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Reference: 2019-19-INF-3679- v1
Target: Pública
Date: 02.02.2022
Created by: CERT10
Revised by: CALIDAD
Approved by: TECNICO
CERTIFICATION REPORT
Dossier # 2019-19
TOE Huawei Reliable Telecomm Operating System version 207.3.5.SPC100.B004
Applicant 440301192203821 - Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.
References
[EXT-4929] Certification request
[EXT-7321] Evaluation technical report
Certification report of the product Huawei Reliable Telecomm Operating System version
207.3.5.SPC100.B004, as requested in [EXT-4929] dated 23/04/2019, and evaluated by DEKRA
Testing and Certification S.A.U., as detailed in the Evaluation Technical Report [EXT-7321] received
on 30/07/2021.
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CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY...........................................................................................................................3
TOE SUMMARY...................................................................................................................................4
SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS ............................................................................................5
SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS...........................................................................................5
IDENTIFICATION.....................................................................................................................................6
SECURITY POLICIES.................................................................................................................................7
ASSUMPTIONS AND OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT .........................................................................7
CLARIFICATIONS ON NON-COVERED THREATS..................................................................................7
OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT FUNCTIONALITY ...............................................................................7
ARCHITECTURE.......................................................................................................................................8
LOGICAL ARCHITECTURE ....................................................................................................................8
PHYSICAL ARCHITECTURE...................................................................................................................9
DOCUMENTS........................................................................................................................................10
PRODUCT TESTING...............................................................................................................................10
PENETRATION TESTING....................................................................................................................11
EVALUATED CONFIGURATION .............................................................................................................11
EVALUATION RESULTS .........................................................................................................................12
COMMENTS & RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE EVALUATION TEAM...............................................12
CERTIFIER RECOMMENDATIONS .........................................................................................................12
GLOSSARY.............................................................................................................................................12
BIBLIOGRAPHY .....................................................................................................................................13
SECURITY TARGET ................................................................................................................................13
RECOGNITION AGREEMENTS...............................................................................................................14
European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)......................................................14
International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA).....................................................................14
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This document constitutes the Certification Report for the certification file of the product Huawei
Reliable Telecomm Operating System version 207.3.5.SPC100.B004.
Huawei Reliable Telecomm OS is a highly-configurable Linux-based operating system for embedded
devices, which has been developed to provide a good level of security as required in commercial
environments.
Developer/manufacturer: Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.
Sponsor: Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd..
Certification Body: Centro Criptológico Nacional (CCN) del Centro Nacional de Inteligencia (CNI).
ITSEF: DEKRA Testing and Certification S.A.U.
Protection Profile:
 Operating System Protection Profile, BSI-CC-PP-0067, Version 2.0; strict conformance;
 OSPP Extended Package - Advanced Management, BSI-CC-PP-0067, OSPP EP-AM, Version
2.0; strict conformance
Evaluation Level: Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Version 3.1 R5 -
EAL4+ (ALC_FLR.3).
Evaluation end date: 18/11/2021
Expiration Date1: 01/02/2027
All the assurance components required by the evaluation level EAL4 (augmented with ALC_FLR.3)
have been assigned a “PASS” verdict. Consequently, the laboratory DEKRA Testing and Certification
S.A.U. assigns the “PASS” VERDICT to the whole evaluation due all the evaluator actions are
satisfied for the EAL4, as defined by the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation Version 3.1 R5 and the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation Version 3.1 R5.
Considering the obtained evidences during the instruction of the certification request of the
product Huawei Reliable Telecomm Operating System version 207.3.5.SPC100.B004, a positive
resolution is proposed.
1
This date refers to the expiration date of the certificate recognition within the scope of the mutual recognition
arrangements signed by this Certification Body.
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TOE SUMMARY
Huawei Reliable Telecomm OS is a general purpose, multi-user, multi-tasking Linux based operating
system for embedded devices.
The following hardware are fully compatible with TOE:
 ARM64 based device board (using ARM64 v8 processor) with Huawei hi1382: 16-core ARM
cortex-A72, 1GB flash storage, serial port and network port interface, with external 48v DC
power module.
