BSI-DSZ-CC-1267-2026
for
genugate firewall 11.0 p0
from
genua GmbH
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 CC-Zert-327 V5.56
BSI-DSZ-CC-1267-2026 (*)
Firewall
genugate firewall 11.0 p0
from genua GmbH
PP Conformance: None
Functionality: Product specific Security Target
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 extended
EAL 4 augmented by ALC_FLR.2, ASE_TSS.2,
AVA_VAN.5 and ALC_PAM.1
valid until: 22 February 2031
The IT Product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation
facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), CEM:2022
extended by Scheme Interpretations, by advice of the Certification Body for components
beyond EAL 5 and CC Supporting Documents as listed in the Certification Report for
conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), CC:2022. CC and
CEM are also published as ISO/IEC 15408 and ISO/IEC 18045.
(*) This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its
evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report and
Notification. For details on the validity see Certification Report part A chapter 5.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification
scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions
of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the
evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT Product by the Federal Office for
Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is
either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 23 February 2026
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Fabian Hodouschek L.S. Sandro Amendola
Head of Certification Director-General Directorate General S
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 87 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
SOGIS
Recognition Agreement
for components up to
EAL 4
Common Criteria
Recognition Arrangement
recognition for components
up to EAL 2 and ALC_FLR
only
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1267-2026
This page is intentionally left blank.
4 / 26
BSI-DSZ-CC-1267-2026 Certification Report
Contents
A. Certification.....................................................................................................................6
1. Preliminary Remarks....................................................................................................6
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure...............................................................6
3. Recognition Agreements..............................................................................................7
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification................................................................8
5. Validity of the Certification Result.................................................................................8
6. Publication...................................................................................................................9
B. Certification Results......................................................................................................10
1. Executive Summary...................................................................................................11
2. Identification of the TOE............................................................................................12
3. Security Policy...........................................................................................................14
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.....................................................................14
5. Architectural Information............................................................................................14
6. Documentation...........................................................................................................15
7. IT Product Testing......................................................................................................15
8. Evaluated Configuration.............................................................................................17
9. Results of the Evaluation...........................................................................................17
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE.....................................................20
11. Security Target.........................................................................................................21
12. Regulation specific aspects (eIDAS, QES)..............................................................21
13. Definitions................................................................................................................21
14. Bibliography.............................................................................................................23
C. Excerpts from the Criteria.............................................................................................25
D. Annexes........................................................................................................................ 26
5 / 26
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1267-2026
A. Certification
1. Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● Act on the Federal Office for Information Security1
● BSI Certification and Approval Ordinance2
● BMI Regulations on Ex-parte Costs3
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
● DIN EN ISO/IEC 17065 standard
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) [3]
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility, its
approval and licensing process (CC-Stellen) [3]
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), CC:2022 4
[1] also published as
ISO/IEC 15408
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 2 December 2025, BGBI. 2025
, no. 301, p. 2
2
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of Security Certificates and approval by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungs- und -Anerkennungsverordnung – BSIZertV) of 02 December
2025, Bundesgesetzblatt 2025, no. 301
3
BMI Regulations on Ex-parte Costs – Besondere Gebührenverordnung des BMI für individuell
zurechenbare öffentliche Leistungen in dessen Zuständigkeitsbereich (BMIBGebV), Abschnitt 7 (BSI-
Gesetz) – dated 2 September 2019, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1365
6 / 26
BSI-DSZ-CC-1267-2026 Certification Report
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), CC:2022 [2] also published as
ISO/IEC 18045
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
3. Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates – as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC – under certain conditions was agreed.
3.1. European Recognition of CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and, in addition, at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS
Technical Domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL 1 to EAL 4. For "Smartcards and similar devices" a SOGIS Technical Domain is in
place. For "HW Devices with Security Boxes" a SOGIS Technical Domains is in place, too.
In addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of
the recognition agreement.
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, details on
recognition, and the history of the agreement can be seen on the website at
https://www.sogis.eu.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the related bodies of the signatory nations. A disclaimer
beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of recognition.
