Certification Report
EAL 3+ Evaluation of Solera DeepSee Software v6.5.0 and
Solera DeepSee Central Manager v6.5.0
Issued by:
Communications Security Establishment Canada
Certification Body
Canadian Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification Scheme
© Government of Canada, Communications Security Establishment Canada, 2012
Document number: 383-4-190-CR
Version: 1.0
Date: 13 December 2012
Pagination: i to iii, 1 to 9
CCS Certification Report Solera Networks
Solera DeepSee v6.5.0
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DISCLAIMER
The Information Technology (IT) product identified in this certification report, and its
associated certificate, has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility – established
under the Canadian Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification Scheme (CCS) – using
the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1
Revision 3, for conformance to the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 3. This certification report, and its associated certificate,
apply only to the identified version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the CCS, and the
conclusions of the evaluation facility in the evaluation report are consistent with the evidence
adduced. This report, and its associated certificate, are not an endorsement of the IT product
by the Communications Security Establishment Canada, or any other organization that
recognizes or gives effect to this report, and its associated certificate, and no warranty for the
IT product by the Communications Security Establishment Canada, or any other organization
that recognizes or gives effect to this report, and its associated certificate, is either expressed
or implied.
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FOREWORD
The Canadian Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification Scheme (CCS) provides a
third-party evaluation service for determining the trustworthiness of Information Technology
(IT) security products. Evaluations are performed by a commercial Common Criteria
Evaluation Facility (CCEF) under the oversight of the CCS Certification Body, which is
managed by the Communications Security Establishment Canada.
A CCEF is a commercial facility that has been approved by the CCS Certification Body to
perform Common Criteria evaluations; a significant requirement for such approval is
accreditation to the requirements of ISO/IEC 17025:2005, the General Requirements for the
Competence of Testing and Calibration Laboratories. Accreditation is performed under the
Program for the Accreditation of Laboratories - Canada (PALCAN), administered by the
Standards Council of Canada.
The CCEF that carried out this evaluation is CGI Security Evaluation and Test Facility.
By awarding a Common Criteria certificate, the CCS Certification Body asserts that the
product complies with the security requirements specified in the associated security target. A
security target is a requirements specification document that defines the scope of the
evaluation activities. The consumer of certified IT products should review the security target,
in addition to this certification report, in order to gain an understanding of any assumptions
made during the evaluation, the IT product's intended environment, its security requirements,
and the level of confidence (i.e., the evaluation assurance level) that the product satisfies the
security requirements.
This certification report is associated with the certificate of product evaluation dated 10
December 2012, and the security target identified in Section 4 of this report.
The certification report, certificate of product evaluation and security target are posted on the
CCS Certified Products list (CPL) and the Common Criteria Portal (the official website of
the Common Criteria Project).
This certification report makes reference to the following registered trademark:
 Solera DeepSee is a registered trademark of Solera Networks Inc.;
Reproduction of this report is authorized provided the report is reproduced in its entirety.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Disclaimer....................................................................................................................................... i
Foreword........................................................................................................................................ii
Executive Summary...................................................................................................................... 1
1 Identification of Target of Evaluation ................................................................................ 2
2 TOE Description ................................................................................................................... 2
3 Evaluated Security Functionality........................................................................................ 2
4 Security Target...................................................................................................................... 2
5 Common Criteria Conformance.......................................................................................... 3
6 Security Policy....................................................................................................................... 3
7 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope............................................................................. 3
7.1 SECURE USAGE ASSUMPTIONS................................................................................... 3
7.2 ENVIRONMENTAL ASSUMPTIONS ............................................................................... 4
7.3 CLARIFICATION OF SCOPE.......................................................................................... 4
8 Evaluated Configuration...................................................................................................... 4
9 Documentation ...................................................................................................................... 4
10 Evaluation Analysis Activities ............................................................................................. 5
11 ITS Product Testing.............................................................................................................. 6
11.1 ASSESSMENT OF DEVELOPER TESTS .......................................................................... 6
11.2 INDEPENDENT FUNCTIONAL TESTING ........................................................................ 6
11.3 INDEPENDENT PENETRATION TESTING....................................................................... 7
11.4 CONDUCT OF TESTING ............................................................................................... 7
11.5 TESTING RESULTS...................................................................................................... 8
12 Results of the Evaluation...................................................................................................... 8
13 Evaluator Comments, Observations and Recommendations ........................................... 8
14 Acronyms, Abbreviations and Initializations..................................................................... 8
15 References.............................................................................................................................. 9
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Executive Summary
Solera DeepSee Software v6.5.0 and Solera DeepSee Central Manager v6.5.0 (hereafter
referred to as Solera DeepSee), from Solera Networks, is the Target of Evaluation for this
Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL) 3 augmented evaluation.
