Certification Report
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
BSI-DSZ-CC-0334-2006
for
MN67S140, RV3, FV12 – EAST JAPAN RAILWAY
COMPANY SuicaII Contactless Smart Card IC
Chip
from
Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd.
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0334-2006 ZS-01-01-F-329 V3.21
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 228 9582-0, Fax +49 228 9582-455, Infoline +49 228 9582-111
BSI-DSZ-CC-0334-2006
MN67S140, RV3, FV12 – EAST JAPAN RAILWAY
COMPANY SuicaII Contactless Smart Card IC Chip
from
Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd.
Common Criteria Arrangement
for components up to EAL4
The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an accredited and licensed/
approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Part 1
Version 0.6, Part 2 Version 1.0 extended by advice of the Certification Body for components
beyond EAL4 and smart card specific guidance for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT
Security Evaluation, Version 2.1 (ISO/IEC 15408:1999) and including final interpretations for
compliance with Common Criteria Version 2.2 and Common Methodology Part 2, Version 2.2.
Evaluation Results:
PP Conformance: Protection Profile BSI-PP-0002-2001
Functionality: PP BSI-PP-0002-2001 conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance Package: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL4 augmented by:
ADV_IMP.2 (Development - Implementation of security functions)
ALC_DVS.2 (Life cycle support – Sufficiency of security measures)
AVA_MSU.3 (Vulnerability assessment – Analysis and testing for insecure states)
AVA_VLA.4 (Vulnerability assessment – Highly resistant)
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated
configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification
scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the
evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
The notes mentioned on the reverse side are part of this certificate.
Bonn, 16. March 2006
The President of the Federal Office
for Information Security
Dr. Helmbrecht L.S.
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 228 9582-0 - Fax +49 228 9582-455 - Infoline +49 228 9582-111
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no
warranty of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other
organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0334-2006
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the
task of issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a
distributor, hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product
according to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised
security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the
BSI or by BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This
report contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the
detailed Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security
functionality of the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and
weaknesses) and instructions for the user.
1
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of 17
December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
V
BSI-DSZ-CC-0334-2006 Certification Report
Contents
Part A: Certification
Part B: Certification Results
Part C: Excerpts from the Criteria
Part D: Annexes
VI
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0334-2006
A Certification
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down
in the following:
• BSIG2
• BSI Certification Ordinance3
• BSI Schedule of Costs4
• Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal
Ministry of the Interior)
• DIN EN 45011 standard
• BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
• Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 2.15
• Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM)
• Part 1, Version 0.6
• Part 2, Version 1.0
• BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS)
• Advice from the Certification Body on methodology for assurance
components above EAL4 (AIS 34)
The use of Common Criteria Version 2.1, Common Methodology, part 2,
Version 1.0 and final interpretations as part of AIS 32 results in compliance of
the certification results with Common Criteria Version 2.2 and Common
Methodology Part 2, Version 2.2 as endorsed by the Common Criteria
recognition arrangement committees.
2
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of
17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 7 July 1992,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik (BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 22 September 2000 in the Bundes-
anzeiger p. 19445
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0334-2006 Certification Report
2 Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries
a mutual recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are
based on ITSEC or CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1 ITSEC/CC - Certificates
The SOGIS-Agreement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on
ITSEC became effective on 3 March 1998. This agreement was signed by the
national bodies of Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands,
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. This
agreement on the mutual recognition of IT security certificates was extended to
include certificates based on the CC for all evaluation levels (EAL 1 – EAL 7).
2.2 CC - Certificates
An arrangement (Common Criteria Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC evaluation assurance levels up to and including
EAL 4 was signed in May 2000. It includes also the recognition of Protection
Profiles based on the CC. The arrangement was signed by the national bodies
of Australia, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, United Kingdom and the United
States. Israel joined the arrangement in November 2000, Sweden in February
2002, Austria in November 2002, Hungary and Turkey in September 2003,
Japan in November 2003, the Czech Republic in September 2004, the Republic
of Singapore in March 2005, India in April 2005.
This evaluation contains the components ADV_IMP.2, ALC_DVS.2,
AVA_MSU.3 and AVA_VLA.4 that are not mutually recognised in accordance
with the provisions of the CCRA. For mutual recognition the EAL4-components
of these assurance families are relevant.
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform
procedure, a uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product MN67S140 Smartcard IC, RV3, FV12 has undergone the
certification procedure at BSI.
The evaluation of the product MN67S140 Smartcard IC, RV3, FV12 was
conducted by TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH. The TÜV Informationstechnik
GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)6
recognised by BSI.
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0334-2006
The sponsor is:
Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd.
1 Kotari-yakemachi Nagaokakyo City
Kyoto 617-8520, Japan
The certification is concluded with
• the comparability check and
• the production of this Certification Report.
This work was completed by the BSI on 16. March 2006.
The confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
• all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in
the following report, are observed,
• the product is operated in the environment described, where specified in the
following report.
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product indicated
here. The validity can be extended to new versions and releases of the product,
provided the sponsor applies for re-certification of the modified product, in
accordance with the procedural requirements, and the evaluation does not
reveal any security deficiencies.
For the meaning of the assurance levels and the confirmed strength of
functions, please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at the end of the
Certification Report.
4 Publication
The following Certification Results contain pages B-1 to B-23 and D1 to D-4.
The product MN67S140 Smartcard IC, RV3, FV12 has been included in the BSI
list of the certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet:
http:// www.bsi.bund.de). Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline
+49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the vendor7
of
the product. The Certification Report can also be downloaded from the above-
mentioned website.
7
Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd.
1 Kotari-yakemachi Nagaokakyo City
Kyoto 617-8520, Japan
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0334-2006
B Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
• the security target of the sponsor for the target of evaluation,
• the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
• complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0334-2006 Certification Report
Contents of the certification results
1 Executive Summary 3
2 Identification of the TOE 9
3 Security Policy 10
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 11
5 Architectural Information 11
6 Documentation 12
7 IT Product Testing 13
8 Evaluated Configuration 13
9 Results of the Evaluation 14
10 Comments/Recommendations 17
11 Annexes 18
12 Security Target 18
13 Definitions 19
14 Bibliography 21
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0334-2006
1 Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is MN67S140, RV3, FV12 - EAST JAPAN
RAILWAY COMPANY SuicaII contactless Smart Card IC chip (further will be
called as MN67S140, RV3, FV12). The Hardware is the complete chip
composed of processing unit, Cryptographic Hardware, security components,
RF interface, and volatile and non-volatile memories. The TOE also includes IC
Dedicated Software with Version FV12.
