National Information Assurance Partnership
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
Validation Report
Apriva MESA VPN v3.0
Report Number: CCEVS-VR-VID11363-2023
Dated: July 31, 2023
Version: 0.1
National Institute of Standards and Technology Department of Defense
Information Technology Laboratory ATTN: NIAP, Suite 6982
100 Bureau Drive 9800 Savage Road
Gaithersburg, MD 20899 Fort Meade, MD 20755-6982
Apriva MESA VPN 3.0 Validation Report Version 0.1, July 18, 2023
ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Validation Team
Swapna Katikaneni
Jerome Myers
Aerospace Corporation
Anne Gugel
Michael Smeltzer
Russell Fink
Robert Wojcik
Richard Toren
Johns Hopkins University - Applied Physics Laboratory
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
Ryan Hagedorn
Cornelius Haley
Gossamer Security Solutions, Inc.
Columbia, MD
Apriva MESA VPN 3.0 Validation Report Version 0.1, July 18, 2023
iii
Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary.................................................................................................... 1
2 Identification............................................................................................................... 1
3 Architectural Information ........................................................................................... 3
3.1 TOE Evaluated Platforms ................................................................................... 3
3.2 TOE Architecture................................................................................................ 3
3.3 Physical Boundaries............................................................................................ 3
4 Security Policy............................................................................................................ 4
4.1 Security audit ...................................................................................................... 4
4.2 Cryptographic support ........................................................................................ 4
4.3 Identification and authentication......................................................................... 4
4.4 Security management.......................................................................................... 4
4.5 Packet filtering.................................................................................................... 5
4.6 Protection of the TSF.......................................................................................... 5
4.7 TOE access.......................................................................................................... 5
4.8 Trusted path/channels ......................................................................................... 5
5 Assumptions & Clarification of Scope ....................................................................... 5
6 Documentation............................................................................................................ 6
7 IT Product Testing ...................................................................................................... 7
7.1 Developer Testing............................................................................................... 7
7.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing ............................................................... 7
8 Evaluated Configuration ............................................................................................. 7
9 Results of the Evaluation ............................................................................................ 8
9.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ASE)............................................................ 8
9.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV).............................................................. 8
9.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD) ................................................. 9
9.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC)..................................... 9
9.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE) ................. 9
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN)......................................................... 9
9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results........................................................................ 10
10 Validator Comments/Recommendations .................................................................. 10
11 Annexes..................................................................................................................... 10
12 Security Target.......................................................................................................... 10
13 Glossary .................................................................................................................... 10
14 Bibliography ............................................................................................................. 11
Apriva MESA VPN 3.0 Validation Report Version 0.1, July 18, 2023
1
1 Executive Summary
This report documents the assessment of the National Information Assurance Partnership
(NIAP) validation team of the evaluation of Apriva MESA VPN v3.0 solution provided by
Apriva ISS, LLC. It presents the evaluation results, their justifications, and the conformance
results. This Validation Report is not an endorsement of the Target of Evaluation by any
agency of the U.S. government, and no warranty is either expressed or implied.
The evaluation was performed by the Gossamer Security Solutions (Gossamer) Common
Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL) in Columbia, MD, United States of America, and was
completed in July 2023. The information in this report is largely derived from the Evaluation
Technical Report (ETR) and associated test reports, all written by Gossamer Security
Solutions. The evaluation determined that the product is both Common Criteria Part 2
Extended and Part 3 Conformant, and meets the assurance requirements of the PP-
Configuration for Network Devices and Virtual Private Network (VPN) Gateways, version
1.2, 31 March 2022 (CFG_NDcPP-VPNGW_V1.2) which includes the Base PP:
collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, version 2.2e, 23 March 2020 with the
PP-Module for Virtual Private Network (VPN) Gateways, version 1.2, 31 March 2022.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the Apriva MESA VPN 3.0.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) identified in this Validation Report has been evaluated at a
NIAP approved Common Criteria Testing Laboratory using the Common Methodology for
IT Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev 5) for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT
Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev 5). This Validation Report applies only to the specific
version of the TOE as evaluated. The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the
provisions of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme and the
conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the
evidence provided.
The validation team monitored the activities of the evaluation team, provided guidance on
technical issues and evaluation processes, and reviewed the individual work units and
successive versions of the ETR. The validation team found that the evaluation showed that
the product satisfies all of the functional requirements and assurance requirements stated in
the Security Target (ST). Therefore the validation team concludes that the testing
laboratory’s findings are accurate, the conclusions justified, and the conformance results are
correct. The conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation technical report are
consistent with the evidence produced.
