1
This document and the information it contains is the property of IDEMIA. It may not be used, reproduced or transmitted to a third
party without prior written approval.
CombICAO Applet v3 on
ID-One Cosmo X (BAC
and CA Configuration)
Public Security Target
Reference: FQR 550 0282 Ed 4 - ST
2
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party without prior written approval.
About IDEMIA
OT-Morpho is now IDEMIA, the global leader in trusted identities for an
increasingly digital world, with the ambition to empower citizens and consumers
alike to interact, pay, connect, travel and vote in ways that are now possible in a
connected environment.
Securing our identity has become mission critical in the world we live in today. By
standing for Augmented Identity, we reinvent the way we think, produce, use
and protect this asset, whether for individuals or for objects. We ensure privacy
and trust as well as guarantee secure, authenticated and verifiable transactions
for international clients from Financial, Telecom, Identity, Security and IoT
sectors.
With close to €3bn in revenues, IDEMIA is the result of the merger between OT
(Oberthur Technologies) and Safran Identity & Security (Morpho). This new
company counts 14,000 employees of more than 80 nationalities and serves
clients in 180 countries.
| For more information, visit www.idemia.com / Follow @IdemiaGroup on Twitter
3
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party without prior written approval.
APPROVAL
COMPANY NAME FUNCTION
Established by: IDEMIA
Rozenn
TRUBERT
Certification Project Manager
Reviewed by: IDEMIA
Abraham YAP R&D Embedded Manager
Jerome
BOUDINEAU
Marketing Product Owner
Authorized by: IDEMIA Sarra MESTIRI IDEMIA Certification Team Manager
4
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party without prior written approval.
DOCUMENT EVOLUTION
Date Version Name Revision
02/12/2021 Ed 1 Prem KUMAR Sanitized version created for Public Issue.
01/02/2022 Ed 2 Prem KUMAR
Sanitized version created for Public Issue
after incorporating ANSSI feedbacks.
09/01/2023 Ed 3 Rozenn TRUBERT
Update [AGD_PRE], [AGD_OPE], [ST_PTF]
and [PTF_CERT] references
28/03/2023 Ed 4 Rozenn TRUBERT
Update [PTF_CERT] and [ST_PTF]
references.
5
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party without prior written approval.
Table of contents
1 SECURITY TARGET INTRODUCTION ...................................................... 10
1.1 ST IDENTIFICATION ..........................................................................................10
1.2 TOE REFERENCE ..............................................................................................10
2 TECHNICAL TERMS, ABBREVIATIONS AND ASSOCIATED REFERENCES 11
2.1 TECHNICAL TERMS............................................................................................11
2.2 ABBREVIATIONS ...............................................................................................22
2.3 REFERENCES....................................................................................................24
3 TOE OVERVIEW AND DESCRIPTION ...................................................... 28
3.1 TOE OVERVIEW ...............................................................................................28
3.2 TOE DESCRIPTION ...........................................................................................30
3.2.1 Physical scope of the TOE ........................................................................30
3.2.2 Logical scope of the TOE..........................................................................30
3.3 REQUIRED NON-TOE HARDWARE/SOFTWARE/FIRMWARE ............................................32
3.4 TOE USAGE AND MAJOR SECURITY FEATURES OF THE TOE..........................................33
3.4.1 Active Authentication (AA)........................................................................34
3.4.2 Basic Access Control (BAC).......................................................................35
3.4.3 Chip Authentication Protocol (v1)..............................................................35
4 LIFE CYCLE............................................................................................. 37
4.1 DEVELOPMENT ENVIRONMENT..............................................................................38
4.2 PRODUCTION ENVIRONMENT ...............................................................................38
4.3 PREPARATION ENVIRONMENT...............................................................................50
4.4 OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT ..............................................................................50
5 CONFORMANCE CLAIMS ........................................................................ 51
5.1 COMMON CRITERIA CONFORMANCE CLAIM ..............................................................51
5.2 PROTECTION PROFILE CONFORMANCE CLAIM ...........................................................52
5.3 PACKAGE CLAIM ...............................................................................................52
5.3.1 Main aspects...........................................................................................52
5.3.2 Overview of differences between the PP and the ST ...................................52
5.3.3 Additional Subjects ..................................................................................53
5.3.4 Additional Threats ...................................................................................53
5.3.5 Additional Organisational Security Policies..................................................53
5.3.6 Additional Assumptions ............................................................................53
5.3.7 Additional Security Objectives...................................................................53
5.3.8 Additional Security Objectives for the Operational Environment ...................53
5.3.9 Additional Security Functional Requirements ..............................................54
5.4 CC CONFORMANCE AND USAGE IN REAL LIFE ............................................................54
6 SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION ......................................................... 56
6.1 ASSETS ..........................................................................................................56
6.1.1 Logical MRTD Data ..................................................................................56
6.1.2 Miscellaneous..........................................................................................57
6.2 USERS / SUBJECTS ............................................................................................57
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party without prior written approval.
6.2.1 Additional Subject....................................................................................58
6.2.2 Miscellaneous..........................................................................................58
6.3 THREATS ........................................................................................................60
6.3.1 Threats from Protection Profile .................................................................60
6.3.2 Additional Threats Identified.....................................................................62
6.4 ORGANISATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES ...................................................................63
6.4.1 Additional OSP ........................................................................................63
6.4.2 Miscellaneous..........................................................................................63
6.5 ASSUMPTIONS..................................................................................................64
6.5.1 Additional Assumptions ............................................................................64
6.5.2 Miscellaneous..........................................................................................65
7 SECURITY OBJECTIVES.......................................................................... 67
7.1 SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE TOE.....................................................................67
7.1.1 Additional Objectives ...............................................................................67
7.1.2 Miscellaneous..........................................................................................68
7.2 SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT......................................70
7.2.1 Issuing State or Organization....................................................................70
7.2.2 Receiving State or Organization ................................................................71
7.2.3 Additional Security Objectives for the Operational Environment ...................72
7.3 SECURITY OBJECTIVES RATIONALE........................................................................73
7.3.1 Threats...................................................................................................73
7.3.2 Organisational Security Policies.................................................................75
7.3.3 Assumptions ...........................................................................................76
7.3.4 SPD and Security Objectives.....................................................................77
8 EXTENDED REQUIREMENTS................................................................... 81
8.1 EXTENDED FAMILIES..........................................................................................81
8.1.1 Extended Family FPT_EMS - TOE Emanation..............................................81
8.1.2 Extended Family FMT_LIM - Limited capabilities.........................................82
8.1.3 Extended Family FIA_API - Authentication Proof of Identity.........................84
8.1.4 Extended Family FAU_SAS - Audit data storage..........................................85
8.1.5 Extended Family FCS_RND - Generation of random numbers.......................86
9 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS.................................................................... 88
9.1 SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS..................................................................88
9.1.1 Class FAU Security Audit ..........................................................................88
9.1.2 Class FCS Cryptographic Support ..............................................................88
9.1.3 Additional FCS SFR's Identified .................................................................89
9.1.4 Class FIA Identification and Authentication ................................................92
9.1.5 Additional FIA SFR's Identified..................................................................94
9.1.6 Class FDP User Data Protection.................................................................96
9.1.7 Additional FDP SFR's Identified .................................................................97
9.1.8 Class FMT Security Management...............................................................99
9.1.9 Additional FMT SFR's Identified............................................................... 101
9.1.10 Class FPT Protection of the Security Functions ...................................... 103
9.1.11 Additional FTP Trusted path/channels SFR Identified ............................. 104
9.2 SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS................................................................. 105
9.2.1 ADV Development ................................................................................. 105
9.2.2 AGD Guidance documents ...................................................................... 110
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9.2.3 ALC Life-cycle support............................................................................ 112
9.2.4 ASE Security Target evaluation ............................................................... 116
9.2.5 ATE Tests ............................................................................................. 122
9.2.6 AVA Vulnerability assessment ................................................................. 125
9.3 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS RATIONALE ................................................................. 125
9.3.1 Objectives............................................................................................. 125
9.3.2 Rationale tables of Security Objectives and SFRs...................................... 131
9.3.3 Dependencies........................................................................................ 135
9.3.4 Rationale for the Security Assurance Requirements .................................. 142
9.3.5 ADV_FSP.5 Complete semi-formal functional specification with additional error
information........................................................................................................ 142
9.3.6 ADV_INT.2 Well-structured internals ....................................................... 142
9.3.7 ADV_TDS.4 Semiformal modular design .................................................. 142
9.3.8 ALC_CMS.5 Development tools CM coverage............................................ 143
9.3.9 ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures ............................................ 143
9.3.10 ALC_TAT.2 Compliance with implementation standards.......................... 143
9.3.11 ATE_DPT.3 Testing: modular design .................................................... 143
10 TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION .......................................................... 144
10.1 TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION .......................................................................... 144
10.2 SFRS AND TSS .............................................................................................. 149
10.2.1 SFRs and TSS - Rationale.................................................................... 149
10.2.2 Association tables of SFRs and TSS ...................................................... 152
8
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party without prior written approval.
Table of figures
Figure 1 TOE’s logical architecture .................................................................................31
Figure 2 Life cycle Overview..........................................................................................37
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party without prior written approval.
Table of tables
Table 1 Different evaluated configurations of the CombICAO application...........................29
Table 2 BAC Configuration ............................................................................................35
Table 3 : Development R&D Sites ..................................................................................38
Table 4 : Audited Production Sites .................................................................................39
Table 5 Option 1: Both Platform and Applet packages are loaded at IC Manufacturer Site...39
Table 6 Option 2: Both Platform and Applet packages are loaded at CC Audited IDEMIA Sites
or Non-Audited IDEMIA Sites or External Sites ..........................................................40
Table 7 Option 3(a): Platform package is loaded at IC Manufacturer Site and Applet package
is loaded at Audited IDEMIA Sites or Non-Audited IDEMIA Sites or External Sites through
GP Mechanism .......................................................................................................41
Table 8 Platform package is loaded at IC Manufacturer Site and Applet package is loaded
through resident application using LSK format or DUMP Package in Ciphered format is
loaded...................................................................................................................43
Table 9 Option 3(c): Platform package is loaded at IC Manufacturer Site and Applet package
in plain format is loaded at Audited IDEMIA Sites only...............................................44
Table 10 Option 4(a): Platform package is loaded at Audited IDEMIA Sites or Non-Audited
IDEMIA Sites or External Sites and Applet package is loaded at Audited IDEMIA Sites or
Non-Audited IDEMIA Sites or External Sites through GP Mechanism............................46
Table 11 Platform package is loaded at Audited IDEMIA Sites or Non-Audited IDEMIA Sites or
External Sites and Options and Applet package is loaded through Resident application
using LSK format or DUMP Package in Ciphered format is loaded ...............................48
Table 12 Option 4(c): Platform package is loaded at IC Manufacturer Site and Applet
package in plain format is loaded at CC Audited IDEMIA Sites only.............................49
Table 13 Common Criteria conformance claim.................................................................51
Table 14 Threats and Security Objectives - Coverage .....................................................77
Table 15 Security Objectives and Threats - Coverage .....................................................78
Table 16 OSPs and Security Objectives - Coverage.........................................................79
Table 17 Security Objectives and OSPs - Coverage.........................................................80
Table 18 Assumptions and Security Objectives for the Operational Environment - Coverage
............................................................................................................................80
Table 19 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment and Assumptions - Coverage
............................................................................................................................80
Table 20 Security Objectives and SFRs - Coverage ....................................................... 133
Table 21 SFRs and Security Objectives........................................................................ 135
Table 22 SFRs Dependencies...................................................................................... 139
Table 23 SARs Dependencies ..................................................................................... 142
Table 24 SFRs and TSS - Coverage ............................................................................. 155
Table 25 TSS and SFRs - Coverage ............................................................................. 155
10
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party without prior written approval.
1 Security Target Introduction
1.1 ST Identification
Title CombICAO Applet v3 on ID-One Cosmo X (BAC and CA
Configuration) Public Security Target
ST Identification FQR 550 0282 Ed 4
CC Version 3.1 revision 5
Assurance Level EAL4 augmented with ADV_FSP.5, ADV_INT.2, ADV_TDS.4,
ALC_CMS.5, ALC_DVS.2, ALC_TAT.2, and ATE_DPT.3
ITSEF CEA-LETI
Certification Body ANSSI
Compliant to
Protection Profile
[PP_BAC]
1.2 TOE Reference
TOE Commercial
Name
CombICAO Applet v3 in BAC and CA configuration on ID-One
Cosmo X
Applet Code Versions
(SAAAAR Code)
‘20 37 42 FF’
Applet Internal
Version
’00 00 02 0D’
Platform Name ID-One Cosmo X
Platform Certificate [PTF_CERT]
Guidance Documents [AGD_PRE], [AGD_OPE].
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party without prior written approval.
2 Technical Terms, Abbreviations and Associated
References
2.1 Technical Terms
Term Definition
Accurate Terminal
Certificate
A Terminal Certificate is accurate, if the issuing Document Verifier is
trusted by the travel document’s chip to produce Terminal Certificates
with the correct certificate effective date, see [TR-03110-3].
Advanced
Inspection
Procedure (with
PACE)
A specific order of authentication steps between a travel document and
a terminal as required by [TR-03110-3], namely (i) PACE, (ii) Chip
Authentication v1, (iii) Passive Authentication with SOD and (iv)
Terminal Authentication v1. AIP can generally be used by EIS-AIP-
PACE.
Agreement This term is used in the current ST in order to reflect an appropriate
relationship between the parties involved, but not as a legal notion.
Application note Optional informative part of the PP containing sensitive supporting
information that is considered relevant or useful for the construction,
evaluation, or use of the TOE (cf. CC part 1, section B.2.7).
Audit records Write-only-once non-volatile memory area of the travel document’s
chip to store the Initialisation Data and Pre-personalisation Data.
Authenticity Ability to confirm the travel document and its data elements on the
travel document’s chip were created by the issuing State or
Organization
Basic Access
Control
Security mechanism defined in [ICAO_9303] by which means the travel
document’s chip proves and the inspection system protect their
communication by means of secure messaging with Basic Access Keys
(see there).
Basic Inspection
System (BIS)
A technical system being used by an inspecting authority and operated
by a governmental organisation (i.e. an Official Domestic or Foreign
Document Verifier) and verifying the travel document presenter as the
travel document holder (for ePassport: by comparing the real biometric
data (face) of the travel document presenter with the stored biometric
data (DG2) of the travel document holder).
Biographical data
(bio data).
The personalised details of the bearer of the travel document
appearing as text in the visual and machine readable zones on the
biographical data page of a travel document [ICAO_9303].
Biometric
reference data
Data stored for biometric authentication of the travel document holder
in the travel document’s chip as (i) digital portrait and (ii) optional
biometric reference data.
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Term Definition
Card Access
Number (CAN)
Password derived from a short number printed on the front side of the
data-page.
Certificate chain A sequence defining a hierarchy certificates. The Inspection System
Certificate is the lowest level, Document Verifier Certificate in between,
and Country Verifying Certification Authority Certificates are on the
highest level. A certificate of a lower level is signed with the private key
corresponding to the public key in the certificate of the next higher
level.
Counterfeit An unauthorized copy or reproduction of a genuine security document
made by whatever means.
Country Signing CA
Certificate (CCSCA)
Self-signed certificate of the Country Signing CA Public Key
(KPu CSCA) issued by CSCA stored in the inspection system.
Country Signing
Certification
Authority (CSCA)
An organisation enforcing the policy of the travel document Issuer with
respect to confirming correctness of user and TSF data stored in the
travel document. The CSCA represents the country specific root of the
PKI for the travel documents and creates the Document Signer
Certificates within this PKI.
The CSCA also issues the self-signed CSCA Certificate (CCSCA) having
to be distributed by strictly secure diplomatic means, see.
[ICAO_9303], 5.5.1.
The Country Signing Certification Authority issuing certificates for
Document Signers (cf. [6]) and the domestic CVCA may be integrated
into a single entity, e.g. a Country Certification Authority. However,
even in this case, separate key pairs must be used for different roles,
see [TR-03110-3].
Country Verifying
Certification
Authority (CVCA)
An organisation enforcing the privacy policy of the travel document
Issuer with respect to protection of user data stored in the travel
document (at a trial of a terminal to get an access to these data). The
CVCA represents the country specific root of the PKI for the terminals
using it and creates the Document Verifier Certificates within this PKI.
Updates of the public key of the CVCA are distributed in form of CVCA
Link-Certificates, see [TR-03110-3].
Since the Standard Inspection Procedure does not imply any certificate-
based terminal authentication, the current TOE cannot recognise a
CVCS as a subject; hence, it merely represents an organizational entity
within this ST.
The Country Signing Certification Authority (CSCA) issuing certificates
for Document Signers (cf. [ICAO_9303]) and the domestic CVCA may
be integrated into a single entity, e.g. a Country Certification Authority.
However, even in this case, separate key pairs must be used for
different roles, see [TR-03110-3].
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Term Definition
Current date The maximum of the effective dates of valid CVCA, DV and domestic
Inspection System certificates known to the TOE. It is used the validate
card verifiable certificates.
CV Certificate Certificate of the new public key of the Country Verifying Certification
Authority signed with the old public key of the Country Verifying
Certification Authority where the certificate effective date for the new
key is before the certificate expiration date of the certificate for the old
key.
CVCA link
Certificate
Certificate of the new public key of the Country Verifying Certification
Authority signed with the old public key of the Country Verifying
Certification Authority where the certificate effective date for the new
key is before the certificate expiration date of the certificate for the old
key.
Document Basic
Access Key
Derivation
Algorithm
The [ICAO_9303] describes the Document Basic Access Key Derivation
Algorithm on how terminals may derive the Document Basic Access
Keys from the second line of the printed MRZ data.
Document Details
Data
Data printed on and electronically stored in the travel document
representing the document details like document type, issuing state,
document number, date of issue, date of expiry, issuing authority. The
document details data are less-sensitive data.
Document Basic
Access Keys
Pair of symmetric Triple-DES keys used for secure messaging with
encryption (key KENC) and message authentication (key KMAC) of data
transmitted between the travel document’s chip and the inspection
system [ICAO_9303]. It is drawn from the printed MRZ of the passport
book to authenticate an entity able to read the printed MRZ of the
passport book.
Document Security
Object (SOD)
A RFC3369 CMS Signed Data Structure, signed by the Document Signer
(DS). Carries the hash values of the LDS Data Groups. It is stored in
the travel document’s chip. It may carry the Document Signer
Certificate (CDS). [ICAO_9303]
Document Signer
(DS)
An organisation enforcing the policy of the CSCA and signing the
Document Security Object stored on the travel document for passive
authentication.
A Document Signer is authorised by the national CSCA issuing the
Document Signer Certificate (CDS), see [ICAO_9303].
This role is usually delegated to a Personalisation Agent.
Document Verifier
(DV)
An organisation enforcing the policies of the CVCA and of a Service
Provider (here: of a governmental organisation / inspection authority)
and managing terminals belonging together (e.g. terminals operated by
a State’s border police), by – inter alia – issuing Terminal Certificates. A
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party without prior written approval.
Term Definition
Document Verifier is therefore a Certification Authority, authorised by
at least the national CVCA to issue certificates for national terminals,
see [TR-03110-3].
Since the Standard Inspection Procedure does not imply any certificate-
based terminal authentication, the current TOE cannot recognise a DV
as a subject; hence, it merely represents an organisational entity within
this ST.
There can be Domestic and Foreign DV: A domestic DV is acting under
the policy of the domestic CVCA being run by the travel document
Issuer; a foreign DV is acting under a policy of the respective foreign
CVCA (in this case there shall be an appropriate agreement between
the travel document Issuer und a foreign CVCA ensuring enforcing the
travel document Issuer’s privacy policy) 1 2
Eavesdropper A threat agent with low attack potential reading the communication
between the travel document’s chip and the inspection system to gain
the data on the travel document’s chip.
Enrolment The process of collecting biometric samples from a person and the
subsequent preparation and storage of biometric reference templates
representing that person's identity. [ICAO_9303]
travel document
(electronic)
The contact based or contactless smart card integrated into the plastic
or paper, optical readable cover and providing the following
application: ePassport.
ePassport
application
[PP-EAC] definition
Non-executable data defining the functionality of the operating system
on the IC as the travel document’s chip. It includes
the file structure implementing the LDS [ICAO_9303],
the definition of the User Data, but does not include the User Data
itself (i.e. content of EF.DG1 to EF.DG13, EF.DG16, EF.COM and
EF.SOD) and
the TSF Data including the definition the authentication data but except
the authentication data itself.
Extended Access
Control
Security mechanism identified in [ICAO_9303] by which means the
travel document’s chip (i) verifies the authentication of the inspection
systems authorized to read the optional biometric reference data, (ii)
controls the access to the optional biometric reference data and (iii)
protects the confidentiality and integrity of the optional biometric
1
The form of such an agreement may be of formal and informal nature; the term ‘agreement’ is used in the
current ST in order to reflect an appropriate relationship between the parties involved.
2
Existing of such an agreement may be technically reflected by means of issuing a CCVCA-F for the Public Key of
the foreign CVCA signed by the domestic CVCA.
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party without prior written approval.
Term Definition
reference data during their transmission to the inspection system by
secure messaging. The Personalisation Agent may use the same
mechanism to authenticate themselves with Personalisation Agent
Authentication Private Key and to get write and read access to the
logical travel document and TSF data.
Extended
Inspection System
(EIS)
A role of a terminal as part of an inspection system which is in addition
to Basic Inspection System authorized by the issuing State or
Organization to read the optional biometric reference data and
supports the terminals part of the Extended Access Control
Authentication Mechanism.
Forgery Fraudulent alteration of any part of the genuine document, e.g.
changes to the biographical data or the portrait.
Global
Interoperability
The capability of inspection systems (either manual or automated) in
different States throughout the world to exchange data, to process
data received from systems in other States, and to utilize that data in
inspection operations in their respective States. Global interoperability
is a major objective of the standardized specifications for placement of
both eye-readable and machine readable data in all travel document’s.
[ICAO_9303]
IC Dedicated
Software
Software developed and injected into the chip hardware by the IC
manufacturer. Such software might support special functionality of the
IC hardware and be used, amongst other, for implementing delivery
procedures between different players. The usage of parts of the IC
Dedicated Software might be restricted to certain life phases.
IC Dedicated
Support Software
That part of the IC Dedicated Software (refer to above) which provides
functions after TOE Delivery. The usage of parts of the IC Dedicated
Software might be restricted to certain phases.
IC Dedicated Test
Software
That part of the IC Dedicated Software (refer to above) which is used
to test the TOE before TOE Delivery but which does not provide any
functionality thereafter.
IC Embedded
Software
Software embedded in an IC and not being designed by the IC
developer. The IC Embedded Software is designed in the design life
phase and embedded into the IC in the manufacturing life phase of the
TOE.
IC Identification
Data
The IC manufacturer writes a unique IC identifier to the chip to control
the IC as travel document material during the IC manufacturing and
the delivery process to the travel document manufacturer.
Impostor A person who applies for and obtains a document by assuming a false
name and identity, or a person who alters his or her physical
appearance to represent himself or herself as another person for the
purpose of using that person’s document.
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party without prior written approval.
Term Definition
Improperly
documented
person
A person who travels, or attempts to travel with: (a) an expired travel
document or an invalid visa; (b) a counterfeit, forged or altered travel
document or visa; (c) someone else’s travel document or visa; or (d)
no travel document or visa, if required. [ICAO_9303]
Initialisation Process of writing Initialisation Data (see below) to the TOE (TOE life-
cycle, Phase 2 Manufacturing, Step 3).
Initialisation Data Any data defined by the TOE Manufacturer and injected into the non-
volatile memory by the Integrated Circuits manufacturer (Phase 2).
These data are for instance used for traceability and for IC
identification as travel document material (IC identification data).
Inspection The act of a State examining an travel document presented to it by a
traveller (the travel document’s holder) and verifying its authenticity.
[ICAO_9303]
Inspection system
(IS)
A technical system used by the border control officer of the receiving
State (i) examining an travel document presented by the traveller and
verifying its authenticity and (ii) verifying the traveller as travel
document holder.
Integrated circuit
(IC)
Electronic component(s) designed to perform processing and/or
memory functions. The travel document’s chip is an integrated circuit.
Integrity Ability to confirm the travel document and its data elements on the
travel document’s chip have not been altered from that created by the
issuing State or Organization
Issuing
Organization
Organization authorized to issue an official travel document (e.g. the
United Nations Organization, issuer of the Laissez-passer).
[ICAO_9303]]
Issuing State The Country issuing the travel document. [ICAO_9303]
Logical Data
Structure (LDS)
The collection of groupings of Data Elements stored in the optional
capacity expansion technology [ICAO_9303]. The capacity expansion
technology used is the travel document’s chip.
Logical Data
Structure 2 (LDS2)
The file structures required to support the ICAO LDS2 [9303-10_LDS2]
consisting of LDS file structure with three additional and optional
applications:
• Travel records (stamps);
• Visa records; and
• Additional biometrics.
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party without prior written approval.
Term Definition
Logical travel
document
Data of the travel document holder stored according to the Logical
Data Structure [ICAO_9303] as specified by ICAO on the contact
based/contactless integrated circuit. It presents contact
based/contactless readable data including (but not limited to)
personal data of the travel document holder
the digital Machine Readable Zone Data (digital MRZ data, EF.DG1),
the digitized portraits (EF.DG2),
the biometric reference data of finger(s) (EF.DG3) or iris image(s)
(EF.DG4) or both and
the other data according to LDS (EF.DG5 to EF.DG16).
EF.COM and EF.SOD
Machine Readable
Travel Document
(MRTD)
Official document issued by a State or Organization which is used by
the holder for international travel (e.g. passport, visa, official document
of identity) and which contains mandatory visual (eye readable) data
and a separate mandatory data summary, intended for global use,
reflecting essential data elements capable of being machine read.
[ICAO_9303]
Machine Readable
Zone (MRZ)
Fixed dimensional area located on the front of the travel document or
MRP Data Page or, in the case of the TD1, the back of the travel
document, containing mandatory and optional data for machine
reading using OCR methods. [ICAO_9303].
Machine-verifiable
biometrics feature
A unique physical personal identification feature (e.g. an iris pattern,
fingerprint or facial characteristics) stored on a travel document in a
form that can be read and verified by machine. [ICAO_9303]
Manufacturer Generic term for the IC Manufacturer producing integrated circuit and
the travel document Manufacturer completing the IC to the travel
document. The Manufacturer is the default user of the TOE during the
manufacturing life phase. The TOE itself does not distinguish between
the IC Manufacturer and travel document Manufacturer using this role
Manufacturer.
Metadata of a CV
Certificate
Data within the certificate body (excepting Public Key) as described in
[TR-03110-3].
The metadata of a CV certificate comprise the following elements:
- Certificate Profile Identifier,
- Certificate Authority Reference,
- Certificate Holder Reference,
- Certificate Holder Authorisation Template,
- Certificate Effective Date,
- Certificate Expiration Date.
Optional biometric
reference data
Data stored for biometric authentication of the travel document holder
in the travel document’s chip as (i) encoded finger image(s) (DG3) or
(ii) encoded iris image(s) (DG4) or (iii) both. Note that the European
commission decided to use only finger print and not to use iris images
as optional biometric reference data.
18
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party without prior written approval.
Term Definition
Password
Authenticated
Connection
Establishment
(PACE)
A communication establishment protocol defined in [ICAO_9303] part
11. The PACE Protocol is a password authenticated Diffie-Hellman key
agreement protocol providing implicit password-based authentication of
the communication partners (e.g. smart card and the terminal
connected): i.e. PACE provides a verification, whether the
communication partners share the same value of a password π). Based
on this authentication, PACE also provides a secure communication,
whereby confidentiality and authenticity of data transferred within this
communication channel are maintained.
PACE passwords Passwords used as input for PACE. This may either be the CAN or the
SHA-1-value of the concatenation of Serial Number, Date of Birth and
Date of Expiry as read from the MRZ, see [ICAO_9303] part 11 or a
user PIN or PUK as specified in [TR-03110-3]
Passive
authentication
(i) verification of the digital signature of the Document Security Object
and (ii) comparing the hash values of the read LDS data fields with the
hash values contained in the Document Security Object.
Personalisation The process by which the Personalisation Data are stored in and
unambiguously, inseparably associated with the travel document. This
may also include the optional biometric data collected during the
“Enrolment” (cf. paragraph 1.7.4.3, TOE life-cycle, Phase 3, Step 6).
Personalisation
Agent
An organisation acting on behalf of the travel document Issuer to
personalise the travel document for the travel document holder by
some or all of the following activities:
ICAO travel document
(i) establishing the identity of the travel document holder for
the biographic data in the travel document,
(ii) enrolling the biometric reference data of the travel
document holder,
(iii) writing a subset of these data on the physical travel
document (optical personalisation) and storing them in
the travel document (electronic personalisation) for the
travel document holder as defined in [TR-03110-1],
(iv) writing the document details data,
(v) writing the initial TSF data,
(vi) signing the Document Security Object defined in
[ICAO_9303] (in the role of DS).
Please note that the role ‘Personalisation Agent’ may be distributed
among several institutions according to the operational policy of the
travel document Issuer.
Generating signature key pair(s) is not in the scope of the tasks of this
role.
19
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party without prior written approval.
Term Definition
Personalisation
Data
A set of data incl.
individual-related data (biographic and biometric data) of the travel
document holder,
dedicated document details data and
dedicated initial TSF data (incl. the Document Security Object).
Personalisation data are gathered and then written into the non-volatile
memory of the TOE by the Personalisation Agent in the life-cycle phase
card issuing.
Personalisation
Agent
Authentication
Information
TSF data used for authentication proof and verification of the
Personalisation Agent.
Personalisation
Agent Key
Symmetric cryptographic key or key set (MAC, ENC) used
by the Personalisation Agent to prove his identity and get access to the
logical travel document.
Physical part of the
travel document
travel document in form of paper, plastic and chip using secure printing
to present data including (but not limited to)
biographical data,
data of the machine-readable zone,
photographic image and
other data.
Pre-personalisation Process of writing Pre-Personalisation Data (see below) to the TOE
including the creation of the travel document Application (TOE life-
cycle, Phase 2, Step 5)
Pre-personalisation
Data
Any data that is injected into the non-volatile memory of the TOE by
the travel document Manufacturer (Phase 2) for traceability of non-
personalised travel document’s and/or to secure shipment within or
between life cycle phases 2 and 3. It contains (but is not limited to) the
Personalisation Agent Key Pair and Chip Life-Cycle Production data
(CPLC data).
