Certification Report
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
BSI-DSZ-CC-0204-2004
for
Infineon Smart Card IC (Security Controller)
SLE66C82P/m1474a15 and SLE66C42P/m1495a15
from
Infineon Technologies AG
- Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 228 9582-0, Fax +49 228 9582-455, Infoline +49 228 9582-111
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 228 9582-0 - Fax +49 228 9582-455 - Infoline +49 228 9582-111
BSI-DSZ-CC-0204-2004
Infineon Smart Card IC (Security Controller)
SLE66C82P/m1474a15 and
SLE66C42P/m1495a15
from
Infineon Technologies AG SOGIS-MRA
The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an accredited and licensed/
approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Part 1
Version 0.6, Part 2 Version 1.0 extended by advice of the Certification Body for components
beyond EAL4 and smart card specific guidance for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT
Security Evaluation, Version 2.1 (ISO/IEC 15408:1999) and including final interpretations for
compliance with Common Criteria Version 2.2 and Common Methodology Part 2, Version 2.2.
Evaluation Results:
PP Conformance: Protection Profile BSI-PP-0002-2001
Functionality: BSI-PP-0002-2001 conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance Package: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL5 augmented by:
ALC_DVS.2 (Life cycle support - Sufficiency of security measures),
AVA_MSU.3 (Vulnerability assessment - Analysis and testing for insecure
states),
AVA_VLA.4 (Vulnerability assessment - Highly resistant)
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated
configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme
of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation
facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
The notes mentioned on the reverse side are part of this certificate.
Bonn, 16. November 2004
The President of the Federal Office
for Information Security
Dr. Helmbrecht L.S.
The rating of the strength of functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms suitable for encryption
and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2)
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty
of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
BSI-DSZ-CC-0204-2004 Certification Report
V
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the
task of issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a
distributor, hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product
according to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised
security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the
BSI or by BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This
report contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the
detailed Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security
functionality of the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and
weaknesses) and instructions for the user.
1
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of
17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0204-2004
VI
Contents
Part A: Certification
Part B: Certification Results
Part C: Excerpts from the Criteria
Part D: Annexes
BSI-DSZ-CC-0204-2004 Certification Report
A-1
A Certification
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down
in the following:
• BSIG2
• BSI Certification Ordinance3
• BSI Schedule of Costs4
• Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal
Ministry of the Interior)
• DIN EN 45011 standard
• BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
• Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 2.15
• Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM)
- Part 1, Version 0.6
- Part 2, Version 1.0
• BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme
(AIS)
• Advice from the Certification Body on methodology for assurance
components above EAL4
The use of Common Criteria Version 2.1, Common Methodology, part 2,
Version 1.0 and final interpretations as part of AIS 32 results in compliance of
the certification results with Common Criteria Version 2.2 and Common
Methodology Part 2, Version 2.2 as endorsed by the Common Criteria
recognition arrangement committees.
2
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of
17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 7 July 1992,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-
Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 29th October 1992, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1838
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 22nd September 2000 in the
Bundesanzeiger p. 19445
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0204-2004
A-2
2 Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries
a mutual recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are
based on ITSEC or CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1 ITSEC/CC - Certificates
The SOGIS-Agreement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on
ITSEC became effective on 3 March 1998. This agreement was signed by the
national bodies of Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands,
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. This
agreement on the mutual recognition of IT security certificates was extended to
include certificates based on the CC for all evaluation levels (EAL 1 – EAL 7).
2.2 CC - Certificates
An arrangement (Common Criteria Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC evaluation assurance levels up to and including
EAL 4 was signed in May 2000. It includes also the recognition of Protection
Profiles based on the CC. The arrangement was signed by the national bodies
of Australia, Canada, Finland France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands,
New Zealand, Norway, Spain, United Kingdom and the United States. Israel
joined the arrangement in November 2000, Sweden in February 2002, Austria
in November 2002, Hungary and Turkey in September 2003, Japan in
November 2003.
BSI-DSZ-CC-0204-2004 Certification Report
A-3
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform
procedure, a uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The products Infineon Smart Card IC (Security Controller)
SLE66C82P/m1474a15 and SLE66C42P/m1495a15 have undergone the
certification procedure at BSI.
The evaluation of the products Infineon Smart Card IC (Security Controller)
SLE66C82P/m1474a15 and SLE66C42P/m1495a15 was conducted by TÜV
Informationstechnik GmbH, Prüfstelle IT-Sicherheit. The TÜV Informations-
technik GmbH, Prüfstelle IT-Sicherheit is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)6
recognised by BSI.
The sponsor, vendor and distributor is:
Infineon Technologies AG
Secure Mobile Solutions
St. Martin-Str. 76
81541 München, Germany
The certification is concluded with
• the comparability check and
• the production of this Certification Report.
This work was completed by the BSI on 16. November 2004.
The confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
• all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as
given in the following report, are observed,
• the product is operated in the environment described, where specified in
the following report.
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product indicated
here. The validity can be extended to new versions and releases of the product,
provided the sponsor applies for re-certification of the modified product, in
accordance with the procedural requirements, and the evaluation does not
reveal any security deficiencies.
For the meaning of the assurance levels and the confirmed strength of
functions, please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at the end of the
Certification Report.
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0204-2004
A-4
4 Publication
The following Certification Results contain pages B-1 to B-26 and D1 to D-4.
The products Infineon Smart Card IC (Security Controller) SLE66C82P
/m1474a15 and SLE66C42P/m1495a15 have been included in the BSI list of
the certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet: http://
www.bsi.bund.de). Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49
228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the vendor7
of
the product. The Certification Report can also be downloaded from the above-
mentioned website.
7
Infineon Technologies AG, Secure Mobile Solutions, P.O. Box 80 09 49, 81609 München,
Germany
BSI-DSZ-CC-0204-2004 Certification Report
B-1
B Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
• the security target of the sponsor for the target of evaluation,
• the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
• complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0204-2004
B-2
Contents of the certification results
1 Executive Summary 3
2 Identification of the TOE 10
3 Security Policy 12
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 13
5 Architectural Information 13
6 Documentation 14
7 IT Product Testing 14
8 Evaluated Configuration 15
9 Results of the Evaluation 15
10 Evaluator Comments/Recommendations 19
11 Annexes 21
12 Security Target 21
13 Definitions 21
14 Bibliography 24
BSI-DSZ-CC-0204-2004 Certification Report
B-3
1 Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) are the Infineon Smart Card IC (Security
Controller) SLE66C82P/m1474a15 and SLE66C42P/m1495a15. They provide a
hardware platform for a smart card to run smart card applications executed by a
smart card operating system.
The chip versions m1474a15 resp. m1495a15 are manufactured in Infineons IC
fabrication in Dresden, Germany, indicated by the production line indicator “2”.
The Infineon Smart Card IC (Security Controller) SLE66C82P/m1474a15 and
SLE66C42P/m1495a15 is a port of the SLE66CX320P architecture to a smaller
production technology, implemented in the 0,22 µm technology.