The technical information included in this report was obtained from the Apriva MESA VPN
3.0 Security Target, version 0.4, July 18, 2023 and analysis performed by the Validation
Team.
2 Identification
The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST) effort to establish commercial facilities to perform trusted product
evaluations. Under this program, security evaluations are conducted by commercial testing
Apriva MESA VPN 3.0 Validation Report Version 0.1, July 18, 2023
2
laboratories called Common Criteria Testing Laboratories (CCTLs) using the Common
Evaluation Methodology (CEM) in accordance with National Voluntary Laboratory
Assessment Program (NVLAP) accreditation.
The NIAP Validation Body assigns Validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality and
consistency across evaluations. Developers of information technology products desiring a
security evaluation contract with a CCTL and pay a fee for their product’s evaluation. Upon
successful completion of the evaluation, the product is added to NIAP’s Validated Products
List.
Table 1 provides information needed to completely identify the product, including:
• The Target of Evaluation (TOE): the fully qualified identifier of the product as evaluated.
• The Security Target (ST), describing the security features, claims, and assurances of the
product.
• The conformance result of the evaluation.
• The Protection Profile to which the product is conformant.
• The organizations and individuals participating in the evaluation.
Table 1: Evaluation Identifiers
Item Identifier
Evaluation Scheme United States NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
TOE Apriva MESA VPN 3.0
(Specific models identified in Section 8)
Protection Profile PP-Configuration for Network Devices and Virtual Private Network (VPN)
Gateways, version 1.2, 31 March 2022 (CFG_NDcPP-VPNGW_V1.2) which
includes the Base PP: collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices,
version 2.2e, 23 March 2020 with the PP-Module for Virtual Private Network
(VPN) Gateways, version 1.2, 31 March 2022
ST Apriva MESA VPN 3.0 Security Target, version 0.4, July 18, 2023
Evaluation Technical
Report
Evaluation Technical Report for Apriva MESA VPN 3.0, version 0.2, July 18,
2023
CC Version Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
rev 5
Conformance Result CC Part 2 extended, CC Part 3 conformant
Sponsor Apriva ISS, LLC
Developer Apriva ISS, LLC
Common Criteria
Testing Lab (CCTL)
Gossamer Security Solutions, Inc.
Columbia, MD
CCEVS Validators Swapna Katikaneni, Jerome Myers, Anne Gugel, Michael Smeltzer, Russell Fink,
Robert Wojcik and Richard Toren
Apriva MESA VPN 3.0 Validation Report Version 0.1, July 18, 2023
3
3 Architectural Information
Note: The following architectural description is based on the description presented in the
Security Target.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the Apriva MESA VPN 3.0. The Apriva MESA VPN
server is an IPsec VPN gateway designed to provide mobile devices with a secure connection
to a protected network. The Apriva MESA VPN is a standards-based VPN concentrator with
no proprietary modes of operation, and supporting most native VPN clients in Microsoft,
Android, and Apple iOS operating systems.
3.1 TOE Evaluated Platforms
Detail regarding the evaluated configuration is provided in Section 8 below.
3.2 TOE Architecture
The TOE is the Apriva MESA VPN 3.0 consisting of the following hardware and software.
• Dell PowerEdge R750 2U Rackmount Server or Dell PowerEdge R650 1U
Rackmount Server
• CPU: Intel® Xeon® CPU listed below:
o Intel® Xeon® Silver 4309Y
o Intel® Xeon® Silver 4316
o Intel® Xeon® Silver 4314
o Intel® Xeon® Gold 5315Y
o Intel® Xeon® Gold 5317
o Intel® Xeon® Gold 5318Y
o Intel® Xeon® Gold 5318N
o Intel® Xeon® Gold 5320
o Intel® Xeon® Gold 6326
o Intel® Xeon® Gold 6330
o Intel® Xeon® Gold 6330N
o Intel® Xeon® Gold 6336Y
o Intel® Xeon® Gold 6338N
• NICs:
o Intel X710-T4L Quad Port 10GbE BASE-T Adapter
o Broadcom 5720 Dual Port 1GbE BASE-T Adapter
• Running Apriva MESA VPN release 3.0
3.3 Physical Boundaries
Each TOE appliance runs the 3.0 version of the Apriva MESA VPN software and has
physical network connections to its environment to facilitate managing and filtering network
Apriva MESA VPN 3.0 Validation Report Version 0.1, July 18, 2023
4
traffic. The TOE appliance can also be the destination of network traffic, where it provides
interfaces for its own management. The TOE may be accessed and managed through a PC
or terminal which can be remote from or directly connected to the TOE. The TOE can be an
IPsec peer or be a server for IPsec clients. The TOE can be configured to forward its audit
records to an external syslog server in the network environment. This is generally advisable
given the limited audit log storage space on the evaluated appliances.
