Mobile FeliCa Applet
i
Version 1.31 Public
No. MAP01-ASEP01-E01-31
FeliCa Networks, Inc
Security Target lite
for Mobile FeliCa Applet
on SkySIM CX Virgo platform
Mobile FeliCa Applet
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Introduction
This document is the Security Target for CC evaluation of "Mobile FeliCa Applet on SkySIM CX Virgo
platform"
・FeliCa is a contactless IC card technology developed by Sony Corporation.
・FeliCa is a trademark of Sony Corporation.
・All names of companies and products appearing in this document are trademarks or registered
trademarks of their respective owners.
・No part of this document may be copied or reproduced in any form without the prior consent of FeliCa
Networks, Inc.
・The information in this document is subject to change without notice.
Contents
Introduction .................................................................................................................................................... i
1. Introducing the Security Target...............................................................................................................1
1.1. ST and TOE identification..................................................................................................................1
1.2. Conformance claims........................................................................................................................ 2
1.2.1. CC Conformance Claim ............................................................................................................. 2
1.2.2. Package claim........................................................................................................................... 2
1.2.3. PP claim .................................................................................................................................... 2
1.3. TOE overview ................................................................................................................................... 2
2. TOE description ...................................................................................................................................... 4
2.1. Physical scope ................................................................................................................................. 4
2.2. Delivery............................................................................................................................................ 5
2.3. Logical scope ................................................................................................................................... 6
2.4. Lifecycle ............................................................................................................................................7
2.5. Evaluated configurations..................................................................................................................7
3. Security problem definition.................................................................................................................... 8
3.1. Assets............................................................................................................................................... 8
3.2. Assumptions.................................................................................................................................... 8
3.3. Organisational security policies ...................................................................................................... 8
4. Security objectives.................................................................................................................................10
4.1. TOE security objectives...................................................................................................................10
4.2. TOE operational environment security objectives .........................................................................10
4.3. Security objectives rationale .......................................................................................................... 11
5. Security requirements ...........................................................................................................................14
5.1. TOE security functional requirements ............................................................................................14
5.2. TOE security assurance requirements ............................................................................................16
5.3. Security functional requirements rationale....................................................................................16
5.4. Security assurance requirements rationale....................................................................................18
6. TOE Summary Specification ..................................................................................................................19
6.1. TOE summary specification rationale.............................................................................................19
7. Glossary and references........................................................................................................................21
7.1. Terms and definitions.....................................................................................................................21
7.2. Acronyms........................................................................................................................................21
7.3. Bibliography....................................................................................................................................22
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1. Introducing the Security Target
This document is the Security Target for CC evaluation of Mobile FeliCa Applet on SkySIM CX Virgo
platform.
This Security Target is provided in accordance with "Common Criteria for Information Technology
Security Evaluation" [CC].
For definitions of the terms, abbreviations, and literary references used in this document, see Chapter 7,
"Glossary and references
1.1. ST and TOE identification
This section provides the information necessary to identify and control this Security Target and its TOE,
Mobile FeliCa Applet on SkySIM CX Virgo platform (hereinafter referred as to FeliCa Applet) in a mobile
phone.
Table 1: ST identification
ST attribute Value
Name Security Target lite for Mobile FeliCa Applet on SkySIM CX Virgo platform
Version 1.31
Reference MAP01-ASEP01-E01-31
Issue Date November 2016
Table 2: TOE identification
TOE attribute Value
Name Mobile FeliCa Applet on SkySIM CX Virgo platform
Version 2.0
Product type Mobile FeliCa IC Chip
Form Factor Embedded secure element
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1.2. Conformance claims
This section describes the conformance claims.
1.2.1. CC Conformance Claim
The evaluation is based on the following:
 "Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation", Version 3.1 (composed of Parts1-3,
[CC Part 1], [CC Part 2], and [CC Part 3])
 "Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation: Evaluation Methodology",
Version 3.1 [CC CEM]
This Security Target claims the following conformances:
 [CC Part 2] extended
 [CC Part 3] conformant
1.2.2. Package claim
The chosen level of assurance is:
 Evaluation Assurance Level 4 (EAL4) augmented with ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5
1.2.3. PP claim
This Security Target and the TOE do not claim any Protection Profile (PP):
1.3. TOE overview
The TOE is an integrated circuit with an embedded smartcard operating system with FeliCa Applet. The
operating system is SkySIM CX Virgo and the integrated circuit is BCM_SPS02 [ST-PLATFORM].
