EUCC-3087-2026-02-0001
Administration ID
BSI-DSZ-CC-1272-2026
for
IFX_CCI_00007Ah/8Fh A11, R11, M11 with optional
Crypto Suite
from
Infineon Technologies AG
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-11
Certification Report V1.0 EUCC-Zert-327 EUCC V6.8
Certification Report
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Contents
A. Certification.......................................................................................................................4
1. Preliminary Remarks.....................................................................................................4
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure................................................................4
3. Recognition Agreements...............................................................................................5
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification.................................................................5
5. Publication.....................................................................................................................7
B. Certification Results..........................................................................................................8
1. Executive Summary......................................................................................................9
2. Identification of the TOE..............................................................................................10
3. Security Policy.............................................................................................................11
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope......................................................................11
5. Architectural Information..............................................................................................12
6. Supplementary Cybersecurity Information..................................................................12
7. IT Product Testing........................................................................................................12
8. Evaluated Configuration..............................................................................................13
9. Results of the Evaluation.............................................................................................13
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE......................................................25
11. Security Target...........................................................................................................26
12. Regulation specific aspects (eIDAS, QES)...............................................................27
13. Bibliography...............................................................................................................28
C. Annexes..........................................................................................................................30
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A. Certification
1. Preliminary Remarks
The Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/482 of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 31 January 2024 [EUCC-VO] establishes a Union-wide cybersecurity
certification scheme for TOEs and Protection Profiles for conformity assessments using
the requirements of Common Criteria.
By implementing the Cybersecurity Act1
, certification activities at assurance level ‘high’ and
in duly justified cases at assurance level ‘substantial’ are reserved to the National
Cybersecurity Certification Agency of a Member State.
In accordance to BSIG2
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) issues
certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out at the request of a developer, vendor or a
distributor, hereinafter called the applicant.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria referenced in the above mentioned Implementing Regulation (EU)
2024/482 as well as relevant application notes and interpretations published by the
certification body of the BSI.
Evaluation facilities notified by the German National Cybersecurity Certification Authority
carry out the evaluation.
This Certification Report is the result of the certification activities carried out by the
certification body of the BSI in conclusion of the technical evaluation. This report contains
among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed Certification
Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body carries out its activities according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/482 of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 31 January 2024 laying down rules for the application of Regulation (EU) 2019/881 of
the European Parliament and of the Council as regards the adoption of the European
Common Criteria-based cybersecurity certification scheme (EUCC) [EUCC-VO]
● EUCC state-of-the-art documents of relevance to the TOE [EUCC_SOTA]
● Act on the Federal Office for Information Security2
1
Regulation (EU) 2019/881 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on ENISA
(the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity) and on information and communications technology
cybersecurity certification and repealing Regulation (EU) No 526/2013 (Cybersecurity Act)
2
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 2 December 2025, BGBl. 2025
Nr. 301, S. 2
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● BSI Certification and Approval Ordinance3
● BMI Regulations on Ex-parte Costs4
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior and Community)
● ISO/IEC 15408 as published on the day of issuance of this certificate and as mirrored by
the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version CC:2022 [CC]
● ISO/IEC 18045 as published on the day of issuance of this certificate and as mirrored by
the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version CEM:2022 [CEM]
● DIN EN ISO/IEC 17065 standard
● EUCC programme: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (EUCC)
[EUCC_PROG]
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [AIS]
3. Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certifications of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates – as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC – under certain conditions was agreed
3.1. International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC
(Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08
September 2014. It covers CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP)
(exact use), CC certificates based on assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or
the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR) and CC certificates for Protection
Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on
the website: https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the related bodies
of the signatory nations. A disclaimer beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of
recognition.
This certificate is recognized according to the rules of CCRA-2014, i. e. up to and including
CC part 5 EAL 2 and ALC_FLR components.
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification
● The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform
application and interpretation of the criteria as well as uniform ratings.
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of Security Certificates and approval by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungs- und -Anerkennungsverordnung – BSIZertV) of 02 December
2025, Bundesgesetzblatt 2025, no. 301
4
BMI Regulations on Ex-parte Costs - Besondere Gebührenverordnung des BMI für individuell
zurechenbare öffentliche Leistungen in dessen Zuständigkeitsbereich (BMIBGebV), Abschnitt 7 (BSI-
Gesetz) - dated 2 September 2019, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1365
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Certification Report
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● The TOE IFX_CCI_00007Ah/8Fh A11, R11, M11 with optional Crypto Suite, has been
certified by the certification body of the Federal Federal Office for Information Security
(BSI).
● The evaluation of the product IFX_CCI_00007Ah/8Fh A11, R11, M11 with optional
Crypto Suite, was carried out by TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH, located at:
Unternehmensgruppe TÜV NORD
Am TÜV 1
45307 Essen.
● The evaluation was completed on 18 December 2025. TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH
is a notified evaluation facility (ITSEF) .
● This certification was applied for: Infineon Technologies AG.
● The assessed TOE was developed by: Infineon Technologies AG.
● The certification activities are concluded with the comparability check and the production
of this Certification Report. This work was completed by the certification body of the BSI.
This Certification Report applies only to the version of the TOE as identified in this
document. The confirmed assurance package is valid on the condition that
● all statements and indications regarding generation, configuration and operation, as
given in the following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in an environment as specified in the following report and in the
Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance components and assurance levels please refer to CC
itself. Detailed references are listed in part C of this report.
The issued Certificate confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
[ST] on certificate’s issuance day. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of
the certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be reassessed.
Therefore, the holder of the certificate should involve the assurance continuity program of
the EUCC Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-assessment or re-certification) in its
obligations to monitor the certified product. Specifically, if certification results should be
used in subsequent evaluation and certification procedures, in a system integration
process or if a user's risk management needs regularly updated results, it is recommended
to perform a reassessment on a regular e.g. annual basis.
In order to prevent an indefinite certificate usage where evolving attack methods justify a
recent reassessment of the product’s resistance, the maximum validity period of the
certificate is limited. The certificate issued on 17 February 2026 is valid until 16 February
2031 and its validity can be renewed by certifying the TOE again.
The holder of this certificate is obliged:
1. to meet the obligations from the Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/482, in
particular but not exclusively to respect the rules for certificate usage, to monitor the
conformity of the certified TOE, to inform the certification body about subsequently
detected vulnerabilities or irregularities with relevance to the security of the TOE
and to maintain vulnerability management and disclosure procedures.
