SERTIT, Postboks 814, 1306 Sandvika, NORWAY
Phone: +47 67 86 40 00 Fax: +47 67 86 40 09 E-mail: post@sertit.no Internet: www.sertit.no
Sertifiseringsmyndigheten for IT-sikkerhet Norwegian Certification Authority for IT Security
SERTIT-089 CR Certification Report
Issue 1.0 10 October 2016
DMT-CBS-CE3D3 Family (DMT-CBS-CE3D3/CC080/CC048) Dual
Interface smart card chips with HAL library version 1.0
CERTIFICATION REPORT - SERTIT STANDARD REPORT TEMPLATE SD 009 VERSION 2.1 11.11.2011
DMT-CBS-CE3D3 Family (DMT-CBS-
CE3D3/CC080/CC048) Dual Interface
smart card chips with HAL library
EAL 4+ BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014 V1.0
Page 2 of 18 SERTIT-089 CR Issue 1.0
10 October 2016
ARRANGEMENT ON THE RECOGNITION OF COMMON CRITERIA CERTIFICATES IN
THE FIELD OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY SECURITY
SERTIT, the Norwegian Certification Authority for IT Security, is a member of the
above Arrangement and as such this confirms that the Common Criteria
certificate has been issued by or under the authority of a Party to this
Arrangement and is the Party’s claim that the certificate has been issued in
accordance with the terms of this Arrangement
The judgements contained in the certificate and Certification Report are those of
SERTIT which issued it and the Norwegian e valuation facility (EVIT) which carried
out the evaluation. There is no implication of acceptance by other Members of
the Agreement Group of liability in respect of those judgements or for loss
sustained as a result of reliance placed upon those judgements by a third party.
The recognition under CCRA is limited to cPP related assurance packages or EAL2
and ALC_FLR CC part 3 components .
MUTUAL RECOGNITION AGREEMENT OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY SECURITY
EVALUATION CERTIFICATES (SOGIS MRA)
SERTIT, the Norwegian Certification Authority for IT Security, is a member of the
above Agreement and as such this confirms that the Common Criteria certificate
has been issued by or under the authority of a Party to this Agreement and is the
Party’s claim that the certificate has been issued in accordance with the terms of
this Agreement
The judgements contained in the certificate and Certification Report are those of
SERTIT which issued it and the Norwegian evaluation facility (EVIT) which carried
out the evaluation. There is no implication of acceptance by other Members of
the Agreement Group of liability in respect of those judgements or for loss
sustained as a result of reliance placed upon tho se judgements by a third party.
Mutual recognition under SOGIS MRA applies to components up to EAL4.
DMT-CBS-CE3D3 Family (DMT-CBS-
CE3D3/CC080/CC048) Dual Interface
smart card chips with HAL library
EAL 4+ BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014 V1.0
SERTIT-089 CR Issue 1.0
10 October 2016
Page 3 of 18
Contents
1 Certification Statement ..................................... 5
2 Abbreviations ................................................... 6
3 References ....................................................... 7
4 Executive Summary ........................................... 8
4.1 Introduction 8
4.2 Evaluated Product 8
4.3 TOE Scope 8
4.4 Prote ction Profile Conformance 8
4.5 Assurance Level 9
4.6 Securi ty Policy 9
4.7 Securi ty Claims 9
4.8 Thre ats Countered 9
4.9 Thre ats Countered by the TOE’s environment 9
4.10 Thre ats and Attacks not Countered 9
4.11 Environmental Assumpti ons and Dependencies 9
4.12 IT Security Objectives 9
4.13 Non-IT Security Objecti ves 10
4.14 Securi ty Functional Requi rements 10
4.15 Securi ty Function Poli cy 10
4.16 Evaluati on Conduct 11
4.17 General Poi nts 11
5 Evaluation Findings .......................................... 13
5.1 Introduction 14
5.2 Delivery 14
5.3 Installation and Guidance Documentation 14
5.4 Misuse 14
5.5 Vulnerabili ty Analysis 14
5.6 Developer Tests 15
5.7 Evaluator Tests 15
6 Evaluation Outcome ......................................... 17
6.1 Certification Result 17
6.2 Recommendations 17
Annex A: Evaluated Configuration ............................... 18
TOE Identification 18
TOE Documentation 18
TOE Configurati on 18