 ARM64 based device board (using ARM64 v8 processor) with Huawei hi1213: 4-core ARM
cortex-A72, LowPower dissipation, 8GB ram, 1GB flash storage, serial port and network port
interface, with external 48v DC power module.
All ARM64 device board using ARM64 v8 processors supports TOE running.
Additionally, the TOE needs an OS Linux x86_64 machine for administration.
The TOE provides the following key security features:
 Security Audit: The TOE is able to intercept all system calls and recording the events
occurred in the system. The security audit functionality also allows to configure the events
to be audited, review and search the audit log retrieved.
 Cryptographic support: The TOE provides cryptographically secured communication to allow
remote entities to log into the TOE. It is achieved by using the SSHv2 protocol. The TOE also
provided TLS protocols in order to secure the communications with other IT entities.
 Identification and Authentication: The TOE includes several ways to identify and
authenticate the users (via the local console using username and password or via the SSH
using password and public-key based authentication. The TOE also offers a password quality
enforcement mechanism as well as it is able to handle failed authentication attempts.
 User Data Protection: The TOE offers a Discretionary Access Control (DAC) which allow
owner of named objects to control the access permissions to these objects. Moreover, the
TOE kernel implements the IPTables mechanism in order to provide a packet filter at
network and transfer layer. Using these two mechanism the TOE offers an access control
policy as well as an information flow control policy.
 Security Management: The TOE offers to the users and/or authorized administrators the
possibility of modify the configuration of TSF. The TOE allows local and remote management
using by using OpenSSH.
 TOE Access: The TOE is able to end user sessions after an inactivity period of time. This can
be initiated by the TSF itself or by user request.
 Trusted Channel: Using the cryptographic communication protocols above mentioned (SSH
and TLS) the TOE is able to establish secure and trusted communication channel with other
IT entities.
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SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS
The product was evaluated with all the evidence required to fulfil the evaluation level EAL4 and the
evidences required by the additional component ALC_FLR.3 to the table, according to Common
Criteria v3.1 R5.
ASSURANCE CLASS ASSURANCE COMPONENT
ASE ASE_CCL.1
ASE_ECD.1
ASE_INT.1
ASE_OBJ.2
ASE_REQ.2
ASE_SPD.1
ASE.TSS.1
ADV ADV_ARC.1
ADV_FSP.4
ADV_IMP.1
ADV_TDS.3
AGD AGD_OPE.1
AGD_PRE.1
ALC ALC_CMC.4
ALC_CMS.4
ALC_DEL.1
ALC_DVS.1
ALC_LCD.1
ALC_TAT.1
ALC_FLR.3
ATE ATE_COV.2
ATE_DPT.1
ATE_FUN.1
ATE_IND.2
AVA AVA_VAN.3
SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS
The product security functionality satisfies the following functional requirements, according to the
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Version 3.1 R5:
SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS
FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation 31 FAU_GEN.2 User identity association 32
FAU_SAR.1 Audit review 32 FAU_SAR.2 Restricted audit review 32
FAU_SEL.1 Selective audit 32 FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage 33
FAU_STG.3 Action in case of possible audit data loss 33 FAU_STG.4 Prevention of audit data loss 33
FCS_CKM.1 (SYM) Cryptographic key generation 34 FCS_CKM.1 (RSA) Cryptographic key generation 34
FCS_CKM.1 (DSA) Cryptographic key generation 35 FCS_CKM.1 (ECDSA) Cryptographic key generation 35
FCS_CKM.2 (NET) Cryptographic key distribution 35 FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction 36
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FCS_COP.1 (NET) Cryptographic operation 36 FCS_RNG.1 Random number generation (Class DRG.2)
37
FDP_ACC.1 (PSO) Subset access control 38 FDP_ACC.1 (TSO) Subset access control 38
FDP_ACF.1 (PSO) Security attribute based access
control 39
FDP_ACF.1 (TSO) Security attribute based access
control 40
FDP_IFC.2 (NI) Complete information flow control 41 FDP_IFF.1 (NI) Simple security attributes 41
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes
43
FDP_RIP.2 Full residual information protection 43
FDP_RIP.3 Full residual information protection of
resources 44
FIA_AFL.1 Authentication failure handling 44