This certificate is recognized according to the rules of SOGIS-MRA, i.e. up to and including
CC part 3 EAL 4 components. The evaluation contained the components ASE_TSS.2,
ALC_PAM.1, AVA_VAN.5 that are not mutually recognised in accordance with the
provisions of the SOGIS MRA. For mutual recognition the EAL 4 components of these
assurance families are relevant.
3.2. International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC
(Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08
September 2014. It covers CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP)
(exact use), CC certificates based on assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or
the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR) and CC certificates for Protection
Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on
the website: https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the related bodies
4
Proclamation of the Federal Office for Information Security dated 14. April 2023 at
https://www.bsi.bund.de.
7 / 26
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1267-2026
of the signatory nations. A disclaimer beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of
recognition.
This certificate is recognized according to the rules of CCRA-2014, i. e. up to and including
CC part 3 EAL 2+ ALC_FLR components.
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product genugate firewall 11.0 p0 has undergone the certification procedure at BSI.
This is a re-certification based on BSI-DSZ-CC-1154-2021.
The evaluation of the product genugate firewall 11.0 p0 was conducted by secuvera
GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 19 February 2026. secuvera GmbH is an
evaluation facility (ITSEF)5
recognised by the certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: genua GmbH.
The product was developed by: genua GmbH.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
5. Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report applies only to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
evaluated guidance documentation are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment as specified and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance components and assurance levels please refer to CC
itself. Detailed references are listed in part C of this report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security
Target. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the certified version of the
product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed. Therefore, the sponsor
should apply for the certified product being monitored within the assurance continuity
program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-assessment or re-certification).
Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation and certification
procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk management needs regularly
updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-assessment on a regular e.g. annual
basis. Therefore the BSI reserves the right to revoke the certificate, especially if a
exploitable vulnerability of the certified product gets to known.
In order to avoid an indefinite usage of the certificate when evolved attack methods would
require a re-assessment of the products resistance to state of the art attack methods, the
maximum validity of the certificate has been limited. The certificate issued on 23 February
2026 is valid until 22 February 2031. Validity can be re-newed by re-certification.
The owner of the certificate is obliged:
5
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
8 / 26
BSI-DSZ-CC-1267-2026 Certification Report
1. when advertising the certificate or the fact of the product's certification, to refer to
the Certification Report as well as to provide the Certification Report, the Security
Target and user guidance documentation mentioned herein to any customer of the
product for the application and usage of the certified product,
2. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately about vulnerabilities of the
product that have been identified by the developer or any third party after issuance
of the certificate,
3. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately in the case that security relevant
changes in the evaluated life cycle, e.g. related to development and production sites
or processes, occur, or the confidentiality of documentation and information related
to the Target of Evaluation (TOE) or resulting from the evaluation and certification
procedure where the certification of the product has assumed this confidentiality
being maintained, is not given any longer. In particular, prior to the dissemination of
confidential documentation and information related to the TOE or resulting from the
evaluation and certification procedure that do not belong to the deliverables
according to the Certification Report part B, or for those where no dissemination
rules have been agreed on, to third parties, the Certification Body at BSI has to be
informed.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
6. Publication
The product genugate firewall 11.0 p0 has been included in the BSI list of certified
products, which is published regularly in the listing found at the BSI Website
https://www.bsi.bund.de/dok/Zertifizierung-Gesamtlisten. Further information can be
obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 (0)228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer6
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
6
genua GmbH
Domagkstraße 7
85551 Kirchheim
9 / 26
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1267-2026
B. Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
10 / 26
BSI-DSZ-CC-1267-2026 Certification Report
1. Executive Summary
The Target Of Evaluation (TOE) genugate firewall 11.0 p0 is part of a larger product, the
firewall genugate 11.0 p0, which consists of hardware and software. The TOE itself is part
of the software. The operating system is a modified OpenBSD. The TOE supports IPv4
and IPv6.
The product genugate exists in two variants. The first simply named genugate is a two-
tiered application with the physically separated components Application Level Gateway
(ALG) and the Packet Filter (PFL) connected in series. They run on dedicated hardware
provided by genua and other selected suppliers. The second variant named genugate
Virtual is the virtualized ALG without the PFL. In virtualized environments, the serial
connection of two virtualized components on one hypervisor does not bring any significant
security advantage. The total system can only be as secure as the hypervisor.