Should changes be introduced into the certified version of the TOE, the validity period of
its related certificate can be extended in order to cover the changed TOE, provided the
holder of the certificate applies for measures under EUCC scheme’s assurance continuity
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(i.e. recertification or maintenance) and the changed TOE then meets the assurance
requirements.
5. Publication
The TOE IFX_CCI_00007Ah/8Fh A11, R11, M11 with optional Crypto Suite, has been
notified to ENISA for publication on the website on European cybersecurity certification
schemes and has also been included in BSI’s list of certified products, which is published
regularly (see [EUCC_CERT]). Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49
228 9582-111.
This holder of the certificate5
has to publish on its website this Certification Report and
supplementary information. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic
form at the internet address stated above.
5
Infineon Technologies AG
Am Campeon 1-15
85579 Neubiberg
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B. Certification Results
The following chapters summarise the assessment results of the
● the applicant’s Security Target specified for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes, statements and indications from the certification body.
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1. Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation is the Infineon Security Controller IFX_CCI_00007Ah A11 / R11 /
M11, IFX_CCI_00008Fh R11 / M11 with firmware version 80.510.04.03, optional Crypto
Suite 5.02.003 and user guidance documents.
The TOE provides a 32-bit Armv8-M CPU architecture. The major components of the
processor system are the CPU (Central Processing Unit), a MPU (Memory Protection
Unit), a Security Attribution Unit (SAU), a Nested Vectored Interrupt Controller (NVIC), an
Instruction Stream Signature (ISS) coprocessor, and a Masked Instruction Set Extension
(MISE) coprocessor. The TOE can communicate using contact-based and contactless
interfaces.
This TOE is intended to be used in smart cards for particular security relevant applications
and as a developing platform for smart card operating systems. The term smartcard
embedded software is used in the following for all operating systems and applications
stored and executed on the TOE. The TOE is the platform for the smartcard embedded
software.
The product IFX_CCI_00007Ah/8Fh A11, R11, M11 with optional Crypto Suite, has been
certified under the EUCC scheme in accordance to the provisions of the Implementing
Regulation (EU) 2024/482. The TOE deliverables are listed in table 1.
The evaluation of the product IFX_CCI_00007Ah/8Fh A11, R11, M11 with optional Crypto
Suite, was conducted by TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH. The evaluation was completed
on 18 December 2025. TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH is a notified evaluation facility
(ITSEF).
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [ETR] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [CC], the Methodology [CEM], the requirements of the Scheme [EUCC-
VO],[EUCC_PROG].
The evaluation has confirmed:
● CC Version and Release: see [CC] and [CEM]
● PP Conformance: Security IC Platform Protection Profile with
Augmentation Packages Version 1.0, 13 January 2014, BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014 [PP]
● Assurance Level: EUCC [High] with component AVA_VAN.5
● Assurance Package: Global Assurance EAL 6
● Augmentation: ALC_FLR.1 and ATE_SDP.1
The Security Target [ST] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified
Protection Profile Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation Packages
Version 1.0, 13 January 2014, BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014 [PP].
A detailed description of the security functionality, addressed threats, organisational
security policies and the operational environment can be found in the Security Target [ST].
Depending on the blocking configuration, the product can have different user available
memory sizes and interface configurations. All products are identical regarding module
design, layout, and footprint. All possible configuration options are achieved by blocking
only.
This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8.
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The vulnerability assessment results stated in this certificate do not express an appraisal
of the strength and suitability of the cryptographic algorithms implemented in the TOE (see
BSIG Section 52, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results apply only to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the statements and indications are kept as detailed in this
Certification Report. Neither the BSI nor any other organisation that recognises or gives
effect to this certificate implicitly or explicitely guarantee or endorse the certified TOE.
2. Identification of the TOE
The Information and communications technology product is identified as follows:
IFX_CCI_00007Ah/8Fh A11, R11, M11 with optional Crypto Suite,
Holder of the certificate: Infineon Technologies AG
Am Campeon 1-15
85579 Neubiberg
https://www.infineon.com/product-information/cybersecurity-information
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
# Type Item / identifier Release(s) / version(s) Form of delivery
1 HW IFX_CCI_00007Ah A11 / R11 /
M11, IFX_CCI_00008Fh R11 /
M11
A11, R11, M11
(design step)
Depending on customer
order.
As stated in [ST, 1.4.4],
the hardware can be
delivered as bare dies
(sawn wafer), as
modules, or in an IC
case.
2 FW Firmware (BOS, ROM part of
HSL, Flash Loader)
80.510.04.03
(Flash Loader version is
also separately identified
as version 10.09.0000)
Stored on the delivered
hardware.
3 SW HSL (NVM part) 04.07.0000 Secure download of
object file via iShare.
4 SW UMSLC library 02.01.0040 Secure download of
object file via iShare.
5 SW CryptoSuite
(optional)
5.02.003 Secure download of
object file via iShare.
6 DOC TEGRION™ SLC22 (32-bit
Security Controller – V31)
Hardware Reference Manual
Rev. 3.1, 2025-04-22 Personalized PDF via
secure iShare server.
7 DOC TEGRION™ SLx2 security
controller family Programmer's
Reference Manual SLx2_DFP
Rev. 1.9.0, 2025-10-16 Personalized PDF via
secure iShare server.
8 DOC SLC22 32-bit Security Controller
– V31 Security Guidelines
1.00-3076, 2025-04-30 Personalized PDF via
secure iShare server.
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# Type Item / identifier Release(s) / version(s) Form of delivery
9 DOC TEGRION SLC22 (32-bit
Security Controller – V31)
Preliminary Production and
personalization manual
Rev. 10.09, 2025-05-12 Personalized PDF via
secure iShare server.
10 DOC Crypto2304T V4, User Manual v3.0, 2024-06-21 Personalized PDF via
secure iShare server.
11 DOC CS-SLC22V31 CryptoSuite 32-
bit Security Controller User
interface manual
v5.02.003, 2025-10-02 Personalized PDF via
secure iShare server.
12 DOC TEGRION™ SLx22 (32-bit
Security Controller – V31) Errata
sheet
Rev. 2.0, 2025-06-27 Personalized PDF via
secure iShare server.
Table 1: Deliverables of the TOE
3. Security Policy
The security policy of the TOE is to provide basic security functionalities to be used by the
smart card operating system and the smart card application, thus providing an overall
smart card system security. Therefore, the TOE will implement different cryptographic
algorithms to ensure the authenticity, confidentiality, and integrity of data and to support
secure authentication protocols it will provide a true random number generator.
Besides that, the TOE can come with the optional Hardware Support Library (HSL)
providing a simplified interface for NVM management and provides the possibility to write
tearing safe into the NVM.