This TOE is manufactured by Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. in Kyoto
indicated by the production line indicator ‘001’ for Tonami and ‘010’ for Kyoto
(see part D. Annex A of this Report).
The MN67S140, RV3, FV12 is intended to be used for the applications requiring
high security such as transportation and fare collection applications (the
Commuter ticket), access control applications (ID cards), and government
applications (the Basic Resident Register, health cards and driver license).
These are only a few examples and its potentiality can be considered finite.
The whole TOE consists of
• Prossesing unit (CPU) contains the Core AM13C, Interrupt function that
processes interrupt. The interrupt function speeds up interrupt response with
circuitry that automatically loads the branch address to the corresponding
interrupt processing program from an interrupt vector table, and processes
non-maskable interrupts (NMI) and level interrupts.
• Cryptographic Hardware, the Cryptographic Hardware is capable of realizing
the DES functionality in accordance with the Single-DES and Triple-DES;
however, the Single-DES is outside the scope of evaluation.
• Security components, Security Circuit contains access control circuit and
various security logics such as RNG (True Random Number), random
current generator, sensors and filters ( see [7]).
• RF Interface (radio frequency power and signal interface) in conformity to
ISO/IEC 14443-2 and JICSAP (Japan IC Card System Application council)
enables contactless communication between the chip and a reader/writer.
The power supply and data are received by an antenna which consists of a
coil with a few turns directly connected to the pads of the TOE.
• Memories consisting of ROM 42Kbytes, SRAM 2Kbytes, XRAM 0.5Kbytes,
FeRAM 8Kbytes, PROM 96Bytes. The IC Dedicated Software is part of TOE
and stored in ROM. The Smartcard Embedded Software is also stored in the
ROM but not part of TOE. FeRAM can be accessed as both data memory
and program memory. In PROM, data not allowed to be overwritten is
stored.
Several security features independently implemented in hardware or controlled
by software will be provided to ensure proper operations and integrity and
confidentiality of stored data. This includes for example measures for memory
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0334-2006 Certification Report
protection, leakage protection and sensors to allow operations only under
specified conditions.
The Security Target [6] is written using the Smartcard IC Platform Protection
Profile, Version 1.0, July 2001, BSI registration ID: BSI-PP-0002-2001 [8]. With
reference to this Protection Profile, the smart card product life cycle is described
in 7 phases. The development, production and operational user environment
are described and referenced to these phases. TOE delivery is defined at the
end of phase 3 in form of sawn wafers (dice).
The assumptions, threats and objectives defined in this Protection Profile [8] are
used. To address additional security features of the TOE (e.g cryptographic
services), the security environment as outlined in the PP [8] is augmented by an
additional policy, an assumption and security objectives accordingly.
The IT product MN67S140 Smartcard IC, RV3, FV12 was evaluated by TÜV
Informationstechnik GmbH, Prüfstelle IT-Sicherheit. The evaluation was
completed on 03. March 2006. The TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH, Prüfstelle
IT-Sicherheit is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)8
recognised by BSI.
The sponsor is
Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd.
1 Kotari-yakemachi Nagaokakyo City
Kyoto 617-8520, Japan
1.1 Assurance package
The TOE security assurance requirements are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in part 3 of the Common Criteria (see Annex C or [1], part
3 for details). The TOE meets the assurance requirements of assurance level
EAL4. The following table shows the augmented assurance components.
Requirement Identifier
EAL4 TOE evaluation: methodically designed, tested, and reviewed
+: ADV_IMP.2 Development – Implementation of the TSF
+: ALC_DVS.2 Life cycle support – Sufficiency of security measures
+: AVA_MSU.3 Vulnerability assessment – Analysis and testing for
insecure states
+: AVA_VLA.4 Vulnerability assessment – Highly resistent
Table 1: Assurance components and EAL-augmentation
8
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0334-2006
1.2 Functionality
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) selected in the Security
Target are Common Criteria Part 2 extended as shown in the following tables.
The following SFRs are taken from CC part 2:
Security Functional Requirement Addressed issue
FCS Cryptographic support
FCS_COP.1A Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1B Cryptographic operation
FDP User data protection
FDP_ITT.1 Basic internal transfer protection
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control
FPT Protection of the TOE Security Functions
FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state
FPT_SEP.1 Domain separation
FPT_ITT.1 Basic internal TSF data transfer protection
FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to physical attack
FRU Resource utilisation
FRU_FLT.2 Limited fault tolerance
Table 2: SFRs for the TOE taken from CC Part 2
The following CC part 2 extended SFRs are defined:
Security Functional Requirement Addressed issue
FAU Security Audit
FAU_SAS.1 Audit storage
FCS Cryptographic support
FCS_RND.1 Quality metric for random numbers
FMT Security Management
FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities
FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability
Table 3: SFRs for the TOE, CC part 2 extended
Note: only the titles of the Security Functional Requirements are provided. For
more details and application notes please refer to the ST [7] chapter 5.1.1 ff
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0334-2006 Certification Report
The following Security Functional Requirements are defined for the IT-
Environment of the TOE:
Security Functional
Requirement
Addressed issue
FDP_ITC.1
or
FDP_ITC.2
or
FCS_CKM.1
Import of user data without security attributes
or
Import of user data with security attributes
or
Cryptographic key generation,
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction,
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes.
Table 4: SFRs for the IT-Environment
Note: only the titles of the Security Functional Requirements are provided. For
more details and application notes please refer to the ST [7] chapter 5.2 ff.
These Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the TOE Security
Functions:
TOE Security Function Addressed issue
SF.RNG Random Number Generator
SF.FAS Filters and Sensors
SF.PHY Tamper Resistance
SF.DPR Data Protection
SF.MCT Mode Control
SF.DES DES
SF.AUTH Mutual Authentication Function
SF.ACU Access Control Unit
SF.ID ID Injection
For more details please refer to the Security Target [7], chapter 6.
1.3 Strength of Function
The TOE’s strength of functions is claimed ‘high’ (SOF-high) for specific
functions as indicated in the Security Target [7, chapter 6]. The rating of the
strength of functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms suitable for
encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2). For details
see chapter 9 of this report.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0334-2006
1.4 Summary of threats and Organisational Security Policies
(OSPs) addressed by the evaluated IT product
The threats which were assumed for the evaluation and averted by the TOE
and the organisational security policies defined for the TOE are specified in the
Security Target [7] and can be summarised as follows.