The hardware part of the TOE is the complete chip, composed of a processing
unit (CPU) with a memory management unit (MMU), several different memories
(256 bytes of internal RAM (IRAM), 2 kBytes of extended RAM (XRAM), 64
kBytes of user ROM, 8 kBytes of test ROM and 8 kBytes of EEPROM for the
SLE66C82P resp. 4 kBytes of EEPROM for the SLE66C82P), a security logic,
an interrupt module, a bus system, a timer, an interrupt-controlled I/O interface,
a Random Number Generator (RNG), a checksum module (CRC module) and a
module for cryptographic operations called DDC (providing the DES algorithm
and especially designed to counter attacks like DPA or EMA).
The EEPROM memory configuration is set by specific configuration data in the
EEPROM Security Area at production time.
The firmware part of the TOE consists of the RMS routines for EEPROM
programming and security function testing (Resource Management System, IC
Dedicated Support Software in Protection Profile [8]) and the STS which
consists of test and initialisation routines (Self Test Software, IC Dedicated Test
Software in Protection Profile [8]). The RMS routines are stored by the TOE
manufacturer in a reserved area of the normal user ROM. The STS routines are
stored in the protected test ROM, used for testing purposes during production
only and are not accessible for the user software.
The smart card operating system and the application stored in the User ROM
and in the EEPROM are not part of the TOE.
The TOE provides an ideal platform for applications requiring non-volatile data
storage. The TOE is intended for use in a range of high security applications,
including high speed security authentication, data encryption or electronic
signature. Several security features independently implemented in hardware or
controlled by software will be provided to ensure proper operations and integrity
and confidentiality of stored data. This includes for example measures for
memory protection, leakage protection and sensors to allow operations only
under specified conditions.
The Security Target is written using the Smartcard IC Platform Protection
Profile, Version 1.0, July 2001, BSI registration ID: BSI-PP-0002-2001 [8]. With
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0204-2004
B-4
reference to this Protection Profile, the smart card product life cycle is described
in 7 phases. The development, production and operational user environment
are described and referenced to these phases. TOE delivery is defined at the
end of phase 3 as wafers or phase 4 as modules.
The assumptions, threats and objectives defined in this Protection Profile [8] are
used. To address additional security features of the TOE (
e.g cryptographic
services), the security environment as outlined in the PP [8] is augmented by an
additional policy, an assumption and security objectives accordingly.
The IT product Infineon Smart Card IC (Security Controller) SLE66C82P
/m1474a15 and SLE66C42P/m1495a15 was evaluated against the claims of
the Security Target [6] by TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH, Prüfstelle IT-Sicher-
heit.
The evaluation was completed on 15. October 2004. The TÜV Informations-
technik GmbH, Prüfstelle IT-Sicherheit is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)8
recognised by BSI.
The sponsor, vendor and distributor is Infineon Technologies AG.
1.1 Assurance package
The TOE security assurance requirements are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in part 3 of the Common Criteria (see AnnexC or [1],
part 3 for details). The TOE meets the assurance requirements of assurance
level EAL5+ (Evaluation Assurance Level 5 augmented). The following table
shows the augmented assurance components.
Requirement Identifier
EAL5 TOE evaluation: Semiformally designed and tested
+: ALC_DVS.2 Life cycle support - Sufficiency of security measures
+: AVA_MSU.3 Vulnerability assessment - Analysis and testing for insecure
states
+: AVA_VLA.4 Vulnerability assessment - Highly resistant
Table 1: Assurance components and EAL-augmentation
1.2 Functionality
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) selected in the Security
Target are Common Criteria Part 2 extended as shown in the following tables.
8
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
BSI-DSZ-CC-0204-2004 Certification Report
B-5
The following SFRs are taken from CC part 2:
Security
Functional
Requirement
Identifier
Source
from PP or
added in ST
FCS Cryptographic support
FCS_COP.1
(DES)
Cryptographic operation ST
FCS_COP.1
(Triple-DES)
Cryptographic operation ST
FDP User data protection
FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control ST
FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control ST
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control PP
FDP_ITT.1 Basic internal transfer protection PP
FMT Security Management
FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes ST
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation ST
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions (see also
[4, AIS 32, Int065])
ST
FPT Protection of the TOE Security Functions
FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state PP
FPT_ITT.1 Basic internal TSF data transfer protection PP
FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to physical attack PP
FPT_SEP.1 TSF domain separation PP
FRU Resource utilisation
FRU_FLT.2 Limited fault tolerance PP
Table 2: SFRs taken from CC Part 2
The following CC part 2 extended SFRs are defined:
Security
Functional
Requirement
Identifier
Source
from PP or
added in ST
FAU Security Audit
FAU_SAS.1 Audit storage PP / ST
9
FCS Cryptographic support
FCS_RND.1 Quality metric for random numbers PP / ST
FMT Security management
9
PP/ST: component is described in the PP but operations are performed in the ST.
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0204-2004
B-6
Security
Functional
Requirement
Identifier
Source
from PP or
added in ST
FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities PP
FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability PP
FPT Protection of the TOE Security Functions
FPT_TST.2 Subset TOE testing ST
Table 3: SFRs CC part 2 extended
Note: Only the titles of the Security Functional Requirements are provided. For
more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 5.1.1 and 7.2.
These Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functions:
TOE Security
Functions
Description
SF1 Operating state checking
SF2 Phase management with test mode lock-out
SF3 Protection against snooping
SF4 Data encryption and data disguising
SF5 Random number generation
SF6 TSF self test
SF7 Notification of physical attack
SF8 Memory Management Unit (MMU)
SF9 Cryptographic support
Table 4: TOE Security Functions
SF1: Operating state checking
Correct function of the Infineon Smart Card IC (Security Controller)
SLE66C82P /m1474a15 and SLE66C42P/m1495a15 is only given in the
specified range. To prevent an attack exploiting that circumstance, it is
necessary to detect if the specified range is left.
All operating signals are filtered to prevent malfunction and the operation
state is monitored with sensors for the operating voltage, clock signal,
frequency, temperature and electromagnetic radiation.
SF2: Phase management with test mode lock-out
During start-up of the TOE the decision for the user mode or the test
mode is taken depending on several phase identifiers. If test mode is the
active phase, the TOE requests authentication before any action (test
mode lock-out).
BSI-DSZ-CC-0204-2004 Certification Report
B-7
The phase management is used to provide the separation between the
security enforcing functions and the user software. After TOE delivery the
TOE is set to user mode.
SF3: Protection against snooping
Several mechanisms, like topological design measures for disguise,
protect the TOE against snooping the design or the user data during
operation and even if it is out of operation (power down).
SF4: Data encryption and data disguising
The memory content of the TOE is encrypted on chip to protect against
data analysis on stored data as well as on internally transmitted data.
Only the key owner has the possibility to read out data. To prevent
interpretation of leaked information, randomness is inserted in the
information. This function is specifically effective to prevent DPA during
DES calculations.
SF5: Random number generation
Random data are essential for cryptography as well as for physical
security mechanisms. The TOE is equipped with a true random generator
based on physical probabilistic effects. The random data can be used
from the user software as well as from the security enforcing functions.