As the TOE is a hardware security platform, the security policy of the TOE is also to
provide protection against leakage of information (e.g. to ensure the confidentiality of
cryptographic keys during AES cryptographic functions performed by the TOE), against
physical probing, against malfunctions, against physical manipulations, and against abuse
of functionality. Hence, the TOE shall
• maintain the integrity and the confidentiality of data stored in the memory of the
TOE, and
• maintain the integrity, the correct operation, and the confidentiality of security
functionalities (security mechanisms and associated functions) provided by the
TOE.
Specific details concerning the above-mentioned security policies can be found in
Chapters 6 and 7 of the Security Target [ST].
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of threats and
organisational security policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled and measures to be taken by the IT environment,
the user, or the risk manager. The following topics are of relevance:
The objective OE.Resp-Appl states that the IC Embedded Software Developer shall treat
user data (especially keys) of the composite product appropriately.
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The ST includes multiple objectives for the Composite Product Integrator and
Personaliser: OE.Process-Sec-IC, OE.Lim_Block_Loader, OE.Loader_Usage,
OE.TOE_Auth, OE.Secure_UC_Load, OE.Secure_Delivery.
Details can be found in the Security Target [ST], chapter 4.2.
5. Architectural Information
The TOE provides a 32-bit Armv8-M CPU architecture. The major components of the
processor system are the CPU (Central Processing Unit), a MPU (Memory Protection
Unit), a Security Attribution Unit (SAU), a Nested Vectored Interrupt Controller (NVIC), an
Instruction Stream Signature (ISS) coprocessor, and a Masked Instruction Set Extension
(MISE) coprocessor. The TOE can communicate using contact-based and contactless
interfaces.
This TOE is intended to be used in smart cards for particular security relevant applications
and as a developing platform for smart card operating systems. The term smart card
embedded software is used in the following for all operating systems and applications
stored and executed on the TOE. The TOE is the platform for the smart card embedded
software.
Further, more detailed information is readily available in the Security Target [ST].
6. Supplementary Cybersecurity Information
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 1 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
The developers website as stated in chapter 2 provides the following supplementary
information:
● the period during which support is offered (esp. security related updates)
● contact information of the manufacturer or provider and accepted methods for receiving
vulnerability information from end users and security researchers
● a reference to online repositories listing publicly disclosed vulnerabilities related to the
TOE/ICT, ICT service or ICT process and to any relevant cybersecurity advisories
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7. IT Product Testing
All tests have been carried out by ITSEF:
TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH,
Unternehmensgruppe TÜV NORD
Am TÜV 1
45307 Essen
under the responsibility of certification Body
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 87
Postfach 20 03 63
D-53175 Bonn
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Please refer to chapter 1 for details on assurance levels or packages involved into testing.
The tests performed by the developer were divided into the following categories:
• Simulation tests (design verification),
• Qualification / verification tests, and
• Production tests.
The developer tests cover all security functionalities and all security mechanisms as
identified in the functional specification.
The evaluation has shown that the actual version of the TOE provides the security
functionalities as specified by the developer. The test results confirm the correct
implementation of the TOE security functionalities.
For penetration testing, the evaluators took all security functionalities into consideration.
Intensive penetration testing was planned based on the analysis results and performed for
the underlying mechanisms of security functionalities. The penetration tests considered
both the physical tampering of the TOE and attacks, which do not modify the TOE
physically. The penetration test results confirm that the TOE is resistant to attackers with
high attack potential in the intended environment for the TOE.
Please refer to chapter 8 for complete and precise information on settings and
configuration of the TOE during the evaluation, including relevant operational notes and
observations.
8. Evaluated Configuration
This certificate covers the following configurations of the TOE:
The tests are performed with the chip IFX_CCI_00007Ah, produced by TSMC fab 15 in
Taiwan. The identifiers IFX_CCI_00007Ah A11 / R11 / M11, IFX_CCI_00008Fh R11 / M11
may differ from each other only in terms of blocked modules: They are still physically
present on the TOE, but not accessible. Thus, the tests were performed on a TOE without
any blocked features. For the tests different chip types are prepared with different patches.
With the loaded patch code, the defined tests could be performed. The entire functionality
is the same for all chips.
9. Results of the Evaluation
9.1. CC specific results
The ITSEF produced and provided the Evaluation Technical Reports (ETR) [ETR]
according to the the requirements of the Scheme [EUCC-VO],[EUCC_PROG], the
Common Criteria [CC], the Common Evaluation Methodology [CEM], and all relevant
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [AIS].
For the evaluation from component level AVA_VAN.4 onwards the following state-of-the-art
documents and supporting documents were applied.
The following guidance specific for the technology was used:
● Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 1,
Durchführung der Ortsbesichtigung in der Entwicklungsumgebung des Herstellers,
Version 14, 2017-10-11,
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● Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 14,
Anforderungenan Aufbau und Inhalt der ETR-Teile (Evaluation Technical Report) für
Evaluationen nachCC (Common Criteria), Version 7, 2010-08-03,
● Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 19,
Anforderungen an Aufbau und Inhalt der Zusammenfassung des ETR (Evaluation
Technical Report) für Evaluationen nach CC (Common Criteria), Version 9, 2014-
11-03,
● Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS
20,Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für
deterministischeZufallszahlengeneratoren, Version 4, 2025-04-11, Herausgeber:
Zertifizierungsstelle des BSI im Rahmen des Zertifizierungsschemas,
● Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS
23,Zusammentragen von Nachweisen der Entwickler, Version 4, 2017-03-15,
● Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 26,
Evaluationsmethodologie für in Hardware integrierte Schaltungen, Version 10,
2017-07-03,
● Attack Methods for Smartcards and Similar Devices, Version 2.5, 2022-05, Joint
Interpretation Working Group (confidential),
● Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 31,
Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für physikalische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren, Version 4, 2025-04-11
● Developer evidence for the evaluation of a physical true random number generator,
Version 0.8, 2013-02-28, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik.
● Evaluation Report as part of the Evaluation Technical Report, Part B – ETR-Part
True Physical and Hybrid Random Number Generator, Template-Version 0.7, 2013-
02-28, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik.
● Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) – AIS 34, Evaluation
Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL5+ (CC v2.3 & v3.1) and EAL6 (CC
v3.1), Version 3, 2009-09-03,
● Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 35, Öffentliche
Fassung eines Security Target (ST-lite), Version 2, 2007-11-12
● Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS
36,Kompositionsevaluierung, Version 5, 2017-03-15,
● Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 37,
Terminologie und Vorbereitung von Smartcard-Evaluierungen, Version 3, 2010-05-
17,
● Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) – AIS 38, Reuse of
evaluation results, Version 2, 2007-09-28,
● Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) – AIS 39, Formal
Methods, Version 3, 2008-10-24, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik.
● Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) – AIS 41, Guidelines for
Pps and STs, Version 2, 2011-01-31,
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● Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 46,
Informationen zur Evaluierung von kryptographischen Algorithmen und ergänzende
Hinweise für die Evaluierung von Zufallszahlengeneratoren, Version 3, 2013-12-04,
● Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 47,
Regelungen zu Site Certification, Version 1.1, 2013-12-04
are considered.
Additionally the CC Supporting Mandatory Technical Documents
● Joint Interpretation Library – Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards, Version
3.2.1, 2024-02 and
● Joint Interpretation Library – ETR template for composite evaluation of Smart Cards
and similar devices, Version 1.1, August 2015
● Transition Policy to CC:2022 and CEM:2022, 2023-04-20, Common Criteria
Recognition Arrangement Management Committee, CCMC-2023-04-001.
● EUCC Scheme State-of-The-Art Document - Security Architecture requirements
(ADV_ARC) for smart cards and similar devices extended to Secure Sub Systems
in SoCs, Version 1.1, 2023-10, ENISA.
● EUCC Scheme State-of-The-Art Document - Application of Attack Potential to
Smartcards and Similar Devices, Version 1.2, 2023-08, ENISA.
● EUCC Scheme State-of-The-Art Document - Application of Attack Potential to
Smartcards and Similar Devices, Version 2.0 (DRAFT), 2025-02, ENISA.
● EUCC Scheme State-of-The-Art Document - Composite product evaluation and
certification for CC: 2022, Version 1.0 (DRAFT), 2025-02, ENISA.
● EUCC Scheme Guideline on Cryptography, Version 2, 2025-05, ENISA.
● COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2024/482 of 31 January 2024
laying down rules for the application of Regulation (EU) 2019/881 of the European
Parliament and of the Council as regards the adoption of the European Common
Criteria-based cybersecurity certification scheme (EUCC), 2024-01-31, ENISA.
● EUCC Scheme State-of-The-Art Document - The Application of CC to Integrated
Circuits, Version 1.1, 2023-10, ENISA.
● EUCC Scheme State-of-The-Art Document - The Application of CC to Integrated
Circuits, Version 2.0 (DRAFT), 2024-12, ENISA.
● EUCC Scheme State-of-The-Art Document - Minimum ITSEF requirements for
security evaluations of Smart Cards and similar devices, Version 1.1, 2023-10,
ENISA.
● EUCC Scheme State-of-The-Art Document - Minimum Site Security Requirements,
Version 1.1, 2023-10, ENISA.
● EUCC Scheme State-of-The-Art Document - Minimum Site Security Requirements,
Version 2.0 (DRAFT), 2025-02, ENISA.
● EU Commission Implementing Regulation 2024/482, 2024-01-31, EU
● EUCC Scheme State-of-The-Art Document - STAR methodology, Version 1.0
(DRAFT), 2025-02, ENISA.
● Remaining Strength of Asymmetric Cryptographic Mechanisms after Partial Key
Leakage, Version 1.0 (confidential), 2020-06, Joint Interpretation Working Group.
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● Joint Interpretation Library – Assurance Continuity - Practical Cases for Smart
Cards and similar devices, Version 1.1, 2024-04, Joint Interpretation Working
Group.
● ETR for composite evaluation TD SC & SD, Version 1.2, 2024-04, Joint
Interpretation Working Group.
● ADV_SPM.1 interpretation for [CC:2022] transition, Joint Interpretation Library,
Version 1.0, 2024-05
are considered.
For RNG assessment the scheme interpretations AIS 20/31 was used (see [AIS]).
To support composite evaluations according to the State of the Art document the document
ETR for composite evaluation [ETRRfCOMP] was provided and approved. This document
provides details of this platform evaluation that have to be considered in the course of a
composite evaluation on top.
The assurance refinements outlined in the Security Target were followed in the course of
the evaluation of the TOE.
As a result of the evaluation, the verdict PASS is confirmed for the assurance components
that are identified in chapter 1 of this report and claimed by the Security Target [ST] for the
corresponding TOE. The corresponding TOE is identified in chapter 2 of this report.
The certificate
● is uniquely identified by: EUCC-3087-2026-02-0001,
administration ID BSI-DSZ-CC-1272-2026
● was issued on: 17 February 2026
● is valid until: 16 February 2031
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 1 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2. Results of cryptographic assessment
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this certification
procedure (see BSIG Section 52, Para. 4, Clause 2). But cryptographic functionalities with
a security level of lower than 120 bits can no longer be regarded as secure without
considering the application context. Therefore, for these functionalities it shall be checked
whether the related crypto operations are appropriate for the intended system. Some
further hints and guidelines can be derived from the 'Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-02102'
(https://www.bsi.bund.de).
The following table gives an overview of the cryptographic functionalities inside the TOE to
enforce the security policy and outlines its rating from cryptographic point of view. Any
Cryptographic Functionality that is marked in column 'Security Level above 120 Bits' of the
following table with 'no' achieves a security level of lower than 120 Bits (in general context)
only.