DMT-CBS-CE3D3 Family (DMT-CBS-
CE3D3/CC080/CC048) Dual Interface
smart card chips with HAL library
EAL 4+ BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014 V1.0
Page 4 of 18 SERTIT-089 CR Issue 1.0
10 October 2016
DMT-CBS-CE3D3 Family (DMT-CBS-
CE3D3/CC080/CC048) Dual Interface
smart card chips with HAL library
EAL 4+ BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014 V1.0
Page 6 of 18 SERTIT-089 CR Issue 1.0
10 October 2016
2 Abbreviations
API Application Programming Interface
CC Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation
(ISO/IEC 15408)
CCRA Arrangement on the Recognition of Common Criteria Certificates in
the Field of Information Technology Security
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation
DEMA Differential Electro Magnetic Analysis
DES Data Encryption Standard
DPA Differential Fault Analysis
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
EEPROM Electrically Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory
EMFI Electro-Magnetic Fault Injection
EOR Evaluation Observation Report
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
EVIT Evaluation Facility under the Norwegian Certification Scheme for IT
Security
FBBI Forward-Body Bias Injection
IC Integrated Circuit
OSP Organizational Security Policy
RAM Random Access Memory
RNG Random Number Generator
ROM Read Only Memory
RSA Rivest, Shamir, Adleman Public Key Encryption
SERTIT Norwegian Certification Authority for IT Security
SEMA Simple Electro Magnetic Analysis
SFR Security Functional Requirements
SPA Simple Power Analysis
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functions
TSP TOE Security Policy
DMT-CBS-CE3D3 Family (DMT-CBS-
CE3D3/CC080/CC048) Dual Interface
smart card chips with HAL library
EAL 4+ BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014 V1.0
SERTIT-089 CR Issue 1.0
10 October 2016
Page 7 of 18
3 References
[1] DMT-CBS-CE3D3 Family (DMT-CBS-CE3D3/CC080/CC048) Dual interface
smart card chips with HAL library version 1.0, Security Target lite,
Version 0.9, 29 August 2016.
[2] Common Criteria Part 1, CCMB-2012-09-001, Version 3.1 R4, September
2012.
[3] Common Criteria Part 2, CCMB-2012-09-002, Version 3.1 R4, September
2012.
[4] Common Criteria Part 3, CCMB-2012-09-003, Version 3.1 R4, September
2012.
[5] The Norwegian Certification Scheme, SD001E, Version 8.0, 20 August
2010.
[6] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Evaluation Methodology, CCMB-2012-09-004, Version 3.1 R4, September
2012.
[7] JIL Attack Methods for Smartcards and Similar Devices, Version 2.2,
January 2013.
[8] JIL Application of Application Attack Potential to Smart Cards, Version
2.9, May 2013.
[9] AIS20/31 A proposal for Functionality classes for random number
generators, Version 2.0, 18 September 2011.
[10] Evaluation Technical Report of DMT-CBS-CE3D3 Family (DMT-CBS-
CE3D3/CC080/CC048) Dual Interface smart card chips with HAL library ,
Brightsight report 16-RPT-365 Version 2.0, 3 October 2016.
[11] DMT-CBS-CE3D3 Family (DMT-CBS-CE3D3/CC080/CC048) Operational
User Guidance, Version 1.6, 31 August 2016.
[12] DMT-CBS-CE3D3 Family (DMT-CBS-CE3D3/CC080/CC048) Preparative
Procedures, Version 1.2, 31 August 2016.
[13] Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation Packages, BSI -
CC-PP-0084-2014, Version 1.0, January 2014.
DMT-CBS-CE3D3 Family (DMT-CBS-
CE3D3/CC080/CC048) Dual Interface
smart card chips with HAL library
EAL 4+ BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014 V1.0
Page 8 of 18 SERTIT-089 CR Issue 1.0
10 October 2016
4 Executive Summary
4.1 Introduction
This Certification Report states the outcome of the Common Criteria security
evaluation of DMT-CBS-CE3D3 Family (DMT-CBS-CE3D3/CC080/CC048) Dual
Interface smart card chips with HAL library version 1.0 to the Sponsor, Datang
Microelectronics Technology Co., Ltd (DMT) , and is intended to assist prospective
consumers when judging the suitability of the IT security of the product for their
particular requirements.
Prospective consumers are advised to read this report in conjunction with the
Security Target[1] which specifies the functional, environmental and assurance
evaluation requirements.