Pre-personalised
travel document’s
chip
travel document’s chip equipped with a unique identifier.
Receiving State The Country to which the travel document holder is applying for entry.
[ICAO_9303]
Reference data Data enrolled for a known identity and used by the verifier to check the
verification data provided by an entity to prove this identity in an
authentication attempt.
RF-terminal A device being able to establish communication with an RF-chip
20
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party without prior written approval.
Term Definition
according to ISO/IEC 14443 [ISO14443].
Secondary image A repeat image of the holder’s portrait reproduced elsewhere in the
document by whatever means [ICAO_9303].
Secure messaging
in encrypted
/combined mode
Secure messaging using encryption and message authentication code
according to ISO/IEC 7816-4 [ISO7816]
Service Provider An official organisation (inspection authority) providing inspection
service which can be used by the travel document holder.
Skimming Imitation of the inspection system to read the logical travel document
or parts of it via the contactless communication channel of the TOE
without knowledge of the printed MRZ data.
Standard
Inspection
Procedure
A specific order of authentication steps between an travel document
and a terminal as required by [ICAO_9303] and [TR-03110-1], namely
PACE or BAC and Passive Authentication with SOD.
Inspection
Procedure for
multi-application
travel document’s
This section describes an inspection procedure designed for travel
document’s containing one or more applications besides the travel
document’s application (“LDS2-documents”): [LDS2_TR] Annex A2.
Terminal A terminal is any technical system communicating with the TOE either
through the contact based or contactless interface. A technical system
verifying correspondence between the password stored in the travel
document and the related value presented to the terminal by the travel
document presenter.
In this ST the role ‘Terminal’ corresponds to any terminal being
authenticated by the TOE.
Terminal
Authorization
Intersection of the Certificate Holder Authorizations of the Inspection
System Certificate, the Document Verifier Certificate and Country
Verifier Certification Authority which shall be valid for the Current Date.
Terminal
Authorisation Level
Intersection of the Certificate Holder Authorisations defined by the
Terminal Certificate, the Document Verifier Certificate and Country
Verifying Certification Authority which shall be all valid for the Current
Date.
TOE tracing data Technical information about the current and previous locations of the
travel document gathered by inconspicuous (for the travel document
holder) recognising the travel document.
travel document Official document issued by a state or organisation which is used by
the holder for international travel (e.g. passport, visa, official document
of identity) and which contains mandatory visual (eye readable) data
and a separate mandatory data summary, intended for global use,
reflecting essential data elements capable of being machine read; see
[ICAO_9303] (there “Machine readable travel document”).
21
This document and the information it contains is the property of IDEMIA. It may not be used, reproduced or transmitted to a third
party without prior written approval.
Term Definition
travel document
(electronic)
The contact based or contactless smart card integrated into the plastic
or paper, optical readable cover and providing the following
application: ePassport.
travel document
Holder
The rightful holder of the travel document for whom the issuing State
or Organisation personalised the travel document.
travel document’s
Chip
A contact based / contactless integrated circuit chip complying with
ISO/IEC 14443 [15] and programmed according to the Logical Data
Structure as specified by ICAO, [ICAO_9303], sec III.
Traveller Person presenting the travel document to the inspection system and
claiming the identity of the travel document holder.
TSF data Data created by and for the TOE, that might affect the operation of the
TOE (CC part 1 [CC1]).
Unpersonalised
travel document
The travel document that contains the travel document chip holding
only Initialisation Data and Pre-personalisation Data as delivered to the
Personalisation Agent from the Manufacturer.
User data All data (being not authentication data)
stored in the context of the ePassport application of the travel
document as defined in [5] and
being allowed to be read out solely by an authenticated terminal.
CC give the following generic definitions for user data:
Data created by and for the user that does not affect the operation of
the TSF (CC part 1 [CC1]). Information stored in TOE resources that
can be operated upon by users in accordance with the SFRs and upon
which the TSF places no special meaning (CC part 2 [CC2]).
Verification The process of comparing a submitted biometric sample against the
biometric reference template of a single enrollee whose identity is
being claimed, to determine whether it matches the enrollee’s
template. [ICAO_9303]
Verification data Data provided by an entity in an authentication attempt to prove their
identity to the verifier. The verifier checks whether the verification data
match the reference data known for the claimed identity.
22
This document and the information it contains is the property of IDEMIA. It may not be used, reproduced or transmitted to a third
party without prior written approval.
2.2 Abbreviations
Acronym Definition
AA Active Authentication
BAC Basic Access Control
BAP Basic Access Protection
BIS Basic Inspection System
CA Chip Authentication
CAN Card Access Number
CC Common Criteria
CLFDB Ciphered Load File Data Block
DER Distinguished Encoding Rules
DES Data Encryption Standard
DF Dedicated File
DH Diffie Hellman
DSK Dump Secret Key
EAC Extended Access Control
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
EF Elementary File
FID File identifier
GP Global Platform
IC Integrated Chip
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization
ICC Integrated Chip card
ICCSN Integrated Circuit Card Serial Number.
IFD Interface Device
IS Inspection System
IDL ISO-compliant Driving Licence
LSK Load Secure Key
MAC Message Authentication code
MF Master File
MRTD Machine Readable Travel Document
MRZ Machine readable zone
OE Security Objectives for the Operational Environment
OSP Organisational security policy
OT Security Objectives for the TOE
PACE Password Authenticated Connection Establishment
PCD Proximity Coupling Device
PICC Proximity Integrated Circuit Chip
PIN Personal Identification Number
23
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party without prior written approval.
PKI Public Key Infrastructure
PP Protection Profile
PS Personalisation System
PT Personalisation Terminal
RF Radio Frequency
ROM Read Only Memory
RSA Rivest Shamir Adleman
RSA CRT Rivest Shamir Adleman – Chinese Remainder Theorem
SAI Scanning Area Identifier
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SCP Secure Channel Procotol
SFR Security functional requirement
SHA Secure Hashing Algorithm
SIP Standard Inspection Procedure
ST Security Target
TA Terminal Authentication
TOE Target Of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functions
24
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party without prior written approval.
2.3 References
Reference Description
[ADDENDUM] 20190821-Module-PP0056 - v1.1
[AGD_OPE]
FQR 220 1641 - CombICAO Applet V3 on ID-One Cosmo X
- AGD_OPE
[AGD_PRE]
FQR 220 1640 - CombICAO Applet V3 on ID-One Cosmo X
- AGD_PRE
[CC1]
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Part 1: Introduction and general model.
Version 3.1. Revision 5. April 2017. CCMB-2017-04-001.
[CC2]
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Part 2: Security functional requirements.
Version 3.1. Revision 5. April 2017. CCMB-2017-04-002.
[CC3]
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Part 3: Security assurance requirements.
Version 3.1. Revision 5. April 2017. CCMB-2017-04-003.
[CEM]
Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Evaluation Methodology. Version 3.1. Revision
5. April 2017. CCMB-2017-04-004.
[FIPS_180_4]
FIPS 180-4, Federal Information Processing Standards
Publication (FIPS PUB) 180-4, Secure Hash Standard,
August 2015
[FIPS_186_3]
FIPS 186-3, Federal Information Processing Standards
Publication (FIPS PUB) 186-3, Digital Signature Standard
(DSS), June 2009
[FIPS_197]
FIPS 197, Federal Information Processing Standards
Publication (FIPS PUB 197), Advanced Encryption Standard
(AES)
[FIPS_46_3]
FIPS 46-3, Federal Information Processing Standards
Publication (FIPS PUB) 46-3, Data Encryption Standard
(DES), 1999 October 25
[GPC_SPE_014]
GlobalPlatform Card Technology - Secure Channel Protocol
'03', Card Specification v2.3 – Amendment D” Version
1.1.2 - Public Release March 2019
25
This document and the information it contains is the property of IDEMIA. It may not be used, reproduced or transmitted to a third
party without prior written approval.
[GPC_SPE_034]
“GlobalPlatform Card Specification“ Version 2.3.1 Public
Release - March 2018
[ICAO_9303]
International Civil Aviation Organization, ICAO Doc 9303,
Machine Readable Travel Documents – 7th
and 8th
edition.
[ISO_15946]
ISO/IEC 15946: Information technology — Security
techniques — Cryptographic techniques based on elliptic
curves — Part 3: Key establishment, 2002
[ISO_18013-3] ISO/IEC 18013-3: Information technology — Personal
identification — ISO-compliant driving licence. Part 3:
Access control, authentication and integrity validation,
April 2017.
[ISO_TR_19446]
ISO/IEC TR 19446:2015
Differences between the driving licences based on the
ISO/IEC 18013 series and the European Union
specifications
[ISO_9796-2]
ISO/IEC 9796-2:2002 - Information technology - Security
techniques - Digital signature schemes giving message
recovery - Part 2: Mechanisms using a hash-function
[ISO_9797_1]
ISO/IEC 9797-1 Information technology – Security
techniques – Message Authentication codes (MACs) – part
1: Mechanisms using a block cipher, Second edition 2011-
03-01
[ISO11770-2]
ISO/IEC 11770-2. Information Technology – Security
techniques – Key management – part 2: Mechanisms using
symmetric techniques, 1996
[ISO11770-3]
ISO/IEC 11770-3. Information Technology – Security
techniques – Key management – part 3: Mechanisms using
asymmetric techniques, 2015
[ISO14443]
ISO/IEC 14443 Identification cards -- Contactless
integrated circuit cards -- Proximity cards, 2016
[ISO7816]
ISO/IEC 7816: Identification cards — Integrated circuit
cards.
[NIST_800_38A]
NIST Special Publication 800-38A: 2001, Recommendation
for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Methods and
Techniques, December 2001
[NIST_800_38B]
NIST Special Publication 800-38B: 2005, Recommendation
for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The CMAC Mode for
Authentication, May 2005
[PKCS#3]
PKCS #3: Diffie-Hellman Key-Agreement Standard, An RSA
Laboratories Technical Note, Version 1.4 Revised
November 1, 1993
26
This document and the information it contains is the property of IDEMIA. It may not be used, reproduced or transmitted to a third
party without prior written approval.
[PP_BAC]
Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable
Travel Document with "ICAO Application", Basic Access
Control, BSI-CC-PP-0055-2009, Version 1.10, 25th March
2009
[PP_EAC]
EAC- Machine readable travel documents with “ICAO
Application”, Extended Access control – BSI-PP-0056 v1.10
25th march 2009
[PP_EACwPACE]
Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable
Travel Document with “ICAO Application”, Extended
Access Control with PACE (EAC PP), BSI-CC-PP0056-V2-
2012-MA-02, version 1.3.2, 5th December 2012
[PP_IC]
Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation
Packages Version 1.0, Registered and Certified by
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI)
under the reference BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014.
[PP_PACE]
Machine Readable Travel Document using Standard
Inspection Procedure with PACE, BSI-CC-PP-0068-V2-
2011-MA-01, Version 1.01, 22 July 2014
[PP-SSCD2]
Protection profiles for secure signature creation device —
Part 2: Device with key Generation, EN 419211-2:2013,
CEN/TC 224, BSI-CC-PP-0059-2009-MA-02, Version 2.0.1,
June 30 2016
[PP-SSCD3]
Protection profiles for secure signature creation device –
Part3: Device with key import, EN 419211-3:2013, CEN/TC
224, BSI-CC-PP-0075-2012-MA-01, Version 1.0.2, June 30
2016
[PP-SSCD4]
Protection profiles for secure signature creation device —
Part 4: Extension for device with key generation and
trusted communication with certificate generation
application, EN 419211-4:2013, CEN/TC 224, BSI-CC-PP-
0071-2012-MA-01, Version 1.0.1, June 30 2016
[PP-SSCD5]
Protection profiles for secure signature creation device —
Part 5: Extension for device with key generation and
trusted communication with signature creation application,
EN 419211-5:2013, CEN/TC 224, BSI-CC-PP-0072-2012-
MA-01, Version 1.0.1, June 30 2016
[PP-SSCD6]
Protection profiles for secure signature creation device –
Part6: Extension for device with key import and trusted
communication with signature-creation application, EN
419211-6:2013, CEN/TC 224, BSI-CC-PP-0076-2013-MA-
01, Version 1.0.4, June 30 2016
[PTF_CERT] ANSSI-CC-2023/06 - ID-One COSMO X
27
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party without prior written approval.
[QR_Guide] FQR 220 1646 Ed 1 - CombICAO Applet V3 -
Recommendations for Compatibility with QR
[RGS2_B1]
GUIDE DES MÉCANISMES CRYPTOGRAPHIQUES RÈGLES
ET RECOMMANDATIONS CONCERNANT LE CHOIX ET LE
DIMENSIONNEMENT DES MÉCANISMES
CRYPTOGRAPHIQUES, Version 2.04 du 01 Janvier 2020
[ST_PTF] Security Target Lite ID-ONE Cosmo X, FQR 110 A19A
[TR-03110-1]
Technical Guideline TR-03110-1, Advanced Security
Mechanisms for Machine Readable Travel Documents –Part
1 – eMRTDs with BAC/PACEv2 and EACv1, Version 2.20,
26.02.2015 by BSI
[TR-03110-2]
Technical Guideline TR-03110-2, Advanced Security
Mechanisms for Machine Readable Travel Documents –Part
2 – Extended Access Control Version 2 (EACv2),Password
Authenticated Connection Establishment (PACE),and
Restricted Identification (RI), Version 2.21, 21.12.2016 by
BSI
[TR-03110-3]
TR-03110-3 Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine
Readable Travel Documents – Part 3: Common
Specifications, version 2.21, 21-12-2016 by BSI
[TR-03111]
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI),
Technical Guideline TR-03111 Elliptic Curve Cryptography,
TR-03111, Version 1.11, 17.04.2009
[X9.92]
AMERICAN NATIONAL STANDARD X9.92-2017: Public Key
Cryptography For The Financial Services Industry (rDSA),
02.02.2017
28
This document and the information it contains is the property of IDEMIA. It may not be used, reproduced or transmitted to a third
party without prior written approval.
3 TOE Overview and Description
3.1 TOE Overview
The TOE is a composite product that consist of an IDEMIA applet named CombICAO v3
loaded on ID-One Cosmo X Global Platform and Java Card Operating system. The product is
contact and/or contactless smart card security controller in BAC and CA configuration
Products.
The Basic Access Control is a security feature which is mandatory supported by the TOE.
The inspection system
(i) Reads optically the MRTD,
(ii) Authenticates itself as inspection system by means of Document Basic Access Keys.
(iii)After successful authentication of the inspection system the MRTD’s chip provides
read access to the logical MRTD by means of private communication (secure
messaging) with this inspection system [ICAO_9303].
The Chip Authentication defined in [TR_03110-3] and [ICAO_9303] is a security feature,
which is optionally supported by the TOE.
The Chip Authentication is provided by the following steps:
(i) The inspection system communicates by means of secure messaging established by
Basic Access Control,
(ii) The inspection system reads and verifies by means of the Passive Authentication the
authenticity of the MRTD’s Chip Authentication Public Key using the Document
Security Object,
(iii)The inspection system generates an ephemeral key pair,
(iv)The TOE and the inspection system agree on two session keys for secure messaging
in ENC_MAC mode according to the Diffie-Hellman Primitive and
(v) The inspection system verifies by means of received message authentication codes
whether the MRTD’s chip was able or not to run this protocol properly (i.e. the
TOE proves to be in possession of the Chip Authentication Private Key
corresponding to the Chip Authentication Public Key used for derivation of the
session keys). The Chip Authentication requires collaboration of the TOE and the
TOE environment.
This TOE addresses the Chip Authentication as an alternative to the Active Authentication
stated in [ICAO_9303].
Within the scope of this ST, the TOE can be configured as a stand-alone application or as a
combination of the following official ID document applications:
 ICAO eMRTD and
 EU/ISO Driving Licence compliant to [ISO_18013-3] or [ISO_TR_19446].
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party without prior written approval.
The TOE may be used as an ISO Driving Licence (IDL) as both eMRTD and IDL applications
share the same protocols and data structure organization
The CombICAO Applet v3 is also evaluated in other configurations as mentioned in the
Table below.
This ST considers the CombICAO Applet v3 in the BAC and CA configuration.
Configuration PP Conformity Extensions to the PP
BAC and CA [PP_BAC]
- Active Authentication (AA)
- Chip Authentication Protocol (v1)
- Restart secure messaging in AES128,
AES192 or AES256 secure messaging
(in addition to 3DES) after Chip
Authentication Protocol (v1)
EAC in
combination with
BAC
[PP_EAC] - Active Authentication (AA)
EAC with PACE
[PP_PACE]
- Active Authentication (AA)
[PP_EACwPACE]
EAC with PACE
for French ID
[PP_PACE]
- [ADDENDUM]
- Active Authentication (AA)
[PP_EACwPACE]
SSCD
[PP-SSCD2],
[PP-SSCD3],
[PP-SSCD4],
[PP-SSCD5], and
[PP-SSCD6]
- ADMIN role
- Integrity token
Table 1 Different evaluated configurations of the CombICAO application
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party without prior written approval.
3.2 TOE Description
The TOE in the BAC configuration encompasses the following features:
 In Personalisation phase:
 authentication protocol for personalisation agent authentication;
 3DES, AES128, AES192 and AES256 Global Platform secure messaging;
 access control;
 Creation and configuration of application instances and their logical data
structure;
 Secure data loading;
 life-cycle phase switching to operational phase;
 In operational phase:
 BAC;
 Active Authentication (AA);
 Chip Authentication v1 (CAv1);
 After CAv1: restart ICAO secure messaging in 3DES, AES128, AES192 or AES256
cipher mode;
Note: Active Authentication and Chip Authentication are optional security features.
3.2.1 Physical scope of the TOE
The TOE is physically made up of several components hardware and software.
Once constructed, the TOE is a bare microchip with its external interfaces for
communication.
The TOE may be used on several physical medium like wafer, inlay, eCover, eDatapage,
eMRTD booklet or in a smart card.
The physical medium on which the microchip is mounted is not part of the target of
evaluation as it does not alter nor modify any security functions of the TOE. Also, the inlay
production including the application of the antenna is not part of the TOE
3.2.2 Logical scope of the TOE
The TOE is a smartcard, composed of:
 IC,
 Java Card Open Platform (OS) and
 CombICAO Applet v3 (data storage file structure)
The pre-personalisation and personalisation are performed by the Manufacturer and the
Personalisation Agent, which controls the TOE. All along this phase, the TOE is self-
protected, as it requires the authentication of the Manufacturer and the Personalisation
Agent prior to any operation.
By being authenticated, the Personalisation Agent gets the rights (access control) for
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party without prior written approval.
(1) reading and writing data,
(2) instantiating the application, and
(3) writing of personalisation data. The Personalisation Agent can so create the file
structure (MF / ADF) required for this configuration.
A schematic overview of the TOE’s logical architecture is shown in below figure:
Figure 1 TOE’s logical architecture
The TOE is composed of:
 Circuitry of the MRTD’s chip (the IC) :
 IC Dedicated Software with the parts IC Dedicated Test Software and IC Dedicated
Support Software
 ID-One Cosmo X Platform: see [ST_PTF] and [PTF_CERT]
 CombICAO Applet v3
 Associated guidance documentation (delivered in electronic version).
32
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party without prior written approval.
The following guidance documents will be provided with the TOE:
Guidance Audience Form Factor of Delivery
[AGD_PRE] Personalising Agent
Electronic Version
[AGD_OPE] End user of the TOE
The following guide is provided only in case compliancy with QR scheme is required:
Guidance Purpose Form Factor of Delivery
[QR_Guide]
Recommendations for
QR Electronic Version
This ST Lite version of this Security Target will also be provided along with above-mentioned
documents.
Platform related guidance documents are mentioned in [ST_PTF].
“Life Cycle” section in this ST provides more details about the TOE delivery for the different
options.
3.3 Required non-TOE hardware/Software/firmware
There is no explicit non-TOE hardware, software or firmware required by the TOE to perform
its claimed security features. The TOE is defined to comprise the chip and the complete
operating system and application. Note, the inlay holding the chip as well as the antenna and
the booklet (holding the printed MRZ) are needed to represent a complete MRTD,
nevertheless these parts are not inevitable for the secure operation of the TOE.
Note: In particular, the TOE may be used in contact mode, without any inlay or antenna.
33
This document and the information it contains is the property of IDEMIA. It may not be used, reproduced or transmitted to a third
party without prior written approval.
3.4 TOE Usage and major security features of the TOE
A State or Organization issues MRTDs to be used by the holder for international travel. The
travel document presenter presents a MRTD to the inspection system to prove his or her
identity.
The MRTD in context of this Security Target contains
i. visual (eye readable) biographical data and portrait of the holder,
ii. a separate data summary (MRZ data) for visual and machine reading using OCR
methods in the Machine readable zone (MRZ) and
iii. data elements on the MRTD’s chip according to LDS for contactless machine reading.
The authentication of the travel document presenter is based on (i) the possession of
a valid MRTD personalised for a holder with the claimed identity as given on the
biographical data page and (ii) optional biometrics using the reference data stored in
the MRTD. The issuing State or Organization ensures the authenticity of the data of
genuine MRTD’s. The receiving State trusts a genuine MRTD of an issuing State or
Organization.
The MRTD is viewed as unit of
(a) the physical MRTD as travel document in form of paper, plastic and chip. It
presents visual readable data including (but not limited to) personal data of
the MRTD holder
(1) the biographical data on the biographical data page of the passport
book,
(2) the printed data in the Machine-Readable Zone (MRZ) and
(3) the printed portrait.
(b) the logical MRTD as data of the MRTD holder stored according to the
Logical Data Structure [ICAO_9303] as specified by ICAO on the contactless
integrated circuit. It presents contactless readable data including (but not
limited to) personal data of the MRTD holder
(1) the digital Machine Readable Zone Data (digital MRZ data, EF.DG1),
(2) the digitized portraits (EF.DG2),
(3) the optional biometric reference data of finger(s) (EF.DG3) or iris
image(s) (EF.DG4) or both
(4) the other data according to LDS (EF.DG5 to EF.DG16) and
(5) the Document security object.
The issuing State or Organization implements security features of the MRTD to maintain the
authenticity and integrity of the MRTD and their data. The MRTD as the passport book and
the MRTD’s chip is uniquely identified by the Document Number.
34
This document and the information it contains is the property of IDEMIA. It may not be used, reproduced or transmitted to a third
party without prior written approval.
The physical MRTD is protected by physical security measures (e.g. watermark on paper,
security printing), logical (e.g. authentication keys of the MRTD’s chip) and organizational
security measures (e.g. control of materials, personalisation procedures) [ICAO_9303].
These security measures include the binding of the MRTD’s chip to the passport book.
The logical MRTD is protected in authenticity and integrity by a digital signature created by
the document signer acting for the issuing State or Organization and the security features of
the MRTD’s chip.
The ICAO defines the baseline security methods Passive Authentication and the optional
advanced security methods Basic Access Control to the logical MRTD, Extended Access
Control to and the Data Encryption of additional sensitive biometrics as optional security
measure in the ‘ICAO Doc 9303’ [ICAO_9303]. The Passive Authentication Mechanism and
the Data Encryption are performed completely and independently on the TOE by the TOE
environment.
Mutatis mutandis, the TOE may also be used as an ISO driving licence, compliant to
[ISO_18013-3] or [ISO_TR_19446] supporting BAP-1 (the same protocol as BAC but used in
the context of driving licence), AA and CA, as both applications (MRTD and IDL) share the
same protocols and data structure organization. Therefore, in the rest of the document, the
word “MRTD” MAY be understood either as a MRTD in the sense of ICAO, or a driving
licence compliant to [ISO_18013-3] or [ISO_TR_19446] depending on the targeted usage
envisioned by the issuer.
The table below indicates how terms and concept present in the current document shall be
read, when considering the TOE to be an ISO driving licence:
MRTD ISO-compliant Driving Licence
MRTD IDL
ICAO ISO/IEC
ICAO 9303 [ISO_18013-3] or [ISO_TR_19446]
BAC BAP-1
DG3 DG7
DG4 DG8
DG15 DG13
MRZ or CAN MRZ or SAI
Traveller Holder
3.4.1 Active Authentication (AA)
Active Authentication is an authentication mechanism ensuring the chip is genuine. It uses a
challenge-response protocol between the IS and the chip.
Active Authentication is realised with the INTERNAL AUTHENTICATE command. The
key and algorithms supported are the following:
35
This document and the information it contains is the property of IDEMIA. It may not be used, reproduced or transmitted to a third
party without prior written approval.
RSA ISO/IEC 9796-2 with a key length of 1024, 1536, 2048, 3072 and 4096 bits and hashing
algorithm of SHA1 or SHA2 (i.e. SHA256, SHA384 and SHA512).
ECDSA over prime field curves with hashing algorithm of SHA1 or SHA2 (i.e. SHA256,
SHA384 and SHA512) and the key sizes 192 to 521
3.4.2 Basic Access Control (BAC)
The protocol for Basic Access Control is specified by [ICAO_9303]. Basic Access Control
checks that the terminal has physical access to the MRTD’s data page. This is enforced by
requiring the terminal to derive an authentication key from the optically read MRZ of the
MRTD. The protocol for Basic Access Control is based on [ISO11770-2] key establishment
mechanism 6. This protocol is also used to generate session keys that are used to protect
the confidentiality (and integrity) of the transmitted data.
The Basic Access Control (BAC) is a security feature that is supported by the TOE. The
inspection system reads the printed data on the document (MRZ), authenticates itself as
inspection system by means of keys derived from MRZ data. After successful 3DES based
authentication, the TOE provides read access to data requiring BAC rights by means of a
private communication (secure messaging) with the inspection system.
The purpose of this mechanism is to ensure that the holder gives access to the IS to the
logical MRTD (data stored in the chip); It is achieved by a mutual authentication.
Once the mutual authentication is performed, a secure messaging is available to protect the
communication between the chip and the IS.
This table lists the supported configurations for BAC protocol:
Configuration Key Algo Key Length Hash Algo MAC Algo
BAC 3DES 2Key 16-bytes SHA-1 Retail MAC
Table 2 BAC Configuration
3.4.3 Chip Authentication Protocol (v1)
The Chip Authentication Protocol is an ephemeral-static Diffie-Hellman key agreement
protocol that provides secure communication and unilateral authentication of the MRTD chip.
The protocol establishes Secure Messaging between an MRTD chip and a terminal based on
a static key pair stored on the MRTD chip. Chip Authentication is an alternative to the
optional ICAO Active Authentication, i.e. it enables the terminal to verify that the MRTD chip
is genuine but has two advantages over the original protocol:
 Challenge Semantics are prevented because the transcripts produced by this protocol
are non-transferable.
 Besides authentication of the MRTD chip this protocol also provides strong session
keys.
36
This document and the information it contains is the property of IDEMIA. It may not be used, reproduced or transmitted to a third
party without prior written approval.
CAv1 provides implicit authentication of both the MRTD chip itself and the stored data by
performing Secure Messaging using the new session keys.
37
This document and the information it contains is the property of IDEMIA. It may not be used, reproduced or transmitted to a third
party without prior written approval.
4 Life Cycle
The TOE life cycle in the following figure distinguishes stages for development, production,
preparation and operational use in accordance with the standard smart card life cycle
[PP_IC].
Figure 2 Life cycle Overview
38
This document and the information it contains is the property of IDEMIA. It may not be used, reproduced or transmitted to a third
party without prior written approval.
4.1 Development Environment
In this environment, the following two phases take place:
 Phase 1: IC Embedded Software Development (Java Card Open Platform components
and CombICAO Applet v3)
 Phase 2: IC Development
The IC Embedded Software Developer is in charge of the specification, development and
validation of the software (Java Card Open Platform and CombICAO Applet v3).
The IC Developer designs the IC, develops the IC dedicated software and provides
information, software or tools to the IC embedded software developer.
Roles, actors, sites and coverage for this environment of the product life-cycle are listed in
the table below:
Role Actor Site Covered by
CombICAO Applet v3
Developer
IDEMIA MANILA, JAKARTA,
COURBEVOIE and PESSAC
R&D sites
ALC
Embedded Software
Developer (Java Card Open
Platform)
IDEMIA Platform Developer
Refer to [ST_PTF]
ALC
Redaction and Review of
Documents
IDEMIA NOIDA, COURBEVOIE and
PESSAC R&D sites
ALC
IC Developer INFINEON IC Manufacturer
Refer to [ST_PTF]
ALC
Table 3 : Development R&D Sites
4.2 Production Environment
In this environment, the following two phases take place:
 Phase 3: IC Manufacturing
 Phase 4: ID-One Cosmo X Platform loading and CombICAO Applet v3 loading
The CombICAO Applet v3 run time code is integrated in the FLASH memory of the chip.
Depending on the intention, the following different loading options are supported. Details on
delivery methods for each option are provided in the [AGD_PRE].
39
This document and the information it contains is the property of IDEMIA. It may not be used, reproduced or transmitted to a third
party without prior written approval.
IDEMIA CC Audited Production Sites are listed below:
IDEMIA CC Audited Production
Sites/Plants
Country
Haarlem Netherlands
Noida India
Ostrava Czech Republic
Shenzhen China
Vitré France
Table 4 : Audited Production Sites
(Option 1) Image Loading audited IC Manufacturer site
FLASH image containing both the “ID-One Cosmo X” Java Card Platform OS along with the
CombICAO Applet v3 is securely delivered directly from the software developer (IDEMIA R&D
Audited Site) to the IC Manufacturer (Infineon CC Audited Site) to be loaded into FLASH
memory. The FLASH image is always encrypted.
TOE Delivery point (i.e. point in time where the TOE starts to exist):
 The TOE delivery point occurs in Phase 4, as soon as the loading of the
image with ID-One Cosmo X Platform + CombICAO Applet v3 by the IC
Manufacturer has been completed.
Package Actor
for FLASH image
loading
Site
For FLASH image
loading
Covered by
CC
FLASH image containing
ID-One Cosmo X Platform
+ CombICAO Applet v3
IC Manufacturer
IC Manufacturer CC
Audited Production Plants
specified in
[ST_PTF]
ALC
Table 5 Option 1: Both Platform and Applet packages are loaded at IC
Manufacturer Site
(Option 2) Image loading at IDEMIA and External sites
FLASH image containing both ID-One Cosmo X Platform along with CombICAO Applet v3 is
securely delivered directly from the software developer (IDEMIA R&D Audited Site) for
loading to CC Audited IDEMIA Production Sites (Refer Audited Production Sites Table)
or Non-Audited IDEMIA Sites or External Sites.