The TOE manages several data sets, each having a different purpose, on a single TOE. The TOE has a file
system consisting of Areas and FeliCa Services, which organise files in a tree structure (as shown in
Figure 1). Multiple Service Providers can use an Area or a FeliCa Service. Access keys enable access to
data, via the Areas and FeliCa Services. This prevents unauthorised access to the User Services of other
Service Providers. By organising these keys in a specific manner, multiple Area and FeliCa Services can be
authenticated simultaneously.
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Figure 1: The FeliCa file system
The security measures of the TOE aim at protecting the access to the User Services (including associated
user data), and to maintain the confidentiality and integrity of the user data. The User Services are
defined by Service Providers. For example, a public transport Service Provider can incorporate the TOE
into a ticketing system, to offer a ticket-payment User Service. A single TOE can be used by multiple
Service Providers. A Service Provider can provide multiple User Services.
To set up the User Services and the access to those services, the Administrator (also known as a
Personaliser) configures the TOE. This configuration work enables the TOE to offer various User Services,
such as cash-purse and transport-payment solutions. After the TOE is personalised, the Users are
allowed only to access the FeliCa Services defined by the Administrator.
The card reader and the TOE authenticate each other, and only then shall the TOE allow the card reader
access, according to the access policy defined by the Administrator. After authentication the
communication between the TOE and the card reader is encrypted.
The TOE has several self-protection mechanisms sufficient to satisfy all requirements for self-protection,
non-bypassability, and domain separation as described by the CC supporting documents for the
smartcard security evaluations [AAPS].
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2. TOE description
This chapter describes the following aspects of the TOE:
 physical scope
 delivery
 logical scope
 lifecycle
2.1. Physical scope
The TOE is an integrated circuit with the Security IC Embedded Software with FeliCa Applet. The Security
IC Embedded Software is the SkySIM CX Virgo and the integrated circuit is BCM_SPS02 .
The following figure illustrates the physical scope of the TOE, which is indicated in yellow, and the
product, which is indicated in blue:
Figure 2: TOE physical scope
The components of the TOE are explained as follows:
 "FeliCa Applet" constitutes the part of the TOE that is responsible for managing and providing
access to the Areas and FeliCa Services.
 SkySIM CX Virgo has a Java Card System which manages and executes applets. It provides APIs for
developing applets in accordance with the Java Card specification. SkySIM CX Virgo has
GlobalPlatform packages providing a common interface to communicate with a smart card and
manage applications in a secure way according to the GP specifications.
Contactless card
reader
Other Java
Applets
Mobile Phone
TOE
FeliCa Applet
SkySIM CX Virgo platform
BCM_SPS02
Antenna
Product
CLF
Host
Controller
SWP
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 "BCM_SPS02" is the hardware platform of the TOE. The hardware platform provides the following
security functionality, DES1
, AES, RNG and CRC. The hardware platform also includes security
detectors, sensors and circuitry to protect the TOE.
The SWP interface enables the exchange of FeliCa commands, which are processed by the FeliCa Applet.
The CLF chip, the Host controller and the antenna are out of scope of the TOE. The CLF chip provides
contact and contactless communication among the TOE, the contactless card reader and the host
controller.
All components of the TOE including guidance manuals are listed in the following section.
2.2. Delivery
The TOE delivery items are listed in the following table:
Table 3: TOE delivery items
Delivery
item type
Identifier Version Medium
Hardware Broadcom BCM_SPS02 0x1C404230 Smartcard
integrated circuit
Software BCM_SPS02 Secure Firmware 002.020 Embedded in
hardware
G&D SkySIM CX Virgo V2.0 0.16.12 Embedded in
hardware
Mobile FeliCa Applet 615100 An application on
Java card platform.
Manuals Mobile FeliCa Applet User’s Manual 1.40 Document
FeliCa Card User’s Maual 1.02 Document
Mobile FeliCa Appet Personalization Specification 1.20 Document
Individual data for Issuer 1.20 Document
Product Acceptance Procedure 1.10 Document
Security Reference Manual – Group Key Generation
(AES 128bit)
1.21 Document
Security Reference Manual – Mutual Authentication &
Secure Communication (AES 128bit)
1.21 Document
Security Reference Manual – Package Generation (AES
128bit)
1.21 Document
1
Mobile FeliCa Applet on SkySIM CX Virgo platform does not implement any Security Functional
Requirement using DES operation. Therefore, the functionality implemented from using DES is part of
the evaluation but the security in this functionality is not claimed.