4.2 Evaluated Product
The version of the product evaluated was DMT-CBS-CE3D3 Family (DMT-CBS-
CE3D3/CC080/CC048) Dual Interface smart card chips with HAL library version 1.0.
This product is also described in this report as the Target of Evaluation (TOE). The
developer was Datang Microelectronics Technology Co., Ltd (DMT).
The TOE is suitable for instance to support a Java Card OS, ID cards, Banking cards,
etc. It consists of:
x A dual-interface DMT-CBS-CE3D3 microcontroller, which exists in two
derivatives: DMT-CBS-CE3D3/CC080 (80KB EEPROM) and DMT-CBS-
CE3D3/CC048 (48KB EEPROM). The DMT-CBS-CE3D3/CC0xx provides
cryptographic coprocessors for AES and TDES and a numerical coprocessor
to support RSA computations. In addition, a true random number generator
meeting class PTG.2 of AIS20/31 is availabl e.
x A HAL library, which provides easy access to the hardware components for
cryptographic operations, EEPROM access and retrieval of random
numbers.
Details of the evaluated configuration, including the TOE’s supporting guidance
documentation, are given in Annex A.
4.3 TOE Scope
The TOE scope is described in the Security Target[1], Section 1.3.
4.4 Protection Profile Conformance
The Security Target[1] claims conformance to the following protection profile:
BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014 V1.0
DMT-CBS-CE3D3 Family (DMT-CBS-
CE3D3/CC080/CC048) Dual Interface
smart card chips with HAL library
EAL 4+ BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014 V1.0
SERTIT-089 CR Issue 1.0
10 October 2016
Page 9 of 18
4.5 Assurance Level
The Security Target[1] specifies the assurance requirements for the evaluation.
The assurance incorporates the predefined evaluation assurance level EAL 4+,
augmented by AVA_VAN.5, ATE_DPT.2 and ALC_DVS.2. Common Criteria Part 3[4]
describes the scale of assurance given by predefined assurance levels EAL1 to
EAL7. An overview of CC is given in CC Part 1[2].
4.6 Security Policy
The TOE security policies are detailed in Security Target[1] , Section 3.3.
4.7 Security Claims
The Security Target[1] fully specifies the TOE’s security objectives, the threats and
OSP’s which these objectives counter or meet and security functional requirements
and security functions to elaborate the objectives. Most of the SFR’s are taken
from CC Part 2[3]; use of this standard facilitates comparison with other evaluated
products.
The following SFR’s are defined in the Protection Profile [13]:FCS_RNG.1,
FMT_LIM.1, FMT_LIM.2, FAU_SAS.1, FDP_SDC.1.
4.8 Threats Countered
All threats that are countered are described in the Security Target [1], Section 3.2.
4.9 Threats Countered by the TOE’s environment
There are no threats countered by the TOE’s environment.
4.10 Threats and Attacks not Countered
No threats or attacks are described that are not countered.
4.11 Environmental Assumptions and Dependencies
The assumptions that apply to this TOE are described in the Security Target [1],
Section 3.4.
4.12 IT Security Objectives
The security objectives that apply to this TOE are described in the Security
Target[1], Section 4.1.
The security objectives for the Security IC Embedded Software are described in the
Security Target[1], Section 4.2.
DMT-CBS-CE3D3 Family (DMT-CBS-
CE3D3/CC080/CC048) Dual Interface
smart card chips with HAL library
EAL 4+ BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014 V1.0
Page 10 of 18 SERTIT-089 CR Issue 1.0
10 October 2016
4.13 Non-IT Security Objectives
The security objectives for the environment are described in the Security
Target[1], Section 4.3.
4.14 Security Functional Requirements
The following Security Functional Requirements are directly taken from the
Protection Profile[13]. Except for FAU_SAS.1, FDP_SDC.1, FDP_SDI.2, FCS_RNG.1
and FCS_COP.1 all assignments and selections are completely defined in the
Protection Profile[13].