Solera DeepSee creates a complete record of network traffic, including both packet headers
and payloads. Data crossing the network is captured, indexed, enriched, and saved for future
analysis. Once stored, data can be analyzed through the DeepSee interface or shared with
other applications to provide additional context and enhanced visibility into network security
events.
CGI Security Evaluation and Test Facility is the CCEF that conducted the evaluation. This
evaluation was completed on 12 October 2012 and was carried out in accordance with the
rules of the Canadian Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification Scheme (CCS).
The scope of the evaluation is defined by the security target, which identifies assumptions
made during the evaluation, the intended environment for Solera DeepSee, the security
requirements, and the level of confidence (evaluation assurance level) to which it is asserted
that the product satisfies its security requirements. Consumers are advised to verify that their
operating environment is consistent with that specified in the security target, and to give due
consideration to the comments, observations and recommendations in this certification
report.
The results documented in the Evaluation Technical Report (ETR)1
for this product provide
sufficient evidence that it meets the EAL 3 augmented assurance requirements for the
evaluated security functionality. The evaluation was conducted using the Common
Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 3, for
conformance to the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 3.1 Revision 3. The following augmentation is claimed: ALC_FLR.2 – Flaw
Reporting Procedures.
Communications Security Establishment Canada, as the CCS Certification Body, declares
that the Solera DeepSee evaluation meets all the conditions of the Arrangement on the
Recognition of Common Criteria Certificates and that the product will be listed on the CCS
Certified Products List (CPL) and the Common Criteria portal (the official website of the
Common Criteria Project).
1
The ETR is a CCS document that contains information proprietary to the developer and/or the evaluator, and
is not releasable for public review.
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1 Identification of Target of Evaluation
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) for this Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL) 3 augmented
evaluation is Solera DeepSee Software v6.5.0 and Solera DeepSee Central Manager v6.5.0
(hereafter referred to as Solera DeepSee), from Solera Networks.
2 TOE Description
Solera DeepSee creates a complete record of network traffic, including both packet headers
and payloads. Data crossing the network is captured, indexed, enriched, and saved for future
analysis. Once stored, data can be analyzed through the DeepSee interface or shared with
other applications to provide additional context and enhanced visibility into network security
events.
3 Evaluated Security Functionality
The complete list of evaluated security functionality for Solera DeepSee is identified in
Section 6 of the ST.
The following Government of Canada approved cryptographic algorithms were evaluated for
correct implementation in Solera DeepSee:
Cryptographic Algorithm Standard Certificate #
Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA-1) FIPS 180-3 1873
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) –
Electronic Codebook (ECB), Cypher-
Block Chaining (CBC)
FIPS 197 2153
Rivest Shamir Adleman (RSA) FIPS 186-2 1108
Hash Message Authentication Code
(HMAC) Secure Hash Algorithm SHA-1
FIPS 198 1318
4 Security Target
The ST associated with this Certification Report is identified by the following nomenclature:
Title: Solera DeepSee Software v6.5.0 and Solera DeepSee Central Manager v6.5.0
Security Target
Version: 1.7
Date: 28 September 2012
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5 Common Criteria Conformance
The evaluation was conducted using the Common Methodology for Information Technology
Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 3, for conformance to the Common Criteria for
Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 3.
Solera DeepSee is:
a. Common Criteria Part 2 conformant, with security functional requirements based
only upon functional components in Part 2;
b. Common Criteria Part 3 conformant, with security assurance requirements based
only upon assurance components in Part 3; and
c. Common Criteria EAL 3 augmented, containing all security assurance requirements
in the EAL 3 package, as well as the following: ALC_FLR.2 – Flaw Reporting
Procedures.
6 Security Policy
Solera DeepSee implements a role-based access control policy to control user access to the
TOE; details of this security policy can be found in Section 6 of the ST.
In addition, Solera DeepSee implements policies pertaining to security audit, cryptographic
support, user data protection, identification and authentication, protection of the TSF, TOE
access and trusted path/channels and security management. Further details on these security
policies may be found in Section 6 of the ST.
7 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
Consumers of Solera DeepSee should consider assumptions about usage and environmental
settings as requirements for the product’s installation and its operating environment. This
will ensure the proper and secure operation of the TOE.
7.1 Secure Usage Assumptions
The following Secure Usage Assumptions are listed in the ST:
 There are one or more competent individuals assigned to manage the TOE and the
security of the information it contains;
 The authorized administrators are trusted to follow and apply all administrative
guidance in a trusted manner; and
 The TOE software will be protected from unauthorized modification.
