National Information Assurance Partnership
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
Validation Report
for the
KLC Group LLC CipherDriveOne Kryptr 1.1.0
Report Number: CCEVS-VR-VID11399-2024
Dated: April 29, 2024
Version: 1.0
National Institute of Standards and Technology Department of Defense
Information Technology Laboratory ATTN: NIAP, SUITE: 6982
100 Bureau Drive 9800 Savage Road
Gaithersburg, MD 20899 Fort Meade, MD 20755-6982
®
TM
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Validation Team
Jenn Dotson
Lori Sarem
Chris Thorpe
The MITRE Corporation
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
Nathan Bennett
Nil Folquer
Kevin Steiner
Lightship Security USA, Inc.
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Table of Contents
1. Executive Summary.................................................................................................... 1
2. Identification............................................................................................................... 2
3. Architectural Information ........................................................................................... 4
3.1. TOE Evaluated Configuration ........................................................................ 4
3.2. Required Non-TOE Hardware, Software, and Firmware ............................... 4
4. Security Policy............................................................................................................ 5
4.1. User Data Protection....................................................................................... 5
4.2. Security Management ..................................................................................... 5
4.3. Protection of the TSF...................................................................................... 5
4.4. Cryptographic Support.................................................................................... 5
5. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope..................................................................... 6
5.1. Assumptions.................................................................................................... 6
5.2. Clarification of Scope ..................................................................................... 6
6. Documentation............................................................................................................ 7
7. IT Product Testing ...................................................................................................... 8
7.1. Developer Testing........................................................................................... 8
7.2. Evaluation Team Independent Testing ........................................................... 8
7.3. TOE Test Environment Configuration............................................................ 8
8. Results of the Evaluation ............................................................................................ 9
8.1. Evaluation of Security Target (ASE).............................................................. 9
8.2. Evaluation of Development Documentation (ADV) ...................................... 9
8.3. Evaluation of Guidance Documents (AGD)................................................... 9
8.4. Evaluation of Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC)..................................... 10
8.5. Evaluation of Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE) ................. 10
8.6. Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN)................................................... 10
8.7. Summary of Evaluation Results.................................................................... 11
9. Validator Comments................................................................................................. 12
10. Annexes..................................................................................................................... 13
11. Security Target.......................................................................................................... 14
12. Glossary .................................................................................................................... 15
13. Acronym List ............................................................................................................ 16
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14. Bibliography ............................................................................................................. 17
List of Tables
Table 1: Evaluation Identifiers............................................................................................ 2
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1. Executive Summary
This report documents the assessment of the National Information Assurance Partnership
(NIAP) Validation team of the evaluation of KLC Group LLC CipherDriveOne Kryptr
1.1.0 provided by KLC Group LLC. It presents the evaluation results, their justifications,
and the conformance results. This Validation Report (VR) is not an endorsement of the
Target of Evaluation (TOE) by any agency of the U.S. government, and no warranty is
either expressed or implied.
The evaluation was performed by the Lightship Security USA Common Criteria
Laboratory (CCTL) in Baltimore, MD, United States of America, and was completed in
April 2024. The information in this report is largely derived from the Evaluation Technical
Report (ETR) and associated test reports, all written by Lightship Security (LS). The
evaluation determined that the product is both Common Criteria Part 2 Extended and Part
3 Conformant and meets the assurance requirements of the:
• collaborative Protection Profile for Full Drive Encryption - Authorization
Acquisition, Version 2.0 + Errata 20190201, February 1, 2019
(CPP_FDE_AA_V2.0E) and
• collaborative Protection Profile for Full Drive Encryption - Encryption Engine,
Version 2.0 + Errata 20190201, February 1, 2019 (CPP_FDE_EE_V2.0E).
The TOE is KLC Group LLC CipherDriveOne Kryptr 1.1.0. The TOE identified in this
VR has been evaluated at a NIAP approved CCTL using the Common Methodology for IT
Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev 5) for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT
Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev 5). This VR applies only to the specific version of
the TOE as evaluated. The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the
provisions of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme (CCEVS) and
the conclusions of the testing laboratory in the ETR are consistent with the evidence
provided.