SF6: TSF self test
The TSF of the Infineon Smart Card IC (Security Controller) SLE66C82P
/m1474a15 and SLE66C42P/m1495a15 has a hardware controlled self-
test which can be started from the user software or is started directly to
test SF1, SF5 and SF7. Any attempt to modify the sensor devices will be
detected from the test.
SF7: Notification of physical attack
The entire surface of the TOE is protected with the active shield. Attacks
over the surface are detected when the shield lines are cut or get
contacted.
SF8: Memory Management Unit (MMU)
The MMU in the TOE gives the user software the possibility to define
different access rights for memory areas. In case of an access violation
the MMU will generate a non maskable interrupt (NMI). Then an interrupt
service routine can react on the access violation. The policy of setting up
the MMU and specifying the memory ranges is defined by the user
software.
SF9: Cryptographic Support
Cryptographic operations are provided by the TOE. The TOE is equipped
with a hardware accelerators to support the standard cryptographic
operation DES.
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0204-2004
B-8
As the final transition from test mode to user mode is performed before TOE
delivery, all TOE Security Functions are applicable from TOE delivery at the end
of phase 3 or 4 (depending on when TOE delivery takes place in a specific
case) to phase 7.
1.3 Strength of Function
The TOE’s strength of functions is claimed ‘high’ (SOF-high) for specific
functions as indicated in the Security Target [6, chapter 6]. The rating of the
strength of functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms suitable for
encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2) (see chapter
9 of this report).
1.4 Summary of threats and Organisational Security Policies (OSPs)
addressed by the evaluated IT product
The threats which were assumed for the evaluation and averted by the TOE
and the organisational security policies defined for the TOE are specified in the
Security Target [6] and can be summarised as follows.
It is assumed that the attacker is a human being or a process acting on behalf
of him.
So called standard high-level security concerns defined in the Protection Profile
[8] were derived from considering the end-usage phase (Phase 7 of the life
cycle as described in the Security Target) as follows:
• manipulation of User Data and of the smart card Embedded Software
(while being executed/processed and while being stored in the TOE’s
memories),
• disclosure of User Data and of the smart card Embedded Software (while
being processed and while being stored in the TOE’s memories) and
• deficiency of random numbers.
These high-level security concerns are refined in the Protection Profile [8] and
used by the Security Target [6] by defining threats on a more technical level for
• Inherent Information Leakage,
• Physical Probing,
• Physical Manipulation,
• Malfunction due to Environmental Stress,
• Forced Information Leakage,
• Abuse of Functionality and
• Deficiency of Random Numbers.
Phase 1 and the Phases from TOE Delivery up to the end of Phase 6 are
covered by assumptions (see below).
BSI-DSZ-CC-0204-2004 Certification Report
B-9
The development and production environment starting with Phase 2 up to TOE
Delivery are covered by an organisational security policy outlining that the IC
Developer / Manufacturer must apply the policy “Protection during TOE
Development and Production (P.Process-TOE)” so that no information is
unintentionally made available for the operational phase of the TOE. The Policy
ensures confidentiality and integrity of the TOE and its related design
information and data. Access to samples, tools and material must be restricted.
A specific additional security functionality for DES, Triple-DES and Memory
Access Control must be provided by the TOE according to an additional security
policy defined in the Security Target.
Objectives are taken from the Protection Profile plus additional ones related to
the additional policy.
1.5 Special configuration requirements
The TOE has two different operating modes, user mode and test mode. The
application software being executed on the TOE can not use the test mode. The
TOE is delivered as a hardware unit at the end of the IC manufacturing process
(Phase 3) or at the end of IC Packaging (Phase 4). At this point in time the
operating system software is already stored in the non-volatile memories of the
chip and the test mode is disabled.
Thus, there are no special procedures for generation or installation that are
important for a secure use of the TOE. The further production and delivery
processes, like the Smart Card Finishing Process, Personalisation and the
Delivery of the smart card to an end user, have to be organised in a way that
excludes all possibilities of physical manipulation of the TOE.
There are no special security measures for the start-up of the TOE besides the
requirement that the controller has to be used under the well-defined operating
conditions and that the requirements on the software have to be applied as
described in the user documentation and chapter 10 of this Report.
1.6 Assumptions about the operating environment
Since the Security Target claims conformance to the Protection Profile [8], the
assumptions defined in section 3.2 of the Protection Profile are valid for the
Security Target of this TOE. With respect to the life cycle defined in the Security
Target, Phase 1 and the Phases from TOE Delivery up to the end of Phase 6
are covered by these assumptions from the PP:
The developer of the smart card Embedded Software (Phase 1) must ensure:
• the appropriate “Usage of Hardware Platform (A.Plat-Appl)” while
developing this software in Phase 1. Therefore, it has to be ensured, that
the software fulfils the assumptions for a secure use of the TOE. In
particular the assumptions imply that developers are trusted to develop
software that fulfils the assumptions.
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0204-2004
B-10
• the appropriate “Treatment of User Data (A.Resp-Appl)” while developing
this software in Phase 1. The smart card operating system and the smart
card application software have to use security relevant user data of the
TOE (especially keys and plain text data) in a secure way. It is assumed
that the Security Policy as defined for the specific application context of
the environment does not contradict the Security Objectives of the TOE.
Only appropriate secret keys as input for the cryptographic function of the
TOE have to be used to ensure the strength of cryptographic operation.
Protection during Packaging, Finishing and Personalisation (A.Process-Card) is
assumed after TOE Delivery up to the end of Phase 6, as well as during the
delivery to Phase 7.
The following additional assumption is assumed in the Security Target:
• Key-dependent functions (if any) shall be implemented in the smart card
Embedded Software in a way that they are not susceptible to leakage
attacks (A.Key-Function).
1.7 Disclaimers
The Certification Results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the
Certificate and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in
this Certification Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product
by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation
that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT
product by BSI or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2 Identification of the TOE
The following TOE deliverables are provided for a customer who purchases the
TOE:
No Type Identifier Release Date Form of Delivery
1 HW SLE66C82P Smart Card
IC
GDS-file-ID:
m1474a15 with
production line
indicator: “2”
(Dresden)
Wafer or packaged
module
resp.
SLE66C42P Smart Card
IC
GDS-file-ID:
m1495a15 with
production line
indicator: “2”
(Dresden)
Wafer or packaged
module
BSI-DSZ-CC-0204-2004 Certification Report
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No Type Identifier Release Date Form of Delivery
2 SW STS Self Test Software
(the IC Dedicated Test
Software)
V53.5E.12 Stored in Test ROM
on the IC
3 SW RMS Resource
Management System (the
IC Dedicated Support
Software)
V0.8 or
V1.3
Stored in reserved
area of User ROM on
the IC
4 DOC SLE66CxxxP
Security Controller
Family, Data Book [9]
08.04 Hardcopy and
pdf-file
5 DOC SLE66CxxxP
Products and Bondout
Confidential Errata and
Information Sheet [10]
07.04 Hardcopy and
pdf-file
6 DOC SLE66CxxxP
Security Controller
Family, Confidential
Instruction Set [11]
05.01 Hardcopy and
pdf-file
7 DOC Application Notes
[12] – [23]
Hardcopy and
pdf-file
Table 5: Deliverables of the TOE for both Infineon Smart Card IC (Security Controller)
SLE66C82P/m1474a15 and SLE66C42P/m1495a15
The hardware part of the versions of the TOE is identified by SLE66C82P
/m1474a15 and SLE66C42P/m1495a15 and the respective GDS-file. For
identification of a specific chip, the Chip Identification Number stored in the
EEPROM can be used (see [9, chapter 7]):
• The chip type byte identifies the different versions in the following
manner:
74 hex for SLE66C82/m1474a1(x) and
77 hex for SLE66C42P/m1495a1(x).