TOE Delivery point:
40
This document and the information it contains is the property of IDEMIA. It may not be used, reproduced or transmitted to a third
party without prior written approval.
 If loading of ID-One Cosmo X Platform + CombICAO Applet v3 is
performed in Audited IDEMIA Production Sites, then TOE delivery is
considered at the end of Phase 4.
 If loading of ID-One Cosmo X Platform + CombICAO Applet v3 is
performed in Non-Audited IDEMIA Production Sites or External Sites, then
TOE delivery is considered after Phase 4.
Package Actor for FLASH
image loading
Site for FLASH image
loading
Covered by
CC
FLASH image containing
the ID-One Cosmo X
Platform + CombICAO
Applet v3
IDEMIA Authorized
Entity
Refer Audited Production
Sites Table
ALC
External Authorized
Agent
Non-Audited IDEMIA
Sites
or
External Sites
AGD
Table 6 Option 2: Both Platform and Applet packages are loaded at CC Audited
IDEMIA Sites or Non-Audited IDEMIA Sites or External Sites
(Option 3) Platform loaded by IC Manufacturer, Applet loaded by IDEMIA or 3rd
party
Only the ID-One Cosmo X Platform is delivered to the IC Manufacturer (Infineon Audited
Sites) to be loaded.
With the ID-One Cosmo X Platform already loaded (i.e. present) on the chip, the following
options (3a or 3b (i) or 3b (ii) or 3c) can be chosen for loading the CombICAO Applet v3.
(Option 3a) Applet loading using GP CLFDB mechanism.
The CombICAO Applet v3 along with the TOE’s guidance documentation is securely
delivered directly from the Software Developer (IDEMIA R&D Audited Site) to
Audited IDEMIA Production Sites (Refer Audited Production Sites Table) or Non-
Audited IDEMIA Sites or External Sites.
Loading of the CombICAO Applet v3 on top of the already present ID-One Cosmo X
Platform GP Java Card OS in any of these sites is accomplished by using a GP CLFDB
decryption Key.
TOE Delivery points:
 If loading of the CombICAO Applet v3 on top of already loaded ID-One
Cosmo X Platform (as described below) is done in a CC Audited IDEMIA
Production Sites then, TOE delivery is considered at the end of Phase 4.
41
This document and the information it contains is the property of IDEMIA. It may not be used, reproduced or transmitted to a third
party without prior written approval.
 If loading of the CombICAO Applet v3 on top of already loaded ID-One
Cosmo X Platform (as described below) is done in Non-Audited IDEMIA
Production Sites or External Sites then, TOE delivery is considered after phase
4.
Package Actor Site Covered by
Image containing only ID-
One Cosmo X Platform
IC Manufacturer
IC Manufacturer
Production Plants
Refer to [PTF-CERT]
ALC
CombICAO Applet v3 loaded
through GP mechanism using
CLFDB Key
IDEMIA Authorized
Entity
Refer Audited Production
Sites Table
ALC
External
Authorized Agent
Non-Audited IDEMIA
Sites
or
External Sites
AGD
Table 7 Option 3(a): Platform package is loaded at IC Manufacturer Site and
Applet package is loaded at Audited IDEMIA Sites or Non-Audited IDEMIA Sites
or External Sites through GP Mechanism
42
This document and the information it contains is the property of IDEMIA. It may not be used, reproduced or transmitted to a third
party without prior written approval.
(Option 3b) Applet loading using the IDEMIA Resident Application
(i) CombICAO Applet v3 along with the guidance documentation is securely
delivered directly from the Software Developer (IDEMIA R&D Audited Site) to
Audited IDEMIA Production Sites (Refer Audited Production Sites Table)
or Non-Audited IDEMIA Sites or External Sites.
CombICAO Applet v3 package is securely loaded via LSK on top of the
present ID-One Cosmo X Platform Java Card OS in any of these sites. This
loading is accomplished by using the IDEMIA “Resident Application” of the ID-
One Cosmo X Platform.
(ii) The DUMP package (including CombICAO Applet v3) with the guidance
documentation is securely delivered directly from the Software Developer
(IDEMIA R&D Audited Site) to Audited IDEMIA Production Sites (Refer
Audited Production Sites Table) or Non-Audited IDEMIA Sites or External
Sites.
Loading of DUMP PACKAGES in any of these sites is done through Resident
Application using DSK secret production key on top of the platform already
loaded by IC Manufacturer (Infineon).
TOE Delivery points:
 If loading of Applet package /DUMP Package on top of already loaded ID-One
Cosmo X Platform (as described below) is done in Audited IDEMIA Production
Sites then, TOE delivery is considered at the end of Phase 4.
 If loading of Applet package /DUMP Package on top of already loaded ID-One
Cosmo X Platform (as described below) is done in Non-Audited IDEMIA
Production Sites or External Sites then, TOE delivery after Phase 4.
43
This document and the information it contains is the property of IDEMIA. It may not be used, reproduced or transmitted to a third
party without prior written approval.
Package Actor Site Covered by
Image containing only ID-One
Cosmo X Platform
IC Manufacturer
IC Manufacturer
Production Plants
Refer to [PTF-CERT]
ALC
3b (i)
CombICAO Applet v3 loaded
through Resident Application
using LSK format
IDEMIA
Authorized Entity
Refer Audited Production
Sites Table
ALC
External
Authorized
Agent
Non-Audited IDEMIA
Sites
or
External Sites
AGD
3b (ii)
DUMP PACKAGE Ciphered
format [DSK Secret Live Key]
IDEMIA
Authorized Entity
Refer Audited Production
Sites Table ALC
External
Authorized
Agent
Non-Audited IDEMIA
Sites
or
External Sites
AGD
Table 8 Platform package is loaded at IC Manufacturer Site and Applet package is
loaded through resident application using LSK format or DUMP Package in
Ciphered format is loaded
44
This document and the information it contains is the property of IDEMIA. It may not be used, reproduced or transmitted to a third
party without prior written approval.
(Option 3c) Applet loading in plain (unprotected) format using GP
CombICAO Applet v3 along with the guidance documentation is securely delivered
directly from the Software Developer (IDEMIA R&D Audited Site) to CC Audited
IDEMIA Production Sites (Refer Audited Production Sites Table).
Here, there is a provision for loading the applet in plain format in Common Criteria
Audited IDEMIA Sites only, on top of the platform already loaded by IC
Manufacturer (Infineon). This applet loading in plain format is not allowed in Non-
Audited IDEMIA Sites or External Sites.
TOE Delivery points:
 The loading of CombICAO Applet v3 on top of already loaded ID-One Cosmo
X Platform is done in plain (unprotected) format in Common Criteria Audited
IDEMIA Production Sites. The TOE delivery is considered at the end of Phase
4.
Package Actor Site Covered by
Image containing only ID-
One Cosmo X Platform
IC Manufacturer
IC Manufacturer
Production Plants
Refer to [PTF-CERT]
ALC
CombICAO Applet v3 in
Plain Format
IDEMIA Authorized
Entity Refer Audited Production
Sites Table
ALC
Table 9 Option 3(c): Platform package is loaded at IC Manufacturer Site and
Applet package in plain format is loaded at Audited IDEMIA Sites only
45
This document and the information it contains is the property of IDEMIA. It may not be used, reproduced or transmitted to a third
party without prior written approval.
(Option 4) Platform and Applet loaded by IDEMIA or 3rd
party
Only ID-One Cosmo X Platform is securely delivered directly from the software developer
(IDEMIA R&D Audited Site) for loading to CC Audited IDEMIA Production Sites (Refer
Audited Production Sites Table) or Non-Audited IDEMIA Sites or External Sites.
Note: Here, when the ID-One Cosmo X Platform package is loaded in Non-Audited IDEMIA
Sites or External Sites, then the Platform is in self-protected mode by its secure functions
The following options (4a or 4b (i) or 4b (ii) or 4c) can be chosen for loading applets on
top of the already loaded platform.
(Option 4a) Applet loading using GP CLFDB mechanism
CombICAO Applet v3 along with the guidance documentation is securely delivered
directly from the Software Developer (IDEMIA R&D Audited Site) to Audited
IDEMIA Production Sites (Refer Audited Production Sites Table) or Non-Audited
IDEMIA Sites or External Sites.
Loading of Applet in any of these sites is done through GP mechanism using CLFDB
Key on top of the platform already loaded by CC Audited IDEMIA Production
Sites or Non-Audited IDEMIA Sites or External Sites.
TOE Delivery points:
 If loading of the CombICAO Applet v3 on top of already loaded ID-One
Cosmo X Platform (as described below) is done in CC Audited IDEMIA
Production Sites then, TOE delivery is considered at the end of Phase 4.
 If loading of the CombICAO Applet v3 onto the already loaded ID-One Cosmo
X Platform (as described below) is done in Non-Audited IDEMIA Production
Sites or External Sites then, TOE delivery is considered after Phase 4.
46
This document and the information it contains is the property of IDEMIA. It may not be used, reproduced or transmitted to a third
party without prior written approval.
Package Actor Site Covered by
Image containing
only ID-One
Cosmo X
Platform
IDEMIA Authorized
Entity
Refer Audited Production Sites
Table
ALC
External Authorized
Agent
Non-Audited IDEMIA Sites
or
External Sites
AGD
CombICAO
Applet v3 loaded
through GP
mechanism using
CLFDB Key
IDEMIA Authorized
Entity
Refer Audited Production Sites
Table
ALC
External Authorized
Agent
Non-Audited IDEMIA Sites
or
External Sites
AGD
Table 10 Option 4(a): Platform package is loaded at Audited IDEMIA Sites or Non-
Audited IDEMIA Sites or External Sites and Applet package is loaded at Audited
IDEMIA Sites or Non-Audited IDEMIA Sites or External Sites through GP
Mechanism
47
This document and the information it contains is the property of IDEMIA. It may not be used, reproduced or transmitted to a third
party without prior written approval.
(Option 4b) Applet loading using the IDEMIA Resident Application
(i) CombICAO Applet v3 along with the guidance documentation is securely
delivered directly from the Software Developer (IDEMIA R&D Audited Site) to
Audited IDEMIA Production Sites (Refer Audited Production Sites Table)
or Non-Audited IDEMIA Sites or External Sites.
Secure loading of CombICAO Applet v3 is done via LSK on top of the present
Cosmo X Java Card OS (already loaded by Audited IDEMIA Production
Sites or Non-Audited IDEMIA Sites or External Sites) in any of these
sites. This loading is accomplished by using the IDEMIA “Resident Application”
of the ID-One Cosmo X Platform OS
(ii) DUMP package (including the CombICAO Applet v3) with the guidance
documentation is securely delivered directly from the Software Developer
(IDEMIA R&D Audited Site) to Audited IDEMIA Production Sites (Refer
Audited Production Sites Table) or Non-Audited IDEMIA Sites or External
Sites.
Loading of DUMP PACKAGES in any of these sites is done through Resident
Application using DSK secret production key on top of the platform already
loaded by Audited IDEMIA Production Sites or Non-Audited IDEMIA
Sites or External Sites.
TOE Delivery points:
 If loading of Applet package /DUMP Package on top of already loaded ID-One
Cosmo X Platform (as described below) is done in Audited IDEMIA Production
Sites then, TOE delivery is considered at the end of Phase 4.
 If loading of Applet package /DUMP Package on top of already loaded ID-One
Cosmo X Platform (as described below) is done in Non-Audited IDEMIA
Production Sites or External Sites then, TOE delivery is considered after Phase
4.
48
This document and the information it contains is the property of IDEMIA. It may not be used, reproduced or transmitted to a third
party without prior written approval.
Package Actor Site
Covered
by
Image containing only ID-One
Cosmo X Platform
IDEMIA
Authorized Entity
Refer Audited Production
Sites Table
ALC
External
Authorized Agent
Non-Audited IDEMIA Sites
or
External Sites
AGD
4b (i)
CombICAO Applet v3
package loaded through
Resident Application using
LSK format
IDEMIA
Authorized Entity
Refer Audited Production
Sites Table
ALC
External
Authorized Agent
Non-Audited IDEMIA Sites
or
External Sites
AGD
4b (ii)
DUMP PACKAGE Ciphered
format [DSK Secret Live Key]
IDEMIA
Authorized Entity
Refer Audited Production
Sites Table ALC
External
Authorized Agent
Non-Audited IDEMIA Sites
or
External Sites
AGD
Table 11 Platform package is loaded at Audited IDEMIA Sites or Non-Audited
IDEMIA Sites or External Sites and Options and Applet package is loaded through
Resident application using LSK format or DUMP Package in Ciphered format is
loaded
(Option 4c) Applet loading in plain (unprotected) format using GP
CombICAO Applet v3 along with the guidance documentation is securely delivered
directly from the Software Developer (IDEMIA R&D Audited Site) to Audited
IDEMIA Production Sites (Refer Audited Production Sites Table).
Here, there is a provision of loading the applet in plain format in Audited IDEMIA
Sites only, on top of the platform already loaded by Audited IDEMIA Production Sites
or Non-Audited IDEMIA Sites or External Sites. This applet loading in plain format is
not allowed in Non-Audited IDEMIA Sites or External Sites.
TOE Delivery points:
49
This document and the information it contains is the property of IDEMIA. It may not be used, reproduced or transmitted to a third
party without prior written approval.
 Here, since the loading of Applet package on top of already loaded ID-One
Cosmo X Platform (as described below) is done in Plain format in CC Audited
IDEMIA Production Sites, so TOE delivery is considered at the end of Phase 4.
Package Actor Site Covered by
Image containing only ID-
One Cosmo X Platform
IDEMIA
Authorized Entity
Refer Audited Production
Sites Table
ALC
External
Authorized Agent
Non-Audited IDEMIA
Sites
or
External Sites
AGD
CombICAO Applet v3 in
Plain Format
IDEMIA
Authorized Entity
Refer Audited Production
Sites Table
ALC
Table 12 Option 4(c): Platform package is loaded at IC Manufacturer Site and
Applet package in plain format is loaded at CC Audited IDEMIA Sites only
50
This document and the information it contains is the property of IDEMIA. It may not be used, reproduced or transmitted to a third
party without prior written approval.
4.3 Preparation Environment
In this environment, the following two phases take place:
 Phase 5: Pre-personalisation of the applet
 Phase 6: Personalisation
The preparation environment may not necessarily take place in a manufacturing site, but
may be performed anywhere. All along these two phases, the TOE is self-protected as it
requires the authentication of the pre-personalisation agent or personalisation agent prior to
any operation.
The CombICAO Applet v3 is pre-personalised and personalised according to [AGD_PRE].
These two phases are covered by [AGD_PRE] tasks of the TOE and Guidance tasks of
[ST_PTF].
4.4 Operational Environment
Phase 7: Use Phase
The TOE is used as a travel document's chip by the traveller and the inspection systems in
the “Operational Use” phase. The user data can be read according to the security policy of
the issuing State or Organisation and can be used according to the security policy of the
issuing State but they can never be modified for eMRTD application.
Note that applications can be loaded onto the ID-One Cosmo X platform during this phase.
During this phase, the TOE may be used as described in [AGD_OPE] of the TOE.
This phase is covered by [AGD_OPE] tasks of the TOE and Guidance tasks of [ST_PTF].
51
This document and the information it contains is the property of IDEMIA. It may not be used, reproduced or transmitted to a third
party without prior written approval.
5 Conformance claims
5.1 Common Criteria Conformance Claim
This security target claims conformance to the Common Criteria version 3.1, revision 5 [CC2]
and [CC3].
The conformance to the CC is claimed as follows:
CC Conformance rationale
Part 2
Conformance with the extended3
part:
 FAU_SAS.1 “Audit Storage”
 FCS_RND.1 “Quality metric for random numbers”
 FMT_LIM.1 “Limited capabilities”
 FMT_LIM.2 “Limited availability”
 FPT_EMS.1 “TOE Emanation”
 FIA_API.12
“Authentication Proof of Identity”
Part 3
Conformance to EAL4, augmented with
 ALC_DVS.2 “Sufficiency of security measures” defined in [CC3],
 ADV_FSP.5 “Complete semi-formal functional specification with additional
error information” defined in [CC3],
 ADV_INT.2 “Well-structured internals” defined in [CC3],
 ADV_TDS.4 “Semiformal modular design” defined in [CC3],
 ALC_CMS.5 “Development tools CM coverage” defined in [CC3],
 ALC_TAT.2 “Compliance with implementation standards” defined in [CC3],
 ATE_DPT.3 “Testing: modular design” defined in [CC3].
Table 13 Common Criteria conformance claim
Remark:
For interoperability reasons, it is assumed the receiving state cares for sufficient measures
against eavesdropping within the operating environment of the inspection systems.
Otherwise, the TOE may protect the confidentiality of some less sensitive assets (e.g. the
personal data of the TOE holder which are also printed on the physical TOE) for some
specific attacks only against enhanced basic attack potential (AVA_VAN.3).
The Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation [CEM] has been
taken into account.
2 FIA_API.1 has been added to this security target for the needs of the Chip Authentication Protocol.
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5.2 Protection Profile Conformance Claim
This security target (ST) claims strict conformance to:
 [PP_BAC] :Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document
with "ICAO Application", Basic Access Control, BSI-CC-PP-0055-2009, Version 1.10,
25th March 2009
This ST also addresses Active Authentication as an additional authentication protocol.
Since the Chip Authentication protocol is an alternative to the Active Authentication defined
in [ICO_9303], the additional assumptions and security objectives for the operational
environment counter the same threats as the ones for chip authentication. They however do
not mitigate the threat, and instead provide an additional functionality to the ones defined in
the PP.
5.3 Package Claim
This ST is conforming to assurance package EAL4 augmented with ADV_FSP.5, ADV_INT.2,
ADV_TDS.4, ALC_CMS.5, ALC_DVS.2, ALC_TAT.2, and ATE_DPT.3 defined in CC part 3
[CC3].
5.3.1 Main aspects
- The TOE description is based on the TOE definition and TOE usage of [PP_BAC]. It was
enhanced by product specific details.
- All definitions of the security problem definition in [PP_BAC] have been taken exactly
from the protection profile in the same wording.
- All security objectives have been taken exactly from [PP_BAC] in the same wording.
- The part of extended components definition has been taken originally from [PP_BAC].
- All SFRs for the TOE have been taken originally from the [PP_BAC] added by according
iterations, selections and assignments.
- The security assurance requirements (SARs) have been taken originally from the
[PP_BAC].
5.3.2 Overview of differences between the PP and the ST
The following parts list additional Subject, Threats and Objectives for this TOE, which are not
in [PP_BAC].
These additions do not contradict with any other Subjects, Threats and Objectives of the
TOE of the original PP nor mitigate a threat (or part of a threat), meant to be addressed by
security objectives for the TOE in the PP.
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5.3.3 Additional Subjects
The following additional Subject are identified:
 Pre-personalization Agent
 MRTD packaging responsible
 Embedded software loading responsible
 Administrator
5.3.4 Additional Threats
The following additional Threats are identified:
 T.Counterfeit
 T.Configuration
 T.ADMIN_Configuration
 T.Key_Access
5.3.5 Additional Organisational Security Policies
The following additional Organisational Security Policy is identified:
 P.Activ_Auth
5.3.6 Additional Assumptions
The following additional Assumptions are identified:
 A.Insp_Sys_Chip_Auth
 A.Signature_PKI
 A.Insp_Sys_AA
5.3.7 Additional Security Objectives
The following additional Security Objectives of the TOE are identified:
 OT.Chip_Auth_Proof
 OT.Configuration
 OT.AA_Proof
 OT.Data_Int_AA
 OT.ADMIN_Configuration
 OT.Key_Usage_Counter
 OT.AC_SM_Level
5.3.8 Additional Security Objectives for the Operational Environment
The following additional Security Objectives of the Operational Environment are identified:
 OE.Auth_MRTD
 OE.Exam_Chip_Auth
 OE.Exam_MRTD_AA
 OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD_AA
 OE.Activ_Auth_Verif
 OE.Activ_Auth_Sign
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5.3.9 Additional Security Functional Requirements
The following additional Security Functional Requirements are identified:
 FCS_CKM.1/CA
 FCS_COP.1/AA
 FCS_COP.1/CA_SHA
 FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC
 FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC
 FCS_CKM.1/GP
 FCS_COP.1/GP_ENC
 FCS_COP.1/GP_AUTH
 FCS_COP.1/GP_MAC
 FCS_COP.1/GP_KEY_DEC
 FIA_UAU.5/MP
 FIA_UAU.6/MP
 FIA_AFL.1/MP
 FIA_UAU.5/CA
 FIA_UAU.6/CA
 FIA_API.1/CA
 FDP_ACC.1/CA
 FDP_ACF.1/CA
 FDP_UCT.1/CA
 FDP_UIT.1/CA
 FDP_DAU.1/AA
 FDP_ITC.1/AA
 FMT_MOF.1/PROT
 FMT_MOF.1/AA
 FMT_MTD.1/CAPK
 FMT_MTD.1/CAPK_READ
 FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_READ
 FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_WRITE
 FMT_MTD.1 /LCS_PERS
 FMT_MTD.1/ADMIN
 FMT_MTD.1/Key_Usage_Counter
 FMT_MTD.1/SM_LVL
 FTP_ITC.1/MP
Note: FPT_EMSEC.1 from [PP_BAC] has been renamed to FPT_EMS.1, in order to keep the
SFR formatting.
5.4 CC Conformance and usage in real life
In the real life, for interoperability purposes, the MRTD will most likely support BAC, PACE
and EAC.
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 If the terminal reads MRTD data by performing only BAC, the security of the MRTD
will be covered by the security evaluation of the TOE described in the ST claiming
compliance to the [PP_BAC] only.
 If the terminal reads the content of the MRTD by performing BAC then EAC, the
security of the MRTD will be covered by the security evaluation of (1) the TOE
described by the ST claiming compliance to [PP_BAC] and (2) the TOE described by
the ST claiming compliance to [PP_EAC], assuming PACE is not supported by the
terminal (as not used for the inspection procedure)
 If the terminal reads the content of the MRTD by performing PACE then EAC, the
security of the MRTD will be covered by the security evaluation of the TOE described
by the ST claiming compliance to [PP_EACwPACE], assuming PACE is supported by
the terminal (as not used for the inspection procedure).
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6 Security Problem Definition
6.1 Assets
6.1.1 Logical MRTD Data
The following table presents the assets of the TOE and their corresponding phase(s)
according to section 1.2.3
Asset Phase 5 Phase 6 Phase 7
Personal Data No Yes Yes
Biometric Data No Yes Yes
EF.COM No Yes Yes
EF.SOD No Yes Yes
CA_PK No Yes Yes
CA_SK No Yes Yes
Perso_K No Yes No
BAC_K No Yes Yes
Session_K Yes Yes Yes
LCS Yes Yes Yes
Personal Data
The Personal Data are the logical MRTD standard User Data of the MRTD holder (EF.DG1,
EF.DG2, EF.DG5 to EF.DG13, EF.DG16).
Biometric Data
The Biometric Data are the sensitive biometric reference data (EF.DG3, EF.DG4).
EF.COM
The EF.COM is an elementary file containing the list of the existing elementary files (EF)
with the user data.
EF.SOD
The elementary file Document Security Object is used by the inspection system for
Passive Authentication of the logical MRTD.
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Chip Authentication Public Key (CA_PK)
The Chip Authentication Public Key (contained in EF.DG14) is used by the inspection
system for the Chip Authentication.
Chip Authentication Private Key (CA_SK)
The Chip Authentication Private Key is used by the application to process Chip
Authentication.
Personalization Agent keys (Perso_K)
This key set used for mutual authentication between the Personalization agent and the
chip, and secure communication establishment.
BAC keys (BAC_K)
This key set used for secure communication establishment between the Terminal and the
chip.
Secure Messaging session keys (Session_K)
Session keys are used to secure communication in confidentiality and authenticity.
TOE Life Cycle State (LCS)
This is the Life Cycle State related to the Prepersonalization, Personalisation and use
phase of the application.
6.1.2 Miscellaneous
Authenticity of the MRTD's chip
The authenticity of the MRTD’s chip personalized by the issuing State or Organization for
the MRTD holder is used by the traveler to prove his possession of a genuine MRTD.
6.2 Users / Subjects
The following table presents the assets of the TOE and their corresponding phase(s)
according to §1.3.6 TOE description
Subject Phase
3
Phase
4
Phase
5
Phase
6
Phase
7
IC manufacturer(Manufacturer role) Yes No No No No
MRTD packaging responsible(Manufacturer role) No Yes No No No
Embedded software loading
responsible(Manufacturer role)
No Yes No No No
Pre-personalization Agent(Manufacturer role) No No Yes No No
Personalization Agent No No No Yes No
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Terminal No No Yes Yes Yes
Inspection System No No No No Yes
MRTD Holder No No No No Yes
Traveler No No No No Yes
Attacker Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
6.2.1 Additional Subject
Pre-personalization Agent
This additional subject is a refinement of the role Manufacturer as described in [PP_BAC].
This subject is responsible for the preparation of the card, i.e. creation of the MF and
MRTD ADF. He also sets Personalization Agent keys.
MRTD packaging responsible
This additional subject is a refinement of the role Manufacturer as described in [PP_BAC].
This subject is responsible for the combination of the IC with hardware for the contactless
and/or contact interface.
Embedded software loading responsible
This additional subject is a refinement of the role Manufacturer as described in [PP_BAC].
This subject is responsible for the embedded software loading when the TOE is loaded by
the OS loader in phase 4 before TOE delivery point This subject does not exist if the TOE
is loaded by the IC Manufacturer. This subject used the Flash loader embedded in the IC.
Administrator
The role ADMIN is an Administrator in use phase who can act on the TOE configuration.
The administrative actions are dedicated to:
o Manage symmetric authentication using Administration Agent keys,
o Configure the size or value of the Chip Authentication key to be modified in USE
phase,
o Change the key parameters during the key generation process,
o Invalidate one of the Chip Authentication key in USE phase and to set the
secondary key as being the primary key.
6.2.2 Miscellaneous
IC Manufacturer
This additional subject is a refinement of the role Manufacturer as described in [PP_BAC].
It is the manufacturer of the IC.
If the IC Manufacturer loads the TOE at phase 3, this subject is responsible for the
embedded software downloading in the IC. This subject does not use Flash loader, even if
it is embedded in the IC.
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Personalization Agent
The agent is acting on behalf of the issuing State or Organization to personalize the MRTD
for the holder by some or all of the following activities (i) establishing the identity the
holder for the biographic data in the MRTD, (ii) enrolling the biometric reference data of
the MRTD holder i.e. the portrait, the encoded finger image(s) and/or the encoded iris
image(s) (iii) writing these data on the physical and logical MRTD for the holder as
defined for global, international and national interoperability, (iv) writing the initial TSF
data and (iv) signing the Document Security Object defined in [ICAO_9303].
Terminal
A terminal is any technical system communicating with the TOE through the contactless
interface.
Note: as the TOE may also be used in contact mode, the terminal may also communicate
using the contact interface
Inspection system (IS)
A technical system used by the border control officer of the receiving State (i) examining
an MRTD presented by the traveler and verifying its authenticity and (ii) verifying the
traveler as MRTD holder. The Basic Inspection System (BIS) (i) contains a terminal for the
contactless communication with the MRTD’s chip, (ii) implements the terminals part of the
Basic Access Control Mechanism and (iii) gets the authorization to read the logical MRTD
under the Basic Access Control by optical reading the MRTD or other parts of the passport
book providing this information. The General Inspection System (GIS) is a Basic
Inspection System which implements additionally the Chip Authentication Mechanism. The
Extended Inspection System (EIS) in addition to the General Inspection System (i)
implements the Terminal Authentication Protocol and (ii) is authorized by the issuing State
or Organization through the Document Verifier of the receiving State to read the sensitive
biometric reference data. The security attributes of the EIS are defined of the Inspection
System Certificates.
MRTD Holder
The rightful holder of the MRTD for whom the issuing State or Organization personalized
the MRTD.
Traveler
Person presenting the MRTD to the inspection system and claiming the identity of the
MRTD holder.
Attacker
A threat agent trying (i) to identify and to trace the movement of the MRTD’s chip
remotely (i.e. without knowing or optically reading the printed MRZ data), (ii) to read or
to manipulate the logical MRTD without authorization, or (iii) to forge a genuine MRTD.
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6.3 Threats
6.3.1 Threats from Protection Profile
T.Chip_ID
"Identification of MRTD’s chip"
Adverse action: An attacker trying to trace the movement of the MRTD by identifying
remotely the MRTD’s chip by establishing or listening to communications through the
contactless communication interface.
Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, not knowing the optically readable
MRZ data printed on the MRTD data page in advance
Asset: Anonymity of user
T.Skimming
"Skimming the logical MRTD"
Adverse action: An attacker imitates an inspection system trying to establish a
communication to read the logical MRTD or parts of it via the contactless communication
channel of the TOE.
Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, not knowing the optically readable
MRZ data printed on the MRTD data page in advance.
Asset: confidentiality of logical MRTD data.
T.Eavesdropping
"Eavesdropping to the communication between TOE and inspection system"
Adverse action: An attacker is listening to an existing communication between the MRTD’s
chip and an inspection system to gain the logical MRTD or parts of it. The inspection
system uses the MRZ data printed on the MRTD data page but the attacker does not
know these data in advance.
Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, not knowing the optically readable
MRZ data printed on the MRTD data page in advance.
Asset: confidentiality of logical MRTD data.
T.Forgery
"Forgery of data on MRTD’s chip"
Adverse action: An attacker alters fraudulently the complete stored logical MRTD or any
part of it including its security related data in order to deceive on an inspection system by
means of the changed MRTD holder’s identity or biometric reference data. This threat
comprises several attack scenarios of MRTD forgery. The attacker may alter the
biographical data on the biographical data page of the passport book, in the printed MRZ
and in the digital MRZ to claim another identity of the traveler. The attacker may alter the
printed portrait and the digitized portrait to overcome the visual inspection of the
inspection officer and the automated biometric authentication mechanism by face
recognition. The attacker may alter the biometric reference data to defeat automated
biometric authentication mechanism of the inspection system. The attacker may combine
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data groups of different logical MRTDs to create a new forged MRTD, e.g. the attacker
writes the digitized portrait and optional biometric reference finger data read from the
logical MRTD of a traveler into another MRTD’s chip leaving their digital MRZ unchanged
to claim the identity of the holder this MRTD. The attacker may also copy the complete
unchanged logical MRTD to another contactless chip.
Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, being in possession of one or more
legitimate MRTDs.
Asset: authenticity of logical MRTD data.
T.Abuse-Func
"Abuse of Functionality"
Adverse action: An attacker may use functions of the TOE which shall not be used in the
phase “Operational Use” in order (i) to manipulate User Data, (ii) to manipulate (explore,
bypass, deactivate or change) security features or functions of the TOE or (iii) to disclose
or to manipulate TSF Data. This threat addresses the misuse of the functions for the
initialization and the personalization in the operational state after delivery to MRTD
holder.
Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, being in possession of a legitimate
MRTD.
Asset: confidentiality and authenticity of logical MRTD and TSF data, correctness of TSF.
T.Information_Leakage
"Information Leakage from MRTD’s chip"
Adverse action: An attacker may exploit information which is leaked from the TOE during
its usage in order to disclose confidential TSF data. The information leakage may be
inherent in the normal operation or caused by the attacker. Leakage may occur through
emanations, variations in power consumption, I/O characteristics, clock frequency, or by
changes in processing time requirements. This leakage may be interpreted as a covert
channel transmission but is more closely related to measurement of operating
parameters, which may be derived either from measurements of the contactless interface
(emanation) or direct measurements (by contact to the chip still available even for a
contactless chip) and can then be related to the specific operation being performed.
Examples are the Differential Electromagnetic Analysis (DEMA) and the Differential Power
Analysis (DPA). Moreover the attacker may try actively to enforce information leakage by
fault injection (e.g. Differential Fault Analysis).
Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, being in possession of a legitimate
MRTD.
Asset: confidentiality of logical MRTD and TSF data.
T.Phys-Tamper
"Physical Tampering"
Adverse action: An attacker may perform physical probing of the MRTD’s chip in order (i)
to disclose TSF Data or (ii) to disclose/reconstruct the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software.
An attacker may physically modify the MRTD’s chip in order to (i) modify security features
or functions of the MRTD’s chip, (ii) modify security functions of the MRTD’s chip
Embedded Software, (iii) modify User Data or (iv) to modify TSF data. The physical
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tampering may be focused directly on the disclosure or manipulation of TOE User Data
(e.g. the biometric reference data for the inspection system) or TSF Data (e.g.
authentication key of the MRTD’s chip) or indirectly by preparation of the TOE to following
attack methods by modification of security features (e.g. to enable information leakage
through power analysis). Physical tampering requires direct interaction with the MRTD’s
chip internals. Techniques commonly employed in IC failure analysis and IC reverse
engineering efforts may be used. Before that, the hardware security mechanisms and
layout characteristics need to be identified. Determination of software design including
treatment of User Data and TSF Data may also be a pre-requisite. The modification may
result in the deactivation of a security function. Changes of circuitry or data can be
permanent or temporary.
Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, being in possession of a legitimate
MRTD.
Asset: confidentiality and authenticity of logical MRTD and TSF data, correctness of TSF.
T.Malfunction
"Malfunction due to Environmental Stress"
Adverse action: An attacker may cause a malfunction of TSF or of the MRTD’s chip
Embedded Software by applying environmental stress in order to (i) deactivate or modify
security features or functions of the TOE or (ii) circumvent, deactivate or modify security
functions of the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software. This may be achieved e.g. by operating
the MRTD’s chip outside the normal operating conditions, exploiting errors in the MRTD’s
chip Embedded Software or misusing administration function. To exploit these
vulnerabilities an attacker needs information about the functional operation.
Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, being in possession of a legitimate
MRTD.
Asset: confidentiality and authenticity of logical MRTD and TSF data, correctness of TSF.
6.3.2 Additional Threats Identified
T.Counterfeit
"MRTD’s chip" Adverse action: An attacker with high attack potential produces an
unauthorized copy or reproduction of a genuine MRTD’s chip to be used as part of a
counterfeit MRTD. This violates the authenticity of the MRTD’s chip used for
authentication of a traveler by possession of a MRTD. The attacker may generate a new
data set or extract completely or partially the data from a genuine MRTD’s chip and copy
them on another appropriate chip to imitate this genuine MRTD’s chip.
Threat agent: having high attack potential, being in possession of one or more legitimate
MRTDs
Asset: authenticity of logical MRTD data
T.Configuration
"Tampering attempt of the TOE during preparation"
Adverse action: An attacker may access to the TOE at Manufacturing and Personalization
phases (phase 5 and 6) to try to (i) deactivate or modify security features or functions of
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the TOE or (ii) circumvent, deactivate or modify security functions of the MRTD’s chip
Embedded Software.
Threat agent: having high attack potential, being in possession of one or more MRTD in
Pre-personalization or Personalization phases.
Asset: authenticity of logical MRTD data
T.ADMIN_Configuration
Adverse action: An attacker may access to the TOE at user phase (phase 7) to try to (i)
deactivate or modify security features or functions of the TOE or (ii) circumvent,
deactivate or modify security functions of the eDigitalIdentity document’s embedded
software.
Threat agent: having high attack potential, being in possession of one or more legitimate
eDigitalIdentity document in Operational use phase.
Asset: authenticity of logical eDigitalIdentity document data.
T.Key_Access
Adverse action: An attacker may access to the internal secret cryptographic keys of the
TOE.
Threat agent: having high attack potential, knowing the key values, being in possession of
a legitimate eDigitalIdentity document.
Asset: TOE internal secret cryptographic keys
6.4 Organisational Security Policies
6.4.1 Additional OSP
P.Activ_Auth
The terminal implements the Active Authentication protocol as described in [ICAO_9303]
6.4.2 Miscellaneous
P.Manufact
"Manufacturing of the MRTD’s chip"
The Initialization Data are written by the IC Manufacturer to identify the IC uniquely. The
MRTD Manufacturer writes the Pre-personalization Data which contains at least the
Personalization Agent Key.
P.Personalization
"Personalization of the MRTD by issuing State or Organization only"
The issuing State or Organization guarantees the correctness of the biographical data, the
printed portrait and the digitized portrait, the biometric reference data and other data of
the logical MRTD with respect to the MRTD holder. The personalization of the MRTD for
the holder is performed by an agent authorized by the issuing State or Organization only.
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P.Personal_Data
"Personal data protection policy"
The biographical data and their summary printed in the MRZ and stored on the MRTD’s
chip (EF.DG1), the printed portrait and the digitized portrait (EF.DG2), the biometric
reference data of finger(s) (EF.DG3), the biometric reference data of iris image(s)
(EF.DG4) and data according to LDS (EF.DG5 to EF.DG13, EF.DG16) stored on the
MRTD’s chip are personal data of the MRTD holder. These data groups are intended to be
used only with agreement of the MRTD holder by inspection systems to which the MRTD
is presented. The MRTD’s chip shall provide the possibility for the Basic Access Control to
allow read access to these data only for terminals successfully authenticated based on
knowledge of the Document Basic Access Keys as defined in [ICAO_9303].
Application Note:
Note that EF.DG3 and EF.DG4 are only readable after successful EAC authentication, not
covered by this ST.
6.5 Assumptions
6.5.1 Additional Assumptions
A.Insp_Sys_Chip_Auth
"Inspection Systems for global interoperability on chip authenticity"
The Inspection System implements the following protocol to authenticate the MRTD’s
chip: Chip Authentication v1 as defined in [TR_03110-3].
The Inspection System is used by the border control officer of the receiving State (i)
examining an MRTD presented by the traveler and verifying its authenticity and (ii)
verifying the traveler as MRTD holder. The Basic Inspection System for global
interoperability (i) includes the Country Signing CA Public Key and the Document Signer
Public Key of each issuing State or Organization, and (ii) implements the terminal part of
the Basic Access Control [ICAO_9303]. The Basic Inspection System reads the logical
MRTD under Basic Access Control and performs the Passive Authentication to verify the
logical MRTD. The General Inspection System in addition to the Basic Inspection System
implements the Chip Authentication Mechanism v1. The General Inspection System reads
the logical travel document under BAC and performs the Chip Authentication v1 to verify
the logical travel document and establishes a new secure messaging that is different from
the BAC one.
A.Signature_PKI
"PKI for Passive Authentication"
The issuing and receiving States or Organizations establish a public key infrastructure for
passive authentication i.e. digital signature creation and verification for the logical MRTD.
The issuing State or Organization runs a Certification Authority (CA) which securely
generates stores and uses the Country Signing CA Key pair. The CA keeps the Country
Signing CA Private Key secret and is recommended to distribute the Country Signing CA
Public Key to ICAO, all receiving States maintaining its integrity. The Document Signer (i)
generates the Document Signer Key Pair, (ii) hands over the Document Signer Public Key
to the CA for certification, (iii) keeps the Document Signer Private Key secret and (iv) uses
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securely the Document Signer Private Key for signing the Document Security Objects of
the MRTDs. The CA creates the Document Signer Certificates for the Document Signer
Public Keys that are distributed to the receiving States and Organizations.
A.Insp_Sys_AA
The Inspection System implements the Active Authentication Mechanism. The Inspection
System verifies the authenticity of the MRTD’s chip during inspection using the signature
returned by the TOE during Active Authentication.
6.5.2 Miscellaneous
A.MRTD_Manufact
"MRTD manufacturing on phase 4 to 6"
It is assumed that appropriate functionality testing of the MRTD is used. It is assumed
that security procedures are used during all manufacturing and test operations to
maintain confidentiality and integrity of the MRTD and of its manufacturing and test data
(to prevent any possible copy, modification, retention, theft or unauthorized use).
A.MRTD_Delivery
"MRTD delivery during phase 4 to 6"
Procedures shall guarantee the control of the TOE delivery and storage process and
conformance to its objectives:
o Procedures shall ensure protection of TOE material/information under delivery and
storage.
o Procedures shall ensure that corrective actions are taken in case of improper
operation in the delivery process and storage.
o Procedures shall ensure that people dealing with the procedure for delivery have
got the required skill.
A.Pers_Agent
"Personalization of the MRTD’s chip"
The Personalization Agent ensures the correctness of (i) the logical MRTD with respect to
the MRTD holder, (ii) the Document Basic Access Keys, (iii) the Chip Authentication Public
Key (EF.DG14) if stored on the MRTD’s chip, and (iv) the Document Signer Public Key
Certificate (if stored on the MRTD’s chip). The Personalization Agent signs the Document
Security Object. The Personalization Agent bears the Personalization Agent Authentication
to authenticate himself to the TOE by symmetric cryptographic mechanisms.
A.Insp_Sys
"Inspection Systems for global interoperability"
The Inspection System is used by the border control officer of the receiving State (i)
examining an MRTD presented by the traveler and verifying its authenticity and (ii)
verifying the traveler as MRTD holder. The Basic Inspection System for global
interoperability (i) includes the Country Signing Public Key and the Document Signer
Public Key of each issuing State or Organization, and (ii) implements the terminal part of
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the Basic Access Control [ICAO_9303]. The Basic Inspection System reads the logical
MRTD under Basic Access Control and performs the Passive Authentication to verify the
logical MRTD.
A.BAC-Keys
"Cryptographic quality of Basic Access Control Keys"
The Document Basic Access Control Keys being generated and imported by the issuing
State or Organization have to provide sufficient cryptographic strength. As a consequence
of the [ICAO_9303], the Document Basic Access Control Keys are derived from a defined
subset of the individual printed MRZ data. It has to be ensured that these data provide
sufficient entropy to withstand any attack based on the decision that the inspection
system has to derive Document Access Keys from the printed MRZ data with enhanced
basic attack potential.
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7 Security Objectives
7.1 Security Objectives for the TOE
This section describes the security objectives for the TOE addressing the aspects of identified
threats to be countered by the TOE and organizational security policies to be met by the
TOE.
7.1.1 Additional Objectives
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof
"Proof of MRTD’s chip authenticity"
The TOE must support the Inspection Systems to verify the identity and authenticity of
the MRTD’s chip as issued by the identified issuing State or Organization by means of the
Chip Authentication as defined in [TR_03110-3] the chip is genuine and chip and data
page belong to each other as defined in [ICAO_9303].The authenticity proof provided by
MRTD’s chip shall be protected against attacks with high attack potential.
OT.Configuration
"Protection of the TOE preparation"
During Pre-personalization and Personalization phases, the TOE must control the access
to its sensitive information and its functions and must provide the means to secure
exchanges using cryptographic functions. It must also ensure secure erasing of useless
keys.
OT.AA_Proof
The TOE must support the Inspection Systems to verify the identity and authenticity of
MRTD’s chip as issued by the identified issuing State or Organization by means of the
Active Authentication as defined in [ICAO_9303]. The authenticity proof through AA
provided by MRTD’s chip shall be protected against attacks with high attack potential.
OT.Data_Int_AA
The TOE must ensure the integrity of the logical MRTD stored on the MRTD's chip against
physical manipulation and unauthorized writing. The TOE must ensure the integrity of the
logical MRTD data during their transmission to the General Inspection System after Active
Authentication.
OT.ADMIN_Configuration
Protection of the TOE administration
In user phase, the TOE must ensure the administration actions are only authorized for
Administrator. The TOE must control the access to its sensitive information and its
functions and must provide the means to secure exchanges using cryptographic functions.
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OT.Key_Usage_Counter
Configuration of Key Usage Counter
The TOE must protect the key usage through OT.Key_Usage_Counter that support a Key
Usage Counter which should be decremented by one each time the key is used. Once the
counter is depleted, the key should become unusable.
OT.AC_SM_Level
Secure Messaging Level
During Operational Use phase, the TOE must allow read access to sensitive biometric data
only if the Secure Messaging level reaches or exceeds the one specified in the biometric
data Access Conditions data object.
7.1.2 Miscellaneous
OT.AC_Pers
"Access Control for Personalization of logical MRTD"
The TOE must ensure that the logical MRTD data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16, the Document
security object according to LDS [ICAO_9303] and the TSF data can be written by
authorized Personalization Agents only. The logical MRTD data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 and
the TSF data may be written only during and cannot be changed after its personalization.
The Document security object can be updated by authorized Personalization Agents if
data in the data groups EF.DG 3 to EF.DG16 are added.
OT.Data_Int
"Integrity of personal data"
The TOE must ensure the integrity of the logical MRTD stored on the MRTD’s chip against
physical manipulation and unauthorized writing. The TOE must ensure that the inspection
system is able to detect any modification of the transmitted logical MRTD data.
OT.Data_Conf
"Confidentiality of personal data"
The TOE must ensure the confidentiality of the logical MRTD data groups EF.DG1 to
EF.DG16. Read access to EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 is granted to terminals successfully
authenticated as Personalization Agent. Read access to EF.DG1, EF.DG2 and EF.DG5 to
EF.DG16 is granted to terminals successfully authenticated as Basic Inspection System.
The Basic Inspection System shall authenticate itself by means of the Basic Access Control
based on knowledge of the Document Basic Access Key. The TOE must ensure the
confidentiality of the logical MRTD data during their transmission to the Basic Inspection
System.
OT.Identification
"Identification and Authentication of the TOE"
The TOE must provide means to store IC Identification and Pre-Personalization Data in its
non-volatile memory. The IC Identification Data must provide a unique identification of
the IC during Phase 2 “Manufacturing” and Phase 3 “Personalization of the MRTD”. The
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party without prior written approval.
storage of the Pre-Personalization data includes writing of the Personalization Agent
Key(s). In Phase 4 “Operational Use” the TOE shall identify itself only to a successful
authenticated Basic Inspection System or Personalization Agent.
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func
"Protection against Abuse of Functionality"
After delivery of the TOE to the MRTD Holder, the TOE must prevent the abuse of test
and support functions that may be maliciously used to (i) disclose critical User Data, (ii)
manipulate critical User Data of the IC Embedded Software, (iii) manipulate Soft-coded IC
Embedded Software or (iv) bypass, deactivate, change or explore security features or
functions of the TOE.
Details of the relevant attack scenarios depend, for instance, on the capabilities of the
Test Features provided by the IC Dedicated Test Software which are not specified here.
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak
"Protection against Information Leakage"
The TOE must provide protection against disclosure of confidential TSF data stored and/or
processed in the MRTD’s chip
o by measurement and analysis of the shape and amplitude of signals or the time
between events found by measuring signals on the electromagnetic field, power
consumption, clock, or I/O lines and
o by forcing a malfunction of the TOE and/or
o by a physical manipulation of the TOE
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper
"Protection against Physical Tampering"
The TOE must provide protection of the confidentiality and integrity of the User Data, the
TSF Data, and the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software. This includes protection against
attacks with enhanced-basic attack potential by means of
o measuring through galvanic contacts which is direct physical probing on the chips
surface except on pads being bonded (using standard tools for measuring voltage
and current) or
o measuring not using galvanic contacts but other types of physical interaction
between charges (using tools used in solid-state physics research and IC failure
analysis)
o manipulation of the hardware and its security features, as well as
o controlled manipulation of memory contents (User Data, TSF Data)
with a prior
o reverse-engineering to understand the design and its properties and functions.
OT.Prot_Malfunction
"Protection against Malfunctions"
The TOE must ensure its correct operation. The TOE must prevent its operation outside
the normal operating conditions where reliability and secure operation has not been
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party without prior written approval.
proven or tested. This is to prevent errors. The environmental conditions may include
external energy (esp. electromagnetic) fields, voltage (on any contacts), clock frequency,
or temperature.
7.2 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment
7.2.1 Issuing State or Organization
The issuing State or Organization will implement the following security objectives of the TOE
environment.
OE.MRTD_Manufact
"Protection of the MRTD Manufacturing"
Appropriate functionality testing of the TOE shall be used in phase 4 to 6.
During all manufacturing and test operations, security procedures shall be used through
phases 4, 5 and 6 to maintain confidentiality and integrity of the TOE and its
manufacturing and test data.
OE.MRTD_Delivery
"Protection of the MRTD delivery"
Procedures shall ensure protection of TOE material/information under delivery including
the following objectives:
o non-disclosure of any security relevant information,
o identification of the element under delivery,
o meet confidentiality rules (confidentiality level, transmittal form, reception
acknowledgment),
o physical protection to prevent external damage,
o secure storage and handling procedures (including rejected TOE’s),
o traceability of TOE during delivery including the following parameters:
 origin and shipment details,
 reception, reception acknowledgement,
 location material/information.
Procedures shall ensure that corrective actions are taken in case of improper operation in
the delivery process (including if applicable any non-conformance to the confidentiality
convention) and highlight all non-conformance to this process.
Procedures shall ensure that people (shipping department, carrier, reception department)
dealing with the procedure for delivery have got the required skill, training and knowledge
to meet the procedure requirements and be able to act fully in accordance with the above
expectations.
OE.Personalization
"Personalization of logical MRTD"
The issuing State or Organization must ensure that the Personalization Agents acting on
behalf of the issuing State or Organization (i) establish the correct identity of the holder
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and create biographical data for the MRTD, (ii) enroll the biometric reference data of the
MRTD holder i.e. the portrait, the encoded finger image(s) and/or the encoded iris
image(s) and (iii) personalize the MRTD for the holder together with the defined physical
and logical security measures to protect the confidentiality and integrity of these data.
OE.Pass_Auth_Sign
"Authentication of logical MRTD by Signature"
The issuing State or Organization must (i) generate a cryptographic secure Country
Signing CA Key Pair, (ii) ensure the secrecy of the Country Signing CA Private Key and
sign Document Signer Certificates in a secure operational environment, and (iii) distribute
the Certificate of the Country Signing CA Public Key to receiving States and Organizations
maintaining its authenticity and integrity. The issuing State or Organization must (i)
generate a cryptographic secure Document Signer Key Pair and ensure the secrecy of the
Document Signer Private Keys, (ii) sign Document Security Objects of genuine MRTD in a
secure operational environment only and (iii) distribute the Certificate of the Document
Signer Public Key to receiving States and Organizations. The digital signature in the
Document Security Object relates all data in the data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 if stored in
the LDS according to [ICAO_9303].
OE.BAC-Keys
"Cryptographic quality of Basic Access Control Keys"
The Document Basic Access Control Keys being generated and imported by the issuing
State or Organization have to provide sufficient cryptographic strength. As a consequence
of the [ICAO_9303] the Document Basic Access Control Keys are derived from a defined
subset of the individual printed MRZ data. It has to be ensured that these data provide
sufficient entropy to withstand any attack based on the decision that the inspection
system has to derive Document Basic Access Keys from the printed MRZ data with
enhanced basic attack potential.
7.2.2 Receiving State or Organization
The receiving State or Organization will implement the following security objectives of the
TOE environment.
OE.Exam_MRTD
"Examination of the MRTD passport book"
The inspection system of the receiving State or Organization must examine the MRTD
presented by the traveler to verify its authenticity by means of the physical security
measures and to detect any manipulation of the physical MRTD. The Basic Inspection
System for global interoperability (i) includes the Country Signing Public Key and the
Document Signer Public Key of each issuing State or Organization, and (ii) implements the
terminal part of the Basic Access Control [ICAO_9303].
OE.Passive_Auth_Verif
"Verification by Passive Authentication" The border control officer of the receiving State
uses the inspection system to verify the traveler as MRTD holder. The inspection systems
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must have successfully verified the signature of Document Security Objects and the
integrity data elements of the logical MRTD before they are used. The receiving States
and Organizations must manage the Country Signing Public Key and the Document Signer
Public Key maintaining their authenticity and availability in all inspection systems.
OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD
"Protection of data from the logical MRTD"
The inspection system of the receiving State or Organization ensures the confidentiality
and integrity of the data read from the logical MRTD. The receiving State examining the
logical MRTD being under Basic Access Control will use inspection systems which
implement the terminal part of the Basic Access Control and use the secure messaging
with fresh generated keys for the protection of the transmitted data (i.e. Basic Inspection
Systems).
7.2.3 Additional Security Objectives for the Operational Environment
OE.Auth_MRTD
"MRTD Authentication Key"
The issuing State or Organization has to establish the necessary public key infrastructure
in order to
(i) generate the MRTD’s Authentication Key Pair(s), (ii) ensure the secrecy of the MRTD’s
Authentication Private Key(s), (iii) sign and store the Authentication Public Key(s) in the
Authentication Public Key data (i.e in EF.DG14 for Chip Authentication Public Key and (iv)
support inspection systems of receiving States or organizations to verify the authenticity
of the MRTD’s chip used for genuine MRTD by certification of the Authentication Public
Key by means of the Document Security Object.
OE.Exam_Chip_Auth
"Examination of the chip authenticity"
Additionally to the OE.Exam_MRTD, inspection system performs the Chip Authentication
to verify the Authenticity of the presented MRTD’s chip.
OE.Exam_MRTD_AA
Aditionally to the OE.Exam_MRTD, the inspection systems perform the Active
Authentication protocol to verify the Authenticity of the presented MRTD’s chip.
OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD_AA
Aditionally to the OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD, the inspection system prevents eavesdropping
to their communication with the TOE before secure messaging is successfully established
based on the Active Authentication Protocol.
OE.Activ_Auth_Verif
In addition to the verification by passive authentication, the inspection systems may use
the verification by Active Authentication, which offers a stronger guaranty of the
authenticity of the MRTD.
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OE.Activ_Auth_Sign
The issuing State or Organization has to establish the necessary public key infrastructure
in order to (i) generate the MRTD’s Active Authentication Key Pair, (ii) ensure the secrecy
of the MRTD’s Active Authentication Private Key, sign and store the Active Authentication
Public Key in the Active Authentication Public Key data in EF.DG15 and (iii) support
inspection systems of receiving States or organizations to verify the authenticity of the
MRTD’s chip used for genuine MRTD by certification of the Active Authentication Public
Key by means of the Document Security Object.
7.3 Security Objectives Rationale
7.3.1 Threats
7.3.1.1 Threats from Protection Profile
T.Chip_ID The threat T.Chip_ID “Identification of MRTD’s chip” addresses the trace of the
MRTD movement by identifying remotely the MRTD’s chip through the contactless
communication interface. This threat is countered as described by the security objective
OT.Identification “Identification and Authentication of the TOE” by Basic Access Control
using sufficiently strong derived keys as required by the security objective for the
environment OE.BAC-Keys “Cryptographic quality of Basic Access Control Keys”.
T.Skimming The threat T.Skimming “Skimming the logical MRTD” addresses the reading of
the logical MRTD trough the contactless interface. This threat is countered by the security
objective OT.Data_Conf “Confidentiality of personal data” through Basic Access Control
using sufficiently strong derived keys as required by the security objective for the
environment OE.BAC-Keys “Cryptographic quality of Basic Access Control Keys” and also
by OT.AC_SM_Level "Secure Messaging Level".
T.Eavesdropping The threat T.Eavesdropping “Eavesdropping to the communication
between TOE and inspection system” addresses listening to the communication between
the MRTD’s chip and a terminal. This threat is countered by the security objective
OT.Data_Conf “Confidentiality of personal data” through Basic Access Control using
sufficiently strong derived keys as required by the security objective for the environment
OE.BAC-Keys “Cryptographic quality of Basic Access Control Keys”.
T.Forgery The threat T.Forgery “Forgery of data on MRTD’s chip” addresses the fraudulent
alteration of the complete stored logical MRTD or any part of it. The security objective
OT.AC_Pers “Access Control for Personalization of logical MRTD” requires the TOE to limit
the write access for the logical MRTD to the trustworthy Personalization Agent (cf.
OE.Personalization). The TOE will protect the integrity of the stored logical MRTD
according the security objective OT.Data_Int “Integrity of personal data” and
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper “Protection against Physical Tampering”. The examination of the
presented MRTD passport book according to OE.Exam_MRTD “Examination of the MRTD
passport book” and OE.Exam_MRTD_AA shall ensure that passport book does not contain
a sensitive contactless chip which may present the complete unchanged logical MRTD.
The TOE environment will detect partly forged logical MRTD data by means of digital
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party without prior written approval.
signature which will be created according to OE.Pass_Auth_Sign “Authentication of logical
MRTD by Signature” and verified by the inspection system according to
OE.Passive_Auth_Verif “Verification by Passive Authentication”.
T.Abuse-Func The threat T.Abuse-Func “Abuse of Functionality” addresses attacks using
the MRTD’s chip as production material for the MRTD and misuse of the functions for
personalization in the operational state after delivery to MRTD holder to disclose or to
manipulate the logical MRTD. This threat is countered by OT.Prot_Abuse-Func “Protection
against Abuse of Functionality”. Additionally this objective is supported by the security
objective for the TOE environment: OE.Personalization “Personalization of logical MRTD”
ensuring that the TOE security functions for the initialization and the personalization are
disabled and the security functions for the operational state after delivery to MRTD holder
are enabled according to the intended use of the TOE.
T.Information_Leakage The threats T.Information_Leakage "Information Leakage from
MRTD's chip" is typical for integrated circuits like smart cards under direct attack with
high attack potential. The protection of the TOE against this threat is addressed by the
directly related security objective OT.Prot_Inf_Leak "Protection against Information
Leakage".
T.Phys-Tamper The threat T.Phys-Tamper "Physical Tampering" is typical for integrated
circuits like smart cards under direct attack with high attack potential. The protection of
the TOE against this threat is addressed by the directly related security objective
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper "Protection against Physical Tampering".
T.Malfunction The threat T.Malfunction "Malfunction due to Environmental Stress" is typical
for integrated circuits like smart cards under direct attack with high attack potential. The
protection of the TOE against this threat is addressed by the directly related security
objective OT.Prot_Malfunction "Protection against Malfunctions".
7.3.1.2 Additional Threats Identified
T.Counterfeit The threat T.Counterfeit "MRTD’s chip" addresses the attack of unauthorized
copy or reproduction of the genuine MRTD chip. This attack is thwarted by chip an
identification and authenticity proof required by OT.Chip_Auth_Proof "Proof of MRTD’s
chip authenticity" using a authentication key pair to be generated by the issuing State or
Organization. The Public Chip Authentication Key has to be written into EF.DG14 and
signed by means of Documents Security Objects as demanded by OE.Auth_MRTD "MRTD
Authentication Key". According to OE.Exam_Chip_Auth the inspection system has to
perform the Chip Authentication Protocol to verify the authenticity of the MRTD’s chip.
This attack is also thwarted by Active Authentication proving the authenticity of the chip
as required by OT.AA_Proof and OT.Data_Int_AA using a authentication key pair to be
generated by the issuing State or Organization. This threat is also covered by
OE.Auth_MRTD "MRTD Authentication Key" using a authentication key pair to be
generated by the issuing State or Organization. OE.Activ_Auth_Verif and
OE.Activ_Auth_Sign covers also this threat enabling the possibility of performing an Active
Authentication which reinforce the security associated to the communication.
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T.Configuration The threat T.Configuration "Tampering attempt of the TOE during
preparation" addresses attacks in Pre-personalization and Personalization phases. The
attacker trying to access to unauthorized TOE functions, trying to access or to modify
sensitive information exchanged between the TOE and the Personalization system.
Protection of the TOE during these two phases is directly addressed by OT.Configuration
"Protection of the TOE preparation".
T.ADMIN_Configuration The threat T.ADMIN_Configuration “Tampering attempt of the
TOE during administration” addresses attacks in Operational use phase. The attacker
trying to access to unauthorized TOE functions, trying to access or to modify sensitive
information exchanged between the TOE and the Administartion system. Protection of the
TOE during this phases is directly addressed by OT.ADMIN_Configuration “Protection of
the TOE administration”.
T.Key_Access The threat T.Key_Access addresses the threat of access to the internal
secret cryptographic keys of the TOE. The TOE protects the key usage through
OT.Key_Usage_Counter “Configuration of Key Usage Counter” that support a Key Usage
Counter that is decremented by one each time the key is used. Once the counter is
depleted, the key becomes unusable. In the case of CA key, the Key Usage Counter will
be reset to the maximum usage if the CA key is re-generated in USE phase.
7.3.2 Organisational Security Policies
7.3.2.1 Additional OSP
P.Activ_Auth The OSP P.Activ_Auth requires the implementation of the Active
Authentication protocol as enforced by OT.AA_Proof.
7.3.2.2 Miscellaneous
P.Manufact The OSP P.Manufact “Manufacturing of the MRTD’s chip” requires a unique
identification of the IC by means of the Initialization Data and the writing of the Pre-
personalization Data as being fulfilled by OT.Identification “Identification and
Authentication of the TOE”.