The TOE is delivered to the customer via courier. The Software is pre-installed on the
hardware prior to delivery.
4 Security Policy
This section summaries the security functionality of the TOE:
1. Security audit
2. Cryptographic support
3. Identification and authentication
4. Security management
5. Packet filtering
6. Protection of the TSF
7. TOE access
8. Trusted path/channels
4.1 Security audit
The TOE is able to generate logs for a wide range of security relevant events. The TOE
always stores the logs locally so they can be accessed by an administrator and can be
configured to send the logs to a designated log server using TLS to protect the logs while in
transit on the network.
4.2 Cryptographic support
The TOE contains a CAVP-tested cryptographic module that provides key management,
random bit generation, encryption/decryption, digital signature and secure hashing and key-
hashing features in support of higher-level cryptographic protocols including IPsec, TLS,
and SSH.
4.3 Identification and authentication
The TOE requires users to be identified and authenticated before they can use functions
mediated by the TOE, with the exception of specific ICMP response. It provides the ability
to perform password and public key authentication for administrative users.
4.4 Security management
The TOE implements a limited command line interface (CLI) to allow authorized
administrators to configure the TOE. This interface restricts the administrator to executing
commands required to configure and administer the TOE. All administrative activity and
Apriva MESA VPN 3.0 Validation Report Version 0.1, July 18, 2023
5
functions including security management commands are limited to authorized users (i.e.,
administrators) only after they have provided acceptable user identification and
authentication data to the TOE.
4.5 Packet filtering
The TOE provides extensive packet filtering capabilities for IPv4, IPv6, TCP, and UDP. The
authorized administrator can define packet filtering rules that apply to most every field within
the identified packet types. The authorized administrator can define each rule to permit,
deny, and log each decision.
4.6 Protection of the TSF
The TOE implements a number of features to protect itself to ensure the reliability and
integrity of its security features.
It protects particularly sensitive data such as stored passwords and cryptographic keys so that
they are not accessible even by an administrator. It also provides its own timing mechanism
to ensure that reliable time information is available (e.g., for log accountability).
The TOE includes functions to perform self-tests so that it might detect when it is failing. It
also includes mechanisms (i.e., verification of the digital signature of each new image) so
that the TOE itself can be updated while ensuring that the updates will not introduce
malicious or other unexpected changes in the TOE.
4.7 TOE access
The TOE can be configured to display a login banner when an administrator establishes an
interactive session and subsequently will enforce an administrator-defined inactivity timeout
value after which the inactive session (local or remote) will be terminated. The TOE can
also restrict VPN clients based on location and time and can assign a private VPN address to
a client.
4.8 Trusted path/channels
The TOE protects interactive communication with administrators using SSH for CLI access
to ensure both integrity and disclosure protection. If the negotiation of an encrypted session
fails or if the user does not have authorization for remote administration, an attempted
connection will not be established.
The TOE protects communication with the audit log server using TLS connections to prevent
unintended disclosure or modification of logs. The TOE can establish IPsec connections
with clients and peers.
5 Assumptions & Clarification of Scope
Assumptions
Apriva MESA VPN 3.0 Validation Report Version 0.1, July 18, 2023
6
The Security Problem Definition, including the assumptions, may be found in the following
documents:
• collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, version 2.2e, 23 March 2020
(NDcPP22e)
• PP-Module for Virtual Private Network (VPN) Gateways, version 1.2, 31 March
2022 (VPNGW12)
That information has not been reproduced here and the NDcPP22e/VPNGW12 should be
consulted if there is interest in that material.
The scope of this evaluation was limited to the functionality and assurances covered in the
NDcPP22e/VPNGW12 as described for this TOE in the Security Target. Other functionality
included in the product was not assessed as part of this evaluation. All other functionality
provided by the devices needs to be assessed separately, and no further conclusions can be
drawn about their effectiveness.
Clarification of scope
All evaluations (and all products) have limitations, as well as potential misconceptions that
need clarification. This text covers some of the more important limitations and clarifications
of this evaluation. Note that:
• As with any evaluation, this evaluation only shows that the evaluated configuration
meets the security claims made with a certain level of assurance (the assurance
activities specified in the collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices with
the VPNGW PP-Module and performed by the evaluation team).