Besides the network interface to the PFL (or the internal network in case of the genugate
Virtual), the ALG has (at least) three more interfaces in order to connect to the external
network, the administration network and the demilitarized zone(s) (DMZ). For the high
availability option, the ALG needs another network interface for the HA network. The PFL
has a second interface which is connected to the internal network, and optional interfaces
for further DMZs.
The aim of the firewall is to control the IP traffic between the different connected networks.
Therefore the ALG uses proxies that implement filter policies in order to control all data
transmitted between the different networks, while the PFL uses packet filtering as an
additional means to control all data that is sent to and from the internal network.
The TOE, genugate firewall 11.0 p0, consists of the software that implements the IP traffic
control and related functionality of the firewall on the ALG. This includes the proxies, the
hardened OpenBSD kernel IP stack, packet filter, but also other supportive functionality as
logging of security events (see the next section for a more detailed definition of the TOE
scope and boundary).
The PFL software, although the PFL is present in the architecture of the hardware variant
genugate, is not part of the TOE.
The Security Target [5] is the basis for this certification. It is not based on a certified
Protection Profile.
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details),
and some (ALC_PAM.1) are newly defined by [11]. The TOE meets the assurance
requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 4 augmented by ALC_FLR.2,
ASE_TSS.2, AVA_VAN.5 and ALC_PAM.1.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [5], chapter 6.1. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functionality:
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue,
SF.SecurityAudit see ST [5], chapter 7.1.1
SF.DataFlowControl see ST [5], chapter 7.1.2
11 / 26
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1267-2026
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue,
SF.IdentificationAuthentication see ST [5], chapter 7.1.3
SF.SecurityManagement see ST [5], chapter 7.1.4
SF.SelfProtection see ST [5], chapter 7.1.5
SF.PatchInstallation see ST [5], chapter 7.1.6
SF.TrustedCommunication see ST [5], chapter 7.1.7
SF.CryptographicSupport see ST [5], chapter 7.1.8
Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities
For more details please refer to the Security Target [5], chapter 7.1.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [5], chapter 3.2 .
Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of Assumptions,
Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security Target [5],
chapter 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5.
This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8.
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 52, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2. Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
genugate firewall 11.0 p0
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
1 SW/
HW
genugate firewall 11.0 p0 Install image and hardware with
no software pre-installed.
12 / 26
BSI-DSZ-CC-1267-2026 Certification Report
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
2 DOC English and German
manuals (only German
versions are part of TOE):
• administrator and user
guidance (genugate
Administration and
Configuration Manual,
genugate Administrations-
und
Konfigurationshandbuch);
• installation manual (for
hardware variant: genugate
Installation Manual,
genugate
Installationshandbuch; for
virtual variant: genugate
Virtual Installation Manual,
genugate Virtual
Installationshandbuch);
• certification guidance
(genugate Certification:
General Information,
genugate Erläuterungen zur
Zertifizierung)
11.0 p0 Manuals, downloaded
separately from genua customer
support server
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
The server hardware is genugate S, genugate M, or genugate L, with hardware revision
3.0 or 4.0; or SDoT Server V3B. The SDoT Server V3B hardware is an Infodas product
and is supplied and delivered by Infodas. If the genugate hardware variant with Infodas
hardware SDoT Server V3B shall be used, the end customer must order and purchase the
hardware SDoT Server V3B separately from company Infodas.
Otherwise, the hardware of the TOE is composed at Pyramid Computer GmbH, Schubert
System Elektronik GmbH and Arrow Central Europe GmbH and shipped together with the
installation image to the customer.
The TOE is located as software distributed within installation images. The installation
images (ISO image, USB image or QCOW2 image format) can either be shipped with the
required non-TOE hardware on a separate USB flash drive, or can be downloaded from
the genua support server, whereby the download is the only one possible for customers
buying the genugate Virtual product variant.
The documentation can be downloaded from the genua support server. The TOE is
contained in the installation images for the product genugate 11.0. The licence information
is sent to the customer by genua.
For the genugate Virtual the end user has to check the hardware if the needed
virtualization features (VT-x for Intel CPUs and AMD-V for AMD CPUs) are supported, see
chapter 1.3.1 of the ST [5] for the requirements on hardware and hypervisor in the scope
of the evaluation. In both cases, for the physical as well as for the virtual variant of the
genugate, the hardware is not part of the TOE.