Security functional
requirement
Title
FRU_FLT.2 Li mi ted faul t tol erance
FPT_FLS.1 Fai l ure wi th preservati on of secure state
FMT_LIM.1 Li mi ted capabi l i ti es
FMT_LIM.2 Li mi ted avai l abi l i ty
FAU_SAS .1 Audi t storage
FPT_PHP.3 Resi stance to physi cal attack
FDP_ITT.1 Basi c i nternal transfer protecti on
FDP_IFC.1 Subset i nformati on fl ow control
FPT_ITT.1 Basi c i nternal TSF data transfer protecti on
FDP_SDC.1 Stored data confi denti al i ty
FDP_SDI.2 Stored data i ntegri ty moni tori ng and acti on
FCS_RNG.1 [P TG.2 ] Qual i ty metri c for random numbers
FCS_COP.1[TD ES ] Cryptographi c operati on – TDES
FCS_COP.1[AES] Cryptographi c operati on - AES
FCS_COP.1[RS A] Cryptographi c operati on - RSA
4.15 Security Function Policy
The TOE is suitable for instance to support a Java Card OS, ID cards, Banking cards,
etc.
The TOE consists of hardware and IC dedicated software. The hardware is based on
a 32-bit CPU with ROM (Non-Volatile Read-Only Memory), EEPROM (Non-volatile
Programmable Memory) and RAM (Volatile Memory). The hardware of the TOE also
incorporates communication peripherals and cryptographic coprocessors for
execution and acceleration of symmetric and asymmetric cryptographic algorithms.
DMT-CBS-CE3D3 Family (DMT-CBS-
CE3D3/CC080/CC048) Dual Interface
smart card chips with HAL library
EAL 4+ BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014 V1.0
SERTIT-089 CR Issue 1.0
10 October 2016
Page 11 of 18
The IC dedicated software consists of a hardware abstraction (HAL) library that
provides cryptographic services and EEPROM access support.
The TOE supports the following communication interfaces:
ISO/IEC 7816 contact interface.
ISO/IEC 14443 contactless interface
The TOE is delivered to a composite product manufacturer. The security IC
embedded software is developed by the composite product manufacturer. The
security IC embedded software is sent to Datang Microelectronics Technology Co.,
Ltd (DMT) to be implemented in ROM and delivered back to the composite product
manufacturer together with the TOE. The security IC embedded software is not
part of the TOE.
4.16 Evaluation Conduct
The evaluation was carried out in accordance with the requirements of the
Norwegian Certification Scheme for IT Security as described in SERTIT Document
SD001E[5]. The Scheme is managed by the Norwegian Certification Authority for IT
Security (SERTIT). As stated on page 2 of this Certification Report, SERTIT is a
member of the Arrangement on the Recognition of Common Criteria Certificates in
the Field of Information Technology Se curity (CCRA), and the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the terms of this Arrangement.
The purpose of the evaluation was to provide assurance about the effectiveness of
the TOE in meeting its Security Target[1], which prospective consumers are
advised to read. To ensure that the Security Target [1] gives an appropriate
baseline for a CC evaluation, it was first itself evaluated. The TOE was then
evaluated against this baseline. Both parts of the evaluation were performed in
accordance with CC Part 3[4] and the Common Evaluation Methodology (CEM) [6].
Interpretations[7][8][9] are used.
SERTIT monitored the evaluation which was carried out by Brightsight B.V. as
Commercial Evaluation Facility (CLEF/EVIT). The evaluation was completed when
the EVIT submitted the final Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [10] to SERTIT on 3
October 2016. As a result SERTIT then produced this Certification Report.
4.17 General Points
The evaluation addressed the security functionality claimed in the Security
Target[1] with reference to the assumed operating environment specified by the
Security Target[1]. The evaluated configuration was that specified in Annex A.
Prospective consumers are advised to check that this matches their identified
requirements and give due consideration to the recommendations and caveats of
this report.
Certification does not guarantee that the IT product is free from security
vulnerabilities. This Certification Report and the belonging Certificate only reflect
the view of SERTIT at the time of certification. It is furthermore the responsibility
DMT-CBS-CE3D3 Family (DMT-CBS-
CE3D3/CC080/CC048) Dual Interface
smart card chips with HAL library
EAL 4+ BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014 V1.0
Page 12 of 18 SERTIT-089 CR Issue 1.0
10 October 2016
of users (both existing and prospective) to check whether any security
vulnerabilities have been discovered since the date shown in this report. This
Certification Report is not an endorsement of the IT product by SERTIT or any
other organization that recognizes or gives effect to this Cer tification Report, and
no warranty of the IT product by SERTIT or any other organization that recognizes
or gives effect to this Certification Report is either expressed or implied.
