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Reference: 2019-7-INF-4068- v1
Target: Pública
Date: 22.09.2023
Created by: I003
Revised by: CALIDAD
Approved by: TECNICO
CERTIFICATION REPORT
Dossier # 2019-7
TOE Huawei UNC V001R001C20SPC200 with Patch V100R001C20SPH230
Applicant 440301192203821 - Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.
References
[EXT-4679] Certification Request
[EXT-8368] Evaluation Technical Report
Certification report of the product Huawei UNC V001R001C20SPC200 with Patch
V100R001C20SPH230, as requested in [EXT-4679] dated 01/02/2019, and evaluated by DEKRA
Testing and Certification S.A.U., as detailed in the Evaluation Technical Report [EXT-8368] received
on 13/03/2023.
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CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ........................................................................................................................ 3
TOE SUMMARY................................................................................................................................ 4
SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS .......................................................................................... 4
SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS......................................................................................... 5
IDENTIFICATION.................................................................................................................................. 5
SECURITY POLICIES.............................................................................................................................. 6
ASSUMPTIONS AND OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT ....................................................................... 6
CLARIFICATIONS ON NON-COVERED THREATS................................................................................ 6
OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT FUNCTIONALITY ............................................................................. 6
ARCHITECTURE.................................................................................................................................... 6
LOGICAL ARCHITECTURE ................................................................................................................. 6
PHYSICAL ARCHITECTURE................................................................................................................ 8
DOCUMENTS....................................................................................................................................... 9
PRODUCT TESTING.............................................................................................................................. 9
PENETRATION TESTING ................................................................................................................. 10
EVALUATED CONFIGURATION .......................................................................................................... 10
EVALUATION RESULTS ...................................................................................................................... 11
COMMENTS & RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE EVALUATION TEAM ............................................. 11
CERTIFIER RECOMMENDATIONS....................................................................................................... 11
GLOSSARY ......................................................................................................................................... 11
BIBLIOGRAPHY .................................................................................................................................. 12
SECURITY TARGET / SECURITY TARGET LITE (IF APPLICABLE)............................................................ 12
RECOGNITION AGREEMENTS............................................................................................................ 13
European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA).................................................... 13
International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)................................................................... 13
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This document constitutes the Certification Report for the certification file of the product Huawei
UNC V001R001C20SPC200 with Patch V100R001C20SPH230.
The TOE is server service software that is deployed on CloudOS, which serves as a united network
controller (UNC).
UNC authenticates mobile subscribers onto the network system and tracks active and idle
subscribers on the network system. UNC pages mobile subscribers when it is triggered by new data
arriving for an idle subscriber at the assigned Serving GW (gateway). When a subscriber attaches to
an eNodeB, the eNodeB select a UNC. UNC in turn selects the Serving GW and the PDN GW that will
handle bearer packets of the subscriber. There are procedures to relocate a subscriber to a new
UNC (and potentially a new Serving GW), when an active or idle subscriber moves to a new area
outside of the current UNC control.
Developer/manufacturer: Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.
Sponsor: Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd..
Certification Body: Centro Criptológico Nacional (CCN) del Centro Nacional de Inteligencia (CNI).
ITSEF: DEKRA Testing and Certification S.A.U.
Protection Profile: None.
Evaluation Level: Common Criteria 3.1 R5 EAL4 + ALC_FLR.1.
Evaluation end date: 03/04/2023
Expiration Date1
: 21/06/2028
All the assurance components required by the evaluation level EAL4 (augmented with ALC_FLR.1)
have been assigned a “PASS” verdict. Consequently, the laboratory DEKRA Testing and Certification
S.A.U. assigns the “PASS” VERDICT to the whole evaluation due all the evaluator actions are
satisfied for the EAL4 + ALC_FLR.1, as defined by the Common Criteria 3.1 R5 and the CEM 3.1 R5.
Considering the obtained evidences during the instruction of the certification request of the
product Huawei UNC V001R001C20SPC200 with Patch V100R001C20SPH230, a positive resolution
is proposed.
1
This date refers to the expiration date of the certificate recognition within the scope of the mutual recognition
arrangements signed by this Certification Body.
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TOE SUMMARY
The UNC is a unified service node used in General Packet Radio Service (GPRS), Universal Mobile
Telecommunications System (UMTS), Long-Term Evolution (LTE) and 5G NSA networks. The UNC
provides the functions of the serving GPRS support node (SGSN) and mobility management entity
(MME) and can be used as a separate SGSN, separate MME, or combined SGSN/MME. The UNC can
also be used as a single network element (NE) to manage other UNCs. The TOE is connected to
WebLMT through TLS and to U2020 server through SSH.
SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS
The product was evaluated with all the evidence required to fulfil the evaluation level EAL4 and the
evidences required by the additional component ALC_FLR.1 to the table, according to Common
Criteria v3.1 R5.
