National Information Assurance Partnership
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
Validation Report
Kyocera Corporation
9520 Towne Centre Drive, Suite 200
San Diego, California 92121
Kyocera DuraForce PRO Mobile
Device
Report Number: CCEVS-VR-10742-2017
Dated: January 5, 2017
Version: 0.4
National Institute of Standards and Technology National Security Agency
Information Technology Laboratory Information Assurance Directorate
100 Bureau Drive 9800 Savage Road STE 6940
Gaithersburg, MD 20899 Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6940
®
TM
Kyocera DuraForce PRO Mobile Device Validation Report Version 0.4, January 5, 2017
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Validation Team
Herbert Ellis
Meredith Hennan
Ken Stutterheim
Aerospace Corporation
Columbia, MD
Noel Richards
National Security Agency
Fort Meade, MD
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
James Arnold
Tammy Compton
Raymond Smoley
Gossamer Security Solutions, Inc.
Catonsville, MD
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Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary.................................................................................................... 1
2 Identification............................................................................................................... 1
3 Architectural Information ........................................................................................... 3
3.1 TOE Evaluated Platforms ................................................................................... 3
3.2 TOE Architecture................................................................................................ 4
3.3 Physical Boundaries............................................................................................ 4
4 Security Policy............................................................................................................ 4
4.1 Cryptographic support ........................................................................................ 4
4.2 User data protection ............................................................................................ 5
4.3 Identification and authentication......................................................................... 5
4.4 Security management.......................................................................................... 5
4.5 Protection of the TSF.......................................................................................... 5
4.6 TOE access.......................................................................................................... 6
4.7 Trusted path/channels ......................................................................................... 6
5 Assumptions................................................................................................................ 6
6 Clarification of Scope ................................................................................................. 6
7 Documentation............................................................................................................ 7
8 IT Product Testing ...................................................................................................... 7
8.1 Developer Testing............................................................................................... 8
8.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing ............................................................... 8
9 Evaluated Configuration ............................................................................................. 8
10 Results of the Evaluation ............................................................................................ 9
10.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ASE)............................................................ 9
10.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV).............................................................. 9
10.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD) ................................................. 9
10.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC) ................................... 10
10.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE) ............... 10
10.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN)....................................................... 10
10.7 Summary of Evaluation Results........................................................................ 10
11 Validator Comments/Recommendations .................................................................. 11
12 Annexes..................................................................................................................... 11
13 Security Target.......................................................................................................... 11
14 Glossary .................................................................................................................... 11
15 Bibliography ............................................................................................................. 12
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1 Executive Summary
This report documents the assessment of the National Information Assurance Partnership
(NIAP) validation team of the evaluation of Kyocera DuraForce PRO Mobile Device
solution provided by Kyocera Corporation. It presents the evaluation results, their
justifications, and the conformance results. This Validation Report is not an endorsement
of the Target of Evaluation by any agency of the U.S. government, and no warranty is
either expressed or implied.
The evaluation was performed by the Gossamer Security Solutions (Gossamer) Common
Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL) in Catonsville, MD, United States of America, and
was completed in January 2017. The information in this report is largely derived from the
Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) and associated test reports, all written by Gossamer
Security Solutions. The evaluation determined that the product is Common Criteria Part 2
Extended and Part 3 Conformant.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the Kyocera DuraForce PRO Mobile Device and
associated TOE guidance documentation.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) identified in this Validation Report has been evaluated at a
NIAP approved Common Criteria Testing Laboratory using the Common Methodology for
IT Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev 4) for conformance to the Common Criteria for
IT Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev 4). This Validation Report applies only to the
specific version of the TOE as evaluated. The evaluation has been conducted in
accordance with the provisions of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation
Scheme and the conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation technical report are
consistent with the evidence provided.
The validation team monitored the activities of the evaluation team, provided guidance on
technical issues and evaluation processes, and reviewed the individual work units and
successive versions of the ETR. The validation team found that the evaluation showed that
the product satisfies all of the functional requirements and assurance requirements stated in
the Security Target (ST). Therefore the validation team concludes that the testing
laboratory’s findings are accurate, the conclusions justified, and the conformance results
are correct. The conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation technical report are
consistent with the evidence produced.
The technical information included in this report was obtained from the Kyocera
DuraForce PRO Mobile Device Security Target, version 1.0, January 5, 2017.