The user is able to verify the authenticity of the delivered TOE. The procedure is described
in detail in the guidance documentation. The valid SHA256 checksums to verify the
authenticity of the delivered TOE and manuals are published on the developers’ web page
13 / 26
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1267-2026
protected via TLS1.2 and TLS1.3 at https://kunde.genua.de/support/genugate-110-
checksummen.
These SHA256 checksums are as follows:
ISO-Image:
G1100_000.iso
31119bc24e978acf629f84938d9f20e9b08842678b23c0c331d3ca4b7a5e9315
IMG-Image:
G1100_000.img:
379701857a064d4c255f55df660d6be878b019d9796f3c8c954ed19f6ed240aa
qcow2-Image:
G1100_000-stage1-128G.qcow2:
ee5d1a8b8e62cb49a316016632766e4c63aeebf59025a908041181466ed59ad3
Handbücher:
genugate-1100-admin-de.pdf:
1303ded7139bed3fa19f5b0efb176fcad572dd84f8bf29479d93a914039a7d02
genugate-1100-install-de.pdf:
e6465e767bba08dd4f19e1a69580d584b01d5f30c272794aa9c9fa2449ae8e41
genugate-1100-virtual-install-de.pdf:
e671ee1b28a9ab26b141b6a79f19fd7a3297f1f68ec6c211ab629bfb11b25875
genugate-1100-zertifizierung-de.pdf:
38b16b6dfb2712118ce6cf0d52b687aaacafe8b112aff9a99229aff0c7403220
3. Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE. It covers Security audit, Data flow control, Identification and
Authentication, Security management, Protection of the TSF, and patch installation, as
detailed in the ST [5] in chapter 7.
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. Details can be found in
the Security Target [5], chapter 4.2.
5. Architectural Information
The TOE genugate firewall 11.0 p0 is used to control the connections and data transfer
between different networks, where each network has different security needs and different
threat levels for the other networks.
14 / 26
BSI-DSZ-CC-1267-2026 Certification Report
The TOE can be configured in such a way that the security needs for each network are
optimally met. A standard configuration consists of the following networks connected to the
TOE:
internal network: This is the network that has to be protected against attacks from the
external network. Usually only a few services from the internal network are accessible from
the external network, secured by user authentication. The internal network is secured by
the TOE, using filtering mechanisms at different levels of the IP stack. This network is
usually controlled by a defined security policy.
external network: This is the most insecure network, e. g. the internet. In general, no
security policy exists, and all kind of attacks can occur in this network.
administrative network: This network is used to allow a secure administration of the TOE.
This network is isolated from all other networks and only administrators have access. The
usual access is through the HTTPS web interface, but an SSH access for debugging and
maintenance operation is also available.
demilitarized zones: These networks allow access to common services from the external
network, without the need to open the internal network. Usually, Web servers and FTP
servers are installed in this network. This network is usually controlled by a defined
security policy.
HA network: This internal network is necessary for the high availability option. It is used to
synchronize the configuration between the systems.
The internal HA network must use IPv4 addresses. For all other networks IPv4 and IPv6 is
supported (with the exception that the proxy mcastudprelay, which is needed for multicast
UDP packets, only supports IPv4).
For the physical genugate, the internal network is moreover protected by a two-tiered
security architecture that filters on different levels of the network stack (ALG and PFL,
running physically separated on different hardware). ALG and PFL must be separately
configured. The filter rules of the PFL cannot be modified during normal operation. All this
provides an additional layer of security hardening.
The genugate Virtual consists of the virtualized ALG and implements equivalent filter tasks
on IP level as the PFL does, which suits a virtualized environment.
The PFL software, although the PFL is present in the architecture of the hardware variant
genugate, is not part of the TOE.
6. Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7. IT Product Testing
The developer testing concept is based on periodically running automatic tests in the
product specific test environment that contains physical as well as virtual test systems.
These are supplemented by unit tests that are executed directly on a test server and some
15 / 26
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1267-2026
manual tests. Additionally to these developer tests there are separate tests of the quality
assurance department.