P.Personalization The OSP P.Personalization “Personalization of the MRTD by issuing State
or Organization only” addresses the (i) the enrolment of the logical MRTD by the
Personalization Agent as described in the security objective for the TOE environment
OE.Personalization “Personalization of logical MRTD”, and (ii) the access control for the
user data and TSF data as described by the security objective OT.AC_Pers “Access Control
for Personalization of logical MRTD”. Note the manufacturer equips the TOE with the
Personalization Agent Key(s) according to OT.Identification “Identification and
Authentication of the TOE”. The security objective OT.AC_Pers “Access Control for
Personalization of logical MRTD” limits the management of TSF data and management of
TSF to the Personalization Agent.
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P.Personal_Data The OSP P.Personal_Data “Personal data protection policy” requires the
TOE (i) to support the protection of the confidentiality of the logical MRTD by means of
the Basic Access Control and (ii) enforce the access control for reading as decided by the
issuing State or Organization. This policy is implemented by the security objectives
OT.Data_Int “Integrity of personal data” and OT.Data_Int_AA describing the
unconditional protection of the integrity of the stored data and during transmission. The
security objective OT.Data_Conf “Confidentiality of personal data” describes the
protection of the confidentiality.
7.3.3 Assumptions
7.3.3.1 Additional Assumptions
A.Insp_Sys_Chip_Auth The examination of the MRTD passport book addressed by the
assumption A.Insp_Sys_Chip_Auth “Inspection Systems for global interoperability on chip
authenticity” is covered by the security objectives for the TOE environment
OE.Exam_Chip_Auth.
A.Signature_PKI The assumption is directly covered by the security objective for the TOE
environment OE.Pass_Auth_Sign “Authentication of logical MRTD by Signature” covering
the necessary procedures for the Country Signing CA Key Pair and the Document Signer
Key Pairs.
A.Insp_Sys_AA The examination of the MRTD passport book addressed by the assumption
A.Insp_Sys_AA "Inspection Systems for global interoperability" is covered by the security
objectives for the TOE environment OE.Exam_MRTD_AA "Examination of the MRTD
passport book". The security objectives for the TOE environment
OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD_AA "Protection of data from the logical MRTD" will require the
Basic Inspection System to implement the Active Authentication Protocol and to protect
the logical MRTD data during the transmission and the internal handling.
7.3.3.2 Miscellaneous
A.MRTD_Manufact The assumption A.MRTD_Manufact “MRTD manufacturing on phase 4
to 6” is covered by the security objective for the TOE environment OE.MRTD_Manufact
“Protection of the MRTD Manufacturing” that requires to use security procedures during
all manufacturing steps.
A.MRTD_Delivery The assumption A.MRTD_Delivery “MRTD delivery during phase 4 to 6”
is covered by the security objective for the TOE environment OE.MRTD_Delivery
“Protection of the MRTD delivery” that requires to use security procedures during delivery
steps of the MRTD.
A.Pers_Agent The assumption A.Pers_Agent “Personalization of the MRTD’s chip” is
covered by the security objective for the TOE environment OE.Personalization
“Personalization of logical MRTD” including the enrolment, the protection with digital
signature and the storage of the MRTD holder personal data.
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A.Insp_Sys The examination of the MRTD passport book addressed by the assumption
A.Insp_Sys “Inspection Systems for global interoperability” is covered by the security
objectives for the TOE environment OE.Exam_MRTD “Examination of the MRTD passport
book”. The security objectives for the TOE environment OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD
“Protection of data from the logical MRTD will require the Basic Inspection System to
implement the Basic Access Control and to protect the logical MRTD data during the
transmission and the internal handling.
A.BAC-Keys The assumption is directly covered by the security objective for the TOE
environment OE.BAC-Keys “Cryptographic quality of Basic Access Control Keys” ensuring
the sufficient key quality to be provided by the issuing State or Organization.
7.3.4 SPD and Security Objectives
Threats Security Objectives Rationale
T.Chip_ID OT.Identification, OE.BAC-Keys Section 7.3.1
T.Skimming OT.Data_Conf, OE.BAC-Keys, OT.AC_SM_Level Section 7.3.1
T.Eavesdropping OT.Data_Conf, OE.BAC-Keys Section 7.3.1
T.Forgery OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int, OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper,
OE.Exam_MRTD, OE.Pass_Auth_Sign,
OE.Passive_Auth_Verif, OE.Personalization,
OE.Exam_MRTD_AA
Section 7.3.1
T.Abuse-Func OT.Prot_Abuse-Func, OE.Personalization Section 7.3.1
T.Information_Leakage OT.Prot_Inf_Leak Section 7.3.1
T.Phys-Tamper OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper Section 7.3.1
T.Malfunction OT.Prot_Malfunction Section 7.3.1
T.Counterfeit OT.Chip_Auth_Proof, OE.Exam_Chip_Auth,
OE.Auth_MRTD, OT.AA_Proof, OT.Data_Int_AA,
OE.Activ_Auth_Verif, OE.Activ_Auth_Sign
Section 7.3.1
T.Configuration OT.Configuration Section 7.3.1
T.ADMIN_Configuration OT.ADMIN_Configuration Section 7.3.1
T.Key_Access OT.Key_Usage_Counter Section 7.3.1
Table 14 Threats and Security Objectives - Coverage
Security Objectives Threats Rationale
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof T.Counterfeit
OT.Configuration T.Configuration
OT.AA_Proof T.Counterfeit
OT.Data_Int_AA T.Counterfeit
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OT.ADMIN_Configuration T.ADMIN_Configuration
OT.Key_Usage_Counter T.Key_Access
OT.AC_SM_Level T.Skimming
OT.AC_Pers T.Forgery
OT.Data_Int T.Forgery
OT.Data_Conf T.Skimming, T.Eavesdropping
OT.Identification T.Chip_ID
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func T.Abuse-Func
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak T.Information_Leakage
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper T.Forgery, T.Phys-Tamper
OT.Prot_Malfunction T.Malfunction
OE.MRTD_Manufact
OE.MRTD_Delivery
OE.Personalization T.Forgery, T.Abuse-Func
OE.Pass_Auth_Sign T.Forgery
OE.BAC-Keys T.Chip_ID, T.Skimming, T.Eavesdropping
OE.Exam_MRTD T.Forgery
OE.Passive_Auth_Verif T.Forgery
OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD
OE.Auth_MRTD T.Counterfeit
OE.Exam_Chip_Auth T.Counterfeit
OE.Exam_MRTD_AA T.Forgery
OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD_AA
OE.Activ_Auth_Verif T.Counterfeit
OE.Activ_Auth_Sign T.Counterfeit
Table 15 Security Objectives and Threats - Coverage
Organisational Security
Policies
Security Objectives Rationale
P.Activ_Auth OT.AA_Proof Section 7.3.2
P.Manufact OT.Identification Section 7.3.2
P.Personalization OE.Personalization, OT.AC_Pers,
OT.Identification
Section 7.3.2
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party without prior written approval.
P.Personal_Data OT.Data_Int, OT.Data_Conf, OT.Data_Int_AA Section 7.3.2
Table 16 OSPs and Security Objectives - Coverage
Security Objectives Organisational Security Policies
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof
OT.Configuration
OT.AA_Proof P.Activ_Auth
OT.Data_Int_AA P.Personal_Data
OT.ADMIN_Configuration
OT.Key_Usage_Counter
OT.AC_SM_Level
OT.AC_Pers P.Personalization
OT.Data_Int P.Personal_Data
OT.Data_Conf P.Personal_Data
OT.Identification P.Manufact, P.Personalization
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper
OT.Prot_Malfunction
OE.MRTD_Manufact
OE.MRTD_Delivery
OE.Personalization P.Personalization
OE.Pass_Auth_Sign
OE.BAC-Keys
OE.Exam_MRTD
OE.Passive_Auth_Verif
OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD
OE.Auth_MRTD
OE.Exam_Chip_Auth
OE.Exam_MRTD_AA
OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD_AA
OE.Activ_Auth_Verif
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OE.Activ_Auth_Sign
Table 17 Security Objectives and OSPs - Coverage
Assumptions Security Objectives for the Operational
Environment
Rationale
A.Insp_Sys_Chip_Auth OE.Exam_Chip_Auth Section 7.3.3
A.Signature_PKI OE.Pass_Auth_Sign Section 7.3.3
A.Insp_Sys_AA OE.Exam_MRTD_AA, OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD_AA Section 7.3.3
A.MRTD_Manufact OE.MRTD_Manufact Section 7.3.3
A.MRTD_Delivery OE.MRTD_Delivery Section 7.3.3
A.Pers_Agent OE.Personalization Section 7.3.3
A.Insp_Sys OE.Exam_MRTD, OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD Section 7.3.3
A.BAC-Keys OE.BAC-Keys Section 7.3.3
Table 18 Assumptions and Security Objectives for the Operational Environment -
Coverage
Security Objectives for the Operational
Environment
Assumptions
OE.MRTD_Manufact A.MRTD_Manufact
OE.MRTD_Delivery A.MRTD_Delivery
OE.Personalization A.Pers_Agent
OE.Pass_Auth_Sign A.Signature_PKI
OE.BAC-Keys A.BAC-Keys
OE.Exam_MRTD A.Insp_Sys
OE.Passive_Auth_Verif
OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD A.Insp_Sys
OE.Auth_MRTD
OE.Exam_Chip_Auth A.Insp_Sys_Chip_Auth
OE.Exam_MRTD_AA A.Insp_Sys_AA
OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD_AA A.Insp_Sys_AA
OE.Activ_Auth_Verif
OE.Activ_Auth_Sign
Table 19 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment and Assumptions -
Coverage
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1
FPT_EMS TOE Emanation
8 Extended Requirements
8.1 Extended Families
8.1.1 Extended Family FPT_EMS - TOE Emanation
8.1.1.1 Description
The additional family FPT_EMS (TOE Emanation) of the Class FPT (Protection of the TSF) is
defined here to describe the IT security functional requirements of the TOE. The TOE shall
prevent attacks against the TOE and other secret data where the attack is based on external
observable physical phenomena of the TOE. Examples of such attacks are evaluation of
TOE’s electromagnetic radiation, simple power analysis (SPA), differential power analysis
(DPA), timing attacks, radio emanation etc. This family describes the functional requirements
for the limitation of intelligible emanations. The family FPT_EMS belongs to the Class FPT
because it is the class for TSF protection. Other families within the Class FPT do not cover
the TOE emanation.
8.1.1.2 Extended Components
Extended Component FPT_EMS.1
Family behavior:
This family defines requirements to mitigate intelligible emanations.
Component levelling:
FPT_EMS.1 TOE Emanation has two constituents:
 FPT_EMS.1.1 Limit of Emissions requires to not emit intelligible emissions enabling
access to TSF data or user data.
 FPT_EMS.1.2 Interface Emanation requires to not emit interface emanation enabling
access to TSF data or user data.
Management: FPT_EMS.1
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: FPT_EMS.1
There are no actions identified that shall be auditable if FAU_GEN
(Security audit data generation ) isincluded in a PP or ST using
FPT_EMS.1.
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Definition
FPT_EMS.1 TOE Emanation
FPT_EMS.1.1 The TOE shall not emit [assignment: types of emissions] in excess of
[assignment: specified limits] enabling access to [assignment: list of types of TSF data]
and [assignment: list of types of user data].
FPT_EMS.1.2 The TSF shall ensure [assignment: type of users] are unable to use the
following interface [assignment: type of connection] to gain access to [assignment: list of
types of TSF data] and [assignment: list of types of user data].
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
8.1.2 Extended Family FMT_LIM - Limited capabilities
8.1.2.1 Description
The family FMT_LIM describes the functional requirements for the test features of the TOE.
The new functional requirements were defined in the class FMT because this class addresses
the management of functions of the TSF. The examples of the technical mechanism used in
the TOE show that no other class is appropriate to address the specific issues of preventing
abuse of functions by limiting the capabilities of the functions and by limiting their
availability.
8.1.2.2 Extended Components
Extended Component FMT_LIM.1
Family behavior:
This family defines requirements that limit the capabilities and availability of
functions in a combined manner. Note, that FDP_ACF restricts access to
functions whereas the Limited capability of this family requires the functions
themselves to be designed in a specific manner.
Component levelling:
1
2
FMT_LIM Limited capabilities and availability
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FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities requires that the TSF is built to provide only the
capabilities (perform action, gather information) necessary for its
genuinepurpose.
FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability requires that the TSF restrict the use of functions
(refer to Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)). This can be achieved, for
instance, by removing or by disabling functions in a specific phase of
the TOE’s life-cycle.
Management: FMT_LIM.1, FMT_LIM.2
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: FMT_LIM.1, FMT_LIM.2
There are no actions defined to be auditable.
Definition
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FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities
FMT_LIM.1.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their capabilities so that in
conjunction with ‘Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)’ the following policy is enforced
[assignment: Limited capability and availability policy]
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability.
Extended Component FMT_LIM.2
Definition
FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability
FMT_LIM.2.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their availability so that in
conjunction with ‘Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)’ the following policy is enforced
[assignment: Limited capability and availability policy]
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: FMT_LIM.1 Limited availability.
8.1.3 Extended Family FIA_API - Authentication Proof of Identity
8.1.3.1 Description
To describe the IT security functional requirements of the TOE a sensitive family (FIA_API)
of the Class FIA (Identification and authentication) is defined here. This family describes the
functional requirements for the proof of the claimed identity for the authentication
verification by an external entity where the other families of the class FIA address the
verification of the identity of an external entity.
Application note 10: The other families of the Class FIA describe only the authentication
verification of users' identity performed by the TOE and do not describe the functionality of
the user to prove their identity. The following paragraph defines the family FIA_API in the
style of the Common Criteria part 2 (cf. [3], chapter 'Explicitly stated IT security
requirements (APE_SRE)') from a TOE point of view.
8.1.3.2 Extended Components
Extended Component FIA_API.1
Family behavior:
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1
FAU_SAS Audit data storage
This family defines functions provided by the TOE to prove its identity and to
be verified by an externalentity in the TOE IT environment.
Component levelling:
Management FIA_API.1
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in
FMT: Management of authentication information used to prove the claimed
identity.
Audit: FIA_API.1
There are no actions defined to be auditable.
Definition
FIA_API.1 Authentication Proof of Identity
FIA_API.1.1 The TSF shall provide a [assignment: authentication mechanism ] to prove the
identity of the [assignment: authorized user or role ].
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: No dependencies.
8.1.4 Extended Family FAU_SAS - Audit data storage
8.1.4.1 Description
To describe the security functional requirements of the TOE, the family FAU_SAS of the class
FAU (Security audit) is defined here. This family describes the functional requirements for
the storage of audit data. It has a more general approach than FAU_GEN, because it does
not necessarily require the data to be generated by the TOE itself and because it does not
give specific details of the content of the audit records.
The family ‘Audit data storage (FAU_SAS)’ is specified as follows:
FAU_SAS Audit data storage
Family behavior
This family defines functional requirements for the storage of audit data.
Component levelling
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FAU_SAS.1 Requires the TOE to provide the possibility to store audit data.
Management: FAU_SAS.1
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: FAU_SAS.1
There are no actions defined to be auditable.
FAU_SAS.1 Audit storage
FAU_SAS.1.1: The TSF shall provide [assignment: authorised users] with the capability to
store [assignment: list of audit information] in the audit records.
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: No Depenedencies
8.1.5 Extended Family FCS_RND - Generation of random numbers
8.1.5.1 Description
This family defines quality requirements for the generation of random numbers intended to
be used for cryptographic purposes.
8.1.5.2 Extended Components
Extended Component FCS_RND.1
Family behavior:
This family defines requirements for the generation random number where
the random numbers are intended to be used for cryptographic purposes.
Component levelling:
Management: FCS_RND.1
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: FCS_RND.1
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party without prior written approval.
There are no actions defined to be auditable.
Definition
FCS_RND.1 Quality metric for random numbers
FCS_RND.1.1 The TSF shall provide a mechanism to generate random numbers that meet
[assignment: a defined quality metric ].
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
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9 Security Requirements
9.1 Security Functional Requirements
Security Functional requirements are as follows:
9.1.1 Class FAU Security Audit
FAU_SAS.1 Audit storage
FAU_SAS.1.1 The TSF shall provide the Manufacturer with the capability to store the IC
Identification Data in the audit records.
9.1.2 Class FCS Cryptographic Support
FCS_CKM.1/BAC Cryptographic key generation
FCS_CKM.1.1/BAC The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key generation algorithm Document Basic Access Key
Derivation Algorithm and specified cryptographic key sizes 112 bit that meet the
following: [ICAO_9303], normative appendix 5.
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.4.1 The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key destruction method zeroisation that meets the following: none.
FCS_COP.1/BAC_SHA Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1/BAC_SHA The TSF shall perform hashing in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm SHA-1 and cryptographic key sizes none that meet the
following: [FIPS_180_4].
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FCS_COP.1/BAC_ENC Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1/BAC_ENC The TSF shall perform secure messaging (BAC) – encryption
and decryption in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm Triple-DES in
CBC mode and cryptographic key sizes 112 bit that meet the following: [FIPS_46_3]
and [ICAO_9303]; normative appendix 5, A5.3 [ICAO_9303].
FCS_COP.1/AUTH Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1/AUTH The TSF shall perform symmetric authentication – encryption
and decryption in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm Triple-DES and
cryptographic key sizes 112 bit that meet the following: [FIPS_46_3].
FCS_COP.1/BAC_MAC Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1/BAC_MAC The TSF shall perform secure messaging – message
authentication code in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm Retail
MAC and cryptographic key sizes 112 bit that meet the following: [ISO_9797_1]
(MAC algorithm 3, block cipher DES, Sequence Message Counter, padding
mode 2).
FCS_RND.1 Quality metric for random numbers
FCS_RND.1.1 The TSF shall provide a mechanism to generate random numbers that meet
the average Shannon entropy per internal random bit exceeds 0.999.
9.1.3 Additional FCS SFR's Identified
FCS_CKM.1/CA Cryptographic key generation
FCS_CKM.1.1/CA The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key generation algorithm based on ECDH compliant to [TR_03110-3]
and specified cryptographic key sizes 192 to 512 bit that meet the following: [ICAO-
9303] Part 11.
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FCS_COP.1/AA Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1/AA The TSF shall perform [cryptographic operation] in accordance with
a specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key
sizes [cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following: [standard]
cryptographic
operation
cryptographic
algorithm
cryptographic key
sizes(bits)
standard
Digital Signature
Creation
ECDSA with SHA1,
256, 384, 512
192 to 521 over
prime field curves
[ISO_9796-2],
[PKCS#3],
[FIPS_180_4] and
[X9.92]
Digital Signature
Creation
RSA signature (CRT)
with SHA1, 256,
384, 512
1024, 1536, 2048,
3072 and 4096
[ISO_9796-2]
FCS_COP.1/CA_SHA Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1/CA_SHA The TSF shall perform hashing in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm SHA-1 and SHA-256 and cryptographic key sizes none that
meet the following: [FIPS_180_4].
FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1/CA_ENC The TSF shall perform secure messaging – encryption and
decryption in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [Algorithm] and
cryptographic key sizes [Key Size(s)] that meet the following: [Standard]
Algorithm Key Size(s) Standard
Triple-DES in CBC mode 112 bit [FIPS_46_3]
AES in CBC mode 128, 192 and 256 bit [FIPS_197]
FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1/CA_MAC The TSF shall perform secure messaging – message
authentication code in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm
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[Algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes [Key Size(s)] that meet the following:
[Standard]
Algorithm Key Size(s) Standard
Retail MAC 112 bit [ISO_9797_1]
AES CMAC 128, 192 and 256 bit [NIST_800_38B]
FCS_CKM.1/GP Cryptographic key generation
FCS_CKM.1.1/GP The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [Algorithm] and specified
cryptographic key sizes [Key Size(s)] that meet the following: [Standard]
Algorithm Key Size(s) Standard
Triple-DES in CBC mode 112 bit [GPC_SPE_034]; appendix E.4.1.
AES in CBC mode 128, 192 and 256 bit [GPC_SPE_014]
FCS_COP.1/GP_ENC Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1/GP_ENC The TSF shall perform secure messaging (GP) – encryption
and decryption in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [Algorithm]
and cryptographic key sizes [Key Size(s)] that meet the following: [Standard]
Algorithm Key Size(s) Standard
Triple-DES in CBC mode 112 bit [FIPS_46_3]
AES in CBC mode 128, 192 and 256 bit [FIPS_197]
FCS_COP.1/GP_AUTH Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1/GP_AUTH The TSF shall perform symmetric authentication –
encryption and decryption in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm
[Algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes [Key Size(s)] that meet the following:
[Standard]
Algorithm Key Size(s) Standard
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Triple-DES 112 bit [FIPS_46_3]
AES 128, 192 and 256 bit [FIPS_197]
FCS_COP.1/GP_MAC Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1/GP_MAC The TSF shall perform secure messaging – message
authentication code in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm
[Algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes [Key Size(s)] that meet the following:
[Standard]
Algorithm Key Size(s) Standard
Retail MAC 112 bit [ISO_9797_1]
AES CMAC 128, 192 and 256 bit [NIST_800_38B]
FCS_COP.1/GP_KEY_DEC Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1/GP_KEY_DEC The TSF shall perform key decryption in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm [Algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes [Key
Size(s)] that meet the following: [Standard]
Algorithm Key Size(s) Standard
Triple-DES in CBC mode 112 bit [FIPS_46_3]
AES in CBC mode 128, 192 and 256 bit [FIPS_197]
9.1.4 Class FIA Identification and Authentication
FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FIA_UID.1.1 The TSF shall allow
o to read the Initialization Data in Stage 2 "Production",
o to read the random identifier in Stage 3 "Preparation",
o to read the random identifier in Stage 4 "Operational"
on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified.
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FIA_UID.1.2 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing
any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
FIA_UAU.1.1 The TSF shall allow
o to read the Initialization Data in Stage 2 "Production",
o to read the random identifier in Stage 3 "Preparation",
o to read the random identifier in Stage 4 "Operational"
on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated.
FIA_UAU.1.2 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before
allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
FIA_UAU.4 Single-use authentication mechanisms
FIA_UAU.4.1 The TSF shall prevent reuse of authentication data related to
o Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism,
o Authentication Mechanisms based on:
 Triple-DES
 AES.
Application Note:
The Authentication Mechanisms based on Triple-DES or AES is the authentication process
performed in phases 5 and 6.
FIA_UAU.5/BAC Multiple authentication mechanisms
FIA_UAU.5.1/BAC The TSF shall provide
o Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism,
o Symmetric Authentication Mechanism based on Triple-DES
to support user authentication.
FIA_UAU.5.2/BAC The TSF shall authenticate any user's claimed identity according to the
following rules:
o The TOE accepts the authentication attempt as Personalization Agent by
one of the following mechanism(s) the Symmetric Authentication
Mechanism with the Personalization Agent Key,
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o The TOE accepts the authentication attempt as Basic Inspection System
only by means of the Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism
with the Document Basic Access Keys.
FIA_UAU.6/BAC Re-authenticating
FIA_UAU.6.1/BAC The TSF shall re-authenticate the user under the conditions each
command sent to the TOE during a BAC mechanism based communication
after successful authentication of the terminal with Basic Access Control
Authentication Mechanism.
FIA_AFL.1/BAC Authentication failure handling
FIA_AFL.1.1/BAC The TSF shall detect when an administrator configurable positive
integer within range of acceptable values 0 to 255 consecutive unsuccessful
authentication attempts occur related to BAC authentication protocol.
FIA_AFL.1.2/BAC When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has
been met and surpassed, the TSF shall wait for an increasing time between
receiving of the terminal challenge and sending of the TSF response during the
BAC authentication attempts.
9.1.5 Additional FIA SFR's Identified
FIA_UAU.5/MP Multiple authentication mechanisms
FIA_UAU.5.1/MP The TSF shall provide Authentication Mechanism based on Triple-
DES and AES to support user authentication.
FIA_UAU.5.2/MP The TSF shall authenticate any user's claimed identity according to the
following rules:
o The TOE accepts the authentication attempt as Manufacturer by the
Symmetric Authentication Mechanism with Personalization Agent Key.
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FIA_UAU.6/MP Re-authenticating
FIA_UAU.6.1/MP The TSF shall re-authenticate the user under the conditions each
command sent to the TOE after successful authentication of the terminal with
the Symmetric Authentication Mechanism shall be verified as being sent by the
authenticated terminal.
Application Note:
This requirement applies to the authentication protocol used by (1) the Manufacturer and (2)
the Personalization Agent
FIA_AFL.1/MP Authentication failure handling
FIA_AFL.1.1/MP The TSF shall detect when 1 unsuccessful authentication attempts occur
related to authentication of the Manufacturer and the Personalization Agent.
FIA_AFL.1.2/MP When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has
been met, the TSF shall slow down exponentially the next authentication.
FIA_UAU.5/CA Multiple authentication mechanisms
FIA_UAU.5.1/CA The TSF shall provide
o Secure messaging in MAC-ENC mode,
o Key agreement protocol Diffie-Hellman during Chip Authentication
Protocol v.1 according to [TR_03110-3]
to support user authentication.
FIA_UAU.5.2/CA The TSF shall authenticate any user's claimed identity according to the
following rules:
o After run of the Chip Authentication Protocol Version 1 the TOE accepts
only received commands with correct message authentication code sent
by means of secure messaging with key agreed with the terminal by
means of the Chip Authentication Mechanism v1.
FIA_UAU.6/CA Re-authenticating
FIA_UAU.6.1/CA The TSF shall re-authenticate the user under the conditions each
command sent to the TOE after successful run of the Chip Authentication
Protocol shall be verified as being sent by the inspection system (GIS).
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party without prior written approval.
FIA_API.1/CA Authentication Proof of Identity
FIA_API.1.1/CA The TSF shall provide a Chip Authentication protocol according to
[TR_03110-3] to prove the identity of the TOE.
9.1.6 Class FDP User Data Protection
FDP_ACC.1/BAC Subset access control
FDP_ACC.1.1/BAC The TSF shall enforce the Basic Access Control SFP on terminals
gaining write, read and modification access to data in the EF.COM, EF.SOD,
EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD.
FDP_ACF.1/BAC Security attribute based access control
FDP_ACF.1.1/BAC The TSF shall enforce the Basic Access Control SFP to objects based
on the following:
o Subjects:
 Personalization Agent,
 Basic Inspection System,
 Terminal,
o Objects:
 data EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD,
 data in EF.COM,
 data in EF.SOD,
o Security attributes:
 authentication status of terminals.
FDP_ACF.1.2/BAC The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation
among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:
o the successfully authenticated Personalization Agent is allowed to write
and read the data of the EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the
logical MRTD,
o the successfully authenticated Basic Inspection System is allowed to
read the data in EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1, EF.DG2 and EF.DG5 to
EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD.
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FDP_ACF.1.3/BAC The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on
the following additional rules: none.
FDP_ACF.1.4/BAC The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the
following additional rules:
o Any terminal is not allowed to modify any of the EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of
the logical MRTD,
o Any terminal is not allowed to read any of the EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the
logical MRTD,
o The Basic Inspection System is not allowed to read the data in EF.DG3
and EF.DG4.
FDP_UCT.1/BAC Basic data exchange confidentiality
FDP_UCT.1.1/BAC The TSF shall enforce the Basic Access Control SFP to transmit
and receive user data in a manner protected from unauthorised disclosure.
FDP_UIT.1/BAC Data exchange integrity
FDP_UIT.1.1/BAC The TSF shall enforce the Basic Access Control SFP to transmit
and receive user data in a manner protected from modification, deletion, insertion
and replay errors.
FDP_UIT.1.2/BAC The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of user data, whether
modification, deletion, insertion and replay has occurred.
9.1.7 Additional FDP SFR's Identified
FDP_ACC.1/CA Subset access control
FDP_ACC.1.1/CA The TSF shall enforce the CA Access Control SFP on terminals
gaining read and modify access to data in the EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1 to
EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD.
FDP_ACF.1/CA Security attribute based access control
FDP_ACF.1.1/CA The TSF shall enforce the CA Control SFP to objects based on the
following:
o Subjects:
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 General Inspection System,
 Terminal,
o Objects:
 data EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD,
 data in EF.COM,
 data in EF.SOD,
o Security attributes
 authentication status of terminals.
FDP_ACF.1.2/CA The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation
among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:
o the successfully authenticated General Inspection System is allowed to
read the data in EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1, EF.DG2 and EF.DG5 to
EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD..
FDP_ACF.1.3/CA The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on
the following additional rules: none.
FDP_ACF.1.4/CA The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the
following additional rules:
o Any terminal is not allowed to modify any of the EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of
the logical MRTD,
o Any terminal is not allowed to read any of the EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the
logical MRTD,
o The General Inspection System is not allowed to read the data in
EF.DG3 and EF.DG4.
FDP_UCT.1/CA Basic data exchange confidentiality
FDP_UCT.1.1/CA [Editorially Refined] The TSF shall enforce the CA Access Control
SFP to transmit and receive user data in a manner protected from unauthorised
disclosure after Chip Authentication.
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FDP_UIT.1/CA Data exchange integrity
FDP_UIT.1.1/CA [Editorially Refined] The TSF shall enforce the CA Access Control
SFP to transmit and receive user data in a manner protected from modification,
deletion, insertion and replay errors after Chip Authentication protocol.
FDP_UIT.1.2/CA [Editorially Refined] The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of
user data, whether modification, deletion, insertion and replay has occurred after
Chip Authentication protocol.
FDP_DAU.1/AA Basic Data Authentication
FDP_DAU.1.1/AA The TSF shall provide a capability to generate evidence that can be used
as a guarantee of the validity of the TOE itself.
FDP_DAU.1.2/AA The TSF shall provide any users with the ability to verify evidence of
the validity of the indicated information.
Refinement:
Evidence generation and ability of verifying it constitute the Active Authentication protocol.
FDP_ITC.1/AA Import of user data without security attributes
FDP_ITC.1.1/AA The TSF shall enforce the Active Authentication Access Control SFP
when importing user data, controlled under the SFP, from outside of the TOE.
FDP_ITC.1.2/AA The TSF shall ignore any security attributes associated with the user data
when imported from outside the TOE.
FDP_ITC.1.3/AA The TSF shall enforce the following rules when importing user data
controlled under the SFP from outside the TOE: none.
9.1.8 Class FMT Security Management
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions:
o Initialization,
o Pre-personalization,
o Personalization,
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o Administration.