2 Identification
The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST) effort to establish commercial facilities to perform trusted product
evaluations. Under this program, security evaluations are conducted by National Voluntary
Laboratory Assessment Program (NVLAP) commercial testing laboratories called
Common Criteria Testing Laboratories (CCTLs). CCTLs evaluate products against
Protection Profiles containing Assurance Activities which are the interpretations of the
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Common Evaluation Methodology (CEM) work units specific to the technology described
by the PP.
The NIAP Validation Body assigns Validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality and
consistency across evaluations. Developers of information technology products desiring a
security evaluation contract with a CCTL and pay a fee for their product’s evaluation.
Upon successful completion of the evaluation, the product is added to NIAP’s Validated
Products List.
Table 1 provides information needed to completely identify the product, including:
 The Target of Evaluation (TOE): the fully qualified identifier of the product as
evaluated.
 The Security Target (ST), describing the security features, claims, and assurances of the
product.
 The conformance result of the evaluation.
 The Protection Profile to which the product is conformant.
 The organizations and individuals participating in the evaluation.
Table 1: Evaluation Identifiers
Item Identifier
Evaluation Scheme United States NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
TOE: Kyocera DuraForce PRO Mobile Device
Protection Profile
(Specific models identified in Section 3.1)
Protection Profile For Mobile Device Fundamentals, Version 2.0, 17 September
2014
ST: Kyocera DuraForce PRO Mobile Device Security Target, version 1.0, January 5,
2017
Evaluation Technical
Report
Evaluation Technical Report for Kyocera DuraForce PRO Mobile Device ,
version 0.3, January 5, 2017
CC Version Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
rev 4
Conformance Result CC Part 2 extended, CC Part 3 conformant
Sponsor Kyocera Corporation
Developer Kyocera Corporation
Common Criteria
Testing Lab (CCTL)
Gossamer Security Solutions, Inc.
CCEVS Validators Herbert Ellis
Meredith Hennan,
Ken Stutterheim,
Noel Richards
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Item Identifier
3 Architectural Information
Note: The following architectural description is based on the description presented in the
Security Target.
The Target of Evaluation is the Kyocera DuraForce PRO smartphone which includes the
Qualcomm MSM8952 processor along with the associated guidance documentation.
The Kyocera DuraForce PRO includes a 5.0 inch, Full HD 1920x1080 resolution LCD
display; a 13MP rear facing camera, 5MP front facing camera and a Super Wide View
1080p HD video Action Camera; 2GB of RAM; 32GB of built-in storage; and a microSD
card slot. The Kyocera DuraForce PRO can operate on CDMA, GSM, UMTS and LTE
communication networks1
.
The Kyocera DuraForce PRO is a mobile device that supports individual users as well as
corporate enterprises. The Kyocera DuraForce PRO is based upon Android 6.0.1 as
customized by Kyocera.
The TOE provides wireless connectivity and creates a runtime environment for applications
designed for the mobile Android environment. The TOE provides telephony features (make
and receive phone calls, send and receive SMS messages), and networking features
(connect to Wi-Fi networks, send and receive MMS messages, connect to mobile data
networks).
3.1 TOE Evaluated Platforms
The evaluated configuration consists of the following models:
Model Model # Storage RAM Kernel
Version
Build # Carrier
Variant
DuraForce
PRO
E6810 32GB 2GB 3.10.84 77f9a2518fcf54e010ac4708f980bc92 Verizon
DuraForce
PRO
E6820 32GB 2GB 3.10.84 5af5d0a4566fec0b8bab756b3386c667 AT&T
DuraForce
PRO
E6830 32GB 2GB 3.10.84 c0307913ad6ff1e293bf8a646988d5bd Sprint
1
CDMA is available only for Sprint and Verizon variants of the mobile device.
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3.2 TOE Architecture
The TOE provides an Application Programming Interface to mobile applications and
provides users installing an application the option to either approve or reject an application
based upon the API access that the application requires.
The TOE provides users with the ability to protect Data-At-Rest (DAR) with AES
encryption, which includes all user and mobile application data stored in the user’s data
partition. The TOE affords protection to all user and application cryptographic keys stored
in the TOE. Moreover, the TOE provides users the ability to use AES to encrypt data and
files stored on an SD Card inserted into the device.
Finally, the TOE can interact with a Mobile Device Management to allow enterprise
control of the configuration and operation of the device to ensure adherence to enterprise-
wide policies.
The TOE protects itself from tampering and bypass by offering only a limited and
controlled set of functions at each of its physical interfaces to its environment.
Communication via those interfaces is either directed at the TOE for the purpose of
administration or is directed through the TOE for communication among network devices.
In both cases the TOE implements a set of policies to control the services available and
those services are designed to protect and ensure the secure operation of the TOE.