The Validation team monitored the activities of the Evaluation team, provided guidance on
technical issues and evaluation processes, and reviewed the individual work units and
successive versions of the ETR. The Validation team found that the evaluation showed that
the product satisfies all the functional requirements and assurance requirements stated in
the Security Target (ST). Therefore, the Validation team concludes that the testing
laboratory’s findings are accurate, the conclusions justified, and the conformance results
are correct. The conclusions of the testing laboratory in the ETR are consistent with the
evidence produced.
The technical information included in this report was obtained from the KLC Group LLC
CipherDriveOne Kryptr 1.1.0 Security Target, Version 1.5, April 2024, and analysis
performed by the Validation Team.
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2. Identification
The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST) effort to establish commercial facilities to perform trusted product
evaluations. Under this program, security evaluations are conducted by commercial testing
laboratories called Common Criteria Testing Laboratories (CCTLs) using the Common
Evaluation Methodology (CEM) in accordance with National Voluntary Laboratory
Assessment Program (NVLAP) accreditation.
The NIAP Validation Body assigns Validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality and
consistency across evaluations. Developers of information technology products desiring a
security evaluation contract with a CCTL and pay a fee for their product’s evaluation. Upon
successful completion of the evaluation, the product is added to NIAP’s Validated Products
List.
Table 1 provides information needed to completely identify the product, including:
• The TOE: the fully qualified identifier of the product as evaluated.
• The ST, describing the security features, claims, and assurances of the product.
• The conformance result of the evaluation.
• The Protection Profile (PP) to which the product is conformant.
• The organizations and individuals participating in the evaluation.
Table 1: Evaluation Identifiers
Item Identifier
Evaluation Scheme
United States NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation
Scheme
Evaluated Product KLC Group LLC CipherDriveOne Kryptr 1.1.0
Sponsor and Developer
KLC Group LLC
1900 Camden Ave.
San Jose, CA 95124
CCTL
Lightship Security USA, Inc.
3600 O’Donnell St., Suite 2
Baltimore, MD 21224
CC Version
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.
CEM
Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation: Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April
2017.
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Item Identifier
Protection Profile
collaborative Protection Profile for Full Drive Encryption -
Authorization Acquisition, Version 2.0 + Errata 20190201, February 1,
2019
collaborative Protection Profile for Full Drive Encryption -
Encryption Engine, Version 2.0 + Errata 20190201, February 1, 2019
ST
KLC Group LLC CipherDriveOne Kryptr 1.1.0 Security Target,
Version 1.5, April 2024
Evaluation Technical
Report
KLC Group LLC CipherDriveOne Kryptr 1.1.0 Evaluation
Technical Report, Version 0.3, April 2024
Conformance Result CC Part 2 extended, CC Part 3 conformant
Evaluation Personnel Nathan Bennett, Nil Folquer, and Kevin Steiner
CCEVS Validators Jenn Dotson, Lori Sarem, and Chris Thorpe
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3. Architectural Information
Note: The following architectural description is based on the description presented in the
Security Target.
The KLC Group LLC CipherDriveOne Kryptr 1.1.0 is software that provides full disk
encryption including pre-boot user authentication, chain-boot to the host Operating System
(OS) and management capabilities to control user access and settings. It applies full drive
encryption to protect all locally stored data from unauthorized access, loss, and exposure
in the event a protected device is lost or stolen. The TOE has two distinct modules:
a. PBA / Management module. Provides pre-boot authentication and TOE
configuration services.
b. Encryption Engine / Driver. Disk encryption for Linux and Windows Operating
Systems.
3.1. TOE Evaluated Configuration
The TOE encompasses the KLC Group LLC CipherDriveOne Kryptr 1.1.0 software
(including Linux Kernel 5.15).