It is assumed that the attacker is a human being or a process acting on behalf
of him.
So-called standard high-level security concerns defined in the Protection Profile
[9] were derived from considering the end-usage phase (Phase 7 of the life
cycle as described in the Security Target) as follows:
• manipulation of User Data and of the smart card Embedded Software
(while being executed/processed and while being stored in the TOE’s
memories),
• disclosure of User Data and of the smart card Embedded Software (while
being processed and while being stored in the TOE’s memories) and
• deficiency of random numbers.
These high-level security concerns are refined in the Protection Profile [9] and
used by the Security Target [7] by defining threats on a more technical level for
• Inherent Information Leakage,
• Physical Probing,
• Physical Manipulation,
• Malfunction due to Environmental Stress,
• Forced Information Leakage,
• Abuse of Functionality and
• Deficiency of Random Numbers.
Phase 1 and the Phases from TOE Delivery up to the end of Phase 6 are
covered by assumptions (see below).
The development and production environment starting with Phase 2 up to TOE
Delivery are covered by an organisational security policy outlining that the IC
Developer / Manufacturer must apply the policy “Protection during TOE
Development and Production (P.Process-TOE)” so that no information is
unintentionally made available for the operational phase of the TOE. The Policy
ensures confidentiality and integrity of the TOE and its related design
information and data. Access to samples, tools and material must be restricted.
A specific additional security functionality Triple-DES and Mutual Authentication
Function must be provided by the TOE according to an additional security policy
defined in the Security Target.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0334-2006 Certification Report
Objectives are taken from the Protection Profile plus additional ones related to
the additional policy.
1.5 Special configuration requirements
The TOE has two different operating modes, user mode and API mode. The
test mode is deactivated before TOE is delivered. The application software
being executed on the TOE can not use the test mode. The TOE is delivered as
a hardware unit at the end of the IC manufacturing process (Phase 3). At this
time the embedded software including operating system and the IC dedicated
software are already stored in the non-volatile memories of the chip. The two
operating modes mentioned above are determined depending on the program
counter place. When the user program is executed, TOE transits to User mode.
On the other hand, when the program of IC Dedicated Software is executed, a
reset is issued, or power turns on, TOE transits to API mode.
There are no special procedures for generation or installation that are important
for a secure use of the TOE. The further production and delivery processes
have to be organised in a way that excludes all possibilities of physical
manipulation of the TOE.
There are no special security measures for the start-up of the TOE besides the
requirement that the controller has to be used under the well-defined operating
conditions and that the requirements on the software have to be applied as
described in the user documentation and chapter 10 of this Report.
1.6 Assumptions about the operating environment
Since the Security Target claims conformance to the Protection Profile [9], the
assumptions defined in section 3.2 of the Protection Profile are valid for the
Security Target of this TOE. With respect to the life cycle defined in the Security
Target, Phase 1 and the Phases from TOE Delivery up to the end of Phase 6
are covered by these assumptions from the PP:
The developer of the smart card Embedded Software (Phase 1) must ensure:
• the appropriate “Usage of Hardware Platform (A.Plat-Appl)” while
developing this software in Phase 1. Therefore, it has to be ensured, that
the software fulfils the assumptions for a secure use of the TOE. In
particular the assumptions imply that developers are trusted to develop
software that fulfils the assumptions.
• the appropriate “Treatment of User Data (A.Resp-Appl)” while developing
this software in Phase 1. The Smartcard embedded software including
operating system have to use security relevant user data of the TOE
(especially keys and plain text data) in a secure way. It is assumed that
the Security Policy as defined for the specific application context of the
environment does not contradict the Security Objectives of the TOE. Only
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appropriate secret keys as input for the cryptographic function of the TOE
have to be used to ensure the strength of cryptographic operation.
• Protection during Packaging, Finishing and Personalisation
(A.Process-Card) is assumed after TOE Delivery up to the end of Phase
6, as well as during the delivery to Phase 7
The following additional assumption is assumed in the Security Target:
• Key-dependent functions (if any) shall be implemented in the smart card
Embedded Software in a way that they are not susceptible to leakage
attacks (A.Key-Function).
• The developer of Smartcard Embedded Software must ensure the
appropriate “Usage of triple-DES (A.DES)” while developing this software
in Phase 1. It is assumed that the triple-DES algorithm shall be used as
encryption algorithm.
• The developer of Smartcard Embedded Software must ensure the
appropriate “Implementation of command interpreter (A.Interpreter)”
while developing this software in Phase 1. It is assumed that the
command interpreter used for the tests in Phase 4 and 5 shall be
implemented. For further details see in [7].
1.7 Disclaimers
The Certification Results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the
Certificate and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in
this Certification Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product
by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation
that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT
product by BSI or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2 Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
MN67S140, RV3, FV12 – EAST JAPAN RAILWAY COMPANY SuicaII
Contactless Smart Card IC Chip
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The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
1 HW MN67S140 RV3, with
production line
indicator ‘001’ for
Tonami and ‘010’
for Kyoto
Wafer (dice)
2 SW IC dedicated software FV12 Stored in ROM on IC
3 DOC MN67S140 Smartcard IC
Administrator Guidance for
Card Manufacturer [10]
1.0 Pdf-file
4 DOC MN67S140 Smartcard IC
Administrator Guidance for
Smartcard Embedded
Software Developer [11]
1.0 Pdf-file
Table 5: Deliverables of the TOE
The TOE is identified by MN67S140 RV3 FV12. Another characteristic of the
TOE is the chip version information. This information is stored in the ROM and
can be read out by the user of the card via relevant command. For the format of
the chip version information see [11] and Chapter 3.9.2.2. The answer to the
relevant command contains 16 bytes where the relevant information can be
found in:
Byte 1 - 2: 0x00, 0x02: MN67S140
Byte 3 - 4: 0x00, 0x03: RV3
Byte 5 – 6: 0x01 0x02: FV12.
During the production tests a unique production line indicator is written into
each TOE. This information can be read out by the user of the card via the
relevant command. For the format of the production line indicator see [11] and
chapter 3.9.2.1. The answer to the command contains 16 bytes where the
relevant information concerning the production site can be found in: Lower three
bits of Byte 3: 001 for Tonami and 010 for Kyoto.