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7.2 Environmental Assumptions
The following Environmental Assumptions are listed in the ST:
 The TOE is assumed to be deployed in a TOE environment such that the network is
configured properly and its size is appropriate for the TOE functionality;
 The TOE is located within a controlled access facility; and
 Physical security, commensurate with the value of the TOE and the data it contains, is
assumed to be provided by the environment.
7.3 Clarification of Scope
Solera DeepSee offers protection against inadvertent or casual attempts to breach system
security by unsophisticated attackers possessing basic attack potential. Solera DeepSee is not
intended for situations which involve determined attempts by hostile or well-funded attackers
using sophisticated attack techniques.
8 Evaluated Configuration
The evaluated configuration for Solera DeepSee comprises of the following software:
 Solera DeepSee Software v6.5.0 build 24397; and
 Solera DeepSee Central Manager v6.5.0 build 24397
The TOE can be deployed in a virtual environment as a VMware virtual image or on Solera
provided Dell hardware. The software maintains the same functionality whether deployed on
the Dell hardware or on an ESX(i) server. Both configurations were evaluated.
The publication entitled Solera DeepSee Software v6.5.0 and Solera DeepSee Central
Manager v6.5.0 Guidance Documentation Supplement, v0.7, describes the procedures
necessary to install and operate Solera DeepSee in its evaluated configuration.
9 Documentation
The Solera Networks documents provided to the consumer are as follows:
a. Solera DeepSee Software v6.5.0 and Solera DeepSee Central Manager v6.5.0 Guidance
Documentation Supplement, v0.7;
b. Solera Networks DeepSee Administration Guide, 5 July 2012;
c. Solera Networks DeepSee central Manager Console Guide, 3 July 2012;
d. Solera Networks Installation guide for Dell PowerEdge R720xd Rack Servers, 27 June
2012;
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e. Solera Networks DeepSee reference Guide, 5 July 2012; and
f. Solera Networks Installation Guide for VMware ESX Server and Workstation, 6 July
2012.
10 Evaluation Analysis Activities
The evaluation analysis activities involved a structured evaluation of Solera DeepSee,
including the following areas:
Development: The evaluators analyzed the Solera DeepSee functional specification and
design documentation; they determined that the design completely and accurately describes
the TOE security functionality (TSF) interfaces, the TSF subsystems and how the TSF
implements the security functional requirements (SFRs). The evaluators analyzed the Solera
DeepSee security architectural description and determined that the initialization process is
secure and that the security functions are protected against tamper and bypass. The
evaluators also independently verified that the correspondence mappings between the design
documents are correct.
Guidance Documents: The evaluators examined the Solera DeepSee preparative user
guidance and operational user guidance and determined that it sufficiently and
unambiguously describes how to securely transform the TOE into its evaluated configuration
and how to use and administer the product. The evaluators examined and tested the
preparative and operational guidance, and determined that they are complete and sufficiently
detailed to result in a secure configuration.
Life-cycle support: An analysis of the Solera DeepSee configuration management system
and associated documentation was performed. The evaluators found that the Solera DeepSee
configuration items were clearly marked and that the access control measures as described in
the configuration management documentation are effective in preventing unauthorized access
to the configuration items. The developer’s configuration management system was also
observed during the site visit, and it was found to be mature and well-developed.
During the site visit the evaluators examined the development security procedures and
determined that they detailed sufficient security measures for the development environment
to protect the confidentiality and integrity of the Solera DeepSee design and implementation.
The evaluators confirmed that the developer used a documented model of the TOE life-cycle
and that the life-cycle model provides for the necessary control over the development and
maintenance of the TOE.
The evaluators examined the delivery documentation and determined that it described all of
the procedures required to maintain the integrity of Solera DeepSee during distribution to the
consumer.
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The evaluators reviewed the flaw remediation procedures used by Solera Networks for
Solera DeepSee. During a site visit, the evaluators examined the evidence generated by
adherence to the procedures. The evaluators concluded that the procedures are adequate to
track and correct security flaws, and distribute the flaw information and corrections to
consumers of the product.
Vulnerability assessment: The evaluators conducted an independent vulnerability analysis
of Solera DeepSee. Additionally, the evaluators conducted a review of public domain
vulnerability databases, and a search of all evaluation deliverables. The evaluators identified
potential vulnerabilities for testing applicable to Solera DeepSee in its operational
environment.
All these evaluation activities resulted in PASS verdicts.
11 ITS Product Testing
Testing at EAL 3 consists of the following three steps: assessing developer tests, performing
independent functional tests, and performing penetration tests.
11.1 Assessment of Developer Tests
The evaluators verified that the developer has met their testing responsibilities by examining
their test evidence, and reviewing their test results, as documented in the ETR2
.