3.2. Required Non-TOE Hardware, Software, and Firmware
The TOE operates with the following components in the environment:
a) Protected OS. The TOE supports protection of the following Linux Operating
Systems and Windows Operating Systems:
a. Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8
b. Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9
c. Microsoft Windows 10
d. Microsoft Windows 11
CC Testing was performed using the following operating systems:
a. Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9
b. Microsoft Windows 11
b) Computer Hardware. 64-bit Intel-based UEFI booted systems that supports Intel
Secure Key Technology. CC testing was performed using the following CPUs:
a. Intel Core i7-1265U (Alder Lake)
c) Smartcard and reader. When dual factor authentication is used, Federal
Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 201 Personal Identity Verification
Common Access Card (PIV-CAC) compliant smartcards and readers are required.
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4. Security Policy
This section summarizes the security functionality of the TOE:
4.1. User Data Protection
The TOE performs full drive encryption on all storage devices to protect data from
unauthorized disclosure in the event of loss or theft of the device. All protected data is
encrypted by default without user intervention and with NIST approved algorithms.
4.2. Security Management
The TOE provides dedicated interfaces for the management of its security functions.
Access to these management functions can be controlled by way of role-based group
assignment to administrative users.
4.3. Protection of the TSF
The TOE ensures the authenticity and integrity of software updates by verifying their
digital signatures prior to installation. Various software and cryptographic self-tests are
performed at start-up to ensure the secure and correct operation of the TOE. All keying
material used for storage encryption is securely generated and protected from disclosure.
4.4. Cryptographic Support
The TOE performs cryptographic operations, which are tested via relevant Cryptographic
Algorithm Validation Program (CAVP) certificates. Secure destruction of cryptographic
keys and keying material is implemented and occurs during transition to a compliant power
saving state, or when the key or keying material is no longer needed.
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5. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
5.1. Assumptions
The Security Problem Definition, including the assumptions, can be found in the
following document:
• collaborative Protection Profile for Full Drive Encryption - Authorization
Acquisition, Version 2.0 + Errata 20190201, February 1, 2019
• collaborative Protection Profile for Full Drive Encryption - Encryption Engine,
Version 2.0 + Errata 20190201, February 1, 2019
That information has not been reproduced here. CPP_FDE_AA_V2.0E and
CPP_FDE_EE_V2.0E should be consulted if there is interest in that material.
5.2. Clarification of Scope
The scope of this evaluation was limited to the functionality and assurances covered in
CPP_FDE_AA_V2.0E and CPP_FDE_EE_V2.0E as described for this TOE in the ST.
Other functionality included in the product was not assessed as part of this evaluation. All
other functionality needs to be assessed separately, and no further conclusions can be
drawn about their effectiveness.
All evaluations (and all products) have limitations, as well as potential misconceptions that
need clarification. This text covers some of the more important limitations and
clarifications of this evaluation. Note that:
• As with any evaluation, this evaluation only shows that the evaluated configuration
meets the security claims made in accordance with the assurance activities specified
in CPP_FDE_AA_V2.0E and CPP_FDE_EE_V2.0E and performed by the
Evaluation team.
• This evaluation covers only the specific software version identified in this
document, and not any earlier or later versions released or in process.
• Apart from the Admin Guides identified in Section 6, additional customer
documentation for the specific models was not included in the scope of the
evaluation and therefore should not be relied upon when configuring or operating
the device as evaluated.
• This evaluation did not specifically search for, nor attempt to exploit, vulnerabilities
that were not “obvious” or vulnerabilities to objectives not claimed in the ST. The
CEM defines an “obvious” vulnerability as one that is easily exploited with a
minimum of understanding of the TOE, technical sophistication, and resources.
• The functionality evaluated is scoped exclusively to the security functional
requirements specified in the CPP_FDE_AA_V2.0E and CPP_FDE_EE_V2.0E
and applicable Technical Decisions. Any additional security related functional
capabilities of the TOE were not covered by this evaluation.
