3 3.11.2 Support Scapy
Scapy 2.5.0 Send custom packets
Green Light 3.0.41 Custom Lightship Test Tool that
performs protocol manipulation and
corruption.
Includes:
• Scapy 2.4.4
• Python 3.9.2
• OpenSSH 8.8p1-Lightship-1.0.1
• OpenSSL 1.0.2g-LS 1 Mar 2016
8.4. Excluded Functionality
The following features were not examined as part of this evaluation:
• High-Availability;
• FortiExplorer client;
• FortiGuard Anti-spam, Firmware,
Anti-Virus, Content Filtering, Web
Filtering, EndPoint Control, and
FortiSandbox services;
FortiGate/FortiOS 7.2 Validation Report Version 1.0 October 09, 2025
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• Use of syslog;
• FortiToken and FortiSSO
Authentication;
• Stream Control Transmission
Protocol (SCTP), BGP, RIP, and
OSPF protocols;
• Usage of the boot-time configuration
menu to upgrade the TOE;
• Policy-based VPN;
• SSL VPN;
• Logging to FortiCloud;
• External Threat Feeds;
• Explicit Web Proxy with Form-
Based Authentication;
• REST API;
• Traffic Shaping;
• SMTP;
• SNMP;
• LDAP;
• Windows AD;
• RADIUS;
• USB Interface
• Diagnostics interface;
• DHCP, DDNS, or DNS;
• Traffic offloading to FortiASIC NPx
network processors.
• IPS
• HTTP GUI
• Telnet (TOE acting as client or
server)
• TFTP (TOE acting as client)
• Precision Time Protocol (PTP)
FortiGate/FortiOS 7.2 Validation Report Version 1.0 October 09, 2025
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9. Results of the Evaluation
The results of the assurance requirements are generally described in this section and are
presented in detail in the proprietary documents: the Detailed Test Report (DTR) and the
Evaluation Technical Report (ETR). The reader of this document can assume that all
activities and work units received a passing verdict.
A verdict for an assurance component is determined by the resulting verdicts assigned to
the corresponding evaluator action elements. The evaluation was conducted based upon
CC Version 3.1 Revision 5 and CEM Version 3.1 Revision 5. The evaluation determined
FortiGate/FortiOS 7.2 to be Part 2 extended, and meets the SARs contained in the PP.
Additionally, the evaluator performed the Evaluation Activities specified in both
CFG_NDcPP-FW-VPNGW_V2.0 and PKG_SSH_V1.0.
9.1. Evaluation of Security Target (ASE)
The evaluation team applied each ASE CEM work unit. The ST evaluation ensured the ST
contains a description of the environment in terms of policies and assumptions, a statement
of security requirements claimed to be met by the FortiGate/FortiOS 7.2 that are consistent
with the Common Criteria, and product security function descriptions that support the
requirements.
The validation team reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient
evidence and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the
evaluation was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the
conclusion reached by the evaluation team was justified.
9.2. Evaluation of Development Documentation (ADV)
The evaluation team applied each ADV CEM work unit. The evaluation team assessed the
design documentation and found it adequate to aid in understanding how the TSF provides
the security functions. The design documentation consists of a functional specification
contained in the ST and guidance documents. Additionally, the evaluator performed the
Evaluation Activities related to the examination of the information contained in the TSS.
The validation team reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient
evidence and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the
evaluation was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the
conclusion reached by the Evaluation team was justified.
9.3. Evaluation of Guidance Documents (AGD)
The evaluation team applied each AGD CEM work unit. The evaluation team ensured the
adequacy of the user guidance in describing how to use the operational TOE. Additionally,
the evaluation team ensured the adequacy of the administrator guidance in describing how
to securely administer the TOE. All of the guides were assessed during the design and
testing phases of the evaluation to ensure they were complete.