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# Purpose Cryptographic
mechanism
Implementation standard Key size in
bits
Security
Level above
120 Bits
Symmetric coprocessor (SCP)
1 Cryptogr
aphic
primitive
AES [FIPS197] 128, 192,
256
yes
2 Confident
iality
#1 in ECB mode for
encryption and
decryption
[NIST_SP800-38A] 128, 192,
256
no
CryptoSuite: symmetric functionality
3 Cryptogr
aphic
primitive
TDES [NIST_SP800-67_2017] 112, 168 no
4 Cryptogr
aphic
primitive
AES [FIPS197] 128, 192,
256
yes
5 Confident
iality
#3 in ECB mode for
encryption and
decryption
[NIST_SP800-38A] 112, 168 no
6 Confident
iality
#3 in CBC mode for
encryption and
decryption
[NIST_SP800-38A] 112, 168 no
7 Confident
iality
#3 in CTR mode for
encryption and
decryption
[NIST_SP800-38A] 112, 168 no
8 Confident
iality
#4 in ECB mode for
encryption and
decryption
[NIST_SP800-38A] 128, 192,
256
no
9 Confident
iality
#4 in CBC mode for
encryption and
decryption
[NIST_SP800-38A] 128, 192,
256
yes
10 Confident
iality
#4 in CTR mode for
encryption and
decryption
[NIST_SP800-38A] 128, 192,
256
yes
11 Confident
iality
#4 in CCM mode for
encryption and
decryption
[NIST_SP800-38C] 128, 192,
256
yes
12 Confident
iality
#4 in GCM mode for
Authenticated
encryption
[NIST_SP800-38D] 128, 192,
256
yes
13 Integrity #3 in Retail MAC
mode for MAC
generation
[ISO_9797-1_2011] 112 no
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# Purpose Cryptographic
mechanism
Implementation standard Key size in
bits
Security
Level above
120 Bits
14 Integrity #3 in CBC MAC
mode for MAC
generation
[ISO_9797-1_2011]
padding method 2
112, 168 no
15 Integrity #4 in CMAC mode for
MAC generation
[NIST_SP800-38B] 128, 192,
256
yes
16 Integrity #4 in CBC MAC
mode for MAC
generation
[ISO_9797-1_2011]
padding method 2
128, 192,
256
no
CryptoSuite: asymmetric functionality
17 N/A Certified FFC domain
parameters:
 1024-bit MODP
Group with 160-
bit Prime Order
Subgroup
 2048-bit MODP
Group with 224-
bit Prime Order
Subgroup
 2048-bit MODP
Group with 256-
bit Prime Order
Subgroup
[RFC5114] N/A --
18 Key
agreeme
nt
Finite-Field Diffie-
Hellman computation
using domain
parameters listed in
#17
[NIST_SP800-56A, 5.7.1.1]
without step 2,
1024-2048
19 Key
generatio
n
Finite-Field key
generation for
domain parameters
listed in #17
[NIST_SP800-56A, 5.6.1.1] 1024-2048
20 N/A Certified Montgomery
elliptic curves:
 Curve25519,
Curve448
[RFC7748] N/A --
21 Key
agreeme
nt
X25519 using
Curve25519
[RFC7748, 5] 256 --
22 Key
agreeme
nt
X448 using Curve448 [RFC7748, 5] 448 --
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# Purpose Cryptographic
mechanism
Implementation standard Key size in
bits
Security
Level above
120 Bits
23 Confident
iality
RSA encryption [PKCS#1_2012, 5.1.1],
[NIST_SP800-56B, 7.1.1]
1024 –
4224
yes for
>= 2800 bit
only
24 Confident
iality
RSA decryption [PKCS#1_2012, 5.1.2 2a],
[NIST_SP800-56B, 7.1.2.1]
1024 –
2112
no
25 Confident
iality
RSA decryption with
CRT
[PKCS#1_2012, 5.1.2 2b],
[NIST_SP800-56B, 7.1.2.3]
1024 –
4224
yes for
>= 2800 bit
only
26 Authentic
ity
RSA signature
generation6
[PKCS#1_2012, 5.2.1 2a] 1024 –
2112
no
27 Authentic
ity
RSA signature
generation with CRT6
[PKCS#1_2012, 5.2.1 2b] 1024 –
4224
yes for
>= 2800 bit
only
28 Authentic
ity
RSA signature
verification6
[PKCS#1_2012, 5.2.2] 1024 –
4224
yes for
>= 2800 bit
only
29 Key
generatio
n
Generation of
probably random
primes p and q for
RSA keys
[FIPS186-5, A.1.3] without
step 1
Note: only conformant for
prime Bitlength >= 2048; in
case prime Bitlength <
2048 identical algorithm is
used, but considered
proprietary
1024 –
4128
--
30 Key
generatio
n
Generation of RSA’s
N and d parameters
from p, q
[FIPS186-5, A.1.1],
[PKCS#1_2012, 3.1 /
3.2(1)],
1024 –
4224
--
31 Key
generatio
n
Generation of RSA
CRT parameters from
p, q
[FIPS186-5, A.1.1],
[PKCS#1_2012, 3.1 /
3.2(2)]
1024 –
4224
--
32 Primality
testing
Miller-Rabin primality
test
[FIPS186-5, B.3.1] 512 – 2064
(prime
length)
--
33 Primality
testing
Enhanced Miller-
Rabin primality test
[FIPS186-5, B.3.2] 512 – 2064
(prime
length)
--
6
Note that the hash calculation is not implemented by the library and lies in the responsibility of the user.
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# Purpose Cryptographic
mechanism
Implementation standard Key size in
bits
Security
Level above
120 Bits
34 N/A Certified Weierstrass
elliptic curves:
 all NIST curves
over prime fields
in [NIST_SP800-
186],
 all Brainpool
curves of
[RFC5639],
 secp160k1,
secp160r1,
secp160r2,
secp256k1 of
[SEC2_2010],
 ANSII FRP256V1
of [ANSSI],
 BN P256 of
[ISO_15946-
5_2022], and
 W-25519, W-448
of [NIST_SP800-
186].
[NIST_SP800-186],
[RFC5639],
[SEC2_2010],
[ANSSI],
[ISO_15946-5_2022]
“No” for BN
P256 in
[ISO_15946,
7.3] in
general case,
“not rated
w.r.t. 120
bits” in
specific
cases.
35 Authentic
ity
ECDSA signature
generation on curves
listed in #346
[FIPS186-5, 6.4.1] 160 – 521 key sizes
>=250: yes
36 Authentic
ity
ECDSA signature
verification on curves
listed in #346
[FIPS186-5, 6.4.2] 160 – 521 key sizes
>=250: yes
37 Key
agreeme
nt
Elliptic Curve Diffie-
Hellman (ECDH) key
agreement on curves
listed in #34
[NIST_SP800-56A, 5.7.1.2]
without cofactor
multiplication
160 – 521 key sizes
>=250: yes
38 N/A PACE integrated
mapping on curves
listed in #34
[ICAO_11, Appendix B.2] 160 – 521 --
39 Key
generatio
n
ECDSA key
generation on curves
listed in #34
[FIPS186-5, A.2.1] 160 – 521 key sizes
>=250: yes
40 Authentic
ity
ECSDSA signature
generation on curves
listed in #34
[ISO_14888-3_2018, 6.10.
4],
[TR-03111_2018, 4.2.3],
160 – 521 key sizes
>=250: yes
41 Authentic
ity
ECSDSA signature
verification on curves
listed in #34
[ISO_14888-3_2018, 6.10.
5],
[TR-03111_2018, 4.2.3]
160 – 521 key sizes
>=250: yes
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# Purpose Cryptographic
mechanism
Implementation standard Key size in
bits
Security
Level above
120 Bits
42 Key
generatio
n
ECSDSA key
generation on curves
listed in #34
[ISO_14888-3_2018, 6.10.