Using the additional detailed production parameter bytes, one can
reconstruct the last character (x) of the version number of a specific chip
via a data base system at Infineon Logistic Department.
• The STS is identified by its unique version number which is stored in
three additional control bytes of the Chip Identification Number.
• The RMS is identified by its unique version number. As the RMS is part
of the ROM mask, one can get the RMS version number for a specific
chip by using the ROM type bytes and asking the data base system at
Infineon Logistic Department.
• The first nibble of the batch number gives the production line indicator
which is "2" for both chips manufactured in Infineons IC fabrication in
Dresden, Germany.
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0204-2004
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Each of the chips SLE66C82P/m1474a15 and SLE66C42P/m1495a15 can
include different RMS firmware versions as indicated in table 5.
The delivery process from Infineon to their customers (to Phase 4 or Phase 5 of
the life- cycle) guarantees, that the customer is aware of the exact versions of
the different parts of the TOE as outlined above.
To ensure that the customer receives the evaluated version of the chip, either
• he has to personally pick up the TOE (IC on Wafers or as Modules) at the
Infineon Warehouse in Regensburg (VKL-Rgb) (see part D, annex A of this
report) or
• the TOE (IC on Wafers or as Modules) is sent as a secured transport by
specific haulage companies from the Infineon Warehouse in Regensburg
(VKL-Rgb) directly or via one of three distribution centers (DC E for Europe,
DC A for Asia and DC U for the United States) to the customer. The sender
informs the receiver that a delivery was started; after the delivery was
received it has to be checked according to the consignment notes and the
sender has to be informed immediately about result of the check.
TOE documentation is delivered either as hardcopy or as softcopy (encrypted)
according to defined mailing procedures.
Defined procedures at the development and production sites guarantee that the
right versions of the RMS and STS are implemented into a specific ROM mask
for a TOE IC.
3 Security Policy
The security policy of the TOE is to provide basic Security Functions to be used
by the smart card operating system and the smart card application thus provi-
ding an overall smart card system security. Therefore, the TOE will implement a
symmetric cryptographic block cipher algorithm to ensure the confidentiality of
plain text data by encryption and to support secure authentication protocols and
it will provide a random number generator.
As the TOE is a hardware security platform, the security policy of the TOE is
also to provide protection against leakage of information (e.g. to ensure the
confidentiality of cryptographic keys during DES and Triple-DES cryptographic
functions performed by the TOE), against physical probing, against
malfunctions, against physical manipulations and against abuse of functionality.
Hence the TOE shall:
• maintain the integrity and the confidentiality of data stored in the memory
of the TOE and
• maintain the integrity, the correct operation and the confidentiality of
Security Functions (security mechanisms and associated functions)
provided by the TOE.
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4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The smart card operating system and the application software stored in the
User ROM and in the EEPROM are not part of the TOE. The code in the Test
ROM of the TOE (IC Dedicated Test Software) is used by the TOE
manufacturer to check the chip function before TOE delivery. This was
considered as part of the evaluation under the CC assurance aspects ALC for
relevant procedures and under ATE for testing.
The TOE is delivered as a hardware unit at the end of the chip manufacturing
process (phase 3 of the life cycle defined) or at the end of the IC packaging into
modules (phase 4 of the life cycle defined). At these specific points in time the
operating system software is already stored in the non-volatile memories of the
chip and the test mode is completely disabled.
The smart card applications need the Security Functions of the smart card
operating system based on the security features of the TOE. With respect to
security the composition of this TOE, the operating system, and the smart card
application is important. Within this composition the security functionality is only
partly provided by the TOE and causes dependencies between the TOE
Security Functions and the functions provided by the operating system or the
smart card application on top. These dependencies are expressed by environ-
mental and secure usage assumptions as outlined in the user documentation.
Within this evaluation of the TOE several aspects were specifically considered
to support a composite evaluation of the TOE together with an embedded smart
card application software (i.e. smart card operating system and application).
This was necessary as Infineon Technologies AG is the TOE developer and
manufacturer and responsible for specific aspects of handling the embedded
smart card application software in its development and production environment.
For those aspects refer to part B, chapter 9.2 of this report.
The full evaluation results are applicable for TOE chips from the semiconductor
factory in Dresden, each labelled by the production line indicator „2“.
5 Architectural Information
The Infineon Smart Card IC (Security Controller) SLE66C82P/m1474a15 and
SLE66C42P/m1495a15 are integrated circuits (IC) providing a platform to a
smart card operating system and smart card application software. A top level
block diagram and a list of subsystems can be found within the TOE description
of the Security Target. The complete hardware description and the complete
instruction set of the SLE66C82P/m1474a15 and SLE66C42P/m1495a15 is to
be found in the Data Book [9] and other guidance documents delivered to the
customer, e.g. Confidential Instruction Set [11].
For the implementation of the TOE Security Functions basically the components
processing unit (CPU) with memory management unit (MMU), RAM, ROM,
EEPROM, security logic, interrupt module, bus system, Random Number
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Generator (RNG) and the module for cryptographic operations (DDC) of the
chip are used. Security measures for physical protection are realised within the
layout of the whole circuitry.
The Special Function Registers, the CPU instructions and the various on-chip
memories provide the interface to the software using the Security Functions of
the TOE.
The TOE IC Dedicated Test Software (STS), stored on the chip, is used for
testing purposes during production only and is completely separated from the
use of the embedded software by disabling before TOE delivery.
The TOE IC Dedicated Support Software (RMS), stored on the chip, is used for
EEPROM programming and Security Function testing. It is stored by the TOE
manufacturer in a reserved area of the normal user ROM and can be used by
the users embedded software.
6 Documentation
The documentation [9] – [23] is provided with the product by the developer to
the customer for secure usage of the TOE in accordance with the Security
Target.
Note that the customer who buys the TOE is normally the developer of the
operating system and/or application software which will use the TOE as hard-
ware computing platform to implement the software (operating system /
application software) which will use the TOE.
7 IT Product Testing
The tests performed by the developer were divided into four categories:
(i) tests which are performed in a simulation environment for analogue and
for digital simulations;
(ii) functional production tests, which are done as a last step of the
production process (phase 3) and, in case TOE delivery is at the end of
phase 4, additionally done as a last step of IC Packaging. These tests
are done for every chip to check its correct functionality;
(iii) qualification tests to release the TOE to production:
- used to determine the behaviour of the chip with respect to different
operating conditions (often also referred to as characterisation tests)
- special verification tests for Security Functions which were done with
samples of the TOE.
(iv) Layout tests by testing the implementation by optical control, in order to
verify statements concerning the layout design.