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Delivery
item type
Identifier Version Medium
Security Reference Manual – Changing Key Package
Generation (AES 128bit)
1.21 Document
Security Reference Manual – Group Service Key & User
Service Key Generation
1.00 Document
Security Reference Manual – Mutual Authentication &
Packet Cryptography
1.00 Document
Security Reference Manual – Issuing Package
Generation Type2
1.00 Document
Security Reference Manual – Changing Key Package
Generation
1.00 Document
Security Reference Manual – Changing Key Package
Generation Type2
1.00 Document
2.3. Logical scope
The TOE offers the following features:
 it can receive FeliCa commands from the CLF.
 it enables the set-up and maintenance of FeliCa Services by Service Providers
 it enables the use of FeliCa Services (e.g., decrement, cash-back)
The TOE offers the following security features:
 authentication of users (AES or DES1
)
 controlled access to data stored internally in the TOE
 secure communication with the smartcard Reader/Writer (AES and DES1
)
 protection of integrity of data stored internally in the TOE
 anti-tearing and rollback
 protection against excess environment conditions
 protection against information leakage and manipulation
 protection against probing and alteration
The security features are provided partly by the underlying hardware and partly by the Security IC
Embedded Software and FeliCa Applet.
1
Mobile FeliCa Applet on SkySIM CX Virgo platform does not implement any Security Functional
Requirement using DES operation. Therefore, the functionality implemented from using DES is part of
the evaluation but the security in this functionality is not claimed.
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2.4. Lifecycle
The lifecycle of the TOE is explained using the smartcard lifecycle as defined in “Security IC Platform
Protection Profile with Augmentation Packages” [BSI-PP-0084], which includes the phases listed in the
following table:
Table 4: Phases of the TOE lifecycle
Phase Description
Phase 1 IC embedded software development
Phase 2 IC development
Phase 3 IC manufacturing
Phase 4 IC packaging
Phase 5 Composite product integration
Phase 6 Personalisation
Phase 7 Operational usage
The TOE is delivered at the end of Phase 4.
An explanation of each phase of the TOE lifecycle follows:
Phase 1 and Phase 2 compose the product development: Embedded Software (IC Dedicated Software,
OS, Java Card System, other platform components such as Card Manager, Applets) and IC development.
Phase 3 and Phase 4 correspond to IC manufacturing and packaging, respectively. Some IC
pre-personalisation steps may occur in Phase 3.
Phase 5: concerns the embedding of software components within the IC.
Phase 6 is dedicated to the product personalisation prior final use.
Phase 7 is the product operational phase.
2.5. Evaluated configurations
The TOE provides a very flexible access control configuration system that allows the system
administrator to choose from several options when creating the services. The administrator may create
(i) unprotected files (i.e., public access files), (ii) files that are protected by advanced high-grade
encryption and (iii) files that are protected by both advanced high-grade encryption and low-grade
encryption. In the above case (iii), the files are practically regarded as being protected by low-grade
encryption.
The TOE provides two distinct modes of operation – Advanced and Backward-Compatible – to ensure
that the TOE can provide the required level of protection.
In the Advanced operation mode, the TOE is accessed via a channel using advanced high-grade
encryption for the protected data, or no encryption for public data.
In the Backward-Compatible operation mode the TOE is accessed via a channel using low-grade
encryption for the protected data, or no encryption for public data.
The TOE claims the security functionality in the Advanced operation mode only.
TOE Delivery
Image for Composite
Product Integration
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3. Security problem definition
The statement of the security problem describes the assets that the TOE is expected to protect and the
security measures that are to be enforced by the TOE or its operational environment.
To this end, the security problem definition (this chapter) identifies and lists the following:
 primary and secondary assets
 the assumptions about the TOE environment
 the organisational security policies with which the TOE is designed to comply.
3.1. Assets
The assets that the TOE is expected to protect are as follows:
 the primary asset of the TOE is the sensitive user data (i.e., data from Users and Service Providers)
loaded into the volatile and non-volatile memory
 all assets employed to protect the primary assets are secondary assets (such as cryptographic keys,
the applet code, data, and so on).
3.2. Assumptions
A.Process The TOE is administered in a secure manner after the TOE delivery.
The customer is responsible for the secure administration of both the TOE and the protected
storage. It is assumed that security procedures are used between delivery of the TOE by the
TOE manufacturer and delivery to the customer, to maintain the confidentiality and integrity of
the TOE and its manufacturing and test data (to prevent any possible copying, modification,
retention, theft for unauthorised use). This means that assets after TOE delivery are assumed to
be protected appropriately.
3.3. Organisational security policies
To record the security problem definition in terms of policies, we state what protection the TOE shall
afford to the user, as follows:
P.Confidentiality The TOE shall provide the means to protect the confidentiality of the
stored assets.