3 Security Policy
The security policy of the TOE is to provide basic Security Functions to be used
by the smartcard operating system and the smartcard application thus providing
an overall smart card system security. Therefore, the TOE will implement a
symmetric cryptographic block cipher algorithm to ensure the confidentiality of
plain text data by encryption and to support secure authentication protocols and
it will provide a random number generator. As the TOE is a hardware security
platform, the security policy of the TOE is also to provide protection against
leakage of information (e.g. to ensure the confidentiality of cryptographic keys
during Triple-DES), against physical probing, against malfunctions, against
physical manipulations and against abuse of functionality. Hence the TOE shall:
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• maintain the integrity and the confidentiality of data stored in the memory
of the TOE and
• maintain the integrity, the correct operation and the confidentiality of
Security Functions (security mechanisms and associated functions)
provided by the TOE.
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The smartcard embedded software including operating stored in the User ROM
and not part of the TOE. The code in the Test ROM of the TOE (IC Dedicated
Software) is used by the TOE manufacturer to check the chip function before
TOE delivery. This was considered as part of the evaluation under the CC
assurance aspects ALC for relevant procedures and under ATE for testing.
The TOE is delivered as sawn wafers (dice) at the end of the chip
manufacturing process (phase 3 of the life cycle defined). At this specific point
in time the embedded software including operating system is already stored in
the non-volatile memories of the chip and the test mode is completely disabled.
The smart card applications need the Security Functions of the smart card
operating system based on the security features of the TOE. With respect to
security the composition of this TOE, the operating system, and the smart card
application is important. Within this composition the security functionality is only
partly provided by the TOE and causes dependencies between the TOE
Security Functions and the functions provided by the operating system or the
smart card application on top. These dependencies are expressed by environ-
mental and secure usage assumptions as outlined in the user documentation.
Within this evaluation of the TOE several aspects were specifically considered
to support a composite evaluation of the TOE together with an embedded smart
card application software (i.e. smart card operating system and application).
This was necessary as Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. is the TOE
developer and manufacturer and responsible for specific aspects of handling
the embedded smart card application software in its development and
production environment. For those aspects refer to part B, chapter 9.2 of this
report.
The full evaluation results are applicable only for TOE chips from the
semiconductor factory in Tonami and Kyoto (labelled by the production line
indicator „001“ for Tonami and ‘010’ for Kyoto).
5 Architectural Information
The MN67S140 Smartcard IC, RV3, FV12 with IC dedicated software are
integrated circuits (IC) providing a platform to a smart card operating system
and smart card application software. A top level block diagram and a list of
subsystems can be found within the TOE description of the Security Target [7].
The complete description of the TOE for card manufacturer and embedded
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software developer is to be found in guidance documents delivered to the
customer, see table 5.
For the implementation of the TOE Security Functions basically the components
processing unit (CPU), XRAM,SRAM, ROM, FeRAM, PROM, security logic,
interrupt module, bus system, Random Number Generator (RNG), RF-Interface
and the DES module for cryptographic operations of the chip are used. Security
measures for physical protection are realised within the layout of the whole
circuitry.
The electrical interface of the TOE to the external environment is the coil pads
to which the RF antenna is connected.The CPU instructions and the various on-
chip memories provide the interface to the software using the Security
Functions of the TOE. The IC dedicated software has two parts, IC dedicated
support software and IC dedicated test software. The TOE IC dedicated test
software, stored on the chip is used for testing purposes during production only
and is completely separated from the use of the embedded software by
disabling before TOE delivery. The TOE IC Dedicated Support Software stored
in ROM can be used by the users embedded software. The following table 6
summarizes the functions of whole IC dedicated software:
Sorting of IC
Dedicated
Software
Name Purpose
I/O Preprocessor API To operate the contactless communications
Memory API To operate the accesses to SRAM, FeRAM,
and XRAM
Cryptographic API To operate the Cryptographic processing and
mutual authentication processing
Timer API To operate Timers
Utility API To acquire the system information and execute
such as CRC calculation
Issuance API To execute functionality tests by card
manufacture after the TOE delivery
IC Dedicated
Support Software
Secure Startup To execute the hardware initial setup and the
interrupt handling
IC Dedicated
Test Software
Contact Test Software To test FeRAM and security functions
Table 6
6 Documentation
The documentation [10] – [23] is provided with the products by the developer to
the customer for secure usage of the TOE in accordance with the Security
Target.
Note that the customer who buys the TOE is normally the developer of the
embedded software including operating system and/or application software
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which will use the TOE as hardware computing platform to implement the
software (operating system / application software) which will use the TOE.
To support a composite evaluation as defined in AIS 36 [4], the document ETR-
lite [24] is provided for the composite evaluator.
7 IT Product Testing
The tests performed by the developer were divided into six categories:
(i) tests which are performed in a simulation environment for analogue and
for digital simulations;
(ii) functional production tests, which are done as a last step of the
production process (phase 3. These tests are done for every chip to
check its correct functionality;
(iii) qualification tests to release the TOE to production to determine the
behaviour of the chip with respect to different operating conditions (often
also referred to as characterisation tests);
(iv) special verification tests on functionality of the chip which were done with
samples of the TOE in user mode and API mode;
(v) special verification tests on Security Functions which were done with
samples of the TOE in user mode and API mode;
(vi) layout tests as part of the design and release process by testing the
implementation by optical control, in order to verify statements
concerning the layout design.
The developer tests cover all Security Functions and all security mechanisms
as identified in the functional specification, the high level design and the low
level design. Chips from the production site in Kyoto (see part D, annex A of this
report) were used for tests.
For this evaluation, the developer provided test evidence for chips from the
production site Kyoto. The test results confirm the correct implementation of the
TOE Security Functions.
The evaluators supplied evidence that the actual version of the TOE with
production line indicator “001” for Tonami and “010” for Kyoto (Japan) provides
the Security Functions as specified.
For this evaluation the evaluators assessed the penetration testing and
confirmed the results. Intensive penetration testing was performed at that time
to consider the physical tampering of the TOE using highly sophisticated
equipment and expertised know-how. Specific additional penetration attacks
were performed in the course of this evaluation.
8 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is identified by the version MN67S140 Smartcard IC, RV3, FV12,-
EAST JAPAN RAILWAY COMPANY SuicaII contactless Smart Card IC chip
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and IC dedicated Software with production line indicator ‘001’ (Tonami) and
“010” (Kyoto). The TOE has only one fixed evaluated configuration at the time
of delivery.
All information of how to use the TOE and its Security Functions by the software
is provided within the user documentation.