3.3 Physical Boundaries
The TOE’s physical boundary is the physical perimeter of the mobile device’s enclosure.
4 Security Policy
This section summarizes the security functions provided by DuraForce PRO:
1. Cryptographic support
2. User data protection
3. Identification and authentication
4. Security management
5. Protection of the TSF
6. TOE access
7. Trusted path/channels
4.1 Cryptographic support
The TOE includes two cryptographic modules with CAVP validated algorithms for a wide
range of cryptographic functions including: asymmetric key generation and establishment,
symmetric key generation, encryption/decryption, cryptographic hashing and keyed-hash
message authentication. These functions are supported with random bit generation, key
derivation, salt generation, initialization vector generation, secure key storage, and key and
protected data destruction. These primitive cryptographic functions are used to implement
security protocols such as TLS and HTTPS and also to encrypt the media (to include the
generation and protection of data, right, and key encryption keys) which are used by the
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TOE. Many of these cryptographic functions are accessible as services to applications
running on the TOE.
4.2 User data protection
The TOE controls access to system services by hosted applications, including protection of
the Trust Anchor Database. Additionally, the TOE protects user and other data through the
use of encryption so that even if a device is physically lost, the data remains protected.
4.3 Identification and authentication
The TOE supports a number of features related to identification and authentication. From a
user perspective, except for limited functions such as making phone calls to an emergency
number and receiving notifications, a password (i.e., Password Authentication Factor) must
be correctly entered to unlock the TOE. Also, even when the TOE is unlocked the
password must be re-entered to change the password. Passwords are obscured when entered
so they cannot be read from the TOE's display. The TOE limits the frequency of password
entry attempts and when a preconfigured number of failures is exceeded, the TOE performs
a full wipe of protected content. Passwords up to 14 characters can be supported and can be
constructed using upper and lower case characters, numbers, and special characters.
The TOE serves as an IEEE 802.1X supplicant and uses X509v3 certificates and perform
certificate validation for a number of functions when applicable, such as EAP-TLS, TLS,
and HTTPS exchanges.
4.4 Security management
The TOE provides the interfaces necessary to manage the security functions claimed in the
corresponding Security Target (and that conform to the MDFPP requirements) as well as
other functions commonly found in mobile devices. Some of the available functions are
available only to the mobile device users while other functions are restricted to
administrators operating through a Mobile Device Management solution. If the TOE has
been enrolled in a MDM and is subsequently un-enrolled, it issues an alert to the
administrator and wipes the device to complete the un-enrollment.
4.5 Protection of the TSF
The TOE implements functions to ensure the reliability and integrity of its security
features. It protects data such as cryptographic keys so that they are not accessible or
exportable. It provides a timing mechanism to ensure that reliable time information is
available (e.g., for cryptographic operations and perhaps user accountability). It enforces
read, write, and execute memory page protections, uses address space layout randomization
and stack-based buffer overflow protections to minimize the potential to exploit application
flaws. The TOE includes the capability to protect itself from modification by applications
as well as to isolate the address spaces of applications from one another to protect those
applications.
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The TOE includes functions to perform self-tests and software/firmware integrity checking
so that it might detect when it is failing or may be corrupt. If any self-test fails, the TOE
does not enter an operational mode. It also includes a mechanism (i.e., verification of the
digital signature of each new image) so that the TOE itself can be updated while ensuring
that the updates will not introduce malicious or other unexpected changes in the TOE.
Digital signature checking also extends to verifying applications prior to their installation.
4.6 TOE access
The TOE is lockable, thereby obscuring its display, either by a user or after a configured
interval of inactivity.
The TOE is able to attempt to connect to wireless networks if so configured.
4.7 Trusted path/channels
The TOE supports the use of IEEE802.11-2012, IEEE802.1X, and EAP-TLS to secure
communications channels between itself and other trusted network devices.
5 Assumptions
The Security Problem Definition, including the assumptions, may be found in the
Protection Profile For Mobile Device Fundamentals, Version 2, 17 September 2014
(MDFPP). That information has not been reproduced here and the MDFPP should be
consulted if there is interest in that material.
6 Clarification of Scope
All evaluations (and all products) have limitations, as well as potential misconceptions that
need clarification. This text covers some of the more important limitations and
clarifications of this evaluation. Note that:
 As with any evaluation, this evaluation only shows that the evaluated configuration
meets the security claims made with a certain level of assurance (the assurance
activities specified in the Mobile Device Fundamentals Protection Profile and
performed by the evaluation team).