The TOE shall have security measures that can protect the stored user data from unauthorised
disclosure. We do not expect the TOE to enforce these security measures on any or all user data,
but those measures shall be available when the user decides that they shall be used to protect
the user data.
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P.Integrity The TOE shall provide the means to protect the integrity of the stored
assets.
The integrity of the stored assets shall be protected during operation in a hostile environment.
The possibility of attacks trying to alter specific data cannot be discounted but, for a contactless
smart card, there are other considerations that already make the integrity a prime concern,
such as the very real possibility of power cut-off at any point during processing. To ensure the
integrity, the TOE shall have security measures that can protect the stored user data from
unauthorised modification and destruction.
P.TransferSecret The TOE shall provide the means to protect the confidentiality of assets
during transfer from outside of the TOE.
At the user’s discretion, user data that is sent or received through the communication channel
needs protection from unauthorised disclosure. The TOE shall provide the capabilities to
provide such measures.
P.TransferIntegrity The TOE shall provide the means to protect the integrity of assets during
transfer from outside of the TOE.
The integrity of the messages on the communication channel shall take into account both the
possibility of benign interference and malicious interference in various forms, such as: RF noise,
spikes in the field, short removals of the field, ghost transmissions, replay, and injection of data
into the channel. The TOE shall provide the means to ensure the integrity of user data
transferred.
P.Configure The TOE shall provide the means to configure the level of protection for
each of the assets.
The TOE is a tool to be used by the user in a system that shall implement specific business rules.
The TOE may not assume the level of protection required for any asset. The TOE shall provide
the means for the level of protection to be specified explicitly by the user for each asset.
P.Keys The keys generated for TOE use shall be secure. The keys for use by the
TOE shall be generated and handled in a secure manner.
Some keys for TOE use are generated outside of the TOE, by the supporting system in a
controlled environment. This system shall check that all such keys are suitably secure by, for
example, weeding out weak keys. The secure keys are then loaded into the TOE. The process of
key generation and management shall be suitably protected and shall occur in a controlled
environment.
P.NoDebugIF The TOE shall not implement the means to export any information for
debugging purposes to outside of the TOE.
The TOE shall be built to provide only the capabilities for its genuine purpose. No test or debug
features shall remain in the TOE. Such test or debug features shall be completely disabled, i,e,,
not even enabled with restricted privileges.
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4. Security objectives
This chapter describes the security objectives for the TOE and the TOE environment in response to the
security needs identified in Chapter 3, "Security problem definition".
Security objectives for the TOE are to be satisfied by technical countermeasures implemented by the TOE.
Security objectives for the environment are to be satisfied either by technical measures implemented by
the IT environment, or by non-IT measures.
4.1. TOE security objectives
The following TOE Security Objectives have been identified for the TOE, as a result of the discussion of
the Security Problem Definition. Each objective is stated in bold type font. It is followed by an
application note, in regular font, which provides additional information and interpretation.
O.AC The TOE shall provide a configurable access control system to prevent
unauthorised access to stored user data.
The TOE shall provide its users with the means of controlling and limiting access to the objects
and resources they own or are responsible for in a configurable and deterministic manner. This
objective combines all aspects of authentication and access control.
O.SC The TOE shall provide configurable secure channel mechanisms for the protection
of user data when transferred between the TOE and an outside entity.
The TOE receives and sends user data over a wireless interface, which is considered easy to tap
and alter. Therefore, the TOE shall provide mechanisms that allow the TOE and an external
entity to communicate with each other in a secure manner. The secure channel mechanisms
shall include protection of the confidentiality and integrity of the transferred user data.
O.NoDebugIF The TOE shall provide a protection mechanism against abuse of the debugging
interface.
The TOE shall protect from leakage and manipulation of information through any debugging
interfaces, such as abuse of test commands. All components of the TOE, i.e., FeliCa Applet, the
underlying platform (including the Java Card OS and the hardware) shall prevent the debugging
interfaces from being enabled.
4.2. TOE operational environment security objectives
This section identifies the IT security objectives that are to be satisfied by the imposing of technical or
procedural requirements on the TOE operational environment. These security objectives are assumed by
the Security Target to be permanently in place in the TOE environment. They are included as necessary
to support the TOE security objectives in addressing the security problem defined in Chapter 3, "Security
problem definition". Each objective is stated in bold type font; it is followed by an application note, in
regular font, which supplies additional information and interpretation.
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OE.Keys The handling of the keys outside of the TOE shall be performed in accordance to
the specified policies.
Specific keys for use by the TOE are generated externally (that is, beyond control of the TOE).
The generation and control of the keys shall be performed in strict compliance to the specific
policies set for such operations.