3]
160 – 521 key sizes
>=250: yes
43 N/A Certified Edwards
curves:
 Ed25519, Ed448
[NIST_SP800-186] N/A --
44 Authentic
ity
EdDSA signature
generation on curves
listed in #43
[FIPS186-5, 7.6] 256, 456 --
45 Authentic
ity
EdDSA signature
verification on curves
listed in #43
[FIPS186-5, 7.7] 256, 456 --
46 Authentic
ity
EdDSA pre-hash
signature generation6
on curves listed in
#43
[FIPS186-5, 7.8.1] 256, 456 --
47 Authentic
ity
EdDSA pre-hash
signature verification6
on curves listed in
#43
[FIPS186-5, 7.8.2] 256, 456 --
48 Key
generatio
n
Elliptic Curve key
generation on curves
listed in #43
[FIPS186-5, A.2.3] 256, 456 --
49 Key
generatio
n
ML-KEM key
generation with
random seed
[FIPS203, 6.1] ML-KEM-
512, ML-
KEM-768,
ML-KEM-
1024
Not rated,
Yes,
Yes
50 Key
generatio
n
ML-KEM key
generation with
provided seed
[FIPS203, 6.1],
Proprietary implementation
ML-KEM-
512, ML-
KEM-768,
ML-KEM-
1024
Not rated,
Yes,
Yes
51 Key
generatio
n
ML-DSA key
generation with
random seed
[FIPS204, 5.1] ML-DSA-
44, ML-
DSA-65,
ML-DSA-87
Not rated,
Yes,
Yes
52 Key
generatio
n
ML-DSA key
generation with
provided seed
[FIPS204, 5.1],
Proprietary implementation
ML-DSA-
44, ML-
DSA-65,
ML-DSA-87
Not rated,
Yes,
Yes
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# Purpose Cryptographic
mechanism
Implementation standard Key size in
bits
Security
Level above
120 Bits
53 Key
encapsul
ation
ML-KEM key
encapsulation
[FIPS203, 6.2] ML-KEM-
512, ML-
KEM-768,
ML-KEM-
1024
Not rated,
Yes,
Yes
54 Key
decapsul
ation
ML-KEM key
decapsulation
[FIPS203, 6.3] ML-KEM-
512, ML-
KEM-768,
ML-KEM-
1024
Not rated,
Yes,
Yes
55 Authentic
ity
ML-DSA signature
generation
[FIPS204, 5.2 / 5.4] ML-DSA-
44, ML-
DSA-65,
ML-DSA-87
Not rated,
Yes,
Yes
56 Authentic
ity
ML-DSA signature
verification
[FIPS204, 5.3 / 5.4] ML-DSA-
44, ML-
DSA-65,
ML-DSA-87
Not rated,
Yes,
Yes
CryptoSuite: hashing functionality
57 Hash SHA-1 [FIPS180-4] N/A --
58 Hash SHA2-256,
SHA2-256,
SHA2-384,
SHA2-512,
SHA2-512/224,
SHA2-512/256
[FIPS180-4] N/A --
59 Hash SHA3-224,
SHA3-256,
SHA3-384,
SHA3-512
[FIPS202, 6.1] N/A --
60 XOF SHAKE-128,
SHAKE-256
[FIPS202, 6.2] N/A --
61 HMAC HMAC generation
using SHA-1,
SHA2-256, SHA2-
384, SHA2-512
[FIPS180-4],
[FIPS198-1]
160, 256,
384, 512
“No” is for
SHA-1 mode
in general for
all
implementati
ons and
certification
procedures.
Hardware RNG
62 RNG Physical RNG N/A; corresponds to PTG.2
in [KS2011]
N/A --
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# Purpose Cryptographic
mechanism
Implementation standard Key size in
bits
Security
Level above
120 Bits
CryptoSuite: RNG functionality
63 RNG Physical RNG N/A; corresponds to class
PTG.2 in [KS2011]
N/A --
64 RNG Physical RNG with
cryptographic post-
processing
Post-processing based on
[NIST_SP800-90A]
CTR_DRBG; corresponds
to PTG.3 in [KS2011] and
[NIST_SP800-90A]
CTR_DRB
G uses
AES-128 or
AES-256
--
65 RNG Deterministic RNG CTR_DRBG as specified in
[NIST_SP800-90A];
corresponds to DRG.3 in
[KS2011]
CTR_DRB
G uses
AES-128 or
AES-256
--
66 RNG Hybrid deterministic
RNG
Post-processing based on
[NIST_SP800-90A]
CTR_DRBG; corresponds
to DRG.4 in [KS2011] and
[NIST_SP800-90A]
CTR_DRB
G uses
AES-128 or
AES-256
--
67 RNG Physical RNG with
cryptographic post-
processing
Proprietary Post-
processing; corresponds to
PTG.3 in [KS2011]
uses AES-
128
--
68 RNG Physical RNG with
cryptographic post-
processing
Proprietary Post-
processing; corresponds to
DRG.4 in [KS2011]
uses AES-
128
--
Flash Loader
69 Cryptogr
aphic
primitive
AES [FIPS197] 128 --
70 Authentic
ated
encryptio
n
#69 in CCM mode [NIST_SP800-38C] 128 --
71 Authentic
ation
#69 in CMAC mode [NIST_SP800-38B] 128 --
72 Key
derivation
KDF in counter mode
with AES CMAC as
PRF
[NIST_SP800-108, 4.1],
[NIST_SP800-38B, 6.2]
128 --
Table 2: TOE cryptographic functionality
The Flash Loader's cryptographic strength was not assessed by BSI. However, the
evaluation according to the TOE's Evaluation Assurance Level did not reveal any
implementation weaknesses.
Please note, that this holds true also for those algorithms, where no cryptographic 120-Bit-
Level assessment was given. Consequently, the targeted Evaluation Assurance Level has
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been achieved for those functionalities as well. Detailed results on conformance have
been compiled into the report [CSCV].
Reference of Legislatives and Standards quoted above:
[ANSSI] Avis relatif aux paramètres de courbes elliptiques définis par l'Etat français, 2011-
10-16, Journal Officiel de la République Française (JORF).
[FIPS140-2] FIPS PUB 140-2, Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules, 2001-
05-25, National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST).
[FIPS180-4] FIPS PUB 180-4 Federal Information Processing Standards Publication
Secure Hash Standard (SHS), 2015-08, National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST).
[FIPS186-5] Federal Information Processing Standards Publication FIPS PUB 186-5,
Digital Signature Standard (DSS), 2023-02-03, National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST).