 This evaluation covers only the specific device models and software as identified in
this document, and not any earlier or later versions released or in process.
 This evaluation did not specifically search for, nor attempt to exploit, vulnerabilities
that were not “obvious” or vulnerabilities to objectives not claimed in the ST. The
CEM defines an “obvious” vulnerability as one that is easily exploited with a
minimum of understanding of the TOE, technical sophistication and resources.
 The functionality evaluated is scoped exclusively to the security functional
requirements specified in the MDFPP and any applicable Technical Decisions. Any
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additional security related functional capabilities of the TOE were not covered by
this evaluation.
7 Documentation
The following documents were available with the TOE for evaluation:
 Kyocera DuraForce PRO Common Criteria Guidance Manual, version 1.2 dated
January 5, 2017
Any additional customer documentation delivered with the product or that is available
through download was not included in the scope of the evaluation, and therefore should not
be relied upon when configuring or using the products as evaluated.
8 IT Product Testing
This section describes the testing efforts of the developer and the Evaluation Team. It is
derived from information contained in the Detailed Test Report (MDFPP20) for Kyocera
DuraForce PRO Mobile Device, version 0.2, October 27, 2016 (DTR) and summarized in
the Assurance Activity Report (MDFPP20) for Kyocera DuraForce PRO Mobile Device,
version 0.3, January 5, 2017 (AAR), which is publically available.
The following diagrams depict the test environments used by the evaluators.
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8.1 Developer Testing
No evidence of developer testing is required in the assurance activities for this product.
8.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing
The evaluation team verified the product according to the Kyocera DuraForce PRO
Common Criteria Guidance Manual, version 1.2, January 5, 2017 document and performed
the tests specified in the MDFPP20 to include tests associated with optional requirements.
9 Evaluated Configuration
The evaluated configuration consists of the Kyocera DuraForce PRO devices.
To use the product in the evaluated configuration, the product must be configured as
specified in Kyocera DuraForce PRO Common Criteria Guidance Manual, version 1.2,
January 5, 2017.
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10 Results of the Evaluation
The results of the assurance requirements are generally described in this section and are
presented in detail in the proprietary ETR. The reader of this document can assume that all
work units received a passing verdict.
A verdict for an assurance component is determined by the resulting verdicts assigned to
the corresponding evaluator action elements. The evaluation was conducted based upon
CC version 3.1 rev 4 and CEM version 3.1 rev 4. The evaluation determined the Kyocera
DuraForce PRO devices to be Part 2 extended, and to meet the SARs contained in the
MDFPP.
10.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ASE)
The evaluation team applied each ASE CEM work unit. The ST evaluation ensured the ST
contained a description of the environment in terms of policies and assumptions, a
statement of security requirements claimed to be met by the Kyocera DuraForce PRO
Mobile Device products that are consistent with the Common Criteria, and product security
function descriptions that supported the requirements.
The validation team reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient
evidence and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the
evaluation was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the
conclusion reached by the evaluation team was justified.
10.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV)
The evaluation team applied each ADV CEM work unit. The evaluation team assessed the
design documentation and found it adequate to aid in understanding how the TSF provides
the security functions. The design documentation consists of a functional specification
contained in the Security target and Guidance documents. Additionally the evaluator
performed the assurance activities specified in the MDFPP20 related to the examination of
the information contained in the TSS.
The validation team reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient
evidence and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the
evaluation was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the
conclusion reached by the evaluation team was justified.
10.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD)
The evaluation team applied each relevant AGD CEM work unit. The evaluation team
ensured the adequacy of the Common Criteria Guidance in describing how to use and or
administer the operational TOE. The guide was assessed during the design and testing
phases of the evaluation to ensure they were complete.
The validation team reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient
evidence and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the
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evaluation was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the
conclusion reached by the evaluation team was justified.
10.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC)
The evaluation team applied the relevant ALC CEM work units. The evaluation team
found that the TOE was identified.
The validation team reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient
evidence and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the
evaluation was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the
conclusion reached by the evaluation team was justified.
10.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE)
The evaluation team applied each relevant ATE CEM work unit. The evaluation team
performed the tests specified by the assurance activities in the MDFPP20 and recorded the
results in a Test Report, and summarized in the AAR.
The validation team reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient
evidence and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the
evaluation was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the
conclusion reached by the evaluation team was justified.
10.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN)
The evaluation team applied the relevant AVA CEM work units. The vulnerability analysis
is in the Detailed Test Report (DTR) prepared by the evaluator. The vulnerability analysis
includes a public search for vulnerabilities. The public search for vulnerabilities did not
uncover any residual vulnerabilities. All vulnerabilities have been addressed and are being
distributed via the carriers.