The developer testing environment includes genugate hardware of different hardware
revisions. The regular tests are not necessarily performed on hardware that is in scope of
the certification. This is because the product is assumed to run on a wider range of
hardware than that in scope of the certification. To ensure this the developer performs
hardware tests in preparation of every major product version which includes changes to a
newer version of the included OpenBSD operating system. Based on these tests of the
operating system for all relevant hardware the further testing is assumed to be
independent of the hardware. Nevertheless for the certification relevant test results it is
ensured that the hardware dependent tests run on hardware revisions in scope of the
certification and also virtualized.
Using the test scripts the developer automatically ensures for the most part that the
entrance conditions and the dependencies between tests are considered. Therefore the
responsibility for the correct testing is transferred to the developer.
Additionally the developer runs tests in the quality assurance (QA) lab. The QA lab is an
independent test department inside the company. The QA lab is involved prior to every
release and has to approve by its positive testing result and is completely separated from
the developer test environment. The lab consists of physical and virtual genugate systems.
These tests are divided in automatically and manual tests. The automatically tests are run
on a regular base.
Complete coverage was achieved for all the TOE security functions as described in the
functional specification. The overall test depth of the developer tests comprises the TOE
design subsystems and the internal interfaces of those subsystems as required for the
assurance level of the evaluation.
All real test results are equal with the expected test results.
The Independent Evaluator Tests were performed in a logically and physically separated
network within the laboratory of the ITSEF. The TOE in this network was accessible via the
connected test devices. The test environment was built-up according to comply with the
security objectives of the TOE environment. For each physical genugate also a PFL was
used. Further an OSPF router and test clients were used in the test network.
A sample of developer tests has been retested with the developer as part of the ITSEF
tests. Testing in the own premises covers among the complex installation all security
functions.
The test results have not shown any deviations between the expected test results and the
actual test results during the installation or operation. Also no deviations during the
performed verification of the TOE and manuals were identified.
The penetration testing was performed in the ITSEF using the TOE in version 11.0 p0 in a
logically and physically separated network within the laboratory of the ITSEF. The TOE in
this network was accessible via the connected test devices.
During the penetration testing not all tests were performed on each TOE hardware and not
on the genugate virtual. As the functionalities of the TOE are independent of the underlying
platform, a sampling was performed in which the platforms for each test procedure were
chosen randomly.
16 / 26
BSI-DSZ-CC-1267-2026 Certification Report
The tests addressed threat by physical access, threat by logical access, external attackers,
and internal attackers. Additionally, as part of ADV_IMP a source code analysis was
performed.
If all operational measures required by the developer are applied, no attack scenario with
high attack potential was actually successful in the TOE’s operational environment as
defined in the ST.
8. Evaluated Configuration
The TOE has to be configured, and is limited to the restrictions, as stated in the Security
Target [5] and Guidance [7 - 10]. The security requirements for a network defined in both
documents are to be met. The TOE has to be configured following the TOE guidance. The
components of the TOE are defined by the TOE configuration list. The configuration list
consists of several archives. Their hash values are listet here:
Configuration list see chapter 2 and additionally:
Source Code:
SHA256(gg-502f2027.tgz):
273ab7a414e66b20f277477942c4275e557ff68a53e6267d396cb37db11a4ca7
SHA256(openbsd-7.5.tgz):
36c06a930bc31efc587ecfe288b27f2a8f30a77de7d8f63c2a6511cac478fdd6
SHA256(websocketd-v0.3.1.zip):
6330d15ab1121f2e9423ddc4c039b3398e5066fb6391fde678208f31a63507dc
9. Results of the Evaluation
9.1. CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [6] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used for those components up to EAL 5
extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and guidance
specific for the technology of the product [4] (AIS 34).
For RNG assessment the scheme interpretations AIS 20 was used (see [4]).
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the EAL 4 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report)
● The components ALC_FLR.2, ASE_TSS.2, AVA_VAN.5 and ALC_PAM.1 augmented for
this TOE evaluation.
As the evaluation work performed for this certification procedure was carried out as a re-
evaluation based on the certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-1154-2021, re-use of specific evaluation
tasks was possible. The focus of this re-evaluation was on extensions and enhancements
of TOE functions and -configurations.