ASSURANCE CLASS ASSURANCE COMPONENTS
ASE ASE_CCL.1
ASE_ECD.1
ASE_INT.1
ASE_OBJ.2
ASE_REQ.2
ASE_SPD.1
ASE.TSS.1
ADV ADV_ARC.1
ADV_FSP.4
ADV_IMP.1
ADV_TDS.3
AGD AGD_OPE.1
AGD_PRE.1
ALC ALC_CMC.4
ALC_CMS.4
ALC_DEL.1
ALC_DVS.1
ALC_FLR.1
ALC_LCD.1
ALC_TAT.1
ATE ATE_COV.2
ATE_DPT.1
ATE_FUN.1
ATE_IND.2
AVA AVA_VAN.3
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SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS
The product security functionality satisfies the following functional requirements, according to the
Common Criteria v3.1 R5:
SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS
FAU_GEN.1
FAU_GEN.2
FAU_SAR.1
FAU_SAR.3
FAU_STG.1
FAU_STG.3
FDP_ACC.1
FDP_ACF.1
FIA_UID.2
FIA_UAU.2
FIA_UAU.4
FIA_AFL.1
FIA_ATD.1
FIA_SOS.1
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MOF.1
FMT_MSA.1
FMT_MSA.3
FMT_SAE.1
FTA_MCS.1/WebLMT
FTA_MCS.1/U2020
FTA_SSL.3
FTP_TRP.1
FTP_ITC.1
IDENTIFICATION
Product: Huawei UNC V001R001C20SPC200 with Patch V100R001C20SPH230
Security Target: Huawei UNC V100R001C20SPC200 with Patch V100R001C20SPH230 Security
Target, version 2.3 (03rd
March 2023).
Protection Profile: None.
Evaluation Level: Common Criteria 3.1 R5 EAL4 + ALC_FLR.1.
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SECURITY POLICIES
The use of the product Huawei UNC V001R001C20SPC200 with Patch V100R001C20SPH230 shall
implement a set of security policies assuring the fulfilment of different standards and security
demands.
The detail of these policies is documented in the Security Target, section 3.2 (“OSP”).
ASSUMPTIONS AND OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
The following assumptions are constraints to the conditions used to assure the security properties
and functionalities compiled by the security target. These assumptions have been applied during
the evaluation in order to determine if the identified vulnerabilities can be exploited.
In order to assure the secure use of the TOE, it is necessary to start from these assumptions for its
operational environment. If this is not possible and any of them could not be assumed, it would not
be possible to assure the secure operation of the TOE.
The detail of these assumptions is documented in the Security Target, section 3.3 (“Assumptions”).
CLARIFICATIONS ON NON-COVERED THREATS
The following threats do not suppose a risk for the product Huawei UNC V001R001C20SPC200 with
Patch V100R001C20SPH230, although the agents implementing attacks have the attack potential
according to the Enhanced-Basic of EAL4 + ALC_FLR.1 and always fulfilling the usage assumptions
and the proper security policies satisfaction.
For any other threat not included in this list, the evaluation results of the product security
properties and the associated certificate, do not guarantee any resistance.
The threats covered by the security properties of the TOE are those defined in the Security Target,
section 3.1 (“Threats”).
OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT FUNCTIONALITY
The product requires the cooperation from its operational environment to fulfil some of the
objectives of the defined security problem.
The security objectives declared for the TOE operational environment are those defined in the
Protection Profile and they are documented in the Security Target, section 4.2 (“Security Objectives
for the Operational Environment”).
ARCHITECTURE
LOGICAL ARCHITECTURE
The TOE provides the following security features:
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• Auditing
- The TOE records operations on and events that occur to the device. The recorded
operations and events are log messages. Log messages provide evidence for
diagnosing and maintaining the TOE.
- The log records user operations, user management, security policy configuration,
system management, etc. associating the identity of the user with the event.
- Only authorized users can view logs and users can select the log based on the time
range and security level.
- The oldest log files are deleted if the audit trail exceeds the size of store device.
• Communication security
- The TOE supports trusted communications using TLS for the communication channel
between the TOE and the WebLMT.
- The TOE supports trusted communications using SSH for the communication channel
between the TOE and the U2020 server.
• Authentication
- The TOE supports password-based user authentication
- The TOE can grant different privileges to the user according to user roles.
- The TOE can enforce user password policy.
- In order to protect the TOE, the TSF can restrict the maximum number of concurrent
sessions and can lock an interactive session after a time interval. The user should re-
authentication prior to unlocking the session.
- The TOE can lock the user account for 5 minutes, if this user has 3 unsuccessful
authentication attempts within 5 minutes.
• Access control
- The TOE supports IP-based Access Control List (ACL) to filter traffic destined to TOE to
prevent internal traffic overload and service interruption.