The TOE has two different operating modes, user mode and API mode. The
test mode is disabled. The application software being executed on the TOE can
not use the test mode. Thus, the evaluation was mainly performed in the user
mode and API mode. For all evaluation activities performed in test mode, there
was a rationale why the results are valid for the user mode and API mode, too.
9 Results of the Evaluation
9.1 Evaluation of the TOE
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR), [8] was provided by the ITSEF
according to the Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of
the Scheme [3] and all interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as
relevant for the TOE.
The evaluation methodology CEM [2] was used for those components identical
with EAL4. For components beyond EAL4 the methodology was defined in co-
ordination with the Certification Body [4, AIS 34]). For smart card IC specific
methodology the CC supporting documents
(i) The Application of CC to Integrated Circuits
(ii) Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards and
(see [4, AIS 25 and AIS 26]) and [4, AIS 31] (Functionality classes and
evaluation methodology for physical random number generators) were used.
The assurance refinements outlined in the Security Target were followed in the
course of the evaluation of the TOE.
The verdicts for the CC, Part 3 assurance components (according to EAL4
augmented and the class ASE for the Security Target evaluation) are
summarised in the following table.
Assurance classes and components Verdict
Security Target evaluation CC Class ASE PASS
TOE description ASE_DES.1 PASS
Security environment ASE_ENV.1 PASS
ST introduction ASE_INT.1 PASS
Security objectives ASE_OBJ.1 PASS
PP claims ASE_PPC.1 PASS
IT security requirements ASE_REQ.1 PASS
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Assurance classes and components Verdict
Explicitly stated IT security requirements ASE_SRE.1 PASS
TOE summary specification ASE_TSS.1 PASS
Configuration management CC Class ACM PASS
Partial CM automation ACM_AUT.1 PASS
Generation support and acceptance procedures ACM_CAP.4 PASS
Development tools CM coverage ACM_SCP.2 PASS
Delivery and operation CC Class ADO PASS
Detection of modification ADO_DEL.2 PASS
Installation, generation, and start-up procedures ADO_IGS.1 PASS
Development CC Class ADV PASS
Semiformal functional specification ADV_FSP.2 PASS
Semiformal high-level design ADV_HLD.2 PASS
Implementation of the TSF ADV_IMP.2 PASS
Descriptive low-level design ADV_LLD.1 PASS
Semiformal correspondence demonstration ADV_RCR.1 PASS
Formal TOE security policy model ADV_SPM.1 PASS
Guidance documents CC Class AGD PASS
Administrator guidance AGD_ADM.1 PASS
User guidance AGD_USR.1 PASS
Life cycle support CC Class ALC PASS
Sufficiency of security measures ALC_DVS.2 PASS
Standardised life-cycle model ALC_LCD.1 PASS
Compliance with implementation standards ALC_TAT.1 PASS
Tests CC Class ATE PASS
Analysis of coverage ATE_COV.2 PASS
Testing: low-level design ATE_DPT.1 PASS
Functional testing ATE_FUN.1 PASS
Independent testing – sample ATE_IND.2 PASS
Vulnerability assessment CC Class AVA PASS
Analysis and testing for insecure states AVA_MSU.3 PASS
Strength of TOE security function evaluation AVA_SOF.1 PASS
Highly resistant AVA_VLA.4 PASS
Table 7: Verdicts for the assurance components
The evaluation has shown that:
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• the TOE is conform to the Smartcard IC Platform Protection Profile, BSI-
PP-0002-2001 [9]
• Security Functional Requirements specified for the TOE are Common
Criteria Part 2 extended
• the assurance of the TOE is Common Criteria Part 3 conformant, EAL4
augmented by ADV_IMP.2, ALC_DVS.2, AVA_MSU.3 and AVA_VLA.4
• The following TOE Security Functions fulfil the claimed Strength of
Function:
SF.DPR (Data encryption) and
SF.RNG (Random number generation)
The scheme interpretations AIS 26 and AIS 31 (see [4]) were used.
The rating of the strength of functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms
suitable for encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2).
This holds for
(i) the TOE Security Function SF.DES -- which is
Triple DES encryption and decryption by the cryptographic hardware
and
(ii) for other usage of encryption and decryption within the TOE.
For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production
environment see annex A in part D of this report.
The code in the Test ROM of the TOE (IC Dedicated Test Software) is used by
the TOE manufacturer to check the chip function before TOE delivery. This was
considered as part of the evaluation under the CC assurance aspects ALC for
relevant procedures and under ATE for testing.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as identified in table
5, produced in the semiconductor factory in Tonami and in Kyoto (Japan),
labelled by the production line indicator „001“ and „010“, the firmware and
software versions as indicated in table 5 and the documentation listed in
chapter 6.
The validity can be extended to new versions and releases of the product or to
chips from other production and manufacturing sites, provided the sponsor
applies for re-certification or assurance continuity of the modified product, in
accordance with the procedural requirements, and the evaluation of the
modified product does not reveal any security deficiencies.
9.2 Additional Evaluation Results
• The evaluation confirmed specific results of a previous smart card IC
evaluation regarding assurance aspects for the development and
production environment. This is outlined in part D of this report, annex A.
• To support a composite evaluation of the TOE together with a specific
smart card embedded software additional evaluator actions were
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performed during the TOE evaluation. The results are documented in the
ETR-lite [24] according to [4, AIS 36]. Therefore, the interface between
the smart card embedded software developer and the developer of the
TOE was examined in detail.
10 Comments/Recommendations
The TOE is delivered to Card Manufacturer and the Smartcard Embedded
Software Developer. The actual end user obtains the TOE from the operating
system producer together with the application which runs on the TOE.
The Smartcard Embedded Software Developer receives all necessary
recommendations and hints to develop his software in form of the delivered
documentation.
• The operational documents [10] - [23] contain necessary information
about the usage of the TOE and all security hints therein have to be
considered.
In addition the following assumptions and requirements concerning external
security measures, explicitly documented in the singles evaluation reports, have
to be fulfilled:
• Requirement resulting from ADV_LLD:
Since the hardware can not guarantee the storage of correct data in case
of power loss during memory write operations the software has to
implement appropriate measures to check if security relevant data are
correctly written.
• Requirement resulting from ADO_DEL:
As the TOE is under control of the user software, the chip manufacturer
can only guarantee the integrity up to the delivery procedure. It is in the
responsibility of the Smartcard Embedded Software Developer to include
mechanisms in the implemented software which allows detection of
modifications after the delivery.