The validation team reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient
evidence and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the
FortiGate/FortiOS 7.2 Validation Report Version 1.0 October 09, 2025
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evaluation was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the
conclusion reached by the evaluation team was justified.
9.4. Evaluation of Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC)
The evaluation team applied each ALC CEM work unit. The evaluation team found that
the TOE was appropriately labeled with a unique identifier consistent with the TOE
identification in the evaluation evidence and that the TOE references used are consistent.
The validation team reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient
evidence and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the
evaluation was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the
conclusion reached by the evaluation team was justified.
9.5. Evaluation of Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE)
The Evaluation team applied each ATE CEM work unit. The evaluation team ran the set
of tests specified by the Test Evaluation Activities and recorded the results in a Test Report,
summarized in the AAR.
The validation team reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient
evidence and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the
evaluation was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the
conclusion reached by the evaluation team was justified.
9.6. Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN)
The evaluation team applied each AVA CEM work unit. The vulnerability analysis is in
the Fortinet, Inc. FortiGate/FortiOS 7.2 Vulnerability Assessment, v1.0, report prepared by
the evaluation team. The vulnerability analysis includes a public search for vulnerabilities.
The public search for vulnerabilities conducted on October 6, 2025 did not uncover any
residual vulnerability.
The Evaluation team searched:
• NIST National Vulnerabilities Database (can be used to access CVE and US-
CERT databases identified below): https://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/search
• Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures:
https://cve.mitre.org/cve/search_cve_list.html
• US-CERT: http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/html/search
• Tenable Network Security: https://www.tenable.com/cve
• Tipping Point Zero Day Initiative: https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories
• Offensive Security Exploit Database: https://www.exploit-db.com/
• Rapid7 Vulnerability Database: https://www.rapid7.com/db/vulnerabilities
The Evaluation team performed a search using the following keywords:
• FortiOS 7.2.8
FortiGate/FortiOS 7.2 Validation Report Version 1.0 October 09, 2025
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• FIPS-CC-72
• TOE models
• Each processor and Crypto Accelerator (ASIC) used by the TOE.
• OpenSSL
• OpenSSH
• Apache
• Node.js
• Firewall
• TCP, UDP, IPv4, IPv6, TLS, SSH, IPsec, ICMP, ICMPv6
Note: Additional proprietary search terms were also included.
The validation team reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient
evidence and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the
evaluation was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the
conclusion reached by the evaluation team was justified.
9.7. Summary of Evaluation Results
The evaluation team's assessment of the evaluation evidence demonstrates that the claims
in the ST are met. Additionally, the evaluation team's test activities also demonstrated the
accuracy of the claims in the ST.
The validation team's assessment of the evidence provided by the evaluation team is that it
demonstrates that the evaluation team followed the procedures defined in the CEM and
performed the Evaluation Activities in CPP_ND_V3.0E, PKG_SSH_V1.0,
MOD_CPP_FW_V1.4E and MOD_VPNGW_V1.3, and correctly verified that the product
meets the claims in the ST.
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10. Validator Comments
The validation team notes that the evaluated configuration is dependent upon the TOE
being configured per the evaluated configuration instructions in the FortiOS 7.2 and
FortiGate NGFW Appliances FIPS 140-3 and NDcPP Common Criteria Technote,
October 6, 2025. As stated in the Clarification of Scope, the evaluated functionality is
scoped exclusively to the security functional requirements specified in the ST, and the only
evaluated functionality was that which was described by the SFRs claimed in the ST. All
other functionality provided by the TOE needs to be assessed separately and no further
conclusions can be drawn about its effectiveness.
Consumers employing the TOE must follow the configuration instructions provided in the
Configuration Guidance documentation listed in Section 7 to ensure the evaluated
configuration is established and maintained. It is important to note the excluded
functionality listed in Section 8.4 and follow any configuration instructions provided to
ensure that this functionality is disabled.