FIA_ATD.1 (HU) User attribute definition 44 FIA_ATD.1 (TU) User attribute definition 45
FIA_SOS.1 Verification of secrets 45 FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication 45
FIA_UAU.5 Multiple authentication mechanisms 45 FIA_UAU.7 Protected authentication feedback 46
FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification 46 FIA_USB.2 Enhanced user-subject binding 46
FMT_MSA.1 (PSO) Management of object security
attributes 48
FMT_MSA.1 (TSO) Management of object security
attributes 48
FMT_MSA.3 (PSO) Static attribute initialization 48 FMT_MSA.3 (TSO) Static attribute initialization 49
FMT_MSA.3 (NI) Static attribute initialization 49 FMT_MSA.4 (PSO) Security attribute value inheritance
49
FMT_MTD.1 (AE) Management of TSF data 50 FMT_MTD.1 (AS) Management of TSF data 50
FMT_MTD.1 (AT) Management of TSF data 50 FMT_MTD.1 (AF) Management of TSF data 50
FMT_MTD.1 (NI) Management of TSF data 50 FMT_MTD.1 (IAT) Management of TSF data 51
FMT_MTD.1 (IAF) Management of TSF data 51 FMT_MTD.1 (IAU) Management of TSF data 51
FMT_MTD.1 (AM-AP) Management of TSF data 51 FMT_MTD.1 (AM-MR) Management of TSF data 51
FMT_MTD.1 (AM-MD) Management of TSF data 52 FMT_MTD.1 (AM-MA) Management of TSF data 52
FMT_REV.1 (OBJ) Revocation 52 FMT_REV.1 (USR) Revocation 52
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
52
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles 53
FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps 53 FPT_TDC.1 Inter-TSF basic TSF data consistency 53
FTA_SSL.1 TSF-initiated session locking 53 FTA_SSL.2 User-initiated locking 54
FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel
EXTENDED SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS
FCS_RNG Generation of random numbers
FDP_RIP.3 Full residual information protection of resources
FIA_USB.2 Enhanced user-subject binding
IDENTIFICATION
Product: Huawei Reliable Telecomm Operating System version 207.3.5.SPC100.B004
Security Target: Huawei Reliable Telecomm Operating System 207.3.5.SPC100.B004 Security Target
(version: 1.2, date: 21/07/2021).
Protection Profile:
 Operating System Protection Profile, BSI-CC-PP-0067, Version 2.0; strict conformance;
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 OSPP Extended Package - Advanced Management, BSI-CC-PP-0067, OSPP EP-AM, Version
2.0; strict conformance
Evaluation Level: Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Version 3.1 R5
EAL4 + ALC_FLR.3.
SECURITY POLICIES
The use of the product Huawei Reliable Telecomm Operating System version 207.3.5.SPC100.B004
shall implement a set of security policies assuring the fulfilment of different standards and security
demands.
The detail of these policies is documented in the Security Target, section 3.2 (“Organizational
Security Policies”).
ASSUMPTIONS AND OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
The following assumptions are constraints to the conditions used to assure the security properties
and functionalities compiled by the security target. These assumptions have been applied during
the evaluation in order to determine if the identified vulnerabilities can be exploited.
In order to assure the secure use of the TOE, it is necessary to start from these assumptions for its
operational environment. If this is not possible and any of them could not be assumed, it would not
be possible to assure the secure operation of the TOE.
The detail of these assumptions is documented in the Security Target, section 3.3 (“Assumptions”).
CLARIFICATIONS ON NON-COVERED THREATS
The following threats do not suppose a risk for the product Huawei Reliable Telecomm Operating
System version 207.3.5.SPC100.B004, although the agents implementing attacks have the attack
potential according to the enhanced-basic attack potential of EAL4 and always fulfilling the usage
assumptions and the proper security policies satisfaction.
For any other threat not included in this list, the evaluation results of the product security
properties and the associated certificate, do not guarantee any resistance.
The threats covered by the security properties of the TOE are those defined in the Database
Management Systems Protection Profile and they are documented in the Security Target, section
3.1 (“Threats”).
OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT FUNCTIONALITY
The product requires the cooperation from its operational environment to fulfil some of the
objectives of the defined security problem.