[FIPS197] Federal Information Processing Standards Publication PUB 197, Advanced
Encryption Standard (AES), Updated Version, 2023-05-09, National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST).
[FIPS198-1] FIPS PUB 198-1 Federal Information Processing Standards Publication, The
Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC), 2008-07, National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST).
[FIPS202] FIPS PUB 202 Federal Information Processing Standards Publication, SHA-3
Standard: Permutation-Based Hash and Extendable-Out-put Functions, 2015-08, National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST).
[FIPS203] FIPS PUB 203 Federal Information Processing Standards Publication, Module-
Lattice-Based Key-Encapsulation Mechanism Standard, 2024-08, National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST).
[FIPS204] FIPS PUB 204 Federal Information Processing Standards Publication, Module-
Lattice-Based Digital Signature Standard, 2024-08, National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST).
[ICAO_11] ICAO Doc 9303, Machine Readable Travel Document, eighth edition, 2021,
Part 11: Security Mechanisms for MRTDs.
[ISO_14888-3_2018] ISO/IEC 14888-3, IT Security techniques – Digital signatures with
appendix – Part 3: Discrete logarithm based mechanisms, 2018-11, ISO/IEC.
[ISO_15946-5_2022] ISO/IEC 15946-5: Information security — Cryptographic techniques
based on elliptic curves Part 5: Elliptic curve generation, 2022-02, ISO/IEC.
[ISO_9797-1_2011] Information technology - Security techniques - Message
Authentication Codes (MACs) - Part 1: Mechanisms using a block cipher, 2011-03,
ISO/IEC.
[NIST_SP800-186] NIST Special Publication 800-186 – Recommendations for Discrete
Logarithm-based Cryptography: Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters 2023-02, National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST).
[NIST_SP800-22] NIST Special Publication 800-22 Revision 1a – A Statistical Test Suite
for Random and Pseudorandom Number Generators for Crypto-graphic Applications,
2010-04, National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST).
[NIST_SP800-38A] NIST Special Publication 800-38A – Recommendation for Block Ci-
pher Modes of Operation – Methods and Techniques, 2001-12, National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST).
[NIST_SP800-38B] NIST Special Publication 800-38B – Recommendation for Block Ci-
pher Modes of Operation – The CMAC Mode for Authentication, Up-dated Version, 2016-
10-06, National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST).
[NIST_SP800-38C] NIST Special Publication 800-38C – Recommendation for Block
Cipher Modes of Operation – The CCM Mode for Authentication and Confidentiality, Errata
24 / 31
Certification Report
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Updated Version, 2007-07-20, National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST).
[NIST_SP800-38D] NIST Special Publication 800-38D – Recommendation for Block
Cipher Modes of Operation: Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC, 2007-11, National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST).
[NIST_SP800-56A] NIST Special Publication 800-56A – Recommendation for Pair-Wise
Key-Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography, 2018-04, National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST).
[NIST_SP800-56B] NIST Special Publication 800-56B Revision 2 – Recommendation for
Pair-Wise Key Establishment Using Integer Factorization Cryptography, 2019-03, National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST).
[NIST_SP800-67_2017] NIST Special Publication 800-67 – Revision 2 – Recommendation
for the Triple Data Encryption Algorithm (TDEA) Block Cipher, rev. 2, 2017-11, National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST).
[NIST_SP800-90A] NIST Special Publication 800-90A – Revision 1 – Recommendation for
Random Number Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit Generators, rev. 1, 2015-06,
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST).
[NIST_SP800-90B] NIST Special Publication 800-90B – Recommendation for the Entropy
Sources Used for Random Bit Generation, 2018-01, National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST).
[PKCS#1_2012] PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Standard, Version 2.2, 2012-10-17, RSA
Laboratories.
[RFC5114] RFC 5114 - Additional Diffie-Hellman Groups for Use with IETF Standards,
2008-01, The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5114.txt.
[RFC5639] RFC 5639 - Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Brainpool Standard Curves and
Curve Generation, 2010-03, The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF),
http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5639.txt.
[RFC7748] RFC 7748 - Elliptic Curves for Security, 2016-01, The Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF), http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc7748.txt.
[SEC_2_2010] Standards For Efficient Cryptography – SEC 2: Recommended Ellip-tic
Curve Domain Parameters, Version 2.0, 2010, Certicom Research.
[TR-02102-1_2014] BSI - Technische Richtlinie TR-02102-1, Kryptographische Verfahren:
Empfehlungen und Schlüssellängen, Version 2014-01, 2014-02-10, Bundesamt für
Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik.
[TR-03111_2018] BSI - Technical Guideline BSI TR-03111 - Elliptic Curve Cryptography,
Version 2.10, 2018-06-01, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik.
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
Table 1: Deliverables of the TOE outlines the documents that contain necessary
information on the intended use of the TOE including all security related information,
conditions and instructions to be taken into account by the user. In addition all aspects of
Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target and not covered by the
TOE itself need to be met by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the TOE shall take the statements of this certificate into account
in its system risk management process. The user should define measures in its risk
management that respond to emerging and new attack methods and techniques to the
TOE until the TOE has been reassessed.
The user also has to consider in its risk management the limited validity for the usage of
cryptographic algorithms as outlined in chapter 9.
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Some security measures are partly implemented in this certified TOE, but require
additional configuration or control or measures to be implemented by a product layer on
top, e.g. the IC Dedicated Support Software using the TOE. For this reason the TOE
includes guidance documentation (see table 1) which contains obligations and guidelines
for the developer of the product layer on top on how to securely use this certified TOE and
which measures have to be implemented in order to fulfil the security requirements of the
Security Target of the TOE. In the course of the evaluation of the composite product or
system it must be examined if the required measures have been correctly and effectively
implemented by the product layer on top. Additionally, the evaluation of the composite
product or system must also consider the evaluation results as outlined in the document
"ETR for composite evaluation" [ETRfCOMP].
At the point in time when evaluation and certification results are reused there might be an
update of the document "ETR for composite evaluation" available. Therefore, the certified
products list on the BSI website has to be checked for latest information on
reassessments, recertifications or maintenance result available for the product.
The TOE is delivered to the composite product manufacturer and to the security IC
embedded software developer. The actual end-consumer obtains the TOE from the
composite product issuer together with the application that runs on the TOE.
The security IC embedded software developer receives all necessary recommendations
and hints to develop his software in form of the delivered documentation.
• All security hints described in the delivered documents have to be considered.