• This evaluation covers only the specific device models and software as identified in
this document, and not any earlier or later versions released or in process.
• Apart from the Admin Guide, additional customer documentation for the specific
VPN models was not included in the scope of the evaluation and therefore should not
to be relied upon when configuring or operating the device as evaluated.
• This evaluation did not specifically search for, nor attempt to exploit, vulnerabilities
that were not “obvious” or vulnerabilities to objectives not claimed in the ST. The
CEM defines an “obvious” vulnerability as one that is easily exploited with a
minimum of understanding of the TOE, technical sophistication and resources.
• The functionality evaluated is scoped exclusively to the security functional
requirements specified in the NDcPP22e/VPNGW12 and applicable Technical
Decisions. Any additional security related functional capabilities of the TOE were
not covered by this evaluation.
6 Documentation
The following documents were available with the TOE for evaluation:
• Apriva® MESA VPN Common Criteria Guidance, Version 3.11, July 18, 2023
Apriva MESA VPN 3.0 Validation Report Version 0.1, July 18, 2023
7
Any additional customer documentation provided with the product, or that is available
online was not included in the scope of the evaluation and therefore should not to be relied
upon when configuring or operating the device as evaluated.
To use the product in the evaluated configuration, the product must be configured as
specified in the Guidance Documentation listed above. Consumers are encouraged to
download the configuration guides from the NIAP website to ensure the device is
configured as evaluated.
7 IT Product Testing
This section describes the testing efforts of the developer and the Evaluation Team. It is
derived from information contained in the proprietary Detailed Test Report for Apriva
MESA VPN 3.0, Version 0.2, July 18, 2023 (DTR) and DTR Supplement for Apriva MESA
VPN v3.0 Version 0.1, July 24, 2023, as summarized in the evaluation Assurance Activity
Report (AAR).
7.1 Developer Testing
No evidence of developer testing is required in the assurance activities for this product.
7.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing
The evaluation team verified the product according to a Common Criteria Certification
document and ran the tests specified in the NDcPP22e/VPNGW12 including the tests
associated with optional requirements. The AAR, in sections 3.4.1 lists the tested
configuration, tested devices and test tools.
8 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is the Apriva MESA VPN 3.0 consisting of the following hardware and software.
• Dell PowerEdge R750 2U Rackmount Server or Dell PowerEdge R650 1U
Rackmount Server
• CPU: Intel® Xeon® CPU listed below:
o Intel® Xeon® Silver 4309Y
o Intel® Xeon® Silver 4310
o Intel® Xeon® Silver 4316
o Intel® Xeon® Silver 4314
o Intel® Xeon® Gold 5315Y
o Intel® Xeon® Gold 5317
o Intel® Xeon® Gold 5318Y
o Intel® Xeon® Gold 5318N
o Intel® Xeon® Gold 5320
o Intel® Xeon® Gold 6326
o Intel® Xeon® Gold 6330
Apriva MESA VPN 3.0 Validation Report Version 0.1, July 18, 2023
8
o Intel® Xeon® Gold 6330N
o Intel® Xeon® Gold 6336Y
o Intel® Xeon® Gold 6338N
• NICs:
o Intel X710-T4L Quad Port 10GbE BASE-T Adapter
o Broadcom 5720 Dual Port 1GbE BASE-T Adapter
• Running Apriva MESA VPN release 3.0.
9 Results of the Evaluation
The results of the assurance requirements are generally described in this section and are
presented in detail in the proprietary ETR. The reader of this document can assume that all
assurance activities and work units received a passing verdict.
A verdict for an assurance component is determined by the resulting verdicts assigned to the
corresponding evaluator action elements. The evaluation was conducted based upon CC
version 3.1 rev 5 and CEM version 3.1 rev 5. The evaluation determined the Apriva MESA
VPN 3.0 TOE to be Part 2 extended, and to meet the SARs contained in the
NDcPP22e/VPNGW12.