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6. Documentation
The following guidance documents are provided with the TOE upon delivery in accordance
with the PP:
• KLC Group LLC CipherDriveOne Kryptr 1.1.0 Common Criteria Guide, Version
1.1, April 2024
• KLC Group LLC CipherDriveOne Kryptr Administrator Guide, V 1.0.1, 4-18-2024
All documentation delivered with the product is relevant to and within the scope of the
TOE. This document is the only documentation that should be trusted to set-up, administer,
or use the product in the evaluated configuration. Additional documentation was not
included in the scope of the evaluation and should not be relied upon when configuring or
operating the device as evaluated.
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7. IT Product Testing
This section describes the testing efforts of the Evaluation team. It is derived from
information contained in KLC Group CipherDriveOne Kryptr 1.1.0 Assurance Activity
Report, Version 0.3, April 2024 (AAR). The AAR provides an overview of testing and the
prescribed evaluation activities.
7.1. Developer Testing
No evidence of developer testing is required in the SARs or Evaluation Activities.
7.2. Evaluation Team Independent Testing
The Evaluation team conducted independent testing at Lightship Security USA in
Baltimore, MD from September 2023 until April 2024. The Evaluation team configured
the TOE according to vendor installation instructions and as identified in the Security
Target.
The Evaluation team confirmed the technical accuracy of the setup and installation guide
during installation of the TOE. The Evaluation team confirmed that the TOE version
delivered for testing was identical to the version identified in the ST.
The Evaluation team used the Protection Profile test procedures as a basis for creating each
of the independent tests as required by the Evaluation Activities.
Each Evaluation Activity was tested as required by the conformant Protection Profile and
the evaluation team verified that each test passed.
7.3. TOE Test Environment Configuration
The TOE testing environment components are identified in Figure 1 below.
Figure 1: Testing Environment Overview
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8. Results of the Evaluation
The results of the assurance requirements are generally described in this section and are
presented in detail in the proprietary documents: the Detailed Test Report (DTR) and the
Evaluation Technical Report (ETR). The reader of this document can assume that all
activities and work units received a passing verdict.
A verdict for an assurance component is determined by the resulting verdicts assigned to
the corresponding evaluator action elements. The evaluation was conducted based upon
CC Version 3.1 Revision 5 and CEM Version 3.1 Revision 5. The evaluation determined
KLC Group LLC CipherDriveOne Kryptr 1.1.0 to be Part 2 extended, and meets the SARs
contained in the PP. Additionally, the evaluator performed the Evaluation Activities
specified in CPP_FDE_AA_V2.0E, CPP_FDE_EE_V2.0E and their supporting
documents.
8.1. Evaluation of Security Target (ASE)
The Evaluation team applied each ASE CEM work unit. The ST evaluation ensured the ST
contains a description of the environment in terms of policies and assumptions, a statement
of security requirements claimed to be met by the KLC Group LLC CipherDriveOne
Kryptr 1.1.0 that are consistent with the Common Criteria, and product security function
descriptions that support the requirements.
The Validation team reviewed the work of the Evaluation team and found that sufficient
evidence and justification was provided by the Evaluation team to confirm that the
evaluation was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the
conclusion reached by the Evaluation team was justified.
8.2. Evaluation of Development Documentation (ADV)
The Evaluation team applied each ADV CEM work unit. The Evaluation team assessed the
design documentation and found it adequate to aid in understanding how the TSF provides
the security functions. The design documentation consists of a functional specification
contained in the ST and Guidance documents. Additionally, the Evaluation team performed
the Evaluation Activities related to the examination of the information contained in the
TOE Summary Specification (TSS).
The Validation reviewed the work of the Evaluation team and found that sufficient
evidence and justification was provided by the Evaluation team to confirm that the
evaluation was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the
conclusion reached by the Evaluation team was justified.
8.3. Evaluation of Guidance Documents (AGD)
The Evaluation team applied each AGD CEM work unit. The Evaluation team ensured the
adequacy of the user guidance in describing how to use the operational TOE. Additionally,
the Evaluation team ensured the adequacy of the administrator guidance in describing how
to securely administer the TOE. All the guides were assessed during the design and testing
phases of the evaluation to ensure they were complete.
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The Validation team reviewed the work of the Evaluation team and found that sufficient
evidence and justification was provided by the Evaluation team to confirm that the
evaluation was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the
conclusion reached by the Evaluation team was justified.