- The TOE can limit the session establishment via SSH/TLS by blacklist/whitelist filtering,
which compares the client of session establishment request with specified
blacklist/whitelist. The TOE can reject the session establishment from the IP address in
the blacklist, while accept the session establishment request from the IP address or in
the whitelist.
• Secure Management
- The security management function of the TOE supports user management, , TLS and
SSH configuration and ACL management.
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PHYSICAL ARCHITECTURE
The TOE physical scope comprises both the software packages detailed in the table below and the
documents described in the next section.
Software and Documents Description File Type SHA256
UNCOption3_V100R001C20SPC200_Install.zip Base software
package (In the
form of binary
compressed
files).
Software 7e9ca6d8bf906aca0
bb0fe8827dc6ce0f3
2fd04d511474331c
320a6870b289c2
UNCOption3_V100R001C20SPC200_Install.zip.asc Signature file
of base
software
package
Signature
file
769f3b177c22a85c
b48ac344ec815ad5
c8a09dbda61a77b3
21faa664da8f34cf
UNCOption3_V100R001C20SPH230.zip Patch software
package
Software 5bffdc88c3490ef62
d9ced087d9ae2317
b5dcff8e4ab8873b6
26679a9938f246
UNCOption3_V100R001C20SPH230.zip.asc Signature file
of patch
software
package
Signature
file
4f662935bd589ae3
e76a9620c292aac0
eb05099e15e9217e
8e9656cd15fb5538
The figure below shows the TOE and its operational environment:
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DOCUMENTS
The product includes the following documents that shall be distributed and made available
together to the users of the evaluated version.
Document title Description File Type SHA256
Huawei UNC V100R001C20SPC200
with Patch V100R001C20SPH230
Security Management Guide
V2.0.pdf
The guidance
documents of TOE
Document 2c406c21141736a91f05
6f1a8424ac15f9f332cb6
a387feb5fa58699d4cdd
249
Huawei UNC V100R001C20SPC200
with Patch V100R001C20SPH230
Installation Guide V2.1.pdf
Document 44a3000c97b450cf6944
aac1524993d10fc842c2
325ab04a42c9db8daea
8b4b7
Huawei UNC V100R001C20SPC200
with Patch V100R001C20SPH230
MML Commands Guide, part 1.pdf
Document ed2e21d13549c895c35
155827a76a3b16e1291
9037764fdc210a1cb68c
5fad7b
UNC V100R001C20SPC200 Upgrade
Guide 01 (FusionSphere+E9000
Based on WebLMT, Applicable to
V100R001C10SPC300 and
Later).doc
TOE base version
full installation
guide (for Huawei
engineer only)
Document 4d96af50b72b5d91d62
14313af9a50615fd89ac
d8bd0513a8d1337e057
833b37
UNC V100R001C20SPH230 Upgrade
Guide (Upgrade by Using the
WebLMT) 01.doc
TOE patch version
full installation
guide (for Huawei
engineer only)
Document 04c9450e10d6c62cfb5d
00c6b6333224c6ede6a
899dc52baae2f57478b9
f16f3
PRODUCT TESTING
The developer has executed test for all the security functions. All the tests have been performed by
the developer in its premises, with a satisfactory result.
During the evaluation process it has been verified each unit test checking that the security
functionality that covers is been identified and also that the kind of test is appropriate to the
function that is intended to test.
All the tests have been developed using the testing scenario appropriate to the established
architecture in the security target. It has also been checked that the obtained results during the
tests fit or correspond to the previously estimated results.
To verify the results of the developer tests, the evaluator has repeated all the developer functional
tests in the evaluator premises. In addition, the lab has devised a test for each of the security
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function of the product verifying that the obtained results are consistent with the results obtained
by the developer.
It has been checked that the obtained results conform to the expected results and in the cases
where a deviation in respect to the expected results was present, the evaluator has confirmed that
this variation neither represents any security problem nor a decrease in the functional capacity of
the product.
PENETRATION TESTING
Based on the list of potential vulnerabilities applicable to the TOE in its operational environment,
the evaluation team has devised attack scenarios for penetration tests. Within these activities, all
aspects of the security architecture, which were not covered by functional testing, have been
considered.
The overall test result is that no deviations were found between the expected and the actual test
results. No attack scenario with the attack potential Enhanced-Basic has been successful in the
TOE’s operational environment as defined in the security target when all security measures
required by the developer in the security guidance defined in DOCUMENTS section are applied.
EVALUATED CONFIGURATION
The software and hardware requirements, as well as the referenced options are indicated below.