9.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ASE)
The evaluation team applied each ASE CEM work unit. The ST evaluation ensured the ST
contains a description of the environment in terms of policies and assumptions, a statement
of security requirements claimed to be met by the Apriva MESA VPN 3.0 products that are
consistent with the Common Criteria, and product security function descriptions that support
the requirements.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
9.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV)
The evaluation team applied each ADV CEM work unit. The evaluation team assessed the
design documentation and found it adequate to aid in understanding how the TSF provides
the security functions. The design documentation consists of a functional specification
contained in the Security Target and Guidance documents. Additionally, the evaluator
performed the assurance activities specified in the NDcPP22e/VPNGW12 related to the
examination of the information contained in the TSS.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
Apriva MESA VPN 3.0 Validation Report Version 0.1, July 18, 2023
9
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
9.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD)
The evaluation team applied each AGD CEM work unit. The evaluation team ensured the
adequacy of the user guidance in describing how to use the operational TOE. Additionally,
the evaluation team ensured the adequacy of the administrator guidance in describing how
to securely administer the TOE. All of the guides were assessed during the design and testing
phases of the evaluation to ensure they were complete.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
9.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC)
The evaluation team applied each ALC CEM work unit. The evaluation team found that the
TOE was identified.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
9.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE)
The evaluation team applied each ATE CEM work unit. The evaluation team ran the set of
tests specified by the assurance activities in the NDcPP22e/VPNGW12 and recorded the
results in a Test Report, summarized in the AAR.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN)
The evaluation team applied each AVA CEM work unit. The vulnerability analysis is in the
Detailed Test Report (DTR) prepared by the evaluator. The vulnerability analysis includes
a public search for vulnerabilities. The public search for vulnerabilities did not uncover any
residual vulnerability.
The evaluator searched the National Vulnerability Database
(https://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/search) and Vulnerability Notes Database
(http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/) on 7/12/2023 with the following search terms: “Apriva”,
“Mesa”, “Broadcom+5720”, “Intel+X710-T4L”, “ssh”, “tls”, “ipsec”, “ike”,
“Intel+Xeon+Silver”, “Intel+Xeon+Gold” and “Ice+Lake”.
Apriva MESA VPN 3.0 Validation Report Version 0.1, July 18, 2023
10
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results
The evaluation team’s assessment of the evaluation evidence demonstrates that the claims in
the ST are met. Additionally, the evaluation team’s testing also demonstrated the accuracy
of the claims in the ST.
The validation team’s assessment of the evidence provided by the evaluation team is that it
demonstrates that the evaluation team followed the procedures defined in the CEM, and
correctly verified that the product meets the claims in the ST.
10 Validator Comments/Recommendations
All of the validators concerns are adequately captured in Section 5, Assumptions, Threats, and
Clarification of Scope.
11 Annexes
Not applicable.
12 Security Target
The Security Target is identified as: Apriva MESA VPN 3.0 Security Target, version 0.4, July
18, 2023.
13 Glossary
The following definitions are used throughout this document:
• Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL). An IT security evaluation facility
accredited by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) and
approved by the CCEVS Validation Body to conduct Common Criteria-based
evaluations.
• Conformance. The ability to demonstrate in an unambiguous way that a given
implementation is correct with respect to the formal model.
• Evaluation. The assessment of an IT product against the Common Criteria using the
Common Criteria Evaluation Methodology to determine whether or not the claims made
are justified; or the assessment of a protection profile against the Common Criteria using
the Common Evaluation Methodology to determine if the protection profile is complete,
consistent, technically sound and hence suitable for use as a statement of requirements
for one or more TOEs that may be evaluated.
Apriva MESA VPN 3.0 Validation Report Version 0.1, July 18, 2023
11
• Evaluation Evidence. Any tangible resource (information) required from the sponsor or
developer by the evaluator to perform one or more evaluation activities.
• Feature. Part of a product that is either included with the product or can be ordered
separately.
• Target of Evaluation (TOE). A group of IT products configured as an IT system, or an
IT product, and associated documentation that is the subject of a security evaluation
under the CC.
• Validation. The process carried out by the CCEVS Validation Body leading to the issue
of a Common Criteria certificate.
• Validation Body. A governmental organization responsible for carrying out validation
and for overseeing the day-to-day operation of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation
and Validation Scheme.
14 Bibliography
The Validation Team used the following documents to produce this Validation Report:
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation: Part 1:
Introduction and General Model, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.
[2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security
functional components, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.
[3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security
assurance components, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.
[4] collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, version 2.2e, 23 March 2020.
[5] PP-Module for Virtual Private Network (VPN) Gateways, version 1.2, 31 March
2022.
[6] Apriva MESA VPN 3.0 Security Target, version 0.4, July 18, 2023 (ST).
[7] Assurance Activity Report for Apriva MESA VPN 3.0, Version 0.2, July 18, 2023
(AAR).
[8] Detailed Test Report for Apriva MESA VPN 3.0, Version 0.2, July 18, 2023 (DTR).
[9] Evaluation Technical Report for Apriva MESA VPN 3.0, Version 0.2, July 18,
2023 (ETR)