Evaluation activities are strictly bound by the assurance activities described in the
CFG_NDcPP-FW-VPNGW_V2.0 and PKG_SSH_V1.0 and accompanying supporting
documents. Consumers and integrators of this TOE are advised to understand the inherent
limitations of these activities and take additional measures as needed to ensure proper TOE
behavior when integrated into an operational environment.
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11. Annexes
Not applicable.
FortiGate/FortiOS 7.2 Validation Report Version 1.0 October 09, 2025
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12. Security Target
Fortinet FortiGate/FortiOS 7.2 Security Target, Version 1.5, October 2025
FortiGate/FortiOS 7.2 Validation Report Version 1.0 October 09, 2025
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13. GLOSSARY
• Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL): An IT security evaluation
facility accredited by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program
(NVLAP) and approved by the CCEVS Validation Body to conduct Common
Criteria-based evaluations.
• Conformance: The ability to demonstrate in an unambiguous way that a given
implementation is correct with respect to the formal model.
• Evaluation: The assessment of an IT product against the Common Criteria using
the Common Criteria Evaluation Methodology to determine whether or not the
claims made are justified; or the assessment of a protection profile against the
Common Criteria using the Common Evaluation Methodology to determine if the
Profile is complete, consistent, technically sound and hence suitable for use as a
statement of requirements for one or more TOEs that may be evaluated.
• Evaluation Evidence: Any tangible resource (information) required from the
sponsor or developer by the evaluator to perform one or more evaluation activities.
• Feature: Part of a product that is either included with the product or can be ordered
separately.
• Target of Evaluation (TOE): A group of IT products configured as an IT system,
or an IT product, and associated documentation that is the subject of a security
evaluation under the CC.
• Threat: Means through which the ability or intent of a threat agent to adversely
affect the primary functionality of the TOE, facility that contains the TOE, or
malicious operation directed towards the TOE. A potential violation of security.
• Validation: The process carried out by the CCEVS Validation Body leading to the
issue of a Common Criteria certificate.
• Validation Body: A governmental organization responsible for carrying out
validation and for overseeing the day-to-day operation of the NIAP Common
Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme.
• Vulnerabilities: A vulnerability is a hardware, firmware, or software flaw that
leaves an Automated Information System (AIS) open for potential exploitation. A
weakness in automated system security procedures, administrative controls,
physical layout, internal controls, and so forth, which could be exploited by a threat
to gain unauthorized access to information or disrupt critical processing.
FortiGate/FortiOS 7.2 Validation Report Version 1.0 October 09, 2025
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14. Acronym List
CAVP Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program (CAVP)
CCEVS Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
CCIMB Common Criteria Interpretations Management Board
CCTL Common Criteria Testing Laboratories
CEM Common Evaluation Methodology for IT Security Evaluation
LS Lightship Security USA CCTL
DHCP Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
IT Information Technology
LDAP Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
MFD Multi-Function Device
NIAP National Information Assurance Partnership
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
NSA National Security Agency