The developer tests cover all Security Functions and all security mechanisms
as identified in the functional specification, the high level design and the low
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level design. Chips from the production site in Dresden (see part D, annex A of
this report) were used for tests.
The evaluators could repeat the tests of the developer either using the library of
programs and the tools delivered to the evaluator or at the developers site.
They performed independent tests to supplement, augment and to verify the
tests performed by the developer by sampling. Besides repeating exactly the
developers tests, test parameters were varied and additional analysis was
done. Security features of the TOE realised by specific design and layout
measures were checked by the evaluators during layout inspections.
The evaluation provides evidence that the actual version of the TOE provides
the Security Functions as specified by the developer. The test results confirm
the correct implementation of the TOE Security Functions.
For penetration testing the evaluators took all Security Functions into
consideration. Intensive penetration testing was planned based on the analysis
results and performed to consider the physical tampering of the TOE and side
channel testing using highly sophisticated equipment and expertised know how.
8 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is identified by the versions Infineon Smart Card IC (Security
Controller) SLE66C82P/m1474a15 and SLE66C42P/m1495a15 and each with
production line indicator “2” (Dresden). Each version has only one fixed
evaluated configuration at the time of delivery.
All information of how to use the TOE and its Security Functions by the software
is provided within the user documentation.
The TOE has two different operating modes, user mode and test mode. The
application software being executed on the TOE can not use the test mode.
Thus, the evaluation was mainly performed in the user mode. For all evaluation
activities performed in test mode, there was a rationale why the results are valid
for the user mode, too.
9 Results of the Evaluation
9.1 Evaluation of the TOE
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR), [7] was provided by the ITSEF
according to the Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of
the Scheme [3] and all interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as
relevant for the TOE.
The evaluation methodology CEM [2] was used for those components identical
with EAL4. For components beyond EAL4 the methodology was defined in co-
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ordination with the Certification Body [
4, AIS 34]). For smart card IC specific
methodology the CC supporting documents
(i) The Application of CC to Integrated Circuits
(ii) Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards and
(iii) ETR-lite – for Composition and
ETR-lite – for Composition: Annex A Composite smartcard evaluation:
Recommended best practice
(see [4, AIS 25, AIS 26 and AIS 36]) and [4, AIS 31] (Functionality classes and
evaluation methodology for physical random number generators) were used.
The assurance refinements outlined in the Security Target [6] were followed in
the course of the evaluation of the TOE.
The verdicts for the CC, Part 3 assurance components (according to EAL5
augmented and the class ASE for the Security Target evaluation) are
summarised in the following table.
Assurance classes and components Verdict
Security Target evaluation CC Class ASE PASS
TOE description ASE_DES.1 PASS
Security environment ASE_ENV.1 PASS
ST introduction ASE_INT.1 PASS
Security objectives ASE_OBJ.1 PASS
PP claims ASE_PPC.1 PASS
IT security requirements ASE_REQ.1 PASS
Explicitly stated IT security requirements ASE_SRE.1 PASS
TOE summary specification ASE_TSS.1 PASS
Configuration management CC Class ACM PASS
Partial CM automation ACM_AUT.1 PASS
Generation support and acceptance procedures ACM_CAP.4 PASS
Development tools CM coverage ACM_SCP.3 PASS
Delivery and operation CC Class ADO PASS
Detection of modification ADO_DEL.2 PASS
Installation, generation, and start-up procedures ADO_IGS.1 PASS
Development CC Class ADV PASS
Semiformal functional specification ADV_FSP.3 PASS
Semiformal high-level design ADV_HLD.3 PASS
Implementation of the TSF ADV_IMP.2 PASS
Modularity ADV_INT.1 PASS
Descriptive low-level design ADV_LLD.1 PASS
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Assurance classes and components Verdict
Semiformal correspondence demonstration ADV_RCR.2 PASS
Formal TOE security policy model ADV_SPM.3 PASS
Guidance documents CC Class AGD PASS
Administrator guidance AGD_ADM.1 PASS
User guidance AGD_USR.1 PASS
Life cycle support CC Class ALC PASS
Sufficiency of security measures ALC_DVS.2 PASS
Standardised life-cycle model ALC_LCD.2 PASS
Compliance with implementation standards ALC_TAT.2 PASS
Tests CC Class ATE PASS
Analysis of coverage ATE_COV.2 PASS
Testing: low-level design ATE_DPT.2 PASS
Functional testing ATE_FUN.1 PASS
Independent testing – sample ATE_IND.2 PASS
Vulnerability assessment CC Class AVA PASS
Covert channel analysis AVA_CCA.1 PASS
Analysis and testing for insecure states AVA_MSU.3 PASS
Strength of TOE security function evaluation AVA_SOF.1 PASS
Highly resistant AVA_VLA.4 PASS
Table 6: Verdicts for the assurance components
The evaluation has shown that:
• the TOE is conform to the Smartcard IC Platform Protection Profile, BSI-
PP-0002-2001 [8]
• Security Functional Requirements specified for the TOE are Common
Criteria Part 2 extended
• the assurance of the TOE is Common Criteria Part 3 conformant, EAL5
augmented by ALC_DVS.2, AVA_MSU.3 and AVA_VLA.4
• The following TOE Security Functions fulfil the claimed Strength of
Function:
SF 2 (Phase management with test mode lock-out),
SF 3 (Protection against snooping) and
SF 4 (Data encryption and data disguising) including resistance of the
DES co-processor against Differential Power Analysis (DPA).
Therefore the scheme interpretations AIS 26 (see [4]) was used.
A Strength of Function rating for the RNG is not part of this certification.
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The rating of the strength of functions does also not include the
cryptoalgorithms suitable for encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 4,
Para. 3, Clause 2). This holds for
(i) the TOE Security Function SF9 -- which is
a) DES and Triple-DES encryption and decryption by the hardware co-
processor and
(ii) for other usage of encryption and decryption within the TOE.
For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production
environment see annex A in part D of this report.
The code in the Test ROM of the TOE (IC Dedicated Test Software) is used by
the TOE manufacturer to check the chip function before TOE delivery. This was
considered as part of the evaluation under the CC assurance aspects ALC for
relevant procedures and under ATE for testing.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the Infineon Smart Card IC
(Security Controller) SLE66C82P/m1474a15 and SLE66C42P/m1495a15
produced in the semiconductor factory in Dresden, each labelled by the
production line indicator „2“ within the chip identification number in the
EEPROM, and the firmware and software versions as indicated in table 5.
The validity can be extended to new versions and releases of the product or to
chips from other production and manufacturing sites, provided the sponsor
applies for re-certification of the modified product, in accordance with the
procedural requirements, and the evaluation of the modified product does not
reveal any security deficiencies.
9.2 Additional Evaluation Results
• The evaluation confirmed specific results of a previous smart card IC
evaluation regarding assurance aspects for the development and
production environment. This is outlined in part D of this report, annex A.
• To support a composite evaluation of the TOE together with a specific
smart card embedded software additional evaluator actions were
performed during the TOE evaluation. Therefore, the interface between
the smart card embedded software developer and the developer of the
TOE was examined in detail. These composition related actions
comprised the following tasks:
- Examination of the integration of the embedded software in the
configuration management system of the IC manufacturer for the
TOE.