Therefore, for the operation of the product Huawei UNC V001R001C20SPC200 with Patch
V100R001C20SPH230 it is necessary the disposition of the following software components:
Item Item Type Requirements
TOE TOE Huawei UNC version V100R001C20SPC200 with
Patch V100R001C20SPH230
Browser Microsoft Internet Explorer
Firefox
Google Chrome
Microsoft Internet Explorer 11
Firefox 64.X
Google Chrome 55.X
Cloud OS Fusion Sphere Version HUAWEI Cloud Stack NFVI 6.5.1
vSwitch Virtual switch N/A
Server E9000 Version: E9000 Chassis V100R001C10SPC522
RAM: 1113GB
Hard disk: 6482GB
U2020 Server U2020 Server Version U2020 V300R019C10SPC540
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EVALUATION RESULTS
The product Huawei UNC V001R001C20SPC200 with Patch V100R001C20SPH230 has been
evaluated against the Security Target Huawei UNC V100R001C20SPC200 with Patch
V100R001C20SPH230 Security Target, version 2.3 (03rd March 2023).
All the assurance components required by the evaluation level EAL4 + ALC_FLR.1 have been
assigned a “PASS” verdict. Consequently, the laboratory DEKRA Testing and Certification S.A.U.
assigns the “PASS” VERDICT to the whole evaluation due all the evaluator actions are satisfied for
the evaluation level EAL4 + ALC_FLR.1, as defined by the Common Criteria 3.1 R5 and the CEM 3.1
R5.
COMMENTS & RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE EVALUATION TEAM
Next, recommendations regarding the secure usage of the TOE are provided. These have been
collected along the evaluation process and are detailed to be considered when using the product.
• It is mandatory to strictly follow the steps indicated in the installation documentation in
order to download and install the correct version of the TOE and the cumulative update in a
proper manner.
• The user guidance must be read and understood in order to operate the TOE in an adequate
manner according to the Security Target.
• The fulfillment of the assumptions indicated in the security target is a key point as it implies
TOE environment configurations that leave some potential vulnerabilities out of the scope.
CERTIFIER RECOMMENDATIONS
Considering the obtained evidences during the instruction of the certification request of the
product Huawei UNC V001R001C20SPC200 with Patch V100R001C20SPH230, a positive resolution
is proposed.
GLOSSARY
CCN Centro Criptológico Nacional
CNI Centro Nacional de Inteligencia
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
OC Organismo de Certificación
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TOE Target Of Evaluation
BIBLIOGRAPHY
The following standards and documents have been used for the evaluation of the product:
[CC_P1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 1: Introduction and
general model, Version 3.1, R5 Final, April 2017.
[CC_P2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security functional
components, Version 3.1, R5 Final, April 2017.
[CC_P3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security assurance
components, Version 3.1, R5 Final, April 2017.
[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation: Version 3.1, R5 Final,
April 2017.
[ST] Huawei UNC V100R001C20SPC200 with Patch V100R001C20SPH230 Security Target, version
2.3 (03rd March 2023).
SECURITY TARGET / SECURITY TARGET LITE (IF APPLICABLE)
Along with this certification report, the complete security target of the evaluation is available in the
Certification Body:
• Huawei UNC V100R001C20SPC200 with Patch V100R001C20SPH230 Security Target, version
2.3 (03rd March 2023).
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RECOGNITION AGREEMENTS
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or CC - under
certain conditions was agreed.
European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in April 2010. It
defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition level and, in addition, at
higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS Technical Domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels EAL 1 to EAL
4 and ITSEC Evaluation Assurance Levels E1 to E3 (basic). For "Smartcards and similar devices" a
SOGIS Technical Domain is in place. For "HW Devices with Security Boxes" a SOGIS Technical
Domains is in place, too. In addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common
Criteria are part of the recognition agreement.
The new agreement has been signed by the national bodies of Austria, Finland, France, Germany,
Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. The current list of
signatory nations and approved certification schemes, details on recognition, and the history of the
agreement can be seen on the website at https://www.sogis.eu.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the terms of this
agreement by the nations listed above.
The certificate of this TOE is recognized under SOGIS-MRA for all assurance components selected.
International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC (Common
Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08 September 2014. It covers
CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP) (exact use), CC certificates based on
assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or the assurance family Flaw Remediation
(ALC_FLR) and CC certificates for Protection Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).
The CCRA-2014 replaces the old CCRA signed in May 2000 (CCRA-2000). Certificates based on CCRA-
2000, issued before 08 September 2014 are still under recognition according to the rules of CCRA-
2000. For on 08 September 2014 ongoing certification procedures and for Assurance Continuity
(maintenance and re-certification) of old certificates a transition period on the recognition of
certificates according to the rules of CCRA-2000 (i.e. assurance components up to and including EAL
4 or the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR)) is defined until 08 September 2017.
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As of September 2014 the signatories of the new CCRA-2014 are government representatives from
the following nations: Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, The Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Korea, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, and the
United States.
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on the
website: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates that this
certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the nations listed above.
The certificate of this TOE is recognized under CCRA for all assurance components up to EAL2 and
ALC_FLR.