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMR.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the roles
o Manufacturer,
o Personalization Agent,
o Basic Inspection System,
o Administrator.
FMT_SMR.1.2 The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
Application Note:
This SFR also applies to the refinement of the role Manufacturer.
FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities
FMT_LIM.1.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their capabilities so that in
conjunction with ‘Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)’ the following policy is enforced
Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow
o User Data to be disclosed or manipulated,
o TSF data to be disclosed or manipulated,
o software to be reconstructed and,
o substantial information about construction of TSF to be gathered which
may enable other attacks
FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability
FMT_LIM.2.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their availability so that in
conjunction with ‘Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)’ the following policy is enforced
Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow
o User Data to be disclosed or manipulated,
o TSF data to be disclosed or manipulated,
o software to be reconstructed and,
o substantial information about construction of TSF to be gathered which
may enable other attacks
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FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/INI_ENA The TSF shall restrict the ability to write the Initialization
Data and Pre-personalization Data to the Manufacturer.
Application Note:
Please refer to F.ACW for details of the data written by the manufacturer.
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/INI_DIS The TSF shall restrict the ability to disable read access for
users to the Initialization Data to the Personalization Agent.
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/KEY_WRITE The TSF shall restrict the ability to write the Document
Basic Access Keys to the Personalization Agent.
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/KEY_READ The TSF shall restrict the ability to read the Document Basic
Access Keys, Personalization Agent Keys and Administrator Keys to none.
9.1.9 Additional FMT SFR's Identified
FMT_MOF.1/PROT Management of security functions behaviour
FMT_MOF.1.1/PROT The TSF shall restrict the ability to enable the functions
o Chip Authentication,
to the Manufacturer.
FMT_MOF.1/AA Management of security functions behaviour
FMT_MOF.1.1/AA The TSF shall restrict the ability to disable and enable the functions
TSF Active Authentication to Personalization Agent.
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FMT_MTD.1/CAPK Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/CAPK The TSF shall restrict the ability to write the Chip Authentication
Keys to the Personalization Agent.
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK_READ Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/CAPK_READ The TSF shall restrict the ability to read the Chip
Authentication Private Key to none.
FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_READ Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/AA_KEY_READ The TSF shall restrict the ability to read the AAK to
none.
FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_WRITE Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/AA_KEY_WRITE The TSF shall restrict the ability to write the AAK to
Personalization Agent.
FMT_MTD.1/LCS_PERS Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/LCS_PERS The TSF shall restrict the ability to switch the LCS from
phase 6 to phase 7 to the Personalization Agent.
FMT_MTD.1/ADMIN Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/ADMIN The TSF shall restrict the ability to [Operation] the [TSF Data]
to Admin
Operation TSF Data
Modify The Chip Authentication key parameters to be used during key
generation in USE phase
Invalidate Invalidate one of the Chip Authentication key in USE phase or set
the secondary key as being the primary key
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FMT_MTD.1/Key_Usage_Counter Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/Key_Usage_Counter The TSF shall restrict the ability to configure the
Key Usage Counter to Personalization Agent.
FMT_MTD.1/SM_LVL Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/SM_LVL The TSF shall restrict the ability to set the allowed Secure
Messaging level when performing Chip Authentication to the Personalization
Agent.
Application Note:
Possible secure messaging levels are: 3DES, AES 128, AES 192 or AES 256
9.1.10 Class FPT Protection of the Security Functions
FPT_EMS.1 TOE Emanation
FPT_EMS.1.1 The TOE shall not emit power variations, timing variations during
command execution in excess of non useful information enabling access to
Personalization Agent Keys and
o Chip Authentication Private Key,
o Personalization Agent Keys,
o BAC Keys,
o Active Authentication: Private Key (AAK),
o Administrator Authentication Key(s).
FPT_EMS.1.2 The TSF shall ensure unauthorized users are unable to use the following
interface smart card circuit contacts to gain access to Personalization Agent Keys
and
o Chip Authentication Private Key,
o BAC Keys,
o Active Authentication: Private Key (AAK),
o Administrator Authentication Key(s).
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FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state
FPT_FLS.1.1 The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of failures
occur:
o Exposure to out-of-range operating conditions where therefore a
malfunction could occur,
o failure detected by TSF according to FPT_TST.1.
FPT_TST.1 TSF testing
FPT_TST.1.1 The TSF shall run a suite of self tests at the conditions
o At reset
to demonstrate the correct operation of the TSF.
FPT_TST.1.2 The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the
integrity of TSF data.
FPT_TST.1.3 The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the
integrity of stored TSF executable code.
FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to physical attack
FPT_PHP.3.1 The TSF shall resist physical manipulation and physical probing to the
TSF by responding automatically such that the SFRs are always enforced.
9.1.11 Additional FTP Trusted path/channels SFR Identified
FTP_ITC.1/MP Inter-TSF trusted channel
FTP_ITC.1.1/MP The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself and
another trusted IT product that is logically distinct from other communication channels
and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel data
from modification or disclosure.
FTP_ITC.1.2/MP The TSF shall permit another trusted IT product to initiate
communication via the trusted channel.
FTP_ITC.1.3/MP The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for loading
sensitive data (Perso_K, CA_SK) shall be encrypted.
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9.2 Security Assurance Requirements
The assurance components for the evaluation of the TOE and its development and operating
environment are those taken from the Evaluation Assurance Level 4 (EAL4) and augmented
by taking the following component: ADV_FSP.5, ADV_INT.2, ADV_TDS.4, ALC_CMS.5,
ALC_DVS.2, ALC_TAT.2, and ATE_DPT.3.
9.2.1 ADV Development
9.2.1.1 ADV_ARC Security Architecture
ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
ADV_ARC.1.1D The developer shall design and implement the TOE so that the security
features of the TSF cannot be bypassed.
ADV_ARC.1.2D The developer shall design and implement the TSF so that it is able to
protect itself from tampering by untrusted active entities.
ADV_ARC.1.3D The developer shall provide a security architecture description of the TSF.
ADV_ARC.1.1C The security architecture description shall be at a level of detail
commensurate with the description of the SFR-enforcing abstractions described in the
TOE design document.
ADV_ARC.1.2C The security architecture description shall describe the security domains
maintained by the TSF consistently with the SFRs.
ADV_ARC.1.3C The security architecture description shall describe how the TSF
initialisation process is secure.
ADV_ARC.1.4C The security architecture description shall demonstrate that the TSF
protects itself from tampering.
ADV_ARC.1.5C The security architecture description shall demonstrate that the TSF
prevents bypass of the SFR-enforcing functionality.
ADV_ARC.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
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9.2.1.2 ADV_FSP Functional specification
ADV_FSP.5 Complete semi-formal functional specification with additional error
information
ADV_FSP.5.1D The developer shall provide a functional specification.
ADV_FSP.5.2D The developer shall provide a tracing from the functional specification to
the SFRs.
ADV_FSP.5.1C The functional specification shall completely represent the TSF.
ADV_FSP.5.2C The functional specification shall describe the TSFI using a semi-formal
style.
ADV_FSP.5.3C The functional specification shall describe the purpose and method of use
for all TSFI.
ADV_FSP.5.4C The functional specification shall identify and describe all parameters
associated with each TSFI.
ADV_FSP.5.5C The functional specification shall describe all actions associated with each
TSFI.
ADV_FSP.5.6C The functional specification shall describe all direct error messages that may
result from an invocation of each TSFI.
ADV_FSP.5.7C The functional specification shall describe all error messages that do not
result from an invocation of a TSFI.
ADV_FSP.5.8C The functional specification shall provide a rationale for each error message
contained in the TSF implementation yet does not result from an invocation of a TSFI.
ADV_FSP.5.9C The tracing shall demonstrate that the SFRs trace to TSFIs in the functional
specification.
ADV_FSP.5.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
ADV_FSP.5.2E The evaluator shall determine that the functional specification is an accurate
and complete instantiation of the SFRs.
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9.2.1.3 ADV_IMP Implementation representation
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party without prior written approval.
ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF
ADV_IMP.1.1D The developer shall make available the implementation representation for
the entire TSF.
ADV_IMP.1.2D The developer shall provide a mapping between the TOE design description
and the sample of the implementation representation.
ADV_IMP.1.1C The implementation representation shall define the TSF to a level of detail
such that the TSF can be generated without further design decisions.
ADV_IMP.1.2C The implementation representation shall be in the form used by the
development personnel.
ADV_IMP.1.3C The mapping between the TOE design description and the sample of the
implementation representation shall demonstrate their correspondence.
ADV_IMP.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that, for the selected sample of the
implementation representation, the information provided meets all requirements for
content and presentation of evidence.
9.2.1.4 ADV_TDS TOE design
ADV_TDS.4 Semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.4.1D The developer shall provide the design of the TOE.
ADV_TDS.4.2D The developer shall provide a mapping from the TSFI of the functional
specification to the lowest level of decomposition available in the TOE design.
ADV_TDS.4.1C The design shall describe the structure of the TOE in terms of subsystems.
ADV_TDS.4.2C The design shall describe the TSF in terms of modules, designating each
module as SFR-enforcing, SFR-supporting, or SFR-non-interfering.
ADV_TDS.4.3C The design shall identify all subsystems of the TSF.
ADV_TDS.4.4C The design shall provide a semiformal description of each subsystem of the
TSF, supported by informal, explanatory text where appropriate.
ADV_TDS.4.5C The design shall provide a description of the interactions among all
subsystems of the TSF.
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party without prior written approval.
ADV_TDS.4.6C The design shall provide a mapping from the subsystems of the TSF to the
modules of the TSF.
ADV_TDS.4.7C The design shall describe each SFR-enforcing and SFR-supporting module
in terms of its purpose and relationship with other modules.
ADV_TDS.4.8C The design shall describe each SFR-enforcing and SFR-supporting module
in terms of its SFR-related interfaces, return values from those interfaces, interaction with
other modules and called SFR-related interfaces to other SFR-enforcing or SFR-supporting
modules.
ADV_TDS.4.9C The design shall describe each SFR-non-interfering module in terms of its
purpose and interaction with other modules.
ADV_TDS.4.10C The mapping shall demonstrate that all TSFIs trace to the behaviour
described in the TOE design that they invoke.
ADV_TDS.4.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
ADV_TDS.4.2E The evaluator shall determine that the design is an accurate and complete
instantiation of all security functional requirements.
9.2.1.5 ADV_INT TSF internals
ADV_INT.2 Well-structured internals
ADV_INT.2.1D The developer shall design and implement the entire TSF such that it has
well-structured internals.
ADV_INT.2.2D The developer shall provide an internals description and justification.
ADV_INT.2.1C The justification shall describe the characteristics used to judge the
meaning of ``well-structured''.
ADV_INT.2.2C The TSF internals description shall demonstrate that the entire TSF is well-
structured.
ADV_INT.2.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
ADV_INT.2.2E The evaluator shall perform an internals analysis on the TSF.
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9.2.2 AGD Guidance documents
9.2.2.1 AGD_OPE Operational user guidance
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_OPE.1.1D The developer shall provide operational user guidance.
AGD_OPE.1.1C The operational user guidance shall describe, for each user role, the user-
accessible functions and privileges that should be controlled in a secure processing
environment, including appropriate warnings.
AGD_OPE.1.2C The operational user guidance shall describe, for each user role, how to
use the available interfaces provided by the TOE in a secure manner.
AGD_OPE.1.3C The operational user guidance shall describe, for each user role, the
available functions and interfaces, in particular all security parameters under the control
of the user, indicating secure values as appropriate.
AGD_OPE.1.4C The operational user guidance shall, for each user role, clearly present
each type of security-relevant event relative to the user-accessible functions that need to
be performed, including changing the security characteristics of entities under the control
of the TSF.
AGD_OPE.1.5C The operational user guidance shall identify all possible modes of operation
of the TOE (including operation following failure or operational error), their consequences
and implications for maintaining secure operation.
AGD_OPE.1.6C The operational user guidance shall, for each user role, describe the
security measures to be followed in order to fulfil the security objectives for the
operational environment as described in the ST.
AGD_OPE.1.7C The operational user guidance shall be clear and reasonable.
AGD_OPE.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
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9.2.2.2 AGD_PRE Preparative procedures
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AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
AGD_PRE.1.1D The developer shall provide the TOE including its preparative procedures.
AGD_PRE.1.1C The preparative procedures shall describe all the steps necessary for secure
acceptance of the delivered TOE in accordance with the developer's delivery procedures.
AGD_PRE.1.2C The preparative procedures shall describe all the steps necessary for secure
installation of the TOE and for the secure preparation of the operational environment in
accordance with the security objectives for the operational environment as described in
the ST.
AGD_PRE.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
AGD_PRE.1.2E The evaluator shall apply the preparative procedures to confirm that the
TOE can be prepared securely for operation.
9.2.3 ALC Life-cycle support
9.2.3.1 ALC_CMC CM capabilities
ALC_CMC.4 Production support, acceptance procedures and automation
ALC_CMC.4.1D The developer shall provide the TOE and a reference for the TOE.
ALC_CMC.4.2D The developer shall provide the CM documentation.
ALC_CMC.4.3D The developer shall use a CM system.
ALC_CMC.4.1C The TOE shall be labelled with its unique reference.
ALC_CMC.4.2C The CM documentation shall describe the method used to uniquely identify
the configuration items.
ALC_CMC.4.3C The CM system shall uniquely identify all configuration items.
ALC_CMC.4.4C The CM system shall provide automated measures such that only
authorised changes are made to the configuration items.
ALC_CMC.4.5C The CM system shall support the production of the TOE by automated
means.
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party without prior written approval.
ALC_CMC.4.6C The CM documentation shall include a CM plan.
ALC_CMC.4.7C The CM plan shall describe how the CM system is used for the development
of the TOE.
ALC_CMC.4.8C The CM plan shall describe the procedures used to accept modified or
newly created configuration items as part of the TOE.
ALC_CMC.4.9C The evidence shall demonstrate that all configuration items are being
maintained under the CM system.
ALC_CMC.4.10C The evidence shall demonstrate that the CM system is being operated in
accordance with the CM plan.
ALC_CMC.4.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
9.2.3.2 ALC_CMS CM scope
ALC_CMS.5 Development tools CM coverage
ALC_CMS.5.1D The developer shall provide a configuration list for the TOE.
ALC_CMS.5.1C The configuration list shall include the following: the TOE itself; the
evaluation evidence required by the SARs; the parts that comprise the TOE; the
implementation representation; security flaw reports and resolution status; and
development tools and related information.
ALC_CMS.5.2C The configuration list shall uniquely identify the configuration items.
ALC_CMS.5.3C For each TSF relevant configuration item, the configuration list shall
indicate the developer of the item.
ALC_CMS.5.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
9.2.3.3 ALC_DEL Delivery
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
ALC_DEL.1.1D The developer shall document and provide procedures for delivery of the
TOE or parts of it to the consumer.
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party without prior written approval.
ALC_DEL.1.2D The developer shall use the delivery procedures.
ALC_DEL.1.1C The delivery documentation shall describe all procedures that are necessary
to maintain security when distributing versions of the TOE to the consumer.
ALC_DEL.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
9.2.3.4 ALC_DVS Development security
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ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures
ALC_DVS.2.1D The developer shall produce and provide development security
documentation.
ALC_DVS.2.1C The development security documentation shall describe all the physical,
procedural, personnel, and other security measures that are necessary to protect the
confidentiality and integrity of the TOE design and implementation in its development
environment.
ALC_DVS.2.2C The development security documentation shall justify that the security
measures provide the necessary level of protection to maintain the confidentiality and
integrity of the TOE.
ALC_DVS.2.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
ALC_DVS.2.2E The evaluator shall confirm that the security measures are being applied.
9.2.3.5 ALC_LCD Life-cycle definition
ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model
ALC_LCD.1.1D The developer shall establish a life-cycle model to be used in the
development and maintenance of the TOE.
ALC_LCD.1.2D The developer shall provide life-cycle definition documentation.
ALC_LCD.1.1C The life-cycle definition documentation shall describe the model used to
develop and maintain the TOE.
ALC_LCD.1.2C The life-cycle model shall provide for the necessary control over the
development and maintenance of the TOE.
ALC_LCD.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
9.2.3.6 ALC_TAT Tools and techniques
ALC_TAT.2 Compliance with implementation standards
ALC_TAT.2.1D The developer shall provide the documentation identifying each
development tool being used for the TOE.
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ALC_TAT.2.2D The developer shall document and provide the selected implementation-
dependent options of each development tool.
ALC_TAT.2.3D The developer shall describe and provide the implementation standards that
are being applied by the developer.
ALC_TAT.2.1C Each development tool used for implementation shall be well-defined.
ALC_TAT.2.2C The documentation of each development tool shall unambiguously define
the meaning of all statements as well as all conventions and directives used in the
implementation.
ALC_TAT.2.3C The documentation of each development tool shall unambiguously define
the meaning of all implementation-dependent options.
ALC_TAT.2.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
ALC_TAT.2.2E The evaluator shall confirm that the implementation standards have been
applied.
9.2.4 ASE Security Target evaluation
9.2.4.1 ASE_CCL Conformance claims
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
ASE_CCL.1.1D The developer shall provide a conformance claim.
ASE_CCL.1.2D The developer shall provide a conformance claim rationale.
ASE_CCL.1.1C The conformance claim shall contain a CC conformance claim that identifies
the version of the CC to which the ST and the TOE claim conformance.
ASE_CCL.1.2C The CC conformance claim shall describe the conformance of the ST to CC
Part 2 as either CC Part 2 conformant or CC Part 2 extended.
ASE_CCL.1.3C The CC conformance claim shall describe the conformance of the ST to CC
Part 3 as either CC Part 3 conformant or CC Part 3 extended.
ASE_CCL.1.4C The CC conformance claim shall be consistent with the extended
components definition.
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ASE_CCL.1.5C The conformance claim shall identify all PPs and security requirement
packages to which the ST claims conformance.
ASE_CCL.1.6C The conformance claim shall describe any conformance of the ST to a
package as either package-conformant or package-augmented.
ASE_CCL.1.7C The conformance claim rationale shall demonstrate that the TOE type is
consistent with the TOE type in the PPs for which conformance is being claimed.
ASE_CCL.1.8C The conformance claim rationale shall demonstrate that the statement of
the security problem definition is consistent with the statement of the security problem
definition in the PPs for which conformance is being claimed.
ASE_CCL.1.9C The conformance claim rationale shall demonstrate that the statement of
security objectives is consistent with the statement of security objectives in the PPs for
which conformance is being claimed.
ASE_CCL.1.10C The conformance claim rationale shall demonstrate that the statement of
security requirements is consistent with the statement of security requirements in the PPs
for which conformance is being claimed.
ASE_CCL.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
9.2.4.2 ASE_ECD Extended components definition
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ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_ECD.1.1D The developer shall provide a statement of security requirements.
ASE_ECD.1.2D The developer shall provide an extended components definition.
ASE_ECD.1.1C The statement of security requirements shall identify all extended security
requirements.
ASE_ECD.1.2C The extended components definition shall define an extended component
for each extended security requirement.
ASE_ECD.1.3C The extended components definition shall describe how each extended
component is related to the existing CC components, families, and classes.
ASE_ECD.1.4C The extended components definition shall use the existing CC components,
families, classes, and methodology as a model for presentation.
ASE_ECD.1.5C The extended components shall consist of measurable and objective
elements such that conformance or nonconformance to these elements can be
demonstrated.
ASE_ECD.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
ASE_ECD.1.2E The evaluator shall confirm that no extended component can be clearly
expressed using existing components.
9.2.4.3 ASE_INT ST introduction
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_INT.1.1D The developer shall provide an ST introduction.
ASE_INT.1.1C The ST introduction shall contain an ST reference, a TOE reference, a TOE
overview and a TOE description.
ASE_INT.1.2C The ST reference shall uniquely identify the ST.
ASE_INT.1.3C The TOE reference shall identify the TOE.
ASE_INT.1.4C The TOE overview shall summarise the usage and major security features of
the TOE.
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ASE_INT.1.5C The TOE overview shall identify the TOE type.
ASE_INT.1.6C The TOE overview shall identify any non-TOE hardware/software/firmware
required by the TOE.
ASE_INT.1.7C The TOE description shall describe the physical scope of the TOE.
ASE_INT.1.8C The TOE description shall describe the logical scope of the TOE.
ASE_INT.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
ASE_INT.1.2E The evaluator shall confirm that the TOE reference, the TOE overview, and
the TOE description are consistent with each other.
9.2.4.4 ASE_OBJ Security objectives
ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
ASE_OBJ.2.1D The developer shall provide a statement of security objectives.
ASE_OBJ.2.2D The developer shall provide a security objectives rationale.
ASE_OBJ.2.1C The statement of security objectives shall describe the security objectives
for the TOE and the security objectives for the operational environment.
ASE_OBJ.2.2C The security objectives rationale shall trace each security objective for the
TOE back to threats countered by that security objective and OSPs enforced by that
security objective.
ASE_OBJ.2.3C The security objectives rationale shall trace each security objective for the
operational environment back to threats countered by that security objective, OSPs
enforced by that security objective, and assumptions upheld by that security objective.
ASE_OBJ.2.4C The security objectives rationale shall demonstrate that the security
objectives counter all threats.
ASE_OBJ.2.5C The security objectives rationale shall demonstrate that the security
objectives enforce all OSPs.
ASE_OBJ.2.6C The security objectives rationale shall demonstrate that the security
objectives for the operational environment uphold all assumptions.
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ASE_OBJ.2.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
9.2.4.5 ASE_REQ Security requirements
ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
ASE_REQ.2.1D The developer shall provide a statement of security requirements.
ASE_REQ.2.2D The developer shall provide a security requirements rationale.
ASE_REQ.2.1C The statement of security requirements shall describe the SFRs and the
SARs.
ASE_REQ.2.2C All subjects, objects, operations, security attributes, external entities and
other terms that are used in the SFRs and the SARs shall be defined.
ASE_REQ.2.3C The statement of security requirements shall identify all operations on the
security requirements.
ASE_REQ.2.4C All operations shall be performed correctly.
ASE_REQ.2.5C Each dependency of the security requirements shall either be satisfied, or
the security requirements rationale shall justify the dependency not being satisfied.
ASE_REQ.2.6C The security requirements rationale shall trace each SFR back to the
security objectives for the TOE.
ASE_REQ.2.7C The security requirements rationale shall demonstrate that the SFRs meet
all security objectives for the TOE.
ASE_REQ.2.8C The security requirements rationale shall explain why the SARs were
chosen.
ASE_REQ.2.9C The statement of security requirements shall be internally consistent.
ASE_REQ.2.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
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9.2.4.6 ASE_SPD Security problem definition
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
ASE_APD.1.1D The developer shall provide a security problem definition.
ASE_SPD.1.1C The security problem definition shall describe the threats.
ASE_SPD.1.2C All threats shall be described in terms of a threat agent, an asset, and an
adverse action.
ASE_SPD.1.3C The security problem definition shall describe the OSPs.
ASE_SPD.1.4C The security problem definition shall describe the assumptions about the
operational environment of the TOE.
ASE_SPD.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
9.2.4.7 ASE_TSS TOE summary specification
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
ASE_TSS.1.1D The developer shall provide a TOE summary specification.
ASE_TSS.1.1C The TOE summary specification shall describe how the TOE meets each
SFR.
ASE_TSS.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
ASE_TSS.1.2E The evaluator shall confirm that the TOE summary specification is consistent
with the TOE overview and the TOE description.
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9.2.5 ATE Tests
9.2.5.1 ATE_COV Coverage
ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage
ATE_COV.2.1D The developer shall provide an analysis of the test coverage.
ATE_COV.2.1C The analysis of the test coverage shall demonstrate the correspondence
between the tests in the test documentation and the TSFIs in the functional specification.
ATE_COV.2.2C The analysis of the test coverage shall demonstrate that all TSFIs in the
functional specification have been tested.
ATE_COV.2.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
9.2.5.2 ATE_DPT Depth
ATE_DPT.3 Testing: modular design
ATE_DPT.3.1D The developer shall provide the analysis of the depth of testing.
ATE_DPT.3.1C The analysis of the depth of testing shall demonstrate the correspondence
between the tests in the test documentation and the TSF subsystems and modules in the
TOE design.
ATE_DPT.3.2C The analysis of the depth of testing shall demonstrate that all TSF
subsystems in the TOE design have been tested.
ATE_DPT.3.3C The analysis of the depth of testing shall demonstrate that all TSF modules
in the TOE design have been tested.
ATE_DPT.3.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
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9.2.5.3 ATE_FUN Functional tests
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ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE_FUN.1.1D The developer shall test the TSF and document the results.
ATE_FUN.1.2D The developer shall provide test documentation.
ATE_FUN.1.1C The test documentation shall consist of test plans, expected test results and
actual test results.
ATE_FUN.1.2C The test plans shall identify the tests to be performed and describe the
scenarios for performing each test. These scenarios shall include any ordering
dependencies on the results of other tests.
ATE_FUN.1.3C The expected test results shall show the anticipated outputs from a
successful execution of the tests.
ATE_FUN.1.4C The actual test results shall be consistent with the expected test results.
ATE_FUN.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
9.2.5.4 ATE_IND Independent testing
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing - sample
ATE_IND.2.1D The developer shall provide the TOE for testing.
ATE_IND.2.1C The TOE shall be suitable for testing.
ATE_IND.2.2C The developer shall provide an equivalent set of resources to those that
were used in the developer's functional testing of the TSF.
ATE_IND.2.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
ATE_IND.2.2E The evaluator shall execute a sample of tests in the test documentation to
verify the developer test results.
ATE_IND.2.3E The evaluator shall test a subset of the TSF to confirm that the TSF
operates as specified.
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9.2.6 AVA Vulnerability assessment
9.2.6.1 AVA_VAN Vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.3 Focused vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.3.1D The developer shall provide the TOE for testing.
AVA_VAN.3.1C The TOE shall be suitable for testing.
AVA_VAN.3.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
AVA_VAN.3.2E The evaluator shall perform a search of public domain sources to identify
potential vulnerabilities in the TOE.
AVA_VAN.3.3E The evaluator shall perform an independent, focused vulnerability analysis
of the TOE using the guidance documentation, functional specification, TOE design,
security architecture description and implementation representation to identify potential
vulnerabilities in the TOE.
AVA_VAN.3.4E The evaluator shall conduct penetration testing, based on the identified
potential vulnerabilities, to determine that the TOE is resistant to attacks performed by an
attacker possessing Enhanced-Basic attack potential.
9.3 Security Requirements Rationale
9.3.1 Objectives
9.3.1.1 Security Objectives for the TOE
Additional Objectives
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof The security objective OT.Chip_Auth_Proof “Proof of MRTD’s chip
authenticity” is ensured by the Chip Authentication Protocol activated by
FMT_MOF.1/PROT and provided by FIA_API.1/CA proving the genuineness of the TOE.
The Chip Authentication Protocol defined by FCS_CKM.1/CA is performed using a TOE
internally stored confidential private key. Confidentiality of this key is ensured by
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK and FMT_MTD.1/CAPK_READ. The Chip Authentication Protocol
[TR_03110-3] requires additional TSF according to FCS_COP.1/CA_SHA (for the derivation
of the session keys) using FCS_RND.1, FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC and FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC (for
the ENC_MAC_Mode secure messaging).
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OT.Configuration The security objective OT.Configuration “Protection of the TOE
preparation” addresses management of the Data Configuration, Pre-personalization Agent
keys, Personalization Agent keys and the Life Cycle State of the TOE.
The authentication of the terminal as Manufacturer is performed by TSF according to SFR
FIA_UAU.4 and FIA_UAU.5/MP. The Manufacturer can be authenticated by using the
symmetric authentication mechanism (FCS_COP.1/GP_AUTH) with the Pre-personalization
key. FIA_UAU.6/MP describes the re-authentication. In case of failed authentication
attempts FIA_AFL.1/MP enforces additional waiting time prolonging the necessary amount
of time for facilitating a brute force attack. The SFR FTP_ITC.1/MP allows the
Manufacturer to communicate with the OS.
Once phase 4 is done, the MRTD packaging responsible is allowed to set the Pre-
personalization Agent keys according to the SFR and FCS_COP.1/GP_KEY_DEC.
In phase 5, the authentication of the terminal as Manufacturer shall be performed by TSF
according to SFR FIA_UAU.4 and FIA_UAU.5/MP. The Manufacturer shall be authenticated
by using the symmetric authentication mechanism (FCS_COP.1/GP_AUTH).
In case of failed authentication attempts FIA_AFL.1/MP enforces additional waiting time
prolonging the necessary amount of time for facilitating a brute force attack
The SFR FIA_UAU.6/MP describes the re-authentication and the protection of the
transmitted data is assumed by means of secure messaging implemented by the
cryptographic functions according to FCS_CKM.1/GP, FCS_RND.1 (for key generation),
and FCS_COP.1/GP_ENC as well as FCS_COP.1/GP_MAC for the ENC_MAC_Mode. The
SFR FCS_CKM.4 enforces the destruction of Secure Messaging session keys.
The Manufacturer can enable Chip Authentication functionalities following
FMT_MOF.1/PROT.
FPT_PHP.3 deals with the physical protection of the TOE and FPT_FLS.1 ensures safety of
the TOE in case of a failure. FPT_EMS.1 ensures no emissions allow access to data stored
on the TOE.
FMT_SMF.1 controls the management functions along with FMT_SMR.1.
OT.AA_Proof The security objective OT.AA_Proof is ensured by the Active Authentication
Protocol activated by FMT_MOF.1/AA and provided by FDP_DAU.1/AA, FDP_ITC.1/AA
proving the identity and authenticity of the TOE. The Active Authentication relies on
FCS_COP.1/AA and FCS_RND.1. It is performed using a TOE internally stored confidential
private key as required by FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_WRITE and FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_READ.
OT.Data_Int_AA The security objective OT.AA_Proof is ensured by the Active
Authentication Protocol activated by FMT_MOF.1/AA and provided by FDP_DAU.1/AA and
FDP_ITC.1/AA proving the identity and authenticity of the TOE.
OT.ADMIN_Configuration The security objective OT.ADMIN_Configuration “Protection of
the TOE administration” addresses management of the Data Configuration with key size
management for the Chip Authentication of the TOE. The Administrator can be
authenticated by using the symmetric authentication mechanism (FCS_COP.1/GP_AUTH)
with the Administartor key. ADMIN keys are created during pre-personalization.
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ restricts the ability to read the Administrator Keys to none.