NVLAP National Voluntary Laboratory Assessment Program
OS Operating System
OSP Organizational Security Policies
PCL Products Compliant List
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
VR Validation Report
FortiGate/FortiOS 7.2 Validation Report Version 1.0 October 09, 2025
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15. Bibliography
The Validation team used the following documents to produce this VR:
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part
Introduction and General Model, CCMB-2017-04-001, Version 3.1 Revision 5,
April 2017
[2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2:
Security functional requirements, CCMB-2017-04-002, Version 3.1 Revision 5,
April 2017
[3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3:
Security assurance requirements, CCMB-2017-04-003, Version 3.1 Revision 5,
April 2017
[4] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Evaluation Methodology, CCMB-2017-04-004, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April
2017
[5] PP-Configuration for Network Devices, Stateful Traffic Filter Firewalls, and
Virtual Private Network Gateways, Version: 2.0
[6] collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 3.0e
[7] Evaluation Activities for Network Device cPP, 06-December-2023, Version 3.0e
[8] Functional Package for Secure Shell (SSH), Version 1.0
[9] PP-Module for Stateful Traffic Filter Firewalls, Version 1.4 + Errata 20200625
[10] Supporting Document Mandatory Technical Document Evaluation Activities for
Stateful Traffic Filter Firewalls PP-Module, Version 1.4 +Errata 20200625
[11] PP-Module for VPN Gateways, Version 1.3
[12] Supporting Document Mandatory Technical Document PP-Module for VPN
Gateways, Version: 1.3
[13] FortiOS 7.2 and FortiGate NGFW Appliances FIPS 140-3 and NDcPP Common
Criteria Technote, October 6, 2025 01-728-1075780-20251006
[14] FortiOS 7.2.8 Administration Guide, August 7, 2024 01-728-791905-20240807
[15] FortiOS 7.2.8 CLI Reference, March 14, 2024 01-728-791773-20240314
[16] FortiOS 7.2.8 Log Reference, March 14, 2024 01-728-791443-20240314
[17] FortiOS 7.2 and FortiGate NGFW Appliances NDcPP Common Criteria Logging
Addendum, June 20, 2025 01-728-1172697-20250620
[18] FortiOS 6.4.0 Parallel Path Processing, January 25, 2021 01-640-619132-
20210125
[19] FortiOS 7.2.8 Hardware Acceleration, March 14, 2024 01-729-538746-20240314
[20] Fortinet FortiGate/FortiOS 7.2 Security Target, v1.5, October 2025
[21] FortiGate/FortiOS 7.2 Assurance Activity Report, v1.3, October 2025
[22] Fortinet, Inc. FortiGate/FortiOS 7.2 Vulnerability Assessment, v1.2, October 6,
2025
[23] FortiGate/FortiOS 7.2 Evaluation Technical Report, v1.3
[24] Fortinet, Inc. FortiGate/FortiOS 7.2 Detailed Test Report, v1.2, October 2025
FortiGate/FortiOS 7.2 Validation Report Version 1.0 October 09, 2025
38
[25] Fortinet, Inc. FortiGate/FortiOS 7.2 NDcPPv3.0e + PKG_SSH_V1.0 Test Plan,
v1.1, August 2025
[26] Fortinet, Inc. FortiGate/FortiOS 7.2 FG-2000E NDcPPv3.0e + PKG_SSH_V1.0
Test Evidence, v1.1, October 2025
[27] Fortinet, Inc. FortiGate/FortiOS 7.2 FG-3001F NDcPPv3.0e + PKG_SSH_V1.0
Test Evidence, v1.1, October 2025
[28] Fortinet, Inc. FortiGate/FortiOS 7.2 MOD_CPP_FW_v1.4e Test Plan, v1.0,
August 2025
[29] Fortinet, Inc. FortiGate/FortiOS 7.2 FG-2000E MOD_CPP_FW_v1.4e Evidence,
v1.0, August 2025
[30] Fortinet, Inc. FortiGate/FortiOS 7.2 FG-3001F MOD_CPP_FW_v1.4e Evidence,
v1.0, August 2025
[31] Fortinet, Inc. FortiGate/FortiOS 7.2 MOD_VPNGWv1.3 Test Plan, v1.0, August
2025
[32] Fortinet, Inc. FortiGate/FortiOS 7.2 FG-2000E MOD_VPNGWv1.3 Test Evidence,
v1.0, August 2025
[33] Fortinet, Inc. FortiGate/FortiOS 7.2 FG-3001F MOD_VPNGWv1.3 Test Evidence,
v1.0, August 2025
[34] Fortinet, Inc. FortiGate/FortiOS 7.2 FG-81E MOD_VPNGWv1.3 Test Evidence,
v1.0, August 2025
[35] Fortinet, Inc. FortiGate/FortiOS 7.2 FG-81F MOD_VPNGWv1.3 Test Evidence,
v1.0, August 2025