8.4. Evaluation of Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC)
The Evaluation team applied each ALC CEM work unit. The Evaluation team found that
the TOE was appropriately labeled with a unique identifier consistent with the TOE
identification in the evaluation evidence and that the TOE references used are consistent.
The Validation team reviewed the work of the Evaluation team and found that sufficient
evidence and justification was provided by the Evaluation team to confirm that the
evaluation was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the
conclusion reached by the Evaluation team was justified.
8.5. Evaluation of Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE)
The Evaluation team applied each ATE CEM work unit. The Evaluation team ran the set
of tests specified by the Test Evaluation Activities in the CPP_FDE_AA_V2.0E and
CPP_FDE_EE_V2.0E and recorded the results in the DTR, summarized in the AAR.
The Validation team reviewed the work of the Evaluation team and found that sufficient
evidence and justification was provided by the Evaluation team to confirm that the
evaluation was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the
conclusion reached by the Evaluation team was justified.
8.6. Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN)
The evaluation team applied each AVA CEM work unit. The vulnerability analysis is in
the KLC Group LLC CipherDriveOne Kryptr 1.1.0 Vulnerability Assessment, Version .2,
April 2024, report prepared by the Evaluation team. The vulnerability analysis includes a
public search for vulnerabilities. The public search for vulnerabilities conducted on April
17, 2024, did not uncover any residual vulnerability.
The Evaluation team searched:
• NIST National Vulnerabilities Database (can be used to access CVE and US-
CERT databases identified below): https://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/search
• Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures:
https://cve.mitre.org/cve/search_cve_list.html
• US-CERT: http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/html/search
The Evaluation team performed a search using the following keywords:
• KLC CipherDriveOne Kryptr
• CipherDriveOne Kryptr
• CipherDriveOne
• Kryptr
• Drive Encryption
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• Disk Encryption
• Key destruction
• Key sanitization
• Opal management software
• SED management software
• Password caching
• Key caching
• BoringSSL
• OpenSSL fips object module
• Libgcrypt
• Cryptsetup
• OpenSSL
• Opensc
• Windows CryptoAPI
• Linux Crypto API
• Linux Kernel 5.15
The Validation team reviewed the work of the Evaluation team and found that sufficient
evidence and justification was provided by the Evaluation team to confirm that the
evaluation was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the
conclusion reached by the Evaluation team was justified.
8.7. Summary of Evaluation Results
The Evaluation team's assessment of the evaluation evidence demonstrates that the claims
in the ST are met. Additionally, the Evaluation team's test activities also demonstrated the
accuracy of the claims in the ST.
The Validation team's assessment of the evidence provided by the evaluation team is that
it demonstrates that the Evaluation team followed the procedures defined in the CEM and
performed the Evaluation Activities in CPP_FDE_AA_V2.0E, CPP_FDE_EE_V2.0E, and
their supporting documents and correctly verified that the product meets the claims in the
ST.
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9. Validator Comments
The Validation team notes that the evaluated configuration is dependent upon the TOE
being configured per the evaluated configuration instructions in the documentation
referenced in Section 6 of this VR. Consumers are encouraged to download the
configuration guides from the NIAP website to ensure the device is configured as
evaluated. Any additional customer documentation provided with the product, or that is
available online, was not included in the scope of the evaluation and should not be relied
upon when configuring or operating the device as evaluated.
The functionality evaluated is scoped exclusively to the security functional requirements
specified in the ST. Other functionality included in the product was not assessed as part of
this evaluation. Other functionality provided by devices in the operational environment
needs to be assessed separately and no further conclusions can be drawn about their
effectiveness. No versions of the TOE and software, either earlier or later, were evaluated.
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10. Annexes
Not applicable.
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11. Security Target
KLC Group LLC CipherDriveOne Kryptr 1.1.0 Security Target, Version 1.5, April 2024
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12. GLOSSARY
• Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL): An IT security evaluation
facility accredited by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program
(NVLAP) and approved by the CCEVS Validation Body to conduct Common
Criteria-based evaluations.