FPT_EMS.1 protects the confidentially of Administrator Agent keys. The SFRs FMT_SMF.1
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and FMT_SMR.1 support the functions and roles related. The administration TSF data
manipulation are supported by FMT_MTD.1/ADMIN. It is now allowed to modify the Chip
Authentication key parameters to be used during key generation in USE phase. The
minimum key size that the user can generate in USE phase is controlled by the “ADMIN”
role. It is also possible to change the key parameters during the key generation process.
For example changing the domain parameters of an elliptic curve key. It is also possible
to invalidate one of the Chip Authentication key in USE phase and to set the secondary
key as being the primary key. Note: after such process, the “freed” CA key set is available
for a future CA key generation.
OT.Key_Usage_Counter The security objective OT.Key_Usage_Counter is covered by
FMT_MTD.1/Key_Usage_Counter.
OT.AC_SM_Level The security objective OT.AC_SM_Level “Access control to sensitive
biometric reference data according to SM level” is covered by FMT_MTD.1/SM_LVL that
allows the personalization agent to set the SM level required to access to the sensitive
data.
Miscellaneous
OT.AC_Pers The security objective OT.AC_Pers “Access Control for Personalization of logical
MRTD” addresses the access control of the writing of the logical MRTD. The write access
to the logical MRTD data are defined by the SFR FDP_ACC.1/BAC and FDP_ACF.1/BAC as
follows: only the successfully authenticated Personalization Agent is allowed to write the
data of the groups EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD. FMT_MTD.1/LCS_PERS
controls transition from lifecycle phase 6 to phase 7. The following paragraph is extracted
from [PP_BAC] and has been refined according to the technical characteristics of this
TOE. The refinement is right after. The authentication of the terminal as Personalization
Agent shall be performed by TSF according to SFR FIA_UAU.4 and FIA_UAU.5/MP. The
Personalization Agent can be authenticated by using the GP authentication mechanism by
FCS_COP.1/GP_AUTH. Note: As BAC mechanism is not supported for the authentication of
the terminal as Personalization Agent, the following two paragraphs have been added to
demonstrate that symmetric authentication used in Personalization phase fulfills the
OT.AC_Pers. The authentication of the terminal as Personalization Agent is performed by
TSF according to SFR FIA_UAU.4 and FIA_UAU.5/BAC. FIA_UAU.6/MP describes the re-
authentication. In case of failed authentication attempts FIA_AFL.1/MP enforces additional
waiting time prolonging the necessary amount of time for facilitating a brute force attack.
As the symmetric authentication is used in Personalization phase, the SFR FIA_UAU.6/MP
describes the re-authentication and the protection of the transmitted data is assumed by
means of secure messaging implemented by the cryptographic functions according to
FCS_CKM.1/GP, FCS_RND.1 (for key generation), and FCS_COP.1/GP_ENC as well as
FCS_COP.1/GP_MAC for the ENC_MAC_Mode. The SFR FCS_CKM.4 enforces the
destruction of Secure Messaging session keys. The SFR FMT_SMR.1 lists the roles
(including Personalization Agent) and the SFR FMT_SMF.1 lists the TSF management
functions (including Personalization) setting the Document Basic Access Keys according to
the SFR FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE as authentication reference data. The SFR
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ prevents read access to the secret key of the Personalization
Agent Keys and ensure together with the SFR FCS_CKM.4, FPT_EMS.1, FPT_FLS.1 and
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FPT_PHP.3 the confidentially of these keys. The following parts are added to integrate the
personalization of the different keys in the OT.AC_Pers. Only the Personalization Agent is
allowed to set the Document Basic Access Keys according to the SFR
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE. The SFR FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ prevents read access to the
Document Basic Access Keys and ensure together with the SFR FCS_CKM.4, FPT_EMS.1,
FPT_FLS.1 and FPT_PHP.3 the confidentially of these keys. Only the Personalization Agent
is allowed to set the Chip Authentication Private Key according to the SFR
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK. The SFR FMT_MTD.1/CAPK_READ prevents read access to the Chip
Authentication Private Key and ensure together with the SFR FCS_CKM.4, FPT_EMS.1,
FPT_FLS.1 and FPT_PHP.3 the confidentially of these keys.
The Personalization Agent is the only subject allowed to ends Personalization of logical
MRTD, setting the TOE Life Cycle State in Operational Use state according to
FMT_MTD.1.1/LCS_PERS. Since then it is no more possible to return in Personalization
state.
OT.Data_Int The security objective OT.Data_Int “Integrity of personal data” requires the
TOE to protect the integrity of the logical MRTD stored on the MRTD’s chip against
physical manipulation and unauthorized writing. The write access to the logical MRTD
data is defined by the SFRs (FDP_ACC.1/BAC, FDP_ACC.1/CA) and (FDP_ACF.1/BAC,
FDP_ACF.1/CA) in the same way: only the Personalization Agent is allowed to write the
data of the groups EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD (FDP_ACF.1.2/BAC, rule 1)
and terminals are not allowed to modify any of the data groups EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the
logical MRTD (cf. FDP_ACF.1.4/BAC). The SFR FMT_SMR.1 lists the roles (including
Personalization Agent) and the SFR FMT_SMF.1 lists the TSF management functions
(including Personalization). The authentication of the terminal as Personalization Agent
shall be performed by TSF according to SFR FIA_UAU.4, FIA_UAU.5/BAC and
FIA_UAU.6/BAC using FCS_COP.1/AUTH.
The security objective OT.Data_Int “Integrity of personal data” requires the TOE to
ensure that the inspection system is able to detect any modification of the transmitted
logical MRTD data by means of the BAC mechanism. The SFR FIA_UAU.6/BAC,
FDP_UCT.1/BAC and FDP_UIT.1/BAC requires the protection of the transmitted data by
means of secure messaging implemented by the cryptographic functions according to
FCS_CKM.1/BAC, FCS_COP.1/BAC_SHA, FCS_RND.1 (for key generation), and
FCS_COP.1/BAC_ENC and FCS_COP.1/BAC_MAC for the ENC_MAC_Mode. The SFR
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE requires the Personalization Agent to establish the Document
Basic Access Keys in a way that they cannot be read by anyone in accordance to
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ.
The following part is added to integrate the Manufacturing and Personalization phases in
the OT_Data_Int.
Manufacturer and Personalization Agent are also able to detect any modification of the
transmitted logical MRTD data by means of the Symmetric Authentication mechanism.
The SFR FIA_UAU.6/MP requires the re-authentication and the protection of the
transmitted data is assumed by means of secure messaging implemented by the
cryptographic functions according to FCS_CKM.1/GP, FCS_RND.1 (for key generation),
and FCS_COP.1/GP_ENC and FCS_COP.1/GP_MAC for the ENC_MAC_Mode.
The following part is added to integrate the Chip Authentication mechanism in the
coverage of the OT.Data_Int.
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The inspection system is also able to detect any modification of the transmitted logical
MRTD data by means of the Chip Authentication mechanism. The SFR FIA_UAU.6/CA,
FDP_UCT.1/CA and FDP_UIT.1/CA requires the protection of the transmitted data by
means of secure messaging implemented by the cryptographic functions according to
FCS_CKM.1/CA FCS_COP.1/CA_SHA, FCS_RND.1 (for key generation), and
FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC and FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC for the ENC_MAC_Mode. The SFR
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK requires the Personalization Agent to establish the Chip Authentication
Private Key in a way that it cannot be read by anyone in accordance to
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK_READ. FCS_CKM.4 enforces the destruction of Secure Messaging
session keys.
OT.Data_Conf The security objective OT.Data_Conf “Confidentiality of personal data”
requires the TOE to ensure the confidentiality of the logical MRTD data groups EF.DG1 to
EF.DG16. The SFR FIA_UID.1 and FIA_UAU.1 allow only those actions before
identification respective authentication which do not violate OT.Data_Conf. In case of
failed authentication attempts FIA_AFL.1/BAC enforces additional waiting time prolonging
the necessary amount of time for facilitating a brute force attack. The read access to the
logical MRTD data is defined by the FDP_ACC.1/BAC and FDP_ACF.1/BAC: the successful
authenticated Personalization Agent is allowed to read the data of the logical MRTD
(EF.DG1 to EF.DG16). The successful authenticated Basic Inspection System is allowed to
read the data of the logical MRTD (EF.DG1, EF.DG2 and EF.DG5 to EF.DG16). The SFR
FMT_SMR.1 lists the roles (including Personalization Agent and Basic Inspection System)
and the SFR FMT_SMF.1 lists the TSF management functions (including Personalization
for the key management for the Document Basic Access Keys).
The SFR FIA_UAU.4 prevents reuse of authentication data to strengthen the
authentication of the user. The SFR FIA_UAU.5/BAC enforces the TOE to accept the
authentication attempt as Basic Inspection System only by means of the Basic Access
Control Authentication Mechanism with the Document Basic Access Keys. Moreover, the
SFR FIA_UAU.6/BAC requests secure messaging after successful authentication of the
terminal with Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism which includes the
protection of the transmitted data in ENC_MAC_Mode by means of the cryptographic
functions according to FCS_COP.1/BAC_ENC and FCS_COP.1/BAC_MAC (cf. the SFR
FDP_UCT.1/BAC and FDP_UIT.1/BAC). (for key generation), and FCS_COP.1/BAC_ENC
and FCS_COP.1/BAC_MAC for the ENC_MAC_Mode. The SFR FCS_CKM.1/BAC,
FCS_CKM.4, FCS_COP.1/BAC_SHA and FCS_RND.1 establish the key management for the
secure messaging keys. The SFR FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE addresses the key
management and FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ prevents reading of the Document Basic Access
Keys.
The following part is added to integrate the Manufacturing and Personalization phases in
the OT_Data_Conf.
Manufacturer and Personalization Agent are also able to detect any modification of the
transmitted logical MRTD data by means of the Symmetric Authentication mechanism.
The SFR FIA_UAU.6/MP requires the protection of the transmitted data by means of
secure messaging implemented by the cryptographic functions according to
FCS_CKM.1/GP, FCS_RND.1 (for key generation), and FCS_COP.1/GP_ENC and
FCS_COP.1/GP_MAC for the ENC_MAC_Mode.
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The following parts are added to integrate the Chip Authentication mechanism and the
Symmetric Authentication mechanism used in Personalization phase in the coverage of
the OT.Data_Conf.
The SFR FIA_UAU.5/CA enforces the TOE to accept only received commands with correct
message authentication code sent by means of secure messaging with key agreed with
the terminal by means of the Chip Authentication Mechanism. Moreover, the SFR
FIA_UAU.6/CA requests secure messaging after successful authentication of the chip
which includes the protection of the transmitted data in ENC_MAC_Mode by means of the
cryptographic functions according to FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC and FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC (cf.
the SFR FDP_UCT.1/CA and FDP_UIT.1/CA). (for key generation), and
FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC and FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC for the ENC_MAC_Mode. The SFR
FCS_CKM.1/CA, FCS_CKM.4, FCS_COP.1/CA_SHA and FCS_RND.1 establish the key
management for the secure messaging keys. The SFR FMT_MTD.1/CAPK addresses the
key management and FMT_MTD.1/CAPK_READ prevents reading of the Chip
Authentication Private Key. During Personalization of logical MRTD, the Chip
Authentication Private Key is transmitted ciphered and the TSF deciphers these keys
according to SFR FCS_COP.1/GP_KEY_DEC (FCS_CKM.1/GP and FCS_RND.1 for
decryption session key generation; FCS_CKM.4 for decryption session key destruction).
OT.Identification The security objective OT.Identification “Identification and
Authentication of the TOE” address the storage of the IC Identification Data uniquely
identifying the MRTD’s chip in its non-volatile memory. This will be ensured by TSF
according to SFR FAU_SAS.1.
Furthermore, the TOE shall identify itself only to a successful authenticated Basic
Inspection System in Phase 4 “Operational Use”. The SFR FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA allows
only the Manufacturer to write Initialization Data and Pre-personalization Data (including
the Personalization Agent key). The SFR FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS allows the Personalization
Agent to disable Initialization Data if their usage in the phase 4 “Operational Use” violates
the security objective OT.Identification. The SFR FIA_UID.1 and FIA_UAU.1 do not allow
reading of any data uniquely identifying the MRTD’s chip before successful authentication
of the Basic Inspection Terminal and will stop communication after unsuccessful
authentication attempt. In case of failed authentication attempts FIA_AFL.1/BAC enforces
additional waiting time prolonging the necessary amount of time for facilitating a brute
force attack.
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func The security objective OT.Prot_Abuse-Func “Protection against
Abuse of Functionality” is ensured by the SFR FMT_LIM.1 and FMT_LIM.2 which prevent
misuse of test functionality of the TOE or other features which may not be used after TOE
Delivery.
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak The security objective OT.Prot_Inf_Leak “Protection against Information
Leakage” requires the TOE to protect confidential TSF data stored and/or processed in the
MRTD’s chip against disclosure
o by measurement and analysis of the shape and amplitude of signals or the time
between events found by measuring signals on the electromagnetic field, power
consumption, clock, or I/O lines, which is addressed by the SFR FPT_EMS.1,
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o by forcing a malfunction of the TOE, which is addressed by the SFR FPT_FLS.1 and
FPT_TST.1, and/or
o by a physical manipulation of the TOE, which is addressed by the SFR FPT_PHP.3.
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper The security objective OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper “Protection against
Physical Tampering” is covered by the SFR FPT_PHP.3.
OT.Prot_Malfunction The security objective OT.Prot_Malfunction “Protection against
Malfunctions” is covered by (i) the SFR FPT_TST.1 which requires self tests to
demonstrate the correct operation and tests of authorized users to verify the integrity of
TSF data and TSF code, and (ii) the SFR FPT_FLS.1 which requires a secure state in case
of detected failure or operating conditions possibly causing a malfunction.
9.3.2 Rationale tables of Security Objectives and SFRs
Security Objectives Security Functional Requirements Rationale
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof FCS_CKM.1/CA, FCS_COP.1/CA_SHA,
FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC, FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC,
FCS_RND.1, FIA_API.1/CA, FMT_MOF.1/PROT,
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK, FMT_MTD.1/CAPK_READ
Section 9.3.1
OT.Configuration FCS_CKM.1/GP, FCS_CKM.4,
FCS_COP.1/GP_ENC, FCS_COP.1/GP_AUTH,
FCS_COP.1/GP_MAC, FCS_COP.1/GP_KEY_DEC,
FCS_RND.1, FIA_UAU.4, FIA_UAU.5/MP,
FIA_UAU.6/MP, FIA_AFL.1/MP,
FMT_MOF.1/PROT, FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1,
FPT_EMS.1, FPT_FLS.1, FPT_PHP.3,
FTP_ITC.1/MP
Section 9.3.1
OT.AA_Proof FCS_COP.1/AA, FDP_DAU.1/AA, FDP_ITC.1/AA,
FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_READ,
FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_WRITE, FMT_MOF.1/AA,
FCS_RND.1
Section 9.3.1
OT.Data_Int_AA FDP_DAU.1/AA, FDP_ITC.1/AA, FMT_MOF.1/AA Section 9.3.1
OT.ADMIN_Configuration FCS_COP.1/GP_AUTH, FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ,
FPT_EMS.1, FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1,
FMT_MTD.1/ADMIN
Section 9.3.1
OT.Key_Usage_Counter FMT_MTD.1/Key_Usage_Counter Section 9.3.1
OT.AC_SM_Level FMT_MTD.1/SM_LVL Section 9.3.1
OT.AC_Pers FCS_CKM.1/GP, FCS_CKM.4,
FCS_COP.1/GP_ENC, FCS_COP.1/GP_MAC,
FCS_RND.1, FIA_UAU.4, FIA_UAU.5/BAC,
FIA_UAU.6/MP, FIA_AFL.1/MP, FDP_ACC.1/BAC,
FDP_ACF.1/BAC, FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1,
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE,
Section 9.3.1
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FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ, FMT_MTD.1/CAPK,
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK_READ,
FMT_MTD.1/LCS_PERS, FPT_EMS.1, FPT_FLS.1,
FPT_PHP.3, FIA_UAU.5/MP,
FCS_COP.1/GP_AUTH
OT.Data_Int FCS_CKM.1/BAC, FCS_CKM.1/GP,
FCS_CKM.1/CA, FCS_CKM.4,
FCS_COP.1/BAC_SHA, FCS_COP.1/BAC_ENC,
FCS_COP.1/AUTH, FCS_COP.1/BAC_MAC,
FCS_COP.1/GP_ENC, FCS_COP.1/GP_MAC,
FCS_COP.1/CA_SHA, FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC,
FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC, FIA_UAU.4,
FIA_UAU.5/BAC, FIA_UAU.6/BAC,
FIA_UAU.6/MP, FIA_UAU.6/CA, FDP_ACC.1/BAC,
FDP_ACF.1/BAC, FDP_UCT.1/BAC,
FDP_UCT.1/CA, FDP_UIT.1/BAC, FDP_UIT.1/CA,
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1,
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE,
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ, FMT_MTD.1/CAPK,
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK_READ, FDP_ACC.1/CA,
FDP_ACF.1/CA, FCS_RND.1
Section 9.3.1
OT.Data_Conf FCS_CKM.1/BAC, FCS_CKM.1/GP,
FCS_CKM.1/CA, FCS_CKM.4,
FCS_COP.1/BAC_SHA, FCS_COP.1/BAC_ENC,
FCS_COP.1/BAC_MAC, FCS_COP.1/GP_ENC,
FCS_COP.1/GP_MAC, FCS_COP.1/GP_KEY_DEC,
FCS_COP.1/CA_SHA, FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC,
FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC, FCS_RND.1, FIA_UID.1,
FIA_UAU.1, FIA_UAU.4, FIA_UAU.5/BAC,
FIA_UAU.5/CA, FIA_UAU.6/BAC, FIA_UAU.6/MP,
FIA_UAU.6/CA, FIA_AFL.1/BAC,
FDP_ACC.1/BAC, FDP_ACF.1/BAC,
FDP_UCT.1/BAC, FDP_UCT.1/CA,
FDP_UIT.1/BAC, FDP_UIT.1/CA, FMT_SMF.1,
FMT_SMR.1, FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE,
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ, FMT_MTD.1/CAPK,
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK_READ
Section 9.3.1
OT.Identification FAU_SAS.1, FIA_UID.1, FIA_UAU.1,
FIA_AFL.1/BAC, FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA,
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS
Section 9.3.1
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func FMT_LIM.1, FMT_LIM.2 Section 9.3.1
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak FPT_EMS.1, FPT_FLS.1, FPT_TST.1, FPT_PHP.3 Section 9.3.1
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper FPT_PHP.3 Section 9.3.1
OT.Prot_Malfunction FPT_FLS.1, FPT_TST.1 Section 9.3.1
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Table 20 Security Objectives and SFRs - Coverage
Security Functional
Requirements
Security Objectives Rational
e
FAU_SAS.1 OT.Identification
FCS_CKM.1/BAC OT.Data_Int, OT.Data_Conf
FCS_CKM.4 OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int, OT.Data_Conf,
OT.Configuration
FCS_COP.1/BAC_SHA OT.Data_Int, OT.Data_Conf
FCS_COP.1/BAC_ENC OT.Data_Int, OT.Data_Conf
FCS_COP.1/AUTH OT.Data_Int
FCS_COP.1/BAC_MAC OT.Data_Int, OT.Data_Conf
FCS_RND.1 OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int, OT.Data_Conf,
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof, OT.Configuration,
OT.AA_Proof
FCS_CKM.1/CA OT.Data_Int, OT.Data_Conf,
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof
FCS_COP.1/AA OT.AA_Proof
FCS_COP.1/CA_SHA OT.Data_Int, OT.Data_Conf,
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof
FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC OT.Data_Int, OT.Data_Conf,
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof
FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC OT.Data_Int, OT.Data_Conf,
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof
FCS_CKM.1/GP OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int, OT.Data_Conf,
OT.Configuration
FCS_COP.1/GP_ENC OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int, OT.Data_Conf,
OT.Configuration
FCS_COP.1/GP_AUTH OT.AC_Pers, OT.Configuration,
OT.ADMIN_Configuration
FCS_COP.1/GP_MAC OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int, OT.Data_Conf,
OT.Configuration
FCS_COP.1/GP_KEY_DEC OT.Data_Conf, OT.Configuration
FIA_UID.1 OT.Data_Conf, OT.Identification
FIA_UAU.1 OT.Data_Conf, OT.Identification
FIA_UAU.4 OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int, OT.Data_Conf,
OT.Configuration
FIA_UAU.5/BAC OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int, OT.Data_Conf
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FIA_UAU.6/BAC OT.Data_Int, OT.Data_Conf
FIA_AFL.1/BAC OT.Data_Conf, OT.Identification
FIA_UAU.5/MP OT.AC_Pers, OT.Configuration
FIA_UAU.6/MP OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int, OT.Data_Conf,
OT.Configuration
FIA_AFL.1/MP OT.AC_Pers, OT.Configuration
FIA_UAU.5/CA OT.Data_Conf
FIA_UAU.6/CA OT.Data_Int, OT.Data_Conf
FIA_API.1/CA OT.Chip_Auth_Proof
FDP_ACC.1/BAC OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int, OT.Data_Conf
FDP_ACF.1/BAC OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int, OT.Data_Conf
FDP_UCT.1/BAC OT.Data_Int, OT.Data_Conf
FDP_UIT.1/BAC OT.Data_Int, OT.Data_Conf
FDP_ACC.1/CA OT.Data_Int
FDP_ACF.1/CA OT.Data_Int
FDP_UCT.1/CA OT.Data_Int, OT.Data_Conf
FDP_UIT.1/CA OT.Data_Int, OT.Data_Conf
FDP_DAU.1/AA OT.AA_Proof, OT.Data_Int_AA
FDP_ITC.1/AA OT.AA_Proof, OT.Data_Int_AA
FMT_SMF.1 OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int, OT.Data_Conf,
OT.Configuration, OT.ADMIN_Configuration
FMT_SMR.1 OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int, OT.Data_Conf,
OT.Configuration, OT.ADMIN_Configuration
FMT_LIM.1 OT.Prot_Abuse-Func
FMT_LIM.2 OT.Prot_Abuse-Func
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA OT.Identification
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS OT.Identification
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int, OT.Data_Conf
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int, OT.Data_Conf,
OT.ADMIN_Configuration
FMT_MOF.1/PROT OT.Chip_Auth_Proof, OT.Configuration
FMT_MOF.1/AA OT.AA_Proof, OT.Data_Int_AA
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int, OT.Data_Conf,
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK_READ OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int, OT.Data_Conf,
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OT.Chip_Auth_Proof
FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_READ OT.AA_Proof
FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_WRITE OT.AA_Proof
FMT_MTD.1/LCS_PERS OT.AC_Pers
FMT_MTD.1/ADMIN OT.ADMIN_Configuration
FMT_MTD.1/Key_Usage_Counter OT.Key_Usage_Counter
FMT_MTD.1/SM_LVL OT.AC_SM_Level
FPT_EMS.1 OT.AC_Pers, OT.Prot_Inf_Leak,
OT.Configuration, OT.ADMIN_Configuration
FPT_FLS.1 OT.AC_Pers, OT.Prot_Inf_Leak,
OT.Prot_Malfunction, OT.Configuration
FPT_TST.1 OT.Prot_Inf_Leak, OT.Prot_Malfunction
FPT_PHP.3 OT.AC_Pers, OT.Prot_Inf_Leak,
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper, OT.Configuration
FTP_ITC.1/MP OT.Configuration
Table 21 SFRs and Security Objectives
9.3.3 Dependencies
9.3.3.1 SFRs Dependencies
Requirements CC Dependencies Satisfied Dependencies
FAU_SAS.1 No Dependencies
FCS_CKM.1/BAC (FCS_CKM.2 or
FCS_COP.1) and
(FCS_CKM.4)
FCS_CKM.4,
FCS_COP.1/BAC_ENC,
FCS_COP.1/BAC_MAC
FCS_CKM.4 (FCS_CKM.1 or
FDP_ITC.1 or
FDP_ITC.2)
FCS_CKM.1/BAC,
FCS_CKM.1/CA,
FCS_CKM.1/GP
FCS_COP.1/BAC_SHA (FCS_CKM.1 or
FDP_ITC.1 or
FDP_ITC.2) and
(FCS_CKM.4)
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/BAC_ENC (FCS_CKM.1 or
FDP_ITC.1 or
FDP_ITC.2) and
(FCS_CKM.4)
FCS_CKM.1/BAC, FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/AUTH (FCS_CKM.1 or
FDP_ITC.1 or
FCS_CKM.1/BAC, FCS_CKM.4
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FDP_ITC.2) and
(FCS_CKM.4)
FCS_COP.1/BAC_MAC (FCS_CKM.1 or
FDP_ITC.1 or
FDP_ITC.2) and
(FCS_CKM.4)
FCS_CKM.1/BAC, FCS_CKM.4
FCS_RND.1 No Dependencies
FCS_CKM.1/CA (FCS_CKM.2 or
FCS_COP.1) and
(FCS_CKM.4)
FCS_CKM.4,
FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC,
FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC
FCS_COP.1/AA (FCS_CKM.1 or
FDP_ITC.1 or
FDP_ITC.2) and
(FCS_CKM.4)
FCS_CKM.4, FDP_ITC.1/AA
FCS_COP.1/CA_SHA (FCS_CKM.1 or
FDP_ITC.1 or
FDP_ITC.2) and
(FCS_CKM.4)
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC (FCS_CKM.1 or
FDP_ITC.1 or
FDP_ITC.2) and
(FCS_CKM.4)
FCS_CKM.4, FCS_CKM.1/CA
FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC (FCS_CKM.1 or
FDP_ITC.1 or
FDP_ITC.2) and
(FCS_CKM.4)
FCS_CKM.4, FCS_CKM.1/CA
FCS_CKM.1/GP (FCS_CKM.2 or
FCS_COP.1) and
(FCS_CKM.4)
FCS_CKM.4,
FCS_COP.1/GP_ENC,
FCS_COP.1/GP_MAC
FCS_COP.1/GP_ENC (FCS_CKM.1 or
FDP_ITC.1 or
FDP_ITC.2) and
(FCS_CKM.4)
FCS_CKM.4, FCS_CKM.1/GP
FCS_COP.1/GP_AUTH (FCS_CKM.1 or
FDP_ITC.1 or
FDP_ITC.2) and
(FCS_CKM.4)
FCS_CKM.4, FCS_CKM.1/GP
FCS_COP.1/GP_MAC (FCS_CKM.1 or
FDP_ITC.1 or
FDP_ITC.2) and
(FCS_CKM.4)
FCS_CKM.4, FCS_CKM.1/GP
FCS_COP.1/GP_KEY_DEC (FCS_CKM.1 or
FDP_ITC.1 or
FCS_CKM.4, FCS_CKM.1/GP
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FDP_ITC.2) and
(FCS_CKM.4)
FIA_UID.1 No Dependencies
FIA_UAU.1 (FIA_UID.1) FIA_UID.1
FIA_UAU.4 No Dependencies
FIA_UAU.5/BAC No Dependencies
FIA_UAU.6/BAC No Dependencies
FIA_AFL.1/BAC (FIA_UAU.1) FIA_UAU.1
FIA_UAU.5/MP No Dependencies
FIA_UAU.6/MP No Dependencies
FIA_AFL.1/MP (FIA_UAU.1) FIA_UAU.1
FIA_UAU.5/CA No Dependencies
FIA_UAU.6/CA No Dependencies
FIA_API.1/CA No Dependencies
FDP_ACC.1/BAC (FDP_ACF.1) FDP_ACF.1/BAC
FDP_ACF.1/BAC (FDP_ACC.1) and
(FMT_MSA.3)
FDP_ACC.1/BAC
FDP_UCT.1/BAC (FDP_ACC.1 or
FDP_IFC.1) and
(FTP_ITC.1 or
FTP_TRP.1)
FDP_ACC.1/BAC
FDP_UIT.1/BAC (FDP_ACC.1 or
FDP_IFC.1) and
(FTP_ITC.1 or
FTP_TRP.1)
FDP_ACC.1/BAC
FDP_ACC.1/CA (FDP_ACF.1) FDP_ACF.1/CA
FDP_ACF.1/CA (FDP_ACC.1) and
(FMT_MSA.3)
FDP_ACC.1/CA
FDP_UCT.1/CA (FDP_ACC.1 or
FDP_IFC.1) and
(FTP_ITC.1 or
FTP_TRP.1)
FDP_ACC.1/CA
FDP_UIT.1/CA (FDP_ACC.1 or
FDP_IFC.1) and
(FTP_ITC.1 or
FTP_TRP.1)
FDP_ACC.1/CA
FDP_DAU.1/AA No Dependencies
FDP_ITC.1/AA (FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_ACC.1/BAC
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FDP_IFC.1) and
(FMT_MSA.3)
FMT_SMF.1 No Dependencies
FMT_SMR.1 (FIA_UID.1) FIA_UID.1
FMT_LIM.1 (FMT_LIM.2) FMT_LIM.2
FMT_LIM.2 (FMT_LIM.1) FMT_LIM.1
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA (FMT_SMF.1) and
(FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS (FMT_SMF.1) and
(FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE (FMT_SMF.1) and
(FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ (FMT_SMF.1) and
(FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MOF.1/PROT (FMT_SMF.1) and
(FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MOF.1/AA (FMT_SMF.1) and
(FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK (FMT_SMF.1) and
(FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK_READ (FMT_SMF.1) and
(FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_READ (FMT_SMF.1) and
(FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_WRITE (FMT_SMF.1) and
(FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.1/LCS_PERS (FMT_SMF.1) and
(FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.1/ADMIN (FMT_SMF.1) and
(FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.1/Key_Usage_Counter (FMT_SMF.1) and
(FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.1/SM_LVL (FMT_SMF.1) and
(FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1
FPT_EMS.1 No Dependencies
FPT_FLS.1 No Dependencies
FPT_TST.1 No Dependencies
FPT_PHP.3 No Dependencies
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FTP_ITC.1/MP No Dependencies
Table 22 SFRs Dependencies
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Rationale for the exclusion of Dependencies
The dependency FCS_CKM.1 or FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 of FCS_COP.1/BAC_SHA
is discarded. The hash algorithm required by FCS_COP.1/BAC_SHA does not need any
key material. Therefore neither a key generation (FCS_CKM.1) nor an import
(FDP_ITC.1/2) is necessary.