The security objectives declared for the TOE operational environment are those defined in the
Protection Profile and they are documented in the Security Target, section 4.2 (“Security Objectives
for the operational Environment”).
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ARCHITECTURE
LOGICAL ARCHITECTURE
The TOE contains several subsystems; each of them has several modules and provides some
security functionality for other subsystems. The figure below shows these subsystems and the
interactions among them.
Figure 1. TOE subsystems and interactions among them
Some notes on Figure 1:
 The Base Kernel subsystem is the basis of the whole system; it supports all other
subsystems, and provides plenty of APIs for them.
To make the figure neat, the interaction between the Base Kernel and related subsystems is
not shown. Instead, the box for the Base Kernel is widened evidently to indicate this.
 Subsystem Crypto contains two independent parts, one in kernel space and the other in
user space, each containing some modules. These parts are denoted with separate boxes in
the figure.
 The subsystems denoted with dotted boxes in kernel space are not fully implemented in
kernel space. Each of such subsystems contains a group of management facilities that run in
user space. To make it easy to understand, these facilities are not shown in the figure.
The table below gives basic information of each subsystem:
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No. Subsystem ID Subsystem Name Description
1 S_KNL Base kernel Fundamental OS services provided in kernel space, including
virtual file system, network protocol stack, inter-process
communication mechanisms, process scheduling, memory
management, timer/clock and so on.
2 S_AUDIT Audit Selection of auditable events, generation of audit records,
protection of configurations and audit tracks, tools to review and
search audit tracks.
3 S_CRYPTO Crypto services Facilities for data randomization, hashing, encryption/decryption
and signing/verifying.
4 S_NETCTL Network data flow
filter and control
Rules for network packet filtering and enforcement of the rules.
5 S_IA User identification
and authentication
Management of user identification, local and remote
authentication, protection of authentication information, log of
failed authentication.
6 S_ACTL Access control Traditional Unix discretionary access control capabilities.
7 S_RIP Protection of
residual infomation
Management of information in reusable resources (RAM, disk,
IPC).
8 S_TCHNL Trusted channel Creation and management of trusted channel between two
connected entities, including authentication, key exchange, and
session management.
Table 1. TOE subsystems
PHYSICAL ARCHITECTURE
The TOE consists of RPM packages and documentation. These packages and files are provided via
email.
 rtos_base-207.3.5.SPC100.B004-20210331120602.i586.rpm
(sha256: d7f59d8a783705006e0d128c4a6b2e328d2efa52e2c9efe04f6438f264b08144)
 rtos_kernelspace_sysroots-arm64le_4.4_ek_preempt-207.3.5.SPC100.B004-
20210331120602.i586.rpm
(sha256: a65c7e9fc7522cdc72697c8c71856cdfe2d9b723662177c574e48ec8487b1187)
 rtos_libc_sysroots-arm64le_4.4_ek_preempt-207.3.5.SPC100.B004-
20210331120602.i586.rpm
(sha256: 5c89f221574c11a8ea098fc14ba21eaf4a85863856ca8882b6f5eb955cfeb65c)
 rtos_userspace_sysroots-arm64le_4.4_ek_preempt-207.3.5.SPC100.B004-
20210331120602.i586.rpm
(sha256: 5431f3fc0b85fce2d300418189a8943fc38fa51ed905965fab00480d38f0eddd)
 rtos_dist-arm64le_4.4_ek_preempt-207.3.5.SPC100.B004-20210331120602.i586.rpm
(sha256: cc26f3ce53c06d4b23455b6abc8587f568ce53a7792c61423378914dd5c7f558)
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DOCUMENTS
The product includes the following documents that shall be distributed and made available
together to the users of the evaluated version.
 Installation guide: Huawei Reliable Telecomm Operating System 207.3.5.SPC100.B004_
AGD_PRE-v1.0, delivered in .pdf format
(sha256: 680f26996a87201994585790f466e3701c230b141c7bbed2b6a8774d00dd9933).
 User guide: Huawei Reliable Telecomm Operating System 207.3.5.SPC100.B004_AGD_OPE-
v1.0, delivered in .pdf format.