The evaluator searched the National Vulnerability Database
(https://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/search) and Vulnerability Notes Database
(http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/) with the following search terms: "Kyocera Explorer",
"Kyocera", "Explorer", "Kyocera DuraForce Pro", "DuraForce", "Android", "Android 6",
"Openssl".
The validation team reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient
evidence and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the
evaluation was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the
conclusion reached by the evaluation team was justified.
10.7 Summary of Evaluation Results
The evaluation team’s assessment of the evaluation evidence demonstrates that the claims
in the ST are met. Additionally, the evaluation team’s testing also demonstrated the
accuracy of the claims in the ST.
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The validation team’s assessment of the evidence provided by the evaluation team is that it
demonstrates that the evaluation team followed the procedures defined in the CEM, and
correctly verified that the product meets the claims in the ST.
11 Validator Comments/Recommendations
References are made throughout the documentation regarding Mobile Device Management
Solutions, the consumer is reminded that although the product provides the capability to be
managed via a compatible MDM product, that functionality was not tested as part of this
evaluation and no claims can be made as to proper operation.
Additionally, the USB update method known as Software Repair Assistant (SRA) is
disabled in CC mode, therefore this functionality was not tested as a part of this evaluation
and no claims can be made as to proper operation.
The validators encourage the consumers of these products to understand the relationship
between the products and any functionality that may be provided via Mobile Device
Management solutions. This evaluation does not cover, nor does it endorse, the use of any
particular MDM solution and only the MDM interfaces of the products were exercised as
part of the evaluation.
Furthermore, to configure CC Mode, users need to obtain CC Mode APK from Kyocera or
Kyocera approved point of contacts. The usage of CC Mode application may be governed
by additional contracts/agreements regulated by Kyocera International Inc.
The Kyocera CC guide includes password history as part of the CC configuration.
Although maintaining password history is good practice, it is not required for CC
compliance.
12 Annexes
Not applicable
13 Security Target
The Security Target is identified as: Kyocera DuraForce PRO Mobile Device (MDFPP20)
Security Target, Version 1.0, January 5, 2017.
14 Glossary
The following definitions are used throughout this document:
 Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL). An IT security evaluation facility
accredited by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) and
approved by the CCEVS Validation Body to conduct Common Criteria-based
evaluations.
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 Conformance. The ability to demonstrate in an unambiguous way that a given
implementation is correct with respect to the formal model.
 Evaluation. The assessment of an IT product against the Common Criteria using the
Common Criteria Evaluation Methodology to determine whether or not the claims
made are justified; or the assessment of a protection profile against the Common
Criteria using the Common Evaluation Methodology to determine if the Profile is
complete, consistent, technically sound and hence suitable for use as a statement of
requirements for one or more TOEs that may be evaluated.
 Evaluation Evidence. Any tangible resource (information) required from the sponsor
or developer by the evaluator to perform one or more evaluation activities.
 Feature. Part of a product that is either included with the product or can be ordered
separately.
 Target of Evaluation (TOE). A group of IT products configured as an IT system, or
an IT product, and associated documentation that is the subject of a security evaluation
under the CC.
 Validation. The process carried out by the CCEVS Validation Body leading to the
issue of a Common Criteria certificate.
 Validation Body. A governmental organization responsible for carrying out validation
and for overseeing the day-to-day operation of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation
and Validation Scheme.
15 Bibliography
The Validation Team used the following documents to produce this Validation Report:
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation: Part 1:
Introduction and General Model, Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012.
[2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security
functional components, Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012.
[3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security
assurance components, Version 3.1 Revision 4, September 2102.
[4] Protection Profile For Mobile Device Fundamentals, Version 2.0, 17 September
2014
[5] Kyocera DuraForce PRO Mobile Device (MDFPP20) Security Target, version 1.0,
January 5, 2017 (ST)
[6] Assurance Activity Report (MDFPP20) for Kyocera DuraForce PRO Mobile
Device, version 0.3, January 5, 2017 (AAR)
[7] Detailed Test Report (MDFPP20) for Kyocera DuraForce PRO Mobile Device,
version 0.2, October 27, 2016 (DTR)
[8] Evaluation Technical Report for Kyocera DuraForce PRO Mobile Device, version
0.3, January 5, 2017 (ETR)
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[9] Kyocera DuraForce PRO Common Criteria Guidance Manual, version 1.1,
November 8, 2016