This comprises the handling of the ROM-code, the related
acceptance and verification procedures with the customer and the
assignment to a unique commercial type identifier as well as the
handling of different ROM-code masks for the same smart card IC.
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- Examination of consistency of delivery and pre-personalisation
procedures.
This comprises the handling of specific delivery procedures and pre-
personalisation data with respect to the physical, technical and
organisational measures to protect these data as well as the
procedures to ensure the correct configuration of the TOE. In
addition, the production test related to customer specific items
including the integrity check of the customer ROM-code and the
personalisation process, were checked.
- Examination of the separation based on the unique commercial type
identifier and the related test and delivery procedures.
- Examination, that Infineon has implemented procedures to provide a
customer product related configuration list based on the general
configuration list [24] provided for the evaluation of the TOE
supplemented by the customer specific items including ROM-mask
labelling, specific development tools for embedded software
development and related customer specific deliveries and the
corresponding verification data generated by Infineon to be sent to
customer.
- Examination of aspects relevant for the user guidance documentation
of the TOE to use the TOE for a product composition.
10 Evaluator Comments/Recommendations
1. The operational documents [9] - [23] contain necessary information about
the usage of the TOE and have to be considered. In the following,
specific items are listed:
- It is possible to store data in the EEPROM without encryption, which
might constitute a risk in case an attacker is given the possibility to
read out this data. The operating system developer is responsible for
the use of all security functionality made available by the TOE and
controllable by him in such a way, that secure operation is
guaranteed. These are the parameters for memory encryption
determining areas for the encryption. In the Data Book [9] it is pointed
out to the operating system developer, which effects on the security
not proper use of this functionality might have, and it is described in
detail, how to use effectively the security mechanisms made available
by the TOE.
- In case an alarm is triggered, the contents of the XRAM is not being
deleted. In order to prevent an attacker from reading out this data, the
embedded software has to delete explicitly the XRAM after each reset
(see [9], chapter 7).
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- The delivered MMU is set so, that the Infineon Smart Card IC (Security
Controller) SLE66C82P/m1474a15 and SLE66C42P/m1495a15 are
compatible with SLECX160S, i.e. all ROM areas are mapped. Since
the movec blockade of the SLE66CX160S is no longer implemented,
in this setting reading out of the ROM by a programme in the
EEPROM is possible. In order to avoid this, the operating system
developer has to programme the MMU in a way that reading out is
impossible. This fact is pointed out in the Data Book [9, chapter 19].
- ROM contents of chips, being manufactured with the same user mask
are identically encrypted. This leads to the possibility to carry out
ROM read out attacks using as many samples as available and
combining all results. Therefore, it is recommended to store security
critical data (e.g. identification and authentication data) not in the
ROM, but in the EEPROM (this is encrypted chip individually). This
fact is pointed out to the operating system developer in application
note [15].
- In order to protect the TOE against attacks on power consumption
(e.g. DPA), the wait states functionality in connection with the random
number generator and additional features to modify the current profile
have to be used by the operating system developer, together with
additional software measures, as described in [9, chapter 19].
- The TOE contains a random number generator (RNG). The
application software developer has to implement tests before the use
of the RNG. These tests and the generation process of random
numbers shall be connected in a way which ensures that the quality
of the random numbers cannot be affected even by a defect of the
RNG.
Random numbers used for the tests shall be kept confidential by the
application software, especially if some of those numbers are used as
data for key generation afterwards.
If tests fail, random numbers shall not be used by the application
software. In order to ensure that the RNG is not defect after the
random numbers for key generation were produced, tests should be
repeated after the key generation and keys shall only be used if tests
do not fail.
As no Strength of Function claim is confirmed for the RNG according
to [4, AIS 31], the evaluator of a composite product has to take this
into account.
- The TOE has an active shielding for the identification of attacks by
means of physical probing. It is possible for the operating system
developer to configure the active shielding (see application note [16]).
It is recommended to change the configuration of the active shielding
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before any security critical operation and to compare the returned
values with the expected values accordingly.
2. Additionally, for secure usage of the TOE the fulfilment of the
assumptions about the environment in the Security Target has to be
taken into account (see part B, chapter 1.6 of this report). For example,
the development environment of the operating system developer has to
be secure, in order to be able to guarantee the security of the TOE on the
whole. For measures important for A.Key-Function refer to [14].
3. For evaluations of products or systems including the TOE as a part or
using the TOE as a platform (for example smart card operating systems
or complete smart cards), specific information resulting from this
evaluation is of importance and shall be given to the succeeding
evaluation. A document ETR-lite according to AIS 36 [4] was not
generated in the course of this evaluation.
4. As an outcome of this evaluation, the customer has to follow the
evaluated delivery procedures (see chapter 2 above). In case of differing
delivery procedures, these have to be evaluated in the course of the
operating system evaluation or the smart card composite product
evaluation.
As the TOE is under control of the user software and depending on the
security policy of the embedded software or the composite smart card,
the Embedded Software Developer may include additional mechanisms
in the software which allows detection of modifications after the delivery.
The Smartcard Embedded Software Developer should not accept
deliverables from Infineon he had not requested. All information send in
electronic form has to be accepted only in encrypted form.
11 Annexes
Annex A: Evaluation results regarding the development and production
environment (see part D of this report).
12 Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [6] of the Target of Evaluation
(TOE) is provided within a separate document.
13 Definitions
13.1 Acronyms
ACE Advanced Crypto Engine
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BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal
Office for Information Security
CBC Cipher Block Chaining
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
DES Data Encryption Standard; symmetric block cipher algorithm
DPA Differential Power Analysis
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ECB Electrical Code Block
EEPROM Electrically Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory
EMA Electro magnetic analysis
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
IC Integrated Circuit
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
PP Protection Profile
RAM Random Access Memory
RNG Random Number Generator
ROM Read Only Memory
RSA Rivest, Shamir, Adelmann – a public key encryption algorithm
SF Security Function
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SOF Strength of Function
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
Triple-DES Symmetric block cipher algorithm based on the DES
TSC TSF Scope of Control
TSF TOE Security Functions
TSP TOE Security Policy
TSS TOE Summary Specification
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13.2 Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more assurance component(s) from CC
Part 3 to an EAL or assurance package.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not
contained in part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the
CC.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics
based on well-established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - An entity within the TSC that contains or receives information and
upon which subjects perform operations.
Protection Profile - An implementation-independent set of security require-
ments for a category of TOEs that meet specific consumer needs.
Security Function - A part or parts of the TOE that have to be relied upon for
enforcing a closely related subset of the rules from the TSP.
Security Target - A set of security requirements and specifications to be used
as the basis for evaluation of an identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined
semantics.
Strength of Function - A qualification of a TOE security function expressing
the minimum efforts assumed necessary to defeat its expected security
behaviour by directly attacking its underlying security mechanisms.
SOF-basic - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that
the function provides adequate protection against casual breach of TOE
security by attackers possessing a low attack potential.