OE.Process The handling of the TOE after the TOE delivery shall be performed in a secure
manner
In the TOE environment, confidentiality and integrity of the TOE and its manufacturing and test
data shall be maintained by means of procedural measures between delivery of the TOE by the
TOE manufacturer and delivery of the TOE to the customer.
4.3. Security objectives rationale
This section demonstrates the suitability of the choice of security objectives and that the stated security
objectives counter all identified, policies, or assumptions.
The following table maps the security objectives to the security problem, which is defined by the
relevant, policies, and assumptions. This illustrates that each policy or assumption is covered by at least
one security objective.
Table 5: Assumptions or Policies Security Objectives
Policy Policy text Objective Objective text
A.Process The TOE is administered
in a secure manner after
the TOE delivery.
OE.Process The handling of the TOE after the
TOE delivery shall be performed in
a secure manner.
P.Confidentiality The TOE shall provide the
means to protect the
confidentiality of the
stored assets.
O.AC The TOE shall provide a
configurable access control
mechanism to prevent
unauthorised access to stored user
data.
P.Integrity The TOE shall provide the
means to protect the
integrity of the stored
assets.
O.AC The TOE shall provide an access
control mechanism to protect
integrity of the stored user data
from unauthorised access.
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Policy Policy text Objective Objective text
P.TransferSecret The TOE shall provide the
means to protect the
confidentiality of assets
during transfer to and
from the TOE.
O.SC The TOE shall provide configurable
secure channel mechanisms for the
protection of user data transferred
between the TOE and an external
entity.
P.TransferIntegrity The TOE shall provide the
means to protect the
integrity of assets during
transfer to and from the
TOE.
O.SC The TOE shall provide a
configurable secure channel
mechanism for the protection of
user data transferred between the
TOE and an external entity.
P.Configure The TOE shall provide the
means to configure the
level of protection for
each of the assets.
O.AC The TOE shall provide a
configurable access control
mechanism to prevent
unauthorised access to stored user
data.
P.Keys The keys generated for
the use of the TOE shall
be secure. The keys for
the use of the TOE shall
be generated and
handled in a secure
manner.
OE.Keys The handling of the keys outside of
the TOE shall be performed in
accordance with the specified
policies.
P.NoDebugIF The TOE shall not
implement the means to
export any information
for debugging purposes
to outside of the TOE.
O.NoDebugIF The TOE shall provide a protection
mechanism against abuse of the
debugging interface.
The following explanation shows that the chosen security objectives are sufficient and suitable to
address the identified, assumptions, and policies.
The policies for the TOE call for protection of user data when stored in the TOE and when in transit
between the TOE and an external security product. Also, the policies require that the system used for
protection of the assets when stored within the TOE be flexible and configurable. These policies are
upheld by defining the following two objectives for the TOE: O.AC and O.SC. The O.AC objective makes
sure that the TOE implements an access control system that protects the stored user data from illegal
access (as required by the P.Confidentiality policy), while providing the capability to configure the access
rules and operations for the authorised users (as required by the P.Configure policy). The O.SC objective
provides a secure channel that shall be established between the TOE and an external entity; this secure
channel shall protect all transmitted user data from disclosure (as required by P.TransferSecret) and from
integrity errors, whether as a result of an attack or environmental conditions (such as loss of power), as
required by P.TransferIntegrity.
The policy P.Integrity requires that user data shall be protected from integrity errors when stored in the
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TOE. It is upheld by two objectives for the TOE: O. AC. The O.AC objective provides the access control
system, which allows only authorised users to access stored user data and protects the integrity of
stored user data from illegal access.
The policy P.NoDebugIF requires that all debug features are completely disabled, and the O.NoDebugIF
objective provides protection against abuse of debug features.
The policy for the environment that requires secure generation and handling of keys, P.Keys, is similarly
directly translated into the objective for the environment OE.Keys for the secure handling of keys and
generation of secure keys.
The security problem defined for the TOE calls for the protection of assets by the TOE. There are several
security measures implemented by the TOE itself, but the proper administration of the TOE’s security
measures and proper handling of the TOE are essential, as stated in the A.Process assumption. That
assumption is upheld by defining the objective for the environment OE.Process, which ensures that
secure procedures are used by the TOE environment to ensure both the security of the assets and the
proper administration of the TOE security measures.