The dependency FCS_CKM.1 or FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 of FCS_COP.1/CA_SHA is
discarded. The hash algorithm required by FCS_COP.1/CA_SHA does not need any key
material. Therefore neither a key generation (FCS_CKM.1) nor an import (FDP_ITC.1/2) is
necessary.
The dependency FMT_MSA.3 of FDP_ACF.1/BAC is discarded. The access control TSF
according to FDP_ACF.1/BAC uses security attributes which are defined during the
personalization and are fixed over the whole life time of the TOE. No management of
these security attribute (i.e. SFR FMT_MSA.1 and FMT_MSA.3) is necessary here.
The dependency FTP_ITC.1 or FTP_TRP.1 of FDP_UCT.1/BAC is discarded. The SFR
FDP_UCT.1/BAC requires the use of secure messaging between the MRTD and the BIS.
There is no need for SFR FTP_ITC.1, e.g. to require this communication channel to be
logically distinct from other communication channels since there is only one channel.
Since the TOE does not provide a direct human interface a trusted path as required by
FTP_TRP.1 is not applicable here.
The dependency FTP_ITC.1 or FTP_TRP.1 of FDP_UIT.1/BAC is discarded. The SFR
FDP_UIT.1/BAC requires the use of secure messaging between the MRTD and the BIS.
There is no need for SFR FTP_ITC.1, e.g. to require this communication channel to be
logically distinct from other communication channels since there is only one channel.
Since the TOE does not provide a direct human interface a trusted path as required by
FTP_TRP.1 is not applicable here.
The dependency FMT_MSA.3 of FDP_ACF.1/CA is discarded. The access control TSF
according to FDP_ACF.1/CA uses security attributes which are defined during the
personalization and are fixed over the whole life time of the TOE. No management of
these security attribute (i.e. SFR FMT_MSA.1 and FMT_MSA.3) is necessary here.
The dependency FTP_ITC.1 or FTP_TRP.1 of FDP_UCT.1/CA is discarded. The SFR
FDP_UCT.1/CA requires the use of secure messaging between the MRTD and the BIS.
There is no need for SFR FTP_ITC.1, e.g. to require this communication channel to be
logically distinct from other communication channels since there is only one channel.
Since the TOE does not provide a direct human interface a trusted path as required by
FTP_TRP.1 is not applicable here.
The dependency FTP_ITC.1 or FTP_TRP.1 of FDP_UIT.1/CA is discarded. The SFR
FDP_UIT.1/CA requires the use of secure messaging between the MRTD and the BIS.
There is no need for SFR FTP_ITC.1, e.g. to require this communication channel to be
logically distinct from other communication channels since there is only one channel.
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Since the TOE does not provide a direct human interface a trusted path as required by
FTP_TRP.1 is not applicable here.
The dependency FMT_MSA.3 of FDP_ITC.1/AA is discarded. The access control TSF
according to FDP_ACF.1/BAC uses security attributes which are defined during the
personalization and are fixed over the whole life time of the TOE. No management of
these security attribute (i.e. SFR FMT_MSA.1 and FMT_MSA.3) is necessary here.
9.3.3.2 SARs Dependencies
Requirements CC Dependencies Satisfied Dependencies
ADV_ARC.1 (ADV_FSP.1) and (ADV_TDS.1) ADV_FSP.5, ADV_TDS.4
ADV_FSP.5 (ADV_IMP.1) and (ADV_TDS.1) ADV_IMP.1, ADV_TDS.4
ADV_IMP.1 (ADV_TDS.3) and (ALC_TAT.1) ADV_TDS.4, ALC_TAT.2
ADV_TDS.4 (ADV_FSP.5) ADV_FSP.5
ADV_INT.2 (ADV_IMP.1) and (ADV_TDS.3) and
(ALC_TAT.1)
ADV_IMP.1, ADV_TDS.4,
ALC_TAT.2
AGD_OPE.1 (ADV_FSP.1) ADV_FSP.5
AGD_PRE.1 No Dependencies
ALC_CMC.4 (ALC_CMS.1) and (ALC_DVS.1) and
(ALC_LCD.1)
ALC_CMS.5, ALC_DVS.2,
ALC_LCD.1
ALC_CMS.5 No Dependencies
ALC_DEL.1 No Dependencies
ALC_DVS.2 No Dependencies
ALC_LCD.1 No Dependencies
ALC_TAT.2 (ADV_IMP.1) ADV_IMP.1
ASE_CCL.1 (ASE_ECD.1) and (ASE_INT.1) and
(ASE_REQ.1)
ASE_ECD.1, ASE_INT.1,
ASE_REQ.2
ASE_ECD.1 No Dependencies
ASE_INT.1 No Dependencies
ASE_OBJ.2 (ASE_SPD.1) ASE_SPD.1
ASE_REQ.2 (ASE_ECD.1) and (ASE_OBJ.2) ASE_ECD.1, ASE_OBJ.2
ASE_SPD.1 No Dependencies
ASE_TSS.1 (ADV_FSP.1) and (ASE_INT.1) and
(ASE_REQ.1)
ADV_FSP.5, ASE_INT.1,
ASE_REQ.2
ATE_COV.2 (ADV_FSP.2) and (ATE_FUN.1) ADV_FSP.5, ATE_FUN.1
ATE_DPT.3 (ADV_ARC.1) and (ADV_TDS.4) and
(ATE_FUN.1)
ADV_ARC.1, ADV_TDS.4,
ATE_FUN.1
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ATE_FUN.1 (ATE_COV.1) ATE_COV.2
ATE_IND.2 (ADV_FSP.2) and (AGD_OPE.1) and
(AGD_PRE.1) and (ATE_COV.1) and
(ATE_FUN.1)
ADV_FSP.5, AGD_OPE.1,
AGD_PRE.1, ATE_COV.2,
ATE_FUN.1
AVA_VAN.3 (ADV_ARC.1) and (ADV_FSP.4) and
(ADV_IMP.1) and (ADV_TDS.3) and
(AGD_OPE.1) and (AGD_PRE.1) and
(ATE_DPT.1)
ADV_ARC.1, ADV_FSP.5,
ADV_IMP.1, ADV_TDS.4,
AGD_OPE.1, AGD_PRE.1,
ATE_DPT.3
Table 23 SARs Dependencies
9.3.4 Rationale for the Security Assurance Requirements
The EAL4 was chosen to permit a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive
security engineering based on good commercial development practices which, though
rigorous, do not require substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL4 is
the highest level at which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing
product line. EAL4 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs
and are prepared to incur sensitive security specific engineering costs.
9.3.5 ADV_FSP.5 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional error information
The TOE actually target an EAL5 + ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5 and is only limited to EAL4+
due to the restriction of [PP_BAC] on AVA_VAN level.
Other MRTDs TOE are targeting the same physical scope are not affected by this limitation
and provide the full EAL5+ set of SARs. This EAL5+ is required to reach a higher level of
assurance due to sensitivity of ID documents.
9.3.6 ADV_INT.2 Well-structured internals
The TOE actually target an EAL5 + ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5 and is only limited to EAL4+
due to the restriction of [PP_BAC] on AVA_VAN level.
Other MRTDs TOE are targeting the same physical scope are not affected by this limitation
and provide the full EAL5+ set of SARs. This EAL5+ is required to reach a higher level of
assurance due to sensitivity of ID documents.
9.3.7 ADV_TDS.4 Semiformal modular design
The TOE actually target an EAL5 + ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5 and is only limited to EAL4+
due to the restriction of [PP_BAC] on AVA_VAN level.
Other MRTDs TOE are targeting the same physical scope are not affected by this limitation
and provide the full EAL5+ set of SARs. This EAL5+ is required to reach a higher level of
assurance due to sensitivity of ID documents.
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9.3.8 ALC_CMS.5 Development tools CM coverage
The TOE actually target an EAL5 + ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5 and is only limited to EAL4+
due to the restriction of [PP_BAC] on AVA_VAN level.
Other MRTDs TOE are targeting the same physical scope are not affected by this limitation
and provide the full EAL5+ set of SARs. This EAL5+ is required to reach a higher level of
assurance due to sensitivity of ID documents.
9.3.9 ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures
The selection of the component ALC_DVS.2 provides a higher assurance of the security of
the MRTD’s development and manufacturing especially for the secure handling of the
MRTD’s material.
The component ALC_DVS.2 augmented to EAL4 has no dependencies to other security
requirements
9.3.10 ALC_TAT.2 Compliance with implementation standards
The TOE actually target an EAL5 + ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5 and is only limited to EAL4+
due to the restriction of [PP_BAC] on AVA_VAN level.
Other MRTDs TOE are targeting the same physical scope are not affected by this limitation
and provide the full EAL5+ set of SARs. This EAL5+ is required to reach a higher level of
assurance due to sensitivity of ID documents.
9.3.11 ATE_DPT.3 Testing: modular design
The TOE actually target an EAL5 + ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5 and is only limited to EAL4+
due to the restriction of [PP_BAC] on AVA_VAN level.
Other MRTDs TOE are targeting the same physical scope are not affected by this limitation
and provide the full EAL5+ set of SARs. This EAL5+ is required to reach a higher level of
assurance due to sensitivity of ID documents.
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10 TOE Summary Specification
10.1 TOE Summary Specification
This section provides a summary of the security functions implemented by the TOE in order
to fulfil the security functional requirements. The summary is structured in security functions.
Access Control in Reading
This function controls access to read functions and enforces the security policy for data
retrieval. Prior to any data retrieval, it authenticates the actor trying to access the data,
and checks the access conditions are fulfilled as well as the life cycle state. It ensures that
at any time, the following keys are never readable:
o Pre-personalization Agent keys and Personalization Agent keys,
o BAC keys,
o CA private key
o AAK (Active Authentication Keys)
It ensures the access control to specific data as defined in FAU_SAS.1.
Regarding the file structure: In the Operational Use phase:
The terminal can read user data, the Document Security Object, (EF.COM, EF.SOD,
EF.DG1 to EF.DG16) only after BAC or CA respectively authentication and through a valid
secure channel.
In the Production and preparation stage: The Manufacturer can read the Initialization
Data in Stage 2 “Production”. The pre-personalization agent and the Personalization Agent
can read only the random identifier in Stage 3 “Preparation” stored in the TOE. Other
data-elements can only be read after they are authenticated by the TOE (using their
authentication keys).
It ensures as well that no other part of the memory can be accessed at any time.
The implementation contributes to:
o FIA_UID.1, FIA_UAU.1
o FMT_MTD.1/LCS_PERS, FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS, FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ,
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK_READ, FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_READ
o FDP_ACF.1/BAC, FDP_ACC.1/BAC
Access Control in Writing
This function controls access to write functions (in NVM) and enforces the security policy
for data writing. Prior to any data update, it authenticates the actor, and checks the
access conditions are fulfilled as well as the life cycle state.
Regarding the file structure:
In the Production and preparation stage: The Manufacturer can write all the Initialization
and data for the Pre-personalization. The Personalization Agent can write through a valid
secure channel all the data Document Basic Access Keys and Active Authentication Keys
after it is authenticated by the TOE (using its authentication keys). The Pre-
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Personalization Agent can write through a valid secure channel data to be used by the
personalization agent (after it is authenticated by the TOE using its authentication keys).
The Pre-personalization agent is only active after delivery. The key that is written in the
TOE for authentication purposes during manufacturing in meant for the pre-
personalization agent. The Pre-personalization agent (which is seen as a sub-role of the
Personalization agent) will refresh this key.
In the Operational Use phase: It is not possible to create any files (system or data files).
Furthermore, it is not possible to update any files (system or data files).
The implementation contributes to:
o FDP_ACC.1/BAC and FDP_ACF.1/BAC
o FDP_ACC.1/CA and FDP_ACF.1/CA
o FMT_MTD.1/LCS_PERS
o FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS
o FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE
o FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA
o FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_WRITE
o FDP_ITC.1/AA
Active Authentication
This security functionality ensures the Active Authentication is performed as described in
[ICAO_9303] (if it is activated by the personalizer).
The implementation contributes to:
o FCS_COP.1/AA
o FDP_DAU.1/AA
o FDP_ITC.1/AA
Basic Access Control
This TSF provides the Basic Access Control, authentication and session keys generation to
be used by F.SM, as described in [ICAO_9303].
The BAC Session Keys are derived from the MRZ of the MRTD’s chip: this is done using
SHA-1 (FCS_COP.1/BAC_SHA). The authentication initialization requires that the MRTD’s
chip generate 8 bytes challenge (nonce rPICC) that is read by the Basic Inspection System
(FIA_UAU.1), and 16 bytes Key (KPICC) (FCS_RND.1). The MRTD BAC authentication
stages also require TDES encryption of 32 bytes of concatenated data and a Retail MAC
computation over the 32 bytes of encryption output (FCS_COP.1/AUTH). The Basic
Inspection System also generated a pair (KPCD, rPCD). The use of challenges enforces a
protection against replay (FIA_UAU.4). Completion of the BAC Authentication protocol
means that a Secure Messaging session, in ENC_MAC_Mode (FCS_COP.1/BAC_ENC and
FCS_COP.1/BAC_MAC), is started with the session keys (KENC and KMAC) derived
according to [ICAO_9303] from the common master secret KMaster = KPICC?KPCD and a
Send Sequence Counter SSC derived from rPICC and rPCD (FCS_CKM.1/BAC). All further
communication with the TOE is handled by F.SM, enforcing confidentiality and integrity
over transferred data (FIA_UAU.5/BAC). In case the BAC authentication protocol fails (the
TOE being unable to identify the Terminal as being a legitimate Basic Inspection System)
the TOE records one authentication failure. If the Terminal reaches a pre-defined amount
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of successive authentication failures, the BAC Authentication Key is blocked
(FIA_AFL.1/BAC). The implementation contributes also to FDP_ACC.1/BAC and by
FDP_ACF.1/BAC for read and write access control management and FMT_SMR.1 for
security roles.
Chip Authentication
This TSF provides the Chip Authentication, authentication and session keys generation to
be used by F.SM, as described in [TR_03110-3]. The session keys are obtained using
SHA-1 or SHA-256 (FCS_COP.1/CA_SHA).
It also handles key generation based on ECDH (FCS_CKM.1/CA).
It also provides management of this function in phase 5. The implementation contributes
to:
o FIA_UAU.5.2/CA
o FIA_UAU.6.1/CA
o FIA_API.1.1/CA
o FDP_UCT.1.1/CA
o FDP_UIT.1.1/CA
o FDP_UIT.1.2/CA
o FMT_MOF.1.1/PROT
o FDP_ACC.1.1/CA
o FDP_ACF.1.1/CA
MRTD Personalization
This security functionality ensures that the TOE, when delivered to the Personalization
Agent, provides and requires authentication for data exchange. This authentication is
based on a Triple DES and AES authentication mechanism. This function allows to:
o Manage symmetric authentication using Personalization Agent keys,
o Compute session keys to be used by F.SM to establish secure channel according to
[GPC_SPE_034] and SCP02/SCP03,
o Enable and disable Active Authentication,
o Write Active Authentication Keys,
o Load user data,
o Load Chip Authentication keys in encrypted mode,
o Set TOE life cycle to Operational Use phase.
The implementation contributes to:
o FCS_CKM.1/GP, FCS_RND.1, FCS_COP.1/GP_AUTH, FCS_COP.1/GP_MAC,
FCS_COP.1/GP_KEY_DEC,
o FIA_UAU.5/BAC, FIA_AFL.1/MP,
o FDP_ACC.1/BAC, FDP_ACF.1/BAC
o FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1, FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS, FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE,
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK, FMT_MTD.1/LCS_PERS
o FTP_ITC.1/MP
o FIA_UAU.4
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o FMT_MOF.1/AA
o FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_WRITE
Physical Protection
This Security Function protects the TOE against physical attacks, so that the integrity and
confidentiality of the TOE is ensured, including keys, user data and TOE life cycle. It
detects physical tampering, responds automatically, and also controls the emanations sent
out by the TOE. It furthermore prevents deploying test features after TOE delivery. This
SF also preserve a secure state when any failure is detected or a malfunction occurs.
The implementation contributes to: FPT_EMS.1, FPT_FLS.1, FPT_PHP.3, FMT_LIM.1 and
FMT_LIM.2.
MRTD Pre-personalization
This security functionality ensures that the TOE, when delivered to the Manufacturer,
provides and requires an authentication mechanism for data exchange. This
authentication is based on Triple DES symmetric authentication mechanism. This function
allows to:
o Manage symmetric authentication using Pre-personalization Agent keys,
o Compute session keys to be used by F.SM to establish secure channel according to
[GPC_SPE_034] and SCP02/SCP03
o Load Personalization Agent keys in encrypted mode.
The implementation contributes to:
o FCS_CKM.1/GP, FCS_COP.1/GP_AUTH, FCS_COP.1/GP_KEY_DEC, FCS_RND.1
o FIA_UAU.5/MP, FIA_AFL.1/MP,
o FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1, FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA, - FTP_ITC.1/MP
Secure Messaging
This security functionality ensures the confidentiality, authenticity and integrity of the
communication between the TOE and the interface device. In the operational phase, after
a successful Authentication Procedure (i.e. BAC or CA), a secure channel is established,
based on Triple DES algorithm in case of BAC and based on Triple DES/AES algorithms in
case of CA (according to FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC and FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC), such that the
TOE is able to verify the integrity and authenticity of exchanged data. This security
functionality also provides a Secure Messaging (SCP02 or SCP03) for the Pre-
personalization and Personalization phases. The protocols can be configured to protect
the exchanges integrity and/or confidentiality. If an error occurs in the secure messaging
layer, the session keys are destroyed.
The implementation contributes to:
o FIA_UAU.1, FIA_UAU.6/BAC, FIA_UAU.6/MP, FIA_UAU.6/CA, FIA_UAU.5/CA
o FCS_CKM.4, FCS_COP.1/BAC_ENC, FCS_COP.1/BAC_MAC, FCS_COP.1/GP_ENC,
FCS_COP.1/GP_MAC,FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC, FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC, and FCS_RND.1
o FDP_UCT.1/BAC, FDP_UCT.1/CA,
o FTP_ITC.1/MP
o FDP_UIT.1/BAC, FDP_UIT.1/CA
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o FIA_UAU.4
Self Tests
The TOE performs self-tests to verify the integrity of the TSF data:
o At Reset. The implementation contributes to FPT_TST.1
ADMIN - MRTD Administration
This security functionality ensures that the TOE, when delivered to the Administration
Agent, provides and requires authentication for data exchange.
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10.2 SFRs and TSS
10.2.1 SFRs and TSS - Rationale
Class FAU Security Audit
FAU_SAS.1 is met by Access Control in Reading
Class FCS Cryptographic Support
FCS_CKM.1/BAC is met by Basic Access Control.
FCS_CKM.4 is met by Secure Messaging
FCS_COP.1/BAC_SHA is met by Basic Access Control
FCS_COP.1/BAC_ENC is met by Basic Access Control and Secure Messaging
FCS_COP.1/AUTH is met by MRTD Personalization
FCS_COP.1/BAC_MAC is met by Basic Access Control and Secure Messaging
FCS_RND.1 is met by Basic Access Control, MRTD Personalization, MRTD Pre-
personalization and Secure Messaging
Additional FCS SFR's Identified
FCS_CKM.1/CA is met by Chip Authentication
FCS_COP.1/AA is met by Active Authentication
FCS_COP.1/CA_SHA is met by Chip Authentication
FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC is met by Secure Messaging
FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC is met by Secure Messaging
FCS_CKM.1/GP is met by MRTD Personalization and MRTD Pre-personalization
FCS_COP.1/GP_ENC is met by Secure Messaging
FCS_COP.1/GP_AUTH is met by MRTD Pre-personalization
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FCS_COP.1/GP_MAC is met by Secure Messaging
FCS_COP.1/GP_KEY_DEC is met by MRTD Personalization and MRTD Pre-personalization
Class FIA Identification and Authentication
FIA_UID.1 is met by Access Control in Reading
FIA_UAU.1 is met by Access Control in Reading
FIA_UAU.4 is met by Basic Access Control, MRTD Personalization and Secure Messaging
FIA_UAU.5/BAC is met by Basic Access Control and MRTD Personalization
FIA_UAU.6/BAC is met by Secure Messaging
FIA_AFL.1/BAC is met by Basic Access Control
Additional FIA SFR's Identified
FIA_UAU.5/MP is met by MRTD Pre-personalization
FIA_UAU.6/MP is met by Secure Messaging
FIA_AFL.1/MP is met by MRTD Personalization and MRTD Pre-personalization
FIA_UAU.5/CA is met by Secure Messaging
FIA_UAU.6/CA is met by Secure Messaging
FIA_API.1/CA is met by Chip Authentication
Class FDP User Data Protection
FDP_ACC.1/BAC is met by Access Control in Reading, Access Control in Writing, Basic
Access Control and MRTD Personalization
FDP_ACF.1/BAC is met by Access Control in Reading, Access Control in Writing, Basic
Access Control and MRTD Personalization
FDP_UCT.1/BAC is met by Secure Messaging
FDP_UIT.1/BAC is met by Secure Messaging
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Additional FDP SFR's Identified
FDP_ACC.1/CA is met by Access Control in Writing, Chip Authentication and Secure
Messaging
FDP_ACF.1/CA is met by Access Control in Writing, Chip Authentication and Secure
Messaging
FDP_UCT.1/CA is met by Secure Messaging
FDP_UIT.1/CA is met by Secure Messaging
FDP_DAU.1/AA is met by Active Authentication
FDP_ITC.1/AA is met by Access Control in Writing and Active Authentication
Class FMT Security Management
FMT_SMF.1 is met by Chip Authentication, MRTD Personalization and MRTD Pre-
personalization
FMT_SMR.1 is met by Basic Access Control, MRTD Personalization and MRTD Pre-
personalization
FMT_LIM.1 is met by Physical Protection
FMT_LIM.2 is met by Physical Protection
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA is met by Access Control in Writing and MRTD Pre-personalization
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS is met by Access Control in Reading, Access Control in Writing and
MRTD Personalization
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE is met by Access Control in Writing and MRTD Personalization
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ is met by Access Control in Reading
Additional FMT SFR's Identified
FMT_MOF.1/PROT is met by Chip Authentication
FMT_MOF.1/AA is met by MRTD Personalization
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FMT_MTD.1/CAPK is met by Access Control in Writing and MRTD Personalization
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK_READ is met by Access Control in Reading
FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_READ is met by Access Control in Reading
FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_WRITE is met by Access Control in Writing and MRTD
Personalization
FMT_MTD.1/LCS_PERS is met by Access Control in Writing and MRTD Personalization
FMT_MTD.1/ADMIN is met by ADMIN - MRTD Administration
FMT_MTD.1/Key_Usage_Counter is met by MRTD Personalisation
FMT_MTD.1/SM_LVL is met by MRTD Personalization in which the level of security of the
allowed secure messaging can now be restricted during perso for the USE phase.
Class FPT Protection of the Security Functions
FPT_EMS.1 is met by Physical Protection
FPT_FLS.1 is met by Physical Protection
FPT_TST.1 is met by Self Tests
FPT_PHP.3 is met by Physical Protection
Additional FTP Trusted path/channels SFR Identified
FTP_ITC.1/MP is met by MRTD Personalization, MRTD Pre-personalization and Secure
Messaging
10.2.2 Association tables of SFRs and TSS
Security Functional Requirements TOE Summary Specification
FAU_SAS.1 Access Control in Reading
FCS_CKM.1/BAC Basic Access Control
FCS_CKM.4 Secure Messaging
FCS_COP.1/BAC_SHA Basic Access Control
FCS_COP.1/BAC_ENC Basic Access Control, Secure Messaging
FCS_COP.1/AUTH MRTD Personalization, Basic Access Control
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FCS_COP.1/BAC_MAC Basic Access Control, Secure Messaging
FCS_RND.1 Basic Access Control, MRTD Personalization, MRTD
Pre-personalization, Secure Messaging
FCS_CKM.1/CA Chip Authentication
FCS_COP.1/AA Active Authentication
FCS_COP.1/CA_SHA Chip Authentication
FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC Secure Messaging
FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC Secure Messaging
FCS_CKM.1/GP MRTD Personalization, MRTD Pre-personalization
FCS_COP.1/GP_ENC Secure Messaging
FCS_COP.1/GP_AUTH MRTD Pre-personalization
FCS_COP.1/GP_MAC Secure Messaging, MRTD Pre-personalization
FCS_COP.1/GP_KEY_DEC MRTD Personalization, MRTD Pre-personalization
FIA_UID.1 Access Control in Reading
FIA_UAU.1 Access Control in Reading
FIA_UAU.4 Basic Access Control, MRTD Personalization,
Secure Messaging
FIA_UAU.5/BAC Basic Access Control, MRTD Personalization
FIA_UAU.6/BAC Secure Messaging
FIA_AFL.1/BAC Basic Access Control
FIA_UAU.5/MP MRTD Pre-personalization
FIA_UAU.6/MP Secure Messaging
FIA_AFL.1/MP MRTD Personalization, MRTD Pre-personalization
FIA_UAU.5/CA Secure Messaging
FIA_UAU.6/CA Secure Messaging
FIA_API.1/CA Chip Authentication
FDP_ACC.1/BAC Access Control in Reading, Access Control in
Writing, Basic Access Control, MRTD
Personalization
FDP_ACF.1/BAC Access Control in Reading, Access Control in
Writing, Basic Access Control, MRTD
Personalization
FDP_UCT.1/BAC Secure Messaging
FDP_UIT.1/BAC Secure Messaging
FDP_ACC.1/CA Access Control in Writing, Chip Authentication,
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Secure Messaging
FDP_ACF.1/CA Access Control in Writing, Chip Authentication,
Secure Messaging
FDP_UCT.1/CA Secure Messaging
FDP_UIT.1/CA Secure Messaging
FDP_DAU.1/AA Active Authentication
FDP_ITC.1/AA Access Control in Writing, Active Authentication
FMT_SMF.1 Chip Authentication, MRTD Personalization, MRTD
Pre-personalization
FMT_SMR.1 Basic Access Control, MRTD Personalization, MRTD
Pre-personalization
FMT_LIM.1 Physical Protection
FMT_LIM.2 Physical Protection
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA Access Control in Writing, MRTD Pre-
personalization
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS Access Control in Reading, Access Control in
Writing, MRTD Personalization
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE Access Control in Writing, MRTD Personalization
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ Access Control in Reading
FMT_MOF.1/PROT Chip Authentication
FMT_MOF.1/AA MRTD Personalization
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK Access Control in Writing, MRTD Personalization
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK_READ Access Control in Reading
FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_READ Access Control in Reading
FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_WRITE Access Control in Writing, MRTD Personalization
FMT_MTD.1/LCS_PERS Access Control in Writing, MRTD Personalization
FMT_MTD.1/ADMIN ADMIN - MRTD Administration
FMT_MTD.1/Key_Usage_Counter MRTD Personalization
FMT_MTD.1/SM_LVL MRTD Personalization
FPT_EMS.1 Physical Protection
FPT_FLS.1 Physical Protection
FPT_TST.1 Self Tests
FPT_PHP.3 Physical Protection
FTP_ITC.1/MP MRTD Personalization, MRTD Pre-personalization,
Secure Messaging
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Table 24 SFRs and TSS - Coverage
TOE Summary
Specification
Security Functional Requirements
Access Control in
Reading
FAU_SAS.1, FIA_UID.1, FIA_UAU.1, FDP_ACC.1/BAC, FDP_ACF.1/BAC,
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS, FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ, FMT_MTD.1/CAPK_READ,
FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_READ
Access Control in
Writing
FDP_ACC.1/BAC, FDP_ACF.1/BAC, FDP_ACC.1/CA, FDP_ACF.1/CA,
FDP_ITC.1/AA, FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA, FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS,
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE, FMT_MTD.1/CAPK,
FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_WRITE, FMT_MTD.1/LCS_PERS
Active
Authentication
FCS_COP.1/AA, FDP_DAU.1/AA, FDP_ITC.1/AA
Basic Access
Control
FCS_CKM.1/BAC, FCS_COP.1/BAC_SHA, FCS_COP.1/BAC_ENC,
FCS_COP.1/AUTH, FCS_COP.1/BAC_MAC, FCS_RND.1, FIA_UAU.4,
FIA_UAU.5/BAC, FIA_AFL.1/BAC, FDP_ACC.1/BAC, FDP_ACF.1/BAC,
FMT_SMR.1
Chip
Authentication
FCS_CKM.1/CA, FCS_COP.1/CA_SHA, FIA_API.1/CA, FDP_ACC.1/CA,
FDP_ACF.1/CA, FMT_SMF.1, FMT_MOF.1/PROT
MRTD
Personalization
FCS_COP.1/AUTH, FCS_RND.1, FCS_CKM.1/GP,
FCS_COP.1/GP_KEY_DEC, FIA_UAU.4, FIA_UAU.5/BAC, FIA_AFL.1/MP,
FDP_ACC.1/BAC, FDP_ACF.1/BAC, FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1,
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS, FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE, FMT_MOF.1/AA,
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK, FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_WRITE,
FMT_MTD.1/LCS_PERS, FMT_MTD.1/Key_Usage_Counter,
FMT_MTD.1/SM_LVL, FTP_ITC.1/MP
Physical
Protection
FMT_LIM.1, FMT_LIM.2, FPT_EMS.1, FPT_FLS.1, FPT_PHP.3
MRTD Pre-
personalization
FCS_RND.1, FCS_CKM.1/GP, FCS_COP.1/GP_AUTH,
FCS_COP.1/GP_MAC, FCS_COP.1/GP_KEY_DEC, FIA_UAU.5/MP,
FIA_AFL.1/MP, FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1, FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA,
FTP_ITC.1/MP
Secure Messaging FCS_CKM.4, FCS_COP.1/BAC_ENC, FCS_COP.1/BAC_MAC, FCS_RND.1,
FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC, FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC, FCS_COP.1/GP_ENC,
FCS_COP.1/GP_MAC, FIA_UAU.4, FIA_UAU.6/BAC, FIA_UAU.6/MP,
FIA_UAU.5/CA, FIA_UAU.6/CA, FDP_UCT.1/BAC, FDP_UIT.1/BAC,
FDP_ACC.1/CA, FDP_ACF.1/CA, FDP_UCT.1/CA, FDP_UIT.1/CA,
FTP_ITC.1/MP
Self Tests FPT_TST.1
ADMIN - MRTD
Administration
FMT_MTD.1/ADMIN
Table 25 TSS and SFRs - Coverage