SOF-medium - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows
that the function provides adequate protection against straightforward or
intentional breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a moderate attack
potential.
SOF-high - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that
the function provides adequate protection against deliberately planned or
organised breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a high attack
potential.
Subject - An entity within the TSC that causes operations to be performed.
Target of Evaluation - An IT product or system and its associated
administrator and user guidance documentation that is the subject of an
evaluation.
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TOE Security Functions - A set consisting of all hardware, software, and
firmware of the TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the
TSP.
TOE Security Policy - A set of rules that regulate how assets are managed,
protected and distributed within a TOE.
TSF Scope of Control - The set of interactions that can occur with or within a
TOE and are subject to the rules of the TSP.
14 Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 2.1, August 1999
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
(CEM), Part 1, Version 0.6; Part 2: Evaluation Methodology, Version 1.0,
August 1999
[3] BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS), Bundesamt
für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Bonn, as relevant for the TOE.
specifically
- AIS 25, Version 2, 29 July 2002 for: CC Supporting Document, -
The Application of CC to Integrated Circuits, Version 1.2, July
2002
- AIS 26, Version 2, 6 August 2002 for: CC Supporting Document, -
Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards, Version 1.1, July
2002
- AIS 31, Version 1, 25 Sept. 2001 for: Functionality classes and
evaluation methodology of physical random number generators
- AIS 32, Version 1, 02 July 2001, Übernahme international
abgestimmter CC-Interpretationen ins deutsche Zertifizierungs-
schema.
- AIS 34, Version 1.00, 1 June 2004, Evaluation Methodology for
CC Assurance Classes for EAL5+
- AIS 36, Version 1, 29 July 2002 for: CC Supporting Document,
ETR-lite for Composition, Version 1.1, July 2002 and
CC Supporting Document, ETR-lite for Composition: Annex A
Composite smartcard evaluation, Version 1.2 March 2002
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148, BSI 7149), periodically
updated list published also on the BSI Web-site
[6] Infineon Technologies AG, Security and Chipcard ICs,
SLE66C82P/SLE66C42P / m1474/m1495, Security Target, Version 1.2,
23. October 2003
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[7] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 1.5, 12 October 2004, for the
Product Smart Card IC (Security Controller) SLE66C82P/SLE66C42P /
m1474/m1495, (confidential document)
[8] Smartcard IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, July 2001, BSI
registration ID: BSI-PP-0002-2001, developed by Atmel Smart Card ICs,
Hitachi Ltd., Infineon Technologies AG, Philips Semiconductors
[9] Infineon Technologies AG, Security and Chipcard ICs, SLE 66CxxxP
Security Controller Family, Data Book Version 08.04, (confidential
document)
[10] SLE66CxxxP, Products and Bondout Errata Sheet, Version 07.04,
(confidential document)
[11] SLE66CxxxP, Security Controller Family, Confidential Instruction Set,
05.01, (confidential document)
[12] Confidential Application Note, SLE66CxxxP, Transfer of a ROM M
ask
from SLE66CxxS to SLE66CxxxP, Version 06.01
[13] Confidential Application Note, SLE66CxxxP, Testing the RNG, Version
09.00
[14] Confidential Application Note, SLE66xxxP, DDES – EC2, Accellerator,
Version 02.2004
[15] Confidential Application Note, SLE66CxxxP, Memory Encryption
Decryption, Version 07.00
[16] Confidential Application Note, SLE66CxxxP, Using the active shield
security feature, Version 01.02
[17] Confidential Application Note, SLE66CxxxP, Issues concerning
EEPROM, Version 08.00
[18] Confidential Application Note, MMU-Memory Management Unit, Version
08.00
[19] Confidential Application Note, SLE66CxxxP, Fast Switching of PLL,
Version 03.03
[20] Confidential Application Note, Security Advice – SLE11/22/44/66CxxxS/
66CxxxP, Version 10.00
[21] Confidential Application Note, SLE66CxxS, Secure Hash Algorithm SHA-
1, Version 01.98
[22] Confidential Application Note, SLE66CxxxP, UART, Version 10.03
[23] Confidential Application Note, SLE66CxxS, SLE66CxxxP, Using the
CRC, Version 03.01
[24] Infineon Technologies AG, Secure Mobile Solutions,
SLE66C82P/SLE66C42P / m1474/m1495 Configuration Management
Scope (ACM_SCP), Version 1.2, 07. October 2004 (i.e. TOE
Configuration List, confidential document)
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C Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part 1:
Caveats on evaluation results (chapter 5.4) / Final Interpretation 008
The conformance result indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is
met by a TOE or PP that passes its evaluation. This conformance result is presented
with respect to Part 2 (functional requirements), Part 3 (assurance requirements) and, if
applicable, to a pre-defined set of requirements (e.g., EAL, Protection Profile).
The conformance result consists of one of the following:
Part 2 conformant - A PP or TOE is Part 2 conformant if the functional requirements
are based only upon functional components in Part 2
Part 2 extended - A PP or TOE is Part 2 extended if the functional requirements
include functional components not in Part 2
plus one of the following:
Part 3 conformant - A PP or TOE is Part 3 conformant if the assurance requirements
are based only upon assurance components in Part 3
Part 3 extended - A PP or TOE is Part 3 extended if the assurance requirements
include assurance requirements not in Part 3.
Additionally, the conformance result may include a statement made with respect to sets
of defined requirements, in which case it consists of one of the following:
Package name Conformant - A PP or TOE is conformant to a pre-defined named
functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the requirements (functions or
assurance) include all components in the packages listed as part of the conformance
result.
Package name Augmented - A PP or TOE is an augmentation of a pre-defined
named functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the requirements (functions
or assurance) are a proper superset of all components in the packages listed as part of
the conformance result.
Finally, the conformance result may also include a statement made with respect to
Protection Profiles, in which case it includes the following:
PP Conformant - A TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the
conformance result.
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CC Part 3:
Assurance categorisation (chapter 2.5)
„The assurance classes, families, and the abbreviation for each family are shown in
Table 2.1.
Assurance Class Assurance Family Abbreviated Name
Class ACM:
Configuration
management
CM automation ACM_AUT
CM capabilities ACM_CAP
CM scope ACM_SCP
Class ADO: Delivery
and operation
Delivery ADO_DEL
Installation, generation and start-up ADO_IGS
Class ADV:
Development
Functional specification ADV_FSP
High-level design ADV_HLD
Implementation representation ADV_IMP
TSF internals ADV_INT
Low-level design ADV_LLD
Representation correspondence ADV_RCR
Security policy modeling ADV_SPM
Class AGD: Guidance
documents
Administrator guidance AGD_ADM
User guidance AGD_USR
Class ALC: Life cycle
support
Development security ALC_DVS
Flaw remediation ALC_FLR
Life cycle definition ALC_LCD
Tools and techniques ALC_TAT
Class ATE: Tests Coverage ATE_COV
Depth ATE_DPT
Functional tests ATE_FUN
Independent testing ATE_IND
Class AVA:
Vulnerability
assessment
Covert channel analysis AVA_CCA
Misuse AVA_MSU
Strength of TOE security functions AVA_SOF
Vulnerability analysis AVA_VLA
Table 2.1 -Assurance family breakdown and mapping“
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Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 6)
„The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances
the level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of
assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE
at the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the
operational use of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from Part 3 are included in
the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable
assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be
considered for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide
utility.