(sha256: e17102c9208ea177728c08651be14e2414c4e333e055feffe30848b0186fcd69)
 Huawei Reliable Telecomm Operating System 207.3.5.SPC100.B004_AGD_OPE_manpage-
v1.0, delivered in .tar.gz format: the usage of all the interfaces provided by the TOE.
(sha256: 94d331aa2c9ba660cf97d25263bbabe9b9348d0483e6af4a70af5bff96e513a3)
 Huawei Reliable Telecomm Operating System 207.3.5.SPC100.B004_AGD_PRE_build_tools-
v1.0, delivered in .tar.gz format: the usage of helping build the TOE.
(sha256: 62efcb45115921c5da984b905d3a82651f4235cab5253905c3c78ab533d8dbe5)
PRODUCT TESTING
The developer has executed tests for all the security functions. All the tests have been performed
by the developer in its premises, with a satisfactory result.
The evaluator designed a set of tests following a suitable strategy for the TOE type taking into
account:
1. All SFRs have been tested whether through TSFI excitation or subsystem checking.
2. The testing criteria of the only accessible TSFI is based on:
 Developer tests rigor.
 Developer test results including the Web interface and subsystems which tests
results are not reliable.
 Importance of the only accessible TSFI and subsystems.
 Types of subsystems.
 Number of subsystems.
In order to create adequate tests, the evaluator has chosen the following criteria: search for critical
SFRs and parameters in the TSFI and subsystems, requirements implemented by the only accessible
TSFI, exhaustive tests over it and subsystems, incorrect behaviour suspicion with specific input
values and the performance of testing every subsystem.
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Moreover, the evaluator has carried out tests with the instructions provided for the only accessible
TSFI and all subsystems that could have special importance in the maintenance of the TOE security.
The evaluator has designed the independent test cases including all the security requirements
defined in [ST].
The evaluator testing plan has been SFR oriented, and the functionality of each SFR included at the
security target has been considered.
All the test cases have been performed using the connection between the local client machine and
the Web Interface. This allow testing appropriately both the SFRs defined in [ST] and the
subsystems.
This sampling selection was used for the TOE version 207.3.5.SPC100.B004 and covered the 100%
of the requirements listed in [ST], the subsystems listed in Table 1. TOE subsystems and the TSF-
relevant TSFIs.
The test cases have taken into account critical parameters values, searching that the TOE behaves
in a non expected manner.
PENETRATION TESTING
The developer has executed a set of penetration tests to check if the potential vulnerabilities may
be exploited in the TOE operational environment. The penetration tests have been performed with
the assumption that the potential attack is enhanced-basic.
The results obtained when executing the penetration tests demonstrates that the TOE does not
present exploited vulnerabilities in the operational environment defined in [ST].
EVALUATED CONFIGURATION
The TOE was tested on the following physical platform:
 ARM64 based device board (using ARM64 v8 processor), Huawei hi1213 Soc based
hardware device board (8GB ram, 1GB flash storage, serial port and network port interface,
with external 48v DC power module).
The host machine used to connect to the TOE for the evaluation was an OS Linux based machine
using Suse Linux 12.4 x86_64.
The evaluated configuration is defined as follows:
 The package set evaluated by CC for the TOE must be selected at install time according to
the installation guide and be installed accordingly.
 The TOE supports the use of IPv4 and IPv6, both are also supported in the evaluated
configuration.
 The default configuration for identification and authentication include both the defined
password-based PAM modules and the key-based authentication for OpenSSH. Support for
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other authentication options, e.g. smart card authentication, is not included in the
evaluation configuration.
 If the system console is used, it must be connected directly to the TOE and afforded the
same physical protection as the TOE.
Configurations and settings that are different from that specified in the installation guide are not
permitted.
EVALUATION RESULTS
The product Huawei Reliable Telecomm Operating System version 207.3.5.SPC100.B004 has been
evaluated against the Security Target Huawei Reliable Telecomm Operating System
207.3.5.SPC100.B004 Security Target (version: 1.2, date: 21/07/2021).
All the assurance components required by the evaluation level EAL4 + ALC_FLR.3 have been
assigned a “PASS” verdict. Consequently, the laboratory DEKRA Testing and Certification S.A.U.
assigns the “PASS” VERDICT to the whole evaluation due all the evaluator actions are satisfied for
the evaluation level EAL4, as defined by the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation Version 3.1 R5 and the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation Version 3.1 R5.