• Requirement resulting from AGD_ADM and AGD_USR:
In the environment, the assumptions listed in [11], chapter 6 have to be taken
into consideration from the Smartcard Embedded Software Developer:
• OS development
• Deal with user data
• Key to be used for cryptographic processing
• Use of private key cryptographic DES
• Implementation of command interpreter
The following requirements of the environment listed in [11] chapter 7 have to
be taken into consideration from the Smartcard Embedded Software Developer:
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• “Cryptographic key generation“ resulting from FCS_CKM.1, or “Import
of user data without security attributes” resulting from FDP_ITC.1, or
“Import of user data with security attributes” resulting from
FDP_ITC.2,
• “Cryptographic key destruction“ resulting from FCS_CKM.4, and
• “Secure security attributes” resulting from FMT_MSA.2.
• Requirement resulting from AVA_VLA:
• The TOE is protected by light sensors against DFA light attacks (e.g.
with laser). Nevertheless there is still a possibility that the running
program would be manipulated with a focused laser. The Smartcard
Embedded Software Developer has to implement sufficient
countermeasures in his software to counter such attacks, too.
The Card Manufacturer receives all necessary recommendations and hints to
develop his software in form of the delivered documentation.
• All security hints described in [10] have to be considered.
In addition the following assumptions and requirements concerning external
security measures, explicitly documented in the singles evaluation reports, have
to be fulfilled:
• Requirement resulting from AGD_ADM and AGD_USR:
In the environment the following assumptions listed in [10] chapter 6
have to be taken into consideration from the Card Manufacturer:
• Process for packing IC into the Card
• The following administrational hints listed in [AGD_CM, 4] have to be
taken into consideration from the Card Manufacturer:
• Deactivation of Card Manufacturer test functionality
• Requirement resulting from AVA_MSU:
• The Card Manufacturer has to deactivate the Card Manufacturer test
functionality before delivering the TOE.
11 Annexes
Annex A: Evaluation results regarding the development and production
environment (see part D of this report).
12 Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the security target [7] of the target of evaluation
(TOE) is provided within a separate document. It is a sanitized version of the
complete security target [6] used for the evaluation performed.
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13 Definitions
13.1 Acronyms
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal
Office for Information Security, Bonn, Germany
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
DES Data Encryption Standard; symmetric block cipher algorithm
DPA Differential Power Analysis
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
EMA Electro magnetic analysis
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
IC Integrated Circuit
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
PP Protection Profile
RAM Random Access Memory
RNG Random Number Generator
ROM Read Only Memory
SF Security Function
SFP Security Function Policy
SOF Strength of Function
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
Triple-DES Symmetric block cipher algorithm based on the DES
TSC TSF Scope of Control
TSF TOE Security Functions
TSP TOE Security Policy
TSS TOE Summary Specification
SC TSF Scope of Control
13.2 Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more assurance component(s) from CC
Part 3 to an EAL or assurance package.
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Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not
contained in part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the
CC.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics
based on well-established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - An entity within the TSC that contains or receives information and
upon which subjects perform operations.
Protection Profile - An implementation-independent set of security require-
ments for a category of TOEs that meet specific consumer needs.
Security Function - A part or parts of the TOE that have to be relied upon for
enforcing a closely related subset of the rules from the TSP.
Security Target - A set of security requirements and specifications to be used
as the basis for evaluation of an identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined
semantics.
Strength of Function - A qualification of a TOE security function expressing
the minimum efforts assumed necessary to defeat its expected security
behaviour by directly attacking its underlying security mechanisms.
SOF-basic - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that
the function provides adequate protection against casual breach of TOE
security by attackers possessing a low attack potential.
SOF-medium - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows
that the function provides adequate protection against straightforward or
intentional breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a moderate attack
potential.
SOF-high - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that
the function provides adequate protection against deliberately planned or
organised breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a high attack
potential.
Subject - An entity within the TSC that causes operations to be performed.
Target of Evaluation - An IT product or system and its associated
administrator and user guidance documentation that is the subject of an
evaluation.
TOE Security Functions - A set consisting of all hardware, software, and
firmware of the TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the
TSP.
TOE Security Policy - A set of rules that regulate how assets are managed,
protected and distributed within a TOE.
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TSF Scope of Control - The set of interactions that can occur with or within a
TOE and are subject to the rules of the TSP.
14 Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 2.1, August 1999
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
(CEM), Part 1, Version 0.6; Part 2: Evaluation Methodology, Version 1.0,
August 1999
[3] BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for
the TOE. Specifically
- AIS 25, Version 2, 29 July 2002 for: CC Supporting Document, -
The Application of CC to Integrated Circuits, Version 1.2, July
2002
- AIS 26, Version 2, 6 August 2002 for: CC Supporting Document, -
Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards, Version 1.1, July
2002
- AIS 31, Version 1, 25 Sept. 2001 for: Functionality classes and
evaluation methodology of physical random number generators
- AIS 32, Version 1, 02 July 2001, Übernahme international
abgestimmter CC-Interpretationen ins deutsche Zertifizierungs-
schema.
-AIS 34, Version 1.00, 1 June 2004, Evaluation Methodology for
CC Assurance Classes for EAL5+
- AIS 36, Version 1, 29 July 2002 for:
CC Supporting Document, ETR-lite for Composition, Version 1.1,
July 2002 and
CC Supporting Document, ETR-lite for Composition: Annex A
Composite smartcard evaluation, Version 1.2 March 2002
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148, BSI 7149), periodically
updated list published also on the BSI Web-site
[6] MN67S140 Smartcard IC Security Target, 1.2, 02.02.2006, Matsushita
Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. (confidential document)
[7] MN67S140 Smartcard IC Security Target (ST-Lite), 1.2, 02.02.2006,
Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. (sanitized public document)
[8] Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) for MN67S140 Smartcard IC Version
RV3, FW12-EAST JAPAN RAILWAY COMPANY SuicaII Contactless
Smardcard IC Chip, Version 5, BSI-DSZ-CC-0334, from 03.03.2006,
(confidential document)
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[9] Smartcard IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, July 2001, BSI
registration ID: BSI-PP-0002-2001, developed by Atmel Smart Card ICs,
Hitachi Ltd., Infineon Technologies AG, Philips Semiconductors
[10] MN67S140 Smartcard IC Administrator Guidance for Card
Manufacturer, Version 1.0, 05.12.2005, Matsushita Electric Industrial Co.,
Ltd.