17 / 26
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1267-2026
The evaluation has confirmed:
● PP Conformance: None
● for the Functionality: Product specific Security Target
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 extended
EAL 4 augmented by ALC_FLR.2, ASE_TSS.2, AVA_VAN.5 and
ALC_PAM.1
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2. Results of cryptographic assessment
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this certification
procedure (see BSIG Section 52, Para. 4, Clause 2). But cryptographic functionalities with
a security level of lower than 120 bits can no longer be regarded as secure without
considering the application context. Therefore, for these functionalities it shall be checked
whether the related crypto operations are appropriate for the intended system. Some
further hints and guidelines can be derived from the 'Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-02102'
(https://www.bsi.bund.de).
The following table 3 (also to be found in the ST [5], chapter 8) gives an overview of the
cryptographic functionalities inside the TOE to enforce the security policy and outlines its
rating from cryptographic point of view. Any Cryptographic Functionality that is marked in
column 'Security Level above 120 Bits' of the following table with 'no' achieves a security
level of lower than 120 Bits (in general context) only.
No. Purpose Cryptographic Mechanism Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in
Bits
Securit
y Level
above
120
Bits
Software Patch Verification
1 Integrity SHA-512 (default),
SHA-384 or SHA-256
FIPS 180-4 N/A yes
2 Authentication RSA using RSASSA-PKCS1-
v1_5
PKCS #1, v2.2 |k| = 4096 yes
3 Authentication ECDSA P-256 FIPS 186-5,
NIST SP 800-186
|k| = 256 yes
SSH
1 Trusted channel SSHv2 RFC 4251,
RFC 4252,
RFC 4253,
RFC 4254
- -
2 SSH server ECDSA P-256 with SHA-256 FIPS 186-5, |k| = 256 yes
18 / 26
BSI-DSZ-CC-1267-2026 Certification Report
authentication NIST SP 800-186
3 SSH user
authentication
ECDSA P-256, P-384 or
P-521 with SHA-256
FIPS 186-5,
NIST SP 800-186
|k| = 256,
384 or 521
yes
4 Key
Agreement
ECDH brainpoolP256r1 with
SHA-256,
brainpoolP384r1 with SHA-384,
or
brainpoolP512r1 with SHA-512
RFC 5656,
RFC 5639
|k| = 256,
384 or 512
yes
5 Key
Agreement
ECDH P-256 with SHA-
256, P-384 with SHA-384,
or P-521 with SHA-512
RFC 5656,
SEC 1,
NIST SP800-186
|k| = 256,
384 or 512
yes
6 Key
Agreement
DH MODP group16 or
MODP group18 with SHA-512
RFC 4253,
RFC 8268
|k| = 4096
or 8192
yes
7 Confidentiality AES CTR FIPS 197,
NIST-SP800-38A
|k| = 128,
192 or 256
yes
8 Integrity HMAC with SHA-256 or
SHA-512
RFC 2104,
FIPS 180-4
|k| = 256 or
512
yes
TLS
1 Trusted channel TLS 1.3 RFC 8446 - -
2 TLS server
authentication
RSA using RSASSA-PSS or
RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 with
SHA-256, SHA-384 or
SHA-512 (with RSASSA-
PKCS1-v1_5 only in certificate)
PKCS #1, v2.2 |k| = 3072
(default) or
bigger
yes
3 TLS server
authentication
ECDSA P-256 with SHA-256,
P-384 with SHA-384,
or P-521 with SHA-512
FIPS 186-5,
NIST SP 800-186
|k| = 256,
384 or 512
yes
4 TLS client
authentication (for
2FA)
RSA using RSASSA-PSS or
RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 with
SHA-256, SHA-384 or
SHA-512 (with RSASSA-
PKCS1-v1_5 only for certificate
verification)
PKCS #1, v2.2 3072 <= |k| yes
5 TLS client
authentication (for
2FA)
ECDSA P-256 with SHA-256,
P-384 with SHA-384,
or P-521 with SHA-512
FIPS 186-5,
NIST SP 800-186
|k| = 256,
384 or 512
yes
6 Key Agreement ECDH P-256 or P-384 RFC 5656,
SEC 1,
NIST SP 800-186
|k| = 256 or
384
yes
7 Key Agreement ECDH brainpoolP384r1
or brainpoolP512r1
RFC 5656,
SEC 1,
RFC 5639
|k| = 384 or
512
yes
8 Confidentiality and AES GCM FIPS 197, |k| = 128 or
256
yes
19 / 26
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1267-2026
Integrity (AEAD) NIST SP 800-38D
9 Integrity HMAC with SHA-256 or
SHA-384
RFC 2104,
FIPS 180-4
|k| = 256 or
384
yes
IPsec
1 Trusted channel IPsec and IKEv2 RFC 4301,
RFC 7296
- -
2 Authentication HMAC with SHA-512, with pre-
shared key
RFC 2104,
FIPS 180-4
|k| = 512 yes
3 Key Agreement ECDH brainpoolP512r1 RFC 5656,
RFC 5639
|k| = 512 yes
4 Pseudo-random
function (PRF)
HMAC with SHA-512 RFC 2104,
FIPS 180-4
N/A yes
5 Confidentiality AES CBC FIPS 197,
NIST SP 800-38A
|k| = 256 yes
6 Integrity HMAC with SHA-512 RFC 2104,
FIPS 180-4
|k| = 512 yes
Table 3: TOE cryptographic functionality
Reference details for table 3 can be found in the ST [5], chapter 8.