DMT-CBS-CE3D3 Family (DMT-CBS-
CE3D3/CC080/CC048) Dual Interface
smart card chips with HAL library
EAL 4+ BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014 V1.0
SERTIT-089 CR Issue 1.0
10 October 2016
Page 13 of 18
5 Evaluation Findings
The evaluators examined the following assurance class es and components taken
from CC Part 3[4]. These classes comprise the EAL4 assurance package augmented
by AVA_VAN.5, ATE_DPT.2 and ALC_DVS.2.
Assurance class Assurance components
Development ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
ADV_FSP.4 Complete functional specification
ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF
ADV_TDS.3 Basic modular design
Guidance
documents
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
Life-cycle support ALC_CMC.4 Production support, acceptance procedures
and automation
ALC_CMS.4 Problem tracking CM coverage
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures
ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model
ALC_TAT.1 Well-defined life-cycle model
Security Target
evaluation
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
Tests ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage
ATE_DPT.2 Testing: security enforcing modules
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing - sample
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis
All assurance classes were found to be satisfactory and were awarded an overall
“pass” verdict.
DMT-CBS-CE3D3 Family (DMT-CBS-
CE3D3/CC080/CC048) Dual Interface
smart card chips with HAL library
EAL 4+ BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014 V1.0
Page 14 of 18 SERTIT-089 CR Issue 1.0
10 October 2016
5.1 Introduction
The evaluation addressed the requirements specified in the Security Target[1]. The
results of this work were reported in the ETR[10] under the CC Part 3[4] headings.
The following sections note considerations that are of particular relevance to
either consumers or those involved with subsequent assurance maintenance and
re-evaluation of the TOE.
5.2 Delivery
On receipt of the TOE, the consumer is recommended to check that the evaluated
version of its constituent components has been supplied, and to check that the
security of the TOE has not been compromised in delivery.
The delivery procedure is described in the supporting document [12].
5.3 Installation and Guidance Documentation
Installation procedures are described in detail in the supporting document [12].
5.4 Misuse
There is always a risk of intentional and unintentional misconfigurations that could
possibly compromise confidential information. Security IC Embedded Software
shall follow the guidance documentation[11][12] for the TOE in order to ensure
that the TOE is operated in a secure manner.
The guidance documents adequately describe the mode of operation of the TOE,
all assumptions about the intended environment and all requirements for external
security. Sufficient guidance is provided for the consumer to effectively use the
TOE’s security functions.
5.5 Vulnerability Analysis
The Evaluators’ vulnerability analysis was based on both public domain sources
and the visibility of the TOE given by the evaluation process.
An independent vulnerability analysis was done, consisting of the following steps:
A design and implementation review on the TOE was done to identify
weaknesses in the TOE that could potentially be exploited by attackers. A
code review of the crypto library and boot code was also executed.
Validation tests of security features performed in the ATE class are taken
into account for the following vulnerability analysis.
A vulnerability analysis based on the design and implementation review
results and the validation test results of security features, was performed
considering the well-known attacks from the “JIL Attack Methods for
Smartcards and Similar Devices”[7]. User guidance is also taken into
consideration while analysing potential vulnerabilities.
A penetration test plan is established based on the results of the
vulnerability analysis.
DMT-CBS-CE3D3 Family (DMT-CBS-
CE3D3/CC080/CC048) Dual Interface
smart card chips with HAL library
EAL 4+ BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014 V1.0
SERTIT-089 CR Issue 1.0
10 October 2016
Page 15 of 18
Practical penetration tests are performed according the pene tration test
plan.
5.6 Developer Tests
The developer tests consist of four parts:
1) Testing on engineering samples
Developer tests performed on engineering samples (cards or Dual -In-Line-
Package ICs)
2) Testing on wafer
Developer tests performed on wafers
3) Testing on simulation tools
Developer tests were done on simulation tools in the chip development
environment, which were used to verify the logical functions.
4) Testing on an emulation board
Developer tests were done on an emulation board (FPGA), mainly for the
HAL.