• Conformance: The ability to demonstrate in an unambiguous way that a given
implementation is correct with respect to the formal model.
• Evaluation: The assessment of an IT product against the Common Criteria using
the Common Criteria Evaluation Methodology to determine whether or not the
claims made are justified; or the assessment of a protection profile against the
Common Criteria using the Common Evaluation Methodology to determine if the
Profile is complete, consistent, technically sound and hence suitable for use as a
statement of requirements for one or more TOEs that may be evaluated.
• Evaluation Evidence: Any tangible resource (information) required from the
sponsor or developer by the evaluator to perform one or more evaluation activities.
• Feature: Part of a product that is either included with the product or can be ordered
separately.
• Target of Evaluation (TOE): A group of IT products configured as an IT system,
or an IT product, and associated documentation that is the subject of a security
evaluation under the CC.
• Threat: Means through which the ability or intent of a threat agent to adversely
affect the primary functionality of the TOE, facility that contains the TOE, or
malicious operation directed towards the TOE. A potential violation of security.
• Validation: The process carried out by the CCEVS Validation Body leading to the
issue of a Common Criteria certificate.
• Validation Body: A governmental organization responsible for carrying out
validation and for overseeing the day-to-day operation of the NIAP Common
Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme.
• Vulnerabilities: A vulnerability is a hardware, firmware, or software flaw that
leaves an Automated Information System (AIS) open for potential exploitation. A
weakness in automated system security procedures, administrative controls,
physical layout, internal controls, and so forth, which could be exploited by a threat
to gain unauthorized access to information or disrupt critical processing.
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13. Acronym List
CAVP Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program (CAVP)
CCEVS Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
CCIMB Common Criteria Interpretations Management Board
CCTL Common Criteria Testing Laboratories
CEM Common Evaluation Methodology for IT Security Evaluation
LS Lightship Security USA CCTL
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
IT Information Technology
NIAP National Information Assurance Partnership
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
NSA National Security Agency
NVLAP National Voluntary Laboratory Assessment Program
OSP Organizational Security Policies
PCL Products Compliant List
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
VR Validation Report
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14. Bibliography
1. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1:
Introduction and General Model, CCMB-2017-04-001, Version 3.1 Revision 5,
April 2017
2. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2:
Security functional requirements, CCMB-2017-04-002, Version 3.1 Revision 5,
April 2017
3. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3:
Security assurance requirements, CCMB-2017-04-003, Version 3.1 Revision 5,
April 2017
4. Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Evaluation Methodology, CCMB-2017-04-004, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April
2017
5. collaborative Protection Profile for Full Drive Encryption – Authorization
Acquisition, v2.0 + Errata 20190201, February 1, 2019
6. collaborative Protection Profile for Full Drive Encryption – Encryption Engine,
v2.0 + Errata 20190201, February 1, 2019
7. KLC Group LLC CipherDriveOne Kryptr 1.1.0 Common Criteria Guide, Version
1.1, April 2024
8. KLC Group LLC CipherDriveOne Kryptr Administrator Guide V 1.0.1, 4-18-
2024
9. KLC Group LLC CipherDriveOne Kryptr 1.1.0 Security Target, Version 1.5,
April 2024
10. KLC Group CipherDriveOne Kryptr 1.1.0 Key Management Description,
Version 1.4, April 2024
11. KLC Group CipherDriveOne Kryptr 1.1.0 Assurance Activity Report, Version
0.3, April 2024
12. KLC Group LLC CipherDriveOne Kryptr 1.1.0 Vulnerability Assessment,
Version 0.2, April 2024
13. KLC Group CipherDriveOne Kryptr 1.1.0 Evaluation Technical Report, Version
0.3, April 2024
14. KLC Group LLC CipherDriveOne Kryptr 1.1.0 cPP FDE AA+EE 2.0E Test Plan,
Version 0.4, April 2024
15. KLC Group LLC CIpherDriveOne Kryptr 1.1.0 cPP FDE AA+EE 2.0E Test
Evidence, Version 0.4, April 2024