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE
itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
The limited validity for the usage of cryptographic algorithms as outlined in chapter 9 has
to be considered by the user and his system risk management process, too.
If available, certified updates of the TOE should be used. If non-certified updates or
patches are available the user of the TOE should request the sponsor to provide a re-
certification. In the meantime a risk management process of the system using the TOE
should investigate and decide on the usage of not yet certified updates and patches or
take additional measures in order to maintain system security.
For a secure operation it is necessary to follow all recommendations of the manual of the
TOE and to follow all requirements of the environment described in the Security Target.
There should be regularly performed inspections of the TOE configuration. During those
inspections also the user, profile and group access rights should be examined.
During operation of the genugate, it is essential to ensure that configuration backups are
stored physically and logically secure. This should be done using a protection method
similar to the physical and logical security measures used for the genugate.
20 / 26
BSI-DSZ-CC-1267-2026 Certification Report
11. Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [5] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report.
12. Regulation specific aspects (eIDAS, QES)
None.
13. Definitions
13.1. Acronyms
ACL Access Control List
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
ALG Application Level Gateway
ANSI American National Standard Institute
BPF Berkeley Packet Filter
BSD Berkeley Software Design
BSDI Berkeley Software Design, Inc.
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CARP Common Address Redundancy Protocol
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
CGI Common Gateway Interface
CLI Command Line Interface
DMZ Demilitarised Zone
DNS Domain Name Service
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard
FTP File Transfer Protocol
GUI Graphical User Interface
HA High Availability
HTML Hyper Text Markup Language
HTTP Hyper Text Transfer Protocol
ICMP Internet Control Message Protocol
21 / 26
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1267-2026
IEC International Electrotechnical Commission
IMAP Internet Message Access Protocol
IP Internet Protocol
ISO International Standardisation Organisation
IT Information Technology
ITSEC Information Technology Security Evaluation Criteria
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
OpenBSD Open Berkeley Software Distribution, a security focused operating system
OSPF Open Shortest Path First
Perl Practical Extraction and Reporting Language
PF Packet Filter (component of OpenBSD)
PFL Packet Filter (component of genugate)
PKCS Public-Key Cryptography Standard
PP Protection Profile
QA Quality Assurance
RSA Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman, a public key encryption algorithm
RSASSA RSA Signature Scheme with Appendix
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SMTP Simple Mail Transfer Protocol
SSH Secure SHell
SSL Secure Socket Layer
ST Security Target
TCP Transmission Control Protocol
Telnet Telecommunication network
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionalities
UDP User Datagram Protocol
URL Uniform Resource Locator
USB Universal Serial Bus
VPN Virtual Private Network
WWW World Wide Web
22 / 26
BSI-DSZ-CC-1267-2026 Certification Report
13.2. Glossary
Augmentation – The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Collaborative Protection Profile – A Protection Profile collaboratively developed by an
International Technical Community endorsed by the Management Committee.
Extension – The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in CC
part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in CC part 3.
Formal – Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Informal – Expressed in natural language.
Object – A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon
which subjects perform operations.