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 6.1)
Table 6.1 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically
ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the
resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.
As outlined in the next section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance
levels are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance. They are hierarchically
ordered inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The
increase in assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a
hierarchically higher assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e.
increasing rigour, scope, and/or depth) and from the addition of assurance components
from other assurance families (i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as
described in chapter 2 of this Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than
one component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every
component are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of
assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation“ allows the addition of assurance
components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the
substitution of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance
component in the same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs
defined in the CC, only EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a
constituent assurance component“ is not recognised by the CC as a valid claim.
Augmentation carries with it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility
and added value of the added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be
extended with explicitly stated assurance requirements.
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Assurance
Class
Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL1 EAL2 EAL3 EAL4 EAL5 EAL6 EAL7
Configuration
management
ACM_AUT 1 1 2 2
ACM_CAP 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
ACM_SCP 1 2 3 3 3
Delivery and
operation
ADO_DEL 1 1 2 2 2 3
ADO_IGS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Development ADV_FSP 1 1 1 2 3 3 4
ADV_HLD 1 2 2 3 4 5
ADV_IMP 1 2 3 3
ADV_INT 1 2 3
ADV_LLD 1 1 2 2
ADV_RCR 1 1 1 1 2 2 3
ADV_SPM 1 3 3 3
Guidance
documents
AGD_ADM 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AGD_USR 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life cycle
support
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 2 2 3
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3
Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3
ATE_DPT 1 1 2 2 3
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_CCA 1 2 2
AVA_MSU 1 2 2 3 3
AVA_SOF 1 1 1 1 1 1
AVA_VLA 1 1 2 3 4 4
Table 6.1 - Evaluation assurance level summary“
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Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 6.2.1)
„Objectives
EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the
threats to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent
assurance is required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with
respect to the protection of personal or similar information.
EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including
independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance
documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could be successfully
conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner
consistent with its documentation, and that it provides useful protection against
identified threats.“
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 6.2.2)
„Objectives
EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design
information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the
developer than is consistent with good commercial practice. As such it should not
require a substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require
a low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready
availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when
securing legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.“
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked
(chapter 6.2.3)
„Objectives
EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive
security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound
development practices.
EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation
of the TOE and its development without substantial re-engineering.“
Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and
reviewed (chapter 6.2.4)
„Objectives
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security
engineering based on good commercial development practices which, though rigorous,
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do not require substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL4 is the
highest level at which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing
product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require
a moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity
TOEs and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.“
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested
(chapter 6.2.5)
„Objectives
EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering
based upon rigorous commercial development practices supported by moderate
application of specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be
designed and developed with the intent of achieving EAL5 assurance. It is likely that
the additional costs attributable to the EAL5 requirements, relative to rigorous
development without the application of specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require
a high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a
rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to
specialist security engineering techniques.“
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and
tested (chapter 6.2.6)
„Objectives
EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security
engineering techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a
premium TOE for protecting high value assets against significant risks.
EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in
high risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional
costs.“
Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 6.2.7)
„Objectives
EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely
high risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs.
Practical application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security
functionality that is amenable to extensive formal analysis.“
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Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF) (chapter 14.3)
AVA_SOF Strength of TOE security functions
„Objectives
Even if a TOE security function cannot be bypassed, deactivated, or corrupted, it may
still be possible to defeat it because there is a vulnerability in the concept of its
underlying security mechanisms. For those functions a qualification of their security
behaviour can be made using the results of a quantitative or statistical analysis of the
security behaviour of these mechanisms and the effort required to overcome them. The
qualification is made in the form of a strength of TOE security function claim.“
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA) (chapter 14.4)
AVA_VLA Vulnerability analysis
„Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether vulnerabilities identified,
during the evaluation of the construction and anticipated operation of the TOE or by
other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses), could allow users to violate the TSP.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that a user will be able to discover flaws
that will allow unauthorised access to resources (e.g. data), allow the ability to interfere
with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users.“
„Application notes
A vulnerability analysis is performed by the developer in order to ascertain the
presence of security vulnerabilities, and should consider at least the contents of all the
TOE deliverables including the ST for the targeted evaluation assurance level. The
developer is required to document the disposition of identified vulnerabilities to allow
the evaluator to make use of that information if it is found useful as a support for the
evaluator's independent vulnerability analysis.“
„Independent vulnerability analysis goes beyond the vulnerabilities identified by the
developer. The main intent of the evaluator analysis is to determine that the TOE is
resistant to penetration attacks performed by an attacker possessing a low (for
AVA_VLA.2), moderate (for AVA_VLA.3) or high (for AVA_VLA.4) attack potential.“
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D Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Evaluation results regarding development
and production environment D-3
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Annex A of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0204-2004
Evaluation results regarding
development and production
environment
The IT product, Infineon Smart Card IC (Security Controller) SLE66C82P/m1474a15
and SLE66C42P/m1495a15 (Target of Evaluation, TOE) has been evaluated at an
accredited and licensed/ approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology
for IT Security Evaluation, Part 1 Version 0.6, Part 2 Version 1.0, extended by advice of
the Certification Body for components beyond EAL4 and smart card specific guidance,
for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.1
(ISO/IEC15408: 1999) and including final interpretations for compliance with Common
Criteria Version 2.2 and Common Methodology Part 2, Version 2.2.
As a result of the TOE certification, dated 16. November 2004, the following results
regarding the development and production environment apply. The Common Criteria
assurance requirements
• ACM – Configuration management (i.e. ACM_AUT.1, ACM_CAP.4, ACM_SCP.3),
• ADO – Delivery and operation (i.e. ADO_DEL.2, ADO_IGS.1) and
• ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC_DVS.2, ALC_LCD.2, ALC_TAT.2),
are fulfilled for the development and production sites of the TOE listed below ((a) – (d)):
(a) Infineon Technologies AG, Königsbrücker Str. 180, 01099 Dresden, Germany
(semiconductor factory)
(b) Infineon TechnologiesAG, St.-Martin-Straße 76, 81541 München, Germany
(development center)
(c) Infineon Technologies AG, Leibnizstraße 6, D-93055 Regensburg, Germany
(IC packaging into modules and warehouse and delivery center)
(d) Infineon Technologies AG, Development Center Graz, Babenbergerstr. 10,
A-8020 Graz, Austria (development center)
The hardware part of the TOE produced in the semiconductor factory in Dresden is labelled
by the production line indicator „2“.
For all sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied for each site
and in accordance with the Infineon Technologies AG, Security and Chipcard ICs,
SLE66C82P/SLE66C42P / m1474/m1495, Security Target, Version 1.2, 23. October
2003 [6]. The evaluators verified, that the threats are countered and the security
objectives for the life cycle phases 2, 3 and 4 up to delivery at the end of phase 3 or 4
as stated in the TOE Security Target are fulfilled by the procedures of these sites.
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