The following table maps all security objectives defined in this Security Target to the relevant, policies,
and assumptions. This illustrates that each security objective covers at least one policy or assumption
Table 6: Security objectives versus Assumptions or Policies
Policy Objective
O.AC P.Confidentiality
P.Integrity
P.Configure
O.SC P.TransferSecret
P.TransferIntegrity
O.NoDebugIF P.NoDebugIF
OE.Keys P.Keys
OE.Process A.Process
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5. Security requirements
IT security requirements include the following:
 TOE security functional requirements (SFRs)
That is, requirements for security functions such as information flow control, identification and
authentication.
 TOE security assurance requirements (SARs)
Provide grounds for confidence that the TOE meets its security objectives (such as configuration
management, testing, vulnerability assessment.)
 This chapter discusses these requirements in detail. It also explains the rationales behind them, as
follows:
 Security functional requirements rationale
 Security assurance requirements rationale
5.1. TOE security functional requirements
The TOE Security Objectives result in a set of Security Functional Requirements (SFRs).
About the notation used for Security Functional Requirements (SFRs):
 The refinement operation is used in many cases, to make the requirements easier to read and
understand. All these cases are indicated and explained in footnotes.
 Selections appear in Italic bold font.
 Assignments appear in Tahoma bold font.
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMR.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the roles User and Administrator.
FMT_SMR.1.2 The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FIA_UID.1.1 The TSF shall allow Polling, Requests, Public_read, Public_write, Echo Back,
Reset Mode on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified.
FIA_UID.1.2 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any other
TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
FIA_UAU.1.1 The TSF shall allow Polling, Requests, Public_read, Public_write, Echo Back,
Reset Mode on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated.
FIA_UAU.1.2 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing any
Mobile FeliCa Applet
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other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
FIA_UAU.4 Single-use authentication mechanisms
FIA_UAU.4.1 The TSF shall prevent reuse of authentication data related to all authentication
mechanisms.
FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FDP_ACC.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the Service Access Policy on the following:
 Subjects:
 User
 Administrator
 Objects: Files
 Operations:
 Authentication
 Read
 Write
 Reset Mode
FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
FDP_ACF.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the Service Access Policy to objects based on the following:
 Subjects:
 User with security attribute authentication
 Administrator with security attribute authentication
 Objects: Files with security attributes ACL
FDP_ACF.1.2 The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among
controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:
 A Subject can do this operation on an Object when: the Subject is
successfully authenticated, and the operation is listed in the Object’s ACL.
FDP_ACF.1.3 The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the following
additional rules: none.
FDP_ACF.1.4 The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following
additional rules:
 no additional explicit rules.
FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
FMT_MSA.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the Service Access Policy to restrict the ability to perform any
operation on the security attributes authentication and ACL to Administrator.
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions:
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management of security attributes.
FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel
FTP_ITC.1.1 The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself and another trusted IT
product that is logically distinct from other communication channels and provides
assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel data from
modification or disclosure.
FTP_ITC.1.2 The TSF shall permit another trusted IT product to initiate communication via the
trusted channel.
FTP_ITC.1.3 The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for no functions.
The following two SFRs are CC Part 2 extended and defined in the Protection Profile [BSI-PP-0084].
Definitions of these SFRs are described in [BSI-PP-0084].
FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities
FMT_LIM.1.1 The TSF shall be designed and implemented in a manner that limits its capabilities so
that in conjunction with “Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)” the following policy is
enforced No debug features shall be available.
FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability
FMT_LIM.1.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits its availability so that in conjunction
with “Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)” the following policy is enforced No debug
features shall be available.
5.2. TOE security assurance requirements
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SARs) consist of the requirements defined by EAL4
augmented with ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5.
5.3. Security functional requirements rationale
The following table presents both the rationale for choosing specific Security Functional Requirements
(SFRs) and how those requirements correspond to the specific Security Objectives:
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Table 7: TOE Security Functional Requirements versus Security Objectives
Objective TOE Security Functional Requirements
O.AC - FMT_SMR.1 “Security roles”
- FIA_UID.1 “Timing of identification”
- FIA_UAU.1 “Timing of authentication”
- FIA_UAU.4 “Single-use authentication mechanisms”
- FDP_ACC.1 “Subset access control
- FDP_ACF.1 “Security attribute based access control”
- FMT_MSA.1 “Management of security attributes”
- FMT_SMF.1 “Specification of Management Functions”
O.SC - FTP_ITC.1 “Inter-TSF trusted channel”
O.NoDebugIF - FMT_LIM.1 ” Limited capabilities
- FMT_LIM.2 “Limited availability”
The objective O.AC is achieved through inclusion of the SFRs FDP_ACC.1 and FDP_ACF.1, which together
specify the access control policy. The operation of the access control system is supported by the SFR
FIA_UAU.4 to make sure that unique authentication sessions shall be used every time. The SFRs FIA_UID.1
and FIA_UAU.1 complement the access control system operation by allowing very specific functions to be
used without mutual authentication. The SFRs FMT_SMR.1 and FMT_MSA.1 in conjunction with the SFR
FMT_SMF.1 allow for the implementation of a flexible, configurable access control system and specify the
roles that shall be allowed to utilise the access control system configuration capabilities. The presented
combination of the SFRs provides an access control system that, as required by the O.AC objective, is
precisely specified, allows for very specific exceptions, and supports very flexible configuration.