Package – named set of either security functional or security assurance requirements
Protection Profile – A formal document defined in CC, expressing an implementation
independent set of security requirements for a category of IT Products that meet specific
consumer needs.
Security Target – An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Subject – An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation – An IT Product and its associated administrator and user guidance
documentation that is the subject of an Evaluation.
TOE Security Functionality – Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
14. Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation/CC
ISO-Version:
ISO 15408:2022, Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation
- Part 1: Introduction and general model
- Part 2: Security functional components
- Part 3: Security assurance components
- Part 4: Framework for the specification of evaluation methods and activities
- Part 5: Pre-defined packages of security requirements
https://www.iso.org/standard/72891.html
https://www.iso.org/standard/72892.html
https://www.iso.org/standard/72906.html
https://www.iso.org/standard/72913.html
https://www.iso.org/standard/72917.html
CCRA-Version:
CC:2022 R1, Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation
- Part 1: Introduction and general model
- Part 2: Security functional components
- Part 3: Security assurance components
- Part 4: Framework for the specification of evaluation methods and activities
23 / 26
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1267-2026
- Part 5: Pre-defined packages of security requirement
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[2] Gemeinsame Evaluationsmethodologie für die Prüfung und Bewertung der
Sicherheit von Informationstechnik (Common Methodology for Information
Technology Security Evaluation (CEM), Evaluation Methodology
ISO-Version:
ISO 18045:2022: Information technology Security techniques Methodology for IT
security evaluation
https://www.iso.org/standard/72889.html
CCRA-Version:
CEM:2022 R1, Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[3] BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) and Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility,
approval and licensing (CC-Stellen), https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE7
https://www.bsi.bund.de/AIS
[5] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-1267-2026, genugate firewall 11.0 p0, Version: 11.0.12
(141f1f2), Date: 2026-01-27, genua GmbH
[6] Evaluation Technical Report BSI-DSZ-CC-01267 for genugate firewall 11.0 p0,
Version 2, Date 09.02.2026, secuvera Gmbh (confidential document)
[7] genugate Administrations- und Konfigurationshandbuch, Version 11.0, Ausgabe 7.
Januar 2026, genua GmbH
[8] genugate Installationshandbuch, Version 11.0, Ausgabe 7. Januar 2026, genua
GmbH
[9] genugate Virtual, Installationshandbuch Ausgabe 15, Dezember 2025, Revision:
39258e4, genua GmbH
[10] genugate Erläuterungen zur Zertifizierung, Ausgabe: 29. Januar 2026, genua GmbH
[11] Technical Specification ISO/IEC TS 9569, Information security, cybersecurity and
privacy protection — Evaluation criteria for IT security — Patch Management
Extension for the ISO/IEC 15408 series and ISO/IEC 18045, ISO/IEC TS9569,
2023-11
7
specifically
• AIS 20, Version 3, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für deterministische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 32, Version 7, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
• AIS 34, Version 3, Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL 5+ (CCv2.3 &
CCv3.1) and EAL 6 (CCv3.1)
• AIS 38, Version 2, Reuse of evaluation results
24 / 26
BSI-DSZ-CC-1267-2026 Certification Report
C. Excerpts from the Criteria
For the meaning of the assurance components and levels the following references to the
Common Criteria in its CCRA Documents can be followed:
• On conformance claim definitions and descriptions refer to CC:2022 part 1 chapter
10.5
• On the concept of assurance classes, families and components refer to CC:2022
Part 3 chapter 6.1
• On the concept and definition of pre-defined assurance packages (EAL) refer to
CCRA CC:2022 Part 5.
• On the assurance class ASE for Security Target evaluation refer to CC:2022 Part 3
chapter 9
• On the detailed definitions of the assurance components for the TOE evaluation
refer to CC:2022 Part 3 chapters 7 to 15
• The table 1 in CC:2022 part 5, Chapter 4.2 summarizes the relationship between
the evaluation assurance levels (EAL) and the assurance classes, families and
components.
The CC are published as the CCRA Version at
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/cc/index.cfm
The CC are published as the ISO/IEC Version at
https://standards.iso.org/ittf/PubliclyAvailableStandards/index.html
25 / 26
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1267-2026
D. Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
Note: End of report
26 / 26