5.7 Evaluator Tests
The evaluator’s responsibility for independent testing is required by the ATE_IND
class. Since developer’s testing procedures were found to be extensive and
thorough, and developer’s hardware testing tools are not generally available to
allow reproduction of developer test cases in the evaluator’s test lab, the choice
was made to perform the evaluator independent testing by witnessing of the
developer’s test cases, using the developer’s tools, at the premises of the
developer. The evaluator used a sampling strategy to select developer tests to
validate the developer’s test results. The sampling strategy is as follows:
Tests on TSFI’s are sampled
Tests on Interfaces of SFR-enforcing modules are sampled
Tests on Security Mechanisms are sampl ed
All the testing methods (Wafer/Sample/ Simulation/Emulator) will be
sampled
In addition to this, the evaluator has defined additional test cases, prompted by
study of the developer documentation. The test strategy is as shown below:
Augmentation of developer testing for interfaces by varying parameters to
more rigorously test the interface
Supplementation of developer testing strategy, for example by applying
the tests performed on engineering samples to wafer samples
DMT-CBS-CE3D3 Family (DMT-CBS-
CE3D3/CC080/CC048) Dual Interface
smart card chips with HAL library
EAL 4+ BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014 V1.0
Page 16 of 18 SERTIT-089 CR Issue 1.0
10 October 2016
The considerations that are taken during the selection of the interfaces to be
tested are:
Observation and understanding during the performance of the wor k units
in ATE_COV, DPT and FUN
Significance of the interfaces with respect to security
These tests are also performed using the developer’s tools at the premises of the
developer. The evaluator witnessed the whole process of the tests.
DMT-CBS-CE3D3 Family (DMT-CBS-
CE3D3/CC080/CC048) Dual Interface
smart card chips with HAL library
EAL 4+ BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014 V1.0
SERTIT-089 CR Issue 1.0
10 October 2016
Page 17 of 18
6 Evaluation Outcome
6.1 Certification Result
After due consideration of the ETR[10] as produced by the Evaluators, and of the
conduct of the evaluation as witnessed by the Certifier, SERTIT has determined
that DMT-CBS-CE3D3 Family (DMT-CBS-CE3D3/CC080/CC048) Dual Interface smart
card chips with HAL library meets the Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
requirements of Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 4+ augmented with AVA_VAN.5,
ATE_DPT.2 and ALC_DVS.2 for the specified Common Criteria Part 2 extended
functionality and Protection Profile BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014 V1.0, in the specified
environment.
6.2 Recommendations
Prospective consumers of DMT-CBS-CE3D3 Family (DMT-CBS-CE3D3/CC080/CC048)
Dual Interface smart card chips with HAL library should understand the specific
scope of the certification by reading this report in conjunction with the Security
Target[1]. The TOE should be used in accordance with a number of environmental
considerations as specified in the Security Target.
Only the evaluated TOE configuration should be installed. This is specified in
Annex A with further relevant information given ab ove under Section 4.3 “TOE
Scope ” and Chapter 5 “Evaluation Findings”.
The TOE should be used in accordance with the supporting guidance
documentation included in the evaluated configuration.
The above “Evaluation Findings” include a number of recommendations relating to
the secure receipt, installation, configuration and operation of the TOE.
DMT-CBS-CE3D3 Family (DMT-CBS-
CE3D3/CC080/CC048) Dual Interface
smart card chips with HAL library
EAL 4+ BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014 V1.0
Page 18 of 18 SERTIT-089 CR Issue 1.0
10 October 2016
Annex A: Evaluated Configuration
TOE Identification
The TOE consists of:
Type Name Version Package
Hardw are DMT-CBS-CE3D3 Family
(DMT-CBS-CE3D3/CC080/CC048)
V1.0 die, module
Softw are HAL V1.0 Softw are library in ROM
Manual DMT-CBS-CE3D3 Family (DMT-CBS-
CE3D3/CC080/CC048) Preparative
Procedures[12]
V1.2 document
DMT-CBS-CE3D3 Family (DMT-CBS-
CE3D3/CC080/CC048) Operational User
Guidance[11]
V1.6 document
TOE Documentation
The supporting guidance documents evaluated were:
[a] DMT-CBS-CE3D3 Family (DMT-CBS-CE3D3/CC080/CC048) Operational
User Guidance, Version 1.6, 31 August 2016[11]
[b] DMT-CBS-CE3D3 Family (DMT-CBS-CE3D3/CC080/CC048) Preparative
Procedures, Version 1.2, 31 August 2016[12]
Further discussion of the supporting guidance material is given in Section 5.3
“Installation and Guidance Documentation”.
TOE Configuration
The TOE configuration used for testing was the same used for developer tests, this
is described in Section 5.6 of this report.