The objective O.SC is directly realised through the requirement for the secure channel SFR FTP_ITC.1
between the TOE and the external device. The objective O.NoDebugIF is directly realised through the
SFRs FMT_LIM.1 and FMT_LIM.2, which together limit the capability and availability of all debug features.
The following table presents the list of the SFRs with the associated dependencies:
Table 8: Security Functional Requirements dependencies
ID SFR Dependencies Notes
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles FIA_UID.1 Included
FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification None
FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication FIA_UID.1 Included
FIA_UAU.4 Single-use authentication
mechanisms
None
FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control FDP_ACF.1 Included
FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based
access control
FDP_ACC.1
FMT_MSA.3
Included
Not satisfied
FMT_MSA.1 Management of security
attributes
FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1
Included (FDP_ACC.1)
Included
Included
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ID SFR Dependencies Notes
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management
Functions
None
FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel None
FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities FMT_LIM.2 Included
FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability FMT_LIM.1 Included
The SFR “FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation” is a dependency for the SFR FDP_ACF.1. In the TOE,
however, the security attributes are always explicitly set and the notion of “default value” for a security
attribute simply does not exist. The security attributes are always set explicitly by the Administrator to a
value appropriate for each asset without exception, so it is our opinion that the system is no less secure
in the absence of the SFR FMT_MSA.3. Therefore, there is no need to include the SFR FMT_MSA.3 in the
ST.
5.4. Security assurance requirements rationale
 To meet the assurance expectations of customers, the assurance level EAL4 and the augmentation
with the requirements ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5 are chosen. The assurance level of EAL4 is
selected because it provides a sufficient level of assurance for this type of TOE, which is expected to
protect high value assets. Explanation of the security assurance component ALC_DVS.2 and
AVA_VAN.5 follows:
 ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures:
This Security Target selects ALC_DVS.2 instead of ALC_DVS.1 because it verifies the security
measures that provide the necessary level of protection to maintain the confidentiality and integrity
of the TOE and its user data.
 AVA_VAN.5 Highly resistant:
The TOE might be in danger of high-level attacks such as those it might encounter in a university
laboratory. Therefore, AVA_VAN.5 is augmented to confirm that TOE has a high level of resistance
against such attacks.
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6. TOE Summary Specification
This chapter describes the TOE summary specification by summarising the architectural design.
The TOE summary specification includes the following:
 TOE summary specification rationale
Describe how the TOE meets each SFR.
6.1. TOE summary specification rationale
This section describes how the TOE is intended to comply with the Security Functional Requirements.
The TOE must satisfy the requirements for secure storage, transfer and management of user data.
Therefore, the TOE is implemented as a software platform on a secure chip.
The TOE includes the functions for creating secure containers (Area and FeliCa Service, also referred to as
Files in section 5.1) and management of the security attributes of those containers. The TOE provides
functions for populating the containers with user data in various ways that are functionally required by
the customers, retrieval of the data or updating the data in situ.
The transfer of data during the operations on secure containers performed in a secure way, where the
external security product and the TOE are mutually authenticated before the operation and then
connected with each other via an encrypted session. The session allows the bilateral transfer of data in a
manner protected from eavesdropping and alteration.
In compliance with the requirements, the TOE also provides a capability for the unsecured storage and
retrieval of user data. The security attributes can be set up in such a manner that data can be made read
only by any unauthenticated user, but can only be updated by an authenticated user/administrator,
allowing for a flexible and fully-configurable access-control system.
 “FMT_SMR.1 Security roles” is met by providing an ability to distinguish between the roles of
“Administrator” and “User”, where the different roles allow the subject to execute different kinds of
operations. The TOE has built-in rules for distinguishing between the operations and required
security attributes for various TOE and TSF data. The Administrator of the TOE specifies the security
attributes for the TOE data and the TSF data. The role of the authenticated entity is assigned after
the authentication has succeeded (in accordance with the requirements of FDP_ACC.1).
 “FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification” and “FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication” are intended to
provide a possibility to configure a publically-accessible container. The TOE provides access to such
specifically-configured containers based on the security attributes of the container. The container
must be configured, by the Administrator, with special attributes that allow the specified mode of
access before authentication.