[11] MN67S140 Smartcard IC Administrator Guidance for Smartcard
Embedded Software Developer, Version 1.0, 05.12.2005, Matsushita
Electric Industrial Co., Ltd.
[12] MN67S140 Smartcard IC Administrator Guidance for Card Manufacturer,
Version 1.0, 05.12.2005, Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd.
[13] MN67S140 Smartcard IC Administrator Guidance for Smart-
cardEmbedded Software Developer, Version 1.0, 05.12.2005,
Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd.
[14] MN101C/MN101E Series Cross Assemblers User's Manual, Version 16,
06.2005, Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd.
[15] MN101C/MN101E Series C Compiler User's Manual Usage Guide,
Version 13, 06.2005, Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd
[16] MN101C00 Series C Compiler User's Manual Language Description
Version 4, 08.1999, Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd.
[17] MN101C00 Series C Compiler User's Manual Library Reference, Version
2, 08.1999, Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd.
[18] MN101C/MN101E Series C Source Code Debugger for Windows®
User's Manual, Version 3, 05.2004, Matsushita Electric Industrial Co.,
Ltd.
[19] MN101C/MN101E Series In-stallation Manual, Version 3, 06.2004,
Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd.
[20] MN101C Series Instruction Manual, Version 4,10.2002, Matsushita
Electric Industrial Co., Ltd.
[21] MN101C Series LSI manual, Version 3, 02.1998, Matsushita Electric
Industrial Co., Ltd.
[22] PCI/PC Card Installation Manual, Version 7.1, 03.2005, Matsushita
Electric Industrial Co., Ltd.
[23] MN67S140 Software Library Specification 2.9, 18.11.2005, Matsushita
Electric Industrial Co., Ltd.
[24] ETR-Lite for Composition (ETR-Lite) for MN67S140 Smartcard IC
Version RV3, FW12-EAST JAPAN RAILWAY COMPANY SuicaII
Contactless Smardcard IC Chip, Version 5, BSI-DSZ-CC-0334, from
03.03.2006
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C Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part 1:
Caveats on evaluation results (chapter 5.4) / Final Interpretation 008
The conformance result indicates the source of the collection of requirements
that is met by a TOE or PP that passes its evaluation. This conformance result
is presented with respect to Part 2 (functional requirements), Part 3 (assurance
requirements) and, if applicable, to a pre-defined set of requirements (e.g., EAL,
Protection Profile).
The conformance result consists of one of the following:
Part 2 conformant - A PP or TOE is Part 2 conformant if the functional
requirements are based only upon functional components in Part 2
Part 2 extended - A PP or TOE is Part 2 extended if the functional
requirements include functional components not in Part 2
plus one of the following:
Part 3 conformant - A PP or TOE is Part 3 conformant if the assurance
requirements are based only upon assurance components in Part 3
Part 3 extended - A PP or TOE is Part 3 extended if the assurance
requirements include assurance requirements not in Part 3.
Additionally, the conformance result may include a statement made with respect
to sets of defined requirements, in which case it consists of one of the following:
Package name Conformant - A PP or TOE is conformant to a pre-defined
named functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the requirements
(functions or assurance) include all components in the packages listed as part
of the conformance result.
Package name Augmented - A PP or TOE is an augmentation of a pre-defined
named functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the requirements
(functions or assurance) are a proper superset of all components in the
packages listed as part of the conformance result.
Finally, the conformance result may also include a statement made with respect
to Protection Profiles, in which case it includes the following:
PP Conformant - A TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the
conformance result.
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CC Part 3:
Assurance categorisation (chapter 2.5)
"The assurance classes, families, and the abbreviation for each family are
shown in Table 2.1."
Assurance Class Assurance Family Abbreviated Name
Class ACM: Configuration
management
CM automation ACM_AUT
CM capabilities ACM_CAP
CM scope ACM_SCP
Class ADO: Delivery and
operation
Delivery ADO_DEL
Installation, generation and start-up ADO_IGS
Class ADV: Development Functional specification ADV_FSP
High-level design ADV_HLD
Implementation representation ADV_IMP
TSF internals ADV_INT
Low-level design ADV_LLD
Representation correspondence ADV_RCR
Security policy modeling ADV_SPM
Class AGD: Guidance
documents
Administrator guidance AGD_ADM
User guidance AGD_USR
Class ALC: Life cycle support Development security ALC_DVS
Flaw remediation ALC_FLR
Life cycle definition ALC_LCD
Tools and techniques ALC_TAT
Class ATE: Tests Coverage ATE_COV
Depth ATE_DPT
Functional tests ATE_FUN
Independent testing ATE_IND
Class AVA: Vulnerability
assessment
Covert channel analysis AVA_CCA
Misuse AVA_MSU
Strength of TOE security functions AVA_SOF
Vulnerability analysis AVA_VLA
Table 1: Assurance family breakdown and map
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Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 6)
"The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that
balances the level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of
acquiring that degree of assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate
concepts of assurance in a TOE at the end of the evaluation, and of
maintenance of that assurance during the operational use of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from Part 3 are
included in the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful
and desirable assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and
components will be considered for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and
STs for which they provide utility."
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 6.1)
Table 6.1 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a
hierarchically ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families.
Each number in the resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component
where applicable.
As outlined in the next section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation
assurance levels are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance.
They are hierarchically ordered inasmuch as each EAL represents more
assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in assurance from EAL to EAL is
accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher assurance component
from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope, and/or depth)
and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance families
(i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as
described in chapter 2 of this Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no
more than one component of each assurance family and all assurance
dependencies of every component are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other
combinations of assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation“ allows the
addition of assurance components (from assurance families not already
included in the EAL) or the substitution of assurance components (with another
hierarchically higher assurance component in the same assurance family) to an
EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only EALs may be
augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance component“
is not recognised by the CC as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with it the
obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the
added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be extended with
explicitly stated assurance requirements.
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Assurance Class Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL1 EAL2 EAL3 EAL4 EAL5 EAL6 EAL7
Configuration
management
ACM_AUT 1 1 2 2
ACM_CAP 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
ACM_SCP 1 2 3 3 3
Delivery and
operation
ADO_DEL 1 1 2 2 2 3
ADO_IGS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Development ADV_FSP 1 1 1 2 3 3 4
ADV_HLD 1 2 2 3 4 5
ADV_IMP 1 2 3 3
ADV_INT 1 2 3
ADV_LLD 1 1 2 2
ADV_RCR 1 1 1 1 2 2 3
ADV_SPM 1 3 3 3
Guidance
documents
AGD_ADM 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AGD_USR 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life cycle
support
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 2 2 3
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3
Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3
ATE_DPT 1 1 2 2 3
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_CCA 1 2 2
AVA_MSU 1 2 2 3 3
AVA_SOF 1 1 1 1 1 1
AVA_VLA 1 1 2 3 4 4
Table 2: Evaluation assurance level summary
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Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 6.2.1)
"Objectives
EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but
the threats to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where
independent assurance is required to support the contention that due care has
been exercised with respect to the protection of personal or similar information.
EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer,
including independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the
guidance documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could
be successfully conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE,
and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a
manner consistent with its documentation, and that it provides useful protection
against identified threats.“
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 6.2.2)
"Objectives
EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of
design information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the
part of the developer than is consistent with good commercial practice. As such
it should not require a substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a low to moderate level of independently assured security in the
absence of ready availability of the complete development record. Such a
situation may arise when securing legacy systems, or where access to the
developer may be limited.“
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked
(chapter 6.2.3)
"Objectives
EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from
positive security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of
existing sound development practices.
EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate level of independently assured security, and require a thorough
investigation of the TOE and its development without substantial re-
engineering.“
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Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and
reviewed (chapter 6.2.4)
"Objectives
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security
engineering based on good commercial development practices which, though
rigorous, do not require substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other
resources. EAL4 is the highest level at which it is likely to be economically
feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a moderate to high level of independently assured security in
conventional commodity TOEs and are prepared to incur additional security-
specific engineering costs.“
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested
(chapter 6.2.5)
"Objectives
EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security
engineering based upon rigorous commercial development practices supported
by moderate application of specialist security engineering techniques. Such a
TOE will probably be designed and developed with the intent of achieving EAL5
assurance. It is likely that the additional costs attributable to the EAL5
requirements, relative to rigorous development without the application of
specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a high level of independently assured security in a planned development
and require a rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable
costs attributable to specialist security engineering techniques.“
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and
tested (chapter 6.2.6)
"Objectives
EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security
engineering techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to
produce a premium TOE for protecting high value assets against significant
risks.
EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for
application in high risk situations where the value of the protected assets
justifies the additional costs.“
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Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 6.2.7)
"Objectives
EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in
extremely high risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies
the higher costs. Practical application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with
tightly focused security functionality that is amenable to extensive formal
analysis.“
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Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF) (chapter 14.3)
AVA_SOF Strength of TOE security functions
"Objectives
Even if a TOE security function cannot be bypassed, deactivated, or corrupted,
it may still be possible to defeat it because there is a vulnerability in the concept
of its underlying security mechanisms. For those functions a qualification of their
security behaviour can be made using the results of a quantitative or statistical
analysis of the security behaviour of these mechanisms and the effort required
to overcome them. The qualification is made in the form of a strength of TOE
security function claim.“
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA) (chapter 14.4)
AVA_VLA Vulnerability analysis
"Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether vulnerabilities
identified, during the evaluation of the construction and anticipated operation of
the TOE or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses), could allow users to
violate the TSP.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that a user will be able to discover
flaws that will allow unauthorised access to resources (e.g. data), allow the
ability to interfere with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised
capabilities of other users.“
"Application notes
A vulnerability analysis is performed by the developer in order to ascertain the
presence of security vulnerabilities, and should consider at least the contents of
all the TOE deliverables including the ST for the targeted evaluation assurance
level. The developer is required to document the disposition of identified
vulnerabilities to allow the evaluator to make use of that information if it is found
useful as a support for the evaluator's independent vulnerability analysis.“
"Independent vulnerability analysis goes beyond the vulnerabilities identified by
the developer. The main intent of the evaluator analysis is to determine that the
TOE is resistant to penetration attacks performed by an attacker possessing a
low (for AVA_VLA.2), moderate (for AVA_VLA.3) or high (for AVA_VLA.4)
attack potential.“
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D Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Evaluation results regarding development
and production environment D-3
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Annex A of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0334-2006
Evaluation results regarding
development and production
environment
The IT product MN67S140 Smartcard IC, RV3, FV12 (Target of Evaluation,
TOE) has been evaluated at an accredited and licensed/ approved evaluation
facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Part 1
Version 0.6, Part 2 Version 1.0, extended by advice of the Certification Body for
components beyond EAL4 and smart card specific guidance, for conformance
to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.1 (ISO/IEC15408:
1999) and including final interpretations for compliance with Common Criteria
Version 2.2 and Common Methodology Part 2, Version 2.2.
As a result of the TOE certification, dated 16. March 2006, the following results
regarding the development and production environment apply. The Common
Criteria assurance requirements
• ACM – Configuration management (i.e. ACM_AUT.1, ACM_CAP.4,
ACM_SCP.2),
• ADO – Delivery and operation (i.e. ADO_DEL.2, ADO_IGS.1) and
• ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC_DVS.2, ALC_LCD.1, ALC_TAT.1),
are fulfilled for the development and production sites of the TOE listed below:
a) Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd., Corporate System LSI
Development Division, Semiconductor Company, 3-1-1 Yagumo-naka-
machi, Moriguchi City, Osaka, 570-8501, Japan (Development)
b) Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd.,19 Nishi-kujyo Kasugachou,
Minami-ku, Kyoto city, Kyoto, 601-8413, Japan (Production: Wafer Fab,
Process Definition)
c) Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd., 271 Higashi-kaihatsu, Tonami
City, Toyama 570-8501, Japan (Production: Wafer Fab, Production
Testing)
d) Toppan Printing Co., Ltd., 1101-20, Myohoji-cho, Higashi Omi City, Shiga
527-8566 Japan (Mask Center)
e) Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd., Uozu Factory 800 Higashiyama
Uozu City, Toyama 937-8585, Japan (Production: Testing)
f) Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd., Arai Factory 4-5-1 Kurihara,
Myoukou City, Niigata 944-8555, Japan (Production: Mounting, Delivery)
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The hardware part of the TOE produced in the semiconductor is labelled by the
production line indicator „001“ for Tonami and „010“ for Kyoto (both in Japan).
For all sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied for
each site and in accordance with the MN67S140 Smartcard IC Security Target,
1.2, 02.02.2006, Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. (confidential document)
[6]. The evaluators verified, that the threats are countered and the security
objectives for the life cycle phases 2, 3 and 4 up to delivery at the end of phase
3 or 4 as stated in the TOE Security Target are fulfilled by the procedures of
these sites.
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