The evaluators analyzed the developer’s test coverage and depth analysis and found them to
be complete and accurate. The correspondence between the tests identified in the developer’s
test documentation and the functional specification and TOE design was complete.
11.2 Independent Functional Testing
During this evaluation, the evaluator developed independent functional tests by examining
design and guidance documentation, examining the developer's test documentation,
executing a sample of the developer's test cases, and creating test cases that augmented the
developer tests.
All testing was planned and documented to a sufficient level of detail to allow repeatability
of the testing procedures and results. Resulting from this test coverage approach is the
following list of CGI Security Evaluation and Test Facility test goals:
a. Repeat of Developer's Tests: The objective of this test goal is to repeat a subset of the
developer's tests;
2
The ETR is a CCS document that contains information proprietary to the developer and/or the evaluator, and
is not releasable for public review.
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b. Independent Evaluator testing: The objective of this test goal is to exercise the TOE’s
claimed functionality through evaluator independent testing: Tests covered in this area
include:
 Audit Data generation: The objective of this test goal is to demonstrate proper audit
data are generated for login events and that authorized users can view/clear logs.
 User data Protection: The objective of this test goal is to demonstrate the enforcement
of Solera access control SFP on captured network traffic data.
 Access Control: The objective of this test goal is to demonstrate only a user with
Administrator role can manage TSF data.
 Advisory Message: The objective of this test goal is to validate a default or advisory
message regarding unauthorized use of device is displayed before establishing a user
session.
 Encryption: The objective of this test goal is to validate that the communications
between the Management PC and TOE are encrypted.
11.3 Independent Penetration Testing
Subsequent to the independent review of public domain vulnerability databases and all
evaluation deliverables, limited independent evaluator penetration testing was conducted.
The penetration tests focused on:
a. Disclosure of ports: The objective of this test goal is to scan for open ports to find
potential vulnerabilities and services offered by the TOE.
b. Inactivity: The objective of this test goal is to determine if TOE consistently disconnects
users due to inactivity.
c. Execute malicious code: The objective of this test case is to attempt to execute malicious
code captured in a malicious URL by the TOE.
d. Exhaust DS File System: The objective of this test goal is to generate enormous amount
of network traffic to attempt to exhaust the DS file system storage.
The independent penetration testing did not uncover any exploitable vulnerabilities in the
intended operating environment.
11.4 Conduct of Testing
Solera DeepSee was subjected to a comprehensive suite of formally documented,
independent functional and penetration tests. The testing took place at the Information
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Technology Security Evaluation and Test (ITSET) Facility at CGI Security Evaluation and
Test Facility The CCS Certification Body witnessed a portion of the independent testing.
The detailed testing activities, including configurations, procedures, test cases, expected
results and observed results are documented in a separate Test Results document.
11.5 Testing Results
The developer’s tests and the independent functional tests yielded the expected results,
giving assurance that Solera DeepSee behaves as specified in its ST and functional
specification and TOE design.
12 Results of the Evaluation
This evaluation has provided the basis for an EAL 3+ level of assurance. The overall verdict
for the evaluation is PASS. These results are supported by evidence in the ETR.
13 Evaluator Comments, Observations and Recommendations
The evaluator recommends that administrators of the TOE regularly review the Solera
Networks Support Center https://support.soleranetworks.com for product’s defect and
support information.
14 Acronyms, Abbreviations and Initializations
Acronym/Abbreviation/
Initialization
Description
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
CBC Cypher-Block Chaining
CCEF Common Criteria Evaluation Facility
CCS Canadian Common Criteria Evaluation and
Certification Scheme
CPL Certified Products list
CR Certification Report
ECB Electronic Codebook
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
Gbps Gigabits per second
HMAC Hash Message Authentication Code
IT Information Technology
ITSET Information Technology Security Evaluation
and Testing
PALCAN Program for the Accreditation of Laboratories
- Canada
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Acronym/Abbreviation/
Initialization
Description
RSA Rivest Shamir Adleman
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SHA-1 Secure Hash Algorithm
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
URL Uniform Resource Locator
15 References
This section lists all documentation used as source material for this report:
a. CCS Publication #4, Technical Oversight, Version 1.8, October 2010.
b. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1
Revision 3, July 2009.
c. Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, CEM,
Version 3.1 Revision 3, July 2009
d. Solera DeepSee Software v6.5.0 and Solera DeepSee Central Manager v6.5.0
Security Target, v1.7, 28 September 2012
e. Solera DeepSee Software v6.5.0 and Solera DeepSee Central Manager v 6.5.0 ETR,
v1.1, 12 October 2012.