 The TOE uses random numbers in the authentication mechanism to comply with the “FIA_UAU.4
Single-use authentication mechanisms” requirement; these numbers are generated by the Security
IC Embedded Software. The random numbers are generated anew each time the authentication is
started, according to the requirements of FDP_ACC.1, and are discarded each time the TOE exits the
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authenticated state.
 “FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control” and “FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control” are
satisfied by providing an access-control mechanism based on the attributes of security containers.
The TOE grants access to the TOE data stored in the containers, based on the security attributes
during the authentication phase. If the correct security attributes are used during the authentication
for the requested mode of access to the specified container, the requested mode of access is
granted. The granularity of access control is based on a single mode of access and a single
container. A request for access may combine attributes for several containers and several modes of
access in a single request. The security attributes are assigned to the containers by the
Administrator. The TOE allows the Administrator to access the security attributes for configuration
purposes, based on the security attributes (in accordance with FMT_MSA.1 and FMT_SMR.1).
 “FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes” and “FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management
Functions“ are met by providing configuration capabilities accessible to the Administrator. The
configuration capabilities are granted based on the security attributes and allow the changing of
these security attributes to new values after successful authentication and privilege verification (in
accordance with FDP_ACC.1 and FMT_SMR.1).
 “FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel” requires the secure channel – this is provided by the TOE using
the AES algorithm, which is calculated by the hardware, for encrypting and authenticating data that
is sent or received through the link.
 “FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities“ and “FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability” are satisfied by not
implementing any test commands that prevent abuse of test functionality. The test functionality
provided by the hardware is not available to the user after Phase 3 IC manufacturing as defined in
the Protection Profile [BSI-PP-0084]. The test functionality provided by the Java Card OS and the
FeliCa Applet is not available after Phase 1 IC embedded software development.
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7. Glossary and references
This chapter explains the terms, definitions and literary references (bibliography) used in this document.
The list entries in this chapter are ordered alphabetically.
7.1. Terms and definitions
The following list defines the product-specific terms used in this document:
 Administrator
The entity responsible for personalisation of the TOE. In most cases, this is a representative of a
Service Provider. Synonymous with Personaliser. See also User.
 Area
A part of the FeliCa file system. An area is similar to a directory in a general file system.
 Contactless card reader
A contactless smartcard Reader/Writer that interacts with the TOE.
 FeliCa file system
The structure of data in the TOE.
 FeliCa Service
The part of the FeliCa file system that contains information that stipulates the method of access
to data. In this context, a service is similar to a file in a general file system.
 Mobile phone holder
A person who uses User Service.
 Personaliser
See Administrator.
 Service Provider
An entity that provides a specific service to a User.
 User
For this product, an entity using any FeliCa Service that a personalised TOE offers. See also
Administrator.
 User Service
A specific service to a Mobile Phone holder that is made technically possible by the TOE. Each
User Service is provided by a Service Provider to a Mobile Phone holder. An example of a User
Service is a virtual train ticket or an electronic purse.
7.2. Acronyms
The following table lists and defines the product-specific abbreviated terms (acronyms) that appear in
this document:
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Table 9: Abbreviated terms and definitions
Term Definition
ACL Access Control List
CLF Contactless Front-End
ID Identification
OS Operating System
PP Protection Profile
RF Radio Frequency
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFR Security Functional Requirement
ST Security Target
SWP Single Wire Protocol
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functions
7.3. Bibliography
The following list defines the literature referenced in this document:
[AAPS] “Common Criteria Supporting Document Mandatory Technical Document Application
of Attack Potential to Smartcards”, Version 2.9, May 2013
[BSI-PP-0084] "Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation Packages", Version 1.0,
January 2014
[CC] "Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation", Version 3.1
(composed of Parts1-3, [CC Part 1], [CC Part 2], and [CC Part 3])
[CC Part 1] "Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation – Part 1: Introduction
and general model", Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012
[CC Part 2] "Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation – Part 2: Security
functional components", Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012
[CC Part 3] "Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation – Part 3: Security
assurance components", Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012
[CC CEM] "Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation: Evaluation
Methodology", Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012
[ST-Platform] "SkySIM CX Virgo v2.0 Security Target"
Mobile FeliCa Applet
Copyright © 2016 FeliCa Networks, Inc.
Security Target lite for Mobile FeliCa Applet on SkySIM CX Virgo platform
Version 1.31 Public
No. MAP01-ASEP01-E01-31
November 25, 2016
FeliCa Networks, Inc