COMMENTS & RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE EVALUATION TEAM
Next, recommendations regarding the secure usage of the TOE are provided. These have been
collected along the evaluation process and are detailed to be considered when using the product.
The TOE usage is recommended by the evaluation team given that there are not exploitable
vulnerabilities for the TOE under its operational environment. The following usage
recommendations are given:
 The fulfilment of the assumptions indicated in the security target is a key point as it implies
TOE environment configurations that leave some potential vulnerabilities out of the scope.
The user guidance must be read and understood in order to operate the TOE in an adequate
manner according to the security target.
CERTIFIER RECOMMENDATIONS
Considering the obtained evidences during the instruction of the certification request of the
product DEKRA Testing and Certification S.A.U., a positive resolution is proposed.
GLOSSARY
CCN Centro Criptológico Nacional
CNI Centro Nacional de Inteligencia
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
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ETR Evaluation Technical Report
OC Organismo de Certificación
TOE Target Of Evaluation
BIBLIOGRAPHY
The following standards and documents have been used for the evaluation of the product:
[CC_P1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 1: Introduction and
general model, Version 3.1, R5 Final, April 2017.
[CC_P2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security functional
components, Version 3.1, R5 Final, April 2017.
[CC_P3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security assurance
components, Version 3.1, R5 Final, April 2017.
[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation: Version 3.1, R5 Final,
April 2017.
[OSPP] Operating System Protection Profile, BSI-CC-PP-0067, Version 2.0; strict conformance;
https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Zertifikate_CC/PP/aktuell/PP_0067.html
[OSPP-AM] OSPP Extended Package - Advanced Management, BSI-CC-PP-0067, Version 2.0; strict
conformance; https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Zertifikate_CC/PP/aktuell/PP_0067.html
[ST] Huawei Reliable Telecomm Operating System 207.3.5.SPC100.B004 Security Target (version:
1.2, date: 21/07/2021)
SECURITY TARGET
Along with this certification report, the complete security target of the evaluation is available in the
Certification Body: Huawei Reliable Telecomm Operating System 207.3.5.SPC100.B004 Security
Target (version: 1.2, date: 21/07/2021).
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RECOGNITION AGREEMENTS
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or CC - under
certain conditions was agreed.
European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in April 2010. It
defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition level and, in addition, at
higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS Technical Domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels EAL 1 to EAL
4 and ITSEC Evaluation Assurance Levels E1 to E3 (basic). For "Smartcards and similar devices" a
SOGIS Technical Domain is in place. For "HW Devices with Security Boxes" a SOGIS Technical
Domains is in place, too. In addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common
Criteria are part of the recognition agreement.
The new agreement has been signed by the national bodies of Austria, Finland, France, Germany,
Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. The current list of
signatory nations and approved certification schemes, details on recognition, and the history of the
agreement can be seen on the website at https://www.sogis.org.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the terms of this
agreement by the nations listed above.
The certificate of this TOE is recognized under SOGIS-MRA for assurance components up to EAL4.
International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC (Common
Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08 September 2014. It covers
CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP) (exact use), CC certificates based on
assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or the assurance family Flaw Remediation
(ALC_FLR) and CC certificates for Protection Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).
The CCRA-2014 replaces the old CCRA signed in May 2000 (CCRA-2000). Certificates based on CCRA-
2000, issued before 08 September 2014 are still under recognition according to the rules of CCRA-
2000. For on 08 September 2014 ongoing certification procedures and for Assurance Continuity
(maintenance and re-certification)of old certificates a transition period on the recognition of
certificates according to the rules of CCRA-2000 (i.e. assurance components up to and including EAL
4 or the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR)) is defined until 08 September 2017.
As of September 2014 the signatories of the new CCRA-2014 are government representatives from
the following nations: Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, The Netherlands, New Zealand,
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https://oc.ccn.cni.es
organismo.certificacion@cni.es
Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Korea, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, and the
United States.
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on the
website: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates that this
certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the nations listed above.
The certificate of this TOE is recognized under CCRA for all assurance components up to EAL2 and
ALC_FLR.