The security IC embedded software developer can deliver their software either to Infineon
to let them implement it in the TOE (in the NVM) or to the composite product manufacturer
to let them download the software into the NVM.
• The delivery procedure from the security IC embedded software developer to the
composite product manufacturer is not part of this evaluation and a secure delivery
may be required. (cf. OE.Secure-Delivery in [ST], 4.2])
• When the TOE is ordered with a disabled Flash Loader, it does not provide full
transport protection. Therefore, technical and / or organisational security
procedures (e.g. a custom mutual authentication mechanism or a security transport)
should be put in place by the customer to secure the personalized TOE during
delivery as required by the security needs of the loaded IC Embedded Software.
• The delivery procedure from the TOE manufacturer (IFX) to the composite product
manufacturer is not part of this evaluation. However, for security reasons, a form of
transport protection might be required depending on the order option. The applied
transport protection mechanisms must be considered during the composite
evaluation considering the security needs of any pre-loaded IC Embedded Software
that is active during delivery.
11. Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [ST] of the Information and
communications technology (TOE) product is provided within a separate document as
Annex A of this report. It is a sanitised version of the complete Security Target used for the
evaluation performed. Sanitisation was performed according to the rules as outlined in the
provisions of the EUCC certification scheme policy (see Implementing Regulation (EU)
2024/482, Annex V, V.2).
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For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [ST] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report.
12. Regulation specific aspects (eIDAS, QES)
None.
12.1. Acronyms
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
cPP Collaborative Protection Profile
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
ICT Information and communications technology
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
PP Protection Profile
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
12.2. Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Collaborative Protection Profile - A Protection Profile collaboratively developed by an
International Technical Community endorsed by the Management Committee.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in CC
part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in CC part 3.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Package - named set of either security functional or security assurance requirements
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Protection Profile - A formal document defined in CC, expressing an implementation
independent set of security requirements for a category of IT Products that meet specific
consumer needs.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - An IT Product and its associated administrator and user guidance
documentation that is the subject of an Evaluation.
TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
13. Bibliography
[EUCC-VO] Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/482 of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 31 January 2024 laying down rules for the
application of Regulation (EU) 2019/881 of the European Parliament
and of the Council as regards the adoption of the European Common
Criteria-based cybersecurity certification scheme (EUCC)
and
Implementation Regulation (EU) 2025/2462 of 8 December 2025
amending Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/482 as regards
definitions, ICT product series certification, assurance continuity and
state-of-the-art document
[CC] ISO 15408:2022, Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation
- Part 1: Introduction and general model
- Part 2: Security functional components
- Part 3: Security assurance components
- Part 4: Framework for the specification of evaluation methods and
activities
- Part 5: Pre-defined packages of security requirements
https://www.iso.org/standard/72891.html
https://www.iso.org/standard/72892.html
https://www.iso.org/standard/72906.html
https://www.iso.org/standard/72913.html
https://www.iso.org/standard/72917.html
as mirrored by CCRA’s edition:
CC:2022 R1, Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation
- Part 1: Introduction and general model
- Part 2: Security functional components
- Part 3: Security assurance components
- Part 4: Framework for the specification of evaluation methods and
activities
- Part 5: Pre-defined packages of security requirements
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[CEM] ISO 18045:2022: Information technology Security techniques
Methodology for IT security evaluation
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https://www.iso.org/standard/72889.html
as mirrored by CCRA’s edition:
CEM:2022 R1, Common Methodology for Information Technology
Security Evaluation
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[EUCC_SOTA] EUCC state-of-the-art documents:
https://certification.enisa.europa.eu/publications/eucc-state-art-
documents_en
[EUCC_PROG] EUCC program of the BSI: Scheme documentation describing the
certification process (EUCC), https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung
[EUCC_CERT] EUCC Certificates, periodically updated list published on ENISA’s
website on European cybersecurity certification schemes
(https://certification.enisa.europa.eu/) but also on BSI’s website
(https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierungsreporte)
[AIS] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant
for the TOE7
https://www.bsi.bund.de/AIS
[ST] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-1272-2026, Rev. 1.0, 2025-10-31,
Confidential Security Target “IFX_CCI_00007Ah/8Fh A11/R11/M11
with optional Crypto Suite”, Infineon Technologies AG (confidential
document)
Security Target lite, Rev. 1.0, 2025-10-31, Public Security Target
“IFX_CCI_00007Ah/8Fh A11/R11/M11 with optional Crypto Suite”,
Infineon Technologies AG
[PP] Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation Packages
Version 1.0, 13 January 2014, BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014
[ETR] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 2, 2025-12-15, EVALUATION
TECHNICAL REPORT SUMMARY, TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH,
(confidential document)
[ETRfCOMP] „Evaluation Technical for Composite Evaluation (ETR COMP) for the
IFX_CCI_00007Ah A11 / R11 / M11, IFX_CCI_00008Fh R11 / M11“,
Version 2, 2025-12-15, TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH, (confidential
document)
[CSCV] Cryptographic Standards Compliance Verification, Version 2, 2025-10-
28, TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH (confidential document)
7
See section 9.1 for detailed list of used AIS
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C. Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
Annex B: Evaluation results regarding development
and production environment
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Annex B of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1272-2026
Evaluation results regarding
development and production
environment
The IT product IFX_CCI_00007Ah/8Fh A11, R11, M11 with optional Crypto Suite, (Target
of Evaluation, TOE, also named as ICT product) has been evaluated at an approved
evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM)
[CEM].
As a result of the TOE certification, dated 17 February 2026, the following results
regarding the development and production environment apply. The Common Criteria
assurance requirements ALC – Life cycle support as claimed by the ST [ST] and that are
stated in chapter 1 of this report are fulfilled for the development and production sites of
the TOE. Listed below are the Distribution Centres:
Site ID Company name and address Functions of site
Distribution Sites
DHL Singapore DHL Supply Chain Singapore Ptd
Tampinese LogisPark
1 Greenwich Drive
Singapore 533865
 Distribution
KWE Shanghai KWE Kintetsu World Express
(China) Co., Ltd.
Shanghai Pudong Airport Pilot
Free Trade Zone
No. 530 Zheng Ding Road
Shanghai,
P.R. China
 Distribution
K&N
Großostheim
Kühne & Nagel
Stockstädter Strasse 10
63762 Großostheim
Germany
 Distribution
For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in accordance
with the Security Target [ST]. The evaluators verified, that the threats, security objectives
and requirements for the TOE life cycle phases up to delivery (as stated in the Security
Target [ST]) are fulfilled by the procedures of these sites.
Note: End of report
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